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Kenneth Burke
This is the basic polarity (like the traditional pair res and verba, things
and the words for things).
It's at the root of such distinctions as mind-body, spirit-matter,
superstructure- substructure, and Descartes' dualism, thought and extension.
I say "at the root of such distinctions" though no such terms quite
match the motion-action pair.
Thus we can begin by logologically secularizing the theological
(Thomistic) view of "matter" as the "principle of individuation."
The human body, in its nature as a sheerly physiological organism,
would thus be in the realm of matter, for which our term is "motion."
In that respect it would be like a fish or a tree or one of B. F.
Skinner's operationally conditioned pigeons.
But the use of such resources as a tribal language would be in the
realm of "action."
Action, as so defined, would involve modes of behavior made possible by the acquiring of a conventional, arbitrary symbol system, a definition that would apply to modes of symbolicity as different as primitive
speech, styles of music, painting, sculpture, dance, highly developed
mathematical nomenclatures, traffic signals, road maps, or mere dreams
(insofar as a dream is interpretable as "symbolic" of the dreamer's
"psyche," or whatever such term a psychologist might prefer to work
with).
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"principleof individuation."
I take it that, even if the "Self" were thought to merge into the
"Culture" as a whole, each member of the "Culture" would be thought of
as having in some way a "Self" different from each and every other
member.
It would be grounded in the realm of nonsymbolic motion and
would mature into what one would call a "person" in the realm of symbolic action.
So far as is known at present, the only typically symbol-using animal
existing on earth is the human organism.
The intuitive signaling systems in such social creatures as bees and
ants would not be classed as examples of symbolic action.
They are not conventional, arbitrary symbol systems such as human
speech, which is not inborn but has to be learned, depending upon
where the child happens to be "thrown," an accident of birth that determines whether the child learns Chinese, or French, or whatever idiom
may prevail in the given locality.
Symbol systems of that sort also differ from intuitive signaling systems in that they have a second-level (or "reflexive") aspect.
That is to say: they can talk about themselves.
Cicero could both orate and write a treatise on oratory. A dog can
bark but he can't bark a tract on barking.
Kenneth Burke is now developing the implications of the position
stated in the present essay. He is also editing his Symbolicof Motives,
a work designed to complement his Grammar of Motives and Rhetoric
of Motives. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Dancing
with Tears in My Eyes" (September 1974) and "Post-Poesque
Derivation of a Terministic Cluster" (Winter 1977). The first section of
"(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action" was presented at a symposium at New York University in May 1976 and will appear in a slightly
altered version in the report of those proceedings, Psychoanalysis,Criticism, and Creativity:A French-AmericanDialogue.
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Here figure the individual's relations to family, to groups, to everwidening and partially conflicting organizations such as church, business, political party, nation, "global" tentatives.
Here, in contrast with the immediaciesof the body, we confront for
our overall "reality" an indeterminately interwoven complexity of symbols, reports about local, national, and international affairs, about history, psychology, geology, astronomy, expectations true or false, promissory or forbidding, and so forth.
Though "reality," (the "world") as thus symbolically conceived, embraces a potential "universe of discourse" far beyond the realm of physiological sensation, the opportunities for such exercising (via resources in
the realm of "symbolic action") depend wholly on the realm of physiological motion (the basic conditions that determine whether the individual
organism lives or dies).
In sum, when to the principle of individuation (involving the underlying physiology of sheer motion) there is added an organism's ability to
parallel the realm of sensations by learning to use words for them, the
concept of Self must necessarily be defined in terms of a polarity.
In terms of nonsymbolic motion, the Self is a physiological organism, separated from all others of its kind at the moment of parturition.
In terms of symbolic action, it becomes a "person" by learning the
language of its tribe, with corresponding identity and roles (beginning
with the equivalent of a proper name and expanding variously in keeping with the currently available resources of symbolism and the institutional structures reciprocally made possible by them), the three corresponding Dramatistic axioms being:
There can be motion without action (as the sea can go on thrashing
about whether or not there are animals that have a word for it).
