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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents the review of related literature and studies


considered germane to the present study. The review comes in two forms,
namely (1) related literature which will broaden our view towards the topic
and (2) related study which serves us the basis in comprehending the ideas
and concepts that would assist in defining the Political Dynasty in the
Philippines.

In Alfred W. McCoys An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the


Philippines (2009) states that Aquinos Constitutional Commission adopted
articles designed to break, for all time, the influence of political dynasties
through both universal term limits and a specific prohibition on relatives ()
holding any public office.
But the famous political scientist Gaetano Mosca (1966 [1896], p. 74)
who, writing in 1986, argued in his book The Ruling Class that every class
displays the tendency to become hereditary, in fact if not in law. In which
even if the position in the public office in the Philippines is accessible to
every qualified individual, a family tie to those already in power would confer
various advantages.

Political dynasty was further discussed by Shiela S. Coronel et. Al.


(2004) in the book the rulemakers

discussing the seven ms of dynasty

building which are the following; money, machine, media and/or movies,
marriage, murder/ mayhem, myth, and mergers (alliance). Thoroughly
elaborated the different factors that facilitates the candidate in dynasty
building.
One of the article found in the The Economist Newspaper entitled
Born to Rule (2013), the author provides us a better understand why we
have such phenomenon and quote In some families the desire to go into
politics is not prompted merely by general interest in the subject; it may
also be a matter of defending the family name.. Hence, a lot of politicians
children pursue the path of public service that was paved by their parents.

Furthermore, the death of the politician spouse leads to the habit of


drafting a widow as a candidate that follows the abandoned legacy build by
the decease. Best example provided in the article of Shiela Coronel entitled
Cory Aquino and democracy in the Philippines and quote The killing
of Benigno Aquino brought "Cory", as she became affectionately known to
Filipinos, into the limelight and into a defiant challenge to these realities.
She united the opposition and ran for the presidency against Marcos. She
campaigned throughout the country, holding audiences rapt by recounting in
a flat monotone the story of her husband's homecoming and death. When

she told Filipinos, "I am like you, a victim of Marcos", there was silence and
tears. Her story mirrored so many of their own and her courageous
expression of it released the potential for others to articulate their hopes for
change. It was a profound democratic moment in the history of the
Philippines.

REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

In the research of Yasushi Asako et. Al. (2012) entitled Dynastic


Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan. They found out that dynastic
politicians have a higher probability of winning in elections, but yield less
economic benefits for the majority of constituents in the district once
elected. Our empirical analysis using data from Japan offers several notable
findings. First, dynastic politicians enjoy the legislative and electoral
advantages over non-dynastic counterparts. Second, dynastic candidates
enjoy a higher probability of winning and a higher vote share than nondynastic candidates. Third and most importantly, the areas represented by
dynastic legislators receive a larger amount of discretionary grants than the
areas represented by non-dynastic legislators, yet the increased transfers do

not boost economic performance in the area. Rather, prefectures face worse
economic performance when represented by dynastic legislators.

Furthermore the term limit that was provided in the Philippine


Constitution was scrutinized by Pablo Querubin and concludes in his research
that The evidence provided in this paper suggests that term limits do not
effectively increase the turnover of incumbent families in congress and
provincial governorships in the Philippines. Moreover, term limits may
backfire due to the behaviour they induce in incumbents and challengers
before and after they bind. Term limits may allow lower quality politicians to
remain in power for longer periods of time, relative to a scenario without
term limits where political competition is stiffer. By making incumbents safer
in their earlier terms, term limits may exacerbate agency problems and
result in less effort and accountability. Similarly, term limits may exacerbate
the dynastic nature of Philippine politics by providing incentives for
incumbents to bring additional members of their family to power and thus
control several offices simultaneously.

Furthermore, Julius Cesar I. Trajano et. Al. (2013) found out in their
studies that A key factor which contributes to the perpetuation of dynastic
politics in the Philippines is the weak political party system. Political
dynasties are the building blocks of Philippine politics. Major political parties

such as the ruling Liberal Party, United Nationalist Alliance and Nacionalista
Party merely exist through alliances forged among powerful political families.
Party leaders and candidates for public office are recruited not through a
rigid process of selection within political parties but through traditional
kinship network.
In relation, as the Institute for Popular Democracy (Gutierrez et al.
1992) says, what passes for political parties in the Philippines are coalitions
of political clans. The building blocks of parties are families. Without the
clans, parties are empty shells.