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Aboitiz Shipping v.

City of Cebu
G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965
Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and
approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27 where plaintiffs were made to pa
wharfage charges under protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement enjoined
in so far as the wharves, docks and ordinance declared other landing places belonging to the
National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far collected by defendants
refunded to them. Appellees allege that the Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is
claimed by them under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, which grants them the
legislative power To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public
wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.
Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide by ordinance for the collection
of wharfage from vessels that dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned
by the National Government.
No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National Government. It is unreasonable to
conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17
(w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage
irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved. The National Government did not
surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an
intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation of paying twice for the
same purpose.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of
an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.
For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application if
viewed together with other provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is declared
null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected thereunder
and to refrain from making such collection.


PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased
aportion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the
same,and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objectiona n d s o d i d t h e w o m e n ' s
groups and the yo uth. De mo nstrations were led b y the ma yo r and the
c i t y legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the
city.The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayand e
Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation
o f a c a s i n o a n d Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the
respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralizeand regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines.The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power
under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:* * * S e c .
1 6 . G e n e r a l Wel f a r e . E v e r y l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t u n i t s h a l l e x e r c i s e t h e
powerse x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d , t h o s e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d t h e r e f r o m , a s w e l l
a s p o w e r s n e c e s s a r y , appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essentialto the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichmentof culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology,e n c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f
a p p r o p r i a t e a n d s e l f - r e l i a n t s c i e n t i f i c a n d technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.T h e r e i s a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e s s h o u l d n o t
c o n t r a v e n e a s t a t u t e . M u n i c i p a l governments are only agents of the national
g o v e r n m e n t . L o c a l c o u n c i l s e x e r c i s e o n l y d e l e g a t e d legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannotbe superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatthe local government units can undo the
acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power inthe first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the
status of a statute that cannotbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.T h e r e f o r e , t h e p e t i t i o n
i s D E N I E D a n d t h e c h a l l e n g e d d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i s AFFIRMED.

Title of the Case:

, et. al., petitioners,vs.The Honorable
, et. al.,respondents G.R. No. & Date: L-42571-72. J uly 25, 1983P onente:FERNANDO, J. Doctrine/Topic:
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles ofBills; Subject shall be expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is anowner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as
aprohibition and closure ordinance which wasbased on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (butwas originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city boardor council of each chartered city shall have thepower to regulate by ordinance
the establishment,maintenance and operation of night clubs,cabarets

and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction

5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section wasamended to include not merely the power toregulate, but likewise "prohibit."
6. The title, however, remained the same. It isworded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibitionwith
preliminary injunction were filed on thegrounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and voidas a municipality has no authority to prohibit alawful
business, occupation or calling; (2)Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners'right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as
the license previously given topetitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicialhearing; and (3)That under Presidential DecreeNo. 189 (as
amended, by Presidential Decree No.259 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, hasbeen
transferred to the Department of Tourism.8. The respondent Judge issued a restrainingorder on November 7, 1975. Then came onJanuary 15,
1976 the decision upholding theconstitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.84 and dismissing the cases. Hence, thispetition
for certiorari by way of appeal.
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibitthe exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses
A. Decision:
The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may beregulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed,set aside, and nullified.
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of theMunicipality of Bocaue is declared void andunconstitutional.
B. Rationale:
Since there is no dispute as the title limits thepower to regulating, not prohibiting, it would resultin the statute being invalid if, as was
done by theMunicipality of Bocaue, the operation of a nightclub was prohibited.
A refusal to grant licenses, because no suchbusinesses could legally open, would be subjectto judicial correction. That is to comply with
thelegislative will to allow the operation andcontinued existence of night clubs subject toappropriate regulations.
It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if onlythe above portion of the Act were considered, amunicipal council may go as far as to prohibit
theoperation of night clubs. If that were all, then theappealed decision is not devoid of support in law. Additionally, the title
was not in any way altered,as the exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
There is thus support for the view advanced bypetitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutionalquestion. The Constitution mandates: "Every billshall embrace only one subject which shall
beexpressed in the title thereof."

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987

FACTS: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
to continue thededuction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
other members of the judiciary.This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on December 4,
1987.Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the RTC,National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin theCommissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that
this constitutes diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, ArticleVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by
law and that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. With the filingof the
petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt
with thematter administratively.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the salaries of judges are subject to tax.
RULING:The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers. Although suchintent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the
intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers.
Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David do notapply anymore. Justices and judges
are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service ingovernment and yet
subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTSJanuary 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votesin a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest provinces and
city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number of
inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act forthe Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the provinceof Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also
issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the
only province which voted favorably
then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first Monday of
March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February
5 , 1 9 9 0 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board
andCordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued
Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly and all offices underExecutive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as theConstitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of morethan one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
m e m o r a n d u m o f t h e S ec retar y of J ustice, Administr ative Orde r No. 160, and
R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 6 8 6 1 a n d prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending

publicfunds for the purposeb . d e c l a r e E x e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 2 2 0 c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e C o r d i l l e r a

E x e c u t i v e B o a r d a n d t h e Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until
anotherorganic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is
duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute suchregion.

RULING: No. the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
connotes that a region consists of more than one unit. In its ordinary sense region
means two or more provinces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.

Calderon vs Carale GR 91636

Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It
provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all beappointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated
thepredecessor.Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissionersof
the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments statedthat the appointees may
qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary
Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161,series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the
newly appointed commissioners.Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended bythe President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC,
withoutsubmitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to RA 6715as amended.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity and
which he contends that the law is not an encroachment on theappointing power of the executive as provided for in
the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by thePresident additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
Whether Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments
extended by the president to government officers, in addition tothose expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
No. The provisions of first paragraph Art. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is exclusiveand cannot be expanded by
mere act of legislation. Even the Solicitor-General stated that theprovision of that law appertaining to the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointmentstransgresses the Constitution and is therefore, without any legal
basis.The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715, Sec. 13 is unconstitutional because:1) it amends by
legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by addingthereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution, byimposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments
which areotherwise entrusted only with the President.The Court further stated that the legislature cannot, upon
passing law which violates aconstitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by
adeclaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.Thus, the Supreme Court said
the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation bythe Commission on Appointments, as the
provision in RA 6715 is declared unconstitutional. TheNLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom
the President may be authorizedby law to appoint.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS267 SCRA 402 February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding
inSeptember 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to
theRenong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner
which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending thedeclaration of Renong
Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize also
with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the
GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and themanagers check.One day after the filing of the petition
in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining therespondents from perfecting and consummating the
sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.
ISSUE:Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
COURT RULING:The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept
thematching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case
at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a
positive command which is complete initself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to
enforce it. The Court En Bancemphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as
mandated by the provision in question.The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the
51% of the equity of saidhotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the
majority andcontrolling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the
nationscultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.