There can be no action without motion (as we animals could not
have words for anything except for the motions of our nervous systems
and the vibrations that carry our words from one of us to another
through the air or that make words visible on the page).
But (and this is the primary axiom that differentiates Dramatism
from Behaviorism) symbolic action is not reducible to terms of sheer
motion. (Symbolicity involves not just a difference of degree, but a motivational difference in kind.)
Yet this difference in kind amounts to a primary DUPLICATION.
This is due to the fact that the nomenclature of symbolic placement
is borrowed from the materials of sensory motion.
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And the terms are of such a nature that they are "fictions" or analogical extensions of their beginning in reference to physical processes and
objects.
A Culture's symbolically conceived "world," or "universe of discourse," is thus built figuratively of terms originally grounded in reference to the nonsymbolic realm of motion.
Otherwise put: the realm of what is usually called "ideas" is constructed of symbolic material usually called sensory "images."
The Self, like its corresponding Culture, thus has two sources of
reference for its symbolic identity: its nature as a physiological organism,
and its nature as a symbol-using animal responsive to the potentialities of
symbolicity that have a nature of their own not reducible to a sheerly
physiological dimension.
Symbolicity itself being of a nature that can rise to higher levels of
generalization until all is headed in some all-inclusive title, we can readily
understand why psychologists like Jung are moved to talk of an overall
oneness, an Unus Mundus.
Yet in the light of the critical Dramatistic distinction between the
motives of a psychological organism as such and the motives of such a
Self as personalized by participation in its particular Culture's modes of
literal (univocal), equivocal, and analogical symbol-using, we can at least
glimpse why Jung could be exercised by such a symbolically engendered
"idea" or "ideal" of Ultimate Unity.
And by the same token we should see why the motion-action "polarity" is unbridgeable in the sense that, although, in every tribal idiom
however rudimentary, there is a wholly reliable basic correspondence
between a thing and its name; never the twain shall meet.
That might seem quite obvious, as regards the kind of "polarity"
that prevails with the correspondence between a tree and the word tree.
But look how far afield from such obviousness you get when the
distinction shifts from the realm of sheer motion (as with the physicality
of a tree) to the corresponding word (which is in the realm of symbolic
action) and you confront what Dramatism would view as inaccurate
equivalents, such as "matter" and "spirit," "matter" and "mind," or even
"brain" and "mind."
There could be no total unity between the realms except along the
lines of orthodox religion's promise to the faithful that their bodies will
be restored to them in heaven.
An unchartable complexity of behavings among the cells of the body
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may add up, for instance, to an overall "unitary" sense of well-being; but
no sheer term for an ideal unity (such as Jung's expression, Unus Mundus) can match that purely physiological kind of "attitude."
Keats, dying, modified a passage in Shakespeare to state it thus:
"Banish money-Banish sofas-Banish Wine-Banish Music; but right
Jack Health, honest Jack Health, true Jack Health-Banish Health and
banish all the world."
Though any attitude, even in purely theoretic matters, has a summarizing, unifying aspect, it must prevail only insofar as in some way it is
grounded in purely physiological behavior (as per William James'
charming and often quoted statement that we're sad because we cry).
In his chapter on "Attitudes" (The Principles of Literary Criticism
[London, 1924]), I. A. Richards was presumably speculating on a behavioristic parallelism of this sort when he wrote:
Every perception probably includes a response in the form of
incipient action. We constantly overlook the extent to which all the
while we are making preliminary adjustments, getting ready to act
in one way or another. Reading Captain Slocum's account of the
centipede which bit him on the head when alone in the middle of
the Atlantic, the writer has been caused to leap right out of his chair
by a leaf which fell upon his face from a tree.
Whatever the implications of an ATTITUDE, as a kind of incipient or
future action, it must be by some means grounded in the set of the body
now; and thus, though an attitude of kindness may be but the preparation
for the doing of a kind act (a subsequent mode of behavior), it is already
"behaving" physiologically in ways of its own (as a dog's implicit way of
"conjugating the verb 'to eat' " is to begin by salivating, a bodily motion
that in effect implies the future tense, "I will eat"; the present tense of
the verb being bodily conjugated by eating; and "I have eaten" is also in
its way a now, as the dog curls up for a comfortable, satisfied snooze).
