Caroline Fehl, Explaining the International Criminal Court: A Practice Test for

Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches, European Journal of International

Relations vol. 10 no. 3 (2004): 357-394.
ICC - issue of institutional design. How independent is it, how far does its reach go.
US objection - might be misused by US enemies to turn it against US military personnel
overseas.
Rationalist theories of international institutions, constructivist theories. How the two explain
different features, identify relevant explanatory factors Rationalist literatures on institutions - states are strategic unitary actors, create institutions
to solve strategic cooperation problems. Why are they set up in a given way?
International atrocities regime

Post WW1 - hold the German Kaiser and other German war criminals accountable in an
international tribunal, but fails because Holland wont extradite. 1921 Leipzig trials - fail,
procedural flaws. 1930s ICC discussion doesnt succeed.
Post Holocaust - IMT, IMTFE, UNWCC. UN International Law Commission drafts statutes
to establish a permanent court, but doesnt make any progress.
Universal jurisdiction becomes more widespread (Eichmann, conviction of Bosnian Serbs
and Muslims in Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, NEtherlands, Rwandans in Switzerland
and Belgium. But - obstacles remain, even where theres a will to prosecute.
Ad Hoc Tribunals.
Undermined by US - American Servicemembers Protection Act (US cuts military aid to
non-NATO, non-ally members of the ICC, use all means necessary to free US personnel
from ICC custody - Hague invasion act).
Bilateral Article 98 agreements - wont extradite US citizens to ICC.
Rational institution design - centralises tasks, more efficient, but also limited by sovereignty
costs - can individual states maintain control of the process? Uncertainty leads states to
want to increase control, or create flexible/opt-out (Koremonos).

Keohane - institutions shaped largely by their most powerful members.

Constructivist approach:
Emphasise that actors are embedded in social structures that have a constitutive effect on
them, shaping world views, identities, interests. Actions can be driven by logics other than
instrumental rationality. Logic of appropriateness.

astatewhichwantstodefineitselfasamemberofthecommunitymustactinaccordance
withthestandardofappropriatebehaviorinthecommunity(FinnemoreandSikkink,1998:
902).Thus,actorsoftenfollowalogicofappropriatenessratherthananinstrumentallogic
ofconsequences,performingtheactionsrequiredbyagivennorminacertainsituation
ratherthanmaximizingutilities.
Creationofnormsnormentrepreneurs.

Thesecond,lessprominentconstructivistperspectiveoninternationalinstitutionslooksat
normativedevelopmentsthatinfluencestates choiceofparticularinstitutions.Alexander
Wendthasputforthasimilarargument,inaconstructivistcommentonthetheoryof
rationalinstitutionaldesign(Wendt,2001).
Notsubstantivenormsaboutaparticularissue(Ruggieseesthemthatway),butnormsabout
institutionaldesignse.g.itsfairtogiveonevote/state.
Problemsdontexistobjectivelybuthavetobeintersubjectivelyidentifiedbyacommunityofstates
inthefirstplace.
Notallofthefactorsgoingtobepresentdifferentconstructivistapproachesheuristicpoolof
explanatoryfactorsthatcanguideourattentiontorelevantfactorsinaparticularcasestudy.

accordingtorationalistinstitutionalism,statescreateanddesigninternational
institutionsinordertosolvestrategiccooperationproblems.Rationaldesigntheorists
hypothesizethatspecificdesignproblemscanbeexplainedbyspecifictypesof
cooperationproblems,suchassovereigntycosts,uncertaintyandpowerasymmetries.
Accordingtoconstructivistinstitutionalism,thecreationofinternationalinstitutionsis
oftentheresultofthepersuasivelobbyingactivitiesofnormentrepreneurs.Likewise,
thecreationanddesignofinstitutionalrulesisofteninfluencedbyconstitutivenorms
andintersubjectiveconceptualdevelopments.

Cantheybecomplementary?(MarchandOlsen,1998:9524)no.

Wendt(2001)theoreticalrivalsorcomplementary.

 Addcausaldepthtorationalistaccount,explainingnormativeandconceptual
developmentsthatleadtocertainoutcomes,howstatesdefinetheirpreferences.
Constructivismnormsdefiningthegamerationalismhowitssolved.

Doesrationalismalwayssolvethegamethough?

Howtojudgeconstructivisttheoriescantaseasilybedeterminedtoberight/wrong.

