Documenti di Didattica
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---1AC---
ADT 1AC
Plan
Plan: the United States Federal Government should
substantially curtail domestic surveillance of agriculture by
amending the Animal Disease Traceability Program.
Small Farms
Advantage one is small farms
ADT devastates small farmers and is built on a flawed export
model
McGeary, et al 12 (Judiath- Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance, Email to the
office of management and budget detailing the objections to ADT- over 60 different
organizations signed on in support, Sep. 14, Re: USDA-APHIS Animal Disease
Traceability Final Rule RIN: 0579-AD24, http://www.r-calfusa.com/wpcontent/uploads/animal_id/120913-ltr-to-OMB-on-costs.pdf)
ADT has been criticized by thousands of individuals and organizations because of
the undue burdens that it will impose on producers. The cost of tagging and the
extensive recordkeeping requirements under the rule will impact farmers and
ranchers, as well as related businesses such as sale barns and veterinarians, and
will ripple through our rural economies. As detailed in our letter of July 24, the USDA has
significantly underestimated the costs of its rule to both cattle producers and poultry producers. While the agency
claims that the costs are under $100 million annually, independent studies indicate that the costs could be three to
75 percent of the contiguous U.S. is experiencing drought conditions, and almost half the country is in severe or
the 1930s Depression,1 as producers with parched pastures, rangelands, and crops face expensive hay, grain, and
shipping costs. Increased feed costs have led to a reduction in profits per livestock animal by more than $100 just
since June 1.2 One agricultural economist has estimated that 2013 feed prices could triple the 1990-2004 average.3
Rapidly depleting livestock water is forcing many producers to haul water, which is also expensive and time-
Families who have been the agricultural backbone of this nation are now at
the breaking point. Many have already sold a large part of their herds, and the
slaughter of many breeding age cows will mean that it will take a decade of normal
rainfall to rebuild the cattle population in America. Traceability programs, such as USDAs ADT
consuming.
rule, also impose costs on livestock-related businesses, such as sale barns and veterinarians. It was recently
reported that sale barns in New Zealand have added a new surcharge for cattle sales due to the additional
equipment, staffing and administrative costs required for their NAIT (national animal identification and tracing)
program.4 It is likely that similar costs under ADT will be passed on to U.S. farmers and ranchers. Like the sale
those producers who are able to stay in business will have to find a way to pass
on the costs, which will mean higher prices for consumers , who are already facing
higher prices at the grocery store.5 In contrast to the clear costs of the program, the benefits remain
vague. The USDAs Regulatory Impact Analysis focused almost entirely on the monetary
benefits from exports, but this approach is fundamentally flawed for several
reasons. First, the benefits are based on models of varying degrees of traceability ,6
yet tagging is not synonymous with traceability : an animal with an ear tag attached
prior to crossing state lines may become untraceable later through lost tags or poor
recordkeeping by state agencies. Second , as has been shown repeatedly and acknowledged by
USDA officials, market access often depends more on politics than on traceability or
other measures. Finally, the financial benefits of exports accrue almost entirely to
barns,
the companies who sell the exports. Since the costs of the program will rest almost
entirely on livestock producers and related businesses, it is inappropriate to justify
those costs on the basis of benefits to other entities .
significant factors.
USDA estimated the total upper-end cost of complying with animal identification
provisions in the proposed rule at only $4.68 per head.13 Yet USDA had been presented a study, explained below,
that estimated that the real cost of tagging cattle ranged from $17.00 per head to $27.00 per head, excluding the
cost of the tag itself.14 Kris Ringwall, Ph.D., Director, Dickinson Research Center Extension and Livestock Specialist,
North Dakota State University (NDSU), conducted the study that involved the tagging of 14,432 calves
during the three-year period 2004-2006. The study concluded that the cost working each calf, tag placement, and
documentation was $7.00 per calf. In addition, Dr. Ringwalls threeyear project determined that the tagging of
calves was costly to producers because of shrink, which he defined as weight loss while handling calves.15 Dr.
Rinwall stated in his testimony: When weve measured shrink in the cattle we have worked during the project, we
estimate up to $10 to $20 in lost income potential per calf, regardless of the management activity applied.16 Based
on Dr. Ringwalls findings, the cost of tagging and documenting calves, and the cost of the income lost due to
shrink, ranged from $17.00 per head to $27.00 per head in 2006 or 2007 dollars, excluding the cost of the tag. The
cost in 2012 dollars would obviously be greater. Applying Dr. Ringwalls findings to the likely number of cattle that
cross state lines each year, the cost of the proposed rule to U.S. cattle producers ranges from $850 million to $1.35
billion, using our estimate of 50 million head of cattle crossing state lines each year. Even if only the cattle moved
to slaughter in 2010 were considered (32.25 million head), the cost to U.S. cattle producers would range from $582
million to $924 million.17 SUMMARY: By understating labor and capital costs, as well as the impact on the animals
the people who own cattle. Both sale barns and veterinarians will be subject to long-term record-keeping
requirements under the proposed rule.18 The agency dismissed the cost to sale barns by stating
that they are already required to keep records on the cattle sold.19 The agency ignored, however, that the current
record-keeping requirements do not require separate documents for each animal or even group of animals, while
the proposed rule would do so, vastly expanding the sheer quantity of paper or data that must be maintained by
or absorb it themselves, someone must pay those costs. In addition, the agencys assumption about the costs for
veterinary services failed to include the typical charges for having a vet come out to the farm (or, in the alternative,
owners
Under the proposed rule, poultry moving interstate must be official identified either through group
managed together as one group throughout the preharvest chain.23 This definition describes the management
practices at large, vertically-integrated facilities, but does not apply to the majority of small-scale poultry owners
to slaughterhouses across state lines. Instead, the agency made the false assumption that incremental costs for
important to first understand the complexity of the poultry industry. From commercial pastured broilers and
pastured laying hens to backyard flocks to pets, hundreds of thousands of people own millions of birds under
diverse conditions. For example, in USDAs 2007 survey of agriculture, the agency identified over 140,000 farms
with between 1 and 399 layer hens.26 The survey did not include the many people in both rural and urban settings
who own a few birds for food, show, or as pets, although urban and backyard poultry production is growing at an
exponential rate. There are myriad variations in how people buy poultry outside of vertically-integrated operations.
Many people order day-old chicks from hatcheries, commonly out-of-state. Some buy chicks from local feed and
supply stores, who in turn usually have ordered the day-old chicks from hatcheries. Some buy juvenile or grown
birds directly from farms. And many homeowners or smaller operations purchase "spent" laying hens for their
personal use from commercial-scale operations, after they have become uneconomic to commercial egg producers.
There are also many variations in how people manage their poultry. Pastured broiler operations often raise birds in
discrete all-in-all-out units that might be amenable to group identification. In contrast, pastured layer operations will
often commingle multiple batches of birds from different locations over a period of many years, culling individuals
in the flock only as needed. Many people have to cross state lines to process their birds because so few
slaughterhouses accept poultry from independent producers. The backyard owners and live bird markets have, if
anything, even more complicated systems.
from one bird to a few hundred, are very high, and there are no
economies of scale . From buying feed in small quantities to the natural supplements to maintain health
and necessary to certified organic production (such as diatomaceous earth, kelp, oyster and clam shell, and anti-
small-scale poultry owners face costs that equal or even exceed their
ability to recover those costs through sales. While pastured poultry products may sell at a
parasitic herbs),
seemingly high price, the profit margin is extremely slim, perhaps $1 on an entire bird or 25 cents on a dozen eggs.
Very few of these individuals have employees to care for the birds, and almost none have employees to handle
administrative functions. Thus the paperwork involved in tracking groups, even dynamic groups as is done in the
vertically integrated hog operations, would impose significant costs in time and effort. The farmers would have to
develop database or paperwork systems capable of tracking the merging and divided groups, and then enter and
maintain all of the information.
accomplished. Permanently tagging baby chicks or young chickens is simply impossible because of the growth
of their legs. That growth would require holders of poultry to change leg bands a number of times as they grew, and
documenting each change in identification. Even for adults, the cost of the tags and CVIs could easily be more than
the value of the entire animal. At a meeting of the USDA Secretarys Advisory Committee on Animal Health, a USDA
official stated that the agency had conducted several studies on the issue of tagging poultry in the context of the
the work conducted by its own staff in proposing the new requirements for poultry under the ADT rule. SUMMARY:
The USDA completely failed to examine the economic impacts to the poultry
industry, especially on smaller scale operations . If the rule is implemented as
proposed, it will place disproportionate, onerous burdens on both small-
scale farmers and those who seek to raise poultry for their personal use and
enjoyment.
threats of terrorism and mad cow disease (BSE), the NIAA thought up a brilliant plan: "Hey Charlie, let's microchip
every single livestock animal in America!" Under
animal
(cattle, horses, sheep, goats, poultry, pigs, bison, deer, elk, and even some species of fish raised for
would have been required to register their name, address, telephone number, and the
Global Positioning System coordinates of the animal's location with the federal
government. Every individual animal in a small operation would have an implanted
Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) bearing a 15-digit number. Large producers
aquaculture)
of pigs or poultry, on the other hand, were going to be allowed the advantage of grouping animals under one
The livestock owner would be required to report activities associated with the
chipped animals. Not only major events like birth or death; if your ram jumped your fence, you would have
had to report it to the government. Ride your horse off your property? Each ride would have to be reported. No
exceptions. There was more: heavy fines for non-compliance (up to $1,000 per day
under proposed Texas regulations) and veterinarians would be required to report
incidences of non-compliance if they find animals without ID numbers . The stated goal of
number.
NAIS was to safeguard America's meat supply against diseases by tracking every conceivable livestock animal. This
detailed control on potential disease vectors would, in turn, soothe the fears of export markets In reality, of course,
the implementation was a nightmare, both logistically and in terms of property rights
and privacy. Additionally, it was clear from the start that the major beneficiaries were
the large producers, and that small farmers and ranchers would be unfairly
impacted. Thankfully, in June 2009, federal funding for NAIS in its original form was dropped from the fiscal 2010
spending bill by the House Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee. House leaders indicated no future funds
would be available unless the USDA one day made NAIS mandatory. Instead, the USDA abandoned NAIS. Some
funding was kept to maintain the program in places where it was already being implemented, such as in Wisconsin,
opposition.