But whatever the correspondence between purely symbolic attitudinizing and the kind of immediacy that poor Keats, with his dying
body, confronted, his very efforts to endow his poetic attitudes with
sensuous immediacy made him all the more cruelly aware of the respects
in which the poet's modes of symbolic action were comparatively (to use
his own word for his own poetry) "abstract."
His "Ode on a Grecian Urn" symbolicallyenacts the "transcending" of
the body.
But that letter he wrote to Fanny Brawne while nearing death was
concerned with a situation in which the sheer nonsymbolic realm of
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motion (the plight of his diseased body) was taking over; for such in
essence is the unbridgeable "polarity" between the social realm of "symbolic action" and motion's "principle of individuation" whereby the
symptoms of his disease were the immediatesensations of himself and none
other.
All told, in our Selves sheerly as physiological organisms, our world
is made of what Santayana would describe as but a single line drawn
through an infinity of possible "essences."
But all of them are experienced immediately,as yours and no one
else's, though you doubtless rightly assume that others of your kind
experience similar immediate sensations.
Beyond that, in polar distinction, is the vast symbolic realm of tribal
sociality, or orientation, as shaped by the influences that you encounter
by reason of your being a symbol-using animal, whose "reality," at every
stage, is determined by such terms.
In Santayana's Realms of Being, his Realm ofMatter would correspond
to what is here called the realm of nonsymbolic MOTION (for which his
word is sometimes "flux," sometimes "action," though I must here employ a different usage).
His passionate Realm of Spirit would be much what I mean by "symbolic action."
And his Realm of Essence would deal with "sensation" as the bridge
between the realms of "matter" and "spirit," though his term "intuitions"
here would ambivalently include both bodily sensations (such as color)
and purely symbolic fictions (such as the character of Hamlet).
The Self as a "person," beyond the individual's identity as a strictly
physiological organism, confronts with varying degrees of comprehensiveness and profoundness the interrelationships among the manifold
details of "reality" (whatever that "orientation" may be) as known and
interpreted in terms of the symbolic lore current in the Culture of that
time.
Necessarily, any individual's formal or informal version of such lore
is selective, in keeping with the limitations and engrossments besetting
that individual (as both person and physiological organism).
The interrelationships among such a conglomerate will be related
consistently (this thereforethat), antithetically (this however that), adventitiously (this and that).
When such an aggregate is felt to fall together "holistically," the
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WILLEFORD:
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background; and the ego, no matter what pride it takes in its powers, is always subordinate to the self, the purposes of which the ego
cannot appropriate except by the difficult way of individuation."
To quote the presumably persuasive TV commercial on the
COMMENT:
principle of individuation's grounding in the strictly physiological
(the realm of motion), it's "my" acid indigestion, and "my" gas, for
which I (my ego) take this medical material. But my ego is an aspect
of my Self, which is developed through modes of sociality (Culture)
made possible by the resources of symbolism. I shall reserve until
later a discussion of the "logological" equivalents for the relation
between "consciousness" and the "unconscious."
WILLEFORD:
"Polaristic thinking is even present in Kant, whom Goethe
a
letter
to Schweigger in 1814) acknowledged as the authority for
(in
In the Farbenlehre(The
his own tendency to think in polarities.
....
how
tries to think about
he
no
matter
one
Theoryof Colors) says that,
a phenomenon, one cannot escape seeing that it implies an original
division capable of unity, or of an original unity capable of division,
and he claims that to divide what is united, to unite what is divided,
is the life of nature."
COMMENT:
motion and action. We can put things together and take things apart.
And as Socrates says in the Phaedrus, the dialectician is skilled in the
use of words that can perform similarly in the realm of ideas. Bergson has astutely shown how this very nature of words leads to
"pseudo-problems," as theorists speculate on how to "resolve" antith-
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have its perfect top. Apparently in his scheme, all was strife; and the
strife added up to perfect harmony. The theory of the U.S. Constitution viewed a conflict of powers as a balance of powers.
