Ocean & Coastal Management 115 (2015) 71e76

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Ocean & Coastal Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman

Back off, man, I'm a scientist! When marine conservation science

meets policy
Naomi A. Rose a, E.C.M. Parsons b, *
a
b

Animal Welfare Institute, Washington DC, USA

Department of Environmental Science & Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 4 January 2015
Received in revised form
24 April 2015
Accepted 27 April 2015

There is often a basic tension at the boundary between science and policy e the former seeks unbiased,
objective descriptions of reality, while the latter must incorporate various factors in its development,
including values, ideologies, economics, biases, and emotions. Problems may arise if, and when, marine
scientists who enter the policy arena fail to understand these differing priorities, and we describe some
common pitfalls. Various strategies are presented for marine conservation scientists to consider in order
to avoid or minimize misunderstandings, especially with the media. Conict of interest issues and public
perception of bias are also addressed, as is misuse of research results and whether scientists have an
obligation to correct misrepresentation of their research. Finally, we consider how marine scientists
should address the inherent uncertainty in their results when those results are used to develop policy,
including the importance of incorporating the Precautionary Principle when making science-based
policy.
2015 Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Keywords:
Marine conservation
Policy
Advocacy
Advice
Policy engagement
Precautionary principle

1. Introduction
Conservation scientists have long debated whether they should
advocate for their science (Lackey, 2007; Noss, 2007; Chan, 2008;
Nelson and Vucetich, 2009; Parsons, 2013), but in recent years attitudes have changed. The need for marine conservation scientists
and their professional societies to become more engaged with
managers and policy-makers is now generally recognized. However, policy is politics and politics is people. This means that when
governments determine conservation policy, values, ideologies,
economics, biases, and emotions are all factors to consider in the
decision-making, with varying degrees of relevance depending on
the issue. Politics and policy-makers often (usually) have a different
agenda from that of science, which seeks unbiased, objective descriptions of reality. Any marine scientist who chooses to get
involved in policy needs to understand this fundamental difference
from the outset or problems will ensue. While we encourage more
marine scientists to become involved in advocating for sciencebased policy decisions (see Parsons, 2013), here we offer a summary of the pitfalls that the unprepared may encounter when
entering the policy arena.

* Corresponding author. Department of Environmental Science & Policy, George

Mason University, MSN 5F2, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA, 22030-4444, USA.
E-mail address: ecm-parsons@earthlink.net (E.C.M. Parsons).

2. Marine scientists engaging in policy

Back off, man, I'm a scientist. Bill Murray as Dr. Peter Venkman
in the lm Ghostbusters
Scientists often believe that in order to make good natural resources policy, all that is needed is good science. For example, in
1998 a researcher posted on the marine mammal science listserve
MARMAM that [a]fter 20 years of work with and around marine
mammals I have come to the conclusion that there is only one thing
that will save them: research.
While science is a very important factor in policy-making
related to natural resources, in fact it is rarely the most important
e and is never the only e input that matters. Science can sometimes
take a protracted time to produce meaningful results and if only
bad policy is made in the meantime, a great deal of damage could
result.
Marine scientists who believe that good policy exclusively
hinges on science can develop an elevated or unrealistic sense of
their own importance e we would go so far as to call it arrogance e
which can hinder effective communication in the policy arena.
Policy-makers, no more than anyone else, do not like being
patronized. Academic arrogance, or even the perception of arrogance, can lead to chronic communications breakdowns.
Moreover, scientists often do not understand that many people,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.04.016
0964-5691/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

