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COMMANDAN~
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTION
SECRETARY
MILITARY REVIEW
VOLUME XXXVI
JUNE 1956
NUMBER 3
CONTENTS
Western Defense Planning............ ..... ......... ....................... .
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Retired
11
19
27
35
43
48
55
65
75
75
.............. .
Lieutenant Colonel Allan W. Mitchell, Artillery and
Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Knowles, Artillery
86
97
102
108
EDITOR IN CHIEF
MANAGING EDITOR
SPANISH-AMERICAN EDITION
BRAZILIAN EDITION
Administrative Officer
Production Officer
MILITARY REVIEW
JUNE 19QG
we
MILITaRY REVIEW
JUNE 1956
MILITARY REVIEW
NATO Bloc
Soviet Bloc
Millions
Millions
Fo/'ward
France
Centcr
Belgium
Holland
Denmark
West Germany
puse
United Kingdom
Italy
Portugal
42
9
11
4
49
115
50
53
9
USSR (Europe)
Poland
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
170
25
13
17
Hungary
225
10
Bulgaria
Romania
17
227
Left Wing Norway
Right Wing Greece
Turkey
Back
United States
Canada
Friendly
Finland
Sweden
Switzerland
Rpain
3
8
23
261
161
15
437
USSR (Asia)
259
42
301
4
7
5
29
482
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SKYCAV Operations
WIth atomic warfare a reality, we must possess a tool that will find
till' enemy, distinguish battlefield vacuums quickly, and be capable of
bi(,eking mobile enemy groups prior to commitment of main battle forces
MILITARY REVIEW
JUNE 1956
1'"'",::
13
14
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131
041
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. JUNE 1956
17
18
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TIl(' outcome of the Dien Bien Phu operation indicates that if we are
to attain the utmost from our airborne capability, we must give acfded'
emphasis and attention to the important raid type airborne operation
20
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JUNE 1956
21
NORTHERN INDOCHINA
MAIN OVERLAND SUPPLY ROUTES
TO OlEN BIEN PHU
JANUARY 1954
CJ
5.
100
MILES
22
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xx
t8J316(-)
12 MARCH 1954
LEGEND
D
=
APPROXIMATE LOCATION
Of VlnMINH UNITS
ROAp
-AIRFIELD
8B8~176
o
I
MILES
JUNE 1966
23
16
APRI~
1954
AP~~OV~~::~HU~~~;~ON
ROAI)
_AJRFlEtt)
o
, .... ~1
...... 1
POSITIONS
fl;P
;~~~:~::ENCH uNIQN
ISABElLE
1
~ 304
'===..=,"',,=S==:=~ 57125.1
1
'f
fiGURE 3
24
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JUNE 1956
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26
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JUNE 1956
The MILITARY REVIEW has the mission of disseminating modern military thought
and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedures of the division
and higher echelons and to provide a forum for articles which stimulate military
thinking. Authors, civilian and military alike, are encouraged to submit materials
which will assist in the fulfillment of this mission.
Civilian Writers
, Reimbursement for published articles submitted to the MILITARY REVIEW by civilian'
authors (to include retired military personnel, and reserve personnel not on active
duty) is on an individual basis.
HEEL OF ACHILLES
F
ROM a world which vehemently pro
tests its rejection of conflict as a means
of settling international disputes, the grim
specter of war refuses to be banished.
The sincerity of the Western Powers'
desire to avoid armed strife is scarcely
to he questioned. Committed to a policy
in which military action; if embarked
upon at all, would be purely retaliatory,
the very fact that they have declared for
restraint has inevitably had the effect of
surrendering the initiative to opponents
whose abiding creed is best summed up in
the words of Stalin:
The memy virile clans and peoples who "ave never been browbeaten or
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JUNE 1956
HEEL OF ACHILLES
eom~issars
29
,30
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HEEL OF ACHILLES
31
, ""'!!'!!I
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HEEL OF ACHILLES
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34
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36
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JUNE '1966
Factors to Consider
The decision to fire a preparation" is
the re,ponsibility of the force commander.
