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DEMOCRACY
ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN INDIA
I.INTRODUCTION
In India, the need to tackle defection arose only after 1967. Prior to
1967, there were only about 500 instances of defection and that too,
mostly at the State level. Such defections occurred mostly for
ideological reasons and not due to the lure of office. These
defections further strengthened the fabric of Indian Democracy and
curbing such defection would have been akin to undermining and
eroding the freedom required setup. After the Fourth General
Elections in the country however, the practice of defections took an
alarmingly unprecedented turn. Many Legislators switched sides
thanks to the use of office and as abruptly switched back when the
promises made to them were not fulfilled. Between 1967 and 1972
more than 50% of the legislators switched at least once. This
practice of switching sides to gain office came to be known as
Horse- Trading 1
The first attempt to analyses this malady came in December, 1967
when the Lok Sabha appointed a high level committee to look into
the problem and to make recommendations. The committee was
constituted under the chairmanship of the then Union Home Minister
Y.B.Chavan and consisted of legal and political luminaries such as
M.C.Setalvad, Jayaprakash Narayan, H.N.Kunzru, M.Kumaramanglam
and Madhu Limaye among others. The Committee placed its report
before the Parliament in February 1969. The committees
recommendations included that:
i. Political parties should arrive at a Code of Conduct among
themselves.
ii. In cases of defection for ideological reasons, the defector should
be disqualified from continuing as a legislator but is allowed to stand
again.
iii. In cases of defection due to the lure of the office or pecuniary
gans the defector should not only be disqualified from office but also
be prevented from standing for a specified period.
1 www.indianjournal.com
3 Archieve.indian exprees.com
DISQUALIFICATION
a. If a member of a house belonging to a political party:
- Voluntarily gives up the membership of his political party,
or
- Votes, or does not vote in the legislature, contrary to the
directions of
his political party.
However, if the member has taken prior permission, or is
condoned by the party within 15
days from such voting or abstention, the member shall not be
disqualified.
b. If an independent candidate joins a political party after the
election.
c. If a nominated member joins a party six months after he
becomes a
member of the legislature.
II. Power to DISQUALIFY
a.) The Chairman or the Speaker of the House takes the decision
to disqualify
a member.
b.) If a complaint is received with respect to the defection of the
Chairman or
Speaker, a member of the House elected by that
House shall take the decision.
III. EXCEPTION
Merger
A person shall not be disqualified if his original political party
merges with
another, and
- He and other members of the old political party become
members of the new political party,
or
- He and other members do not accept the merger and opt to
function as a separate group.
This exception shall operate only if not less than two-thirds of the
members of party in the House
4 www.ijra.com
TENTH SCHEDULE
[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
Provisions as to disqualification on ground of defection
1. Interpretation.- In this Schedule, unless the context otherwise
requires,- (a) "House" means either House of Parliament or the
Legislative Assembly or, as the case may be, either House of the
Legislature of a State;
(b) legislature party", in relation to a member of a House
belonging to any political party in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 or, as the case may be, paragraph 4,
means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the
time being belonging that political party in accordance with the said
provisions;
(c) "original political party", in relation to a member of a House,
means the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of
sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2;
(d) "paragraph" means a paragraph of this Schedule.
2. Disqualification on ground of defection. - (1) Subject to the
provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging
to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the
House(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political
party; or
(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any
direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any
person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining,
in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or
authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by
such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the
10 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
(a) have become members of such other political party or, as the
case may be, of a new political party formed by such merger; or
(b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a
separate group,
and from the time of such merger, such other political party or new
political party or group, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be
the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of subparagraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for
the purposes of this sub-paragraph.
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the
erger of the original political party of a member of a House shall be
eemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of
the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such
merger.
