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if you extend it to the rest of the Arab Middle East as it is swept by popular revolts against
authoritarian rule. Will the nations that emerge from the Arab Spring embrace the rule of law
and other crucial institutions that have allowed capitalism to flourish in the West? Or are
Islam and economic progress fundamentally at odds?
Muslim economies havent always been low achievers. In his seminal work The World
Economy, economist Angus Maddison showed that until the twelfth century, per-capita
income was much higher in the Muslim Middle East than in Europe. Beginning in the twelfth
century, though, what Duke University economist Timur Kuran calls the Long Divergence
began, upending this economic hierarchy, so that by Rifaas time, Europe had grown far
more powerful and prosperous than the Arab Muslim world.
A key factor in the divergence was Italian city-states invention of capitalisma
development that rested on certain cultural prerequisites, Stanford Universitys Avner Greif
observes. In the early twelfth century, two groups of merchants dominated Mediterranean sea
trade: the European Genoans and the Cairo-based Maghrebis, who were Jewish but, coming
originally from Baghdad, shared the cultural norms of the Arab Middle East. The Genoans
outpaced the Maghrebis and eventually won the competition, Greif argues, because they
invented various corporate institutions that formed the core of capitalism, including banks,
bills of exchange, and joint-stock companies, which allowed them to accumulate enough
capital to launch riskier but more profitable ventures. These institutions, in Greifs account,
were an outgrowth of the Genoans Western culture, in which people were bound not just by
blood but also by contracts, including the fundamental contract of marriage. The Maghrebis
Arab values, by contrast, meant undertaking nothing outside the family and tribe, which
limited commercial expeditions resources and hence their reach. The bonds of blood
couldnt compete with fair, reliable institutions (see Economics Does Not Lie, Summer
2008).
Greifs theory suggests that cultural differences explain economic development better than
religious beliefs do. Indeed, from a strictly religious perspective, one could view Muslims as
having an advantage at creating wealth. After all, Islam is the only religion founded by a
traderone who also, by the way, married a wealthy merchant. The Koran has only good
words for successful businessmen. Entrepreneurs must pay a 2.5 percent tax, the zakat, to the
community to support the general welfare, but otherwise can make money guilt-free. Private
property is sacred, according to the Koran. All this, needless to say, contrasts with the
traditional Christian attitude toward wealth, which puts the poor on the fast track to heaven
and looks down in particular on merchants (recall Jesuss driving them from the Temple).
But Dukes Kuran believes that Islam did play a role in the Long Divergence. It wasnt the
Koran, which the Muslim faithful see as written by God and unalterable, that impeded
Muslims economically, he argues, but instead sharia, the religious law developed by scholars
after Mohammeds time. Not that sharia was overtly hostile to economic progress; it
established commerce-friendly legal rules that, for instance, allowed for bazaars and for the
arbitration of economic disputes. Rather, Kuran maintains, sharia became economically
counterproductive because it was less efficient than the Western legal framework.
The most significant of the sharia-rooted economic liabilities was the Islamic partnership,
which proved no match for the Western worlds joint-stock company. Partnerships were
short-lived, dissolving with the death of any of the partners, and they tended to be small,
often formed among family members. Joint-stock companies, which sharia prohibited, had
much greater reach and risk-hedging power. Sharia inheritance rules were a second drag on
economic development, Kuran explains. Since the Koran sanctions polygamy, sharia
required a husbands wealth, upon his death, to go in equal portions to his widows and
children, which worked against capital accumulation. In the Roman law that held sway in
Europe until the nineteenth century, by contrast, the eldest son inherited his deceased fathers
wealth, creating vast fortunes that could be put to economic work. Some economists point to
sharias prohibition of interest as another hamper on development, but this is much less
significant than it appears. From at least the twelfth century on, sharia lawyers authorized
fees that could accompany money-lending, getting around the ban.
Muslim welfare foundations to aid the poor, called waqf, also undermined economic
competitiveness over time, says Kuran. According to sharia, all money given to these
charities was exempt from taxation. But Muslim merchants began to establish waqf as fronts
for commercial enterprises, depriving the government of sufficient funds to function
properly. This tax evasion contributed to the failure of the Arab kingdoms and the Ottoman
Empire to build a competent minimal state, which is essential to the effective rule of law.
For evidence that sharia had negative economic effects, consider the Egyptian city of
Alexandria. Beginning in the fifteenth century, non-Muslim merchants in the city could opt
out of sharias business rules. Those who did and embraced Western capitalist norms quickly
grew richer than those who continued to follow sharia, historians have shown.
Over time, however, sharia adapted to capitalism. In the nineteenth century, it finally allowed
Muslims to form joint-stock companies and to borrow other key capitalist institutions from
the West. Today, Islamic banks follow the same practices that non-Islamic banks do
(including the use of derivatives) but describe them differently, so that they conform with
sharia. Yet despite this transformation in Islamic law, Muslim economies still lag behind
Western ones. Greif and Kuran may help explain the Long Divergence, but what accounts for
the fact that there is no Arab Tiger comparable with Asias remarkable success stories?
Part of the answer may, in fact, be religious: Islams apostasy law. Sharia holds that a
Muslim who breaks with Islam becomes an apostate, an offense punishable by death. And
since, at least for Sunni Muslims, there is no central theological authoritythe theocratic
regime in Iran establishes such authority for Shiite Muslimsany Sunni imam can define
what constitutes breaking with Islam. This power may deter potential innovators, including
the entrepreneurial kind, from doing anything that could conceivably get them into trouble.
