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FORECLOSURE OF
REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE
G.R. No. 183984
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing
the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4 August 2008
Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals
Decision, are as follows:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 6, 1999, and
the resolution dated February 18, 1999, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46391.
Therefore, the sheriff's sale of TCT Nos. T-11337, T11828 and T-11839 to Continental Bank is hereby
declared null and void. It should be stressed that
we are not here called upon to resolve the merits
of Civil Case No. 612, as contained in the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas
dated December 16, 1974. In their petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as well as
in the petition for review before us, petitioners
question Continental Bank's act of debiting the
sum of P576,000.00 from the proceeds of their
loan, purportedly to satisfy previous obligations
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
10
11
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by Leonila Policarpio, from a
resolution of the Land Registration Commission.
12
13
September 1, 2000
14
Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 895424 as mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting
to P8.5 million obtained by petitioner from
Intercon, in whose favor petitioner mortgaged the
aforesaid parcels of land as security for the said
loan.
15
Thus:
"Petitioner must have received the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated
February 16, 1994 denying with finality its
motion for reconsideration in G.R. No.
112044 before March 14, 1994, otherwise
the Supreme Court would not have made
an entry of judgment on March 14,
1994. While, computing the 150-day
period. Petitioner may have until
September 11, 1994. within which to pay
the amounts covered by the judgment,
such period has already expired by this
16
17
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION) IN
CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAD RESOLVED
"WITH FINALITY" THAT PETITIONER HUERTA
ALBA HAD NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION BUT
ONLY THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN IGNORING THAT
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA POSSESSES THE
ONE-YEAR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337 (THE GENERAL
BANKING ACT).
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT
GROUP, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.5
In its comment on the petition, private respondent
countered that:
SO ORDERED."4
Private respondent interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking the reversal of the Order
but to no avail. In its Order dated September 4,
1995, the trial court denied the same.
18
(2)
THE 20 MARCH 1995 RESOLUTION IN CA
G.R. SP NO. 35086 IS NOT A FINAL
JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE. IT IS NOT
EVEN A JUDGMENT OR ORDER TO BEGIN
WITH. IT ORDERS NOTHING; IT
ADJUDICATES NOTHING.
II.
THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL HERE. PETITIONER
HUERTA ALBA INVOKED ITS RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 IN TIMELY FASHION, i.e., AFTER
CONFIRMATION BY THE COURT OF THE
FORECLOSURE SALE, AND WITHIN ONE (1)
YEAR FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE.
(3)
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
37 WAS NOT AN ISSUE AND WAS NOT IN
ISSUE, AND COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY
BEEN AN ISSUE NOR IN ISSUE, IN CA G.R.
SP NO. 35086.
III.
THE PRINCIPLE OF 'THE LAW OF THE CASE'
HAS ABSOLUTELY NO BEARING HERE:
(4)
(1)
THE 30 SEPTEMBER 1994 DECISION IN CA
G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAVING ALREADY
BECOME FINAL EVEN BEFORE THE FILING
OF THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, THE
COURT OF APPEALS NO LONGER HAD ANY
JURISDICTION TO ACT OF THE MOTION OR
ANY OTHER MATTER IN CA G.R. SP NO.
35086, EXCEPT TO MERELY NOTE THE
MOTION. EASIHa
II.
IN STARK CONTRAST, THE ISSUE OF
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 WAS DIRECTLY RAISED AND JOINED BY
THE PARTIES, AND THE SAME DULY
RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 78 OF R.A. NO. 337 IS
MANDATORY AND AUTOMATICALLY EXISTS
BY LAW. THE COURTS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO
RECOGNIZE SUCH RIGHT.
IV.
19
V.
THEREFORE THE 21 JULY 1995 AND 04
SEPTEMBER 1995 ORDERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE VALID AND PROPER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
LAW.
