UPDATES ON LAW ON RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DARAB

BY:
ASEC AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
DARAB

1. LEGAL BASIS OF THE DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE.

1.a. Section 49, RA No. 6657:

"Rules and Regulations The PARC and the DAR shall have the power
to issue rules and regulations whether substantive or procedural, to carry
out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10)
days after publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation."
1.b. Section 50, Republic Act No. 6657:

"Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR

The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources DENR) . . . ."
1.c. Section 34, Executive Order No. 129-A:

"Implementing Authority of the Secretary.

The Secretary shall issue orders, rules and regulations and other
issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation
of the provisions of this Executive Order."
1.d. Section 17, Executive Order No. 229:

"Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.

The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the DENR and DA. . . ."
2. EVOLUTION OF JURISDICTION ON AGRARIAN CASES.

Rule: The jurisdiction of court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of an action.

2.a. Section 12, Presidential Decree No. 946 vested the then Court of Agrarian
Relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted
and obligations imposed by presidential issuance promulgated in relation to the
agrarian reform program.
2.b. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. The
Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and
the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.
2.c. Section 17, Executive Order No. 229 Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.
The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR and the DA.
(Note: Sec. 50, RA 6657 substantially reiterates Section 17, EO 229 while
Sections 56 and 57 provide for the designation of at least one branch of the RTC
in each province as a Special Agrarian Court. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197)
3. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. (DARAB OR OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, SEC. 50, RA 6657)

3.a. Primary Jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate Agrarian Reform

Matters: and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform; except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995))
3.b. DARAB has JURISDICTION over Agrarian Disputes: (Central
Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 96)
3.b.1. Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or indications of such tenurial arrangements. (Par. D,
Sec. 3, RA 6657) (Isidro vs. CA, 228 SCRA 503)
4. DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE:
4.a. DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure
Effectivity February 6, 1989;
4.b. DARAB New Rules of Procedure
Effectivity June 22, 1994;
4.c. DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure
Effectivity February 8, 2003.
5.

CASES UNDER THE PRIMARY

JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB.

AND

EXCLUSIVE

Sec. 1, Rule II. 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. They are as follows:

ORIGINAL

5.a. Cases involving rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or

juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands (Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 259 (1988); Oarde vs.
CA, 280 SCRA 235 (1997);
5.b. Preliminary administrative determination of just compensation
(Executive Order No. 405);
5.c. Annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their
amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition of
the DAR or LBP;
5.d. Ejectment and dispossession of tenants/leaseholders:
5.e. Sale, alienation, pre-emption, and redemption of agricultural lands;
5.f. Correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent
issuances of registered CLOAs and EPs;
5.g. Review of leasehold rentals;
5.h. Collection of amortizations on payments for lands awarded under PD
No. 27, including payment for residential, commercial and industrial lots
within settlement and resettlement areas;
5.i. Annulment or rescission of lease contracts and deeds of sale and the
cancellation or amendments of titles of lands under the administration of
DAR, homestead patents, free patents, miscellaneous sales patents, to
setters in settlement and resettlement areas;
5.j. Boundary disputes;
5.k. Determination of title of agricultural lands where the issue is raised in
an agrarian dispute;
5.l. Cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12; PD No. 946;
5.m. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it
by the Secretary of DAR.
6. AGRARIAN LAW IMPLEMENTATION CASES.

Sec. 3. Rule 11, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure and Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 2000. These cases are exclusively cognizable and under the
exclusive prerogative of the Office of the Secretary of DAR.
6.a. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under
the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and EPs,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such
coverage;

6.b. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or

disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
6.c. Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
6.d. Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of
Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases
outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with
the Register of Deeds;
6.e. Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
6.f. Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA
6657;
6.g. Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ)
Opinion No. 44 (1990);
6.h. Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for
livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
6.i. Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
6.j. Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject to Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable
for agricultural purposes;
6.k. Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and purposes
including protests or oppositions thereto;
6.l. Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to
homelots;
6.m. Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's
landholdings;
6.n. Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
6.o. Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its
predecessors; or
6.p. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it
by the Secretary of the DAR.
7. SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT (SAC).
The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) within each province to act as Special Agrarian Court.