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N.A. Rose, E.C.M. Parsons / Ocean & Coastal Management 115 (2015) 71e76

including policy-makers, will ignore scientic evidence if it contradicts their core beliefs and values (Redlawsk, 2002;
Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Nyhan et al., 2014).
2.1. Policy-makers and science illiteracy
They say a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but it's not one
half so bad as a lot of ignorance Pratchett (1987, by Terry
Pratchett)
A major current example is the continuing public debate in the
United States as to whether climate change even exists (Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2012; Schneider, 2009), despite strong scientic evidence that it does and moreover is being caused by human activity
(IPCC, 2007; Lovejoy, 2014). Denying scientic facts is not unique to
climate change, however (Diethelm and McKee, 2009). There are
more egregious examples, such as politicians who do not believe in
evolution, ignoring the plethora of data to the contrary.
For example, Representative Paul Broun (R-GA), of the U.S.
Congress' House Committee on Science, Space and Technology,
once stated that all that stuff I was taught about evolution and
embryology and Big Bang theory, all that is lies straight from the pit
of hell (Associated Press, 2012). Rep. Broun holds a medical degree
and thus is one of the few members of Congress who has a science
background, yet he believes that the earth is only 9000 years old
(Associated Press, 2012). The former chair of the House Committee,
(former) Representative Bart Gordon (D-TN), explained that
[the current committee members] see science as a liberal plot,
to validate something they don't think is true. And climate
change is a good example (Anonymous, 2013; also see https://
whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2014/12/04/im-no-scientistcolbert-on-republican-climate-change-denialism/).
Disregard of science in the United States is especially galling, as
the US Constitution states that Congress has a duty to promote the
Progress of Science (Article 1, Section 8). This statement actually
comes before Congressional power to declare war and to form a
navy. The current state of affairs would certainly horrify the scientists among the founders of the nation, such as Thomas Jefferson
and Benjamin Franklin (who was a Fellow of the Royal Society). This
is not a uniquely current occurrence, as Isaac Asimov, Boston University biochemistry professor, author, and science advocate
(1980), pointed out more than three decades ago:
There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has
always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant
thread winding its way through our political and cultural life,
nurtured by the false notion that my ignorance is just as good as
your knowledge.
However, no matter how many scientic facts are presented to
such policy-makers, their deeply held beliefs may cause them to
reject those that do not t within their world view. The likelihood
of scientists' changing these rmly held beliefs and values is
negligibly small. The incoming chair of the US Congressional
Environment and Public Works Committee is an infamous climate
change denier, who even published a book called The Greatest
Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future
(Inhofe, 2012). To write an entire book on how anthropogenic
climate change is not happening requires an author to ignore the
vast majority of peer-reviewed science on the issue and disregard
the opinion of scientists on a truly enormous scale. Therefore, it
may sometimes be necessary to reframe an argument and to present issues to such policy-makers in ways that avoid mention of
trigger topics such as climate change or evolution and in terms that

they understand and value, if the goal is to get their acceptance of

certain related information. For example, scientists could frame the
protection of whales not by extolling the importance of protecting
biodiversity or saving a majestic species, but by emphasizing their
contribution to tourism revenue generation and the associated
benets to coastal economies (Parsons et al., 2003).

Troublesome scientists
Here are three types of scientists who can create difficulties (rather than assist in solutions) when involving
themselves in policy debates and discussions.
The Nave Scientist
These scientists believe that if only policy-makers had the
right information, they would make the right decisions. They
do not understand the important human and legal dimensions of policy-making and make little attempt to interpret their work in that context. As one researcher stated in an
interview, If all sides devoted their resources to research
rather than to lawsuits, we could get some answers, but
without them, the lawsuits will continue (Madin, 2009).
The Ivory Tower Scientist
They believe that it is essential for scientists to remain
pure, to stay at arm's length from anything resembling
advocacy, even though they may also seek media attention
for their work. This may result in essential data not reaching
policy-makers, resulting in poor decisions. Or, even worse,
their research is mischaracterized or misunderstood and
they make no attempt to correct these misinterpretations
(see below). As a researcher once told one of the authors
(Rose): I can't be held responsible for the policy implications of my work.
The Industry Scientist
They work directly for special interests, but expect their
science (even when not peer-reviewed) to be accepted as
objective. They either do not understand their conflicts of
interest, or ignore them. As one government scientist
emphatically stated in a policy meeting attended by one of
the authors (Rose), in response to a comment from a
participant that there was disagreement over industry
research results, Only if you disagree with science!