We were unaware that something new and just as insidious was up the USDA's sleeve.
There are no exceptions -- under the USDA plan , you will be forced to register and report even if
you raise animals only for your own food or keep horses for draft or for transportation. The Negative Effects
Eradication of Small Farms People with just a few meat animals or 40-cow dairies
are already living on the edge financially. The USDA plan will force many of them to
give up farming. Loss of the True Security of Organic and Local Foods The NAIS is
touted by the USDA and agricorporations as a way to make our food supply
secure against diseases or terrorism. However, most people instinctively understand that real
food security comes from raising food yourself or buying from a local farmer you actually know.
The USDA plan will only kill off more local sources of production and further promote
the giant industrial methods which cause many food safety and disease problems .
Extreme Damage to Personal Privacy Legally, livestock animals are a form of
personal property. It is unprecedented for the United States government to conduct
large-scale computer-aided surveillance of its citizens simply because they own a
common type of property. (The only exceptions are registration of motor vehicles and guns, due to their
clear inherent dangers but they are registered at the state level, not by the federal government.) The NAIS
would actually subject the owner of a chicken to far more surveillance than the
owner of a gun. Surveillance of small-scale livestock owners is like the government subjecting people to
surveillance for owning a couch, a TV, a lawnmower. What about non-livestock animals? Will the government next
want to register all cats, dogs, and parakeets, and demand the global positioning coordinates of their owners
houses and apartments?
of higher, sensitive living creatures, treating individual animals as if they were cans
of peas with a bar code. Many people who raise their own animals or buy from small, local producers do so
because they are very troubled by industrial-scale production of chickens, cattle, and pigs. These people will
be forced either to sacrifice their personal privacy to government surveillance, or to
stop raising their own food by humane standards . Burden on Religious Freedom Many
adherents of plain (and other) faiths raise their own food animals and use animals in
farming and transportation because their beliefs require them to live this way. Such
people obviously cannot comply with the USDAs computerized, technologydependent system. The NAIS will force these people to violate their religious beliefs.
Outside magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's,
Rolling Stone, the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals, 9/29, Could
the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?, The Guardian, pg. 29, Lexis
Infectious disease is all around us
under ordinary
conditions it's
natural
But conditions aren't always ordinary
. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey
from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful,
,
every bit as
. Just as
predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new
Aberrations occur
zoonosis
It's a word
target.
. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a
. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and
of the future,
bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine
tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of
that
a pathogen
humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or
have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects.
Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years.
to lurk within
what's called
a reservoir host
: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's
often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is
also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a
bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her
during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her
husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes
said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They
arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach."
The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun
shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body
regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again,
negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a
news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the
following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who
called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners,
one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the
place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released
more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again
including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only
through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to
another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to
which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of
Sars
, the scenario
outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and
impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases
were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto.
different
city
larger segment of humanity
sort of big
- more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions -
. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather
than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is
1918 influenza
occurred
before
globalisation
When the Next Big One comes it will
conform to the
1918 influenza high infectivity preceding notable
symptoms
it move through
airports like an angel of death
reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the
-1919
in the era
likely
cities and
scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight.
the
virus
-1
, it
, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this
route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what
separates a
bizarre, awful,
(such as Ebola)
capacity
. Have you
noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities.
Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category
of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible,
so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-tohuman transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52
were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly
from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent
political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all
that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "
in the world
. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-
to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the history of mammals.
. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant.
. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In
some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five
to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.
has dropped precipitously in recent decades with the boom in industrial molecular biology. A small team of people
with the necessary technical training and some cheap equipment can create weapons far more terrible than any nuclear bomb.
these trends utterly undermine the lethalityversus-cost curve that existed throughout all of human history. Access to extremely lethal agentseven to those that may
Indeed, even a single individual might do so. Taken together,
exterminate the human racewill be available to nearly anybody. Access to mass death has been democratized; it has spread from
a small elite of superpower leaders to nearly anybody with modest resources. Even the leader of a ragtag, stateless group hiding in
a caveor in a Pakistani suburbcan potentially have the button. Turning Life Against the Living The first and simplest kinds of
biological weapons are those that are not contagious and thus do not lead to epidemics. These have been developed for use in
military conflicts for most of the 20th century. Because the pathogens used are not contagious, they are considered controllable:
that is, they have at least some of the command-and-control aspects of a conventional weapon. Typically, these pathogens have
been weaponized, meaning bred or refined for deployment by using artillery shells, aerial bombs, or missiles much like
conventional explosive warheads. They can be highly deadly. Anthrax is the most famous example. In several early- 20th-century
outbreaks, it killed nearly 90% of those infected by inhaling bacterial spores into their lungs. Anthrax was used in the series of mail
attacks in the United States in the fall of 2001. Even with advanced antibiotic treatment, 40% of those who contracted inhalational
anthrax died during the 2001 attacks.1 That crime is believed to have been the work of a lone bioweapons scientist who sought to
publicize the threat of a biological attack and boost funding for his work on anthrax vaccines. This conclusion is consistent with the
fact that virtually no effort was made to disperse the bacterium indeed, the letters carrying the spores thoughtfully included text
warning of anthrax exposure and recommending that the recipient seek immediate treatment. Despite this intentional effort to limit
rather than spread the infection, a surprising amount of trouble was caused when the fine anthrax powder leaked from envelopes
and contaminated other mail. Before this episode, nobody would have guessed that letters mailed in New Jersey to addresses in
Manhattan and Washington, D.C., could kill someone in Connecticut, but they did. And no one would have predicted that a domestic
bioterrorist launching multiple attacks, including one against the U.S. Congress, would elude the FBI for years. But that is what
happened. What if such an attack were made not by some vigilante trying to alert the world to the dangers of bioweapons but
instead by a real sociopath? Theodore J. Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, may have been such a person. He was
brilliant enough to earn a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Michigan yet was mentally disturbed enough to be a one-man
terrorist cell: His mail bombs claimed victims over nearly two decades. Kaczynski certainly had enough brains to use sophisticated
methods, but because he opposed advanced technology, he made untraceable low-tech bombs that killed only three people. A
future Kaczynski with training in microbiology and genetics, and an eagerness to use the destructive power of that science, could be
a threat to the entire human race. Indeed, the world has already experienced some true acts of biological terror. Aum Shinrikyo
produced botulinum toxin and anthrax and reportedly released them in Tokyo on four separate occasions. A variety of technical and
organizational difficulties frustrated these attacks, which did not cause any casualties and went unrecognized at the time for what
they were, until the later Sarin attack clued in the authorities.2 Had the group been a bit more competent, things could have turned
out far worse. One 2003 study found that an airborne release of one kilogram of an anthrax-spore-containing aerosol in a city the
size of New York would result in 1.5 million infections and 123,000 to 660,000 fatalities, depending on the effectiveness of the public
health response.3 A 1993 U.S. government analysis determined that 100 kilograms of weaponized anthrax, if sprayed from an
airplane upwind of Washington, D.C., would kill between 130,000 and three million people.4 Because anthrax spores remain viable
in the environment for more than 30 years,1 portions of a city blanketed by an anthrax cloud might have to be abandoned for years
while extensive cleaning was done. Producing enough anthrax to kill 100,000 Americans is far easier to doand far harder to detect
than is constructing a nuclear bomb of comparable lethality. Anthrax, moreover, is rather benign as biological weapons go. The
pathogen is reasonably well understood, having been studied in one form or another in biowarfare circles for more than 50 years.
Natural strains of the bacterium are partially treatable with long courses of common antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin if the
medication is taken sufficiently quickly, and vaccination soon after exposure seems to reduce mortality further.5 But bioengineered
anthrax that is resistant to both antibiotics and vaccines is known to have been produced in both Soviet and American bioweapons
laboratories. In 1997, a group of Russian scientists even openly published the recipe for one of these superlethal strains in a
scientific journal.6 In addition, numerous other agents are similar to anthrax in that they are highly lethal but not contagious. The
lack of contagion means that an attacker must administer the pathogen to the people he wishes to infect. In a military context, this
quality is generally seen as a good thing because the resulting disease can be contained in a specific area. Thus, the weapon can be
many biological
agents are communicable and so can spread beyond the people initially infected to affect the entire population.
