TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,

oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants.
Jul
25
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the
widow en plenodominio in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or free
portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nudapropriedad. Furthermore,
one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the
remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino
national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because
first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec
5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between
widow and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any
kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a
usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where
it will run counter to the testators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is
entitled to of the estate enpleno dominio as her legitime and which is more
than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in
the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators
intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended
to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only
case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases
also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a
fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond
one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute
duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact
the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct
to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the
Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the
opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise
the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a
piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel
of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real
right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary
(Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1981 December
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 111
G.R. No. , 111 SCRA 356
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 31, 1981
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
,.

, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the order
of the respondent Judge dated August 5, 1974, in Civil Case No. 7262 of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
therein plaintiff, now private respondent, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, as well as the
levy on execution dated March 26, 1971, and the sale at public auction dated July
21, 1971, and to restrain the respondents from enforcing said orders or doing acts
that would tend to dispossess the herein petitioner of her usufruct. As prayed for, a
temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on September 23, 1974. 1
The private respondent, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, is the owner of four parcels of
land situated in Iloilo City, and more particularly known as Lots 72-B, 591, 73, and
72-A of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo over which her mother, herein petitioner
Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki has a usufruct, covering one-third (1/3) of onehalf (1/2) each of the said parcels of land or equivalent to one-sixth (1/6) of the
share pertaining to the deceased Cesar Bogacki, Jr. Due to a misundersatnding,
Maria Emma Bogacki, left the home for her mother and the latter took possession of
all these properties exclusively for herself, without sharing with Maria Emma Luz the
rentals she obtained from the said properties. As a consequence, Maria Emma Luz
filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against her
mother Anulina "to define the portions over which the defendant may exercise her
usufructuary rights over the four parcels of land, Lots 72-B, 591, 73 and 72-A." After
appropriate proceedings, judgment was rendered therein, as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders the defendant to limit her right
of usufruct to one-sixth (1/6) each of all these portions of the land described in the
complaint and which is now subject of litigation, including 14th 72-A which is
included in the amended complaint already admitted by this Court.
It is to be regretted that the several attempts of the Court as well as the attorney
for the parties and the willingness on the part of the plaintiff to assign to the
defendant a definite portion of some of these lots to correspond to the usufructuary
right of the mother, she has adamantly refused to accede to any approach at an
amicable settlement thereby making manifest the necessity of defining the same
for her compliance. Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to order the
mother, the defendant, to get only one-sixth (1/6) of whatever collection may be
obtain from the lots in question and orders her to turn over to the plaintiff 5/6 of all
that she had previously collected from the lots not beyond ten years before this
date and conservatively appraised at P50.00 a month from 1959 until the filing of
this case and an equivalent of said amount from date of judgment, without
pronouncement as to other damages or costs. 2
No appeal was taken from said decision and a writ of execution was issued on March
3, 1971. But, since no tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy the
money judgment, the plaintiff therein asked the Court that a levy be made on the
usufructuary rights of the defendant. 3 The defendant opposed the motion upon the
ground that her usufructuary right is one created by law as a surviving spouse and
hence, exempt from execution for family reasons. 4 The motion was denied on
March 25, 1971, 5 and thereafter, the respondent Sheriff set the sale of the usufruct

