Seeds of Hope and Destruction

How Europe's refugee inaction threatens to undermine its own security

By Jo Majerus
A Call for Action
In every generation there comes a time when the calls for
humanity and solidarity can no longer be ignored. When they
demand to be answered with a single voice on a broad and united
front. When the cries of millions for foreign aid and a minimum
degree of humane treatment following years of unconceivable
misery and adversity must not be silenced or rejected. When
instead they must be received with open hearts by all nations not
as veiled attempts by the impoverished to gain illegal access to the
riches of western societies, but as desperate screams for helping
them overcome the agonies of protracted warfare, material
devastation and ethnic displacement. Such are the calls that reach
European countries by the thousands each day as a result of the
aggravating refugee crisis confronting the continent at this very
moment, and they must no longer be allowed to fall on deaf ears.
For one, both morality and historical experience require
nothing less of us than rendering these sorrow -stricken people our
full and unrelenting assistance in th e most trying stage of their
lives. Just as important, however, failure to help them while we
still can might also entail dire long-term consequences for our
own long-term safety and security, notably by presenting Islamic
extremists with the very means, mindsets and social environments
necessary for waging war against us on a trans-national scale.
Accordingly, this is the time for all of uscitizens and politicians
aliketo rise up in a common effort to the arguably most daunting
and formidable challenge facing Europe in this day and age. This
is the time for giving back to other fellow human beings in need of
our support just a little bit of that relative comfort , security and
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ease which we ourselves have been enjoying for so long now and
which we all too often take for granted as being but our own god given birthright or prerogative. This is the time to realize that
most of the people now seeking shelter and refuge with us from
the anguish and unimaginable horrors in their native countries
have no intention whatsoever to forcibly wrest away our economic
privileges, nor to undercut our established values and modes of
living. That instead they merely wish to share in the same basic
human rights we all hold so dear peace, stability and, above all,
freedom from fear, want and persecution. And, finally, this is also
the time to link the current refugee crisis more closely to distinct
geopolitical issues and concerns, notably by more systematically
considering the wider strategic setbacks likely to be incurred in
the event that national leaders prove unable to devise applicable
solutions to the real human suffering endemic to this harrowing
tragedy.

Seeds of Hope....
First of all, however, this is the time to remember where we
ourselves came from, how we got to this state of comparative
wealth and domestic security, what tremendous difficulties we had
to conquer and what massive obstacles we had to vanquish on the
long and rocky path that progressively led us into this era of
unprecedented economic integration and political cooper ation.
Most important of all, this is the moment to recall the goodwill
and assistance we were ourselves initially afforded by other
peoples in our noble endeavour to build a better and brighter
future for us all. To remind ourselves once again of the
undeniable truth that, as John F. Kennedy so eloquently put it, "of
those to whom much is given, much is req uired." 1 For given much
we were indeed, whether we like to admit it or not.
Regardless of whatever arguments critics may advance in
order to not grant an ever increasing stream of refugees asylum in
Europe, nobody can ultimately dismiss or refute the historical
1

John F. Kennedy, "Address of President-Elect John F. Kennedy Delivered to a Joint Convention of the
General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," (speech given at the State House, Boston,
Massachusetts, 9 January 1961). http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/OYhUZE2Qo0ogdV7ok900A.aspx [accessed 18 September 2015].

reality that less than three generations ago, Europeans were

themselves among the most necessitous beneficiaries of foreign
aid the world had ever witnessed. Now that we have all grown so
accustomed to lives spent in material affluence, we too often
forget (or conveniently overlook) the fact that modern European
countries and the many social amenities their citizens benefit from
would never have thrived or come into being in the first place had
it not been for the kindness and generosity which other nations
bestowed upon us in the wake of the second World War. True,
European societies might eventually have recovered of their own
accord, yet most definitely not in such rapid and comprehensive a
fashion as they ultimately did thanks to the enormous level of
external help and support received from other countries. During
that period, vast tides of refugees and uprooted communities
swept the continent from one end to the other, fleeing military
occupation, political reprisals, lawlessness, economic deprivation,
or simply the near total lack of prospects at ever again leading a
charmed and peaceful existence in their homeland s on account of
the chaos left behind there by years of incessant warfare and
destruction. 2 Not all of them were permitted to stay in their
chosen place of refuge; still, millions eventually were despite vocal
opposition from all sides over admitting such large crowds into
recipient societies. In time, they were all suc cessfully integrated
and not seldom even became an essential and indispensable part
of the larger socio-economic fabric of these countries. 3
Thus not only did refugees find a new home in culturally
different societies, but hardly any of these nations could,
moreover, also have rebounded all by itself from material
devastation had they not been given the requisite means and
financial wherewithal to reconstruct in the immediate post-war
years. Accordingly, charitable aid agencie s such as the only
recently created UNRRA (United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration) provided bitterly needed assistance
to millions of homeless people by taking care of them in
2

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: The Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 22-26. On
the postwar refugee crisis, see in particular Ben Shephard, The Long Road Home: The Aftermath of the
Second World War (London: Bodley Head, 2010).
3
Judt, Postwar, pp. 26-32.

numerous shelters and reception centres throughout Europe. 4

More significant still, however, the continent as a whole could
likewise never have recuperated of its own from the systemic
shocks inflicted on it by the war. The truth of the matter is that
without substantial funds and grants from other nations, above all
from the United States of America , our forefathers would just
plain and simply have lacked the required capacities to forge a
more stable and prosperous Europe to begin with. Specifically,
America's monetary contributions, cu lminating in the 1947
Marshall Plan 5 (a programme which at a combined expenditure of
over 100 billion in today's dollars cost considerably more than the
fiscal burdens projected for abating the current refugee crisis), 6
altogether played a major and critical role in alleviating the plight
endured by millions of European citizens in those desolate days. 7
In so doing, they not only helped to set entire nation-states back
on the road to economic recovery, but also presented them with
the freedom and opportunity to create for their subjects an
environment free from inter-state warfare, political instability
and/or internal strife. 8
Freedom and opportunitythese two solemn words are key
to understanding why it should be the moral obligation of this
generation to welcome in our midst every single person attempting
to escape internecine violence and bloodshed in his or her home
country. Because after all, freedom and opportunity stand at the
very heart of what we are today, embodying like no other virtues
the essence of what a united and conflict-free Europe should look
like. Freedom and opportunity not only constitute some of our
most esteemed values and ideals; they also form the basis of
nearly every other positive aspect of the varied lives and careers
4