WILLEFORD: "The first source of this polaristic thinking is the nature of
the human mind. .... Polaristic thought has an archetypal basis in
that the human mind is disposed to structure its experience by making distinctions between what something is and what it is not, between a thing of one kind and a thing of another. This may be seen
in the binomial properties of language-the tendency to pair words
and concepts in various ways."
COMMENT:Logologically, the stress would be not upon "the human
mind" but upon the nature of symbolism.High among my reasons for
this statement of the case is my belief that we should not take on
more obligations than necessary. Why haggle with Behaviorists
when you don't need to? They can't deny that our kind of animal
behaves by a lot of verbalizing. So let's account for as much as we can
in such terms. To my way of thinking, in carrying out the implications of that one shift of locus, we completely invalidate Skinner's attacks upon the concept of what he calls "autonomous man"
(which I interpret as his own addition of a straw man).
WILLEFORD: "The individuation process described by Jung is governed
by the self which is a principle of unity and purpose in the unfolding
of the personality."
COMMENT: Though I have already "translated"Jung's nomenclature into
"logologese" on this point, one further qualification is here
suggested. In the realm of sheer motion, the individual organism is
motivated by such obvious "purposes" as the need for food. But
once you turn from the need for food to the ways of buying food
with money, you're in a realm where "purpose" involves modes of
authority, enterprise, and the like not even remotely reducible to
the sheerly physiological needs of living. And, incidentally, the concern with a principle of individuation is itself a notable step in the
right direction. Since, in the last analysis, each thing is but a part of
everything, there is far too much tendency to overstress this principle of merger at the expense of concerns with a principium individuationis (such as the centrality of the nervous system so obviously supplies).
WILLEFORD:
"The 'Panlogism' of Heraclitus, the idea that all things partake of the logos, which reconciles the opposites ..."
COMMENT:
Logologically, all things partake of the Word in the sense that
all discussion of them is by the same token in the "universe of discourse" (the Greek word logos encompassing a range of meanings,
such as "basic principle," that favor such an extension). We have
already noted the modes of stylization whereby competition can be a
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3.
4.
5.
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Most obvious are the traditional metaphysical or theological distinctions between body and mind (matter and spirit). Others: the
microcosm-macrocosm pair, "eternal recurrence," variations on a theme,
double plot, cults of the body (attempts to will that all be reduced to the
immediacy of physiological sensation), transcendence (attempts like
Jung's to have the "polarity" encompassed by an ideal unity), theories of
"imitation" (such as Plato's and Aristotle's), bisymmetry, delegation of
authority, antecedent and consequent in musical phrasing, identification
by association, ritual (which symbolically reenacts some supposedly literal event). In a case of psychogenic illness, is not the body behaving
(misbehaving?) in problematical ways of a collateral nature? Are not the
symptoms that characterize its illness contriving in spontaneously uncharted ways to duplicate in terms of physiologic motion certain distresses imposed upon an individual socialized self that happens to be
entangled in unresolved symbolicallyengendered vexations? And is not
the physical disease in effect a disastrously "literal" translation of the
victim's predicament? Indeed, may not the symptoms be so radical a
physical counterpart that they in effect serve to reinforce the symbolic
burden to which they were orginally but a response?
I dare but ask that. However, I would for sure end on this family of
DUPLICATIONS:
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without motion. (An audience could not see, hear, and interpret it as a
"symbol system" without the aid of the nervous system and its physiological motions.)
But such purely physiological behavior on the part of the audience
can figure in a totally different kind of "communication." For instance,
consider the operations of air conditioning equipment in a movie house.
I have read that if a thriller is being played, this mechanism must work
much harder than if the plot is of a milder sort because of the effects
which the excitement of the audience has upon the conditions of the
atmosphere in the theatre. Such bodily responses as increased warmth
and accelerated respiration place a greater burden upon the air conditioning device, which is equipped with mechanical "sensors" that register the change in conditions and "behave" accordingly.