2.2. Communicating with policy-makers

A number of papers have been written on the skills and training
required by conservation biologists (Blockstein, 2002; Jacobson,
1990; Jacobson and Robinson, 1990; Cannon et al., 1996; Jacobson
and McDuff, 1998; Inouye and Dietz, 2000; Clark, 2001; Fisher
et al., 2009; Muir and Schwartz, 2009; Blickley et al., 2013;
Parsons, 2012) and they frequently point out the need to be able
to understand policy and communicate with policy-makers. However, scientists are often overcondent in their communication
skills, equating good teaching evaluations and conference presentations with wider communication skills. Scientists can
completely lose an audience of Congressional aides by explaining in
excruciating detail the theory and methodology of their studies,
instead of providing a brief summary of research conclusions and
public, economic and political implications of their work, about
which policy-makers care most (Parsons, 2013). Communications
training is important preparation for engaging in the policy arena

N.A. Rose, E.C.M. Parsons / Ocean & Coastal Management 115 (2015) 71e76

(Parsons, 2013) and there are books that can also assist; we
recommend Chapters 6e8 and 13 in Baron (2010) and Olson (2009).
Scientists can get involved in policy inadvertently or deliberately, but regardless they should recognize (and investigate) when
their research is likely to have policy implications. They should
prepare for worst-case scenarios e for example, how their work
could possibly be misinterpreted, or how the ndings could be
deliberately manipulated to promote a political agenda.
Scientists should also identify their goals in getting involved in
policy when they are doing so deliberately. For example, are they
seeking merely to provide objective information to policy-makers
or are they seeking to inuence a particular outcome? In our
opinion, remaining completely objective is an unrealistic goal;
nevertheless, many scientists think this is possible, reasonable, and
even desirable. Scientists are human beings and should recognize
that they have values and opinions (Noss, 2007). Arguably staying
uninvolved is not desirable and frequently not even possible,
especially given that many conservation scientists received their
training and conduct their research precisely because they value
the conservation of biodiversity and wildlife.
2.3. Should marine scientists even engage in policy?
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to
do nothing. Edmund Burke (Irish statesman and philosopher,
1729e1797)
Those who have the privilege to know, have the duty to act. Albert Einstein (1879e1955)
With all the pitfalls involved with scientists engaging in policy,
should they simply avoid the policy arena? We would argue that, as
marine scientists, we best understand the biology and ecology of
marine species, ecosystems and ecological processes, as well as the
uncertainty and caveats of research. Therefore, marine scientists
should become involved, as our input is vital to the protection of the
marine environment. The alternative is having those who do not
understand marine science interpreting research results. This could
lead to a Chinese whisper effect, with each stage of translation of
the translation of science to the policy-makers being oversimplied or distorted so that the policy-makers eventually
receive incorrect information. Marine scientists engaging with
policy helps research results arrive at a policy forum in a more
accurate and less ideologically-transformed format.
In the eld of conservation biology, arguably all research has
policy implications. However, even in less applied elds of marine
biology, research can have policy implications. Rose et al. (2011)
analyzed a broad selection of published cetacean science literature
(n 2812 papers) for the period 2005e2008. Of the papers that
focused on some aspect of cetacean biology or ecology, approximately 54% were on basic biology, while the rest were on
conservation-related topics. Given the necessarily somewhat subjective nature of determining whether a paper was focused on basic or
applied biology, this was likely an underestimate of the number of
studies undertaken to inform cetacean management or conservation
actions. This suggests that, given the often cryptic ecology and conservation status of many marine mammals, if one is working with
these taxa, then there are likely to be policy implications to one's
work, and similar situations are likely for other marine species, top
predators and/or biologically important habitats, such as rainforests.
3. Lost in translation
There are 435 members in the U.S. House of Representatives and