Infectious pathogens are inherently hard to control because there is usually no reliable way to stop an
directed at a well-defined target, and with luck, little collateral damage will result. Unfortunately,
epidemic once it starts. This property makes such biological agents difficult to use as conventional weapons. A nation that starts an
epidemic may see it spread to the wrong countryor even to its own people. Indeed, one cannot target a small, well-defined
population with a contagious pathogen; by its nature, such a pathogen may infect the entire human race. Despite this rather severe
drawback, both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as Imperial Japan, investigated and produced contagious
bioweapons. The logic was that their use in a military conflict would be limited to last-ditch, scorched earth campaigns, perhaps
with a vaccine available only to one side. Smallpox is the most famous example. It is highly contagious and spreads through casual
contact. Smallpox was eradicated in the wild in 1977, but it still exists in both U.S. and Russian laboratories, according to official
statements.7 Unofficial holdings are harder to track, but a number of countries, including North Korea, are believed to possess
covert smallpox cultures. Biological weapons were strictly regulated by international treaty in 1972. The United States and the
Soviet Union agreed not to develop such weapons and to destroy existing stocks. The United States stopped its bioweapons work,
but the Russians cheated and kept a huge program going into the 1990s, thereby producing thousands of tons of weaponized
anthrax, smallpox, and far more exotic biological weapons based on genetically engineered viruses. No one can be certain how far
either the germs or the knowledge has spread since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Experts estimate that a large-scale,
coordinated smallpox attack on the United States might kill 55,000 to 110,000 people, assuming that sufficient vaccine is available
to contain the epidemic and that the vaccine works.8, 9 The death toll may be far higher if the smallpox strain has been engineered
to be vaccine-resistant or to have enhanced virulence. Moreover, a smallpox attack on the United States could easily broaden into a
global pandemic, despite the U.S. stockpile of at least 300 million doses of vaccine. All it would take is for one infected person to
leave the country and travel elsewhere. If New York City were attacked with smallpox, infections would most likely appear on every
continent, except perhaps Antarctica, within two weeks. Once these beachheads were established, the epidemic would spread
almost without check because the vaccine in world stockpiles and the infrastructure to distribute it would be insufficient. That is
particularly true in the developing world, which is ill equipped to handle their current disease burden to say nothing of a return of
smallpox. Even if only 50,000 people were killed in the United States, a million or more would probably die worldwide before the
disease could be contained, and containment would probably require many years of effort. As horrible as this would be, such a
pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on
1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other
Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were
decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for
the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and
1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrows terrorists will have vastly more deadly
virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was
unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on
that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Bullers variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of
investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the
engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite
possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic
modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the
same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one
that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? Ive asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such
Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even
trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an
epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but
asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus
harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV, which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many
other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to
progress to AIDS, which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have
lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34
million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host
quickly, to generate symptoms slowlysay, only after weeks or monthsand to spread easily through the air or by casual contact
would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This
type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became
obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed,
terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which
biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future,
could
someone may
a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that
particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward
humans.16 When Ive talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily
detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested
attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the
demise of the human race or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back
1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in
mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this
potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has
frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism
throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agentslethal enough to exterminate Homo sapienswill be available to anybody
with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient
education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin Laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed
Atta attended a German university, where he earned a masters degree in urban planningnot a field he likely chose for its
and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds
more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small
band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly terrible, such as
fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people. Indeed,
chickens or goats, or raise a lamb or steer for themselves (or as a 4-H project) or have a horse. In these instances
the premises the USDA wants to target with GPA surveillance are homes . NAIS would be
intrusive to people who have done nothing more than own an animal, which is their right, under U.S. law. Forcing
registration and having information about your private property (premises and animals) in
a huge database is also a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Property rights are protected by our Constitution. No one can be deprived of
property without due process of law. But the NAIS says USDA can remove untagged
animals from a premises, with no mention of compensation for the owner.
Government does not have the right, according to the Constitution, to come onto
website about the state of Vermont halting premises registration, a comment was left on the website from someone
pretending to be a terrorist. The comment read: "Thanks, Vermont, for opening an avenue for those that wish to use
animal disease as a bio-eco-terrorism tool. We would have tried to start along the SW border but thats now just too
obvious. Thanks! Well take the NE corner and work our way in that way. ABET" When a comment is made,
however, the website software records the IP address of the commenter. The owner of the nonaois.org site was able
to track it down, with some help from OrgAbuse personnel. The comment came from the USDA Office of Operations,
Office of the Chief Information Officer. This raises several questions. Is
threatening terrorism in order to justify the NAIS ? Is some disgruntled USDA employee unhappy
that many farmers are not accepting the NAIS, after all the hard work on it? Would some stoop so low as to actually
pose as terrorists (or worse, commit an act of terrorism that might be blamed on another country) to scare
Americans into thinking we really need the NAIS? This is no idle concern, considering that in todays world the
control of food production has become political. As stated by Leo M. Schwartz (Chairman of the Virginia Land Rights
agriculture is a mark of despotism ," said Schwartz. He quoted Zimbabwes Marxist dictator,
Robert Mugabe (who "nationalized" 95 percent of that countrys rural land and plunged Africas leading food
producing nation into chaos) who said, "Absolute power is when a man [person] is starving and you are the only one
able to give him [them] food." Food is power. Food is a weapon. Schwartz raised questions about the
UKs outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001 in which some six million healthy sheep, cows, pigs and goats
(including rare breeds) were slaughtered without justification, completely devastating British agriculture. Farmers
were unable to defend their property, and the forced quarantine held them prisoner on their own land. British
veterinarian Bob Michell later wrote, recalling the mass culling, "In
whose livelihoods evaporated in the smoking pyres." The cost of all this, according to Schwartz was more than 12
billion pounds, 60 farmer suicides "and a nation further conditioned to accept the security and safety of militarized
police-state control."
Exports
Advantage 2 is exports
Lack of traceability greatly hurts U.S. meat exports
Schroeder and Tonsor 11(Ted C. Schroeder - Professor Agricultural
Economics and Director Center for Risk Management Education and Research at
Kansas State University, and Glynn T. Tonsor -Associate Professor Agricultural
Economics at Kansas State University, Cattle Identification and Traceability:
Implications for United States Beef Exports,
http://www.agmanager.info/livestock/marketing/AnimalID/KSU_FactSheet_SchroederT
onsor_9-12-11.pdf)
Meat importing countries are adopting animal traceability systems similar to those of major exporters. Animal
Consumers in
European and Asian markets are increasingly requiring animal traceability, access to
animal movement records, and producer identification as a means for developing
trust in food safety assurances. Consequently, these countries will likely continue to
add traceability requirements on their international suppliers . Access to these
disease control and food safety assurances highlight the main goals of these systems.
competitive position relative to major competing exporters and important importing countries. Table 2 summarizes
trade requirements for selected major export and import countries. The United States, Canada, and Brazil share the
same BSE status of controlled risk in OIE (World Animal Health Organization) classification whereas Australia, New
Zealand, and Argentina enjoy negligible risk. Several important observations arise from the review of trade status
summarized in table 2. The United States faces an array of trade restrictions related to animal age and export
verification requirements to many key export market destinations. Most of these restrictions surfaced following the
BSE discovery in the United States cattle herd in late 2003. In contrast, Australia and New Zealand face no
restrictions on beef exports to important US export customers. Brazil and Argentina face some restrictions because
of FMD, but also have no restrictions related to animal age verification. [Table omitted] [table omitted]
Requirements for US beef exports to major importers are complicated by varying market access requirements. For
example, maximum age requirements are common but vary, country-specific export verification programs are often
required, different requirements and definitions exist across countries relative to specified risk material (SRM), some
programs require tracing to farm of origin, and EU requires non-hormone treated cattle (NHTC) verification. The
myriad of age and source verification requirements for U.S. beef export market access has been mostly met by the
use of voluntary USDA age and source certification and related export verification programs. However, only about
10% of fed cattle slaughtered in the United States currently are being produced under a USDA age and source
verified program. The varied market access requirements make sorting beef products a challenge that would be
easier met with animal identification and traceability. Certainly, Australia and New Zealand have comparative
advantages of having less cumbersome export market access requirements. Relative to the other major exporters
in table 2, the U.S. animal identification system is the least developed. Therefore, export market access restrictions
based on ID and traceability requirements will place the U.S. beef industry at a competitive disadvantage.
Additionally, if the United States suffers an animal disease outbreak, the
another case of BSE, which prompted South Korea to close its doors. But the impact from that will be minimal. South
Korea does not purchase much beef from Canada and it is unlikely that the Canadian case will affect current US
how other countries respond now that a second case of bird flu is found in a California, especially since this time it
was found in a commercial operation. Most US poultry production is located in the South and Southeastern part of
the US and there have been no indications of cases of bird flu there. Still,
disease spreads in other states, we could see a more forceful reaction from
our trading partners . Mexico in the past has blocked US poultry shipments due to bird flu concerns
and Mexico today is a much more important market than it was 10 years ago. Back then (2005), Mexico accounted
for about 10 per cent of US chicken exports. Last year, Mexico represented 21 per cent of all US chicken exports
and, at 154 million pounds (CWE), it also represented about 2.7 per cent of all US chicken production. This is a very
important market for US chicken and it bears watching how they respond to the new cases of avian flu cropping up.
Some
countries may find this an opportune time to ban US shipments and use the
outbreak of avian influenza as an excuse . And we need all the exports we can get considering
Poultry supplies are expanding globally and a strong US dollar also is working against our exports.
the supply of chicken coming to market today and expectations for higher production in the spring and summer.
Provides A Lesson In How to Ruin a Beef Industry , http://beefmagazine.com/beefexports/argentina-provides-lesson-how-ruin-beef-industry, Sep 26, 2013)
That was seven years ago. USDA reports that Argentina exported only 164,000 mt of beef in
2012, slipping to 11th place as a global beef exporter. Per-capita beef consumption
has declined to 121 lbs./year. And during those same seven years, U.S. beef exports have increased from
472,668 mt to more than 1.13 million mt. Argentinas beef export decline is a welcome development to American
cattlemen. After all, the less beef the Argentinians offer for the world market, the less competition for our U.S. beef
But Argentinas problems also serve as a warning for just how quickly bad
government policies can cripple [undermine] an industry. In March 2006, Argentinas
government in an effort to lower the rising price of beef to its people banned beef exports for 180
days. It followed that up by imposing a 15% export tax on fresh beef a tax thats still in force. The export tax
choked off exports and domestic beef prices dropped . The government assumed
ranchers and farmers would continue to raise cheap beef . But instead, they cut their
exports.
more than 48 million acres in 2012 mostly gaining those new acres from pasture and other crops,
such as corn. The national beef herd dropped from 54.26 million head in 2009 to 49.59
million head in 2012. In addition to raising fewer cattle, farmers and ranchers also freed up land for crops by
finishing cattle in feedlots instead of producing the grass-fed beef for which the country had been famous.
