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o lado irrational
da gerncia que da mudana
a maioria de programas da mudana falham, mas as probabilidades do sucesso podem
extremamente
ser melhoradas fazendo exame no cliente destas introspeces counterintuitive sobre
como
os empregados interpretam seu ambiente e o escolhem agir.
Carolyn Aiken e
Scott Keller
em 1996, John Kotter publicaram mudana principal. Considerado por muitos
para ser o trabalho seminal no campo da gerncia da mudana, a pesquisa
de Kotter revelou que somente 30 por cento de programas da mudana sucedem. Desde
que
a liberao do livro, literalmente milhares dos livros e dos artigos de jornal
foi publicada no tpico, e os cursos dedicados mudana controlando so
agora parte de muitos programas principais do MBA. Contudo em 2008, um exame de
McKinsey
de 3.199 executivos em torno do mundo encontrado, como Kotter, que somente uma
transformao em trs sucede. Outros estudos sobre os dez anos passados
revelam resultados notvelmente similares. Parece que, apesar da sada prolific,
o campo da gerncia da mudana no conduziu a uns programas mais bem sucedidos da muda
na.
Tambm no ajudou que a maioria academics e de practitioners concordam agora com
os blocos de edifcio para influenciar atitudes do empregado e comportamento
da gerncia. Emily Lawson de McKinsey e o preo de Colin forneceram um perspective
holstico no psychology da gerncia da mudana, 1 que sugere
que quatro circunstncias bsicas so necessrias antes que os empregados mudarem seu
comportamento: a) uma histria compelindo, porque os empregados devem ver o ponto
da mudana e concordar com ela; b) papel que modela, porque devem tambm ver
o CEO e os colegas admiram comportar-se na maneira nova; c) reforando
mecanismos, porque os sistemas, os processos, e os incentives devem ser na linha
do comportamento novo; e edifcio da potencialidade de d), porque os empregados de
vem ter
as habilidades requeridas para fazer as mudanas desejadas.
Preo
da prtica
1Colin da organizao
do il
W
e
b b
de N e e Emily Lawson, o psychology da gerncia da mudana, mckinseyquarterly.com, ju
nho 2003.
O McKinsey 2009 trimestrais nmero 2102
esta prescrio aterrado bem no campo do psychology e inteiramente
racional. Um de seus mritos sua apelao intuitive: muitos gerentes sentem
que, uma vez que revelado, sentido comum simplesmente bom. E isto, ns acreditamos
,
somos precisamente onde as coisas vo erradamente. A prescrio direita, mas os gerent
es
racionais que tentam pr as quatro circunstncias no lugar aplicando
o tempo e a energia do misdirect do sentido comum tipicamente, cram as mensagens
que faltam a marca, e a experincia frustrando conseqncias unintended
de seus esforos influenciar a mudana. Por que? Porque quando implement a prescrio, eles negligenciarem certo, s vezes irrational-mas
predictable-elementos da natureza humana.
Em nossa pesquisa e trabalhando com as companhias que tentam a mudana, ns
identificamos nove introspeces em como a natureza humana comea na maneira
ment the experiment has taken place in, researchers have always found that
they have to pay at least five times more to those who came up with their
own number.
This reveals something about human nature: when we choose for ourselves,
we are far more committed to the outcome (almost by a factor of five to
one). Conventional approaches to change management underestimate this
impact. The rational thinker sees it as a waste of time to let others discover
The McKinsey Quarterly 2009 Number 2104
for themselves what he or she already knowswhy not just tell them and be
done with it? Unfortunately this approach steals from others the energy needed
to drive change that comes through a sense of ownership of the answer.
At BP, to develop a comprehensive training program for frontline leaders,
a decision was made to involve every key constituency in the design of the
program, giving them a sense of writing their own lottery ticket. It
took a year and a half to complete the design using this model but was well
worth it: now in implementation, the program is the highest rated of its
kind at BP. More than 250 active senior managers from across the business
willingly teach the course, and, most important, managers who have
been through the training program are consistently ranked higher in performance than those who havent, both by their bosses and by the employees
who report to them.