73

100 in the Senate. Currently, 25 Congressional members have some

type of medical degree, while six are engineers and three are scientists (one microbiologist and two physicists), for a total of 34
members with a background in a STEM discipline. Therefore less
than 10% of federal legislators have a background in science or
science training at the college or university level and thus can be
said to have a substantive understanding of science.
As an example, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), a
member of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, showed an illuminating (lack of) understanding of climate
science by stating in a hearing on UN climate policies, Is there some
thought being given to subsidizing the clearing of rainforests in order
for some countries to eliminate that production of greenhouse gases?
(Samuelsohn, 2011). Additionally, a low level of science literacy
among policy-makers is not unique to the United States (e.g.,
Goldstein, 2010). Therefore, expecting policy-makers to understand
complex scientic methods, results and principles is unrealistic,
although staffers often have the necessary background to understand these details.
Communications training can aid delivering a scientic message
to policy-makers, and also to the general public (Olson, 2009).
However, simply because a message is clear does not mean it will
be absorbed, especially when dealing with issues that are so
politically charged that policy-makers and journalists may lter
these messages and cherry pick statements that back their preconceived arguments (Wright et al., 2013a). Still, clarity of message
is often the exception rather than the rule.
The following example shows how one set of research results
was misunderstood by the media in two directly conicting ways.
Mooney et al. (2009) published on the impacts of simulated military sonar on captive dolphins. Two media headlines simultaneously stated:
Sonar doesn't appear to deafen dolphins (Thomas, 2009)
and
Military sonar blamed for deafness in dolphins (Hooper, 2009).
One should work to correct misinterpretation of one's ndings
whenever it occurs. Ideally, where appropriate, one should actively
promote a specic conservation goal (e.g., protection of habitat,
passage of legislation or regulations that benet wildlife), which is
difcult to misunderstand.
3.1. Do scientists have a responsibility to correct inaccurate
interpretations of their work?
What should happen if policy-makers and the media misunderstand or misrepresent research results (accidentally or deliberately)? Some scientists say it is not their responsibility to correct the
misinterpretations of others, but if these misunderstandings lead to
policy decisions and public opinions that are deleterious to conservation, then we and other scientists (for example, see also Karr,
2006) disagree. Some scientic societies specically direct their
members to correct misrepresentations of their work. For example,
the Society for Conservation Biology Code of Ethics calls for members to attempt to correct misrepresentation of their research by
others (http://www.conbio.org/SCB/Information/Ethics/).
Unfortunately, there are many examples where researchers
make no effort to correct the misuse of their results by politicians,
industry, non-governmental organizations, or others (alternatively,
when they do, there are times when they are ignored). Scientists
are often passive, not wanting to get involved in controversies. This
is an understandable human impulse, but in the case of science in
policy, it is troubling.

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4. Conicts of interest
Researchers should accept and anticipate that conicts of interest will occur on occasion, and that perceived conicts of interest
will occur even more often, rather than ignore, deny or reject the
possibility. Rejecting potential conicts will frequently merely
emphasize the perception that one exists and consequently that
one's data are biased.
Again, the Society for Conservation Biology calls for members to
disclose conicts of interest. Moreover, the (U.S.) National Research
Council describes the problem adeptly:
sponsors of research need to be aware that studies funded and
led by one special interest are vulnerable to concerns about conict
of interest. For example, research on the effects of smoking funded
by [the U.S. National Institutes of Health] is likely to be perceived to
be more objective than research conducted by the tobacco industry (National Research Council, 2000, p. 84).

Indeed, military representatives called the president and several

deans of the academic institution of one of the authors (Parsons),
noting the concerns he had expressed regarding the impacts of
military sonar on cetaceans in peer-reviewed papers, and further
noting that the Ofce of Naval Research funded several research
projects at this institution, in what was perceived as a not-terriblyveiled threat. Military ofcials also dictated which faculty could or
could not be on the graduate committees of students who were
actively serving in the military (Parsons, pers. obs.).
In the environmental consulting eld this has long been
recognized e the client often dictates the conclusions of a study,
because if a client is not pleased, contracts and funding are not
renewed (see Wright et al., 2013b). If one feels that speaking out
might affect funding, or might otherwise result in punishment,
then one does not have academic freedom and one's scientic
opinion is not truly independent.