37
Targets
In conducting any operation against
hostile forces targets are always present
-the problem is to find them. In any
future conflict an attacking force must
accelerate its intelligence effort and every
possible device and agency must be zeal
ously used in target acquisition. Firing
data can and must be computed as fast
as targets are acquired. If only a few
located targets exist, a preparation may
not necessarily be in order. However, when
a large number of targets are definitely
located, a preparation is indicated when
only the factor of targets is considered.
Any condition between few known targets
and many known targets would tend to
decrease the value of the target factor in
arriving at a decision.
An interesting technique employed by
the Soviets in World War II, when target
information was scanty, was their use
of a preparation feint. It was a false
preparation using only enough artillery
to make it realistic with the infantry
launching an attack with limited forces.
The object was to make the Germans open
up with their defensive fires and to move
local reserves. A considerable number of
observers were used in order to cover the
entire front. As soon as sufficient targets
were located and the information con
verted to firing data, a real preparation
was fired and the attacking force advanced
rapidly to prevent the Germans from relo
cating their forces.
Promiscuous firing on suspected targets
may look very effectiVe on the staff offi
cer's charts and may sound emphatic, but
they seldom achieve the desired results. It
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Means Available
All fire support means available to the
force must be considered as well as am
munition supply problems. Moreover, an
estimate must be made of the firepower
needed for the three phases of an attack:
the preparation, the attack and seizure of
the objective, and the consolidation of that
objective.
Unless the force is engaged in an un
usual type of operation it should have
the wherewithal to conduct a successful
attack. Therefore, this factor by itself
has very little significance in determining
whether to shoot or not to shoot. However,
it is vital in determining the duration of
any contemplated preparation. This point
will be covered later.
The advent of missiles provides the op
portunity to the ground commander to ex
tend his preparation far deeper into en
emy territory. With his own organic
means he can direct a more penetrating
interdiction program and attack targets
such as reserves, communication centers,
control facilities, and logistical installa
tions located in areas heretofore acces
sible only by air.
Effect Sought
JUNE 1956
39
40,
MILITARY REVIEW
Duration
The duration of a preparation may be
determined betore an estimate is made to
solve the shoot or not to shoot problem.
For instance, a commander may well start
his analysis by answering this question:
"If we fire a preparation, how long should
it be?" Another approach is to consider
the duration question along with the basic
question, to shoot or not to shoot. A third
approach is to determine the duration of
the preparation after arriving at a deci
sion to fire one. In all three cases the
same factors-targets, means available,
effect sought, and surprise must be con
sidered.
In simplified terms the length of a
preparation is determined by the number
of targets and the policy of attack. Tak
ing the counterbattery problem for illus
trative purposes, let us assume that 24
hostile batteries have been located. It
takes two medium or heavy artillery bat
talions (preferably heavy) firing for 5
minutes to neutralize one hostile artillery
battery. Thus if we have 10 battalions
available to neutralize 24 hostile batteries
it would take 24 minutes to complete the
job.
2 battalions x 24 batteries=48 missions
48 missions x 5 minutes each=240 min
utes
240 minutes710 battalions=24 minutes
Allowances must be made, of course, for
otller type missions and other means of
delivery. If atomic weapons are used, the
duration of the preparation will be re
duced. An estimated duration may be ob
tained by determining the time it would
take to neutralize those targets not af
fected by atomics.
Once a decision has been made to fire
a preparation, the force commander should
announce how the fire support means avail
able will be employed prior to the prep
JUNE 1966'
41
Atomics
Atomics have been considered in general
terms throughout this article, However,
since the magnitude of atomic implica
tions on future warfare is so terrific, the
following thoughts have been isolated for
emphasis and special consideration.
Targets.-Because of the comparative
cost and criticality of atomics, we must
select targets worthy of the expenditures.
Small targets should be attacked with
other means.
Means available,-The number of atomic
weapons available and their respective
yields should be considered in the same
light as nonatomic projectiles.
Effect sought,-Due to the magnitude of
an atomic explosion, the effect sought can
be achieved so rapidly that the enemy will
have no time to change his tactical dispo
sitions. Furthermore, the goal for the
preparation can be destruction rather than
neutralization as is in the case of non
atomic projectiles.
Surplise.-This factor is very signifi
cant since surprise is most desirable in
order to maximize the effects of atomics.
If we achieve surprise and thus catch the
enemy unawares with an atomic prepara
tion, most individuals within the lethal
effects radii will become casualities. With
other type projectiles the first exploding
shell or bomb alerts the enemy and gives
many an opportunity to seek protection
from the remainder of the preparation.
