ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v.

JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
ENBANC
G.R. No. L-14639
March 25, 1919
PONENTE: J. MALCOLM
FACTS:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with

Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October
25, 1918 beyond the womens consent and
knowledge.
Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the
district of Sampaloc, Manila.
Thereafter the women were shipped to
Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers.
The purpose of sending this women to davao is to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district
for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years.
That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed
for habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor and
police moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and
that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

ISSUE RELEVANT TO SECTION 1 ARTICLE II of the

Constitution
1. WHETHER OR NOT MAYOR LUKBAN WHO IS AN OFFICER OF
THE STATE, TO ERADICATE VICES IN ITS CITY HAVE THE RIGHT
TO DEPORT SAID WOMEN OF ILL-REPUTE?

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed

thatNo freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land. No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish
official transgressors
2.
On the second issue, the court believed that the true
principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor Lukban) is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to
obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that
he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched
by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
3.
In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police,
acting under no authority of law, could deport these women
from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao
to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
NOTE:

OTHER ISSUE

HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law Dictionary

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF MANILA DOES NOT HAVE A

JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO DAVAO
CITY TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE WOMEN SINCE IT IS OUT
OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND THUS, DISOBEYING THE WRIT
ISSUED BY THE COURT TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE
WOMEN?

Literally means- That you have the body

HELD:

The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found

in contempt of court for not following the order of the court
to produce the body of the women and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the
sum of one hundred pesos (P100)
RATIO:
1.
On the first issue, the courts decision is based on the
principle of Republicanism wherein Ours is a government of
laws and not of men

It is a writ employed to bring a person before a court,

most frequently to ensure that the partys imprisonment or
detention is not illegal.
In addition to being used to test the legality of the
arrest or commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain
review of (1) the regularity of the extradition process (2)
the right to or amount of bail or (3) the jurisdiction of a
court that has imposed a criminal sentence.
In other words, it is a writ which compel someone to
produce the body of the person under the name of the law.
=====================================================

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO

GUIVELONDO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003]
PONENTE: J. YNARES-SANTIAGO
FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing

Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent
domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu,
Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for
the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they
were waiving their objections to NHAs power to
expropriate their properties. Thus an order of
execution has been granted and the court already
appointed commissioners to determine the amount
for just compensation
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted
their report wherein they recommended that the
just compensation of the subject properties be
fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a
partial judgment has been rendered.
After the report on the just compensation has
completed, both parties filed an MR on the amount
for the just compensation stating that it has no
adequate basis and support. Both MR was denied by
the court.
While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC
and an entry of judgment and the motion for
execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied
the petition on the ground that the Partial
Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal the
same.
Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
1)
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND
COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR CONTINUE WITH
THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2)
WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND
GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN
EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE
3) WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES APPLIES TO
GOVERNMENT;
HELD:
The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the
lower court was affirmed.

RATIO:

On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state
can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue
exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA
does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation
proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and
executory. In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and
Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, an
expropriation proceeding was explained.

Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,

condemnation of the property after it is determined that its
acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and,
second, the determination of just compensation to be paid
for the taking of private property to be made by the court
with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

The first is concerned with the determination of the

authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would
be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on
the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a
final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is

concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose
of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be
done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or
another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous
in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or
otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek
a reversal of the order by taking an appeal there from.

On the second issue, the court held that a socialized

housing is always for the public used and that the public
purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way
diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court
has fixed.

On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA,
although it is public in character, it is only public in
character since it is government-owned, having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, the
funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations
and non-corporate agency, although considered public in
character, are not exempt from garnishment.

Notes:
Important Discussion in the case:

When does the Doctrine of State Immunity not applied in

the government agencies?
1. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law
2. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a
government-owned or controlled corporation which is
clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt
from garnishment. This is so because when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation.

He contends that the Commission which is

represented by Atty. Melville Hussey and Robert Port
of USA, prosecuting him, established pursuant to EO
68 and being Americans is therefore without
jurisdiction.

