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Lang. Soc.
10, 227-249.
A BSTRACT
$2.50
(?
198I
CambridgeUniversityPress
227
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different contexts. For example, the utterance, "The wastebasketis full," may
be a simple assertion, or it may have the force of a directive if addressed to
someone who is responsiblefor emptying the wastebasket.My utterance,"Shut
the door," has the illocutionaryforce of a command (directive, order, request,
suggestion, etc.) if I intend to command someone to shut the door. However, in
the context of this article, "Shut the door" has no such force since 1, the author,
am not commandingyou, the reader, to do anything.
Searle's and Vendler's analyses show that illocutionary acts presuppose a
speaker- a centerof experience whose intentdefines the act. To this I would add
that illocutionaryacts also presupposean intendedrecipient. That is, illocutionary force must be on some other person. For example, "Shut the door" has
directive force only on the person addressed, not on anyone who overhears. If
there is no intendedrecipient, there is no illocutionaryact. (However, the recipient may be a diffuse collectivity, such as the readershipto whom the assertions
in this article are addressed.) The illotLutionary force on the recipient is entirely
determined by the speaker and is distinct from the perlo(utionaryv effect. For
This article presents three principles of classification, each of which uses the
naturaldichotomy of speakerversus other. An utterancecan have either speaker
or other as its source of experience; it can use the speaker'sor the other'sfr(ame
Of reference; and it can have either speaker or other as its focus. The eight
228
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INTERSUBJECTIVE
ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
modes (VRMs), are Disclosure (D), Advisement (A), Edification(E), Confirmation (C), Question (Q), Interpretation(I), Acknowledgment(K), and Reflection
(R). This taxonomy is summarizedin Table i . It has evolved from a list of modes
identified in naturalisticobservation of interactingdyads by Gerald Goodman
(Goodman & Dooley 1976).
The principles are based on a psychological conception of human cognitive
processes which views individuals as centers of experience, and experience as a
continuous stream that takes place within each center. Each communicative act
can be construed as a point of contact (or attempted contact) between two
streams. In order to convey two distinct points of experience, two communicative acts are necessary.
The grammaticalrealizationof the communicativeact is the utterance, which
is the scoring unit for the VRM taxonomy. My tentative enumerationof what
counts as an utterance includes each independent clause, each nonrestrictive
dependent clause, each element of a compound predicate, and each term of
acknowledgment, address, or salutation. The enumerationis intended to avoid
cases in which the sense of one utterancedemandstwo differentclassifications.
Principles of classific ation
TABLE
I. Taxonomy of intersubjective
illocutionary acts
Principles of classification
Act categories
Source of
experience
Frame of
reference
Speaker
Disclosure (D)
Speaker
Speaker
Other
Other
Speaker
Other
Advisement (A)
Edification (E)
Confirmation (C)
Speaker
Speaker
Other
Speaker
Other
Question (Q)
Interpretation (I)
Acknowledgment (K)
Reflection (R)
Other
Other
Focus
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Reflection is the other's experience. For example, the Disclosure, "I wish I had
kept my baseball card collection," concerns the speaker's experience (a wish)
whereas the Question, "Where are the paper towels?" concerns the other's
experience (knowledge of the papertowels' location). Similarly, the Edification,
"The Reds beat the Astros,'"conveys informationheld by the speaker, whereas
the Acknowledgment, "Oh," conveys receipt of the other's communication.
Frame of reference refers to whetherthe experience (i.e., the centraltopic of
the utterance)is expressed from the speaker'sown viewpoint or from a viewpoint
sharedwith the other. A frameof referenceis the constellationof ideas, feelings,
memories, etc. that gives an experience the meaning it has in a particularutterance; it consists of the mental associations - the related "experiences" - that
surroundthe central experience. The relation of an experience to its frame of
reference is like that of figure to ground or of an event to its context. Every
experience may be construedin alternativeframesof reference. Framesof reference, like experiences, are infinitely varied; however, the taxonomy distinguishes only speaker versus other. The taxonomic issue is only whose associations give the centralexperience the meaning it has in a particularutterance,not
what those associations are.
Strictly speaking, of course, every meaningful utteranceuses the speaker's
frame of reference. It cannot get its meaning exclusively from the other's frame
of reference, or else the speakerwould not understandhis or her own utterance.