In general, we can assume that the
factors to be considered and the planning
sequence are essentially the same when
considering a preparation employing
atomic warheads. The duration of a prep
aration will probably be much shorter.
The three phases of the preparation prob
ably can be reduced to two. In the first
phase we can accomplish the destruction
or neutralization of enemy artillery, com
mand posts, communication centers, obser
vation posts, reserve units, and defensive
positions simultaneously. In the second
MILITARY REVIEW
42
Favor a Preparation
1. Strong force
Weak force
2. Alert force
Nonalert force
Poor position
4. Good observation
Poor observation
Behind no obstacle
6. Strong in firepower.
Weak in firepower
7. No open flank
Open flank
last.
A positive statement regarding prepa
rations must be included in every attack
order.
In case of doubt-Shoot.
-~
James E. Cross
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47
SHOTGUN MARRIAGE'
....
SHOTGUN MARRIAGE
50
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SHOTGUN MARRIAGE _
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SHOTGU;N MARRIAGE
53
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In the last analysis, soldiers will always be the men of final decision.
Artillery, atomic and conventional; tanks, machineguns, mortars, bazookas. and
all the rest of the military arsenal are helpful. but they represent military
power only in the hands of trained and organized men. It takes men on the
ground to resist troops on the ground. The notion that wars can be fought and
won by remote control. with machines and pushbuttons. is a dangerous myth
which. if encouraged, can lead only to psychological, spiritual, and physical
unpreparedness for the realities of military conflict.
Our Army ... is a m:>ior component of our Nation's power to deter ag
gression or to win the victOl y. Our modern Army is equipped with both atomic
and conventional weapons. Our Army of today has great versatility. It can
apply force, great or small, with measured discrimination. It can use the right
amount of force at the right time in all types of weather and on all types of
terrain. In fog. rain. mountains. desert. and jungle-and from the silent thrust
of a bayonet to the instantaneous release of greater destructive force than man
has ever heretofore witnessed in combat, the Army is ready to supply the in
dispensable answer on the spot.
IN THEATER OPERATIONS
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60
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JOI~T
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.TUNE 1956
UNITED STATES
'Buddy System'
A "buddy system" of flight refueling
which would enable an Air Force super
sonic F-I00 to take fuel from another
SlIper Sabre is under development. The
installation of the probe and drogue re-
Tactical Camera
Serving as reconnaissance eyes and ears
for the Army are the new 8-pound tactical
television camera and the handy-talkie
radio. The camera's transmitter, weighing
47 pounds, is carried on the back of the
camera operator. It has built-in batteries
thus freeing the cameraman for the first
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MILITARY REVIEW
JUNE 1956
Intercontinental Missile
The Air Force's Snark SM-62 long-range
strategic missile is undergoing tests at
the Air Force Missile Test Center, Pat-
rick Air Force Base, Florida. The Snark
is a winged pilotless bomber capable of
Unusual Vessel
The Navy's new fuel and cargo-ammu
nition carrier, Kawishiwi, is also fitted
for use as a hospital ship. Equipped with
operating rooms, X-ray room, and a main
ward with 32 bunks, it is said to be better
equipped for handling battle casualties
than many cruisers.-News release.
Electronic Brain
Bz'zmac, the Army's giant electronic
brain in the' Ordnance Tank Automotive
Command at Detroit, is nearing comple.
tion. The intricate data-processing sys
tem will soon be put to work keeping track
of more than 200,000 items on hand in
Army depots all over the world. It can
give a complete inventory in minutes when
supplies fall below the safety level.-News
release.
'Regulus'
Designed for launching from subma
rines, surface ships, and shore bases, the
versatile Regulus guided missile has in
creased tremendously the striking power
of the Navy's surface and submarine
67
'Skylark 600 1
The Skylark 600 medium-range jet trans
port, the fastest commercial airplane in
the world, will be ready for delivery to
airlines early in 1960. The swept-wing
plane will be powered by the new CJ-B05
jet engine, commercial version of the J-79
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Command Transport
The Army has ordered six model D50
Twin-Bonanza executive type aircraft for
command use in the field. The plane is
JUNE 1956
Tropical Uniform
69
ECM Trainer
An electric countermeasures trainer be
ing developed for the Air Research and
Development Command will provide class
room simulation of all types of electronic
emissions, such as various types of radar,
guided missile control, 'microwave com
munication equipment, and commercial in
stallations. The trainer consists of the
instructor's console and student booths.
