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A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief (Kit:b

al-Irsh:d il: Qaw:3i6 al-Adilla)
By IM2M AL-EARAMAYN AL-JUWAYN>, trans. Paul E. Walker (Reading:
Garnet, 2000), 287 pp. Price PB 15.00. ISBN 1859641571.
The author of the Irsh:d, Im:m al-Earamyan al-Juwayn; (d. 478/l085), a
towering figure in the history of Islamic religious thought, belonged to the
Ash6arite school of theology (kal:m). This school, which takes its name from
its founder al-Ash6ar; (d. 324/935), was noted for its occasionalismthe
doctrine that all events (including human acts) are the direct creation of the
eternal divine attribute of power. The orderly course of events that we witness
around us is in itself not necessary. Its uniformity is arbitrarily decreed by the
divine will and enacted by the divine power. Its disruption, when God creates a
miracle on behalf of a prophet, is thus possible. The Ash6arite school is also
noted for rejecting the doctrine (espoused by the earlier Mu6tazilite school of
kal:m) that the moral values of acts are intrinsic to them and are rationally
discernible independently of revelation. For the Ash6arites, the moral values of
acts derive exclusively from the commands and prohibitions of the divine law.
In themselves, all human acts are morally neutral.
Al-Juwayn;s Irsh:d, an exposition of its authors Ash6arite theology, is a
classic of its genre. Although Ash6arite to the core, it does not simply parrot or
expand on what earlier Ash6arite masters said, but is also critical of them.
There is a freshness and a directness in its approach that perhaps helps explain
in part the influence it exerted on subsequent thinkers. This is not to suggest
that its thought lacks intricacy and subtlety, and Walkers translation of
this workthough open to criticismremains in its own way an irsh:d, a
guide, that helps us follow the intricacies of al-Juwayn;s arguments.
While these arguments are of particular interest to students of kal:m, they
are not without interest to those concerned in a more general way with the
history of ideas. To cite some examples, there is the chapter in which
al-Juwayn; argues against the Mu6tazilite dogma that God cannot be seen.
(The Ash6arites maintain that he can be seen in the hereafter.) He argues against
the theory of perception upheld by his opponents, namely, that light travels
from the eye to meet its object. What is of particular interest here is that
al-Juwayn;, like the majority of the theologians he is opposing, is an atomist,
and uses the very atomism he shares with his opponents to refute their theory
of perception.
Another example is the brief criticism in the Irsh:d directed against the
philosophers. Now, in his larger theological work, al-Sh:mil (parts of which are
lost), al-Juwayn; had given a critiqueagain from an atomists perspectiveof
the Aristotelian doctrine of prime matter. Some of this is re-echoed in the
Irsh:d, where al-Juwayn; also introduces a brief critique of Neoplatonic ideas.
As expected, he is concerned with the Neoplatonic theory of emanation as
developed by the Islamic philosophers. He thus alludes to the triadic scheme of
emanation associated with Ibn S;n: (Avicenna) although Ibn S;n: is not
explicitly mentioned. Al-Juwayn; rejects this scheme. In objecting to it, he