Roberto Ortega tried to make a living slaughtering pigs in Veracruz, Mexico. In my town, Las Choapas, after I killed
a pig, I would cut it up to sell the meat, he recalls. But in the late 1990s, after the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) opened up Mexican markets to massive pork imports from US companies like Smithfield Foods,
Ortega and other small-scale butchers in Mexico were devastated by the drop in prices. Whatever I could do to
make money, I did, Ortega explains. But I could never make enough for us to survive. In 1999 he came to the
United States, where he again slaughtered pigs for a living. This time, though, he did it as a worker in the worlds
Ceja, another immigrant from Veracruz who wound up in Tar Heel, recalls, Sometimes the price of a pig was
enough to buy what we needed, but then it wasnt. Farm prices were always going down. We couldnt pay for
electricity, so wed just use candles. Everyone was hurting almost all the time. Ceja remembers that his family had
ten cows, as well as pigs and chickens, when he was growing up. Even then, he still had to work, and they
sometimes went hungry. But we could give milk to people who came asking for it. There were people even worse
off than us, he recalls. In 1999, when Ceja was 18, he left his familys farm in Martinez de la Torre, in northern
Veracruz. His parents sold four cows and two hectares of land, and came up with enough money to get him to the
border. There he found a coyote who took him across for $1,200. I didnt really want to leave, but I felt I had to, he
remembers. I was afraid, but our need was so great. He arrived in Texas, still owing for the passage. I couldnt
find work for three months. I was desperate, he says. He feared the consequences if he couldnt pay, and took
whatever work he could find until he finally reached North Carolina. There friends helped him get a real job at
Smithfields Tar Heel packinghouse. The boys I played with as a kid are all in the US, he says. Id see many of
them working in the plant. North Carolina became the number-one US destination for Veracruzs displaced farmers.
Many got jobs at Smithfield, and some, like Ortega and Ceja, helped lead the sixteen-year fight that finally brought
in a union there. But they paid a high price. Asserting their rights also made them the targets of harsh immigration
The experience of
Veracruz migrants reveals a close connection between US investment and trade
deals in Mexico and the displacement and migration of its people. For nearly two
decades, Smithfield has used NAFTA and the forces it unleashed to become the worlds largest
packer and processor of hogs and pork . But the conditions in Veracruz that
enforcement and a growing wave of hostility toward Mexicans in the American South.
over Mexican producers , as US corn, heavily subsidized by US farm bills, was much cheaper. After
NAFTA, says Timothy Wise, of the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University, US corn was
NAFTA
allowed it to import pork as well. According to Alejandro Ramrez, general director of the Confederation
priced 19 percent below the cost of production. But Smithfield didnt just import feed into Mexico.
of Mexican Pork Producers, Mexico imported 30,000 tons of pork in 1995, the year after NAFTA took effect. By 2010
As a
result, pork prices received by Mexican producers dropped 56 percent. US pork
exports are dominated by the largest companies. Wise estimates that Smithfields share of this
export market is significantly greater than its 27 percent share of US production. Imported pork had a
dramatic effect on Mexican jobs. We lost 4,000 pig farms , Ramrez estimates, based on
pork imports, almost all from the United States, had grown more than twenty-five times, to 811,000 tons.
reports received by the confederation from its members. On Mexican farms, each 100 animals produce five jobs, so
we lost 20,000 farm jobs directly from imports. Counting the five indirect jobs dependent on each direct job,
we
poverty rate of 35 percent in 199294, before NAFTA, jumped to 55 percent in 199698, after NAFTA took effect
the years when Ortega and Ceja left Mexico. This could be explained, the report said, mainly by the 1995 economic
By
2010, according to the Monterrey Institute of Technology, 53 million Mexicans were
living in poverty half the countrys population. About 20 percent live
crisis, the sluggish performance of agriculture, stagnant rural wages, and falling real agricultural prices.
in extreme poverty , almost all in rural areas. The growth of poverty, in turn,
fueled migration. In 1990, 4.5 million Mexican-born people lived in the United
States. A decade later, that population had more than doubled to 9.75 million, and
in 2008 it peaked at 12.67 million. About 5.7 million were able to get some kind of
visa; another 7 million couldnt but came nevertheless. As an agricultural state, Veracruz
suffered from Mexicos abandonment of two important policies, which also helped fuel migration. First, neoliberal
reforms did away with Tabamex, a national marketing program for small tobacco farmers. A similar program for
coffee growers ended just as world coffee prices plunged to record lows. Second, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the
countrys corrupt president, pushed through changes to Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, dismantling land
buy land for its swine sheds. Displaced farmers then went to work in those sheds at low wages. Simultaneous
changes in the United States also accelerated migration. The Immigration Reform and Control Act, passed by
Congress in 1986, expanded the existing H2-A visa program, creating the current H2-A program, which allows US
agricultural employers to bring in workers from Mexico and other countries, giving them temporary visas tied to
employment contracts. Growers in North Carolina became large users of the program, especially through the North
Carolina Growers Association. Landless tobacco farmers from Veracruz became migrant tobacco workers in the
Carolinas. Many Veracruzanos came because we were offered work in the tobacco fields, where we had
experience, remembers Miguel Huerta. Then people whod been contracted just stayed, because they didnt have
anything in Mexico to go back to. After the tobacco harvest, workers spread out to other industries. From Huertas
perspective, these
bring as many employees as they want and replace them when they want .
all
had to leave Veracruz because of it, he emphasizes. Otherwise, we wouldnt do something so hard.
1997, federal judge Rebecca Smith imposed the largest federal pollution fine to that date$12.6 millionon the
thenState Attorney General Mike Easley forced Smithfield to fund research by North Carolina State University to
Despite North
Carolinas well-known hostility to regulating business, in 2007 Easley (by then governor)
made the moratorium permanent. In the face of public outcry over stench and flies,
even the anti-regulation industry association , the North Carolina Pork Council,
supported it. [image omitted] In Mexicos Perote Valley, howevera high, arid, volcanorimmed basin straddling the states of Veracruz and PueblaSmithfield could
operate unburdened by the environmental restrictions that increasingly hampered
its expansion in the United States. Mexico has environmental standards, and NAFTA
supposedly has a procedure for requiring their enforcement, but no complaint was ever filed against
GCM or Smithfield under NAFTAs environmental side agreement . Carolina Ramirez, who
heads the womens department of the Veracruz Human Rights Commission, concluded bitterly that the
company can do here what it cant do at home. For local farmers like Fausto Limon, the
hog operation was devastating. On some warm nights his children would wake up and vomit from the
develop treatment methods for hog waste that are more effective than open lagoons.
smell. Hed put his wife, two sons and daughter into his beat-up pickup, and theyd drive away from his farm until
they could breathe without getting sick. Then hed park, and theyd sleep in the truck for the rest of the night.
Limon and his family all had painful kidney ailments for three years. He says they kept taking medicine until finally
a doctor told them to stop drinking water from the farms well. Last May they began hauling in bottled water. Once
they stopped drinking from the well, the infections stopped. Less than half a mile from his house is one of the many
pig farms built by Smithfields Mexican hog-raising subsidiary, GCM. Before the pig farms came, they said they
would bring jobs, Limon remembers. But then we found out the reality.
sharing or company benefits, he says. Granjas Carroll made millions of dollars in profits, but never
distributed a part of them to the workers, as required under Mexicos federal labor law. Torres was paid 1,250
pesos ($90) every fifteen days; he says the company picked him up at 6 every morning and returned him home at
commissioner in Chichicuautla, a valley town surrounded by hog farms, also says there is no membrane beneath
the pools. In response to an article published in August in Imagen de Veracruz, a Veracruz newspaper, GCM public
relations director Tito Tablada Corts declared, Granjas Carroll does not pollute. And Smithfield spokeswoman Amy
Richards says, Our environmental treatment systems in Mexico strictly comply with local and federal regulations.
here, he says. In 2004 a coalition of local farmers called Pueblos Unidos (United Towns) started collecting
signatures for a petition to protest the expansion of the swine sheds. According to teacher Veronica Hernandez,
students told her that going to school on the bus was like riding in a toilet. Some of them fainted or got
headaches, she charges. When expansion plans moved forward nonetheless, on April 26, 2005, hundreds of people
blocked the main highway. That November a construction crew about to build another shed and oxidation pond was
met by 1,000 angry farmers. Police had to rescue the crew. Finally, in 2007 GCMs Tablada Corts signed an
agreement with local towns blocking any new expansion. That year, however, the company filed criminal
complaints against Hernandez and thirteen other leaders, charging them with defaming the company. Although
the charges were eventually dropped, the farmers were intimidated and the protest movement diminished. [image
Then, in early 2009, the first confirmed case of swine flu, the AH1N1 virus,
was found in a 5-year-old boy, dgar Hernndez from La Gloria. Pickup trucks from the local health
department began spraying pesticide in the streets to kill the omnipresent flies.
Nevertheless, the virus spread to Mexico City. By May, forty-five people in Mexico had died. Schools
omitted]
soils will erode and become unproductive - which , along with temperature
will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as
reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of
clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing
eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic
food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be
a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb
carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by
phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling
coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide
tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against
erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste
change,
disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per
year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible
goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're
heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who
really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from
cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful
enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots.
And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins,
including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin
(another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us
quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin.
More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the
Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that
saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been
screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current
extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have
tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our
quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always
base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally
compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that
transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be
more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that
we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else,
apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily
religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is
No War
No scenario for great power war laundry list
Deudney and Ikenberry 9 (Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
AND Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
University (Jan/Feb, 2009, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, The Myth of the
Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail, Foreign Affairs)
This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and
inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days
severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science
paper, went so far as to posit the extinction of Homo sapiens (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63,75-77;
1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George
Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: Nuclear winter is
the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory ,
(see go.nature.com/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had
become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robocks singledigit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about -25C) continental cooling
originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted
darkness at noon from a US-Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight
that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan-India conflict literally
the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling
has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree- days Celsius (a
measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the
very term nuclear winter into question.