5. Exemption.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Schedule, a person who has been elected to the office of the
Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the House of the People or the
Deputy Chairman of the Council of States or the Chairman or the
Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council of a State or the Speaker
or the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of a State, shall
not be disqualified under this Schedule,(a) if he, by reason of his election to such office, voluntarily gives up
the membership of the political party to which he belonged
immediately before such election and does not, so long as he
continues to hold such office thereafter, rejoin that political party or
become a member of a another political party; or
(b) if he, having given up by reason of his election to such office his
membership of the political party to which he belonged immediately
before such election, rejoins such political party after he ceases to
hold such office.
6. Decision on questions as to disqualification on ground of
defection.- (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a
13 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
(c) the reports which a political party shall furnish with regard to
admission to such political party of any members of the House and
the officer of the House to whom such reports shall be furnished;
and
(d) the procedure for deciding any question referred to in subparagraph (1) of paragraph 6 including the procedure for any inquiry
which may be made for the purpose of deciding such question.
(2) The rules made by the Chairman or the Speaker of a House
under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph shall be laid as soon as
may be after they are made before the House for a total period of
thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more
successive sessions and shall take effect upon the expiry of the said
period of thirty days unless they are sooner approved with or
without modifications or disapproved by the House and where they
are so approved, they shall take effect on such approval in the form
in which they were laid or in such modified form, as the case may
be, and where they are so disapproved, they shall be of no effect.
(3) The Chairman or the Speaker of a House may, without prejudice
to the provisions of article 105 or, as the case may be, article 194,
and to any other power which he may have under this Constitution
direct that any wilful contravention by any person of the rules made
under this paragraph may be dealt with in the same manner as a
breach of privilege of the House.
the position of the Tribunal and therefore, his decisions like those of
all tribunes were subject to judicial review.
In regard to the various contentions raised and urged at the hearing,
the Supreme Court held as follows:
1. That at the paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution is valid, its provisions do not suffer from the vice of
subverting democratic rights of elected members of Parliament and
the Legislatures of the States. It does not violate their
freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended.
The provision of Paragraph 2 does not violate any right or freedom
under Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution.
2. That having regard to the background and evolution of the
principles underlying the constitution(52nd Amendment) Act, 1985,
in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the
Constitution of India, the provision of Paragraph 7 of the Tenth
Schedule in the Constitution in terms and in effect bring about the
change in the operation and effect of Article 136, 226, 227 of the
Constitution of India, and, therefore, the amendment would require
to be ratified in accordance with the proviso to clause 2 of article
368 of the Constitution of India.
3. The paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains a provision which
is independent of, and stands apart from, the main provisions of the
Tenth Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy for the evil
of unprincipled and unethical political defections and therefore is a
severable part.
4. The paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks
to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid.
But the concept of Statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1)
does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under article
136,226 and 227 in so far as infirmities based on violations of
constitutional mandates, mala fides, non compliance with the Rules
of Natural Justice an perversity, are concerned.
5. It would be unfair to the high traditions of that great office to say
that the investiture in it of this jurisdiction would be vitiated for
violation of a basic feature of democracy. It is inappropriate to
express distrust in the High Office of the Speaker, merely because
some of the speakers are alleged, or even found to have discharged
their functions not in keeping with that great tradition of that High
Office.
On the third issue court was of the view that the provisions grant
finality to the orders of the Speaker, the provision is valid. However,
the High Courts and the Supreme Court can exercise judicial rev iew
under the Constitution. Judicial review should not cover any stage
prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/ Chairmen.
Ravi S Naik v. Union of India 9
Issue- Whether only resignation constitutes voluntarily giving up
membership of a political party.
Judgment- The words voluntarily giving up membership have a
wider meaning. An inference can also be drawn from the conduct of
the member that he has voluntarily given up the membership of his
party.
G. Vishwanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly 10
Issue- Whether a member can be said to voluntarily give up his
membership of a party if he joins another party after being expelled
by his old political party.
Judgment -Once a member is expelled, he is treated as an
unattached member in the house. However, he continues to be a
member of the old party as per the Tenth Schedule. So if he joins a
new party after being expelled, he can be said to have voluntarily
given up membership of his old party.
