Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
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Introduction
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Key Points
This article evaluates the Google Spain ruling and
its implementation from the perspective of public
international law.
After analysing the ruling itself, an analysis is made
of the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines concerning the territorial effect of delisting decisions.
The article outlines different ways in which the
right to be delisted might be implemented, using
case law to identify relevant jurisdictional considerations.
The authors conclude that insistence upon global
delisting may be justifiable in many cases, but not all.
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google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/edit?pli=1. accessed
21 November 2014.
If you run a name search on google.co.uk today, you will in all probability
find a notice at the bottom of the page which says: Some results may have
been removed under data protection law in Europe. The message appears
regardless of whether the person in question has requested any removal of
results.
Leila Abboud and Julia Fioretti, Europe debates how far to push right to
be forgotten (Reuters, 25 July 2014), ,http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/07/25/google-eu-privacy-idUSL6N0Q02JR20140725. accessed at
30 November 2014.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the
implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment
on Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja GonzalezC-131/12 (2014) WP225 ,http
://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/
opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. accessed 10
December 2014.
Cf. Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice (n 10).
See e.g. David Meyer, Why the EUs right to be de-linked should not go
global (Gigaom Research, 26 November 2014) ,https://gigaom.com/
2014/11/26/why-the-eus-right-to-be-de-linked-should-not-go-global/.
accessed 10 December 2014.
See also Alan McQuinn, EU Guidelines for Right to Be Forgotten Harm
Transparency and Represent a Vast Overreach on Internet Policy (The
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15
Search results of people using google.com remain unaltered, while people using google.es or google.be may
no longer be seeing the full picture.8 However, Google
still allows its EU users to switch to the .com version,
simply by clicking a button at the bottom of the page. By
not taking further measures to limit access to delisted
search results, Googles approach has provoked concerns
from EU Data Protection Authorities (DPAs).9 So what
should the search engine operator be doing?
According to the Article 29 Working Party, search
engine operators should implement the ruling in a way
that guarantees effective and complete protection of data
subjects rights and that EU law cannot easily be circumvented.10 In practice, this means that delisting should be
made effective on all relevant domains, including
.com.11 Critics argue that the approach advanced by the
Working Party goes a bridge too far.12 After all, search
engines such as Google offer their services on a global
scale. By requiring Google to modify search results on all
domains, it seems as if the EU is imposing its values
upon non-EU countries.13 This is problematic because,
at least in principle, each State is free to decide how to
balance privacy and freedom of expression.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the Google Spain
ruling and its extraterritorial effects from the perspective
of public international law. We should note that, as a
matter of principle, data protection law cannot be characterized as falling wholly within either public or
private international law.14 Kuner argues that the characterization instead depends on the specific activity or
issue in question. For example, an enforcement action
would fall within the ambit of public international law,
Brendan van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek . Internet and jurisdiction after Google Spain
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Assessment
Under customary international law, there should be a
bona fide connection between the subject matter of a
dispute and the State asserting jurisdiction over it.32
There are approximately five general principles upon
which a jurisdictional claim might be based, namely (i)
the territoriality principle (objective and subjective); (ii)
the nationality principle (active or passive); (iii) the
effects principle; (iv) the protective principle; or (v) the
universality principle.33 For purposes of public international law, it is the territoriality principle that is the
primarybut not the solebasis of jurisdiction.34
The principle of territoriality entails that each State has
the right to regulate persons, matters, and events within
its own territory.35 It is based on the principle of sovereign
equality of States and the principle of non-intervention.36
A corollary of the territoriality principle is that States
should exercise some restraint before asserting jurisdiction extraterritorially: if a State wishes to be recognized as
sovereign within its own borders, it must respect the sovereignty of other States within their borders.37 Nevertheless, it would appear that States increasingly undertake to
regulate conduct taking place abroad.38 The seemingly
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an activity.) (Ibid, 21 22.) See also Bernhard Maier, How Has the Law
Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet (2010) IJLIT
(18)(2) 155, with reference to Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick, 194
ALR 4333 (10 December 2002), para 101.
See Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 80 et seq.;
Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 143 and Robert Dover and Justin
Frosini, The extraterritorial effects of legislation and policies in the EU
and US (2012) Study for the European Parliaments Committee on
Foreign Affairs ,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2012/433701/EXPO-AFET_ET%282012%29433701_EN.pdf. last
accessed 19 December 2014.
Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 20 and Cf. Jurisdiction in
International Law (n 32) 27 et seq. See also The American Law Institute,
Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1988) Section 402.
Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 et seq.
Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, (OUP, 2008), 29.
Other arguments against extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction include
unforeseeability, limited enforceability, liability under multiple
jurisdiction, etc. See eg Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 161 2.
See The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 61. For a
discussion of the development of international case law in this respect see
Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 108.
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For a charming metaphor (a story about eggs) on how the internet has
further complicated the issues sovereignty and jurisdiction see Jurisdiction
and the Internet (n 6) 1 3.
Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 174.
Cf. The long arm of EU data protection law (n 17) 29.
Ibid, p. 29 30 (emphasis added). The use of a virtual connection to EU
territory as a means to regulate conduct taking place abroad is similar to
(but not the same as) the concept of territorial extension, whereby the
EU indirectly exports its standards to other jurisdictions by virtue of a
territorial connection. See Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial
Extension in EU Law (2014) (62) (1) AJCL, 90. The Data Protection
Directive provides an example of territorial extension not in Article
4(1)a but in one of its other provisions, namely in Article 25 (in that it
entails evaluation of foreign legal systems with export from the EU as a
territorial trigger). See J. Scott, The New EU Extraterritoriality (2014),
manuscript on file with author.
Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations (n 34). See also
The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82; Cedric
Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, United States and European
perspectives (2007) PhD. Thesis, 198, ,https://lirias.kuleuven.be/
bitstream/1979/911/2/doctoraat.pdf. accessed at 11 December 2014. See
also M. Huffman, A Retrospective of Twenty-Five Years on the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Houston Law Review 2007, Vol. 44,
p. 285, 298 300.
Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82.
See also Deepa Rishikesh, Extraterritoriality Versus Sovereignty in
International Antitrust Jurisdiction (1990) (14)(3) World Competition,
49; Cf. A Retrospective of Twenty-Five Years (n 43).
See more generally John H. Currie, Public International Law (Irwin Law,
2001), 300.
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Privacy Laws (n 16) 60. See also Cf. Extraterritoriality and Territorial
Extension in EU Law (n 42).
In the same vein: Dan J. B. Svantesson, After Microsoft v. U.S.Law
Enforcement in the Cloud (1 of 2), (LinkedIn blog 31 December 2014)
,https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/after-microsoft-v-us-law-enforcementcloud-1-2-svantesson?_mSplash=1&trk=mp-reader-card. accessed 25
February 2015.
Id. (noting that it may be more useful to assess whether whether
jurisdictional claims with an extraterritorial effect can create clashes of
interest with foreign state) (Id.) See also Dan J.B. Svantesson, After
Microsoft v. U.S.Law Enforcement in the Cloud (2 of 2), (LinkedIn
blog 5 January 2015) ,https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/after-microsoftv-us-law-enforcement-cloud-2-dan-jerker-b-svantesson. (arguing that
to hold otherwise reflects an narrow and outdated view of
extraterritoriality).
For a more detailed discussion on how such an assessment could be made,
see Cedric Ryngaert and Marieke Koekkoek, Extraterritorial Regulation
of Natural Resources, A Functional Approach, in Wouters et al. (eds),
Ensuring Good Global Governance Through Trade, An Assessment of New
EU Trade Policies and Approaches, Edward Elgar Publishing (Forthcoming
summer 2015).
111
2. Geographic filtering: search results are tailored according to the geographic origin of the search query, regardless of which domain is used; or
3. Global implementation: all search results are modified,
worldwide, regardless of the geographic origin of the
query or domain name extension used to access the
search engine.