ISSUE related to Art 2 Section 2 of Constitution

WHETHER OR NOT KURODA BE PROSECUTED UNDER EO 68
WHICH IS ADHERENT TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION EVEN
THOUGH THE PHILIPPINES IS NOT A SIGNATORY OF IT?
OTHER ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT KURODA CAN BE PROSECUTED BY THE
MILITARY COMMISSION OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?
HELD:

GARNISMENT AS DEFINED BY BLACK LAW DICTIONARY:

Garnishment
A judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or a
potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who
is indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn over to the
creditor any of the debtors property (such as wages or
bank accounts) held by that third party.
A person can initiate a garnishment action as means of
either prejudgment seizure or post judgment collection.
In short, it only means whether the Heirs of
Guivelendo can file a case to NHA to compel the latter to
give to them the amount of the just compensation as
rendered by the court.

The court held that Kuroda can be prosecuted by the Military

Commission

=====================================================

2. The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of

a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which
fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and
having said Kuroda in its custody, this Court will not interfere
with the due process of such Military commission.

SHIGENORI KURODA, vs .Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
PONENTE: MORAN, C.J
FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of

the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines during
a period covering 1943 and 1944 is now charged
with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such commander to control
the operations of members of his command,
permitting them to commit high crimes in violation
of laws the laws and customs of war under E.O 68.
EO 68 was issued in conformity to the generally
accepted principles of international law established
in Hague Convention.
Kuroda Agues that EO 68 is unconstitutional as the
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention.

RATIO:
1. On the first issue, it was held that yes, Kuroda can be
prosecuted under E.O 68 even though Philippines is not a
signatory of such E.O. Art. II Section 2 of our constitution
provides that the Philippines adopt the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation. Furthermore, when the crimes were committed, the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of US and thus equally
bound together with the US to the treaty as the US is a
signatory of the convention.

NOTES:
HAGUE CONVENTION
One of a number of international conventions that
address different legal issues and attempt to standardize
procedures between nations. (BLACK LAW DICTIONARY)
=====================================================
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the
Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings
on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines

and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made
during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid
even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments
and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by
MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and
proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the
military force and deriving their authority from the laws of
war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in
force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil
obedience is expected even during war, for the existence
of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then
it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come
out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the
interpretation of the phrase processes of any other
government and whether or not he intended it to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during
the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments
and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in
violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result
from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to

presume that such construction was not intended by the

makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese
occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be
construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in
the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws
and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and
courts of the Philippines did not become, by being
continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature,
law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY
BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new
sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired
sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of
the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said
courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon
them have continued in force until now, it follows that the
same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government
are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation
unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments,
but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because
such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue
hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through
rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or
the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the
will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount
force)
through insurrection (established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state)
=====================================================

LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending
that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on
the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over
the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended
during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of
a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government
or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There
is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the
change of form of government does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
=====================================================
Ruffy vs Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-533
75 Phil 875
August 20, 1956
Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al.
Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines,
military men were assigned at designated camps or military
bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro
thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains
and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A
certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of
their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new
authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy
and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to
military law at the time the offense was committed, which
was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject
to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still
covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and

other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming

of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of
95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military
jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers,
which makes them even more eligible for the military court's
jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit
and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby
DENIED.

Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of

State (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

=====================================================
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs CAMPOS RUEDA
October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as
administrator of the estate of the late EstrellaSoriano Vda.
De Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible
personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a
Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco
from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955.
Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision
denying the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent
denied this request on the grounds that there was no
reciprocity with Tangier, which was moreover a mere
principality, not a foreign country.
Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign
country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of
that foreign power which, although not an international
person in the sense of international law, does not impose
transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties
of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a
similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the
exemption benefits of the last provision of Section 122 of our
Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at least so
much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign
country" to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
DECISION:

Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.