Dr. Kashinath G Jhalmi v. Speaker, Goa Legislative
Assembly 11
Issue- Whether a Speaker can review his own decision to disqualify
a member under the Tenth Schedule.
Judgment-The Speaker of a House does not have the power to
review his own decisions to disqualify a candidate. Such power is not
provided for under the Schedule, and is not implicit in the provisions
either.
9 AIR 1994 SC 1558
17 DATED:28.9.2012 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7125 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 54 OF
2012)
Shri Rajeev Ranjan Singh Lalan vs. Dr. P.P. Koya, JD(U),
(January 9, 2009). Dr. Koya defied a party whip requiring him to be
present in the House and vote against the Motion of Confidence for
the government. He claimed he was too ill to be present in the
House. The Speaker concluded that Dr. Koya abstained from voting
by remaining absent, and the evidence of the illness is not
sufficient to conclude that he was so ill that he could not be present
in the House.
Shri Prabhunath Singh vs. Shri Ram Swaroop Prasad,
JD(U), (October 3, 2008). Shri Prasad defied a party whip requiring
him to be present in the House. In his defence, he denied that any
whip was issued or served. The Speaker held that in view of the fact
that there is evidence to show that the whip had been delivered to
Shri Prasads house, and had been duly received, it cannot be said
that Shri Prasad had no knowledge of the whip.
Shri Avtar Singh Bhadana vs. Shri Kuldeep Singh, Indian
National Congress, (September 10, 2008). The INC alleged that
Shri Bishnoi often dissented from, and criticized the Congress
government publicly, and had demanded the dismissal of the
government in Haryana. The Speaker held that a person getting
elected as a candidate of a political party also gets elected because
25 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
18
PTI NOVE,BER 15,2010
26 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
They had pleaded before the Supreme Court that the provisions of
the Tenth Schedule, which deals with disqualification of MPs, are not
applicable to the expelled members of a political party.
Challenging the apex court's 1996 verdict, the leaders had
contended that the court had erroneously interpreted the Tenth
Schedule, while holding that its provisions apply even to the
expelled members if they join a new political party.
They had submitted that the Viswanathan case ruling had also led to
an anomalous situation where a party makes its expelled member
abide by its whip even after expelling him from the party and the
failure to adhere to such whip results in disqualification of the
expelled member from the House.
In their petition, they had submitted the ruling in the Viswanathan
case render them ineligible from both joining or forming a new
political party due to the fear of disqualification under Clause 2(1)(a)
of the anti-defection law.
BELOW IS A LIST OF LEADERS WHO QUIT PARTIES AS THE LOK
SABHA ELECTIONS GET CLOSER19:-
19
www.prs india .org
28 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
CONCLUSION
Anti-defection law when it was passed, it aimed at bringing down the
political defect but due to ever increasing political dishonesty and
corruption this law never evolved properly and now a question have
arose that whether achieving the goals of this law a reality or a
myth? Politicians found loopholes in this law and used it for their
own benefit.
It is high time that a watchdog should be provided to our Parliament
and there is a need for our constitutional pundits to revisit the issue
to combat the menace of corruption and defection which has eroded
the values of democracy.
Social activists like Anna Hazare and now public figures like Baba
Ramdev are doing their best with the help of citizens and using the
method of non-violence and satyagrah which were adopted by the
father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi to eradicate Britishers from
the country and doing their best to make sure that our sleeping
government should wake up and start taking steps towards
eradicating political corruption and only this will help in achieving
31 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACY
the goal which was set while passing this law. This law can also work
if certain recommendations mentioned above are taken into
consideration and an amendment be made in this law.
In the end I would like to quote that a government, for protecting
business only, is about a carcass, and soon falls by its own
corruption and decay, so the government has a duty to stand and
deliver now and not let this law turn into a myth .