Rationalistexplanation
Institutionstrategiccooperationproblems.
Fulfilfunctionsin
issuelinkage
centralisingmonitoring/enforcement/reducetransactioncosts.
Rationalistexplanationssolveenforcementproblemsrelatingtonationalprosecutions.
Otherreducehightransactioncostsofadhoctribunals.

AbbotICCsolvesenforcementproblem.Ininterestofallstatestoprevent,punish,deter
atrocities,avoidcostlyinterventions.Statesreluctanttobearcostsofprosecution
unilaterally,socentralisetheseproblems.

Convincing?Lotsofoccasionswhereprosecutorsdonttakeoncasesbecauseofstate
pressure,diplomatictrouble.HisseneHabreofChad,Pinochet.

Twoobjections
shallow?Stateshaventalwayshadanagreeduponcommoninterestintheprosecutionof
atrocities.Decadesofatrocitieswithoutinternationalcommunitymakinganeffortto
providethepublicgood ofinternationaljustice.Consensualperceptionofcooperation
problem notalwaysgiven.Wendtcanaddcausaldepthtothisbylookingat
constructivistaccountsofhowconceptual,normativedevelopmentsemergetopromote
this.

 Transactioncoststribunalfatigue.Whyithappenswhenithappensprocessrevitalisedin
1989,butonlyreallygetsgoingin1994,aftersomeexperienceofthe
expensive/exhaustingrunningoftheICTs.

ConstructivistexplanationendofColdWar,gridlockinUN(Ferencz),adoptionofmore
andmorehumanrightsconventions.Gainprescriptivestatus.Finnemorepartof
universalisationofWesternstyleworldculture?
Justbecausestatesratifynormsdoesntmeantheycomplywithit,butgrowingextentto
whichcountrieswanttoviewthemselves/otherstoviewthemasprohumanrightsstates.

Rissehardtomeasurethis.Onlycommunicativestatementsofactors.Butsomeevidence
thatthisishappeningmoreandmorejudgementsinnationalcourts,since1970s,making
referencetohumanrights.
Publics(especiallyintheWest)wantinternationalcommunitytodosomething.
Thefundamentalreasonforthese[UN]courtsistheinternationalcommunitysresolveand
potentialtorespondtotheinternationalcrimesofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,andwar
crimesandensurethattheleadingperpetratorsofthesecrimesarebroughttojustice....Withthe
endoftheColdWarandthegrowingnumberofdemocraciesandpluralisticsocietiescommittedto
theadvancementofhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw,itsimplyisnolongertenableeitheramong
democraticallyelectedpoliticalleadersoramongthepublicstheyservetotolerateimpunityforthe
commissionofsuchinternationalcrimes....Therearemanydifferentmechanismsthatthe
internationalcommunityisexploringandusingtorespondtogenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,
andwarcrimes....ThepermanentInternationalCriminalCourtisneededatoneextremeofthis
spectrumofmechanisms.(Scheffer,

SchefferdelegatetoICCdesign.

Complementedbyliberalargumentestablishmentofintltribunalssimplythecheapest
wayofpacifyingagitatedpublics.

Normentrepreneurs?Notreally.Lawyersorganisationsactive,butmostNGOslacked
capacityearlyintheprocess.LargelystateledNGOCoalitionforanInternational
CriminalCourtextremelyinfluentiallaterintheprocess.

Secondconstructivistargumentneedtoavoidvictorsjustice?

Irrationallyselectiveprosecutionsunderminetheperceptionofjusticeasfairandevenhanded,and
thereforeserveasthebasisfordefianceandcontempt.TheadhocnatureoftheexistingTribunalsis
indeedaseverefaultlineintheaspirationsofauniversallyapplicablesystemofcriminal
accountability....Notthattheimpunityofsomemakesotherslessculpable,butitmakesitless
justtosinglethemout.Itthereforerunstheriskofgivingcredencetotheirclaimofvictimisation,
andevenifitdoesnotcastdoubtonthelegitimacyoftheirpunishment,ittaintstheprocessthat
turnsablindeyetotheculpabilityofothers.ThebroaderthereachoftheInternationalCriminal
Court,thebetteritwillovercometheseshortcomingsofadhocjustice.(LouiseArbourICTY
Prosecutor,1999)

ExplaininginstitutionaldesignoftheICC

Consensusstartstofallapartwhendesigningit.

