Section 1 Rule 138, ROC

RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. Citizens of the United States of
America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of
the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens,
are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or
district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began
before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be
admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for admission other than those referred to in
the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly
studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate
from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by
the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in
a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and
legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme
Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If
not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate
required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their
admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their
professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme
Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the
examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be
subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal
Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and

Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. Persons taking the examination shall not
bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy
thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally
without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read
his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering
the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination
shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually
in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar
examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor
and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law
(morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be
appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act
as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be
published in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and
during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any
assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the
examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent
disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per
cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. Not later than February 15th after the
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be
examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three
times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they
have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a
recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath
that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary
students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An applicant who has passed the required examination, or
has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the
courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of
such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice,
which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses
only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent
with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and
to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any
man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person
may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require
any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved
in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without
the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the
docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and
attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be
entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the
discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding

section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court.
Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts
involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such,
as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the
practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge
to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and
that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for
sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the
court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the
court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less
than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One
hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses;
(4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. Any official or other person appointed
or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly
authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici
curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in
a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his
just fees and disbursements.
BAR MATTER 702 May 12, 1994
BAR MATTER NO. 702 May 12, 1994
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a Resolution of the Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994.
Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as
Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner)

Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame University who was admitted to the
Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the instant petition praying that this Court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who possess the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within their respective jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of the
Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to
appoint the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further argues that, being a special member of the
Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the exercise of his
profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed as notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner likewise
claims that Shari'a lawyers cannot be appointed as notaries public in their places of residence and in cities and other
pilot centers where Shari'a courts are established because the RTC Executive Judges in Cotabato and Maguindanao
require them to secure certifications from the IBP Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the place where
they are applying. Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to be appointed as notaries public because of the policy of
the IBP chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP members practically in all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers of notaries public are governed by the provisions of the
Notarial Law embodied in Sections 231 to Section 241, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 232 of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Executive Order No. 41, May 11, 1945 provides:
Section 232. Appointment of notaries public. Judges of Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) in the respective may appoint as many notaries public as the public
good requires, and there shall be at least one for every municipality in each province.
Notaries public in the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of the judges of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila to be chosen by the judges of the
branches of said court" (Words in parenthesis supplied)
Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system of the Philippines. Section 2
of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the
integrated judicial system. Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding that, when said B.P.
Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of
including them "in the funding appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as those of Regional Trial Courts
does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the Regional Trial Court. The latter is a court of general
jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court,
created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original
only over cases specifically enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular
court exercising general jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply that they are on equal footing or are identical with
regular courts, for the word "court" may be applied to tribunals which are not actually judicial in character, but are
quasi-judicial agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology, Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are not elevated to this Court by appeal under Rule 41, or by petition
for review under Rule 45, of the Rules of Court. Their decisions are final "whether on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit
Court or not" 2 and hence, may reach this Court only by way of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, similar to those of the National Labor Relations Commission, or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 3

Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court are different from those required
of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No person shall be appointed Regional trial Court Judge
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and,
for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a Special Bar Examination for Shari'a Courts was authorized by the
Supreme Court in its En Banc resolution dated September 20, 1983. Those who pass said examination are qualified for
appointment for Shari'a court judges and for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to practice law in
the Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation to Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152, P.D.
No. 1083 provides, thus:
Art. 152. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years of age, and
has passed an examination in the Sharia' and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be given by
the Supreme Court for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to practice
law in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial
Court, in their respective provinces to appoint notaries public cannot be expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a
District Court with the same statutory authority. The authority to appoint notaries public contemplated under Section
232 of the Notarial Law and the corresponding supervising authority over them authorized under Section 248 thereof
require the qualifications and experience of an RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination does not
automatically become a regular member of the Philippine Bar, he lacks the necessary qualification to be appointed a
notary public. Section 233 of the Notarial Law provides for the qualifications for appointment as notary public, thus:
Section 233. Qualifications for Appointment. To be eligible for appointment as notary
public, a person must be a citizen of the Philippines (or of the United States) and over
twenty-one years of age. He must, furthermore, be a person who has been admitted to the
practice of law or who has completed and passed in the studies of law in a reputable
university or school of law, or has passed the examination for the office of the peace or clerk
or deputy clerk of court, or be a person who had qualified for the office of notary public
under the Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the provinces, where there are two or more
lawyers appointed as notaries public, no person other than a lawyer or a person who had
qualified to hold the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty shall hold said
office.
In municipalities or municipal districts where no person resides having the qualifications
herein before specified or having them, refuses to hold such office, judges of first instance
may appoint other persons temporarily to exercise the office of notary public who have the
requisite qualifications or fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow Shari'a
Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts," this Court categorically stated that a person who has passed
the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even
if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to practice only in the Shari'a courts.

Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in accordance with the Rules of Court are entitled to
practice law before the regular courts. Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681, that:
In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the candidate must pass an
examination for admission covering the following subjects: Political and International Law;
Labor and Social Legislation; Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law;
Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec. 11, Rule 138) Further, in
order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the bar examination, he must have
obtained a general average of 75% in all the aforementioned subjects without failing below
50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand, the subjects covered by the
special bar examination for Shari'a courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary
laws (Adat); (2) Persons, Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions, Wills/Adjudication
and Settlement of Property; (4) Procedure in Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated
September 20, 1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations are different. The
Philippine Bar Examination covers the entire range of the Philippine Laws and
jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar Examination covers Muslim personal laws and
jurisprudence only. Hence, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination, who is
not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular courts because he has not
passed the requisite examinations for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal Trial Courts as agent or
friend of a litigant, if appointed by the latter for the purpose but not before the Regional
Trial Courts as only duly authorized members of the Bar may conduct litigations in the
latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the
Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is not qualified to
practice to qualified to practice law before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not possessed of the
basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in
relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers as notaries public in
their respective jurisdiction is DENIED.
Very Truly Yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court

Footnotes
1 See Circular 1-91, February 27, 1991.
2 Art 145, P.D. 1083.
3 See Resolution of November 26, 1990, G.R. No. 95895, Heirs of Datu Mangindra Sinsuat,
represented by Lourdes Sinsuat v. Datu Haakon Sinsuat and Hon. Corocoy D. Moson,
Shari'a District Judge; cf., Tampar v. Usman, 200 SCRA 652 (1991); Rulona-Al Awadhi v.
Astih, 165 SCRA 771 (1988).
ALAWI v ALAUYA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.
of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on
the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract
an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith.
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales
agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our

contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract .
. . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul
the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps.
Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President,
Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary
deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of
the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting
of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3,
1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon
M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to
stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's)
mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage thatnotices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed
by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also
averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his
acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent
of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for
the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by
some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn
to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-atlaw." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction,
but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got
his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several
months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.

13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996
and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.

15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest." 17More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."

18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed however sincerely to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious,
in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or
undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect
for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by

prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid
or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
adequately establishing the accusation.

22

the record contains no evidence

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting
or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, The Finance Management and Budget Office and-the Financial
Division of the Supreme Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or
communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3)
Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or his
Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.

7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id at p. 60.
9 id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3)
removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate
body or agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v.
Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v.
Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
19 Art. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to
Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a
lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court. CIRCULAR NO. 19
December 19, 1986
SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS
SUBJECT: ADOPTION OF RULE 138A OF THE REVERSED RULES OF COURT TO PERMIT LIMITED LAW
STUDENT PRACTICE
Quoted hereunder, for the information and guidance of all concerned, is the text of new Rule of Court numbered Rule
138A adopted by the Supreme Court's Resolution En Banc of December 18, 1986, effective immediately, as follows:

Bar matter No. 194. Re: Petition to amend the Revised Rules of Court to include a Law Student
Practice Rule. The Court Resolved to ADOPT the following Rule permitting limited law student
practice effective immediately, as follows:
RULE 138A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
SECTION 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to present any indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Sec. 3. Privileged communications. The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client
shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. The law student shall comply with the standards of professional
conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may
be a ground for disciplinary action.
Let copies hereof be circulated among all Courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and major voluntary bar
associations, and the Deans of the law schools.
December 19, 1986.
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL
(BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule
(Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme
Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v.
Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an
intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo
questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly
accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona
to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the
Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public
Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.

Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied
by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the
matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to
the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under
Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer
during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect
itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license,
as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left
to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under
the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools.
The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those
who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our
law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar
are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the
Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the
protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts
and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law
student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule
138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his
appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of court
Footnotes
1 Consulta, p. 2.
2 Comment, p. 9.
3 Comment, p. 5.
4 Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth Edition, 1989), pp. 39-40.
5 134 SCRA 252 (1985).