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SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142824
Nestor Ocampo
President
Carmelo Santos
Vice-President
Marites Montejo
Treasurer/Board Member
Rico Gonzales
Auditor
Rod Abuan
Director
Segundino Flores
Director
Hernando Clemente
Director
Nestor Ocampo
Presidente
Carmelo Santos
Bise-Presidente
Nanding Clemente
Director
TessMontejo
Chief Stewar
Segundo Flores
Director
Enrico Gonzales
Auditor
Boy Alcantara
Shop Stewar
Rod Abuan
Director
xxx
xxx
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION, respondents.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M.
Gopengco and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for petitioner.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Textile
Workers Union.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of
Industrial Relations.
REGALA, J.:
This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial
Relations. The pertinent facts are the following:
At the National Development Co., a governmentowned and controlled corporation, there were four
shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.,
while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2
p.m; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10
p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour
mealtime period, to wit: From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon
for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and
from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between
2 p.m. and 10 p.m.
The records disclose that although there was a onehour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the
workers with eight hours of work for each shift and
paid them for the same number of hours. However,
since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were
required to continue working until the next shift,
ROMERO, J.:
Private respondent, a corporation engaged in
providing security services to its client, hired
petitioner on November 4, 1980 as one of its security
guards. Thereafter, he was assigned to the Cat House
Bar and Restaurant with a monthly salary of
P2,000.00 until its closure on August 31, 1993.
On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint 1 against
private respondent for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime
pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift
differential, uniform allowance, service incentive
leave pay and 13th month pay from the year 1990 to
1993.
Private respondent, in its position paper, 2 rejected
petitioner's claim alleging it merely acted as an agent
of the latter in securing his employment at the Cat
House Bar and Restaurant. Thus, the liability for the
claims of the petitioner should be charged to Cat
House Bar and its owner, being his direct employer.
In resolving the dispute in a decision dated May 31,
1995, 3 the Labor Arbiter brushed aside the private
(a) An additional
sum equivalent to
25% of their
respective basic
or regular salaries
for services
rendered on
Sundays and
legal holidays
during the period
from March 20.
1961 up to June
30, 1962; and
(b) Another
additional sum or
premium
equivalent to
25% of their
respective basic
or regular salaries
for nighttime
services rendered
from March 20,
1961 up to June
30, 1962.
3. Petitioners' petition to convert
them to monthly employees should
be, as it is hereby, denied for lack
of merit.
4. Respondent Mariano Que, being
an officer and acted only as an
agent in behalf of the respondent
corporation, should be absolved
from the money claims of herein
petitioners whose employer,
Republic Act
875, the CIR lost
its jurisdiction
over claims for
additional
compensation for
regular night
work. Petitioner
says that this Act
reduced the
jurisdiction of
respondent court
and limited it to
specific cases
which this Court
has defined as: ...
(1) when the
labor dispute
affects an
industry which is
indispensable to
the national
interest and is so
certified by the
President to the
industrial court
(Sec. 10,
Republic Act
875); (2) when
the controversy
refers to
minimum wage
under the
Minimum Wage
Law (Republic
Act 602); (3)
when it involves
hours of
employment
litigations,
beyond which it
is not permitted
to act.
We believe petitioner to be in error.
Its position collides with our ruling
in the Naric case [National Rice &
Corn Corp. (NARIC) vs. NARIC
Workers' Union, et al., G.R. No. L12075, May 29, 1959] where we
held;
While it is true
that this Court
made the above
comment in the
aforementioned
case, it does not
intend to convey
the Idea that
work done at
night cannot also
be an overtime
work. The
comment only
served to
emphasize that
the demand
which the Shell
Company made
upon its laborers
is not merely
overtime work
but night work
and so there was
need to
differentiate night
work from
daytime work. In
fact, the company
contended that
there was no law
that required the
payment of
additional
compensation for
night work unlike
an overtime work
which is covered
by
Commonwealth
Act No. 444
(Eight Hour
Labor Law). And
this Court in that
case said that
while there was
no law actually
requiring
payment of
additional
compensation for
night work, the
industrial court
has the power to
determine the
wages that night
workers should
receive under
Commonwealth
Act No. 103, and
so it justified the
additional
compensation in
the Shell case for
'hygienic,
medical, moral,
cultural and
sociological
reasons.
xxx xxx xxx
True, in Paflu, et al. vs. Tan, et al., supra, and in a
series of cases thereafter, We held that the broad
powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the
CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875
which limited them to the four categories therein
expressed in line with the public policy of allowing
settlement of industrial disputes via the collective
bargaining process; but We find no cogent reason for
concluding that a suit of this nature for extra
compensation for night work falls outside the domain
of the industrial court. Withal, the record does not
show that the employer-employee relation between
the 64 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has
not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of
jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and
overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. City
Automotive Co., et al., G.R. No. L- 11655, April 29,
1959; Prisco vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13806, May
23, 1960] or for payment of additional compensation
for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for
night work [Nassco vs. Almin, et al., G.R. No.
L9055, November 28, 1958; Detective & Protective
Bureau, Inc. vs. Felipe Guevara, et al., G.R. No. L8738, May 31, 1957] but has also supported such
court's ruling that work performed at night should be
paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that
work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of
duty, he should also be paid additional compensation
for overtime work. [Naric vs. Naric Workers' Union.