Obviously, its "sensitivity" is not to the motions on the screen as a
drama (hence a process in the realm of symbolic action) but purely to
physical conditions produced by the sheer bodiesof the audience in their
responses to the motions of the film as a drama (hence in the realm of
symbolic action, for which the classic word in this connection would be
"imitation").
Obviously, the air conditioning equipment is not concerned at all
with the drama as a form of symbolic act, an "imitation." Rather it is
responding to a situation purely in the realm of motion, the state of the
atmosphere produced by the physiological motions of the audience. Its
motions would proceed in the same way even if there were no drama or
audience at all but there were some other such condition in the realm of
motion that was "communicated" to it by its "sensors."
I stress this distinction because it so clearly indicates two different
realms of "behavior" here, the one involving the interpretation of the
film as a symbolic act, the other wholly in the realm of nonsymbolic
motion (the human bodies being "composite" entities that "behave" in
both ways, whereas the film sheerly as visible shapes and sounds and the
air conditioning system with its mechanical "sensors" behave in but one).
The audience possesses such duality by meeting these two conditions: first, its members are biological organisms; second, they are
endowed with the ability (and corresponding need, by our tests) to learn
an arbitrary conventional symbol system, such as a tribal language, which
also has the ability to discuss itself.
There is an admirable article much to our purposes, though we may
apply it somewhat differently than the author intended: "Explanation,
Teleology, and Operant Behaviorism," by Jon D. Ringen (Philosophyof
Science 43 [1976]). I would like to mention it in connection with the
paragraph by I. A. Richards that I previously quoted on the subject of
"attitudes." When Richards was reading of a man being bitten by a
centipede, a leaf fell against his face, causing him "to leap right out of his
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chair." Richards cites the incident as an indication that "Every perception probably includes a response in the form of incipient action. We
constantly overlook the extent to which all the while we are making
preliminary adjustments, getting ready to act in one way or another."
Recall that in connection with Ringen's discussion of the difference between "respondent" behavior and Skinner's ingenious experiments with
"operant" behavior. In a typical experiment of Pavlov's, the experimental animal respondsby salivating when you give it a sniff of meat. Its
response is checked quantitatively by a device that can measure the flow
of saliva. Then begin ringing a bell at the same time as you give the sniff
of meat. And after having by repetition established the association between the sniff of meat and the ringing of a bell, ring the bell without the
sniff of meat, and check on the amount of salivation as a response thus
conditioned.
Skinner's "operant" conditioning proceeds quite differently. He
gives his animal a goal by setting up some condition whereby, if it pecks
at a certain form (or color) or presses a lever, it operates a mechanism
that releases a bit of food. Having been systematically starved to about
four-fifths of its normal weight, it does whatever it can in its need for
food. The laboratory conditions are so set up that there are few things it
can do. As the result of its random motions, it learns to repeat the
pressing or pecking operation that is both congruent with its "natural
endowment" and releases the food. By gradually complicating the conditions, Skinner can get his pigeon to making a much more agile series of
discriminations than he could perform, without benefit of training inside
his Skinner box. The animal is thus induced not merely to "respond" to a
stimulus but to learn a set of operations that have a "purpose," as per the
term "teleology" in Ringen's title.
But note that Richards' anecdote is more in line with the earlier
Behaviorism that stressed "response." And as I interpret it, his reference
to "a response in the form of incipient action" concerns a bodilystate that
is collateral with what I would call the "symbolic action" of his reading.
The situation is made still clearer by Ringen's reference to a distinction between "molar" behavior and "molecular" behavior. Skinner's experimental animals would be studied for their "molar" behavior (as, for
instance, when they learn the order of key-pecks or lever-presses needed
to procure them their food). I would say that Pavlov's measuring of
salivation was rather on the side of the animal's "molecular" behavior, as
was Richards' behavior when the leaf startled him. Obviously, in that
sense, laughter, tears, or prurient responses would be on the slope of the
"molecular," along with the suggestion, as Richards' anecdote indicates,
that there are many subtler such responses in the body of the reader who
is "symbolically reenacting" a text.
Such is my reply to Behavioristic monism. No arguments about
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