From the various decisions, resolutions and
orders a quo it can be gleaned that what petitioner
has been adjudged to have was only the equity of
redemption over subject properties. On the
distinction between the equityof redemption and
right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 comes to the
fore. Held the Court in the said case:
20
21
22
RULE 69 PARTITION
G.R. No. 192486
23
The Case
Petitioners have availed of Rule 45 to assail and
nullify the Decision1 dated July 24, 2009, as
effectively reiterated in a Resolution2 of June 2,
2010, both rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344, setting aside the
Decision3 dated June 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 in Macabebe, Pampanga, in
Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), an accion
publiciana/reivindicatoria, which respondents
commenced with, but eventually dismissed by, that
court.
The Facts
At the core of the present controversy are several
parcels of land which form part of what was once
Lot No. 733, Cad-305-D, Masantol Cadastre (Lot
733 hereinafter), registered in the name of Ellen P.
Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Moses Mendoza,
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 141-RP
of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga. With an area
of 9,137 square meters, more or less, Lot 733 is
located in Brgy. Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga.
On April 28, 1986, Geodetic Engineer Abdon G.
Fajardo prepared a subdivision plan4 (Fajardo Plan,
for short) for Lot 733, in which Lot 733 was divided
into six (6) smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions, designated as: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B,
Lot 733-C, Lot 733-D, Lot 733-E, and Lot 733-F
consisting of 336, 465, 3,445, 683, 677 and 3,501
square meters, respectively.
Lot 733-A
Lot 733-B
Unsold
Lot 733-C
3,445 square
meters
Unsold
Lot 733-D
Proposed Road
Lot 733-E
Unsold
Lot 733-F
3,501 square
meters
Lot No.
Area
Conveyances by
24
t No.
Land Area
Partitioned
to:
Lot 733-C-13]
25
xxxx
SO ORDERED.21
The adverted Civil Case Nos. 88-0265-M and 880283-M were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 55, which, on
26
880283-M
Sps. Viray
Absolute
Sale
(Fajardo
Plan)
of Sps.
Viray.
Decision
is now
final.
Mendoza v.
Jesus Viray
Annulment
of Deed of
Absolute
Sale
733-F
Decision
in favor
of Sps.
Viray.
(Fajardo
Plan)
Subject
of CAG.R. CV
Nos.
2498182
denied.
Subject
of G.R.
No.
122287
petition
denied.
91 (13)
Jesus Viray
v. Sps. Usi
Forcible
Entry
733-F
(Fajardo
Plan)
900914M
Sps. Usi v.
Vda. de
Viray
Petition for
Annulment
of MCTC
733-F
(Fajardo
Plan)
Decision in
CC No. 91
(13)
Judgmen
t in favor
of Viray.
No
appeal.
RTC
dismisse
d
petition.
CA-G.R.
CV No.
67945
appeal
dismisse
d. G.R.
No.
154538
petition
denied.
Civil
Case
No.
880265-M
The Parties
Sps. Usi v.
Action/Suit
for
Annulment
of Deed of
Subject
Lot(s)
733-A
(02)1164(M
)
Dispositi
on
Decision
in favor
27
Vda. de
Viray v.
Mendoza,
et al.
Cancellatio
n of Titles
before RTC,
Br. 55,
Pampanga
Lots 733C-8
To 733-C12
(Lot 733F (Fajardo
Plan)
Pending
before
the RTC.
011118(M
)
Sps. Usi v.
Vda. de
Viray
Petition for
Accion
Publiciana
and
Reivindicato
ria before
RTC, Br. 55,
Pampanga
733-B,
733-C1 and
733-C10
(Galang
Plan)
Petition
dismisse
d.
CA-G.R.
CV No.
90344
reversed
RTC
Decision.
Subject
of instant
case,
G.R. No.
192486
28
Notably, after a full-blown trial in Civil Case No. 011118 (M) wherein the spouses Usi merged an
accion publiciana with an accion reinvindicatoria in
one petition, the RTC held that Sps. Usi failed to
prove their case. However, in CA G.R. CV No.
