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1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Batas Pambansa Blg 129
1.2 Courts and their jurisdiction
Over persons
Over res
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC V. SELUDO, 671 SCRA 78
The doctrine pf primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency.
2.
Competency of parties
the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules
so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their
claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice
on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.
3.
Kinds of Pleadings
Verification by counsel
in
initiatory
4)
Must
specifically
deny
material
allegations lest they be deemed
admitted
The rules and jurisprudence do not require that the parties to the
counterclaim be the original parties only. In fact, the presence of third
parties is allowed, the only provision being their capacity to be subjected
under the courts jurisdiction. As regards the nature of the claims of the
parties, neither is it required that they be of the same nature, only that
they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.
Read Judicial Affidavit Rule A.M. 12-8-8-SC
3.4 Effect of Failure to Plead
Order of default
By motion only, court cannot motu proprio declare party
in default
When to file
3.8 Summons
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is
necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer
upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
SAN PEDRO V. WILLY ONG AND NORMA CABELLES, G.R. NO 177598
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in
the absence of a valid waiver is null and void.
To provide perspective, it is crucial to determine first whether the action
is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of
summons under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court apply according to
the nature of the action.
CAB: The case instituted by San Pedro is anchored on his claim that he is
the real and rightful owner of the subject properties, thus, no one else has
the right to mortgage them. The real estate mortgages constituted on the
subject properties in favor of Ong, annotated on their TCTs, are
encumbrances on said properties, which may be considered a cloud on San
Pedros title thereto.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular
parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action. Technically, they are neither in
rem nor in personam.
Personal service of summons is preferred to substitute service. Only if the
former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the
latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of
the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The
failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing
requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective. Indisputably, the Sheriff did not comply with any of the
Grounds
Lack of jurisdiction over person
AMIGO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 25 3 SCRA 382
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons; the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant must be seasonably raised, and it can well be
pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer.
Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be
invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however, as has been so held
lately in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, must be seasonably
raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an
affirmative defense in an answer. The records bear out the fact that
petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until
the rendition of the judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to
assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over their person, a somersault that
neither law nor policy will sanction.
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Litis pendentia
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facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different
claims or causes of action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds application
when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed
upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to
that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-ininterest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains
standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition;
the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their
privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the
operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as
that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the
former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues
or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the
ruling in the earlier case. 42 In other words, the dictum laid down in the
earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be
binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest,
as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding
effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated
in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to
rest in the earlier case.
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No cause of action
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but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of action." De Dios did
indeed hold that a movant to dismiss on the ground of failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action is burdened with the implied admission
of the truth of "all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint," but not of "mere epithers charging fraud," or legal conclusions,
or mere inferences, or matters of evidence. Said case gave examples of
allegations not within the hypothetical admission rule, to wit: "malicious
and unjustified" institution of an action acting maliciously and for the
purpose of political persecution and vengeance, with intent of
circumventing a constitutional provision; usurping the Office of Senator of
the Philippines; that the master had breached the contract, or discharged
an employee in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unjust manner, etc.
CAB: ruling in De Dios, does not apply to the case at bar. In the instant
case, the complaint asserts that plaintiff purchased the property in question
from the person admittedly holding title thereto. It then infers that by this
mode, it became the successor-in-interest of the vendor, if not indeed the
owner of the property. Hence, the restrictions in the title should be nullified
not only because it is contrary to law but also because the conditions under
which they were imposed had ceased to exist. In fact, the averments in the
complaint like the title of ADEC's vendor, the execution of the sale by said
vendor to ADEC, the latter's status as the vendor's successor-in-interest,
and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations
well within the hypothetical-admission principle. These averments satisfy
the three (3) elements of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint
did state a cause of action. In view of such, SLVAI cannot successfully
invoke the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of action" in its
motion to dismiss.
CALALANG V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 194 SCRA 514
It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action, the question submitted for
determination is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. The
sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint
itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano vs. Genato, 80
SCRA 217). This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the
grounds relied upon by way of affirmative defenses state other matters.
Thus the trial court, in the case at bar, did not commit any error in
conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of herein
petitioners.