George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); Susan E. Armstrong-Reid and David Murray; Armies of
Peace: Canada and the UNRRA Years (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2008).
5
On the European Recovery Programme, see especially Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America,
Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987).
6
Barry Machado, "A Usable Marshall Plan," in: The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century,
edited by Eliot Sorel and Pier Carlo Padoan (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), p. 5.
7
Judt, Postwar, pp. 89-98.
8
See also James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations. The United States, 1945-1974 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 129-133.

we are able to pursue today. No matter what anyone of us may

have achieved through personal sacrifice and dedication; no
matter how much effort we may have put into our daily activities,
either at school, university, in our jobs or in some other
professional capacity; no matter how much pride we may take in
the fact that we attained financial independence and wealth
entirely through our own ingenuity and devotion to a life worth
livingin short no matter how much we may think that we owe
nothing to anyone else on this planet, the indisputable actuality
nevertheless remains that ultimately we all would be nothing today
if at a particular moment in our own recent past someone would
not have made the deliberate decision to help us out in our
arguably most darkest hour. If we had not been furnished with the
elementary freedoms and opportunities to make all subsequent
developments and accomplishments, all future individual gains
and advantages possible in the first place. In other words, the
conditions to prosper and diversify our options at a better life
were not solely of our making, but ultimately only arose due to a
sizeable measure of help from the outside.
Benevolent assistance of various forms and types enabled us
to move beyond the carnage and destitution surrounding us,
invigorating and encouraging us in our quest for lasting peace,
security and sustainable economic growth. Consequently,
everything we achieved thereafter would never have been feasible
in such an impressive manner if we hadn't been extended the
same kind of external aid which nowaday s far too many of us are
about to deny foreign people flocking to our shores and cities in
search of no more than permanent relief from the same atrocities
that once afflicted our own ancestors. A relief which at the time
soon was to become the original so urce of our enduring safety and
well-being. A relief which allowed European nations to fash ion a
robust system of institutional norms and mechanisms to prevent
an entire continent from being plunged anew into the mutual
slaughtering of its peoples, conditions which Syrians, Iraqis and
other tormented ethnicities still experience on a daily basis. A
relief which back then signalled to war -torn communities
everywhere 'You are not alone in your trials and ordeals', and 'We
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stand united in our joint struggle to create a better world.' A relief

that single-handedly spelled hope and liberty not only for
contemporaries living through tho se days, but for generations
thereafter as well. A relief that stood symbolically for the
possibility of finally breaking the vicious cycle of resurgent
conflict and belligerency, substituting it with the ideal of bringing
people, even former enemies, together in the hour of their
greatest hardship and distress. A relief that was before long
vindicated by the peaceful evolution of a continent growing ever
closer together and which, as a result, has since been seen by so
many of the oppressed and battered peoples on this earth as a
genuine sanctuary of freedom and opportunity.
A relief which now must be widened beyond our own
internal borders, reminding us once more that we could not
possibly have attained a position in international affairs where we
are called upon to act as kind -hearted benefactors to broken
individuals if at a much darker time in our own history we had
been left entirely to our own devices, without being given the
assistance we so desperately needed then. Assistance for want of
which none of the things we treasure today, not least of all our
own lives in unparalleled abundance, would have fallen to us in
the first place.

....and Destruction
The necessity to ensure an orderly resettlement of refugees
into nations unravaged by war and human suffering is, however,
not only on ethical grounds the right thing to do. Although for any
righteous and upstanding person with only so much as one tiny
little shred of decency and integrity left within himself or herself
such a moral imperative already ought to be more than enough
incentive for lending these strangers a helping hand, we moreove r
also have good cause for doing so out of a less altruistic
sentiment. For reasons directly relating to our own long -term
safety and security, the relocation of displaced persons is after all
far more in our own national self -interest than most of our ele cted
representatives presently seem to grasp. In that regard, much has
recently been made in printed media, online blogs and various
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news outlets of the supposed security dangers involved in allowing

huge numbers of mostly middle-eastern nationals cross our
frontiers each day. 9 In a nutshell, the central argument put forward
against permitting such a vast influx of foreigners usually goes like
this: as it is impossible to perform adequate background checks
on all individuals entering our domestic spheres, local authorities
are ultimately unable to accurately determine the ir political,
ideological or religious affiliations. 10 This, in turn, invariably
increases the risk of Islamic fanatics, if not outright terrorists
acquiring easy and unfettered access to the vulnerable
infrastructures of western societies. Admittedly, there can be no
guarantee that such fears and anxieties might not indeed prove
legitimate in some cases, given that extremists posing as helpless
refugees could always slip through the cracks of criminal
surveillance and/or immigration control. Importantly, however,
the prospect of allegedly facilitating the ent ry of jihadist elements
into Europe as a result of more open and inclusive EU policies
ultimately constitutes a far lesser evil than the developments that
might realistically ensue if we deny dislodged ethnicities
permanent shelter from war and oppression. Put differently, the
threat of terrorist infiltration essentially pales in comparison to
the negative and utterly pernicious ramifications that could follow
in subsequent years if we categorically reject the requests of
asylum seekers and instead compel them to return to failed states
rife with sectarian violence and civilian turmoil. 11