As mentioned in the introduction, Googles current approach is largely65 domain-based, whereby it limits delisting to the European versions of its search engine. While
certain results might have been removed from google.es
or google.be, they remain available by a simple switch to
google.com or any other non-EEA domain name extension (e.g., google.ca).66 By making it so easy to retrieve
delisted search results, Googles current approach arguably undermines the effectiveness of the CJEU ruling.67
On the other hand, implementing local requirements on a
global scale can bring about unintended consequences,
not least with regard to the freedom of expression.68 After
all, the fundamental right to freedom of expression comprises the freedom to receive and impart information regardless of frontiers.69 So how should search engines
implement the ruling?
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the
Google Spain ruling offers no explicit guidance on this
point. Nothing in the ruling of the CJEU suggests that
Google is justified in limiting its implementation to specific websites, countries, or regions.70 Nor does the ruling
explicitly require Google to extend its implementation to
non-EEA countries or domains. According to the Article
29 Working Party, however, Googles current domainbased approach is woefully inadequate. It reasoned that
Although concrete solutions may vary depending on the
internal organization and structure of search engines, delisting decisions must be implemented in a way that
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Geographic filtering
A second possible mode of implementation involves geographic filtering, whereby search results are tailored to the
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Zittrain has referred to this model to the Youtube model, whereby certain
videos at the universal youtube.com links are withheld from certain
jurisdiction. See Is the EU compelling Google to become about.me (n 75).
Svantensson would most likely categorize this approach as strict geofiltering.
See Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 162 et seq.
Geo-location can be achieved in several ways. For more information, see
Dan J.B. Svantesson, Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy Law, (Ex Tuto
Publishing, Kopenhagen 2013), 173; Cf. Delineating the Reach of internet
intermediaries (n 65) 161 8; Cf. The Proper Basis for Exercising Jurisdiction
in Internet Disputes (n 6) 17 9 and Marketa Trimble, The Future of
Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geo-location (2012)
(22) (3) Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 586 96.
Geographic filtering and domain-based approaches can of course also
work in conjunction. As previously noted, European visitors to
google.com (ie individuals who access google.com from inside the EAA)
are automatically redirected to their own country-specific version of the
search engine. Only if the user chooses to override, ie by clicking switch
to google.com, shall the redirect be overridden. This approach illustrates
how geographic filtering tools and domain-based approaches can work in
tandem. However, for purposes of conceptual clarity, we have chosen not
to distinguish between soft and hard geographic filtering in the context
of this article. For more information, see Delineating the Reach of internet
intermediaries (n 65) 164 5.
See eg also Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 819 21.
See also Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 164 (Where
content is sufficiently valued by Internet users, they may seek to circumvent
the geo-location technologies used in order to access that content. While some
circumvention techniques are technologically advanced [. . .], others are easy
enough to be used by virtually anyone [. . .] or even inherent in the system-
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geographic origin of the search query.88 Geographic filtering implies use of software to identify the geolocation of a
search engine user.89 In principle, such tools can operate
independently of the ccTLD used to access the search
engine.90 From the perspective of public international
law, the use of geographic filtering tools appears to offer
important benefits. It enables national authorities to
assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct, while at the same
time confining its impactat least for the most partto
its own national territory.91 A significant limitation of
geographic filtering tools, however, is that none of them
are completely effective. Anyone willing to invest a little
time and money can often circumvent them quite easily
(e.g., by using a proxy server).92
As with the domain-based approach, one can find
several examples of case law, supporting the use of geographic filtering tools. A first example is UEJF and LICRA
v. Yahoo! and Yahoo France, 93 one of the most famous
cases regarding internet jurisdiction.94 Here, Yahoo! was
sued for hosting an auction page displaying Nazi paraphernalia. This page was accessible from anywhere in the
world, including France, where the display of Nazi paraphernalia is outlawed. The UEJF and LICRA, two student
organizations seeking to combat anti-Semitism, filed for
injunctive relief before the Tribunal de Grande Instance
(TGI) of Paris.95 Yahoo! argued that the TGI did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case, as the facts at issue were
committed in the USA and not in France (the litigious
pages being hosted by a server located on US soil). The
TGI rejected this argument, reasoning that
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Global implementation
Global implementation involves delisting on all versions
of the search engine, regardless of the geographic origin
of the query or the ccTLD used to access the search
engine. This approach is arguably the most contentious
from the perspective of public international law, as it
implies the greatest interference with the territorial sovereignty of other States. Nevertheless, one does not need
to look back very far in order to find an example of an
injunction for global delisting. Although the case concerned private rather than public international law, the
reasoning of the Court is informative for our further
analysis.
In Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, the Canadian
company Equustek claimed that Jack et al. had misappropriated its goodwill by performing a bait and switch.
(Jack et al. advertised Equustek products on their websites, but delivered their own products instead once a
sale was made). In the end, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (SCBC) considered it necessary to issue an injunction with global effect in order to adapt to the borderless electronic web of the internet.104 The SCBC also
noted that Googles removal of search results from google.ca alone was inadequate to offer the plaintiff s effective relief. Specifically, it reasoned that
[A]lthough Google has a website for each country to which
searches made within that country default, users can override that default and access other countrys Google websites.
[. . .] [T]o be effective, even within Canada, Google must
block search results on all of its websites.105
The SCBC also observed that the defendants sales originated primarily in other countries.106 As a result, the
Courts process cannot be protected unless the injunction ensures that searchers from any jurisdiction do not
find the defendants websites.107 The reasoning of the
SCBC was not, however, limited to considerations of effectiveness alone. The Court also took into account the
104 Supreme Court of British Columbia, Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014
BCSC 1063, at paragraph 159, accessible at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/
jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm, last accessed 12 December 2014.
105 Case No. S112421, Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack [2014] BCSC 1063, at
para 159 ,http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.
htm. accessed 12 December 2014.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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Assessment
The principle of territoriality implies that the geographical borders of a State should, as a rule, delineate its
ability to impose restrictions upon the accessibility of
online content.111 Both the domain-based and geo-filtering approaches sit rather comfortably with the principle
of territoriality. Under the domain-based approach,
delisting is limited to websites, which actively target the
inhabitants of the regulating State. The geo-filtering approach goes slightly further, by requiring website operators to take measures to prevent access from within the
territory of the regulating State.112 A major benefit of
108 Ibid, at para 149. According to the BCSC, this distinguished the current
situation from fact pattern underlying the TGIs judgment in Max Mosely
v. Google Inc. and Google France.
109 Ibid, at para 151. Applying this test, the Court reasoned that [. . .] the
plaintiffs have established that they are suffering irreparable harm by the
defendants ongoing sale of the [product] on the internet. The plaintiffs have
also established that Google is inadvertently facilitating that harm through
its search engines. While there are other search engines, Google does not
contest the plaintiffs assertion that Googles position as the search engine
used for 70 75% of internet searches means the defendants will not be
commercially successful if they cannot be found through Googles search
services. (Ibid, at para 152.)
110 Ibid, at paras 154 5.
111 Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 et seq. As noted by the District
Court of California: [a] basic function of a sovereign state is to determine by
law what forms of speech and conduct are acceptable within its borders.
(Case No. C-00-21275 JF, Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and UEJF [2001] 169 F
Supp 2d 1181, 1186 ,http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
FSupp2/169/1181/2423974/.. See also Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6)
213.
112 Both approaches thus seek to somehow transpose geographical borders
onto cyberspace in order to create national cyberspaces. But make no
mistake: both the domain-based approach and the geo-filtering
approaches are rooted in the effects principle (rather than the territoriality
principle). In both instances, it is the accessibility of content in the
both approaches is that they minimize potential interferences with other States sovereignty.113 In principle, only
internet users residing in the territory of the regulating
State are affected by delisting.114 Nevertheless, there may
still be instances in which a demand for global implementation can be justified. As indicated earlier, the
effects principle allows States to regulate behaviour,
which takes place outside its territory insofar as it produces substantial effects within its territory.115 Depending on the circumstances, the continued availability of
certain types of content may produce substantial effects
within a States territoryeven when the content it is
not targeted at its inhabitants or requires additional
efforts to be reach.116 If this is the case, it does not,
however, provide a carte blanche: the regulating State
must still ensure that its demand for global implementation is in fact reasonable.