If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is
required in line with Pound's formulation that it be
apolitically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning
under a regime of law.
It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it
viewed as an organized corporate society under a government
with the legal competence to exact obedience to its
commands.
The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means
of its government its sovereign will over the individuals
within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.
State is a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over
all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the
power entrusted to its government to maintain within its
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied,
international law does not exact independence as a condition
of statehood.
This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that evens a tiny
principality that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this
exempt category.
=====================================================
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita

damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant

constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as
well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a
regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are
tenable.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS,
itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty
and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In
fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522
(RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing
the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square
nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Facts:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the
archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law
is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to
comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines
in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA
9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased
the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of
Paris and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the
exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine
waters as archipelagic waters which, in international law,
opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident
on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea
of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and
that we may term it as our internal waters, but the bottom
line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to
our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of
others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from
the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well
as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the

baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate

their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be
enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which
is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that,
then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation
should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels
of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines;
where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines;
jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the
baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental
shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
=====================================================
Bacani v. NACOCO Digest
G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956
Two-fold Function of the Government
FACTS:
1. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned
in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of another civil case
(Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'),
Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Natl Coconut Corporation) ,
requested the said stenographers for copies of the transcript
of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani
and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per
page.
3.
Subsequently, the Auditor General required the
plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a DOJ
circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
4.
Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government
entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section
2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt
from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

Ruling:
No, it is not.

PVTA v. CIR
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
Fernando, J.

1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason

that they do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the
purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States and of
providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products
and the proper utilization of coconut by-products, a function
which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and
distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the
provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and
be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from
our government.

Facts:

2.
There are functions which our government is required to
exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of
sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote
merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.

whether PVTA discharges governmental and not

proprietary functions

3.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions
as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and
between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and
interchange of property, and the determination of its
liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and
relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation
of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests.
4. The most important of the ministrant functions are:
public works, public education, public charity, health and
safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles deter mining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a
government should do for the public welfare those things
which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2)
that a government should do these things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
=====================================================

Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their

employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of
the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the
differential between the amount actually paid to them and
the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration would predicate its plea for the
reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition
that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from
the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue:

Held:
No. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner
corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioners
plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary
functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265,
its purposes and objectives were set forth thus:
(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia
tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those
engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic
security;
(b) To establish and maintain balanced production and
consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured
products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and
stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of
production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as
in the foreign market;
(c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing,
warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and
supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that
the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair
return of their investments;
(d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading,
classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and
(e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the
people engaged in the tobacco industry.
The amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even
more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first
section on the declaration of policy reads: It is declared to
be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia
tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia
tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable
in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this

industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a

climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the
qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported
and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of
locally manufactured cigarettes. The objectives are set forth
thus: To attain this national policy the following objectives
are hereby adopted:
1. Financing;
2. Marketing;
3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and
conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco
industry may be established on a sound basis; and
4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes
through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco;
such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of
one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia
tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.
Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property
rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations may not be
strictly considered constituent. Under the traditional
constituent-ministrant classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people these latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
the government. Nonetheless, the growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic,
not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals, continue to lose
their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the
times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself
in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.
=====================================================
Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad
G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented

by Executive Treasurer
Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila
FACTS:
On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines
took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as
received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of
the earthquake. The government used the money as such but
$80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte
de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries,
equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the
same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The
Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the
ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the
affected party. On account of various petitions of the persons,
the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad
for a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to
provide the money, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file
a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in
respondent bank.
HELD:
The Court held that the Philippine government is competent
to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in
accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The
government is the sole protector of the rights of the people
thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws
which promote public interest. The government has the right
to "take back" the money intended fro people. The
government has the right to enforce all charities of public
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over
the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with
it.

264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of

Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of
power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that
by granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or
not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the
National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively
granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free
collective bargaining.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of
power.
HELD:
No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for
adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the
entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there
is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of
legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows
compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise
of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental
principle and state policy that the state should afford
protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an
unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a
factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is
complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be
any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest.
=====================================================
ACCFA v CUGCO Digest
G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
Facts:
1.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby

GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the
amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in
Philippine peso.
=====================================================
Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor
108 SCRA 757
Political Law Delegation of Power Completeness Test
Facts:
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free
Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long
Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas
Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article

2.

ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821,

as amended was reorganized and its name changed
to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under
the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA
Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA
Workers' Association (AWA), are labor organizations
(the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the
rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and
AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be
effective on 1 July 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike.
And 5 days later, the Unions, with its mother union,
the Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint
against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged
acts of unfair labor practices; violation of the
collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the

3.

exercise of their right to self-organization,

discrimination against said members in the matter
of promotions and refusal to bargain.
ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the
appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed which
effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA
petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights
with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided
upon, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA
under the Land Reform Project Administration.
Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the
trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of
ASA and AWA.

ISSUE:
W/N ACA is a government entity
RULING:
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform
Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among
them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no
dispute as to the fact that the land reform program
contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of
any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely
governmental function, no less than, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when,
aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as
they are to the implementation of the land reform program of
the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government
office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs
vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the
ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a
government instrumentality; and that its personnel are
subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization
with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as
to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
and only "because it was better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed
ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the
implementation of the Land Reform Program of the

government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary

function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal
privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it
was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern
society have rendered the classification of the governmental
functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and
governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move
towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
=====================================================

at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary

as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
=====================================================
Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the
constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its
implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo
Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to
use this.

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to
be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies
while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when
the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge
of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother
of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to
be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.

The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early

warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents
between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more
than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked
on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner:
1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power,
equal protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car
dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72
pesos per set.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens
patriae to the terms of the insurance policy?

Hence the petition.

RULING:

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition

with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of
police power to such acts.

YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family
as the basic social unit, and that whenever any
member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a
litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child
and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards
the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae,
is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects
one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It
may happen, family relations may press their respective
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the
natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the
conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna

convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the
petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police
power.
Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of
police power?
Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which
cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of
government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
and general welfare of the people.

J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional

rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct
unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure
communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute
validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing
the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy
reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was
fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature
and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident
because its installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed
from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the
law doesnt violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the
reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement
from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both
recommended enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother
possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of
principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the
petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
=====================================================
Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts:
Chinese businessman, Lao Ichong, entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound. His type
of business particularly is a retail business. He and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local
market in Pasay. But in June 1954, Congress passed the
Republic Act No. 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act.
This act is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business.
Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on
the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by
the Philippines. He said it violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda) and, as a Chinese businessman engaged
in the business here in the country who helps in the income

generation of the country, he should be given equal

opportunity.

law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when

the classification is without reasonable basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Republic Act No. 1180 violates equal
protection clause.

=====================================================

HELD:
No. The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth
or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. He
is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his
Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.
The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are
real and actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.

Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova

9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law
Treaty vs Executive Agreements Statutes Can Repeal
Executive Agreements
FACTS:
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered
into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for
the importation of rice without complying with the requisite
of securing a certification from the National Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the
then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice
and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that

he never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. The alien's interest in this country being
merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised
to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive
agreements entered into by Macapagal.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of

distribution show the existence of real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a national
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the
retail trade measure

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by

our courts.

Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for

distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the
retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish
sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders
into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom
of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this
is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court
finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and
all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be
said that the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature
acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed
or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The
legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a

W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our

courts.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the

Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power.
He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in
point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at
bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized
by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has
clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC
may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise,

reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of

error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law,
but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
=====================================================
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of
law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others
that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino
parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was
allowed to practice law profession in spain under the
provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise
of profession between the republic of the phils.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to
the phil. bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the
treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils.
and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said
treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to
practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have
been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason
the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to
the congress of the phils.
=====================================================
People of the Philippines vs Tranquilino Lagman
66 Phil. 13 Political Law Defense of State
FACTS:
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is
being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1
(National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman
refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no
military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD:

Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot

be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the
National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
=====================================================
People of the Philippines vs Pedro Manayao
78 Phil. 721 Political Law Citizenship Defense of State
Treason

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of
Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of
Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not
her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year
before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is
not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident
of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.