The student booths are mockups of the
ECM positions in typical a1rcraft, and an
intercom system connects it to the instruc
tor's console. This equipment permits
training in all phases of operation that
the student may encounter under actual
6,OOO-foot-per-minute drop for Stratojet. . combat conditions.-News release.
of making a 6,000-foot-per-minute descent
In-Flight Refueling
from high altitude in penetrating a traffic
The feasibility of in-flight refueling for
control area.-News release.
helicopters was demonstrated recently by
Marine Experimental Squadron One at
Army Atomic Power
Studies are being made to determine Quantico, Virginia. The system employed
how nuclear power might be applied to
ArlllY transportation equipment used in
land and water operations. Rail locomo
tin's, several types of Army harbor and
inland waterways craft, and special cargo
calrying land vehicles of large size, known
as "land trains," are being considered in
th.. study.-News release.
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JUNE 1956
CANADA
YUGOSLAVIA
Cut Arms Spending
The Yugoslav Government has an
nounced that approximately 70 percent of
its 708 million-dollar budget for 1956 will
PHILIPPINES
Nuclear Research Center
The nuclear research center for Asia
will be located in the Philippines accord
ing to a recent announcement by the In
ternational Cooperation Administration.
Japan, Thailand. and Ceylon were also
considered as potential sites.-News re
lease.
USSR
'TU-J04'
The TU-t04. a civilian transport version
of the Soviet medium bomber, the Badge1',
is being produced in quantity according
to official Soviet press reports. This plane
was first brought to the attention of the
Western World when it was flown to Lon
don recently. The TU-104 is reported to
have a cruising speed of 500 miles an
hour, a cruising altitude of 32,000 feet,
and has been flown nonstop for a distance
of 1,900 miles. The 2-motor, swept-back
wing plane is all metal, it was stated, and
all material and equipment to include nav
igation instruments came from sources
within the Soviet Union. The plane is
capable of carrying 50 passengers and is
furnished with adjustable seats.-News
release.
Navy Shakeup
, 71
WEST GERMANY
Order Planes
A West German airline has ordered 7
to 9 British Viscount 810 passenger planes
for use in establishing airlinks in Eu
rope, the Near East, and Middle East in
addition to routes it already flies. The
first of the 4-engine Viscounts will be de
livered in 1958 and the remainder in 1959.
-News l'elease.
MILITARY REVIEW
72
JUNE 1956
feathering propellers
version of the Hel"Oll
engine 'fails in flight
turn so that the air
. SIKKIM
First Airfield Opens
A recent ceremony at Gantok, the capi
tal city, marked the opening of the first
airfield in this tiny independent Himalayan
state.-News release.
G~EAT
BRITAIN
Test Rocket
A high altitude rocket and launcher de
signed to meet the needs of the Royal So
ciety, Great Britain's leading society for
the promotion of science, has been de
veloped by the Ministry of Supply's Royal
t
I
t,
Upper atmosphere research aided by rocket.
Aircraft Establishment. The rocket is to
be used in the society's program of upper
atmosphere ;'.esearch. It is 25 feet long
and 17 iI~chesi in diameter. The missile will
be propelled by solid fuel and will carry
73
Night Fighter
Although its performance details are
not available, the Venom NF 3 is designed
primarily as a defensive night fighter and
. Liquid Oxygen
In studying the problem of air supply
in supersonic flight, the Ministry of Sup
ply is testj,,!!: a new breathing apparatus
High-Speed Plane
The British Government has contracted
fo\' the development of a new 1,500-mile
anhour jet bomber and expects it will see
service in the early 1960's. The new bomber
INDIA
Order Arms
A multimillion-dollar order for British
jet bombers, tanks, and other weapons has
been placed by the Indian Government. It
was reported that Great Britain probably
will supply up to about 40 Canberra jet
bombers to replace a fleet of obsolete
United States World War II Liberators.