PERPETUAL V. FAJARDO, 233 SCRA 720
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a
cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a
judge may validly grant the relief demand in the complaint. Having
examined the record here carefully, and while the complaint filed in the trial
court is not exactly a model of draftsmanship, we consider that it
substantially meets the established test and that the complaint does state
cause(s) of action not only against the borrower corporation, J.J. Mining, but
also against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and
individual capacities.
The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA
663 [1991]). In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the
statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the
court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to
determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants.
CITY OF CEBU V. COURT OF APPEALS, 258 SCRA 175
A
complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity,
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated therein for these
are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars. It
should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the
face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any
state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein.
The rule that: when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the
issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the
complaint, is not without exceptions. In the case of Tan v. Director of
Forestry, this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and held that, ".
. . although the evidence of the parties were on the question of granting or
denying the petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of
the motion to dismiss. Likewise, in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia
we sanctioned the act of the trial court in considering, in addition to the
complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or
not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. This
Court deemed such course of action but logical where the trial court had
the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with
counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to
the request for admission. The same liberality should be applied in the
instant case where an examination of petitioner's "Comment and
Opposition" to private respondent's Motion to Dismiss leaves no room for
doubt that petitioner had indeed made ''a valid and definite offer" to
private respondent as required by law.
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based on the principle of res judicata, the petitioners are barred in another
action (involving the same subject matter, parties and issues) from raising
a defense and from asking for a relief inconsistent with an order dismissing
an earlier case with prejudice. In Medija vs. Patcho, et al., we ruled that a
case for partition and an action for quieting of title have identical causes of
action and can therefore be the subject of res judicata. . . . Petitioners filed
an action to quiet title for the sole purpose of claiming for themselves
exclusive ownership of Lot 4389. On the other hand, in the case for
partition filed by respondents, petitioners set up the defense of sole
dominion in order to frustrate the equal division of the property between
the heirs of Felix and Juana. Considering the similarity of petitioners'
defense in this case with their main averment in the case for quieting of
title, petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership of
Lot 4389.
CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO 164797
Citing Section 3 Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court
held that the rule enumerates the instances where the complaint may be
dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules
or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute,
this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be
with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in
the order of dismissal. . . . The order dismissing Civil Case No. 1600 reads:
For failure of the plaintiffs as well as counsel to appear on several settings
despite due notices, precisely for the reception of plaintiffs' evidence, upon
motion of the defendant through Atty. Mark Arcilla, this case is dismissed
for failure to prosecute. It is clear from the afore-mentioned order that said
case was dismissed, upon petitioners' motion, for failure of private
respondents and their counsel to attend several scheduled hearings for the
presentation of their evidence. Since the order did not contain a
qualification whether same is with or without prejudice, following Section 3,
it is deemed to be with prejudice and shall have the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. A ruling based on a motion to dismiss, without
any trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a
judgment on the merits.
Definition
ANSON TRADE CENTER V. PACIFIC BANKING, G.R. NO 179999
Pre-trial, by definition, is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit
the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of
the realm of surprise and maneuvering. It is an answer to the clarion call for
the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it thus paves
the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case.
Non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal
of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact,
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the
non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown
therefor. We find such a valid cause extant in the case at bar.
INTERLINING CORP V. PHILIPPINE TRUST, 428 SCRA 583
The conduct of a pre-trial in civil actions has been mandatory as early as
January 1, 1964, upon the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Court. Pre-trial
is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between
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the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of
the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial,
or totally dispense with it, as in the case at bar. Prescinding therefrom, it is
a basic legal precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations
they made during the pre-trial.
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Modes of discovery
Deposition
o
Function
o
When may be availed of
PAJARILLA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 570 SCRA 347
While the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain
truth and to expedite the disposal of cases, the trial court may disallow a
deposition if there are valid reasons for so ruling.
The several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation
of his evidence, we are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect.
Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his counsel's absences. Besides,
even as we scrutinize petitioner's arguments, we think that he has not
sufficiently shown an "exceptional" or "unusual" case for us to grant leave
and reverse the trial and appellate courts.
o
De bene esse
o
Perpetuam rei memoriam (prior to action)
o
Who do you depose
Interrogatories to parties
Requests for admission
Production and inspection of things
Examination of persons
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outside the Court. The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted;
otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in
ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated.
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3.14Trial
Order of trial
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simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain
justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG V. COURT OF APPEALS, 667 SCRA 82
For consolidation to be proper, the cases sought to be consolidated must be
related.
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation. In the recent
case of Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., 20
the Court held that "it is a time-honored principle that when two or more
cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters,
they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In
other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved
and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to
determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties
by hearing the suits together." In the present case, there is no sufficient
justification to order the consolidation inasmuch as the Deutsche Bank AG
Petition has no relation whatsoever to the Vitarich Petition.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V. EXCELSA INDUSTRIES, 669
SCRA 470
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases
consolidated; on the parties and the causes of action involved; and on the
evidence presented in the consolidated cases. The Court declared that the
effect of consolidation would greatly depend on the sense in which the
consolidation is made. Consolidation of cases may take place in any of the
following ways:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is
tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as
to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as
such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is
rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions
are pending between the same parties stating claims which might
have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate
judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into
a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to
the other. (consolidation for trial)
3.16Demurrer to evidence
Concept of demurrer
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The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case
after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the
facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in
the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.
When what is left are not genuinely issues requiring trial but questions
concerning the proper interpretation of the provisions of some written
contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper.
REILO V. SAN JOSE, G.R. NO 166393
This case is unusual because it was petitioner, and not the claimant
respondent, who moved for a judgment on the pleadings during the pretrial.
Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof
as to the truth of her own allegations and without giving respondent the
opportunity to introduce evidence, is deemed to have admitted the
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material and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her motion
for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties.
3.18Summary judgments
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of filing a notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished from an
interlocutory issuance, is that the former decisively puts to a close, or
disposes of a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing else to be done by
the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the
adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular matter
involved. An order is interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would
only be provisional in character and would still leave substantial
proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in order to put the
controversy to rest.
EVANGELISTA V. MERCATOR FINANCE, 409 SCRA 410
Summary judgment "is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham
claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation." The crucial question
in a motion for summary judgment is whether the issues raised in the
pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means "an issue of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue
for trial." To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving
party to confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial,
plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the
presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of fact could
return a verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would
therefore be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners
constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial.
CAB: There are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not
deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they
got the loan as officers of Embassy Farms without intending to personally
bind themselves or their property. However, a simple perusal of the
promissory note and the continuing suretyship agreement shows otherwise.
These documentary evidence prove that petitioners are solidary obligors
with Embassy Farms.
3.19Judgments
Requirements
Written and signed by the judge
Must contain findings of facts and law applied
Must contain a dispositive portion
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judgment will not furnish the basis for such an entry. The object of a
judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper
form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action
really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which
the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously
render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the
judgment may have been. A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry
made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect
as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court,
but to supply an omission in the record of action really had, but omitted
through inadvertence or mistake. It is competent for the court to make an
entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction occurred, even
though the rights of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro
tunc will not be ordered except where this can be done without injustice to
either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the record
something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by
the court.
NAVARRO V. METROBANK, G.R. NO 165697
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a
judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision,
amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or the
making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or
where the judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule is twofold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make
orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial
controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as
controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.
3.20Remedies from judgments (same court, same case)
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the
extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court.
MONZON V. SPOUSES RELOVA, G.R. NO 171827
In PNB v. de Leon, the Court declared that orders of default have the effect
of denying a litigant a chance to be heard, increasing needless litigation in
the appellate court. While there are instances when a party may be
properly defaulted, these should be the exception rather than the rule, and
should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate
neglect to comply with the orders of the court.
It is even worse when the court issues an order not denominated as an
order of default, but provides for the application of effects of default. Such
amounts to the circumvention of the rigid requirements of a default order,
to wit: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant; (2) the defendant failed to timely file his answer; and (3)
there must be a motion to declare the defendant in default with notice to
the latter.
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