90344, an appeal from said RTC decision, the CA,
while acknowledging the existence of the April 29,
1986 deeds of absolute sale, nonetheless accorded
validity to the August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991
subdivision agreements. This is incorrect. The CA
held that the two (2) subdivision agreements, as
notarized, enjoy the presumption of regularity and
effectuated the property transfers covered thereby,
obviously glossing over the mala fides attendant
the execution of the two subdivision agreements. It
cannot be overemphasized enough that the two (2)
deeds of absolute sale over portions of
substantially the same parcel of land antedated the
subdivision agreements in question and their
execution acknowledged too before a notary
public.
29
30
31
In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her threefourths () share to Benigna Llamas.6 The sale was
duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695.
When Benigna died in 1944,7 she willed her threefourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra
Llamas and Josefa Llamas.8 Thus, Alejandra and
Josefa each owned one-half () of Benignas threefourths () share.
On June 14, 1969, Alejandras heirs sold their
predecessors one-half () share (roughly
equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the
respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.9
WITNESSETH
32
xxx
4. Affidavit of Confirmation of
Subdivision21 dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit),
which reads:
33
RTC RULING
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled
that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove
that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are
fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to
nullify the petitioners titles. The court observed
that the respondent did not even compare his
genuine signature with the signatures appearing in
these documents.
CA RULING
34
THE ISSUES
The two basic issues32 for our resolution are:
1. Whether the CA erred in nullifying the
petitioners titles.
2. Whether the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the parcel of land covered
by the petitioners titles.
THE RULING
We partially grant the petition.
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose
land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to
him.33 The plaintiff in this action must allege and
prove his ownership of the land in dispute and the
defendants erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful
registration of the property.
35
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since the time you purchased the property
according to you you already divided the property,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that as of today who is in possession of that
4,020 square meters?
A: I, sir.42
The petitioner and the respondent were originally
co-owners of the subject property when they jointly
bought it from the same vendor in 1969. However,
the parties immediately terminated this state of
indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in
the nature of a partition agreement.
36
We disagree.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
37
38
The Issues
39
40
41
42
RULE 70
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in CA G.R. CV
No. 39251 1which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in
Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing
herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal
structures which she constructed in front of the
subject lot, to vacate the said property and right of
way, and return possession thereof to the
respondents.
The antecedent facts:
The subject premises was formerly part of the
estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806
square meters, more or less, located at the corner
of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The
legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United
43
44
SO ORDERED. 15
Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: 1)
the lower court should have dismissed the
complaint of private respondents considering that
based on the letter of demand dated November 20,
1990, the action filed should have been unlawful
detainer and not an action for recovery of
possession; 2) the action filed by private
respondents is barred by res judicata considering
that the present action is identical with that of Civil
Case No. 6652; 3) the lower court erred in not
dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action
with respect to enforcement of right of way vis a
vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in
ordering that defendants vacate the properties in
question since the lease of defendants thereon was
still in existence and had not yet been
terminated. 16
45
46
47
48
SO ORDERED. 33
We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by
petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts distinctly
show that the complaint filed by the owners of the
property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was
the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after
advising the defendant (the lessee of the premises
in question) that a member of the family, Dr.
Igama, urgently needed the house and after
repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee
proved to be unsuccessful. All these incidents, from
notification to the filing of the complaint dated May
16, 1985, transpired within a period of six (6)
months. Indeed, the factual background of this
case is a classic illustration of an action for
unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore
diametrically opposite to the facts or case at bar.
49
DANAO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA
M. GURIEZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision2 dated February 18, 2013 and the
Resolution3dated June 5, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117686 which
reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated October
27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
6974 and dismissed petitioner Bonifacio Piedad's
(Bonifacio) Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages against respondents-spouses Victorio
Gurieza and Etneteria M. Gurieza (Sps. Gurieza).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages5 filed by Bonifacio
against Sps.Gurieza before the Municipal Trial Court
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (MTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 3877. In his complaint, Bonifacio
alleged that heis the absolute owner of the 1/3
middle portion of a parcel of residential land
designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, withan area of
4,640.98 square meters (subject lot) which he
acquired through intestate succession from his late
father who inherited the same from the latters
parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro)and Tomasa
Villaray (Tomasa). He also claimed that his
ownership of the subject lot took place even before
his fathers death and was validated through a
Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and
Partition (Deed of Confirmation) executed by
Alejandro and Tomasas legal heirs. Further,
Bonifacio alleged that before migrating to Hawaii,
he built a bungalow on the subject lot and assigned
numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of
which were Sps. Gurieza. Sometime in 2005,
however, Sps. Gurieza allegedly took interest of the
bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an
employee of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) that Lot 1227 is public
land. Using such information, Sps. Gurieza had the
subject lot declared under their name for tax
purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227,
and filed an application for survey authority and
titling with the Bureau of Land Management,
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
(CENRO DENR Nueva Vizcaya).6
50
51
G.R. No.177484
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is
the September 15, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010. Said
Decision granted respondent Waterfields Industries
Corporation's (Waterfields) Petition for Review of
the July 14, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional TriaJ
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No.