Chris Hughes, "Jihadis enter Europe disguised as refugees fear terrorism experts," Mirror, 21 June 2015.
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jihadis-enter-europe-disguised-refugees-5924643 [accessed 22
September 2015]; Lori Hinnant, Sarah El Deeb and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Refugee surge to Europe
raises fears about 'disguised terrorists'," The Denver Post, 16 September 2016.
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_28820355/refugee-surge-europe-raises-fears-aboutdisguised-terrorists [accessed 22 September 2015].
10
Elizabeth Whitman, "ISIS in Hungary? As Refugees Enter Europe, Officials Fear Islamic State Militants
Could Be Among Them," International Business Times, 9 September 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-hungary-refugees-enter-europe-officials-fear-islamic-state-militants-couldbe-2088752 [accessed 22 September 2015]; Jamie Dettmer, "Analysts: IS Poised to Exploit Refugee
Crisis," Voice of America, 18 September 2015. http://www.voanews.com/content/islamic-state-poisedto-exploit-refugee-crisis/2969641.html [accessed 22 September 2015].
11
On the causal links between failed states and terrorism see, for example, Robert I. Rodberg, State Failure
and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Ken
Menkhaus, "Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens," Journal of Conflict Studies,
Vol. 23:2 (Fall 2003), pp. 723; Stewart Patrick, "Failed States and Global Security: Empirical
Questions and Policy Dilemmas," International Studies Review, Vol. 9:4 (Winter 2007), pp. 644-662;

For amid all the public outrage and inflammatory speeches

heard of late in stark and shameful opposition to plans for
accommodating more refugees, 12 hardly any of those in power truly
appear to comprehend the true nature and dimension of the
terrorist menace facing the international community these days
through the likes of ISIS and Al -Qaeda. Particularly, it is a
serious fallacy to believe that the m ost acute and worrisome
danger in regard to these jihadist networks merely concerns the
possibility of their operatives masquerading as victims of war and
persecution plotting to de-stabilize western polities. Instead it lies
in the largely unspoken hazards of providing them with the human
tools and assets needed for carrying out their nefarious schemes
in the first place. 13 This above all else is the one seminal
observation which the West has got to come to grips with if it ever
wants to stand a reasonable chance at decisively disrupting the
activities of these terrorist groupings.
As outcries over taking in additional refugees show,
however, this unfortunately is a matter which political leaders
have yet to not only appreciate, but also in corporate into their
overall approach to the intensifying crisis. Otherwise they would
already long ago have recognized that aiding refugees find
personal safety away from the desolation of their ruined home
countries is not only going to offer them a renewed sense of hope
and opportunity, but will before long also result in definitive
strategic gains for our own long-term security and well -being. Yet
in order to fully perceive and understand this irrefutable reality,
one first has to see contemporary terrorist organizations for what
they actually are. With a view to further illustrate this pivotal
aspect, it may therefore be appropriate to employ an analogy
which arguably serves like no other to accurately describe and
identify the peculiar nature of trans-national terrorist networks.
12

Jess McHugh, "How the EU Migrant Crisis Is Fueling Right-Wing Politicians and Refugee Policies in
Europe," International Business Times, 27 August 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/how-eu-migrantcrisis-fueling-right-wing-politicians-refugee-policies-europe-2071326[accessed 21 September 2015];
Michelle Martin, "Rebel Crisis Arouses Fear and Fury on Germany's far-right," Reuters, 17 September
2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/us-europe-migrants-germany-rightwingidUSKCN0RH0KX20150917 [accessed 21 September 2015].
13
On ISIS's recruitment successes, see, for example, Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic
State: Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2015).

Accordingly, ISIS and Al-Qaeda can best be compared to a

lethally infective disease, analogous to a scattering and extremely
resilient cancer that primarily affects those areas of the
international system least immunized to it and which, in
consequence, are most susceptible to transmitting its deadly
pathogen. 14 Granted, the many conflicts presently being fought in
Africa and the Middle East might ultimately all have originated
over very diverse national grievances. But at the same time it is
also true that embedded terrorist groups typically do not have a
distinctively nationalist agenda limited to only those countries. 15
Particularly, they do not initially ally with any one local faction
out of some purely political or ideological affinity with the latter. 16
Rather they engage in those regions for only one single reason:
because violence and civil disunity are by far their most powerful
weapons in pursuit of their ultimate objectives, notably the
overthrow of governing regimes and the incremental disintegration
of an ostensibly western-imposed system of beliefs. 17
To that end, they essentially exploit and prey upon the many
instances of social unrest and sectarian killings which at this
moment western nations appear either incapable or unwilling to
stop through a more active form of intervention of their own . 18 For
even though terrorist insurgencies may occasionally be quashed,
such temporary victories will ultimately hardly suffice to deter
other groups from retaking their place. Not if our principal
adversary is utterly intent on availing itself of any popular
grievance to further disseminate its pervasive ideology, in
particular in such areas where the breakdown of socio -economic
activities and basic governmental services has left people
especially vulnerable to its malicious influences . Consequently, it
is under such dreadful conditions that extremists frequently
14

Corine Hegland, "Global Jihad," National Interest, Vol. 36:19 (2004), pp. 1396-1402; J. Majerus, The
Threat of Al-Qaeda after Osama Bin Laden (Mnchen: Grin Verlag, 2013), pp. 8-9.
15
Oliver Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (in German) (Mnchen: Siedler Verlag 2008), p. 162.
16
Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Bombing (New York: Random House, 2005),
p. 104.
17
Walter Lacqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century (in German) (Berlin: Ullstein
2004), pp. 80-84.
18
"1000-strong Syrian rebel brigade defects to Islamic State," RT News, 11 July 2014.
http://www.rt.com/news/171952-thousand-strong-defect-islamic-state/ [accessed 21 September 2015];
Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, pp. 162-63.

