Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PILAR
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. RAMON DUMADAG, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013
FACTS: On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for accion
publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building
their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in Pilar Village
Subd situated in Las Pias City. The petitioner claims that said
parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name, was designated
as an open space of Pilar Village Subd intended for village
recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents. In
their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material
allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local
government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over
them.
Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and
the trial court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property. On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed
petitioner's complaint, finding that the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading
towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek and within the three-meter legal
easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public
dominion, which could not be owned by petitioner. The trial court
opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied
lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes
and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute
an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 21, 2007.
Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which, on March 5, 2010, sustained the dismissal of the case.
Referring to Section 2 of A.O. No. 99-21 of the DENR, the appellate
court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the
creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to
the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or
ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip
was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the Transfer
Certificate of Title it is then estopped from claiming ownership and
enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA
noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of
the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the Republic
of the Philippines, through the SG, pursuant to Section 101 of C.A.
No. 141.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the
CA per Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pilar Development Corporation is entitled to
the lawful possession of the 3-meter easement, as provided by Art.
630 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: The court ruled that Pilar Development Corporation is not
lawfully entitled to the 3-meter easement. This is because, according
to the lands Transfer Certificate of Title the said easement has a
reservation, to wit:
That the 3.00 meter strip of the lot described herein along
the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement
purposes and to limitations imposed by RA No. 440.
Also, though Art. 630 of the New Civil Code provides for the
general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the
ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of
the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all
matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating
thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title
Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."
With the conclusion arrived at, the Court finds no need to resolve the
other issues raised.
She further asserted that after she filed for annulment oftheir
marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and
brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of
drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that
these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.
Issue:
March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental,
Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision
dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is well aware of the
constitutional prohibition and even asseverated that, because of
such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties
in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his
palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply
the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule
will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage
any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered
into.