5. The Precautionary Principle

These conict of interest perceptions might appear as common
sense when the issue is not related to one's own work, but when it
is, it may be difcult not to take the perception personally. This
impulse should be resisted. With tobacco, we can say, of course,
this is common sense. It is also common sense when the issue is
military sonar, the welfare of captive marine mammals, whaling or
marine oil and gas exploration impacts. Science coming from a user
group (e.g., industry, military) e or heavily funded by a user group
e is going to be perceived as biased. It is not a personal attack when
this is pointed out.
Unfortunately when it comes to perceptions of conicts of interest, there is often little that can be done to remedy these beyond
being honest and open to audiences, clearly disclosing the conict,
and experiencing a subsequent series of positive, objective interaction with audiences. Scientists need to accept that some audiences
will perceive a bias, and there is usually no way to eliminate initial
public perceptions. Therefore, as noted above, scientists should not
take this as a personal slight on their honor and integrity, but accept
that perceptions of bias will happen and take this in their stride.
4.1. The fallacy of the truly independent scientist
Many research funding sources have political strings attached.
For example, the U.S. Navy funds 70% of all marine mammal
research in the United States and 50% of marine mammal research
worldwide (Weilgart et al., 2004). Its funding is allocated according
to its policy priorities; likewise with major commercial funders
(e.g., the oil and gas industry). Although non-prot charity funding
is comparatively tiny, it too is used to advance an organization's
agenda, which is ideological and often political.
Even in the best case, research foundations have priorities set by
establishers and directors. These are often based on non-scientic
values and opinions. With so much funding being politically
motivated, it is difcult to identify scientists who are truly independent of political agendas. In addition to potential conicts of
interest, the fact that so much funding is politically motivated
means that ideas that do not directly address political goals cannot
be readily investigated.
However, conicts may be even more egregious, through direct
interference in research. There is evidence that the U.S. Navy has
used the threat of withdrawing funding to stie commentary from
academics (Whitehead and Weilgart, 1995; Weilgart et al., 2004).1

1
See also: Administrative Record, August 6e9, 2001, Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

The Precautionary Principle was introduced as part of the 1982

United Nations World Charter for Nature, and was incorporated
into the 1992 Rio Declaration (on Environment and Development),
the result of the so-called Earth Summit meeting. Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration described the Precautionary Principle as follows:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientic certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The European Union enshrines the Precautionary Principle in
environmental decision-making (European Union, 2000):
The precautionary principle applies where scientic evidence is
insufcient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientic
evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for
concern.
It is a tenet of the Precautionary Principle that interventions
(actions) are required to be put in place before actual harm occurs
to humans or the environment, and managers cannot simply wait
until there is scientic certainty or impacts occur (UNESCO, 2005).
However, in general a degree of initial scientic analysis is required
before the Precautionary Principle is invoked, and that there is a
plausible scientically valid concern (UNESCO, 2005). A good
example of how the Precautionary Principle can be used is in the
IPCC (2007) report, where scientically plausible predictions are
outlined on which policy-makers can base decisions.
However, it is an inside joke that a scientist's nal comment in a
presentation will be that more research/funding is needed. This is
often a researcher's default response about the impacts of an
environmental threat. Marine scientists are generally averse to
taking a precautionary approach; as an example of nonprecautionary thinking, one researcher noted, [I]n ve years,
researchers will know enough about beaked whale behavior in
response to sonar to allow the Navy to plan missions that have minimum impact on whales (Madin, 2009).
This comment focuses too much on science and not enough on
policy e it ignores the Precautionary Principle. Policy inertia, which
can lead to status quo conservation disasters that the Precautionary
Principle was formulated to avoid, can sometimes arise from scientists' natural caution in interpreting results.
Marine scientists carry a lot of weight in the policy arena, even
when they are not directly involved. Even a casual comment that
becomes public can have undue inuence on policy-makers. It is

N.A. Rose, E.C.M. Parsons / Ocean & Coastal Management 115 (2015) 71e76

also important to note that comments can be taken out of context

and then perpetuated, with the important caveats, exemptions and
critical explanations that should accompany these comments being
lost (Wright et al., 2013a).