acquire their most valuable instruments for committing additional

acts of terror. 19 These instruments handed over to terrorist
organizations simultaneously consist of the conflict -ridden
environments in which they are permitted to fester in the first
place, and of the many local inhabitants which for various reasons,
ranging from outright fear and coercion to personal alienation
and/or professional opportunism, 20 ultimately find themselves
attracted to them. 21 Hence it is imperative that western states help
fragile governmental structures attain such levels of social justice
and institutional stability as will be increasingly inimical to
terrorist activities. 22 Such undertakings must preeminently
concentrate on creating and improving political as well as
economic conditions that will not only promote national
reconciliation and eventually restore civil harmony, but which
will, moreover, also provide regional governments with a
legitimatized state apparatus for conducting anti-terrorism
campaigns of their own. 23
If, however, the current situation in those countries does not
allow for a practicable implementation of such measures in the
foreseeable future, the international community must resort all
the more strongly and consistently on other suitable methods for
denying ISIS and Al-Qaeda territorial gains. While it is true that
many individuals ultimately do not join these groupings for
reasons of material poverty or a lack of personal prospects alone, 24
it is all the same worth noting that desperate or disenfranchised
citizens in war-torn countries frequently represent the most
19

Brian Michael Jenkins, "The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War," RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 10.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf [accessed 22
September 2015].
20
Samia Nakhoul, "Saddam's former army is secret of Baghdadi's success," Reuters, 16 June 2015.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/16/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insightidUSKBN0OW1VN20150616 [accessed 21 September 2015].
21
Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism," in: Readings in American Foreign Policy:
Problems and Responses, edited by Glenn P. Hastedt (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp.
110-112.
22
Hardin Lang, Peter Juul, and Mokhtar Awad, "Recalibrating the Anti-ISIS Strategy. The Need for a More
Coherent Political Strategy," Center for American Progress (Washington: Center for American Progress,
2015), p. 3, 14. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ISIS-StrategyUpdateFINAL.pdf [accessed 22 September 2015].
23
Andrew J. Tabler, "Syria's Collapse. And How Washington Can Stop It," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92:4
(July/August 2013), pp. 99-100. Majerus, The Threat of Al-Qaeda, p. 10.
24
Pape, Dying to Win, p. 200.

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precious and destructive commodity utilized by jihadist leaders for

putting their despicable intentions into action. 25 Mitigating the
sorrows and frustrations of local populations by taking away the
incentives for conspiring with extremists will certainly not in and
of itself result in the wholesale dismantling of their networks. But
such an approach may nevertheless significantly contribute
towards blunting the very tools they routinely misuse for their own
ends, namely the tactics of generating as much anarchy and chaos
in these regions as may ultimately be required to control ever
more territory, thereby steadily increasing the necessity for
western democracies to eventually confront them directly at the
latest once their own interests are concerned. 26 In sum, the all but
inextricable entrapment of local inhabitants into a perpetual cycle
of civil strife and national destabilization is thus precisely what
Islamic terrorism feeds on in the first place. 27
This is why it is of the utmost importance to forestall the
advent or aggravation of any such adverse situation from the
outset, i.e. before popular ills and resentment turn these countries
into enemy strongholds from where the terrorist infestation could
spill over to adjacent areas and, in so doing, evolve into a threat
to cross-regional security as well. 28 It is because of this very real
danger that western nations must strive to assist oppressed
communities build a more stable and benign life for themselves, if
not in their own country, then at least by enabling them to escape
the mayhem and despair that awaits them there. For if it is indeed
primarily the killing of innocent Muslims rather than deep -seated
religious convictions which in most instances accounts for why
disgruntled and upset individuals may choose to join ranks with
extremist organizations, 29 then our refusal to grant war-racked
25

Howard Gambrill Clark, "Defeating ISIS - Go Local," The American Interest, Vol. 10:6 ((July/August
2015), pp. 28-29. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/10/go-local/ [accessed 21 September
2015]; Roy (2008), pp. 172-73; Kareem Shaheen, "Food aid cuts 'making refugees targets for ISIS
recruitment'," The Guardian, 13 August 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/13/foodaid-cuts-making-refugees-targets-for-isis-recruitment [accessed 22 September 2015].
26
Bruce Riedel, "Al-Qaeda Strikes Back," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86:3 (May/June 2007), pp. 24-25; Philip H.
Gordon, "Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War?," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86:6
(November/December 2007), p. 57; Clark, "Defeating ISIS," p. 26.
27
Pape, Dying to Win, p. 103.
28
Jenkins, "The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War," p. 19.
29
Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), pp. 223-231; Clark, "Defeating ISIS," p.

11

refugees a life in safety and security will certainly not allay such
grievances. By admitting them into societies which have for a long
time now been spared such awful and appalling conditions,
however, we may on the other hand not only help them protect
their own lives, but can moreover also guard ourselves against the
spectre of otherwise inevitably larger and more extensive terrorist
networks.
It is on these grounds that jihadist extremism consequently
needs to be contained along the lines of a global ideological
front. 30 However, that battle ultimately cannot be won through a
show of sheer military might alone, but essentially only by a
vigorous desire to purge domestic societies of all those aspects
and practices that might play directly into the hands of Islamic
fanatics. For no matter how effective tighter immigration controls
may be, such measures will never be able to strike at the
underlying roots of religious fundamentalism. That is why western
democracies must first and foremost seek to render unattractive
the allure and anticipated gains that any one distraught person
might associate with radical Islam, if only so as to withhold from
its followers the individual willingness and social surroundings
which frequently form their most potent weapon for hurting other
nations. 31 In particular, elected officials must more persistently
attempt to undercut jihadist's' "ideological legacies", i.e. their
ability to persuade men and women to engage in terrorist activities
of their own. 32 This, however, can only be accomplished by
discrediting the appeal and constitutive tenets of their aggressive
ideological mission. 33 To that end, it is crucial to first identify
where exactly the hatred and discontent of some Muslims vis--vis
western civilization derive from and how this may, in turn, affect
the radicalization and recruitment processes of terrorist
organizations.