00-96228, which in tum affirmed the May 7, 1999
Decision3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Manila, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 160443-CV
granting petitioners spouses Alejandro Manzanilla
and Remedios Velasco's (spouses Manzanilla)
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
Waterfields. Likewise questioned is the CA April 12,
2007 Resolution4 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
Factual Antecedents
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a
25,000-square meter parcel of land in BarangaySan
Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, covered by Transfer
of Certificate of Title No. T-35205. On May 24,
1994, they leased a 6,000-square meter portion of
the above-mentioned property to Waterfields, as
represented by its President Aliza R. Ma (Ma).
Pertinent portions of their Contract of
Lease5 provide, viz:
52
8,000.00
10 May 97
18,000.00
10 June 97
18,000.00
10 July 97
18,000.00
check replacement
8,000.00
P70,000.00
(Signed)
ALIZA MA
President
Waterfields Industries Corporation
7/9/97
Quezon City9
53
SO ORDERED.23
SO ORDERED.
18
54
Issues
Our Ruling
There is merit in the Petition.
The CA has confused itself in resolving the basic
issue involved in this case.
55
56
57
DECISION
SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the
complaint failed to state the essential elements of
an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents
occupation of the subject property was
unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the
demand letter sent by petitioners counsel that
respondents entered the property through stealth
and strategy, and in petitioners own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for
forcible entry which should have been filed within
one year from the discovery of the alleged entry.
Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
possession of her property through illegal means
and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one
SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period, the above
decision became final and executory.8
58
59
xxxx
60
xxxx
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint
do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted
or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that "respondents without any color of
title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof."
Nothing has been said on how respondents entry
was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions dated 12 May
61
The Facts
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 1595-A containing an area of
27,551 square meters situated in Buanoy,
Balamban, Cebu and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-57604.
On 5 February 2003, respondents Maria Lim Vda.
de Gonzalez, Gaudencia L. Buagas, Ranulfo Y. Lim,
Don L. Calvo, Susan C. Santiago, Dina C. Aranas,
and Rufina C. Ramirezfiled with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a
Complaint4 for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order with Damages and Attorneys
Fees against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog).
At the time of the complaint, the land was declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 0108-05410 with an assessed value of P57,960 and a
market value of P264,930.5
SO ORDERED.7
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 May
2008. Tagalog then filed an appeal8 with the Court
of Appeals. In a Resolution9 dated 12 May 2011, the
CA dismissed the case for failure of Tagalog to
filethe required brief within the extended period
requested. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of appellants failure to file
the required brief within the extended period
requested, and pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the aboveentitled case is hereby DISMISSED.
62
SO ORDERED.10
xxxx
14. Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief being
demanded which is for the defendant to
vacate the premisesin question and to
desist from constructing a residential house
thereon because plaintiffs have a right to
possess the property being the owners
thereof and that defendants possession of
the same is now unlawful and illegal due to
the termination of the verbal contract of
lease on a month to month basis.12
xxxx
6. For quite sometime, defendant
(petitioner) has been occupying a portion
of the above-described parcel of land, as
lessee thereof, where her house was being
built withlight materials and was paying
rentals over the same by virtue of a verbal
contractof lease on a month to month
basis.
7. The said house of the defendant was
damaged by a strong typhoon which hit
Cebu and was no longer inhabited by her
and her family for quite sometime.