---Case---
No War
No GPW Extension
United States nuclear primacy solves all conflict- superior
capabilities to both Russia and China are only increasing
Engdahl 14 (William Engdahl is an award-winning geopolitical analyst and
US nuclear primacy
In a 2006 interview with Londons Financial Times, then US Ambassador to NATO, former Cheney advisor
Victoria Nuland the same person today disgraced by a video of her phone discussion with US Ukraine Ambassador Pyatt on changing the Kiev
government (Fuck the EU) declared that the US wanted a globally deployable military force that would operate everywhere from Africa to the
Middle East and beyondall across our planet. Nuland then declared that it would include Japan and Australia as well as the NATO nations. She added,
Its a totally different animal. She was referring to BMD plans of Rumsfelds Pentagon.
at that time, more than eight years ago, deployment of even a minimal
missile defense , under the Pentagons then-new CONPLAN 8022, would give the
US what the military called, Escalation Dominance the ability to win a war
back in April 2006 noted: Washington's continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country's development of a limited missile-defense capability
take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look A nuclear war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States' military doctrine and
nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States. The two authors of the Foreign Affairs piece, Lieber and Press, went on to outline the real
To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out
attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably
likely, a number of
thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several probabilities. The most likely
scenario--one that could be perhaps considered at least to begin to approach the rational--was a "counterforce"
strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile
silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the countrys strategic
ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers, most
of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million,
depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.15
as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless
made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the
latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its
defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and
moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what
is the alternativeit can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a
political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for
example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or
would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an
asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in
deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If
vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary,
a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that
whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare
particularly difficulties of communication and controlwould drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is
obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war
suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the
nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this
fairly intense level of strategic exchangewhich was only one of many possible levels of conflict an adversary judged it to be in
it
remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization,
no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor
his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however,
has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume
escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption.
The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent , and never zero. Where between
those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so
calculable, it would not be uniquely fixedit would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any
risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it
most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear
war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict
and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available
to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is
to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must
forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47
has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial
route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender
and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most
effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever
geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are
likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to
maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation
dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are
in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible
without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism
accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention
structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a
single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosiona technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental
or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some eventperhaps such an
explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systemsinitiating
a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that
is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has
been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite
not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability.
We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security
There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known
accidents involving nuclear weapons , from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or
accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent
feature of readiness arrangements----it no longer is) . A few of these accidents may have released into
the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some
planning as in everyday life.
commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A
respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly
less so.
The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized
detonation
by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US
In none of these
instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-- extraordinary good
fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of
events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the
probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is
remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of
any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly
interposed as well as capping the sequences . To convey that because a first step was prompted the world
nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued.
somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening
by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential
or brush,
which are flammable about 50 percent of the time . 6 The leading populariser of the Nuclear Winter
hypothesis was Carl Sagan, the brilliant planetary scientist and humanist. He had noticed in 1971, when Mariner 1 was
examining Mars, that the planet was subject to global dust storms which markedly affected the atmospheric and surface
temperatures. Large amounts of dust in the upper atmosphere absorbed sunlight, heating the atmosphere but cooling the
surface, spreading cold and darkness over the planet. He recognised that wholesale ground-bursts of nuclear weapons and
the incineration of hundreds of cities could produce sufficient dust and smoke to cause a similar effect on the Earth. Sagan
Nuclear Winter hypothesis, both in lengthy correspondence and, in August-September 1985, when I was a guest in the
lovely house he and Ann Druyan had overlooking Ithaca in up-state New York. I argued that, with more realistic
data about the operational characteristics of the respective US and Soviet force configurations (such
as bomber delivery profiles, impact footprints of MIRVed warheads) and more plausible exchange scenarios, it was
impossible to generate anywhere near the postulated levels of smoke . The
megatonnage expended on cities (economic/industrial targets) was more likely to be around 140-650 than over 1,000; the
amount of smoke generated would have ranged from around 18 million tonnes to perhaps 80 million tonnes. In the case of
counter-force scenarios, most missile forces were (and still are) located in either ploughed fields or tundra and, even where
they are generally located in forested or grassed areas, very few of the actual missile silos are less than several kilometres
from combustible material. A target-by-target analysis of the actual locations of the
strategic nuclear forces in the United States and the Soviet Union showed that
the actual amount of smoke produced even by a 4,000 megaton counter-force
scenario would range from only 300 tonnes (if the exchange occurred in January) to 2,000
tonnes (for an exchange in July)the worst case being a factor of 40 smaller
than that postulated by the Nuclear Winter theorist s. I thought that it was just as wrong to
overestimate the possible consequences of nuclear war, and to raise the spectre of extermination of human life as a serious
likelihood, as to underestimate them (e.g., by omitting fallout casualties).
Small Farms
ADT = NAIS
The USDA compared ADT to NAIS
McGeary, et al 12 (Judiath- Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance, Email to the
office of management and budget detailing the objections to ADT- over 10 different
organizations signed on in support, June 6, Re: USDA-APHIS Animal Disease
Traceability Final Rule RIN: 0579-AD24, http://www.r-calfusa.com/wpcontent/uploads/animal_id/120606-OMB-Letter-updated.pdf
IV. USDA failed to consider alternatives to its ADT proposal In considering alternatives to the
proposed rule, the agency did not consider the alternative that was proposed by many cattle organizations to
identify only the breeding herd and not phasing in feeder cattle. Nor did the agency consider the alternative of not
NAIS, which was withdrawn by the USDA in February 2010 after widespread, vocal opposition from tens of
thousands of people, would have required that every single person who owned even one livestock or poultry animal
register their property in a government database, identify each animal (in many cases with electronic forms of
identification), and report a long list of events to a database within 24 hours.
absurdly expensive and unnecessary program , and using it as the baseline against which
to compare the ADT rule was inappropriate and inconsistent with the reasons behind requiring regulatory impact
analyses.
NAIS Bad-disease
NAIS increases disease risks through faulty monitoring
Smith Thomas No Date (Heather Smith Thomas- author of 20 books and
thousands of articles on animal health care, The NAIS Controversy
Part I, http://www.dairygoatjournal.com/84-6/heather_smith_thomas/ )
By now most people who own farm animals have heard about the National Animal Identification System (NAIS) plan
thats being pushed by USDA, but many of us are still finding out how this might affect us-with premises
registration, individual animal ID and tracking requirements. In spite of the fact
authority to force this system on us, the agency has pushed forward with plans to have it mandatory
by 2009. As of March 2006, 235,000 premises (10 percent of national total) had been registered and USDA
predicted that 475,000 of our two million premises will be registered by the end of 2006. USDA says much of the
NAIS is now operational and that remaining elements soon will be. Plans are for having all databases operational by
early 2007, and 100 percent of all premises registered (and all nine billion target animals given ID) by January 2009.
USDA has a contingency plan to make this "voluntary" program mandatory "if participation rates are not adequate."
Secretary Johanns says this has been high priority with USDA; "weve made significant strides toward achieving a
comprehensive U.S. system. We recognize that this represents one of the largest systematic changes ever faced by
the livestock industry and we have welcomed suggestions from stakeholders to ensure that we continue to gain
momentum." Yet some of the stakeholders have never had the chance for input and are just now learning about
USDA claimed that "listening sessions" held by APHIS (June through November, 2004) produced 59 out of 60
comments in support of the NAIS. This was a distortion-since these were closed meetings; the people who attended
them were carefully chosen. By contrast, after USDA announced the program publicly in July 2005, a listening
session in Texas drew more than 700 comments, a majority of which were opposed to the program. How did the
NAIS evolve? This ambitious project was spawned by the NIAA (National Institute for Animal Agriculture), a selfappointed group made up of many organizations involved in animal agriculture, including some of the largest
corporations (such as Monsanto, Cargill Meat, National Pork Producers) and many manufacturers of high-tech
animal equipment (Allflex, Digital Angel, Global Vet Link, Micro Beef Technologies, etc.). Some of them have a
vested interest in a national animal ID program because it will ensure more markets and higher prices for their
meat or for ID equipment. The NIAA brings together interested parties from government and industry to discuss
issues in animal agriculture and to create action plans. Neil Hammerschmidt, Coordinator for the NAIS at USDA
(APHIS), helped develop an international program before he took charge of the U.S. ID program. During 1998-2003
(just prior to his present position) he chaired the ID and Information committee of the NIAA and was involved in the
International Committee on Animal Recording and the ISO (International Standards Organization) Working Group for
International Standards for Electronic Identification of Animals. Some of the big players in the livestock/meat
packing industry want a strong foreign market for their beef and a lions share of the domestic market. The
international trade market is part of what is driving the NAIS plan. In 2003 our beef exports brought $7.5 billion.
This market crashed after the first cow with BSE was discovered in the U.S. (a cow that came originally from a
Canadian herd); in 2005 beef exports were down to $1.22 billion because some countries refused to buy our beef.
So packers and their trade associates want to restore and enhance the export market. They want traceability of
animals (since many foreign markets demand it). Some of the largest domestic markets for beef are also
demanding traceability. McDonalds claims traceability for 10 percent of their meat and wants 100 percent; Wal-Mart
demands 100 percent. These demands put pressure on meat processors who then want producers to provide
disease caused by cattle eating feed containing body parts of cattle with BSE. The sale of feed supplements
containing rendered animal parts was banned in the U.S. in 1997. The only way we can get it is by importing
and Regulatory Programs (which include APHIS, which puts him in charge of the NAIS), Bruce Knight, stated at the
hearing for his nomination that he thought the program should be kept voluntary. But this may be a ploy to pacify
the growing opposition to the program. In June 2006 USDA put out a "Guide for Small Scale or Non-commercial
Producers" which implies that the program is completely voluntary and has no penalties or enforcement provisions.
But when pressed for comment in a news conference, USDA Secretary Johanns made it very clear that if voluntary
participation was not 100 percent, he had the authority to make the program mandatory. Indeed, if USDA had no
thought of making it mandatory and didnt really care whether people participated or not, why would they be
spending so much money and pushing so hard to implement it? Shortcomings of the RFID system
The NAIS
dictates that every farm animal (other than those in large commercial groups like pigs and chickens that
stay together from birth to slaughter and have one group number) must have an individual ID number.
