ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

CASES

Universal Robina Corp. vs Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No.

191427, May 30, 2011
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal
Robina Corp. failed to comply with government standards provided under
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders
(DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved
that respondent is found to be discharging pollutive waste water. Petitioner moved
to reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and
reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the
orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide petitioners
petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from
decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President,
a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner
had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its
contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an
exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best,
speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before
the case against him is decided.

Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011

Facts:
Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct for their
alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees, and
placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days.
Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of certain employee privileges but
were denied because of their pending administrative case.
Petitioner promulgated Resolutions 372 and 197 disqualifying employees with
pending administrative case from step increment and other benefits and privileges.
Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the
ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed
innocent and that they are being punished without hearing.
In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents petition for
prohibition, restraining petitioners from implementing the above resolutions.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolutions need to be filed with the UP Law Center to be valid.
Ruling:
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed
with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be
filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines for receiving and publication of
rules and regulations, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not
the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center.
Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was
about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was
about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions
pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There
was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) v.La Trinidad Water District

(LTWD),
G.R. No. 166741, March 22, 2011
Facts:
TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay
Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility
created under PD 198 which authorized to LTWD supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an application for a certificate of
public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. LTWD opposed
TMPCs application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is
exclusive. In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved
TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that
LTWDs franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional
and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a
waterworks system.
Issue:
Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive.
Ruling:
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the
operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions (the latter in Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly
prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.When the law is
clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., and other cases,the Court held
that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall
not be exclusive."

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot
legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the
Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing
the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President

Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the
BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in

character. Section 47 of PD No. 198 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to
any other person or agency xxxunless and except to the extent that the board of
directors consents thereto xxx subject to review by the Administration." Section 47
creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it
is patently unconstitutional.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must
conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void
all laws that do not conform to it.

Sterling Selections Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority

(LLDA,
G.R. No. 171427, March 30, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Sterling Selections Corporation is assailing the decision of Pasig City RTC
and resolution of Court of Appeals. Sterling Selections Corporation is a company
engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewellery with the products
manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan
Luis Faustmann, located in Barangay Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. On January
16, 1998, Alicia Maceda, a neighbour of the petitioner, wrote a letter to the Brgy.
Chairman to complain the loud noise and offensive toxic fumes coming from the
petitioners manufacturing plant. Maceda has likewise filed a formal complaint with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - NCR office, with the
latter endorsing the complaint to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
which had territorial and functional jurisdiction over the matter. On November 19,
1998, a notice of violation and a cease and desist order (CDO) was served on
petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and
Permit, as required by RA 4850. Petitioner contended that, as a cottage, its jewellery
business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. Under
RA 6977, the law prevailing at the time of its registration with the SEC in December
1996, cottage industry was defined as one with assets worth Php 50,001.00 to Php
500,000.00, and, based on its Articles of Incorporation and CPAs Balance Sheet, it
claims that its total assets, when it was incorporated, amounted only to
Php312,500.00.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to
obtain a clearance from the LLDA to operate its business because it is a cottage
industry.
Ruling:
The term "cottage industry" as used in this Act shall mean an economic activity
carried on in the homes or in other places for profit, with a capitalization of not
exceeding P100,000 at the time of registration.

Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its
assets. The law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance
sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than
its paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by
petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and
P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the
maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.
Thus, the conclusion is that petitioner is not a cottage industry and, hence, is not
exempted from the requirement to secure an LLDA clearance.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage
industry. Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance
requirement of the LLDA.
It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on
technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect
but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not
overwhelming or preponderant.69 Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy
decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned
and not by the courts.

Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31,
2011
Facts:
Private respondents Barien, et al are stockholders and board members of United
Workers Transport Corp. which took over the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corp.
They allege that upon orders of UWTCs general manager, the buses regularly
driven by them were confiscated by a task force composed 0of former drivers,
conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons, petitioner
and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and
took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority
as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce
the drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the
preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his
termination after due hearing. He was sentenced the penalty of 3 mos. suspension
from service without pay.
Petitioner appealed his case with the DILG but Sec. Alfredo Lim denied it and
affirmed the suspension. He then appealed to the CSC claiming that he was denied
due process but was again denied and modified the decision to dismissal from
service.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the Office
of the Legal Service of the PNP
Ruling:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him
and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a precharge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary
hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and
was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process.

Imperial vs GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner, then Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office was administratively
charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service for approving salary loan requests of 8 employees who lacked
contribution requirements. He was preventively suspended for 90 days. The counsel
of the petitioner explained that his client granted the loan applications under an
existing board resolution, with the approval of the GSIS Vice President; the loans
were fully paid, without causing any prejudice to the service. The GSIS President
found him guilty of the said charges. This being petitioners second administrative
offense, the penalty of dismissal was imposed upon him with accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process
Ruling:
Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an
opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no

reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. A

formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. In the case at bar, what negates
any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration
which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the
course of hearing the petitioners case. Again, the GSIS President duly considered
the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he
denied the same. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.

Office of the Ombudsman vs Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave
abuse of misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and
testimonies of several witnesses (Penaloza, Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that
Reyes would give the flunkers of the drivers license examination the option of
retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing
grade without actually re-taking the same. It is alleged that he illegally exacted
money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's license to the latter,
notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.
On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the
administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes was denied due process
Ruling:
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is

simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to

explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
Department of Health v. Camposano restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations that due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right
to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such
manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.
Reyes was denied due process because the 5th requirement (the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected) on the cardinal principles on due
process in administrative proceedings as laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v CIR
was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner's decision that
found him guilty of grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes
was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza,
Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the petitioner issued its Decision.

Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTRCB is entitled to issue preventive suspension
Ruling:
YES. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix

of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine
only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly,
by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry
should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given
should be liberally construed. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well
within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD
1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to
supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition,
and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c)
hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The power to issue
preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and
supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority
subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its
power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, but merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation
. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the
power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. The mere absence of a
provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986 would not work to deprive the
MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. It is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the
exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to
impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the aforequoted
Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law.
Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. The preventive suspension was actually done in
furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there
has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on
MTRCB.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of
Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance
with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code
under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the
province as unconstitutional.

Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of
Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which
states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands. The preceding italicized provision contained
in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an
exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict
with the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails.
Issue:
Whether or not the IRR of R.A. No. 9355 went beyond the criteria prescribe by law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by
Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion
above stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. Nowhere in the Local Government
Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement
need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population
requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a
province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the
Local Government Code.
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules
and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules
and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that the land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands is null and void.

City Engineer of Baguio Vs. Baniqued G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008
Facts:
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros
Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the

Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land
located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, City Mayor of Baguio
City, Domogan, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses
Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. It states that the building was constructed without
any building permit in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279, qualifying it as
illegal thus, subject to demolition. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for
prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. RTC
granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued. The CA
sustained Baniqued. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the City Mayor's act of issuing a notice of demolition is a quasijudicial function.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court explains that under existing laws, the office of the mayor is
given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It
has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this
manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the
matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal
occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its
respective municipalities or cities.
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of
issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be
denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should
be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and
opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of
due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasijudicial powers. Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasijudicial function as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of
Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the
Office of the Mayor.

Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. Advertising Board of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 164242, November 28, 2008
Facts:
Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising
agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a
clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na
ba ng Kinse Anyos)."
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement but was swept with complaints
from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was
no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time,
asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. AdBoard decided to recall the
clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Petitioners argue that their right
to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right.
Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements
can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They
also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be
subject to constitutional proscriptions.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of prohibition will lie on this case
Ruling:
No. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to
such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies which are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
1inisterial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a
given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of
his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board,
officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is
at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of
several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its
own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and
purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or
group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued
against private individuals or corporations so acting.

Gov. Orlando Fua v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 175803, December
4, 2009
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No.
2003-247 segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra
Christmas bonus at P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. On the same
date, corresponding Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed.
Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant
such bonus who wrote a marginal note, NO OBJECTION.
The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the
Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to
its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was and thereafter limiting the
grant of the bonus.AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty.
Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, Commission
on Audit Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of
Disallowance.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the petition should not be given due
course because of petitioners failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.4 Moreover, respondents emphasized that the marginal
note allegedly written by the President stating No Objection had never been
authenticated and was effectively revoked by Budget Circular No. 2003-7 and
Administrative Circular No. 88, limiting extra cash-gift to all government and local
government personnel to P5,000.00 only.
Petitioner counters that the present case should be deemed an exception to the
above-mentioned general rule, because the issue raised here is a purely legal one.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court,
he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action,
thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence of the failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as ruled by the
LAO-C has now become final and executory. There is nothing in this case to
convince us that it should be considered as an exception to the aforementioned

general rule. The issue presented is not a purely legal one. The Commission Proper,
which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the
audit, would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No
Objection on petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and
tantamount to the required approval.

Municipality of Pateros v. CA, G.R. No. 157714, June 16, 2009

Facts:
The subject property in this case consists of portions of Fort Bonifacio. The subject
property is allegedly situated within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent as per
Proclamation No. 247 issued on January 7, 1986(Proclamation No. 2475) by former
President Marcos. Subsequently, on January 31, 1990, former President Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 518,[5] amending Proclamation No. 2475.
Pateros, in 1991, filed against Makati before the RTC of Pasig. It was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
It was later re-filed with the RTC of Makati. Pateros claimed that, based on historical
and official records, it had an original area of 1,038 hectares, more or less. However,
when a cadastral mapping was conducted in 1978, Pateros learned that its territorial
boundaries had been substantially reduced to merely 166 hectares.
Makati filed a MTD and later on a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, arguing that the
bill converting Makati into a city was pending approval before the Senate and
portions of the subject property are included in the proposed charter. Makati was
later converted into a highly urbanized city.
RTC dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. CA denied the appeal of Pateros.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that when Pateros filed its complaint with the RTC of
Makati, Makati was still a municipality. We take judicial notice of the fact that there
was no Sangguniang Panlalawigan that could take cognizance of the boundary
dispute, as provided in Section 118(b) of the LGC. Neither was it feasible to apply
Section 118(c) or Section 118(d), because these two provisions clearly refer to
situations different from that obtaining in this case. Also, contrary to Makati's
postulation, the former MMA did not also have the authority to take the place of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan because the MMA's power was limited to the delivery of
basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila. The MMA's
governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors
of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and

consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of

a code of basic services, and exercise of its rule-making power.
Therefore, there is no merit in Makatis argument that Pateros failed to exhaust
administrative remedies inasmuch as the LGC is silent as to the governing body in
charge of boundary disputes involving municipalities located in the Metropolitan
Manila area.

Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, G.R .No. 171491, September
4, 2009
Facts:
This is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its
Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the
August 5, 2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB
Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman correctly
dismissed the complaint against the respondents. The appellate court held that
petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying the
particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence of the respondents.
The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative, cannot, by
their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent are administratively liable
Ruling:
An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed
independently thereof. Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a
crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative
complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively
liable.
A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will not
necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and
civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal
liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public

service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On
the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To
state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative
liability.
Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the
respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of
command responsibility. Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no
administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot
always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own
negligence. While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were sanctioned
for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow that
those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise
negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.