FACTS:
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of
Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao
conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to
inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where
they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they killed were
alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas
fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively
identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted
with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was
sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayaos
counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with treason
because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due
to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause.
Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for
any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the
congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures
for executing the declaration which was completely executed
by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed
by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.

ISSUE:

HELD: No. Manayaos swearing of allegiance to Japan was not

proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese
Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a
group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court
also emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes
the Constitutional provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government,
in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to
render personal, military or civil service
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by
merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and
joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine
Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is
also indicated that no such person shall take up arms against
his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and
treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the

administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

=====================================================

Whether or not Escritors religious belief and practice should

warrant her claim of religious freedom under Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the

judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office
of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that
the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free
exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish
her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since
this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right
to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply
take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom
but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the
Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to
intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity
(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence
on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's
religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means
the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive
to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
=====================================================
Aglipay v. Ruiz Digest
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney,
the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part
remained unsold.

3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the

petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in
the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage
stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the
principle of separation of church and state
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to
religion.

within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny

the petition for a writ of prohibition.
=====================================================
GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY
1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc
City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will
be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the
fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for
one year and until the election of his successor. The image
would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saints feast day.

Ruling:
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order
to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society
is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act
No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
issue postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to
assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in
issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the
case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between
the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of
the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify
the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said

projects were implemented. The image was temporarily
placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay.
However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused
to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the
churchs property since church funds were used in its
acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a
lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the
recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy.
Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in
his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the
Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec
18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue:
Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the
Constitution violated.
Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the
custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious
matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as
the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in
connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils
funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their

property. Right of the determination of custody is their right,

and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure
of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative
of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church
and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property.

in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal

office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national
funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge
Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is
repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.

=====================================================

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised

Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz
before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their
expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this
case?
Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion
of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise
control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to
just church regulations. Civil Courts will not interfere in the
internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the
subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,
use, or possession of church property. Obviously, there was
no violation of a civil right in the present case.
=====================================================
Fortunato Pamil vs Victorino Teleron
86 SCRA 413 Political Law Inviolability of the
Separation of Church and State
Facts:
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for
mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as
mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo
warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of
Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of
the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the

1935 Constitution, No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. If the the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section
2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for
elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the
Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote
of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175
of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed
by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court
reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to
vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how
can one who swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be
in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict
with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of
the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still
stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active
service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run
for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the
Election Code of 1971 every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces shall ipso facto cease in their office or position
on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This
implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for
an elective office. The Comelec further ruled that as to the
two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised
Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for public
works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal
elective offices under the maxim, Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, they being not included in the enumeration of
persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is
that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications,
except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are
eligible to run for public office.
=====================================================

Reli German vs Santiago Barangan

135 SCRA 514 Political Law Religious Freedom vs Clear
and Present Danger Doctrine
FACTS:
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP
Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But
they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering
the church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacaang. And considering that Germans group is
expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who
were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan
deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather
they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacaang.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and
pray at St. Lukes is a violation of their freedom to worship
and locomotion.
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted
to translate the same into action. There has been a clear
manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al
to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that
German et al impressed. Such manner impresses clear and
present danger to the executive of the state hence the need
to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom
to worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure then
from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes
decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly
the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority
among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of
man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding
any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and
much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith
that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least
for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, mans very
existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of
worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and
peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary
-even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has
been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of

justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do

precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both
petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present
danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons
within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as
the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to
insure against any public disturbance or violence.
=====================================================
Salonga vs. Farrales
Facts:
1.Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land
that was leased.

unlike Salonga who does not have the right to buy the land in
question because the contract between her and Farrales is
non-existent.
Section 10, Article II states that The State shall promote
social justice in all phases of national development. The
aforementioned provision is applicable to the case at bar. The
social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights
of property owners who are also entitled for protection under
our Constitution. The social justice consecrated in our
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a
person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
The plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts.
=====================================================

2.Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land,

Salonga was already a lessee of some portion of the land. She
had built a house and paid rentals thereon.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:

3.Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales filed an

ejectment case (one of the old forms of action for recovery of
the possession of real property) for non-payment of rentals
against Salonga. The lower court rendered a decision infavor
of Farrales and ordered Salonga and the other lessees (Pascual
et al.) tovacate the portion occupied by them and to pay
rentals in arrears, attorneysfees and costs.