P5(criticalrestrictcourtpowers)vs.likemindedgroup (Canada,mostofEuropeFrance
andUKswitchhereafterthe1997election)strong,independentcourt).

Whoentitledtostartaninvestigation?Triggermechanisms.USledstateswanttorestrict
thistotheUNSC,othersIndia,Mexico,Egypt,wantthisout.
Article16canUNSCblock/delaytrials?

CouldtheICCtrycasesagainstnonsignatories?Yes.

OptoutprovisionsagainstwarcrimesArticle124.
Easilyexplainedinrationalistdesigntheoristtermscentralisation,control,flexibility.

Therationalisttheoryofinstitutionaldesigncomprisesseveralhypotheseswhichcould
explainthedegreeofcentralization,controlandflexibilitythatcharacterizestheICCs
design.Thesehypothesesstatethatcentralizationofdecisionmakingdecreaseswith
sovereigntycosts,thatcontrolandflexibilityincreasewithsovereigntycostsand
uncertainty,andthatpowerasymmetriesresultinasymmetricalcontroloftheinstitutionby
majorpowers.

Thefollowinganalysissuggeststhatsovereigntycosts,uncertaintyandpowerasymmetry
didmatterinthedesignnegotiations.Mostobserversviewedpowerfulstates concernfor
sovereigntyasthemainobstacletothecreationofastrongICCthatwouldbebeyondthe
controlofindividualstates(Lee,1999:141;Morton,2000:66).Sovereigntycostswere
emphasizedbyallmajorpowers,butespeciallybytheUnitedStates.USdelegationleader
Schefferwarnedmonthsbeforetheconferencethatthe...bedrockofinternationallaw[is
the]thresholdof[national]sovereignty (citedinBall,1999:202).ThekeyUSconcernwas
thattheICCwouldassertjurisdictionoverUSmilitarypersonnelinoverseasmissions,for
committingcrimesontheterritoryofanICCmemberstate(Scheffer,1999:18).Asaresult,
akeydomainofUSnationalsovereignty,jurisdictionoveritsowncitizens,wouldbe
undermined.Ifwecomparethissituationtotheconditionsunderwhichtheadhoctribunals
wereestablished,itisclearthatsovereigntycostswereanewfactor thestateswho
designedtheUNtribunalsdidnotinitiallyexpecttobethemselvessubjecttotheir
jurisdiction,althoughthisexpectationwaspartiallyprovenwronginthecaseoftheICTY. 17

UncertaintywillthisbeturnedagainstUSroguestates,biasedprosecutor,
PowerasymmetryUS,Russia,Chinamoreworriedaboutrestrictionsontheirpowers.

Butsomecautione.g.UKswitch,UScriticalstanceemergesfromPentagon/individualleadersin
Congress.Americanexceptionalism thisisaquestionofnorms.
ConstructivistpositionroleofNGOs.

Accordingtotheprecedinganalysis,bothrationalistandconstructivistapproacheshelp
explainthecreationanddesignoftheICC,complementingeachotherindifferentways.
Theestablishmentofthecourtcanbeexplainedpartlybytworationalistarguments first,
statesfacedapublicgoodproblemininternationalcriminaljustice,havingdisincentivesto
prosecuteperpetratorsinnationalcourtsonthebasisofuniversaljurisdiction;theICC
solvesthisproblembycentralizingprosecutions.Second,theICClowersthetransaction
costsincurredinasystemofadhoctribunalsestablishedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.
Aconstructivistperspectivecancomplementtherationalistargumentsintwoways first,
thepublicgoodargumentremainstooshallowifonedoesnotexplainhowstatescameto
perceiveimpunityforatrocitiesasacommonprobleminthefirstplace.Aconstructivist
perspectivecandeepentheexplanation itemphasizestheconstitutiveeffectsofhuman
rightsnorms,whichhavecometodefinetheidentityofthecommunityofliberalstates,
andhavestrengtheneddemandfortheprosecutionofatrocities.Second,aconstructivist
approachprovidesanalternativetotheargumentofcostsaving.TheICCwasexpectedto
benotonlycheaperthanaregimeofadhoctribunals,butalsomorelegitimate.These
alternativeexplanations,however,arenotmutuallyexclusive.Theevidencesuggeststhat
considerationsofbothcostsandlegitimacyinfluencedthedecisionforanICC,with
differentactorsdrivenbydifferentmotivations.

Rationalisttrackrecordmixed.