29.
Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, "The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of Al Qaeda," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), pp. 197-211.
31
Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," pp. 223-231.
32
Hady Amr and P.W. Singer, "To Win the 'War on Terror,' We Must First Win the 'War of Ideas': Here's
How," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), pp. 212222.
33
Gordon, "Can the War on Terror Be Won?," p. 60; p.65.
30

12

In that context, it is a common misconception to attribute

participation in terrorist schemes chiefly to economic poverty. As
numerous scholars have demonstrated, 34 the decision to join
terrorist networks runs significantly deeper than worries about
unemployment and financial distress. 35 For many it is ultimately
far less a question about wealth than it is about values, tolerance
and an unrequited sense of belonging. True, some Muslims may
never accept western ways no matter how sensitive our societies
may be of their religious beliefs. 36 But does this really mean that,
by implication, Islam and western democracy are really two
incompatible and diametrically opposed visions of societal
organization? That since Muslims are supposedly so utterly
unhappy with how matters are being handled by the West, they
will never embrace its ideational framework , thus rendering their
integration a vain and futile endeavour to begin with? Yet for
reasons pertaining to both morality and our own national interest,
there cannot possibly exist any viable alternative other than their
eventual integration into the wider international community. For if
on account of the dire repercussions outlined further above we
draw up even sharper lines between Islam and the West, we after
all run the serious risk of endangering ou r own long-term security
far more severely than most of us presently seem to realize.
Therefore it is vital to prevent a further alienation of
Muslims by pandering to the toxic notion of their alleged nonintegrability, notably as such a misguided course of action will
only further abet the attempts of radicals to win over impressible
individuals to their infamous cause. 37 Importantly, however, a selfcritical re-examination of Europe's approach to not only the
ongoing refugee crisis, but to Islam in general is not meant to call
into question the defining standards and ideals of its political
organization and/or cultural traditions, not least since our values
routinely form a major source of hope and attraction for many
strangers to begin with. Rather, the basic point to be made here is
for the West to more consistently honour and live up to them with
34

Lacqueur, No End to War, pp. 21-27; Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, pp. 165-66.
Pape, Dying to Win, p. 200.
36
Lacqueur, No End to War, p. 102.
37
Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, pp. 163-65.
35

13

regard to foreign minorities as well. For very often, Muslims do

not take issue with western norms per se , but rather with how we
repeatedly fail to do them justice by declining to extend them to
non-European communities too. Specifically, how can their
integration ever be advanced if every once and again Muslims are
given clear evidence of their religion's perceived inferiority, for
example in relation to popular opposition over the construction of
minarets in Switzerland 38 or a mosque near Ground Zero in New
York City? 39 Or, for that matter, when Europe turns down the
requests of hundreds of thousands of them for shelter and relief
in one of the worst refugee tragedies the world has seen in a long
time? Instead, Muslims everywhere need to be presented with
tangible proof that they are being offered the same tolerance and
respect we grant to other faiths, that rather than excluding them
from the safety and prosperity of our societies we let them share
in the same benefits and freedoms we all cherish so much,
especially if as at this very instant their only other option consists
of continued exposure to endless suffering and brutality.
The execution of such a less self -centered and narrowminded policy will certainly not keep every single Muslim from
flirting with jihadist ideology. However, it will invariably help to
create a more pronounced sense of belonging in many Muslim
communities. Failure to do so will only further reinforce the
image of western aversion to Islamic culture, thus supplying
extremist organizations with added legitimacy for their dangerous
doctrines. This is why on this critical ideological front the war on
terrorism is accordingly just as much about saving men and
women from becoming active terrorists than it is about afterwards
arresting them. 40 Because in the end, one single misled person may
after all be all there is between our long-term security and the
next assault on innocent civilians. Until we all come to terms with
this indisputable reality, terrorist networks may ultimately never
38

N. Cumming-Bruce, S. Erlanger, "Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques," The New York Times, 30
November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html [accessed 26
November 2012].
39
P. Vitello, "Islamic Center Exposes Mixed Feelings Locally," The New York Times, 20 August 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/nyregion/20muslims.html?pagewanted=all [accessed 26
November 2012].
40
Pape, Dying to Win, pp. 238-39.

14

be destroyed in their entirety, not when we miss the will and

resolution to tackle them at the very heart of t heir structural and
ideological foundations.
Consequently, policy-makers need to recognize that
terrorism is a threat of global proportions that can only be
overcome by taking it apart at the seams. That an enemy who
operates concurrently on multiple fronts can, like militant
communism, not be defeated on the battlefield alone, 41 but only
through mellowing out from the inside. 42 And that, as a result, any
anti-terrorism measures must above all be aimed at depriving
extremists of the human capital and sectarian environments they
depend upon for conducting their operations in the first place. 43 In
all of this, the necessity to grant the nationals of devastated
countries the right to an agreeable and dignified life in freedom
and security, either at home or abroad, is key to containing the
threat of international terrorism, given that a more peaceful and
less troubled existence than many of them presently have to bear
might ultimately prohibit a potential collusion with radical groups
right from the very beginning.
As far as Islamic terrorism is concerned, the world is thus
increasingly being presented with a seminal choice. Either we
allow groupings such as ISIS to go on exploiting the fears and
dissatisfaction of local populations, assisting them to grow nearly
unchecked in the process. Possibly to a point where airstrikes, the
flying of reconnaissance missions and/or the support of rebel
coalitions will no longer suffice to stymie its inexorable spread
over ever larger swathes of territory. Or, alternatively, we must
think of ways and means to actively compromise its recruitment
drives, preventing it from assimilating a mounting host of loyal
foot soldiers into its ranks. If, in that context, we might therefore
through a simple gesture of good -will and charity towards
incoming refugees at the same time conduce to efforts directed at
denying ISIS the one tool it so strongly relies upon, then omission
to act accordingly would ultimately not only attest to o ur moral
41

Gordon, "Can the War on Terror Be Won?," p. 55; pp. 59-60.