Thus the distinction is technically whether an utteranceuses only the speaker's
own frame of referenceor a frame of referencethat is sharedwith the other. As
shown in Table i, Disclosure, Advisement, Question, and Interpretationuse the
speaker's frame of reference;whereas Edification, Confirmation,Acknowledgment, and Reflection use a frame of referencethat is shared with the other. To
illustrate,the Disclosure "'I'mangry with him" takes the internalperspectiveof
the speaker, whereas the Edification "He insulted my sister" takes an external
perspective that is shared with all objective observers, including the other. The
Interpretation"'You are mistaken" evaluates the other's experience from the
speaker's viewpoint whereasthe Reflection "You don't like what he did" takes
the other's internalviewpoint.
Focus refers to whether the speaker implicitly presumes to know what the
other's experience or frameof referenceis or should be. An utteranceis focused
on the speakerif it does not requiresuch a presumption;it is focused on the other
if it does require such a presumption. Disclosure, Edification, Question, and
Acknowledgment are focused on the speaker in that no specific presumption
about the other is required.Advisement, Confirmation,Interpretation,and Reflection are focused on the other in thateach requiressome specific presumption
about the other's privateexperience or volitional behavior(what it is, has been,
will be, or should be) in orderto have the meaningit does have. Forexample, the
Disclosure "I don't like cauliflower" reveals the speaker's experience in the
speaker's frame of reference and presumes nothing of the other (focus on
230
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ILLOCUTIONARY
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The principles also help to explain why different categories are prey to different infelicities - for example, why an Edification's happiness (in Austin's
1975 sense) depends on its truth, whereas a Disclosure's happiness depends
on its sincerity and an Advisement's happiness depends on its feasibility. In
each case, an utterance'sfelicity is judged only in relation to its own frame of
reference, given the presumptionsmade about it (focus). Thus the felicity of
[isclosures, Advisements, Questions, and Interpretationsis judged from the
speaker's internalviewpoint, whereas the felicity of Confirmationsand Reflections must be judged from the other's internalviewpoint (i.e., the other's private
frame of reference, of which the speakerpresumes knowledge), and the felicity
of Edifications and Acknowledgments must be judged from an external viewpoint (i.e., a frame of reference which is shared with the other but about which
no specific knowledge is presumed). In this sense, the taxonomy uses epistemological principles, ratherthan social meaning or conventional usage, to distinguish among classes of illocutions.
VRM categories
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A Reflection, such as "You feel left out," concerns the other's experience, as
viewed from the other's frame of reference, and it is focused on the other - the
speaker must presume to understandthe other's communicationin order to restate it. Repetitions, rephrasings,summaries, and clarificationsare Reflections.
To be felicitous, a Reflection must be empathic it must accuratelyarticulate
what the other is experiencing from the other's viewpoint.
Mode forms, mixed modes, and indirec t speech acts
TA BLE 2.
Disclosure:
Advisement:
First person singular or first person plural where the other is not a referent.
Imperativeor second personwith verbof permission,prohibition.or obligation.
Edification.
Third person.
Confirmation:
Question:
Interpretationn:
Acknowledgment:
Reflection:
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ILLOCUTIONARY
INTERSUBJECTIVE
TABLE
ACTS
Intent
Disclosure (D)
Advisement (A)
Edification (E)
Confirmation (C)
Questions (Q)
Interpretation (I)
Acknowledgment (K)
D(D)
D(A)
D(E)
D(C)
D(Q)
D(l)
D(K)
A(D)
A(A)
A(E)
A(C)
A(Q)
A(l)
A(K)
E(D)
E(A)
E(E)
E(C)
E(Q)
E(l)
E(K)
C(D)
C(A)
C(E)
C(C)
C(Q)
C(O)
C(K)
Q(D)
Q(A)
Q(E)
Q(C)
Q(Q)
Q(l)
Q(K)
I(D)
I(A)
I(E)
I(C)
1(Q)
1(1)
I(K)
K(D)
K(A)
K(E)
K(C)
K(Q)
K(l)
K(K)
R(D)
R(A)
R(E)
R(C)
R(Q)
R(l)
R(K)
Reflection (R)
D(R)
A(R)
E(R)
C(R)
Q(R)
1(R)
K(R)
R(R)
Note: The form abbreviation is written first, followed by the intent abbreviation in parentheses. For
example, D(A) means Disclosure form with Advisement intent.
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intent can be expressed in alternativeforms; for example, the following utterances express approximatelythe same guiding intent.