Reasonableness
The jurisdictional principle of reasonableness requires
States to balance the need for effectiveness against the principle of non-intervention.117 It means States should weigh
the realization of their own policy objectives against the
risk of undue interference with the national policies of
other States.118 The main difficulty with reasonableness is
that it is an amorphous construct, meaning national authorities applying the principle may easily become
biased.119 Moreover, it is not always clear for the parties
involved which parameters will be considered relevant,
thus undermining legal certainty and foreseeability. Still,
principles such as reasonableness offer a more workable
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territory of the regulating State and the resulting impact that supports the
jurisdictional assertion.
For a more detailed discussion of the respective advantages and
disadvantages of each approach, see Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6)
140 1 (who characterizes the domain-based approach as a moderate
country of destination approach and geo-filtering as an outright country
of destination approach).
See also Be Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 11.
Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations (n 34). See also
The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82.
As indicated earlier, EU States are bound under human rights treaties to
adequately protect their citizens privacy interests regardless of the origins
of the attack (cf. above; section 2.3).
See Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations (n 34). The
principle of reasonableness is closely linked (but not identical to) the
principle of comity. For more information see Jurisdiction in
International Law(n 43) 42 et seq. See also Christopher Kuner, Data
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)
(2010) (18)(3) IJLIT, 244.
Id.
As a result, the application of the reasonableness principle would wind up,
not serving the interest of the international community but rather the
interest of one State. (Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (1983) (31)(4) Am. J. Comp. L., 584. See also
Data Protection Law (n 117) 244 5.
Brendan van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek . Internet and jurisdiction after Google Spain
120 Cf. Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 808. Cedric Ryngaert, The Limits of
Substantive International Economic Law: In Support of Reasonable
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Bert Keirsbilck et al. (eds), Facing the
Limits of the Law (Springer, 2009), 248. Moreover, it could be argued
preventing States from adopting legitimate policy objectives due to the
fact that multilateral action is (temporarily) impossible or inadequate
would, from a jurisdictional perspective, arguably have similar impact on
State sovereignty as an unjustifiable intervention in foreign State affairs.
121 Cf. Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 822, with reference to J. Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules (1955) (64)(3) Philosophical Review, 12.
122 See eg Ellen Goodman, Practical obscurity and the right to be forgotten:
pretty much privacy is enough, (LSE Media Policy Blog, 11 February
2015) ,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/02/11/practicalobscurity-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten-pretty-much-privacy-isenough. accessed 1 March 2015. Practical obscurity exists where
information is technically available, but can only be found by spending a
significant amount of time and effort. Hartzog and Stutzman attribute the
term practical obscurity to the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court judgment U.S.
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
[489 U.S. 749 (1989)]. See Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic Stutzman,
The Case for Online Obscurity, (2013) (101)(1) Cal. L. Rev., 21.
123 See eg the specific comments by Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger in
The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, 6
February 2015, 26 7 ,https://drive.google.com/file/d/
0B1UgZshetMd4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view. accessed 1 March 2015. (The
internet is global, the protection of the users rights must also be global. Any
circumvention of these rights must be prevented. Since EU residents are able
to research globally the EU is authorized to decide that the search engine has
to delete all the links globally.).
117
Interest balancing
In the context of antitrust law, the concept of interest
balancing has emerged in an effort to constrain the (perceived) arbitrariness linked to the principle of reasonableness.125 When performing interest balancing, courts
weigh domestic and foreign interests against one
another, based on a list of identified factors.126 The
outcome of this balancing exercise is a determination as
to whether or not there exist sufficient grounds to
warrant extraterritorial jurisdiction. Interest balancing is
somewhat less perilous than mere reasonableness,
mainly because it requires courts to explicitly consider
both domestic and foreign State interests.127
In our view, the principle of interest balancing should
inform the further enforcement of the Google Spain
ruling. When looking at the context of internet search,
several factors seem relevant. First, one should consider
the potential interests other States might have with
regard to the referenced content. In principle, all signatories to the ICCPR have an interest in protecting the accessibility of information available on the web. Article
19(2) ICCPR provides that
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice.