But a bigger reason for the Arab worlds stagnation is political. In nearly every Arab Muslim
country, the prime enemy of entrepreneurship and the free market is an abusive
governmentand the strong, unaccountable, and usually despotic regimes that have
dominated Arab Muslim populations for decades owe neither their origins nor their
legitimacy, such as it is, to Islam. All emerged from the decolonization struggles of the 1950s
3
and 1960s, which, since the primary colonizers were Europeans, provoked angry antiWestern and anticapitalist attitudes in Muslim societies. The decolonization of the Arabs did
not go well. Violent confrontations were the norm, even when full-blown war didnt break
out, as happened in Algeria. The upheavals brought military regimes to power in most of the
decolonized Arab states; even when the military wasnt officially in charge, it controlled
puppet governments, as in Morocco. All these regimes espoused nationalism and resisted any
rule of law that might limit state poweror give entrepreneurs a freer hand.
Worse, independence took place at a time when the Soviet Union was influential and many
believed that centrally planned socialism was a shortcut to power and prosperity. Arab
governments thus found it tempting to confiscate private property, eradicate the existing
bourgeoisie, and create massive state monopolies in resources like copper, oil, and
phosphate. In the name of national independence and economic modernization, all the wealth
could be concentrated in the hands of the ruling militaries and bureaucracies.
After the fall of the Soviet Union showed socialism to be far less efficient than the free
market, Arab Muslim governments began to free up markets somewhat, but without
surrendering their tyrannical authority. This resulted in an Arab crony capitalism, which is
now the dominant economic arrangement in the Muslim Middle East. In todays pseudomarket Arab economies, it makes little sense to be an independent entrepreneur. If you want
to open a business, youll need a license, and the only surefire way to obtain it is to belong to
(or be close to) someone in the ruling elite; even then, youll share your profits with the
bureaucrats. Its far easier to seek a renta benefit based on your position in society. Rentseeking is particularly prevalent in countries overflowing with natural resources like oil and
gas, which bring in massive revenues that reduce the incentive to diversify the economy.
Egypt exemplifies the crony-capitalist model. During the 1990s, corrupt privatizations
transferred state monopolies in energy, steel, cement, and other industries to private
entrepreneurs, most of whom were members of President Hosni Mubaraks family, top
military officers, and other well-connected people. Meanwhile, economist Hernando de Soto
has calculated, opening a modest bakery in Cairo required two years of slogging through the
bureaucracy, at each stage of which the would-be owner would need to grease official
palmsand if his bakery finally opened, he would then have to pay ongoing protection
money to the local police. Small wonder Egypt suffers from slow growth, massive
unemployment, and a large black market.
The authoritarian nature of todays Muslim governments also generates social norms that
harm entrepreneurship. For example, a survey conducted by the Casablanca-based business
magazine LEconomistecompared the organizational structures of Moroccan firms with those
of Western companies operating in Morocco. It found that the boss of a Moroccan firm tends
to have a larger office and more assistants, secretaries, and chauffeurs than his Western
counterpart does and that his behavior is more autocratic. The likely reason is that the
Moroccan boss, mimicking the king and his entourage, finds powerand the exhibition of
powermore compelling than profits.
hadnt registered it with the authorities, police confiscated it. Bouazizi then set himself on
fire.
Bouazizis suicide brought millions of Arabs to the streets because they could identify with
him. Human rights leaders didnt start the revolutions; neither did long-banned Islamic
movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. The upheavals werent characterized by Islamic
banners or by Israeli flags going up in flames (though there were disturbing reports of
Muslims attacking Christian churches in Egypt after the police had vanished from the
streets). No, the dominant message of the Arab Spring was that the Arabs didnt want to
remain separated from the rest of the world. The Egyptian students in Tahrir Square couldnt
have put it more clearly: they wanted democracy, globalization, and market prosperity, not
Islamicization. We want a normal country, which means free enterprise and democracy,
said one of their leaders, Amr Salah of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights, in Paris this
April. Even the notorious Muslim Brotherhood is on board with capitalism: Our economic
program is a free-market society in order to pursue social justice, says Sameh al-Barqui, an
American-educated economics expert with the Brotherhood.
The transition from the Arab worlds authoritarian regimes to democracy, markets, and the
rule of law is far from guaranteed, of course. For a reminder of the difficulty of installing
successful Western-style capitalism, consider Rifaa, who returned to Egypt after seven years
in France and became the pashas main advisoroverseeing the translation of French
scientific books into Arabic, founding the first Arabic newspapers, and opening schools for
girls. Though Rifaa faced the hostility of Muslim conservatives, his reforms, accompanying
the eras shifts in sharia, inaugurated an era of modernization in Egypt. By the late nineteenth
century, Cairo was starting to look like a European city, with electricity, sanitation,
universities, and an independent press. But the renaissance didnt last long, because Rifaa
repeatedly failed to persuade the pasha to accept a Western-style constitution, which would
have limited the rulers arbitrary power. What kept Egypt back was its failure to establish the
rule-governed institutions familiar in the West.
It should be sobering, therefore, that the military isnt likely to surrender its political
privileges easily in any Arab country. Still, most of the political parties emerging in the
ferment are supporters of free markets. (Some socialist parties remain in Morocco and
Tunisia, where the French influence left its mark, but they are socialist in name only.) The
young men and women behind the Arab Spring will continue to push for more open markets
where millions of Bouazizis will be able to become entrepreneurswhere it wont take two
years and countless bribes to open a bakery. And there appears to be no cultural or religious
reason that someday, in the not-so-distant future, we wont find cafs in Cairo that run as
efficiently and reasonably as those in Marseille.
Guy Sorman, a City Journal contributing editor, is the author of Children of Rifaa: In Search of a Moderate
Islam and many other books
Source: http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_3_muslim-economy.html