These can be ear tags or implanted microchips. The NAIS stipulates use of the ISO (International Standards
Organization) 134.2 kHz (kilohertz) frequency chips-the type used in many European countries. There are several
kinds of microchips, however. In the U.S., horse owners, pet owners and other animal owners have been using an
American chip system (125 kHz) to provide secure ID for registered animals, to help prevent theft, locate missing
animals, etc. For pets and horses, for instance, there are private tracking systems that work together and have
been in place for 15 years. After Hurricane Katrina, 364 horses were gathered up and all but one returned to their
owners because they had microchips. Most horses in Louisiana have microchips already (in conjunction with the
states Coggins testing program to eliminate Equine Infectious Anemia), but these are the 125 kHz chips. A private
database network gives horse and pet owners immediate assistance when an animal is missing or stolen. There are
scanners for these chips in nearly every law enforcement office, animal shelter, etc. across the country. The ISO
scanners, however, cant detect these chips. The USDA is hurrying to put their ISO type scanners into the field to
accommodate the type of chip they want us all to use, but it will take awhile to get enough out there, and unless
the new scanners are dual readers, any 125 kHz chips wont be detected. Yet dual readers are not reliable because
they dont "read" each chip at the same speed.
compatible. Scanners designed to read both frequencies are not efficient nor reliable because only one
frequency can be prioritized within the scanner. This leaves the other in second place and
vulnerable to being missed.
only the 125 kHz chip produced 100 percent read efficiency, while a scanner designed to read both frequencies
missed 50 percent of the chips. In any ID program, it is essential that scanners read microchips quickly and
accurately. Scanners operate at top efficiency (and are most reliable) when built to read one frequency, not several.
One reason the U.S. system has worked so well is because we have just one
frequency and all scanners read all the chips that operate at that frequency . The 125
kHz system is an American system thats been in use for more than 15 years. Many countries (including most of
South America) have never used the ISO system the USDA wants us to use, because the latter is an open system
and easily compromised. It was originally developed in Russia and Europe to identify tractor parts and commodities
for the international European market. A scanner in Germany or France, for instance, could "read" a chip on an
Italian part and know what it was. The 134.2 kHz chip has a 15 digit number, the first three digits being a country
Because the ISO system is open (in the public domain, with published standards any chip
manufacturer can follow) there is no legal way to stop production of unsanctioned
code.
chips. The problem with using this type of chip for disease trace-back, bio-security
or unique ID for ownership proof, breed registry number or theft and fraud
prevention is there is no guarantee of uniqueness of ID codes . There are several
ways the ID codes can be counterfeited in an open standard. Chips can be ordered factory programmed with
desired numbers, and some manufacturers are selling reprogrammable chips indistinguishable from factoryprogrammed chips. Some chips can be reprogrammed as many times as you want, even after theyre in an animal
or an ear tag. An implanted chips number can be read by a small hand-held device that can then be used to put
that number on another chip in a different animal. Duplicate numbers werent a problem in the original setting for
which the ISO system was developed (commodities-to make sure certain types of paper products made by different
companies would fit your printer, for instance), but they are a problem for animal ID. Because ear tags in livestock
are often lost, the ISO group in 2001 decided to allow for retagging animals with a new tag carrying the same chip
number as the lost one, and allowed for blank chips that can be programmed. Then reprogrammable chips were
allowed. In a May, 2001 ISO document describing their criteria for replacing lost animal chips, they stated it would
be disastrous if these blank chips fell into the wrong hands. Instead of trying to preserve the integrity of the system
An open
system wont work for a national database for disease control or for valuable
animals that need unique ID to prevent theft or animal-switching. A look-alike could
pose for a more valuable animal. An animal from another country could appear to be
one from the U.S. or vice versa. USDA is not being realistic in thinking we can use
this system for dependable animal trace-back to farm of origin, or to thwart bioterrorism. A published open standard for something thats supposed to provide unique or secure ID wont work.
they essentially said "you can duplicate and reprogram these tags", but "we are not responsible."
According to Barbara Masin, the U.S. member of the ISO board, "This would be like our government publishing the
standard for dollar bills, telling people exactly what paper to use, what color ink, etc. so anyone could do it!" This is
not a good system upon which to base a national animal ID program! USDA and others who are pushing for the ISO
134.2 kHz chip required by the NAIS tell us this is an international standard and our country must comply. But
of the countries using it are not happy with it and have asked that the standard be repealed. There were so many
complaints last year that the matter was put to a vote, and 50 percent of the voting nations in the ISO group voted
to have the standard repealed or revised. Thus it is not the universally accepted technology that some people claim
it to be. There are suspicions that this system was chosen mainly because of the market advantage it will give
certain players who helped create the NAIS. People who are aware of the problems with the ISO system wonder why
USDA is dictating the use of this particular chip. Barbara Masin, who sits on the ISO board, says it is not suitable,
and "when this was being discussed for livestock, our ISO board approached the USDA and attempted to
communicate with everyone from Anne Venneman (Secretary of Agriculture at that time) on down, and they did not
return our calls. I went to the USDA listening sessions and offered to show them the problem with duplication
possibilities, but they didnt want to see it. The situation is very political. There are certain people involved within
the USDA who have very close ties to certain manufacturers. There is an underlying agenda, unfortunately," says
Masin. The flaws in this system have been well documented as far back as 1995, she
says. "Its unfortunate that when the discussion at USDA was happening for the livestock standard, it wasnt an
open discussion." Listening sessions were "closed" with crowd control supervision. "USDA did not want to see any
information against the system, and did not respond to efforts to show them what was going on in other countries,"
says Masin. USDA continues to push on with their agenda , telling stockmen to use these tags with
this RIFD frequency, but they dont have enough "read range" to be practical. Scanners must be practically at
touching distance. Cattle, sheep and goats must be restrained (in a chute, or held) to get close enough for accurate
scanning. In field tests, a high percentage of tags or implanted chips cant be detected when animals come off a
truck or go through a sale ring. One sale yard reported "read rates" as low as 47 percent for feeder pigs and 66
percent for sheep. Environmental factors (weather, lighting in a sale barn, type of fencing, electromagnetic
interference from motors used in the auction yard) can interfere with the scanners in sale barns; they cant pick up
the low frequency chips. Sale barn owners worry that they cant afford the equipment and also wonder if the
complications of the ID system will lead more stockmen to sell directly to feedlots or packers; it all adds up to more
small markets going out of business. Equity Livestock (an outfit with 13 sale barns in Iowa and Wisconsin) recently
spent $70,000 for scanners, software and extra labor to test electronic ID at one of their yards, but feels this cost
would be hard to justify in smaller operations.
the
infrastructure and labor necessary to place tags on livestock is not as simple as it
sounds. Range cattle are large, ornery, and generally not in the mood to be subdued in a chute and tagged.
Indirect costs associated with this ruling may include the purchasing or construction
of chutes, hiring additional labor, legal requirements to sale barns and
veterinarians, vet charges and farm calls, and even increased insurance
requirements for labor. This doesn't even address the cost to the taxpayers for
hiring personnel to manage an enormous computerized database of information.
The vast bulk of the cost associated with compliance will not fall on those who
benefit the most from implementation. The costs will be born by producers and
associated businesses (such as sale barns and veterinarians), but the benefits will be reaped
by exporters and digital chip manufacturers because, yes, the ear tags and leg
bands favored under the current version of ADT contain NAIS-style RFID chips. Third,
FARFA believes many aspects of livestock production should be exempt . For instance, feeder
cattle (cattle under 18 months of age) and poultry should be excluded to avoid harming
producers and sales barns and to avoid problems like the impossible burden of having to band,
re-band, and re-band birds and report each banding as their legs grow. Banding adult birds and
is no exception. The agency is "encouraging the use of lower-cost technology" such as electronic ear tags, but
obtaining Interstate Certificates of Veterinary Inspection (ICVIs) would likely cost more than the value of the bird.
Dairy cattle should be better defined and those in small operations should be exempted and rules concerning
officially recognized forms of identification, subject to states' abilities to opt out. The proposed rule "downgrades
brands to an unofficial form of identification," notes Ms. McGeary. "Yet producers in brand states know that branding
is an extremely reliable method for identifying animals." And unlike ear tags, brands and tattoos are things an
animal can't lose. Additionally, removing brands and tattoos as official forms of identification could have
ramifications on the legal and practical status of the animal. Also, FARFA maintains that cattle moving directly to
slaughter should be identified with backtags, not ear tags. Backtags reduce stress on the animals, speed up
efficiency, reduce hazards to workers, and cost less. FARFA also suggested that the USDA reduce the record-keeping
The
proposed justification for the extra paperwork does not hold up under examination
in "real world" situations. Vets and livestock sale barns would be required to keep records on cattle for five
years, even though most of the cattle being documented will have already been consumed long before. This
would create mountains of useless paperwork. Costs to producers for veterinary
services are likely to rise as well, since vets will need to pass the additional costs of regulatory
requirements to avoid imposing undue burdens on producers, veterinarians, state officials, and sale barns.
paperwork on to the producers. And vets who specialize in large-animal care are already in short supply. (Trust me
exceptions). Personally, I find this extraordinary; and it demonstrates that those making the ruling are unfamiliar
with the hands-on realities of livestock. The proposed ruling gives preference to electronic ear tags; but ear tags
can be lost on a regular basis (trust me on this). That's why additional identification such as brands and tattoos
should be recognized and maintained. FARFA identified many other problems. For instance, the proposed rule
defines livestock as "all farm-raised animals." Clearly this is vague and open to problems of interpretation. What
about livestock (such as chickens or goats) raised in urban environments? What about farm-raised dogs bred for
sale? Don't laugh; these are serious issues that require specific definitions. Finally, FARFA recommended that the
proposed rule not be adopted at all until performance standards and evaluations have been determined. " In
effect," notes FARFA, "the agency is asking producers to provide it with a 'blank
check,' signing on to a program when the consequences are unknown . That blank check
could be expensive. The agency has not accurately evaluated all of the direct and indirect costs of the
proposed rule to producers and sale barns, such as the costs in time and potential injuries to both people and
omitted] Put on the brakes Bottom line, FARFA is urging the USDA to identify the specific diseases of concern and
analyze how to best address those diseases (including prevention measures) rather than continuing to push a one-
the agency claims, then the packing companies that export meat should pay the costs and offer economic
Exports
Many in the
industry however, believe we need a more comprehensive traceability program to help
ensure future competitiveness in international markets . Shere says unnamed
independent beef supply chains have approached USDA with proposals for pilot
projects to demonstrate their birth-to-slaughter traceability systems, with the goal
of gaining access to the Chinese market for their branded beef .