6. In policy development, disagreement can be good

Disagreement can sometimes lead to better policy in the long
run and does not have to be perceived as conict. Disagreeing on
practical, real-time, cost-effective, and for that matter politically
viable application of research results to management is not the
same as disagreeing on (or ignoring) the results themselves. For
example, we and our colleagues published a paper that, among
other things, expressed concern about an over-reliance by policymakers on preliminary captive cetacean research results whose
applicability to wild animals was uncertain, and the captive animal
studies might be underestimating potential impacts on animals in
their natural environment (Parsons et al., 2008). Our original
commentary was not a rejection of those results, but the researchers responsible for them perceived it as such (Ridgway and
Houser, 2009; Wright et al., 2009). Interestingly, the defensive
marine scientists agreed with our assessment several years later
(Houser et al., 2013).
Far from impeding research, public pressure on policy-makers
and funding agencies often results in greater funding for research
(J. Reynolds, pers. comm.). Similarly, legal action to strengthen
environmental policy often indirectly increases funding for
research generally, by motivating user groups and agencies to meet
the standards of relevant environmental laws (Reynolds et al.,
2009).

75

 Anticipate where and how science might be misunderstood,

misinterpreted or taken out of context by policy-makers.
We recommend that more training in science communication,
at both the undergraduate and graduate level, be made available at
universities. This would include training in engaging with policymakers, addressing the media, and speaking to the lay public
(Olson, 2009; Parsons, 2012). Training should not only include
communication techniques, but it should also prepare scientists for
the pitfalls and obstacles that might be encountered when scientists engage in policy (Parsons, 2013). We urge our colleagues to
understand that even when science produces compelling results,
politicians will make political decisions, and be prepared for this
eventuality.
We also recommend that universities and academic bodies
consider introducing additional metrics to their evaluations of
conservation faculty and researcher success, including whether
research published in journals is used in policy-making or environmental intervention. In other words, ask not only Is a faculty
member's research published? but Is it cited in regulatory contexts? For example, are papers cited in environmental impact
studies, documents justifying endangered species listing, or protected area establishment? Such a real world impact could
become part of the faculty evaluation process. With universities
showing an increasing interest in the media impact of research e
via systems such as Altmetrics (www.altmetric.com) e it would be
a simple step to develop metrics that measure conservation
impacts.
It would be a very different, and better, world indeed if faculty
gained tenure not for the size of their grants or how many papers
they publish, but for the conservation and societal impact of their
research beyond the ivory tower, with scientists being rewarded,
instead of criticized, for producing marine science that matters.

7. Conclusion: engage in policy but recognize the pitfalls

Acknowledgments
Dark times lie ahead of us and there will be a time when we must
choose between what is easy and what is right. Albus Dumbledore in Rowling (2002)
You dont just give up. You dont just let things happen. You make a
stand! You say no! You have the guts to do whats right, even when
everyone else just runs away. Billie Piper as Rose Tyler in Doctor
Who
Marine scientists play an important e arguably essential e role
in providing scientic advice to policy-makers. However, sometimes regulatory decisions are only tenuously based on science.
This is not necessarily because science is being ignored or given low
priority, but rather because it is often a step (or more) behind
management needs. To avoid detrimental impacts to the environment, scientists should use a precautionary approach more
frequently. Waiting until overwhelming data are available before
suggesting conservation actions is ill-advised, as the wheels of
policy and regulatory change can move slowly and historically
conservation interventions have often been too late. Marine scientists giving their expert opinion can result in excellent sciencebased interim advice. If, for example, science eventually shows
that a protected area is larger than required, it is easier to reduce
the size of the area than it is to reintroduce the species populations
that are extirpated because the area was too small. In addition,
scientists engaging in the policy arena should take measures to:
 Understand policy and how policy-makers can misunderstand
science;
 Present science with policy implications carefully;

This paper was the product of an International Marine Conservation Congress (IMCC) workshop. We wish to thank participants in
the workshop and the IMCC organizers for their encouragement
and enthusiasm in this project. We also thank two anonymous
reviewers for their useful comments on draft versions of this
manuscript.
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