About the same number of Centurion
tanks as well as other items of equipment
are a topic of negotiations. The armed
forces of India in the past have been
MILITARY REVIEW
GUATEMALA
Powerplant
Guatemala is planning the construction
of a 20 million-dollar hydroelectric plant
on the Marinala River, about 30 miles
from Guatemala City, according to a re
cent report.-News release.
EAST GERMANY
Target Practice
In Eastern Germany, rifle marksman
ship has been declared a national sport re
placing soccer. Every able-bodied man
and woman is being pressured to turn out
for target practice. Reports indicate that
legislation has been drafted making marks
manship compulsory for all East Germans
between the ages of 12 and 60.-News re
lease.
Army Confirmed
It has been officially announced for the
first time that the formation of an East
German Army is' under way. It was re
ported that the "~ational People's Armt'
would be restricted in size and that its
only job would be defensive. The arms and
equipment of the new army will be modern.
JUNE 1956
FRANCE
French Divisions to Algeria
France's two crack armored divisions,
the 5th and the 7th, stationed in West
Germany, have been ordered to Algeria.
-News release.
Transport Plane
The development of an airplane that
makes very short takeoff runs from any
unprepared field, even in obstructed
areas, has been announced in France. The
940 Integral meets the requirements for a
civil or military plane for passenger or
freight transport. Its design is based on
the blown-wing principle, with the entire
wing being placed in the slipstream of the
propellers, and its outstanding charac
teristic is a very high-speed ratio. The
large diameter propellers of the conven
tionally piloted craft are mechanically
connected, thus permitting symmetrical
flight even in the case of engine failure.
The plane has a maximum cruising speed
of 240 miles an hour and a minimum speed
of 28 miles an hour. It requires only 200
feet for a takeoff and 120 feet for a land
ing. The Integral is 40 feet long and has
a wingspan of 58 feet 4 inches. It can ac
commodate 21 passengers.-News release.
Independence Granted
An agreement has been signed in Paris
between the French and Tunisian Govern
ments recognizing the independence of
Tunisia and defining the basis for the ne
gotiations designed to organize coopera
tion between the two countries in the
domains in which they have common inter
ests, particularly in matters of defense
and foreign relations. The new agreement
provides for the establishment of a Tunis
ian national army and offers French' as
sistance in organizing the army.-News
release.
Burma in "The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" (Great Britain) May 1955.
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77
Mediterr.anean Command, under the Com mand of the Supreme Allied Command in
mander in Chief of the British Mediter Europe-by virtue of which it. ranked as
ranean Fleet, was finally approved. This an equal partner with the Southern, Cen
not 'only brought the British, Greeks, and tral, and Northern European Commands.
Turks under one Allied naval command My principal tasks were the security of
with the remainder, but it ensured that the' sea communications in the command, and
considerable British forces in the Medi the support of adjacent commands.
terranean would be available to play their
It might have been supposed that the
part in the over-all Allied tasks, in addi Allied Commander in Chief of the Medi
tion to securing the sea communications terranean would have under him all the
of the Suez Canal.
naval and maritime air forces of the Allies
On the foundation of Allied Forces concerned throughout the Mediterranean.
Mediterranean Command (AFMED), the On going into the matter, however, I
Command of COMNAVSOUTH was abol found that this was far from being the
ished on 15 March 1953. It was suc case.
ceeded by the Allied Command of the
Restrictions
Naval Striking and Support Forces
Under the NATO military organization,
Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH)
it seemed that I was restricted not only
under the Commander in Chief South. as to the actual forces which were to come
STRIKFORSOUTH has up to the present under my co~rand, but also as to the
time consisted solely of ships of the United areas in which ~ could command them. In
States Sixth Fleet, and is charged only point of fact, jonly those ships and air
with the task of supporting the land/air forces specificajly assigned to NATO by
battle in southern Europe. It has two main the respective rations would come under
components: the amphibious force, capable my command ir war, or for large-scale,
of landing United ~tates Marines against peacetime exercises-and then only on the
opposition to support a land battle; and high seas. Thei remaining forces were to
the carrier task force, capable of deliver remain under their national commanders,
ing atom bombs in support of the air of and coastal waters would also remain un
fensive. The carrier task force, used in der national control-but not necessarily
this mobile and flexible way, is an exten always under those same commanders who
sion of the land-based strategic air force commanded the seagoing national forces.