Give me a match. A(A)
Could I have a match? Q(A)
I need a match. D(A)
There are matches in that drawer. E(A)
(Shall I get you some matches?) Yes. K(A)
Obviously, accurate classification requires knowledge of context and circumstances. However, these are used to infer the speaker's intent;once the intent is
known, the classification is unambiguous. For example, in saying "There are
matches in that drawer," does the speakerintend to requestaction by the other?
If so, the intent is unequivocally Advisement. If not, the intent is Edification.
The table of mixed modes (Table 3) adds system to the study of indirect
speech acts (e.g., Davison 1975, Searle 1975). The concept of an indirect speech
act - thatthe surface syntacticform of an utterancedoes not matchits illocutionary force - logically requiressome system of parallelclassification of form and
intent, to distinguish when they match and when they do not. The VRM
taxonomy provides such a system. (On the other hand, the mixed modes do not
exhaust the concept of indirectspeech acts, as there are some indirectconstructions that are not mixed modes. For example - from Davison ( 1975) - in "May I
ask if you intendto sue?" Q(Q), form and intentare the same mode. but differ in
content.)
Advantages of the taxonomy
The advantagesof the VRM taxonomy's derivationfrom principlesof classification includemutualexclusivity, exhaustiveness,and a systematicbasis for grouping related categories, all of which are standarddesiderata for verbal coding
schemes (Holsti 1969; Lazarsfeld& Barton 1951; Russell & Stiles 1979). The
eight modes are mutually exclusive insofar as the three principles are dichotomous; each combinationof "speaker" and 'other" values yields a uniquecategory. The list is exhaustive insofaras "speaker" and "other" exhaustthe membership of the communicator-recipientdyad; all possible combinations have
been accounted for. Of course, in normal discourse there are many utterances
thatare ambiguous, but the ambiguityconcerns what the speaker's illocutionary
intent is, not how to classify it once it is known.'
The claim of exhaustivenessmeans only thatevery utterancecan be classified,
not thatthe classificationexhausts its illocutionaryforce - much less its meaning
or function. In a detailed analysis of a particularstretchof discourse, the VRM
system is only one of many complementaryperspectivesthat might be applied.
Since the VRM intentcategoriesarederivedfrom principleswhich are tied to a
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Empirical applications
patients used Edification and Disclosure forms to tell their story in their own
words while physicians gave Acknowledgments,and (2) feediback exchanges in
the conclusion, in which physicians gave Edifications - objective information
about illness and treatment- while patients gave Acknowledgmentsand asked
Questions. Five other types of verbalexchange were identifiedwhich had recognizable medical functions, but were unrelated to patient satisfaction (Stiles,
Putnam, Wolf, & James 1979a).
As the medical interview results illustrate, VRM use reflects features of the
task and of the participants'social roles and relationships(e.g., relative status,
intimacy) independentlyof the propositionalcontent of the discourse. This pat238
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INTERSUBJECTIVE
ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
tern is consistent with the intersubjectivecharacterof the modes (Russell & Stiles
I979; Stiles, in press). It also may make the VRM system a useful tool for
comparativestudies of social roles and relationshipsacross settings and cultures.
COMPARISONS
WITH
OTHER
APPROACHES
This section compares the VRM approach to illocutionary acts with (i) the
traditionalapproachof Austin (I 975) and Searle (1969, 1976) and its emendation
by Hancher(1979); (2) the empirical and functional classification of children's
speech acts by Dore (1974,
1978); and (3) the analysis of politeness by Brown and Levinson (1 978). These
approachesstartfrom very differentpoints and are largely complementaryrather
than competitive, although there are some disagreements. A comparison can
show the strengthsand limitationsthat accrue to each by virtue of their starting
points.
Comparison with traditional speech act theory
1972;
1979).
However, as Austin
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B. STILES
included several categories for the intersubjectiveillocutionaryforce of Disclosure and no categories for some other modes. Searle's (1976) five-category
scheme is illustrative. Commissives, which commit the speaker to some future
course of action, and expressives, which express the speaker's psychological
state, are obviously subclasses of Disclosure intent. Representatives, which
commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to the truth of some proposition, are
primarilyEdification in intent, although this category might house some other
modes as well. Directives, which are attemptsby the speakerto get the other to
do something, correspondprimarilyto Advisement intent, although Searle also
included Questions in this category.2 De(clarations,which are utteranceswhose
"successful performanceguaranteesthat the propositionalcontent corresponds
to the world" (13), such as declarations of war or marriage, are more
heterogeneous;most of Searle's examples are Edifications - ""Waris hereby
declared" E(E) - or Disclosures
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ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
ments) - diverges sharply from the VRM solution. Hancher seems to have
focused on the performativeaspect of speech acts - whethersaying makes it so.