63
vs.
MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(MAHA), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify
the Decision1 dated October 19, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The CA had
affirmed the Decision3 dated January 10, 20064 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 05-485 which reversed
the Decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
104-00.
64
65
66
67
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when establishing
the jurisdiction of the court over an action for
forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his complaint
prior physical possession of the property and b) the
need for plaintiff to prove as well the fact of such
prior physical possession.
68
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
69
70
71
July 7, 2014
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals
only from the time the demand to vacate was
served upon it and not from the time it began
occupying the disputed premises, petitioner ProGuard Security Services Corporation (ProGuard)
seeks recourse to this Court.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the
September 6, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which denied
the Petition for Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard
as one of the petitioners. Likewise assailed is the
CA's Janu'!l)' 23, 2007 Resolution3 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On July 24, 1984, Manuel A.Torres, Jr.,
(Manuel)assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and
Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of
land located in Pasay Cityand all the improvements
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said
corporation.4 Despite the assignment, however,
title to the real properties remained in Manuels
name as he neither registered the transaction in
the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the
necessary documents to have the titles over the
properties transferred inits name. Later,Manuel
unilaterally revoked the transaction.
Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other
persons, one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan
(Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty,
Incorporated (Torres-Pabalan). As part of his capital
contribution, Manuelassigned the same aforesaid
parcels of land to Torres-Pabalan.In the meantime,
construction of the Torres Building on the subject
real properties was completed in1985 and its units
rented out. Edgardo, who was also then the
General Manager and Administrator of Tormil, acted
as the building administrator and occupied the 2
nd floor. He later resigned from his position inTormil
in September 1986.
72
SO ORDERED.23
xxxx
Parties Arguments
Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming
the lower courts award of P20,000.00 monthly
rental reckoned from the time it occupied the unit.
It contends that it cannot be blamed if it relied on
the representations of TorresPabalan when it
entered into a lease contract with it, the latter
being then in possession of the building. Pro-Guard
maintains that in any case, it owes no unpaid
rentals to Tormil for the entire period of its stay in
the building out of Tormils tolerance. On the other
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and ProGuard reiterated their arguments on Torres-
73
Our Ruling
While indeed Tormil, as the victor inthe unlawful
detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for
the use and occupation of the unit in the building,
such compensation should not be reckoned from
the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but
from the time of the demand to vacate. "In
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property but his possession eventually becomes
unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right
to possess."27 In other words, the entry is legal but
the possession thereafter became illegal.
Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of
such action within a year after the withholding of
possession,28 meaning that "if the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, [then] an
ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful
detainer) is proper x x x."29 Here, from the moment
Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994
up to November 15, 1998, the right ofPro-Guard to
possess the premises was not challenged. It was
only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its
ownership of the same that it terminated ProGuards right to possess the unit it was occupying
through a letter to vacate dated November 16,
1998. Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is
considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of ProGuards occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guards
possession became unlawful at that same moment.
This is supported by the allegation in the complaint
for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not
because of non-payment of rentals, but because of
withdrawal oftolerance. Tolerance or "[t]oleration
isdefined as the act or practice ofpermitting or
enduring something not wholly approved
of,"30 while tolerated acts are "those which by
reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
the property allowshis neighbor or another person
to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which ones property
can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permitsthem out of
friendship or courtesy."31
74
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40824 dated November 15, 1996
and its Resolution dated January 13, 1997.
75
76
77
78
79
October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
80
81
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for
review.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorarilacks merit.
An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect
the actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved.19The sole question for
resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto)of the property in
question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive
the trial court from taking due cognizance of the
case. Hence,even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may
pass upon the issue but only to determine the
question of possession especially if the question of
ownership is inseparably linked with the question
of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in
that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving the title to the property.21
82
83
December 3, 2014
84
MTC Ruling
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
85
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.22
86
87
December 3, 2014
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision2 dated September 29, 2011 and the
Resolution3dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113046 which set
aside the Decision4dated August 20, 2009 and the
Order5 dated January 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 (RTC) in Sp. Civil
Case No. 08-744, finding that the action instituted
by petitioner was not one for forcible entry, but for
recovery of ownership and possession, hence,
within the original jurisdiction of the latter.