program, which was designed to help minimize and contain potential disease outbreaks.
example, U.S. agricultural policy included various mechanisms to manage the farm supply of commodities, in part
through limits on production and through price floors. These policies dampened volatility in both commodity
In the last quarter of the 20th century, public policy moved away
from supply management. Commodity firms and food processors pushed for these
changes, precisely because greater production would mean lower prices for these
commodities. Low prices, especially for corn and soybeans, in turn attracted livestock and dairy producers to
supplies and prices.
begin using these commodities as feed. Today, meat and dairy producers are the largest end-users of corn and
soybeans. Decreasing commodity prices also led to the proliferation of novel products derived from them, such as
high fructose syrup from corn, and hydrogenated vegetable oil from soybeans. These in turn served as inexpensive
ingredients in a plethora of processed foods, usually relatively dense in calories but low in nutritive value.
Commodity overproduction and depressed prices for commodities in the U.S. led the
government to seek new export markets for U.S. grains (and, more recently, U.S. meat).
However, the sale overseas of U.S. commodities at prices less than the cost of
domestic productioni.e., dumpinghas been tied to the loss of economic value
from agriculture in developing countries, resulting in hunger and depressed
production in rural communities abroad.
2014. The problem, setting aside issues around the morality of eating animals, is that
the planet
on potential links between high levels of meat consumption, cancer and heart disease. And it depends on exactly
what you eat (see "Let them eat steak: How to eat meat the healthy way"). A more viable option might be to pull
back on the agricultural subsidies that underpin meat production.
best hope for change lies in consumers becoming aware of the true costs of industrial meat production. When you
look at environmental problems in the U.S., says Professor Eshel, nearly all of them have their source in food
production and in particular meat production. And factory farming is optimal only as long as degrading waterways
is free.
Real
prices of beef, pork and poultry have held steady, perhaps even decreased , for 40
years or more (in part because of grain subsidies), though were beginning to see them
increase now. But many experts, including Tyler Cowen, a professor of economics at
George Mason University, say they dont believe meat prices will rise high enough
to affect demand in the United States. I just dont think we can count on market
prices to reduce our meat consumption, he said. There may be a temporary
place were some of the grain we use to grow meat directed instead to feed our fellow human beings?
spike in food prices, but it will almost certainly be reversed and then some. But if
all the burden is put on eaters, thats not a tragic state of affairs .
Solvency
USDA's War on a Family Farm, Vermont Farm Leader, Linda Faillace, on Why the
USDA Will Not Allow US Beef Producer, Creekstone Farms, to Test Cows for Mad Cow
Disease, https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/vermont-farm-leader-lindafaillace-why-usda-will-not-allow-us-beef-producer-creekstone-farms ,September 26,
2008)
How much longer should we defer to a governmental agency that has consistently
failed to perform its duties? The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is charged
with protecting the American food supply, yet not a week goes by without another
food-related health scare seizing headlines across the nation: listeria in pasteurized milk;
spinach contaminated with E. coli; and potentially unsafe meat from "downer" cattle (animals which are sick or
injured and unable to stand). This past spring tomatoes and peppers were accused of causing 1,442 illnesses and
These outbreaks
are the results of decades of USDA policy decisions which favor corporations and
two deaths, yet the USDA is still unable to confirm the source of the salmonella infections.
industrial agriculture over small family farms and local production. Intensive
animal and crop operations can lead to sick animals and tainted vegetables entering the food chain, and regulations
which would prevent these incidents are often overlooked when corporate interests are at stake. A prime example is
the USDA's (mis) handling of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or "mad cow" disease. Europe has dealt with
BSE for more than twenty-one years and has an extensive surveillance program in place: just last year
approximately 9.7 million cattle were tested. While Europe tested millions, the USDA tested a few thousand and
arrogantly proclaimed the United States was free of BSE, until the first case was discovered in 2003. Export markets
dried up overnight. Japan and Korea, two of the largest importers of American beef, demanded the USDA either test
for BSE or halt beef sales. The United States refused and a trade war quickly ensued. To date, tens of thousands of
Koreans have taken to the streets to protest their government's acceptance of untested American beef.
Japanese and Korean top officials have been either severely criticized or
forced to resign for allowing imports of US beef into their countries. Creekstone Farms
Subsequently,
raises all natural, premium beef and had a very lucrative overseas market until the first case of BSE. Anxious to reestablish trade, Creekstone contacted the USDA to purchase BSE testing kits, but the USDA denied them access to
the kits and threatened fines and even imprisonment if Creekstone attempted to test their cattle. Creekstone Farms
filed a federal suit against the USDA, demanding the right to test. In 2007, a federal district court ruled in their
favor. The USDA quickly appealed-and won. In a decision last week, D.C. Court of Appeals Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson overturned the district court's ruling and made repeated references to the fact that Congress gave the
USDA broad powers. "We owe USDA a considerable degree of deference in its interpretation of the term, bearing, as
it does, on USDA's charge to 'administer our federal meat and poultry inspection laws,'" she stated. But the USDA
does not deserve this deference. When the Humane Society released undercover footage of animal abuse and
downer cattle going into the human food supply while USDA officials were on site, Americans were outraged and
called for action. The USDA worked with the California-based company to organize the largest meat recall in history143 million pounds. What the American public was not told was that the recall was for all the meat the company
had produced over the previous two years, and the vast majority of it had already been consumed.
The USDA
The best
suggestion is for the USDA to support smaller slaughterhouses instead of forcing
them out of business with burdensome regulations necessary for the industrial meat
processors. Our family farm, which produced high quality breeding stock and gourmet cheese, experienced the
already on site, so more inspections would not have made a difference, nor would more regulations.
USDA's ineptness and corruption first hand when they targeted our healthy flock of sheep for BSE, a disease which
does not exist in sheep. Our decade-long battle with the USDA and a subsequent lawsuit has revealed a laundry list
of documented misdeeds against us including: destruction of evidence, suppression of test results, extensive
undercover surveillance, and misleading and false statements given to the general public and our elected officials.
The most egregious was an armed invasion of our family farm and the subsequent seizure and destruction of our
animals and livelihood. In an attempt to find a nonexistent disease, the USDA used every possible BSE testing
method on our sheep, sometimes running five or six tests per animal, but to no avail. Our sheep were healthy. None
of our sheep had BSE or any other disease. However, when a brief "enhanced" BSE surveillance program uncovered
three cases of BSE in American cattle, the USDA quickly announced it would reduce testing for BSE by 90 percent,
not increase-reduce. How is this protecting the American public? The USDA does not want to test American cattle
for BSE and they are preventing any private company from doing so. The question is Why? Once again it comes
down to the corporate-controlled USDA doing the bidding of its corporate sponsors, in this case the beef packers,
slaughterhouses, and feed lots-rather than what is best for the American public. The Creekstone v USDA lawsuit will
head back to federal district court for one more ruling, and along with Chief Judge Sentelle who gave the dissenting
opinion on the appeals court decision, I will be watching to see if the district court's review of USDA's denial to allow
---Off-Case---
Add-ons
Cali Ag
Meat production devastates California ag
McWilliams 14 (James McWilliams-professor of history at Texas State University,
Meat Makes the Planet Thirsty, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/opinion/meatmakes-the-planet-thirsty.html?_r=0 ,MARCH 7, 2014)
AUSTIN, Tex. CALIFORNIA is experiencing one of its worst droughts on record. Just two
and a half years ago, Folsom Lake, a major reservoir outside Sacramento, was at 83 percent capacity. Today its
down to 36 percent. In January, there was no measurable rain in downtown Los Angeles. Gov. Jerry Brown has
The
situation, despite last weeks deluge in Southern California, is dire . With California producing
nearly half of the fruit and vegetables grown in the United States, attention has
naturally focused on the water required to grow popular foods such as walnuts, broccoli,
declared a state of emergency. President Obama has pledged $183 million in emergency funding.
lettuce, tomatoes, strawberries, almonds and grapes. These crops are the ones that a recent report in the magazine
Mother Jones highlighted as being unexpectedly water intensive. Who knew, for example, that it took 5.4 gallons to
produce a head of broccoli, or 3.3 gallons to grow a single tomato? This information about the water footprint of
food products that is, the amount of water required to produce them is important to understand, especially for
contrast, the water footprint for sugar crops like sugar beets is about 52,000 gallons per ton; for vegetables its
about 4,200 gallons per ton; and fruit, about 38,800 gallons per ton. By comparison, pork consumes 121,000
gallons of blue water per ton of meat produced; beef, about 145,000 gallons per ton; and butter, some 122,800
gallons per ton. Theres a reason other than the drought that Folsom Lake has dropped as precipitously as it has.
Dont look at kale as the culprit. (Although some nuts, namely almonds, consume considerable blue water, even
more than beef.) That said, a single plant is leading Californias water consumption .
