Doctrine: retroactivity of laws (article 4 NCC, cf.

NCC 2252 2269)

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be
observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).
Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or
events which took place under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize
them. But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)
Article 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the
rights of others. (n)
Article 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into
before the effectivity of this Code, even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into
effect. (n)
Article 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully
operative as provided in the same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts
and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a) Article
2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which
were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or
incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.
If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied.
If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same
subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code
shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a)
Article 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full
force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this
Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on
the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties
concerned may choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)
Article 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was
celebrated under the former laws. (n)
Article 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before
the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)
Article 2261. The exemption prescribed in article 302 shall also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing or
granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)
Article 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act
as such, notwithstanding the provisions of article 320. (n)
Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or
without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new
body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by
this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in
no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a)
Article 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in
article 287, shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)
Article 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things
which came into the creditor's possession before said date. (n)
Article 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromises. (n)
Article 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes
effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n)
Article 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be
suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal
separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n)
Article 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not

specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a)

Francisco v CA
Facts:

Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage.
Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of
Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the
following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S.
Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until
he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to
sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for
damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement.
Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce
proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that
they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong
exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.

Issue:

whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the
properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio
exclusively.

Ruling:

Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines which It took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of
the New Civil Code which was expressly (not repealed by Article 254 Article 253 as alleged by petitioner
in her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case
without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 relation to Article Indeed, Articles 158
(second 105 paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New

Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued
while the said provisions were in force. Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were
in effect survive their repeal. We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties
based on the provisions of the New Civil Code

Doctrine: DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[

PESCA vs. PESCA

FACTS:

Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married March 1975
after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in 1988, petitioner noticed that her
husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became violent. On March 1994,
respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was convicted by the MTC of
Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11 days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the
RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. On November
1995, RTC decided in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that
petitioner had failed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that
incapacity is grave, (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is
psychological (6) that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by
an expert (8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on
January 1995), as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should
have no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta
should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its
dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply to the case at bar

RULING:

The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed
by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of the Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith (lex prospicit, non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both in
her allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent.

HELD:
Petition is DENIED.

Doctrine: mandatory or prohibitory laws. (NCC Art 5 with NCC Art 17)
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Nerwin v PNOC

FACTS:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ( NEA ) published an invitation to prequalify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for t he supply and delivery of
about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of
crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project.

Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin]
emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/componentsof the contract. NEA then conducted a
pre-award inspection of private respondent s [Nerwin s] manufacturing plants and facilities,
including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver
NEA s requirements.

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin
filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil CaseNo. 03106921 entitled Nerwin
Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as
Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an
attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying
that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred
no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the
corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.

. Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for
certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and
from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and
established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents
counsel from representing them.

Issues/s

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance
of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects.

Ruling:
1. The petition fails.

In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of
the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003,and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No.
03106921, as follows:

a. It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respond Judge s issuance of
a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.

b. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for /preliminary
injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners
sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved
on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated
July 20 and December 29, 2003.

2. The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which underscored the
prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court