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

4.Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower

court, Farrales sold toPascual et al. (the other lessees of
Farrales) the areas occupied by them.

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to

Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and

5.Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of

land that Salonga wasleasing. Farrales persistently refused the
offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the
ejectment case. Hence if Salongas offer to purchase was
persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no meeting
of the minds took place and no contract was ever perfected
between them. It was revealed that Farrales wanted the
payment of the portion of land under consideration tobe in
cash but Salonga did not have any money for that purpose
that is why Farrales persistently refused to sell the portion of
the leased land to the lessee.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of
Salonga on the ground that no legal contract exists between
Farrales and Salonga.
Held:
Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of
perfection. In the case atbar, Farrales rejected and did not
accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land inquestion. There
being no consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell
tospeak of. In the case of the other lessees (Pascual et al.)
who were able to buythe portion of land that they occupy,
there was an existing contract betweenthem and Farrales,

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at

Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548
which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulga
te rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the
Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and
the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the

respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire
to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.
=====================================================

Estrella Ondoy vs Virgilio Ignacio

the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter
compliance.

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The

State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

=====================================================

Facts:
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the
employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and
oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the
workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left
the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella
was asking for compensation from the death of her son while
in the respondents employ. However, the statement given
by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing
officer and therefore dismissed the claim for lack of merit.
Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was
also denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason,
that is, lack of merit.

Facts:

Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy
is constitutional; is social justice applicable in this case?
Ruling:
Yes. Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of
the Department of Labor. It merely disregarded the
statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly,
the principle of social justice applied inthis case is a matter
of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of
the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while in the actual performance of
his work. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social
justice and protection to labor, The Court quoted another
case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and
the employer, who hasresources to secure able legal advice,

Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging

that the statutory requirements on possession of the land
under section 48(b) of CA 141 because the land applied for
was a forest land and became alienable and disposable land
on January 3, 1968 only.

Almeda vs. CA

Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto all surnamed Almeda are the

heirs of the parcel of land owned and possessed by their
father Emiliano Almeda by virtue of Escretura de Particion
Extrajudicial executed on June 15, 1935 between him and his
brother Adriano. This parcel of land was inherited by their
father from his parents, Vedasto Almeda and Josefina C.
Concepcion, who inherited the same from their parents.
Emeliano Almeda died on May 1, 1948, his wife Ana Menguito
and their children received the fruit of the land and rented
out portion of the property. Upon Anas death on April 3, 1950
his children inherited the property and apportioned it among
themselves on June 9, 1980 thru the execution of
extrajudicial partition.

The CA, reversed the decision of the lower court in its

decision dated May 9, 1988. It held that the applicant had not
qualified for the grant under section 48(b) of commonwealth
Act 141 which requires public, continuous, adverse possession
of the land in the concept of owner for a period at least 30
years. They only have in their credit 17 years in possession
and occupation of the said land.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by CA,
applicant filed a petition for review before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Does land classification affect the vested right of the
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest.
Held:

On September 12, 1984 Almeda brothers applied for the

registration of the land in the RTC of Pasig. On the date of the
hearing nobody opposed the application except the Director
of Lands through the Solicitor General. An order of default
was executed by the judge against the whole world. The trial
court found that the applicant had been in possession of the
land to be registered, together with their predecessors-ininterest for over 30 years.

The Supreme Court held that under section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act the applicant did not qualify for the grant of
title because their possession of the land, while it was still
inalienable forest land. When they occupy it and became
alienable and disposable land on January 13, 1968 could not
ripen into private ownership. Hence the applicant had only
been in actual occupation of the land for only 17 years.

On January 18, 1986 the court a quo conferred the title of the
parcel of land to the petitioner.

Wherefore the petition for review is denied for lack of merit

by the Supreme Court.

However the Republic of the Philippines represented by the