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argues that when in this scheme God is said to necessitate the worlds existence,
He is being denied choice (ikhtiy:r) in His creative acts. This objection was to
become central in the criticisms levelled at Ibn S;n: by al-Juwayn;s illustrious
student al-Ghaz:l; in his Tah:fut al-Fal:sifa (The Incoherence of the
Philosophers). Now, al-Ghaz:l; tells us that he pursued an intensive study of
philosophy during his career as teacher in the NiC:miyya in Baghdadthat is,
after al-Juwayn;s death. There is no reason to doubt this. But al-Juwayn;s
criticisms of the philosophers indicate that al-Ghaz:l; had an earlier exposure
to philosophy while a student of al-Juwayn;. (In his Introduction (p. xxxii),
Walker draws full attention to this.)
Another example of the books broader appeal will interest the student of
ethical theory. In the discussion of divine justice, the Ash6arite theory (referred
to by the late George F. Hourani as theistic subjectivism) is defended and the
Mu6atizilite doctrine of the intrinsic nature of the moral act is criticized and
rejected. The debate, to be sure, is within a theological framework. But the
issues in the last analysis are highly theoretical and their parallels are detectable
in modern debates about the different types of ethical theorydeontological,
teleological, emotive, and so on.
The translation is essentially sound, though not free from blemishes. Some of
the translated terms and expressions are left without clarification in the notes.
There are also some mistakes in the translation. When the Ash6arites refer to
one type of knowledge as @ar<r;, literally necessary, it includes such a selfevident logical principle as the law of excluded middle, generally regarded as a
priori. But it also includes knowledge of ones own existence and subjective
states, and knowledge attained directly by the senses. Walkers translation of
@ar<r; as a priori is not illegitimate, if the sense in which the expression is
used is fully explained. However, this is not done, and the reader may remain
quite puzzled by its inclusion of knowledge attained by the senses. Another
expression where an explanatory note would have been helpful is al-sabr wa-ltaqs;m: the disjunctive syllogism used in kal:m where the alternatives are
exclusive. This is variously translated in the text, but never properly explained.
Turning to the basic Ash6arite concept of kasb, the term is normally translated
as acquisition. Walker in several places translates itnot inappropriatelyas
appropriation. However he also translates kasb as performance, and kasban
(grammatically in the accusative) as the power to perform (pp. 105, 106).
This shift in the translation is not explained. Performance and the power to
perform have been used by others to designate kasb, but this can be very
misleading as it suggest that what is enacted is done by the 6abd, by Gods
servant, not by divine power that bequeaths it to the servant, who then
acquires it.
On p. 32, in But if they should say that the Exalted Lord has the ability to
compel creatures to do as He wishes, the as He wishes should be amended to
what He does not wish (il: m: l: yur;duhu). On p. 61, in If the speaker were
the one who does the act of speaking, one would not know that the speaker is
speaking without knowing that he speaks the words, the without knowing
that he speaks the words, should read without knowing that he is the doer of

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the act of speaking. These two examples represent some of the more serious
errors in the translation.
Notwithstanding, the translation remains basically sound. For this Professor
Walker and the reviewer of the translation, Dr Muhammad Eissa, are to be
commended. Professor Walker allows the text to speak for itself as he focuses
on its lines of reasoning, endeavouring very effectively to convey these in clear,
readable language. He also provides the translation with an enlightening Introduction.
All in all, the publication of this volume is a significant and welcome event.

Michael E. Marmura
University of Toronto

Al-Ghazali: Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence

Translated by DAVID B. BURRELL (Louisville, Ky: Fons Vitae, 2001),
202 pp. Price PB $18.95. ISBN 1887752358.
Book 35 of IAy:8 6ul<m al-d;n is one of the most important parts of this
monumental work. In the later al-Arba6;n f; uB<l al-d;n (Cairo, 1328 AH, pp.
268), al-Ghaz:l; states that while he uses a kal:m approach to provide proofs
that support common peoples theological beliefs (i6tiq:d) in the section of the
IAy:8 entitled al-Ris:la al-Qudsiyya, real theological knowledge (ma6rifa)
should be sought elsewhere in the IAy:8. He writes: If you wished to inhale
some of the fragrances of ma6rifa, you would find a small amount thereof
inserted in the Book of Patience and Thanksgiving, the Book of Love and the
section on divine unity in the beginning of the Book of Trust in Divine
Providence, all being parts of the IAy:8. Undiluted theological knowledge,
however, is only to be found expounded in some of his books that should be
kept away from those unworthy of them (al-ma@n<n bi-h: 6al: ghayri ahli-h:).
Thus, while the section on divine unity is intended as the main theological
core of the IAy:8hence its great importanceit is not the most explicit
and comprehensive account of al-Ghaz:l;s theology. And as the statement
quoted above indicates, this section is complemented by other theological
discussions in the IAy:8 (so e.g. the reader is referred in this section to Book 32,
On Thanksgiving, for discussion of certain theological themes, p. 47).
The book is divided into a section on divine unity and a longer section on
trust in divine providence, divided in turn into subsections. The crux of the
whole book, which connects its two main themes, is a statement that
introduces the section on divine unity. David Burrell translates it as follows:
Know that trust in God pertains to faith, and all matters pertaining to faith
may be classified by way of the knowledge, the state of being, and the activity
proper to them. So trust in God can be classified according to knowledge as its
source and activity as its fruit, while it is the state of being which renders the
sense of the term tawakkul (p. 9). This is an inaccurate and obscure translation of a rather simple statement; I propose this alternative: Know that trust