The 1987 Constitution

Political Law Review Case Digest SBCA AY 2013-2014, Commissioner Sarmiento
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

CHREA VS.CHR
G.R. NO. 155336, November 25, 2004; July 21, 2006
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act

of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions
in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended
to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of
the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and
reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit
of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE:
Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD:
The petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law,
provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation
and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses
the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously
held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to
direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in
law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that
compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees
without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
THE MONMON COMMISSION Catalla. Precion. Sta. Maria. Trios
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the
national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power
to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage
of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by
virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution
affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean
that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its
discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that
PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under
R.A. No. 6758. )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of
the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading
of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC
of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management
shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having
budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve
the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod
of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR
is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR
belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no
uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter
5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including
the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of
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the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary
authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution,
Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear
that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the
oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one
person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds
granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its
needs may require from time to time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office
of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while
cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those
offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational
structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and
Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless,
not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of
the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must,
all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the
DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While
the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified
Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC
when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a nonissue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our
hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that
was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and
due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law
of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks
legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General
Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key
positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here,
the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve
positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this
would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and
administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded
great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory
Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.
JELBERT B. GALICTO VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
667 SCRA 150
Facts:
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of
Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that
there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona
fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its
president has the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that
a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file
employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions
benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test.
Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation
Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and
Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its
standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate), through the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs]
and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses,
incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive
practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances,
bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and
[GFIs].
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7,
entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the
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guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all
remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were
ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO
7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI
employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all
allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010.
EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010
and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting
and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from
increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their
employees.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the
implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed out
the following procedural defects as grounds for the petitions dismissal: (1) the petitioner
lacks locus standi; (2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretarys
certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth; (3) the petitioners
signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4)
the jurat of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a
valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the President should
be dropped as a party respondent as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not
applicable to this case.
Issue:
Whether the Petitioner lacks locus standi>
Held:
Petitioner lacks locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of
standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question
when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancyor a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the
petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO]
7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or
increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the
prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation. The
petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who
has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally
and validly issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-ininterest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or
expectancies. The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. Section 9 of EO 7 reads:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and
Other Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new
increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary
adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive
Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the
President.
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated
that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his
interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the
curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be
characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to
salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal
standing
to
assail
EO
7.
It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something
that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and
substantial to make it worth the courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the
constitutionality of the acts of another department of government. If the asserted injury is
more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may
end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion
into constitutional adjudication. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus
standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation
of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the
President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to
the very essence of representative democracies.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is
instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an
interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
validly issued.
This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated
Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The Court made
a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo and held that the petitioners
therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege
any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as
a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order
No. 5.
We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions
concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and
GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot infuse
or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount
public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, we held that even if the Court
could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic
effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due
to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case. In other words, giving
due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities
explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit
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the Courts liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles, while the Court has
taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the
stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance
doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.
Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal
interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case
as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant
failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate from
PhilHealth to act as its representative.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
267 SCRA 408; G.R. NO. 122156; 3 FEB 1997
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service InsuranceSystem
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In
a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share
tendered
by
Renong
Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
this
Court
on
prohibition
and
mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity
to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the
shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of
the national
economy.
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead
to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive
command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the
equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises
the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride
will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should
be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does
not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the
absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing
the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and
that the foreigners are qualified, too.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET. AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET. AL.
G. R. NO. 113375, MAY 5, 1994
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery
system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the
basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease
violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal
policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions
to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various
government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the
contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent
contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but
by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract
itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is
4
Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity
to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has
played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of
the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus
ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel

hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.
A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July
14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of
Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of
Name of Justice
Artemio
(Chief Justice)
Items Purchased
Valuation
CFAG
(in pesos)
under
the Chief Justice. These Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper
formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government
properties they used during their tenure.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services
Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found
that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme
Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to
them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:
1wphi1
Valuation
under
COA
Difference
Memorandum
(in pesos)
No.
98-569A
(in pesos)
Panganiban Toyota
2003 model
Camry, 341,241.10
365,000.00
23,758.90
Toyota
2002 model
Grandia, 136,500.00
151,000.00
14,500.00
Toyota
2001 model
Camry, 115,800.00
156,000.00
40,200.00
Reyes Toyota
2005 model
Camry, 579,532.50
580,600.00
1,067.50
Toyota
2003 model
Grandia, 117,300.00
181,200.00
63,900.00
Angelina
S.
Gutierrez Toyota
(Associate Justice)
2002 model
Grandia, 115,800.00
150,600.00
34,800.00
Azcuna Toyota
2005 model
Camry, 536,105.00
543,300.00
9,195.00
Toyota
2002 model
Grandia, 117,300.00
145,000.00
27,700.00
2,500.00
100.10
Ruben
T.
(Associate Justice)
Adolfo
S.
(Associate Justice)
Sony TV Set
2,399.90
Ma. Alicia
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised
the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG)
Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it
should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated
August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum
dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to
5,800.002
respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the
first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property
since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving
two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-house
appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of
its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of
full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciarys resources, based on its own
determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate
5

and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the
discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Courts policy in the
disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial
prerogative.
OUR RULING
We find Atty. Candelarias recommendation to be well-taken.
The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional
bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence
and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of
powers, as follows:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the
other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their
respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11
Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the
idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes,
while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional
functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into
two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence."
Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political
or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other
hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence
refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body."
In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, the
Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of judicial independence in the
following manner:
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each
particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy
within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do
his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does
hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept
is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of
independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity
of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate.
italics and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system
of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine
whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with
grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards
to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained.
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from
passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary. The
Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only
the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by
prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and ensures
their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy
years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office." With these
guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals
brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the
law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
unworthy motives.
All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial
independence, not only by clearly stating the Courts powers, but also by providing
express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the
Courts affairs.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional
grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging
his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its
hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from
courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the
authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form
of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch
is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate
resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of)
legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of
concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain
judicial independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the
grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:
6

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of
fiscal autonomy in the following manner:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate
and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and
pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by
law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says
it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have
so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners
that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)
In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquinos veto of
particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciarys constitutionally guaranteed independence
and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to
make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the
judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in
the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The
Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed.
The Courts declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release
of its approved annual appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the
Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from
any outside control or interference.
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief
Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative
control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution
(dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary
serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of
the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:
WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v.

Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility
to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs
require";
WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate
courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they
used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such
government officials; and
WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for
sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his
or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and
disposition of government resources.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long
and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that
they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.
This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has
previously recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a
form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in
the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative
authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this
includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements
of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.33
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges,
court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power;
they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority
to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of.
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but
also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7,
Chapter 3, which states:
Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The
full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and
other assets owned by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local
government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the
national government, the local government units and the governing bodies or managing
heads of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall
constitute the appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied;
emphases ours
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the
Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of
the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner and
the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of
the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En
Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc,
the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for
7

interpretations and insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value
made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based
on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court
Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and
valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
Facts:
On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990.
The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview
for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition
on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Issue:
Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be
under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held:
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
670 SCRA 373
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic
or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators
and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members
of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose
and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function
devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation
of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching
the evils of pork barrel.
Issues:
Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are
met in this case?
Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal?
Held:
I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The
petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits
is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of
jurisdiction over the petition.
II. The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not
lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify
the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal,
not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate
[a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot
indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable
8