George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25:4 (July/August 1947), p. 582.
43
Gordon, "Can the War on Terror Be Won?," p. 54; pp. 58-59.
42

15

depravity, but would most definitely also result in further strategic

disadvantages for the entire international community, above all in
terms of regional stability and security in the Middle East.
In the final analysis, the struggle against ISIS and Al-Qaeda
is indeed a war that has to be contested simultaneously on several
interrelated fronts. To the extent that the current refugee crisis is
inextricably tied to that conflict, it would of course be preferable
to resolve that issue at its source, notably through durably
pacifying war-ridden countries and thus stemming the surge of
displaced persons right from the start. Yet failing a coordinated
military intervention or increased diplomatic pressure on ruling
regimes to accomplish that objective any time soon, the
international community ultimately is left with no other choice but
to draw on alternative, if arguably less -than-perfect approaches for
degrading these terrorist networks. One possible avenue already
explored by the United States is to t rain, equip and assist
moderate rebel forces on the ground. Another equally important
one is, as US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently noted,
to stanch "the flow of foreign fighters, looking out for jihadi
recruits around the world." 44 In addition to these steps, however,
ISIS must also be hindered from harvesting more obedient and
submissive followers from battle -scarred war zones. Some of these
operatives may indeed join it for purely ideological reasons, yet
far too many others still do so out of genuine desperation and
frustration. If these young men, women and, increasingly, small
children, 45 who are not always driven to extremism of their own
desire, but often by circumstance alone, were instead offered
decidedly more favourable prospe cts in European societies than
those awaiting them in their native countries, than such a mutually
beneficial course of action might altogether stand far better
chances of bolstering Europe's long-term security as well. For
rather than thinking of every ad mitted Muslim refugee as a
potentially radical fundamentalist, consider the following much
more disturbing scenario: each non-admitted refugee might upon
44

'The Scholar As Secretary. A Conversation with Ashton Carter', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94:5 (Sep/Oct
2015], p. 77.
45
Kate Brannan, "Children of the Caliphate," Foreign Policy, 24 October 2014.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/24/children-of-the-caliphate/ [accessed 21 September 2015].

16

return to his or her death-laden homeland ultimately be exposed

even more easily to such harmful teachings. Put differently, every
refugee we do not let in might in the worst case be one more
terrorist we will have to take out on another day. After all, the
freedom, protection and opportunities which refugees could
reasonably expect to obtain for themselves in European nations
might in the end go a long way towards shielding deeply conflicted
youths from sympathizing with jihadist influences in countries
where these sacred conditions are, as we all know, still entirely
lacking at this very moment.

The Legacies of History

Once again we are creating our own demons, and no one
really seems to care about it until it is too late. For in the end, it
is always the same old story of failure to act before things go
wrong instead of having to react to them afterwards, of allowing
events to simply run their course and then being forced to rectify
them thereafter. Thus when one day we find that individuals
responsible for the next major attack in some western society were
radicalized by Islamic extremists after their coerced repatriation
to a country in the throes of intra-state warfare, material
destitution and utter hopelessness, people will once again ask
themselves these pivotal questions: How could this happen? Why
didn't we see it coming? Couldn't we somehow have prevented it?
And, crucially, who screwed up this time and who is to be held
accountable? And the answer to the latter question will once more
be fairly straightforward: We are too.
Although none of us may bear any direct responsibility for
the hideous actions perpetrated by terrorists against innocent
human beings, that certainty alone nonetheless doesn't absolve us
from sharing at least part of the blame, not if we are guilty of a
moral complicity for providing Islamic fanatics with men and
women who not that long ago did not harbour any resentment
whatsoever against western nations but who, quite to the contrary,
merely wished for a small measure of sympathy and compassion to
their terrible plight and agony. Yet by spurning their pleas for
humanity, we drove them right back into th e arms of those bent
17

on destroying us, aiding them to turn children and helpless

individuals into instruments of war by exploiting their legitimate
frustration and disappointment at being refused safety and
security in countries which once they themselves regarded as
symbols of hope and freedom but which, hardened and
embittered by the indifference and hostility encountered there,
they eventually came to despise just as much as those who
recruited them out of a far more pervasive motivation.
Then it will become apparent that, once again, we have
obviously learned nothing from past experiences, that neither did
we take to heart the lessons of history, nor recognized and
understood the writings on the wall when we still had the chance
to change things for the better. That just as in Vietnam, there was
done too little, too late to win over the hearts and minds of local
communities, preventing them from seeing us as the principal
enemy to their established way of life rather than the nat ional
liberators which, as forty years later in Iraq, we purported to be. 46
That as the example of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the
subsequent entrenchment of Al -Qaeda in that country illustrates,
it is not enough to merely contest one's opponent with firepower,
or to furnish indigenous resistance movements with the weapons
and machinery required for holding out against a superior
enemy. 47 When we fail to realize that spending billion s of dollars
on the secret funding of native combatants may ultimately turn
into a nightmare for later generations if at the same time we
cannot bring ourselves to invest in institutional, educational and
medical facilities for enabling governments to secure the peace in
the years thereafter. 48 When through our own negligence to he lp
war-battered populations build a safer and more stable future we
invite less well-disposed elements to fill the political v oid in those
nations, thus involuntarily contributing to the formation of
46

Ross Coffey, "Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq," Military
Review, (March/April 2006), pp. 24-34; W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, The Lessons of
Vietnam (Crane, Russak & C0.: New York, 1977), p. 213.
47
Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: The Free Press,
2001), pp. 63-75.
48
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000), pp. 175176; Richard Outzen, "The Flawed Strategic Debate on Syria," INSS
CSR Strategic Forum No. 285 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014), p. 7.
http://inss.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/SF-285.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].