Contracts, sales, marriages, and so forth are instances in which cooperative
linguistic behavioris requiredto "make it so." My disagreementwith Hancher
concerns whetherto call these complex performancesillocutionaryacts.
The VRM taxonomy rests on the essential separateness of communicating
centers of experience. "Shared" experiences or frames of reference are shared
only in the speaker's assumption, and the VRM code is unchanged if the
speaker's assumption is mistaken or if the utterance is infelicitous or misunderstood. I believe that analytic rigor is best served by preserving the single
utterance - the conversational act - as the unit of illocutionary force and by
treatingHancher'scooperativeperformancesas complex phenomenathatrequire
distinct illocutionaryacts by more than one person.
This view does not contradictdevelopment of taxonomies of cooperative performatives - verbal performancesby two or more people that change the social
world (e.g., the ownership of something). I see Hancher's contributionas a
generalization of Austin's (and Searle's) concept of performativityto performances that requiremultiple, complementaryillocutions.
Comparison with Dore's classification of children's conversational acts
force offorms" (Dore et al. 1978: 370, italics in original). Thus Dore's system
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In an empirical system, such as Dore's, at best all observed responses fit into
one of the classifications, but there is no theoreticalassurancethat every future
response will fit into some class. There is no reasonto suppose the system will be
exhaustive when applied to some other kind of interaction.
The substantive results of Dore's work imply that illocutionary force is an
early, universal, and formative pressure on the development of language in
children (Dore I974, 1975, 1979). "Primitive speech acts," which are classifi-
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INTERSUBJECTIVE
ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
Familiarity
Verbal response
rank
mode
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Acknowledgment
Edification
Question
Disclosure
Reflection
Confirmation
Interpretation
Advisement
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grammatical forms. Most obviously, any alternative form should reduce the
seriousness of an Advisement, the highest rankedmode. A particularlycommon
example is expressing the presumptuous, directive, informative intent of an
Advisement in the unassumingand attentive(but still directive) form of a Question,4 e.g., "Would you pass the butter?" Q(A). Probably a majority of the
indirect speech acts discussed by previous authors(e.g., Davison I975; ErvinTripp 1976; Searle 1975) have been Advisementintentsredressedin unassuming
forms, testimony to the face-threateningeffect of directives and the pervasive
effect of politeness on language use.
This use of indirect speech acts fits many of Brown and Levinson's negative
politeness strategies including "be conventionally indirect," "Question,
hedge," "Impersonalizespeakerand hearer;avoid the pronouns'I' and 'you,' "
"State the FTA as a generalrule," and "Nominalize." (The last three, in effect,
specify Edification forms, which are low in imposition, as shown in Table 4.)
Note, however, thataccordingto VRM theory, the choice of forms is not merely
conventional. In every mixed mode, the form systematicallymodifies the utterance's illocutionaryforce specifically to resemble the force of the form - to be
more unassuming or presumptuous,acquiescent or directive, and attentive or
informative.Wheneversocial role requirementsdiffer from task requirementson
any of these dimensions, it may be expected that people will tend to use mixed
modes, with the forms constrainedby social relationshipsand the intents constrainedby the task at hand. Politeness is a majorexample - redressingutterance
intentsthat are too presumptuousor directive for the speaker's relative power or
intimacy with the other - but it is not the only example. For instance, lecturers,
whose task constrains them to present facts (i.e., Edification intents) may at
times use presumptuousforms as a way of expressingtheir higher statusvis-a-vis
theiraudience, e.g., "We have here an example of Picasso's blue period" C(E).
SUMMARY
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INTERSUBJECTIVE
ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
NOTES
I thank RobertElliott, BrittonJ. Harwood, Robert L. Russell, James J. Sosnoski, and this journal's
editor, Dell Hymes, for their comments on drafts of this article.
The term "intent" does not imply that mind-readingis necessary to code utterances.As Bach
I.
and Harnish (1979) put it, building on Grice's (1957) analysis of meating, illocutionaryforce is a
reflexive intent, by which they mean it is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized.