of lawful enforcement.
or an amendment of the Constitution.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of
Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given
to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per
se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that
individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long
as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the
budgetary process remain intact.
Ruling :
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 127325 - MARCH 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atyy,. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Private initiative for
Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the
right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing thepublication of the
petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing,
Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest
LawCenter, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco fileda motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizable by the COMELEC.The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the
following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of
peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issue :
Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law
of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide
for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is
void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
(potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC
being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that
of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or notthe petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
SALONGA VS. PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts:
On September 6, 1980, a bomb exploded inside the room of Victor Burns Lovely
Jr, a Philippine-born American citizen. The explosion almost killed him and injured his
younger brother Romeo. Lovely was then brought by the military and police authorities to
the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) for medical assistance. Lovely and his two
brothers, Romeo and Baltazar were charged with subversion, illegal possession of
explosives and damage to property.
When his room was investigated, the authorities found several pictures taken at
the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza. Petitioner Jovito Salonga and his
wife were among those who appeared in the group pictures, including Lovely.
On September 12, 1980, another bomb exploded in Rustans Makati killing an
America lady and injuring several people. The younger brother Romeo was presented
during President Marcos; anniversary television radio press conference. According to
Romeo, he drove Victor to Salongas residence on two occasions. The next day, the
headlines of different newspaper came out implying that Jovito Salonga was linked to the
various bombings in Metro Manila.
After several days, Lovely was taken out of the ICU of the hospital and was
transferred to the office of Col. Madella. Several bombs were again reported to have
exploded in the different parts of Metro Manila. Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders were
issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of
bombings, one of them was Jovito Salonga.
On October 21, 1980, the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the
Manila Medical Center and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga
the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. The
lawyers of Salonga were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until the Court
issued an order directing that the petitioners right to be visited by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, Salonga was transferred from the hospital to an army prison camp
at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Salonga claimed that he was informed why he was transferred
and detained, nor was he investigated or questioned by any military of civil authority.
On November 27, 1980, Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from
military custody and placed under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga still
without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On December 10, 1980, the Judge
Advocate General sent Salonga a Notice of Preliminary Investigation stating that the
case has been set on December 12. Petitoner said that up to the time martial law was lifted,
9

he had not received any copied of the charges against him.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over to the Ministry of
Justice. On February 24, 1981, respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint against petitioner
for violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Art 142 of the
RPC. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981. Salonga was
allowed to leave the country to undergo comprehensive medical examinations. He was
one of those who suffered serious injuries during the Plaza Miranda Bombing. On March
26, 1981, an amended complaint dated March 12, 1981 charging him with violation of RA
1700 as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. Preliminary investigation was conducted.
The counsel for petitioner then filed a motion ro dismiss the charges against Salonga for
failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. Judge Pano denied
the motion. He then issued an order for filing an information for violation of the Revised
Anti0Subversion Act, as amended, against the petitioner and forty others. The said
resolution is now being challenged by the petitioner. He contends that there is no prima
facie case established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him.
Issue:
Whether the information filed against Jovito Salonga should be dismissed for
failure to establisha a prima facie case against him.
Held:
Yes, the case should be dismissed. The term "prima facie evidence" denotes
evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it
supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to
warrant a conviction.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent
judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador
Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the
United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the
Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the
complaint. Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay,
can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given
credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has
no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated
therein. The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could
positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free
Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had
already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was
alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was
taken but only political discussion.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is
within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be
construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization.
The petitioner s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions.
Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis
of criminal indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the government.
In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of
membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with
officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or
enterprise thereof. In the case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of
any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. Lovely also declared that
his bombing mission was not against the government, but directed against a particular
family.
TAADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of the Department of
Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act).
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of
the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1),
two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free
market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention. They argue that the WTO agreement violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for
the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and
12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.
Issue:
Whether Resolution No. 97 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While
the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a
self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due
respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done
in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary.
As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of
sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
10
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. 159086 February 3, 2004
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained
of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending
that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated
any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v.
Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to
the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring
suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state
or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by
the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised
within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of
the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state
of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless
arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or
not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
DAVID VS. PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR No. 171396 May 6, 2006
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their
rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later
that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another
known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran
of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in
jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021
w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis
and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.
Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration
of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power,
take care power and take over power.
Issue:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
Held:
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of
the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The
SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP
11