18

antagonistic forces which we will then one day have to grapple

with ourselves. 49
When instead we would do well to remember that welcoming
those in need of our unmitigated support will invariably bear
richer fruits than ignoring their pain and sorrows. That both
Europe and the United States would be we ll advised to revisit
their own histories in order to discern how in the bleak and
barren aftermath of World War II, it was a relief effort of an
unparalled order that not only managed to put entire nation -states
back on their feet, but which likewise produced important
geostrategic benefits as well. Above all, mass resettlement and
economic rehabilitation were paramount in those days to
forestalling the empowerment of communist parties throughout
southern and western Europe. Specifically, the latter were never
given ample enough scope to capitalize on the misery and
discontent of civilian populations over a prolonged period of
time, thus precluding them from positioning their ideology and
organizational forms as the only alternative to the alleged
impotence
of
governing
authorities
and
the
popular
disenchantment threatening to engulf an entire continent at the
time. 50 As millions of people who had just survived first-hand the
woes and upheavals of inter -human conflict were thus not left to
fend completely for themselves, the assistance which they received
ultimately helped to not only renew their faith in democratic
governance, but was also instrumental in reducing the over-all
influence of communist movements in western Europe. 51
Accordingly, this episode ought to serve as an illuminating
precedent for how the most expedient method for weakening one's
enemies does altogether not only reside with their eventual
military decimation, but with likewise discrediting the popular
allure of their underlying ideology. For although wars may indeed
49

George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War (New York: Grove Press, 2003), pp. 517-524; Seth G. Jones, In the
Graveyard of Empires (New York: Norton, 2009), p. 51.
50
Judt, Postwar, pp. 88-89; Patterson, Grand Expectations, pp. 130-131.
51
Michael Kort, The Columbia Gide to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 28;
William I. Hitchcock, "The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West," in: The Cambridge History of
the Cold War Volume I: Origins, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 170.

19

be won on the battlefield, peace most often is lost in their

immediate aftermath. Thus if ever we intend to satisfy high minded aspirations at codifying the concept of a "Responsibility to
Protect" into international lawa principle which western
democracies in particular have been keen to endorsethan such a
norm must ultimately also extend to people seeking refuge and
shelter not only within but also outside the boundaries of their
home state. 52 Hence it is not only for moral and historical reasons,
but also in regard to strategic and self-serving interests that we
must offer every person marred by the atrocities of modern
warfare the opportunity to pursue a life in peace and security, free
from tyranny, deprivation and perennial fright. In other words,
rather than perpetuating a culture of fear, we must finally create
and advance a culture of hope and mercy instead.
Even if we may profoundly dread the prospect of cultural
dilution or the corrosion of our western traditions, the inherent
dangers to our own long-term safety and well-being as a result of
our continued humanitarian inaction might ultimately far outweigh
any such artificially inflated concerns. Rarely therefore did the
preamble to UNESCO's founding charter rang more true tha n in
the current situation: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is
in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be
constructed." 53 On that note, accepting refugees into our lives
consequently does not endanger our societies in any meaningful
way. Instead it will but help to strengthen and preserve our own
peace as well.
52

On the United Nations' concept of a "Responsibility to Protect", see "The Responsibility to Protect,"
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (New York: ICISS,
December 2001). http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [accessed 21 May 2014];
"United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005," United Nations (New York: United Nations,
2005). http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014]; Ban KiMoon, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677)," United Nations (New York: United
Nations, 2009). http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014].
For critical academic analyses, see Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2009), pp. 35-65; Cristina G. Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect:
Security and Human Rights (New York: Taylor and Francis e-library, 2010); Philip Cunliffe (ed.),
Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York:
Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011); aban Karda, "Humanitarian Intervention as a Responsibility to
Protect: An International Society Approach," A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 2:1 (January
2013), pp. 21-38.
53
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 16 November 1945,
London, United Kingdom. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [accessed 19 September 2015].

20

A Promise of Mercy
That is why we all must search our hearts and examine our
minds, rediscovering once more that a "true man does not only
stand up for himself," but, as William McKenzie King remarked,
"he stands up for those do not have the ability to." 54 That is why we
must embrace with every fibre of our being Mahatma G andhi's
wisdom that in the end "the human voice can never reach the
distance that is covered by the still small voice of conscience." 55
That is why people of all creeds and denominations must render
justice to the divine commandments, praised and glorified
throughout all religions, of charity, humility, compassion and
unconditional brotherly love. That is why every virtuous Christian
dutifully attending mass each week must reflect upon how he or
she could ever possibly be doing the will of a merciful G od who
through his own beloved son Jesus Christ instructed us to love one
another as ourselves. If instead we might not actually be in danger
of sanctimony and hypocrisy when ultimately we do not practice
and observe the commands we were taught, precepts which many
of us so fervently and piously profess to believe in. When we
knowingly disobey time and time again the teachings of Jesus
himself, notably when instead of living out one of Christianity's
most central and foundational passages that we find in Matthew
25:31-46, 56 we essentially fail to comply with the principl es laid out
therein in our daily dealings and activities. Whe n with special
relevance to the current refugee exodus and our refusal to take in
more strangers we accordingly do not heed Jesus' admonition that
"[....] whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you
did not do for me either". 57 When we thus not only neglect to
follow through with these injunctions ourselves, but, what's more,
when we also become party to the same inequities and
transgressions which some of us never cease to rebuke others for.
When, in short, we consciously choose not to adhere to the
reminder issued by the late Pope Jean Paul II. that "the person
54

Quote featured on: http://www.qotd.org/quotes/Mackenzie.King [accessed 22 September 2015].