at public auction. 6 The defendant filed an urgent motion to stop said public auction
sale, 7 but the motion was denied on June 24, 1971. 8 The usufructuary rights were
subsequently sold to the judgment creditor, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, as the
highest bidder thereof, for P6,300.00. 9 On July 26, 1971, the defendant Anulina
Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of June
24, 1971, stating a new grounds therefor, that the usufructuary right is exempt from
execution under Sec. 12(a) of Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court; and that the usufruct
cannot be levied upon, much less sold at the public auction which, in effect, would
extinguish it in a manner not according to the modes for extinguishing a usufruct as
provided for under Art. 603 of the Civil Code. 10 Her motion was denied on July 31,
1971. 11 On October 24, 1972, the plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution, to which the defendant filed an opposition, but the said
motion was withdrawn before the court could act on it, and the plaintiff, instead,
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, 12 which was granted by the
respondent Judge on August 5, 1974. 13
Hence, the instant recourse for the annulment of the order of August 5, 1974, as
well as the levy on execution and the sale at public auction of the petitioner's
usufructuary rights, and to restrain the respondents from dispossessing her of the
said usufruct.
The only issue to be resolved, considering the facts, is whether or not there was
abuse of discretion in the levy and sale on execution of the petitioner's usufructuary
rights and the issuance of the writ of possession.
The petitioner claimed that her usufructuary rights are exempt from execution for
the reasons that: (1) a usufruct of a surviving spouse cannot be alienated for family
reasons pursuant to Art. 321 of the Civil Code; (2) her usufruct, already confined to
a single area equivalent to 1/6 of the total area of the lots on which she has a
usufruct and where she had built a residential house, is a homestead within the
purview of Sec. 12 (a) of Rule 39, Rules of Court; and (3) her usufructuary rights
partake of the nature and character of such personal relations as in the right to
receive legal support, government pension and gratuity, as provided for under Sec.
12(1) of Rule 39. The petitioner further claimed that her usufruct cannot be levied
on execution, much less sold at public auction, which, in effect, would extinguish it
in a manner not according to the modes for extinguishing a usufruct provided for
under Art. 603 of the Civil Code.
The petition is without merit. This Court had ruled that the usufruct of a widow may
be transferred, assigned or otherwise disposed of by her as she may please, like any
other hereditary property, 14 and hence, an interest in real property which can be
sold upon execution. 15
Besides, the grounds relied upon by the petitioner in resisting the levy and sale on
execution of her usufructuary rights are devoid of merit. Thus. the petitioner
claimed that her usufruct cannot be alienated for family reasons pursuant to Article
321 of the Civil Code. This article of the Civil Code, however, cannot be invoked by
the petitioner because the usufructuary rights mentioned in this article are those
enjoyed by parents over the property of their unemancipated children under their
custody, and not those enjoyed by the petitioner which are those of a widow,

constituted on the property of her late husband as her share in the estate of the
latter. Said article provides:
Art. 321. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire
with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority
and in whose company he lives; but if the child, with the parent's consent, should
live independently from them, he shall be considered as emancipated for all
purposes relative to said property, and he shall have over it dominion usufruct and
administration.
The usufruct herein granted cannot be alienated or transferred to third persons
because it arises from parental authority and is necessary to enable the parents to
carry out their obligations to the incompetents under their authority. But, upon
emancipation of the child or loss of parental authority, as in the case of the private
respondent who has already attained the age of majority, is married, and living
independently of the petitioner, the usufruct is extinguished.
The petitioner also claimed that her usufruct, which she had confined to a single
area of about 500 square meters, equivalent to 1/6 of the total area of the lots of
the private respondent on which she has a usufruct, and where she had constructed
a residential house, is a homestead and therefore, exempt from execution according
to Sec-12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
But, Section 12(a) of Rule 39 cannot be invoked by the petitioner. Under this
section, the debtor's family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code, or
in the absence thereof, the homestead in which he resides, and the land necessarily
used in connection therewith, both not exceeding in value P3,000.00, shall be
exempt from execution. In the instant case, however, the execution was not
enforced against the petitioner's "homestead" or residential house, but on her
usufructuary rights over the lots belonging to the private respondent. The
residential house constructed by the petitioner on the land of the private
respondent is but an improvement on the property which the usufructuary may
remove upon extinguishment of the usufruct, if it be possible to do so without
damage to the property. 16
Section 12 (1) of Rule 39 is not also applicable because the property levied and sold
on execution is not the right to receive legal support or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the government. The right to
support, unlike the usufruct of a widow, is a personal right essential to the life of the
recipient, so that it cannot be subject to attachment or execution. 17 On the other
hand, the usufruct of the widow, which was not reincorporated in the new Civil
Code, maybe transferred or otherwise disposed of by her, as she may please, like
any other hereditary property. 18
Moreover, it appears that the levy on execution was made on March 26, 1971, 19
and the petitioner's usufructuary rights were sold at a public auction sale on July 21,
1971. 20 The petitioner, however, took no action thereon such that the orders
issued have already become final and executory when she filed the instant petition.
It is now too late to review the proceedings made therein.