- i t will 'be able to outflank the enemy's
The climax Was reached when I discov
front and get closer to him. It is no part ered that even the extent of the coastal
of the duties of the Striking Force to sup waters themsel~es had been left undefined
port the war at sea; and that is why it and that some ountries wished to include
does not come under the Allied Naval Com all areas coverd by coastal radar sets
mander in Chief-although the latter is which in somel cases meant that claims
charged with the responsibility for co were made for 'as much as 30 miles from
onlinating the movements of the Striking the shore. A glflnce at Figure 1 will show
Force with those of his own forces.
that. if such interpretations were to be
AFMED, the main Allied Command in seriously accep ed, the area of sea which
the Mediterranean, was then set up at would be left to the Allied Command
Malta, with myself as Commander in would make a equate Allied control, or
Chief. It consisted of forces from six na even planning, mpossible.
tions-France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the
I, therefore, rmly stated from the out
United Kingdom, and the United States. set that I woul not accept a limit greater
It constituted a major subordinate com than the inter ationally accepted 3-mile
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JUNE 1956
79
the Eastern Aegean were formed into another area, under a Turkish admiral. The
Commander in Chief of the Turkish Navy
and at the same time the Chief of their
Naval Staff, at once offered to become the
Allied area commander-which he did under the title COMEDNOREAST, with his
headquarters in the Ministry of Marine at
Ankara. The Supreme Allied Commander,
then General Ridgway, laid down that this
area should not be called the "Black Sea
area," as he considered that this would be
particula~
10'
FRANCE
,
40" /
N
SPAIN
ALGIERS
,
\.
ALGERIA
...-
;
30'
N
o
I
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81
CINCAfMEO
DEPUTY CinC
VICE ADMIRAL USN
I
CHIEF Of AlliED STAfF
VICE ADMIRAL UK
I REAR PLANS
OPERATIONS
ORGANIZATION
ADMIRAL fNI II REAR
ADMIRAL IN II REARLOGISTICS
ADMIRAL RHN111 REAR
ADMIRAL TN II
..
..
I
I
II
INT LliGENCE
CAP AIN USN
II
COMMUNICATIONS
CAPTAIN RN
OPERATIONS DIV LOGISTICS DlV ORGANIZATION DlV INTE LICENCE DIV COMMUNICATIONS
PLANS DlV
TOTAl
DIV
9
FRENCH ~
Ot@
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t
6
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GREEK tC!
t
t
t
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1\
ITALIAN .@
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TURKISH t
6
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UK
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US
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~.~
.00
OINDICATES ONE NAVAl AIR OEFICER @INDICATES AIR fORCE OFFICER
.INDICATES ONE OFFICER
~ INDICATES CHIEF OF DIVISION
OOCUlINDICATES OFFICER SHARED BY TWO DIVISIONS
FIGURE 2.
1
NATIONALITY
.C
..
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83
t6
84.
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85
86
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88
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xxxx
FEJDET
50
MILES
MILITARY REVIEW
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JUNE 1956
,tanks. However, the weather and condi long as .fear of the German Army makes
tion of the terrain will more or less para her do so. As soon as the offensive power
lyze or at least hamper their movements. of our army is exhausted and the Soviets
Therefore, I do not believe that sending no longer have to figure on the possibility
an army into an operation which can only of having to withstand a German attack,
be won by speed is the thing to do while then we shall have to consider all the pos
there is the possibility that the action of sibilities."
our aviation will be restricted, without
If Von Manstein had confined himself
considering that at this season of the to these catastrophic considerations, he
year the French would be able to take full would not have differed from the other
advantage of their superiority in heavy opponents of an immediate offensive, but
artillery."
he now expressed an idea which was ,to
The plan, the available resources, and revolutionize the plan: "For the command
the time of year-all were against a de the key to success lies in surprising the
cisive success. "We can count only on our enemy and in achieving the possibility of
acfive divisions to defeat the French and hitting him in the rear and flank as soon
English. At the present time and in the as he enters the conflict." Continuing, he
more or less near future, the entire evolved a course of action which was con
strength of the army, therefore, depends sidered more fayorable to Germany.