Consequently, the CA ordered the remand of the
case to the R TC for trial on the merits.
The Facts
This case originated from a forcible entry
Complaint6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by petitioner
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and
natural guardian Susan G. Canencia (petitioner),
against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent)
before the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal
(MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929.
88
The CA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA
set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to
the latter court for trial on the merits.31
It held that the issue of possession of the subject
land is intimately intertwined with the issue of
ownership, such that the former issue cannot be
determined without ruling on who really owns such
land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial
on the merits in the exercise of the latters original
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40
of the Rules of Court.32
89
90
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated May 13, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272
which dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer of Baby Arlene Larao (petitioner) against
Spouses Alfredo and Rafaela Calendacion
(respondents).
SO ORDERED.10
SO ORDERED.13
91
92
93
ROMERO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the
decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29284
dismissing for lack of merit the petition
for habeas corpus of petitioners.
94
95
Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant;
when lawful. A
peace officer or
private person
may, without a
warrant, arrest a
person;
(a) When an
offense has in fact
just been
committed, and he
has personal
knowledge of facts
indicating that the
person to be
arrested has
committed it;
96
97
98
99
SALVACION
P.
ONQUIT, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and
SHERIFF
IV
DANILO
O.
MATIAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint charging
respondents, namely: Judge Aurora BinamiraParcia, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (5th Judicial
Region), Ligao-Oas, Albay, with grave abuse of
authority, bias and grave misconduct; and, Sheriff
IV Danilo O. Matias, with grave misconduct,
misbehavior in the performance of his official
duties, and collusion.[1]
100
101
xxxxxxxxx
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of
complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was not served to (sic) the defendants. Records
show that said writ was served to (sic) the
defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence
but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefor,
nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy
to (sic) the defendants (Annex H, rollo, p.41).[21]
102
ROMUALDO
C.
PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
103
SO ORDERED.[12]
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Court of Appeals held that the decision of
the Regional Director of Lands disapproving the
survey application of petitioner Perez and affirming
the right of respondent Cruz to file the application
for titling of the subject land rendered moot and
academic the possessory action in the RTC. Said
decision awarding the land to Cruz gave him a
better right of possession over the disputed lot as
against Perez, a non-awardee. [15] It likewise held
that the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in
reversing the decision of the RTC of Malolos,
Branch 13, because said decision already acquired
finality. The Court of Appeals agreed with Branch
13 that the issue involved respondents right of
prior possession, and sustained the ruling of
104
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 and the
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6,
2001 and February 15, 2002, respectively, (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
The antecedents are as follows:
105
respondent built on the subject land a semiconcrete structure. Respondent stated that
petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even
granting, without admitting, that respondent's
claim of ownership over the property is improper
because petitioners are the registered owners
thereof, respondent argued that she is a builder in
good faith, because she was able to build the
structure on the subject lot with the prior
permission of the owner.
In its Decision4 dated September 11, 1997, the
MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
It held that laches had already set in which
prevented petitioners from questioning the validity
of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed
the MCTCs judgment. The RTC ruled that
respondent's occupation of the subject property
was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and
permission. Hence, respondent is bound by an
implied promise that she will vacate the property
upon demand. Thus, her possession over the
subject property became unlawful after the
petitioners demanded her to vacate the property.
The RTC found that respondent failed to prove the
alleged oral sale and that petitioners have
adequately proven that they are entitled to the
possession of the subject land as registered owners
thereof. The RTC ordered the respondent and all
other persons claiming rights under her to vacate
and surrender the possession of the subject land to
the petitioners and to remove any and all
improvements she introduced on the parcel of
land.5
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the RTC in an Order 6 dated
November 24, 1998. Obviously dissatisfied by the
Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for
review with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction.7
106
III
107
108
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Order1 dated April 30, 2003 and
the Special Order of Demolition2 dated May 9,
2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 77. Petitioners had applied
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) but the Court in a resolution3 dated May 15,
2003 denied the application.