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129 In a similar vein (but with different outcome): Cf. Beyond Internet
Universalism (n 55) 12 4. A practical difficulty here is that States may not
necessarily possess sufficient information to fully assess the interests of
individuals residing in third countries. (Stacie Walsh, The Missing Link:
Where do Third Parties Stand in the Right to be Forgotten? (LSE Media
Policy Project Blog, 12 December 2014), ,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
mediapolicyproject/2014/12/10/the-missing-link-where-do-third-partiesstand-in-the-right-to-be-forgotten/. accessed 18 December 2014.
130 Equally important, however, is ones mental adversary: is the searcher
someone with technical knowledge? Is it someone who might be willing to
invest some time and money to seek out delisted search results? Or is it
someone completely unaware of the fact that there may be a difference
between European and non-European search results?
131 In a similar vein (but with different outcome): Cf. Beyond Internet
Universalism (n 55) 10 11.
132 Harmonization of relevant legislation was also an important factor in the
decision of the court in Equustek. Case No. S112421, Equustek Solutions
Inc. v. Jack [2014] BCSC 1063, at para 149 ,http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/
jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm..
133 See however also Marc Rotenberg, The Right to Privacy Is Global, (U.S.
News Debate Club, 5 December 2014) ,http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-there-be-a-right-to-be-forgotten-on-the-internet/the-rightto-privacy-is-global.
There will always be a theoretical possibility that delisting imposed by one State affects the constituents of
another State. Instead, one should consider whether it is
sufficiently probable that delisting will actually affect
residents in other States. In cases such as Google Spain
(which involved an announcement in a local newspaper
of an event long gone by), we would argue that the interest of other States is quite low. Chances are small that the
constituents of non-EEA States would experience any
real adverse impact from such delisting. Conversely, if
the facts are such that the connection with other jurisdictions is stronger (eg if the search results referred to
content authored by a Canadian author working for a
US newspaper, or if the content refers to an individual of
interest in other jurisdictions), it might well be unreasonable to pursue global implementation.129
Second, one should consider the likelihood of adverse
impact if delisting is confined to local search results.
For example, how high is the likelihood of (continued)
adverse impact if the same search results remain available on other ccTLDs? How high is the likelihood of
adverse impact if the search engine provider were to
employ geo-filtering? As indicated earlier, the answers to
these questions will depend largely on how effective one
thinks these approaches are.130 However, they may also
enable differentiation between cases depending on the
subject matter. For example, cases involving additional
thresholds (such as market dominance in a substantial
part of the internal market) may be decided different
from those in which such additional thresholds are
absent.
A third relevant factor to consider is harmonization.
To what extent is the norm to be enforced shared by
other States? From a jurisdictional point of view, this is
an important question.131 The higher the degree of harmonization between the States, the less problematic an
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction becomes. (It is
difficult to consider the interference with other States
competences as excessive when the relevant states have
(near) unique legislation in place.132) As far as Google
Spain is concerned, this factor would probably weigh
Brendan van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek . Internet and jurisdiction after Google Spain
134 Reliance on territorial links resonates well with the basic tenets of public
international law, which assumes the territory of the State as the more
preferable basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. By further considering the
adverse impact on other States as well as the degree of harmonization, the
potential for excessive interference can be substantially minimized. The
second factor (likelihood of adverse impact) is far more subjective and
should therefore mainly be considered as an additional justification for
tempering extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction in cases where
keeping it local clearly does not stand in the way of achieving the States
policy objective.
119
Conclusion
The EUs jurisdictional authority in Google Spain can be
justified by reference to two principles of international
jurisdiction, namely the territoriality principle and the
effects principle. While the territoriality principle typically supports a strong jurisdictional claim, jurisdiction
based on the effects principle is more contentious. A jurisdictional principle that could be of guidance here is the
principle of interest balancing, which requires national
authorities to balance the need for effective protection
against undue intervention in a foreign States policies.
135
136
137
138
Looking ahead
The previous section identified four factors to determine
whether a State can reasonably demand global delisting.