3. It takes a story with both + and to create real energy. The deficit based
approachwhich identifies the problem, analyzes whats wrong and how to
fix it, plans, and then takes actionhas become the model predominantly
taught in business schools and is presumably the default change model in most
organizations. Research has shown, however, that a story focused on
whats wrong invokes blame and creates fatigue and resistance, doing little to
engage peoples passion and experience.
This has led to the rise of the constructionist based approach to change,
where the change process is based on discovery (discovering the best of
what is), dreaming (imagining what might be), designing (talking about what
should be), and destiny (creating what will be). The problem
with this approach is that
an overemphasis on the positive can lead to watereddown aspirations and impact.
The reason is that, as
humans, we are more willing
to take risks to avoid losing what weve got than we are to gain something
more. Some anxiety is useful when it comes to spurring behavioral change.
We believe the field of change management has drawn an artificial divide
between deficit-based and constructionist-based approaches and stories.
While it is impossible to prescribe generally how the divide should be split
between positive and negative messages (as it will be specific to the context
of any given change program), we strongly advise managers not to swing
the pendulum too far in one direction or another. Consider Jack Welch, former
CEO at GE, who took questions of whats wrong here? (poorly performing
The fact is that human beings consistently
think they are better than they are
a phenomenon referred to in psychology as
a self-serving bias
105The irrational side of change management
businesses, silo-driven behavior, and so forth) head-on, as well as imagining what might be (number one or two in every business, openness, and
accountability).
Role modeling
Conventional change management suggests leaders should take actions that
role model the desired change and mobilize a group of influence leaders
to drive change deep into the organization. Unfortunately, this does not
do with it).
The beauty of this equation for change managers is that small, unexpected
rewards can have disproportionate effects on employees satisfaction with
a change program. Gordon M. Bethune, while turning around Continental
Airlines, sent an unexpected $65 check to every employee when Continental
made it to the top five for on-time airlines. John McFarlane, former CEO of
ANZ Bank, sent a bottle of champagne to every employee for Christmas
with a card thanking them for their work on the companys Perform, Grow,
and Break-out change program. Most change managers would refer to
these as merely token gestures and argue that their impact is limited and shortlived. Employees on the receiving end beg to differ. Indeed, they consistently report back that the rewards have a disproportionately positive impact
on change motivation that lasts for months, if not years.
7. The process and the outcome have got to be fair. Employees will go against
their own self-interest if the situation violates other notions they have
about fairness and justice. Consider a bank, which, as part of a major change
program, created new risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) models and
107The irrational side of change management
delivered the resulting new pricing schedules to the front line along with new
and appropriate sales incentives. The result: customer attrition (not only of
the unprofitable ones) and price overrides went through the roof and significant value was destroyed by the effort. What went wrong? Because the
frontline bankers perceived the changes as unfair to the customer, a significant number of them vocally bad-mouthed the banks policies to customers
and used price overrides to show their good faith, even though it meant they
were less likely to achieve individual sales goals.
In making any changes to company structures, processes, systems,
and incentives, change managers should pay what might strike them as an
John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Boston: Harvard
Business Press, 1996.
Danah Zohar, Rewiring the Corporate Brain: Using the
New Science to Rethink How We Structure and Lead
Organizations, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1997.
Richard Barrett, Liberating the Corporate Soul:
Building a Visionary Organization, Woburn, MA:
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998.
Don Edward Beck and Christopher C. Cowan, Spiral
Dynamics: Mastering Values, Leadership, and Change,
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1996.
Ellen J. Langer, The illusion of control, in
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
eds. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1982. This chapter describes the lottery ticket study
mentioned on page 103.
Andreas Priestland and Robert Hanig, Developing
first-level leaders, Harvard Business Review, 2005,
Volume 83, Number 6, pp. 11220.
Bernard J. Mohr and Jane Magruder Watkins, The
Essentials of Appreciative Inquiry: A Roadmap for
Creating Positive Futures, Waltham, MA: Pegasus,
2002. The juxtaposition of the deficit-based and
constructionist-based approaches to change is
described in this work.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices,
values, and frames, American Psychologist, 1984,
Volume 39, Number 4, pp. 34150. In this article,
Kahneman and Tversky propose evidence that
humans are irrational loss avoiders.
Brad M. Barber and Terrance Odean, Boys will be