Gaviola vs People of the Philippines

(Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
products.)
(Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken
from the premises of a plantation.)
Facts:
With the land dispute issue between the parties, the court clearly identified the
demarcation of the properties involve therein. Having known of the said court decision,
the accused still gathered 1500 of coconuts from the land of Cleto Eusebio and was
convicted of qualified theft. On appeal, he invoked his honest belief that he owned the
land which negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of theft.
Issues:
Whether or not the act of taking the coconuts from anothers plantation
constitutes qualified theft.
Held:
Yes. In all cases where one in good faith takes anothers property under
claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile
or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on
behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a
mere pretense, it will not protect the taker. Gaviola cannot feign ignorance or
even unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and bounds of the
properties involved as it is categorically stated clearly that the three parcels of
land are distinct and separate from each other. Hence, Gaviolas claim of good
faith in taking the coconuts is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability and
was guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified theft but under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of
a plantation.

People vs Rodrigo
(Theft, intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to
the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does not belong to him.)
Facts:
Muerteigue complained of a stealing incident declaring his horse being stolen. Rodrigo
was convicted of the crime of theft for having known of the said incident but failed to
deliver the same to authorities or its owner. On appeal, he contends that intent to gain is
absent since the horse was lost and not stolen.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of not returning a lost horse falls under the third element (intent
to gain) of theft.
Held:
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (1) of the Crime of Theft, the elements are (1) the finding of
lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner. In this kind of theft intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to
deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does
not belong to him. The contention that since the complaint refers to a stolen horse, does
not fall under said particular paragraph, "stolen property" not being the same as "lost
property." The argument is without merit. The word "lost" is generic in nature, and
embraces loss by stealing or by any act of a person other than the owner, as well as by
the act of the owner himself or through some casual occurrence. If anything, the finder
who fails deliberately to return the thing lost may be considered more blameworthy if the
loss was by stealing than through some other means.

Abundo vs Sandigan Bayan

Facts:
Rafael Abundo, a public officer, being then the Disrict Engineer of the DPWH of Virac,
Catanduanes, made a request in writing, duly addressed to the Area Equipment
Services Office, to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor
vehicles lying idle in the Capitol compound. His request was granted by Equipment
Engineer Marcelo R. Alberto, the Motor Pool Officer. A memorandum receipt was issued
and signed by him and Engineer Alberto. Pursuant thereto, Romeo Go, the Supply
Officer and Property Custodian of the Catanduanes Area Equipment Services,
authorized Abundos driver, Geronimo Romero, to take the chassis out of the DPWH
site in the Capitol Compound. Typewritten on the receipt is a note signed by Alberto that
"this chassis is included in the I and I Report (Inventory and Inspection Report) for
properties subject to disposal by the Area Equipment Services." For this reason, Alberto
received the chassis subject to the condition, also typewritten on the receipt that he
would "negotiate with the winning highest bidder for the junk property after the public
auction or return same in case of failure to agree on cost."
The chassis, with the engine of Abundo installed thereon, was taken out of the capitol
compound and brought to a shop owned by Leon Caten for the installation of a body.
The proposed body, however, did not fit the chassis. Because Napoleon Co., another
Chinese dealer, offered to sell and install a stainless jeep body on the old chassis
owned by Abundo, he decided to return, through his driver, the government chassis to
the capitol site from where it was originally taken. The chassis having been actually
returned in December 1985, the Memorandum Receipt therefor was, in turn, returned to
the driver. Later on a complaint was filed against Abundo and was convicted for
qualified theft.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of qualified theft.
Held:
No.
The essential elements of the crime of theft are the following:
1. There must be a taking;
2. The property belongs to another;
3. The taking was done with intent to gain;
4. That it was done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That it was accomplished without violence or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things (Santos vs. People, 181 SCRA 487).
Absent any of the elements of the crime, the prosecution must fail.

In this case, the element of lack of the owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis
was absent. The facts clearly show that there was no furtive taking or unlawful
asportation, in the criminal sense, of the chassis. The delivery of the chassis to the
petitioner was properly documented. The transfer or "turn over" was subject to the
condition, stated in the Memorandum Receipt.
It must be emphasized that both Abundo and Alberto thought and believed the latter to
be clothed with the authority to lend out the subject chassis. It was upon this honest
perception that both acted accordingly on the part of the Abundo by requesting in
writing for the use of the junk chassis and on the part of Alberto by consenting thereto,
finally culminating in the issuance of a Memorandum Receipt. Needless to state, a thief
does not ask for permission to steal.

Valenzuela vs. People

FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket,
he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of
detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting.
Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons
of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside.
As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of
the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently
apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of
the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals,
arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.
HELD:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all
the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime
of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already
committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already
ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be
attempted or consummated.

Matrido vs People
Facts:
Private respondent, Empire East Land Holdings Inc. filed a case against Matrido for
estafa in the Makati Prosecutors Office for failing to remit payments received from its
clients. By resolution, the prosecution office dismissed the complaint for estafa for
insufficiency of evidence but found probablecause to indict petitioner for qualified theft.
RTC convicted the Matrido of qualified theft and was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner
challenges the conviction by contending that despite the indictment for qualified theft,
the prosecution was trying to prove estafa during trial, thus violating her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial court.
Held:
No. The appellate court correctly explained that conversion of personal property in the
case of an employee having material possession of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have
been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa. Notably,
petitioners belated argument that she was not an employee but an agent of private
complainant grants her no respite in view of her stipulation during pre-trial and her
admission at the witness stand of the fact of employment. Petitioners reliance on estafa
cases involving factual antecedents of agency transactions is thus misplaced.