DECISION
IV
. . . IN HOLDING, ALTHOUGH MERELY AS AN
OBITER DICTUM, THAT ONLY PETITIONER
JERRY ACEDERA SIGNED THE CERTIFICATE
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.25cralaw:red
The third assigned error respecting petitionersappellants right to intervene shall first be passed
upon, it being determinative of their right to raise the
other assigned errors.
Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene
on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Section 1 of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors right may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
They stress that they have complied with the
requisites for intervention because (1) they are the
ones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of any judgment that may be
rendered in this case, (2) no undue delay or prejudice
would result from their intervention since their
Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for
Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was
still hearing the case and before any decision thereon
was rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to
file a separate case as they would be guilty of forum
shopping because the only forum available for them
was the Labor Arbiter. 26
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner Pampanga Sugar Development Company,
Inc. seeks the reversal of the order dated June 6, 1974
of respondent Court of Industrial Relations awarding
to respondent Sugar Workers Association's (Union)
counsel attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the
judgment in CIR Case No. 4264- ULP and ordering
the lower court's Examining Division to compute the
wage and fringe benefits differentials due the 28
individual workers who did not execute quitclaims as
well as attorney's fees corresponding to 20% of the
benefits due to 53 workers who entered into
agreements waiving their rights and benefits under
the decision dated December 4, 1972 in the aforecited
case; also, the setting aside of the CIR resolution of
September 3, 1974 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order (pp. 15 & 57,
rec.).
For a better appreciation of this case, certain
prefatory facts must be recalled. Sometime in
February, 1956, the workers' affiliates of respondent
Union staged a strike against petitioner company.
This labor dispute was certified by the President to
the Court of Industrial Relations which was docketed
as Case No. 13-IPA. After six years, the said Court
13thmonth
pay
net basic
pay
=
12
months
where:
net
basic
pay
February 4, 1991
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Nestl Philippines, Inc., by this petition
for certiorari, seeks to annul, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, the decision dated August 8,
1989 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Second Division, in Cert. Case No. 0522
entitled, "In Re: Labor Dispute of Nestl Philippines,
Inc." insofar as it modified the petitioner's existing
non-contributory Retirement Plan.
Four (4) collective bargaining agreements separately
covering the petitioner's employees in its:
1. Alabang/Cabuyao factories;
2. Makati Administration Office. (Both
Alabang/Cabuyao factories and Makati
office were represented by the respondent,
Union of Filipro Employees [UFE]);
3. Cagayan de Oro Factory represented by
WATU; and
xxx
xxx
7. Retirement Plan
The company shall continue implementing
its retirement plan modified as follows:
a) for fifteen years of service or less an
amount equal to 100% of the employee's
monthly salary for every year of service;
b) more than 15 but less than 20 years
125% of the employee's monthly salary for
every year of service;
c) 20 years or more 150% of the
employee's monthly salary for every year of
service. (pp. 58-59, Rollo.)
Both parties separately moved for reconsideration of
the decision.
On August 8, 1989, the NLRC issued a resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration. With regard
to the Retirement Plan, the NLRC held:
Anent management's objection to the
modification of its Retirement Plan, We find
no cogent reason to alter our previous
decision on this matter.
While it is not disputed that the plan is noncontributory on the part of the workers, tills
does not automatically remove it from the
ambit of collective bargaining negotiations.
On the contrary, the plan is specifically
mentioned in the previous bargaining
agreements (Exhibits "R-1" and "R-4"),
thereby integrating or incorporating the
provisions thereof to the agreement. By
reason of its incorporation, the plan assumes
a consensual character which cannot be
terminated or modified at will by either
party. Consequently, it becomes part and
parcel of CBA negotiations.
However, We need to clarify Our resolution
on this issue. When we increased the
emoluments in the plan, the conditions for
the availment of the benefits set forth therein
remain the same. (p. 32, Rollo.)
On December 14, 1989, the petitioner filed this
petition for certiorari, alleging that since its
retirement plan is non-contributory, it (Nestl) has the
sole and exclusive prerogative to define the terms of
the plan "because the workers have no vested and
demandable rights thereunder, the grant thereof being
not a contractual obligation but merely gratuitous. At
most the company can only be directed to maintain
the same but not to change its terms. It should be left
to the discretion of the company on how to improve
or mollify the same" (p. 10, Rollo).
The Court agrees with the NLRC's finding that the
Retirement Plan was "a collective bargaining issue
right from the start" (p. 109, Rollo) for the
improvement of the existing Retirement Plan was one
of the original CBA proposals submitted by the UFE
on May 8, 1987 to Arthur Gilmour, president of
Nestl Philippines. The union's original proposal was
to modify the existing plan by including a provision
for early retirement. The company did not question
the validity of that proposal as a collective bargaining
issue but merely offered to maintain the existing non-
2. Ordering respondents-appellees
to pay complainants-appellants
their back allowances reckoned
from the time of illegal deduction;
and
3. Ordering respondents-appellees
from further illegally deducting the
allowances of complainantsappellants.
SO ORDERED.
Presiding Commissioner of the NLRC, Diego P.
Atienza, concurred in the result, while Commissioner
Cleto T. Villaltuya dissented and voted to affirm in
toto the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents
from enforcing the Decision of 10 March 1986 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in
NCR Case No. 1-168-85 entitled "FFW-Globe
Mackay Employees Union, et al., vs. Globe Mackay
Cable & Radio Corporation, et al.," the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed Decision
is as it is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one issued:
1. Declaring respondents-appellees
(petitioners herein) guilty of illegal
deductions of cost-of-living
allowance;