A long delay was impossible. Obviously,
on them alone. Their loss would soon de
prive us of trained reserves and their it could not be p'l"olonged until Great
losses in officers and noncommissioned offi Britain had had time to complete her reo
cers could not be made up. The Polish armament. Besides, the battle had to be
Campaign already showed us that troops started under favorable conditions. "We
possess a fighting spirit only when well must operate," he wrote, "in such a way
officered. Their worth now and what their that the fighting spirit of the French,
worth will be after a period of hard fight which certainly is not at its zenith, will
ing can be imagined by recalling the short be put to the test under circumstances
age of active officers at the time of our not calculated to raise it. It is of vital
entrance into war and the losses we sus importance, therefore, in my opinion, to
tained in Poland (1,300 officers in Army force the enemy to attack first.
"We may expect that if the aerial at
Group South). It would be a serious mis
take to imagine that with their present tack on England is intensified, this will
deficiencies the new formations will very force a penetration into Belgium, although
;oon possess any actual combat worth." A the French will do this reluctantly. The
weakness of this nature would have a sooner we can force our adversaries to
serious influence on the outcome of events: do this the better, as the number of Brit
"An offensively operating army will al ish divisions will be all the smaller. Our
ways be the decisive factor on the Con chances of success will be greater if we
tini nt in a war of long duration. We meet the enemy in an encounter battle
should not lose sight of the fact, either, while he is penetrating into Belgium
that. this also conditions the German against the will of .the Belgians than if,
SO\ iet friendship. The Soviet Union has . and during the most unfavorable season,
not hing of a decisive nature to fear from we are obliged to break the resistance of
eit"er France or England, however, she the Belgian Army awaiting us with their
will always see in Germany, a possible and weapons ready. The enemy thus gains
red )ubtable adversary. She wiIl permit us, time either to cross Belgium clear to the
the j'efore, to fight Great Britain, only as eastern frontier without any opposition
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95
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its northern flank. Consequently, with cism." Moreover, this was not entirely un
three armies Army Group B will be strong true. It would, however, have been diffi
enough to fulfill its mission. If the enemy cult for him to express the same objections
commits this mistake, however, the final in regard to the second letter. In reality,
decision will pass to the Twelfth Army in if he did not attach more importance to
the direction of the lower Somme provided it, it was because he was convinced, as
its southern flank can be covered by an were the majority of the generals, that the
offensive conducted by a supplementary German Army was not yet in a position to
engage in an offensive action. After an in
army.
,
"It is Army Group A that will be in spection of the front which led him first
danger, but on the other hand it will also to Von Bock and then to Army Group A,
have the lopportunity to achieve a great he wrote on 3 November, "No high mili
success ekpecLally if the enemy greatly tary authority considers that the attack
prescribed by the OKW is likely to suc
strengthens his northern flank."
Thus conceived, the plan embodies the ceed. We cannot expect a victory that will
conditions of success. By skillfully dis decide the issue of the war on the Con
tinent. Generally speaking, the attitude
tributing forces, Von Manstein counted on
of the enemy is as envisaged by the OKW."
obtaining maximum effectiveness by means
Caustically he added: "Each army group
of surprise, speed, and power at the de
is almost persuaded that the full weight
cisive place and moment. Appearing un of the enemy's countermeasures will be
expectedly and in force out of a weakly carried out on its front." As for Von
defended region, he would crush the de Manstein's second letter, he is perhaps al
fenses, cross the Meuse, and then assem luding to it as he notes: "I do not share
bling all his tanks he would push in the di the views of Army Group A according to
rection of the sea, across the allied lines which it would be necessary to guard
of communication, inflicting a staggering against a powerful counterattack emerg
blow, while a secondary thrust toward the ing from the Maginot Line with remote
south would ensure freedom of action and objectives (right flank on the Moselle)."
continuity of maneuver.
Thus, for the time being, the fate of the
It would not be Cannae again; it would Von Manstein plan was sealed. It was to
be Arbela.
take a great tieal of insistence and even
But the reception accorded the plan by vigorous effort to bring it out again onto
the OKH was devoid of warmth. On 1 the carpet. Contrary to all logic, it was
November when Halder received the criti finally as a spectator that he would see
cism of his initial plan, he noted simply - the realization of his idea, for it is not
enough to be right; one should also be for
in his journal: "Report of Army Group A:
Positive aspect wanting. Adverse criti given for it.