Section 56 of R.A. No. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian

Courts". These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have,
according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a)
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA
176)

7.a. "Just Compensation" is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court, that the measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
7.b. "The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original
and exclusive", because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as
the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. For the matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to courts cannot be
foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of
administrative action" (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals , G.R. No.
132767, January 18, 2000).
"It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section 11, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for
determination of just compensation has already been transformed into an
appellate jurisdiction.
It only means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative
law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency
to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be
paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination is subject
to challenge in the courts (ibid).
7.c. Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657
granting the Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction
(administrative proceeding) to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform
matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction cover "all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform" which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the provisions of Sec. 57, R.A. 6657
granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction"
(judicial proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses
under Republic Act No. 6657. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322
SCRA 139).
The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except
on the aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over

which regular courts have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA
885)
Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever between the parties that could bring a controversy under the
ambit of the agrarian reform laws, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board has no jurisdiction. (Heirs of the Late Herman Rey
Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293).
7.d. Supreme Court Circulars on Jurisdiction Re: Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
7.d.1. Office of Court Administrator Circular No. 79-2003, June 12,
2003 Issuance of TROs & Writs of Preliminary Injunction (PI)
Presbitero J. Velasco;
7.d.2. Office of Court Administrator Circular No. 23-2004, February
13, 2004 Reiteration of Circulars Regarding TROs, Writs of
Preliminary Injunction (PI), Prohibition & Mandamus over Cases
under CARP Presbitero J. Velasco.
7.d.3. Administrative Circular No. 38-2002, August 28, 2002
Implementation of Sec. 68, RA 6657 Immunity of Gov't. Agencies
from Undue Interference No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by lower courts, against
DAR, DAR, DENR & DOJ in the implementation of the CARP.
Chief Justice (CJ) Hilario G. Davide
7.d.4. Administrative Circular No. 29-2002, July 1, 2002
Avoidance of Conflict of Jurisdiction over Cases under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

8. ELEMENTS OF TENANCY.
The leading cases are the following, to wit:

8.a. Bernas vs. CA, 225 SCRA 119 (1993) Consent of the lawful
possessor creates tenancy;
8.b. Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 229 (1992) A hollow block
maker or piggery/poultry owner cannot claim tenancy on land which
is not devoted to agricultural production;
8.c. Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197 (1992) Tenancy is created
by the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful
means and not by imposition or usurpation.
8.d. Zamoras vs. Su, Jr. 184 SCRA 248 (1990) An overseer
cannot be a tenant because of the absence of personal cultivation.
Also in Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981), there is no

tenancy because of the absence of sharing arrangement with an

overseer.
8.e. Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 (1988) Agricultural
production is not present. Respondent is only a caretaker who cannot
qualify to be a tenant.
Note: Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88 (1966) The SC considered a
caretaker as a tenant.
8.f. Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969) Where there is
sharing of the produce or rental payment, tenancy exists.
9. EJECTMENT OF TENANTS FOR NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS.

9.a. Par. 6, Sec. 36, RA 3844 The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due, Provided, . . .
9.b. Presidential Decree No. 816 (October 21, 1975) penalized any agricultural
lessee on rice and corn lands under PD 27 who deliberately refuses or continues
to refuse to pay rentals or amortization when they are due and remain unpaid
within a period of two years.
9.c. Section 38. Statute of Limitations Application to Sec. 36, RA 3844.
9.d. Roxas y Cia vs. Hon. Jose R. Cabatuando, et al., 1 SCRA 1106 The
mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give
the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on
the part of the tenant to pay, or there is failure of crop due to fortuitous event.
10. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION:
Spouses Eligio P. Mallari, et al., vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. [G.R. No. 106615.
March 20, 2002]
Ignacio Arcega et al., vs. Honorable Norberto C. Ponce, et al. [G.R. No. 108591.
March 20, 2002]
Spouses Eligio P. Mallari, et al., vs. Ignacio Arcega et al. [G.R. 109452. March 20,
2002]
Spouses Eligio P. Mallari, et al., vs. Ignacio Arcega et al. [G.R. No. 109978. March
20, 2002]
Spouses Eligio P. Mallari, et al., vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. [G.R. No. 139379.
March 20, 2002]
The appellate court correctly ruled that it is not necessary for the lessee to make a
tender of payment and/or consignation of the amount of redemption price, and that a
certification issued by the Land Bank that it will finance the redemption of the property
in question is sufficient. . ."