109
110
111
Meanwhile,
another
group
of
persons
occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F
and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case,
organized
themselves
into
the
Sunflower
Neighborhood
Association
(Sunflower),
the
petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996,
Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a
complaint
for
prohibition/injunction
with
preliminary injunction against private respondent
also with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257.
Sunflower argued that its members should be
excluded from the demolition order as they were
not parties to the original unlawful detainer case.
To include their houses in the demolition would be
to deprive them of due process. This time, Judge
How granted the injunction and ordered the
exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner
from demolition.
112
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification
of the Court of Appeals' Resolution1 dated March
29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated
March 29, 2006 granted the application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie G.
Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite
Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to
make current the supersedeas bond and to pay to
the A TO the rental and concession privilege fees.
113
114
115
116
xxxx
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.
(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review
and the payment of the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected
as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due
course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the appeal shall stay the
judgment or final order unless the Court of
Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall provide
otherwise. (Emphases supplied.)
117
118
Factual Antecedents
119
120
SO ORDERED.17
SO ORDERED.19
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent appealed before the Makati Regional
Trial Court (RTC),20 but in a February 19, 2009
Decision21 the RTC affirmed the MeTC in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 64, Makati City
dated April 4, 2008 in Civil Case No. 85043 is
hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.22
xxxx
121
Respondents Arguments
Respondent argues in his Comment28 that
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
ejectment case indirectlyattacked the DENR rulings
and that it constituted forum-shopping, since these
issues were not raised by petitioners in their
pleadings below; thatthe courts are not divested of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case, since the only
issue involved therein is possession and not who is
entitled to a miscellaneous sales application
covering the disputed lot which the DENR is
tasked to determine; and thatas a consequence of
Mauricios 1994 affidavit, petitioners are estopped
from questioning respondents possession.
Our Ruling
The Court partially grants the Petition.
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners
may not raise the issues of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and forum-shopping, after
having voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the
ejectment case. Besides, these issues are being
raised for the first time at this stage of the
proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant
Petition pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC
Decision;as such, they cannot be allowed to
simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings
or actions taken by the lower courts.
Petitioners Arguments
122
xxxx
In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme
Court held that, "Under the Public Land Act, the
Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary
ultimately have the authority to dispose of and
manage public lands. And while the DENRs
jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the
authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of
possession, the DENRs decision would prevail with
regard to the respective rights of public land
claimants. Regular courts would have no
jurisdiction to inquire intothe validity of the award
of the public land."
123
xxxx
FOR THESE REASONS, WeDISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
124
The Case
125
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the
relocation and verification survey in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction upon motion of the
petitioners and over the objection of the
respondents, and making a determination of
whether there was an encroachment based on
such survey and testimony of the surveyor, had
acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the
second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the
RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the
reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under
Section 13(3) Rule 70 of theRules of Court. It
observed that the relocation and verification
survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the surveyor
had himself admitted that he could not determine
which of the three survey plans he had used was
correct without a full-blown trial.
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority
to receive additional evidence on appeal in an
ejectment case because it was not absolutely
confined to the records of the trial in resolving the
appeal; that the respondents were estopped from
assailing the relocation and verification survey
ordered by the RTC because they had actively
participated in the survey and had even crossexamined Engr. Limpin, the surveyor tasked to
conduct the survey;20 that Engr. Limpins testimony
must be given credence, honoring the wellentrenched principle of regularity in the
performance of official functions;21 that the RTC did
not conduct a trial de novo by ordering the
relocation and verification survey and hearing the
testimony of the surveyor; that the desirability of
the relocation and verification survey had always
been part of the proceedings even before the case
was appealed to the RTC;22 that, in any case, the
peculiar events that transpired justified the RTCs
order to conduct a relocation and verification
survey;23 that the case, because it involved
126
P10,000.00.27
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a nonsummary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our
view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute
must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the
plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the
possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The
defendants possession was lawful at the
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession.
In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is
illegal from the very beginning, and the issue
centers on which between the plaintiff and the
defendant had the prior possession de facto.
127
128