Of the four factors, greatest weight should be given
to the first (interests of residents of other states), third
(harmonization), and fourth factor (territorial nexi).134
None of the proposed factors are by themselves determinative. Instead, one should look at them in combination to determine whether, on the whole, an order for
global delisting might be justified.
Abstract notions of State sovereignty, reasonableness, and interest balancing are difficult to implement
in practice. While the proposed criteria may help make
these notions more tangible, critics will argue that they
are still too fuzzy. Moreover, they add complexity to
what is already a complex exercise (i.e. balancing an
individuals privacy interests against the publics interest
in having access to that information on the basis of a
name search).
The criteria developed in the previous section were
not developed with a corporate mind set. Public international law is first and foremost a matter for States,
who must carefully weigh their own interests against
those of the international community when exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In its guidance document,
the Article 29 Working Party indicated that that the implementation of the Google Spain ruling should in principle be global.135 In the abstract, this seems excessive.
The Working Partys position becomes more understandable, however, when read in conjunction with the
other guidance contained in this document. According
to the Article 29 Working Party, search engine operators
are only required to modify search results if the privacy
interests of the requestor are not overridden by the
publics interest in having access to that information on
the basis of a name search.136 If there is no overriding
public interest in the EAA, there is unlikely to be a
strong public interest in other States. As a general
matter, the risk of significant adverse impact on the
inhabitants of non-EAA States should therefore be
minimal. Moreover, if the individual concerned is not of
international interest, chances are high that other territorial nexi (e.g., establishment of the publisher and
ARTICLE
120
ARTICLE
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Uta Kohl Joanne Scott,
Peggy Valcke, Cedric Ryngaert and Joris Van Hoboken
for their valuable comments and feedback.
The research leading to this paper has received
funding from the agency for Innovation by Science and
Technology (www.iwt.be) in the context of the project
Security and Privacy for Online Social Networks (www.
spion.me), the Flemish research institute iMinds (www.
iminds.be), the Special Research Fund (Bijzonder
Onderwijs FondsBOF) of KU Leuven and the
European Communitys Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and
demonstration in the context of the REVEAL project
(revealproject.eu) (grant agreement no: 610928).
Declarations
The contribution by Brendan Van Alsenoy has been
carried out under the academic supervision of Prof Peggy
Valcke. Prof Valcke acted as a volunteer member of The
Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten.
Neither Mr Van Alsenoy nor Prof Valcke has received any
direct or indirect financial support from Google for this
publication. The contribution by Marieke Koekoek has
been carried out under the academic supervision of Prof
Geert Van Calster and Prof Cedric Ryngaert. The viewpoints represented in this paper are entirely those of the
authors and should not be associated with any of the
aforementioned entities.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipv003
Advance Access Publication 8 April 2015
Although the existence of such a principle is not generally accepted, some courts have already referred to it as a
basis of limiting the extent to which jurisdiction could
be asserted.
The Article 29 Working Party was rather succinct
regarding the extraterritorial effects of the EUs right to
be delisted. Its guidance document contains no evidence
of a weighing of EU interests against the interests of
other States. Still, it may depend on the circumstances of
each case whether or not global delisting is appropriate.
In Google Spain, there were several elements, which provided a particularly strong link to EU territory. As a
result, insistence on global delisting in such a case may
be justified. However, it should not be excluded that
there may also be situations in which there are also
strong connections to other States, rendering bids for
global delisting more contentious.
Effectiveness of regulation is and will remain an important factor in deciding questions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Preventing States from effectively enforcing
their legislation is as much an infringement of sovereignty as applying domestic regulation extraterritorially.
However, effectiveness cannot be the sole criterion upon
which the further implementation of Google Spain is
based. This would run afoul of the basic tenet of public
international law that territory acts as the primary basis
of jurisdiction. Moreover, effectiveness alone can be
quite a subjective test and so will risk leading to bias. As
a result, one should take into account the potentially
competing interests of other States involved. This article
has proposed four factors for application of interest balancing to the context of internet search. While these
factors will undoubtedly be contested, we hope they will