"Section 11 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is a provision on the lessee's right of preemption and provides that: '. . . If the agricultural lessee agrees with the terms and
conditions of the sale . . . [he] must either tender payment of, or present a certificate from
the Land Bank that it shall make payment . . . on the price of the landholding to the
agricultural lessor. If the latter refuses to accept such tender or presentment, he may
consign it with the court . . . ' True, said provision does not appear in Section 12 thereof,
which refers to the lessees' right of redemption. However, there is no doubt that within
the context of the Code and in line with this Court's exhortation that a liberal
interpretation of the Code's provisions is imperative, to give it full force and effect to its
clear intent, the lessee-preemptioner and the lessee-redemptioner have the same rights
and are in the same footing and category insofar as the availment of the facilities of the
Land Bank and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform are concerned. Moreover, it is explicitly
provided in Section 12 that 'the Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate while the
Land Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the case of preemption.' Hence, it is not
necessary for tenants redemptioners to make a tender of payment and/or consignation
of the redemption price. A certification from the Land Bank to finance the redemption
when presented will suffice.
11. VALUATION OF LANDS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27.

11.a. The value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2-1/2) times
the AVERAGE HARVEST OF THREE NORMAL CROP YEARS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE PROMULGATION OF THIS DECREE.
11.b. LBP vs. CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1990 The
Supreme Court decided not to apply the 6% increment to the valuation because
the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARAD's use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price
in the valuation of the private respondent's lands following the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in the case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168.
11.c. Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Y. Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15 and LBP vs.
CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15.
DOCTRINES
11.c.1. "The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative
bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in"
the details, and all that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in a conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular
No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of
P.D. 27, i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the
tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they're tilling."
11.c.2. Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27 it is therefore valid and has the
force of law. The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly
recognized by the appellate court when it stated that "(T)he main purpose
of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the
tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
land . . . . The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-

farmer's lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against
the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual
obligor for said purchase price." Since the assailed Circular essentially
sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid.
Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.
11.c.3. The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D.
No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No.
816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease
rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been
determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other
hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates
that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of
the land has been determined.
11.c.4. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued
pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in
isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Private respondent,
however, "split hairs," so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is
premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816,
whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in
implementation of P.D. 27, These must not be read in isolation, but rather,
in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be
made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been
determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their
amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly,
there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR
Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for
the payment of lease rentals on the agricultural property.
11.c.5. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a
judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number
of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, 24
P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of
the law of the land, viz.: "There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly
therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part
and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution
itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That
would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it
has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so
because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the
fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk
of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a
feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an
open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of
a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and
precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the
past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no
justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical

norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing

and not thwarting fundamental policy goals."
11.c.6. The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in
Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive
unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of
the property by the Barrrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR,
the parties may bring dispute to court in order to determine the
appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the
prerogative of the court. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of
Section 2 of E.O. 228:
". . . In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount
of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production
concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its
submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent
issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the
dispute, the landowner's compensation shall still be processed for
payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the
court."

11.c.7. The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP
Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and
private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229; while P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands.
12. EXECUTION OF THE ADJUDICATOR'S DECISION PENDING APPEAL TO
THE BOARD.

12.a. Section 2, Rule XX, 2003 DARAB Rules: "Execution Pending Appeal.
Any motion for execution of the decision of the adjudicator pending appeal
shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious
grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the
payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the
final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement
shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant."
12.b. Section 3, Rule XX, 2003 DARAB Rules: "Execution when issued;
Exception. On Motion of the prevailing party or motu proprio, the Board or the
adjudicator shall order execution of an order or decision that has already
became final and executory.
Appeal shall not stay the execution of a decision or order except when the
ejectment of a tenant farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller, settler or amortizing
owner-cultivator is directed.

When the decision is based on an amicable settlement or compromise

agreement, the same shall be immediately executory."