"The intended effect of an act of communication is not just any effect produced by means of the
recognitionof the intentionto producea certaineffect, it is the recognition of that effect. " (Bach &
Harnish 1979: 15, italics in original). Illocutionary intents are thus on record, in Brown and
Levinson's (1978) sense. Coding VRM intent (or any other category of illocutionaryforce) requires
no assessment of the speaker's private merdtalstate beyond that requiredof the utterance'sintended
recipient.
To count as an illocutionaryact, an utterancemust be intended to secure uptake;however, it need
not actually secure uptake. A Question is still a Question if the other misunderstandsit or is distracted
and does not hear it. My conception thus differs slightly from those who require that uptake be
secured (cf. Dore, Gearhart,& Newman 1978: 339, 348; Bach & Harnish 1979: 15). Similarly, an
illocutionaryact need not be felicitous nor must a speakerbe "committed" to its felicity for it to have
its illocutionary force. Unanswerable Questions are still Questions; insincere Disclosures are still
Disclosures; and false Edificationsare still Edifications, even if both speakerand other are aware of
the falsity, e.g., "The moon is made of green cheese" E(E).
Incidentally, elements of the formula, "intendedto be recognized as intendedto be recognized,"
can be progressivelyparedaway to define several additional,deeper levels of intent(all "off record"
in Brown & Levinson's 1978 sense). Hints are only intendedto be recognized as intended(but not as
intendedto be recognized). Manipulationsare only intendedto be recognized (but not as intended).
Deceptions are only privately intended (i.e., private experiences not intended to be recognized).
Finally, self-deceptions may be defined as utterances driven by unconscious experiences whose
expression is not intended or recognized by the speaker. To illustrate, "The wastebasket is full"
could be E(A) - i.e., on record as an Advisement intent (intendedto be recognized as intendedto be
recognized) - if the other were known to have the responsibilityof emptying the wastebasketwhen it
is full. In that case, it is equivalent to "Empty the wastebasket" A(A), and a response such as
"Okay," or "I'll do it during the next commercial," would be appropriate.In a relationshipwhere
emptying the wastebasket is a shared chore, the Advisement underlying "The wastebasketis full"
might be a hint - intendedto be recognized as intended, but off record - which could be abbreviated
E(E(A)). Or it might be a manipulation- intended to be recognized, but ingenuous - abbreviated
E(E(E(A))), seeking a response such as "Would you like me to do it for you?" (This response would
be sarcastic if the Advisement intent were at the hint level.) In anotherrelationship,the Advisement
could be a wish that was not intendedto be recognized, i.e., a deception, E(E(E(E(A)))), in which
case an offer of help might be met with chagrin that the wish had leaked through. Finally, the
Advisement might (if we believe Freud) be a self-deception, say, a guest's unconscious obsessive
desire for cleanliness that motivates the ostensibly objective observation, "The wastebasketis full"
E(E(E(E(E(A))))).
Obviously, it would be a hopeless task to code utterances'intentsat all of these levels; applications
of the VRM system use only the illocutionary, "on record" level. Nevertheless, it is often possible to
discern deeper levels, and keeping them in mind can help clarify discriminations.
This lumping of Questions and Advisements in one category seems inconsistentwith consider2.
ing Question-Advisementcombinationsas indirect speech acts (Searle 1975). For example, both the
form and the intent of "Would you move your car?" Q(A) appear to be scorable as directives in
Searle's system.
The evolution of t and v forms of second person pronouns may be related to the face3.
threateningaspect of presumptuousmodes. As Table 2 shows, second-person forms are invariably
presumptuous(i.e., Advisement, Interpretation,or Reflection) and hence tend to be FTAs. There
may thus be a universal pressure on languages to develop conventional ways to show respect or
deference when using second-personforms, i.e., to undo the intrinsic FTA of presumptuousness.
4.
According to Table 4, an Edification form would be more polite, but by being acquiescent, it
might fail to accomplish its mission; e.g., "The butteris in frontof you" E(A) might be construedas
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an offer ratherthan a request. Most polite of all, but also less efficient, would be an Acknowledgment
form, which would requirewaiting for an appropriatecontext, e.g., (at last!) "Would you like me to
pass you the butter?" "Yes" K(A).
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INTERSUBJECTIVE
ILLOCUTIONARY
ACTS
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