Mahatma Gandhi, The Wit and Wisdom of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: New Book Society of India,
1960), p. 60.
56
Mt. 25:31-46 (New International Version)
57
Mt. 25:45 (New International Version)
55

21

who wants to be with Christ must take on his shoulders the whole
burden of morality, which will be the inst rument of his
elevation." 58
That is why each personbeliever and non-believermust do
everything in their power to not only uphold, but also measure up
to the values and ideals which we all prize and cherish so much
and which, lest we forget, continue to form the very cornerstone
of the incredible progress western civilization has made until this
day. That is why now can and must no longer be the time for
empty rhetoric. If we really are the progressive and open -minded
communities we claim to be in front of the whole world, then now
more than ever we must allow empathy and tolerance to blaze
forth as shining justifications of our own humanity. Because in the
end, our culture will be vindicated by it deeds, and not just by
what it superficially stands for.
This, above all else, is why state authorities must at long last
match the worthy example set forth by thousands of their own
citizens who selflessly volunteered to give whatever assistance they
could to the multitudes of refugees already relocated to their
respective regions. In particular, they must strive to equal the
efforts of the many local individuals who offered a warm and
heartfelt welcome to these strangers as they first arrived in their
communities and who, in many cases, likewise donated to the
numerous charity associations presently providing displaced
persons with whatever help and support their strained and limited
capacities can spare. This is why political representatives must
now lead the way in restoring safety and well -being to all those
deeply shaken and informed by both the physical and emotional
wounds of incessant warfare in their native countries.
This is why more states must seek to emulate the relief
measures adopted and put in place by Germany, of all nations, a
modern republic which in the past century was after all itself the
origin of so much pain and humiliation to so many peoples and
ethnicities, but which after having experienced first-hand the
58

Father Jerome Vereb (ed.), A Year with Jean Paul II. Daily Meditations from His Writings and Prayers
(New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 25.

22

positive benefits of international assistance, nowadays has evolved

for so many tormented persons into a veritable beacon of hope ,
opportunity and trust into the goodness of others. This is why in
the years to come history will pass a kinder and more favourable
judgement on senior state leaders such as Angela Merkel and
Stefan Lfven, the sitting Prime Minister of Sweden. 59 Because at
the hour of greatest need they not merely did what was politically
convenient for themselves, but in addition to exhibiting true
political statesmanship, they also displayed actual moral
leadership. This is why the powers that be in all countries need to
remember the words spoken only a little over two years ago by US
President Barack Obama that instead of losing sight of "the sweep
of history" by turning inwards and thinking of our own pursuits,
we must reaffirm the principle that "complacency is never the
character of great nations." 60 In that speech, Obama touched upon
many of the contemporary issues still demand ing to be addressed
in greater detail, yet he above all emphasized the fact "that if we
ignore the instability and intolerance that fuels extremism, our
own freedom will eventually be in danger." 61 This most definitely is
an assessment that cannot be stressed highly enough and which,
therefore, must without fail become a firm and integral part of any
actions contemplated in response to this deplorable refugee
tragedy.
For how many times already had the world to watch and
endure the fulfilment of Edmund Burke's exhortation that all too
often "the only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men
to do nothing." 62 No one person of stature and with at least some
rudimentary appreciation of historical cycles and events could
59

Adam Lebor, "Angela Merkel: Europe's Conscience on the Refugee Crisis," Newsweek, 18 September
2015, pp. 12-15; Sven Nordenstam, "Thousands of Swedes rally in support of refugees," Reuters, 6
September 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/06/us-europe-migrants-swedenidUSKCN0R60UW20150906 [accessed 21 September 2015]; Oliver Gee, "Swedish PM: 'My Europe
takes in refugees'," The Local, 6 September 2015. http://www.thelocal.se/20150906/thousands-to-rallyfor-refugees-in-stockholm [accessed 21 September 2015].
60
Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate," (speech given at the
Brandenburg Gate, Pariser Platz, Berlin, Germany, 19 June 2013).
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html [accessed 18 September 2015].
61
Ibid.
62
Although scholars still debate the exact origin of this widely used quotation, it is generally attributed to
Irish philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-1797). See "The Only Thing Necessary for the Triumph of Evil
is that Good Men do Nothing," The Quote Investigator,
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/12/04/good-men-do/ [accessed 18 September 2015].

23

seriously dispute the time-proven validity of this axiom. Yet once

again we seem incapable of comprehending the underly ing
suppositions of this statement. Thus rather than to simply
discount the many historical precedents clearly and un mistakeably
bearing out this prudent and timeless observation, we should all
have it serve as a supreme guiding principle in international affairs
for anticipating the rise of any forces that could, before long,
develop into a substantial threat to our own safety and security as
well. Because if there is one incontestable certainty in world
politics, it is ultimately the fact that at one point or another,
history will strike back at uswith a vengeance.

Conclusion
In the absence of light, darkness prevails. 63 Yet for those
coming up on the side of light, it may at times be difficult to
perceive that "darkness" for wha t it exactly is. For the millions of
people presently fleeing the carnage in their homelands, that
darkness is nothing short of utter misery and despair, endless
shelling and human slaughtering, unabated poverty and
destitution, and, above all, crippling f ear and the permanent
absence of hope. Both as individuals and as nations we may think
ourselves entitled not to care about this cruel and unfair state of
affairs, that all things considered the problems of refugees and
uprooted families are of no immediat e concern to us and that,
consequently, it does not fall within our remit to solve them. But
if we willingly cho ose to do so, we all must know and live with the
possibility that rather sooner than later that very same darkness
may well come back to haunt us one day. If not ourselves, than
arguably even more so our children. This is why we all ought to
pay close attention to the saying immortalized by Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. that, ultimately, "darkness cannot drive out
darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only
love can do that." 64 Thus if by a comparatively small show of
benevolence and support extended to the oppressed and
unfortunate asking at this very moment for shelter and security in
63
64

A variation of a well-known Buddhist saying.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Where do we go from here: Chaos or Community? (Boston: Beacon Press,
2010), p. 65.

24

our societies we can ignite the spark that might eventually shine
just as bright a light for them as it once did for us, then I believe
we all should do our best to no longer keep that light in the dark.
For although in the end our ignorance and unawareness may be
forgiven us by future generatio ns, our apathy and indifference
most certainly will not.

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