It results that there was no abuse of discretion committed in the levy and sale on
execution of the petitioner's usufructuary rights to satisfy a judgment against her.
There was, likewise, no abuse of discretion in the issuance of the writ of possession
because the said writ is but complementary to the writ of execution, and the period
for the redemption of the thing sold at public auction had expired without its being
redeemed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued is lifted and set aside. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
DEL SAZ OROZCO vs. ARANETA (1951)
JUGO, J.:

FACTS
Eugenio del Saz Orozco died on February 7, 1922, leaving a will which he had
executed on March 5, 1921 will provided that certain properties should be given in
life usufruct to his son Jacinto del Saz Orozco with the obligation on his part to
preserve said properties in favor of the other heirs who were declared the naked
owners thereof. Among these properties were 5,714 shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company.
SEPT 11, 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company declared and
distributed stock dividends out of its surplus profits, Jacinto receiving his
proportionate portion of 11,428 shares.
NOV 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared stock dividends out of its
surplus profits, of which the Jacinto received 17,142 shares, making a total of
28,570 shares.
ISSUE: WON the stock dividend is part of the capital which should be
preserved in favor of the owners or an income of fruits of the capital
which should be given to and enjoyed by the life usufructuary, Jacinto, as
his own exclusive property?

COURT LOOKS AT in re: Testate Estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach AS

BASIS Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is
it capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman.
Justice Ozaeta ruled that a dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is
income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration
that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits
of the corporation, for it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious
violation of the law.

IN THIS CASE
Araneta and his clients attempt to differentiate the present case from that case,
contending that, while the doctrine in that case effected a just and equitable
distribution, the application of it in the present case would cause an
injustice quoting Justice Holmes, "abstract propositions do not decide concrete
cases."
Difference pointed out by the declaration of stock dividends the voting power
of the original shares of stock is considerably diminished, and, if the stock dividends
are not given to the remaindermen, the voting power of the latter would be greatly
impaired
Bearing in mind that the number of shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining company is so large, the diminution of the voting power of the original
shares of stock in this case cannot possibly affect or influence the control of the
policies of the corporation which is vested in the owners of the great block of
shares. not significant enough a reason to change doctrine
We have examined the two cases carefully and we have not perceived
any difference which would justify a reversal or modification of the
doctrine in the Bachrach case.
With regard to the sum of P3,428.40 which is alleged to have been received by
Jacinto from the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, as a result of the reduction
of its capital not proven on the contrary, it was denied by him as soon as he
arrived in the Philippines from Spain. There is no ground, therefore, for ordering the
plaintiff to deliver such sum to the defendants.
DECISION: Reversed, and it is declared that the stock dividends amounting
to 28,570 shares belongs to Jacinto del Saz Orozco exclusively and in
absolute ownership.
JUANA PICHAY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EULALIO QUEROL, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Evaristo Singson for appellants.
Jose M. del Valle, and Lucas Paredes for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:
From the admissions made in the pleadings, and from the facts agreed upon in the
court below, it appears that the plaintiff, Juan Pichay, in April, 1905, conveyed to the
defendants an undivided one-third interest in twenty- five parcels of land situated in
the Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment of a debt of P1,500 which she owed them.
The contract by which this conveyance was made contained the following clause:

Third. The one-third part of these lands belong to me, it being my share in the
inheritance left by my deceased parents; but I have requested may said creditors to
allow me to enjoy the usufruct of the same until my death, notwithstanding the fact
that I have conveyed the said lands to them in payment of my debt, and I bind
myself not to sell, mortgage, or leave the said lands as inheritance to any person.
The defendants and appellants claim that this clause above quoted gave plaintiff no
right of usufruct in the land, saying that it appears that she only asked for this right
and it does not appear that the defendants gave it to her. This contention can not
be sustained. The only reason for inserting this clause in the contract was for the
purpose of securing to the plaintiff the right which is therein set out. The form of the
words used is not sufficient to defeat this purpose.
On the 10th of August, 1905, the owners of the twenty- five parcels of land made a
partition thereof among themselves, in which the plaintiff took no part, and in this
partition certain specific tracts of land were assigned to the defendants as the third
to which they were entitled by reason of the conveyance from the plaintiff to them.
They have been in possession of the tracts so assigned to them in partition since
the date thereof, and are now in such possession, and have refused to recognized in
the plaintiff any right of usufruct therein.lawphil.net
In February, 1907, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, asking
that it be declared that she had no right if usufruct in a third a twenty-five parcels of
land; and that she had the right to the administrations of land, and that the
appellees pay her the rents which they had received during the time of her
dispossession.
The court rendered the following judgment:
In view of the allegations and evidence adduced by the parties, the court concludes:
(1) That all the lands described in the complaint be delivered to Juana Pichay for
administration; (2) that Juana Pichay has a right of usufruct in a third party of the
said lands until her death; (3) that the partition of the said lands, made by the
coowners of Juana Pichay can not affect the latter; (4) Eulalio Querol is hereby
directed to deliver to Juana Pichay two crops from the third part of the lands in
question, or the equivalent thereof, taking as a basis the present crop that is, the
crop to be harvested within a short time and (5) Juana Pichay is sentence to
indemnify Eulalio Querol in the sum of P300 on account of the past suit, without
costs.
The first proposition contained in this judgment finds no support in the record, and
there is nothing therein to show that the plaintiff had any acquired right to the
administration of the lands described in the complaint.
The second proposition finds its support in the record if it is limited to the lands
which were assigned to the defendants in partition.

The third proposition can not be supported. Article 490 of the Civil Code is as
follows:
ART. 490.
The usufructuary of part of a thing held in common shall exercise all
the rights corresponding to the owner thereof with regard to the administration and
collection of fruits or interests. Should the community cease by reason of the
division of the thing possessed in common, the usufruct of the part awarded to the
owner of coowner shall appertain to the usufructuary.
As to the fourth proposition, the agreed statement of facts shows that, while the
defendants are in possession of the tracts which had been assigned to them, they
received the crops for only two years; that the crop for the year 1906 amounted to
14 uyones and 13 manojos, of the value of P4 for each uyon, and that the crop of
1907 amounted to 15 uyones and 4 manojos, of the value of P6.25 for each uyon.
These are the only amounts which the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
As to the fifth proposition, while it appears that the plaintiff excepted to the
judgment, and stated that she desired to present a bill of exceptions, yet she is in
fact did not present any. The error, therefore, assigned by her with reference to this
fifth proposition can not be considered. (Naval vs. Benavides, 8 Phil. Rep., 250;
Puruganan vs. Martin, 8 Phil. Rep., 519; Ullmann vs. Ullmann and Co., 10 Phil. Rep.,
459.)
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded, with directions
to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that she is entitled to the
right of usufruct in the lands assigned to the defendants by the partition of August
10, 1905, and to enter a judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant
Querol for P149.48 without cost of to either party. No costs will be allowed to either
party in this court. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Tracey JJ., concur.
VDA DE ALBAR VS FABIE

FACTS:
Doa Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a
building and improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly
probated she devised the naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey
Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for life.
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many
portions of Manila, the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls
and other improvements that were not destroyed by the fire.

One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at
the same time agreeing to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked
owners as well as the usufructuary sign the agreement of the lease. As the
usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to cede the property by
lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on
the other hand the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was
extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right of the usufructory being
limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in order that
the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary
compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the
monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of
said monthly rental. It was likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the
building to be constructed would accrue to the land upon it completion as an
integral part of the lot covered by the transfer certificate of title issued in the name
of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The parties
expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the termination
of the contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.
By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United
States War Damage Commission approved the claim that was presented for the
damage caused to the property, paid to and received by the naked owners. In the
meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due on the property at
Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the
usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the
reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?

HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is
clear that when the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas
situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance
both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed the building cannot
exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable
part of the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value
whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the term "fincas" has a broad

scope; it includes not only building but land as well. (Diccionario Ingles-Espaol, por
Martines Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the usufruct is
constituted not only on the building but on the land as well, then the usufruct is not
deemed extinguished by the destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article
603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course,
this is addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents
and purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property. This has been clarified
in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536, which was litigated between
the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the will has been
the subject of interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention
that the real estate taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for
several years previous to the present litigation should be paid by her, as she did,
instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in a
formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the
same parties and the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an
amicable agreement which was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary,
herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special
assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of
the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said agreement,
respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.