Unfortunately, its a plant thats not generally cultivated for humans: alfalfa. Grown on over a million acres in
alfalfa sucks up more water than any other crop in the state. And it has one
primary destination: cattle. Increasingly popular grass-fed beef operations typically
rely on alfalfa as a supplement to pasture grass. Alfalfa hay is also an integral feed
source for factory-farmed cows, especially those involved in dairy production. If Californians were
California,
eating all the beef they produced, one might write off alfalfas water footprint as the cost of nurturing local food
systems. But thats not whats happening. Californians are sending their alfalfa, and thus their water, to Asia. The
Its more profitable to ship alfalfa hay from California to China than
from the Imperial Valley to the Central Valley. Alfalfa growers are now exporting
some 100 billion gallons of water a year from this drought-ridden region to the other
side of the world in the form of alfalfa. All as more Asians are embracing the American-style, meatreason is simple.
hungry diet. Further intensifying this ecological injustice are incidents such as the Rancho Feeding Corporations
recent recall of 8.7 million pounds of beef because the meat lacked a full federal inspection. That equals 631.6
million gallons of water wasted by an industry with a far more complex and resource-intensive supply chain than
the systems that move strawberries from farm to fork. This comparison isnt to suggest that produce isnt
eliminating the consumption of animal products. Changing ones diet to replace 50 percent of
animal products with edible plants like legumes, nuts and tubers results in a 30 percent reduction in an individuals
food-related water footprint. Going vegetarian, a better option in many respects, reduces that water footprint by
almost 60 percent.
We continue to
run California as if the longest drought we are ever going to encounter is about
seven years. Were living in a dream world. So whats the big deal? As they say,
this time its different. The ongoing California drought provides a disturbing glimpse
of future water shortages and their impact on agricultural production and food
security. Californias agricultural heartland is the Central Valley, a vast
professor of environmental studies at Cal State East Bay, told the San Jose Mercury News,
area comprising 22,500 square miles (58,000 square kilometers) of the worlds most productive agricultural land.
State-wide farm production was $44.7 billion in 2012, making California the largest agriculture producer in the US.
The Central Valley represents about 72% of this production. California is also the
countrys largest agriculture exporter, selling 39% of annual production overseas.
The USDA estimates that the value of US agricultural exports in 2011 was $136
billion, meaning California alone accounts for about 12% of all US farm exports. As a
result of the drought, Central Valley farms have left fallow 500,000 acres (202,000 hectares), roughly 8% of the
regions total. Agriculture production is shifting from low margin fruit and produce such as cantaloupe to more
profitable commodities like tree nuts and tomatoes. The droughts impact on overall agriculture production could
amount to losses of $1.6 billion for farms and approach $5 billion for California agribusiness in general. Were from
the government, and were here to help if youre a fish The political response has been predictable and unhelpful.
California Governor Jerry Brown declared a drought emergency in January to open taps of federal relief dollars. For
the first time in its 54-year history, the State Water Project will not provide any water to the 750,000 acres (300,000
hectares) of farmland it services. The nations largest state-built water and power development and conveyance
system, according to its website, will not convey resources contracted by agriculture. Neither will the federal
governments Central Valley Project deliver agriculture water this year. Though the project was, in its own words,
originally conceivedto protect the Central Valley from crippling water shortages, it will not prevent water
shortages from crippling farmswith the possible loss of over 100,000 local jobs. Water destined to benefit
endangered fish species, such as the Delta Smelt (a short-lived, 6-cm long, reproduction-challenged member of the
Osmeridae family), will remain at 100% allocation. Their population is so low that the State of California says it is
exceptionally difficult to determine the actual number of Delta smelt.
contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has appreciated 9.5% since midNovember. The possibility of global food price inflation cannot easily be dismissed.
We can also expect to see greater volumes of food being imported to the US this year, in response to higher prices.
To the extent global supplies and production will respond to American market price signals, food diverted for US
Institute Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization? Scientific American, May)
The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to
cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening
environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change.
Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well.
But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.
expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about
responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to
dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide
with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic
resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global
signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental
field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort
to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing
a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin
when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in
or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008,
the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow
when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as
education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their
monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that
food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating
for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading
supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands
of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).
meat consumption was gradually reduced while diet recommendations in terms of energy supply, proteins and fat
were followed.
reducing the animal product contribution in the diet, global green water (rainwater) consumption decreases up to
21 % while for blue water (irrigation water) the reductions would be up to 14 %. In other words ,
by shifting to
vegetarian diet we could secure adequate food supply for an additional 1.8 billion
people without increasing the use of water resources . The potential savings are, however,
distributed unevenly, and even more important, their potential alleviation on water scarcity varies widely from
Central and Eastern Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, diet change reduces mainly green water use. In Finland, for
example, turning into a meat free diet would decrease the daily green water use of a Finn over 530 litres but at the
South and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, diet change does not result in savings in water use, as in these
regions the diet is already largely based on a minimal amount of products.
water crises dwindling freshwater supplies, inequitable access to water and the corporate control
pose the greatest threat of our time to the planet and to our survival. Together with
impending climate change from fossil fuel emissions, the water crises impose some life-or-death
decisions on us all. Unless we collectively change our behavior, we are heading toward a
world of deepening conflict and potential wars over the dwindling supplies of freshwater between nations,
The three
of water
between rich and poor, between the public and the private interest, between rural and urban populations, and
between the competing needs of the natural world and industrialized humans. Water Is Becoming a Growing Source
of Conflict Between Countries Around the world, more that 215 major rivers and 300 groundwater basins and
aquifers are shared by two or more countries, creating tensions over ownership and use of the precious waters they
contain. Growing
warns
of coming water wars. In a public statement on the eve of a 2006 summit on climate change, Reid
predicted that violence and political conflict would become more likely as watersheds turn to deserts, glaciers melt
water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur. We
potential
conflict. These include Israel, Jordan and Palestine, who all rely on the Jordan River, which is controlled
by Israel; Turkey and Syria, where Turkish plans to build dams on the Euphrates River brought the country to
should see this as a warning sign. The Independent gave several other examples of regions of
the brink of war with Syria in 1998, and where Syria now accuses Turkey of deliberately meddling with its water
China and India, where the Brahmaputra River has caused tension between the two countries in the
Angola, Botswana and
Namibia, where disputes over the Okavango water basin that have flared in the past are now threatening to reignite as Namibia is proposing to build a threehundred- kilometer pipeline that will drain the delta; Ethiopia and
Egypt, where population growth is threatening conflict along the Nile; and Bangladesh and India, where
supply;
past, and where Chinas proposal to divert the river is re-igniting the divisions;
flooding in the Ganges caused by melting glaciers in the Himalayas is wreaking havoc in Bangladesh, leading to a
rise in illegal, and unpopular, migration to India.
Institute Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization? Scientific American, May)
The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to
cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening
environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change.
Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well.
But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.
expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about
responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to
dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide
with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic
resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global
signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental
field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort
to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing
a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin
when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in
or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008,
the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow
today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.
States fail
when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as
education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their
monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that
food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating
for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading
supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands
of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).
Warming
Beef production creates huge GHG emissions
McGrath 14 (Matt McGrath-Environment correspondent for BBC ,Beef
environment cost 10 times that of other livestock,
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28409704 , 21 July 2014)
A new study suggests that the production of beef is around 10 times more
it has long been known that beef has a greater environmental impact than other meats, the authors of this paper
say theirs is is the first to quantify the scale in a comparative way. Beef footprint The researchers developed a
uniform methodology that they were able to apply to all five livestock categories and to four measures of
environmental performance. "We have a sharp view of the comparative impact that beef, pork, poultry, dairy and
eggs have in terms of land and water use, reactive nitrogen discharge, and greenhouse gas emissions," lead author
Prof Gidon Eshel, from Bard College in New York, told BBC News. "The uniformity and expansive scope is novel,
unique, and important," he said. The scientists used data from from 2000-2010 from the US department of
agriculture to calculate the amount of resources required for all the feed consumed by edible livestock. They then
worked out the amount of hay, silage and concentrates such as soybeans required by the different species to put on
They also include greenhouse gas emissions not just from the
production of feed for animals but from their digestion and manure. As ruminants,
cattle can survive on a wide variety of plants but they have a very low energy
conversion efficiency from what they eat. As a result, beef comes out clearly as the
food animal with the biggest environmental impact. [image omitted] As well as the effects on
land and water, cattle release five times more greenhouse gas and consume six times
more nitrogen than eggs or poultry. Cutting down on beef can have a big
a kilo of weight.
environmental impact they say. But the same is not true for all livestock. "One can reasonably
be an environmentally mindful eater, designing one's diet with its environmental impact in mind, while not resorting
to exclusive reliance on plant food sources," said Prof Eshel. "In fact, eliminating beef, and replacing it with
relatively efficiency animal-based alternatives such as eggs, can achieve an environmental improvement
comparable to switching to plant food source." Other researchers say the conclusions of the new study are
applicable in Europe, even though the work is based on US data. " The
extinction
Mazo 10 PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA
Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental
Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what
to do about it, pg. 122
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.54.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the bestcase scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business
as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of
likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000
levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be
expected to reach 1.2C (O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the
century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects
of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are
likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the
developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate
change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and
advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of
widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And
although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many
informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end
of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is
certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid
change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation
to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political
changes.
Topicality
T
ADT is surveillance
USDA 2015 (February 15, SA Monitoring and Surveillance
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/banner/help?1dmy&urile=wcm%3Apath
%3A/APHIS_Content_Library/SA_Our_Focus/SA_Animal_Health/SA_Monitoring_And_S
urveillance)
These programs conduct or contribute to animal health surveillance in the United
States.
National Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS) - NAHSS integrates animal health monitoring and surveillance
activities conducted by many federal and state government agencies into a comprehensive and coordinated
system.
US Status for reportable diseases as reported to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
National Animal Health Reporting System (NAHRS) - Information on the presence of reportable animal diseases in
the United States.
National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) - National studies on animal health and health management
practices of U.S. livestock and poultry.
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) - This network of state animal health laboratories provides,
among other things, laboratory data to meet epidemiological and disease reporting needs.
National Poultry Improvement Program (NPIP) - National poultry health monitoring and surveillance.
National Aquaculture Program (NAP) - National aquaculture health monitoring and surveillance.
National Surveillance Unit - organization within APHIS tasked with coordinating activities related to animal health
surveillance.