MOVING?
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of your change of address. Be sure to include your name, old address, and new address.
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will
as
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JUNE 1966
Defensive Aspect
Whatever side is considered, whether
offense or defense, the intelligence officer
must always take these capabilities into
account and include them in his studies.
Depending on the point of view'from which
one regards them-offensive or defensive
-the problem possesses a different aspect
and it will be examined from these two
angles.
We shall designate as the defensive as
pect the point of view of the side which
anticipates receiving these bombs whatever
its strategic or tactical attitude otherwise
may be. Likewise, the offensive attitude
will consid~r the utilization of the bomb
for the support of a defensive or offensive
tactical or strategic . action.
In each case we shall examine the prob
lem of the determination of the needs with
respect to intelligence, of investigation,
and of capabilities.
In the utilization by the enemy of a
means of warfare it is always necessary
to consider three stages: the creation of
the means, constitution and instruction of
the units, and manufacture of the means;
the movement of these means to the loca
tion of their employment; and putting
these means into operation.
When faced with a so-called conven
tional arm, these three stages require ap
preciable time during which intelligence
may operate. In the case of modern weap
ons the problem is different-the last two
stages disappear almost completely, while
the first is extremely long.
As always, one will seek to destroy the
means that the enemy may utilize. If deal
ing with the atomic cannon, the ca'ie is
conventional. However, in the case of pro
jectiles it is in the first stage, that of
FOREIGN
MIL~TARY
DIGESTS
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MILITARY REVIEW
JUNE 1961
Strategic Aspects
This leads us to consider no longer theil
technical but their tactical or strategil
effects. It is conceivable that the certaiI
destruction of the means located in 01
menacing the decisive direction of astra
tegic effort may be given priority over th
destruction of means that are far mOTI
considerable but which exercise no threa
against this effort.
Far from limiting himself to the tech
nical aspect of the capabilities, the intelli
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JUNE 1956
107
Our own security will increase as our allies gain information concerning
the use of and the defense against atomic weapons. Some of our allies, in fact,
are now producing fissionable materials or weapons, supporting ell'ective atomic
energy research, and developing peacetime uses for atomic power. But aU of
them should become better informed in the problems of atomic warfare and.
therefore, better prepared to meet the contingency of such warfare. In order
for the free world to be an ell'ective defense unit, it must be geared to the
Itomic facts of this era..
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Argentina
Circulo Militar, Buenos Aires.
Bolivia
Director, "Revista Militar," La
Paz.
Brazil
Biblioteca Militar, Ministerio
da Guerra, Rio de Janeiro.
Chile
Estado Mayor General del Ejer
cito, Departamento de Informa
ciones, Santiago.
Colombia
Seccion de Historia y Bibliote
ca del Estado Mayor General,
Ministerio de Guerra, Bogota.
Ecuador
Direccion de Publicaciones Mi
litares del Estado Mayor Ge
neral, Ministerio de Defensa,
Quito.
EI Salvador
Estado Mayor General de la
Fuerza Armada, Departamento
de Publicidad y Bibliografia,
San Salvador.
Mexico
Escuela SuperioJ;' de Guerra,
Oficina de Divulgacion Cultu
ral Militar,
San Jeronimo Lidice, D. F.
Nicaragua
Direccion de la Academia Mi
litar, Managua.
Peru
AIr Force.
Ministerio de Aeronautica,
Academia de Guerra Aerea,
Lima.
Ground' Force.
Ministerio de Guerra, Servi
cio de Prensa, Propaganda y
Publicaciones Militares,
Lima.
Portugal
Revista Militar, Largo
Anunciada 9, Lisboa.
da
Uruguay
Biblioteca de la Inspeccion Ge
neral del Ejercito, Montevideo.
Venezuela
Negociado de Publicaciones de
la 2" Seccion del Estado Mayor
General, Ministerio de la De
fensa Nacional, Caracas.
The-MILITARY REVIEW and the Command and General Stair College assume no responsi.
bility for the fadual accuracy of the information contained in the MILITARY NOTES
AROUND THE WORLD and the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS sections of this publi
cation. The items are printed for the purpose of stimulating discussion and interest, and no
official endorsement of the views, opinions, or 'factual statements is to be implied.-The Editor.
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