1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017,
with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever
it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. NO. 190293
Facts:
These consolidated cases were an offshoot of the so-called Maguindanao
Massacre.
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed to be led by the ruling Ampatuan
family of Maguindanao gunned down 57 innocent civilians,including the wife of then
Buluan, Maguindanao Vice-Mayor Esmail Toto Mangudadatu. She was supposed to file
her husbands certificate of candidacy for Governor of Maguindanao with the Provincial
Office of the OMELEC in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.
The other victims of this gruesome incident were Mangudadatus relatives,
lawyers and members of the press, among others. Five others who only happened to be
travelling on the same highway traversed by the Mangudadatu convoy were also killed.
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred
that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other
hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural
calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president
can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.
In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP
1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for
identified areas of the MILF.
On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On
December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the
Presidents action.
Two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the
President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ.
Issue:
In deciding the consolidated petitions, the ponencia stuck to the most
fundamental issue: Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic?
12

itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.
Ruling:
As pointed above, the Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the

ground that they have become MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
The Court held that the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic. Said the
Court:
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate
that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of
the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said
the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the
case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for
two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court
step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions
in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao
was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not
been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control
of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate
mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed
with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President
intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated
province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face
of a determined and amply armed government presence.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress
BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25
APR 2006]
Facts:
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was
violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that
the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al.,
claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege
that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them
from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of
them.
Three
other
rallyists
were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985,
some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no
rally
policy
and
the
CPR policy
announced
on
Sept.
21,
2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human
rights
treaties
of
which
the
Philippines
is
a
signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is
sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880
isunconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for
redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows
their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and
for
lack
of
publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly
and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing
evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they
argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can
perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive ordersupports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably
assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic rerouting to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the
free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor
power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of
13

a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based
regulation
because
it
covers
all
rallies.
4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;
5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines
in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful
cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum
tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content
of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech
is
not
relevant
to
the
regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null
and
void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880
through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble andpetition in the public parks or plazas of a city
or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
ROQUE VS COMELEC
GR NO. 188456, SEPTEMBER10, 2009
Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the
September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of
the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).
In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking
that the contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made in
violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also
interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be
ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic transmission of the
election returns.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the
September 10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds:
1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there
will be failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in
case the PCOS machines fail;
6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will
assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010
elections; and
7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelecs
bidding rules.
Issue:
Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?
Ruling:
No.
Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the
arguments earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired
reconsideration.
Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or
may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected
in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public
pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high
probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there is a high probability
that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections";
"the unaddressed logistical nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans that should
have been crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an automated failure of elections very
probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the
contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any,
probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis--vis the possibility of
Comelec going manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec
Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16,
2009.
Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their
comment, described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelecs
contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a misleading
spinto the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to
make reference to his succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer and true picture.
Private respondents observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively
cite portions of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to
assert a misleading conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be
deliberately attached to innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple
expediency of lifting them out of context from any publication.
Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to
guide Comelec in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should
PCOS machines fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and
back-up plans that would be implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the
2010 elections. The overall fallback strategy and options to address even the worst-case
scenariothe wholesale breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the
2,000 reserved unitshave been discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this
recourse. The Court need not belabor them again.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved
in the decision sought to be reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a
14

reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters
substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legalframework issue, invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban
in Loong v. Comelec, where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual
appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic features of the automated election
system," and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for the
appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if not
downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading of the ballots used in the
automated system." Without delving on its wisdom and validity, the view of Justice
Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding
effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the individual view of a member of
the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held
by the majority.
And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court
invalidate the automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by
Smartmatic during the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in
elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners assert that
the system certified as having been used in New York was the Dominion Image Cast, a
ballot marking device.
Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new
factual dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters,
the Court cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private
respondents have even questioned the reliability of the website24 whence petitioners base
their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same website, state that the Image Cast Precinct
tabulation device refers to the Dominions PCOS machines.
Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on
review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not
speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the practice of
parties of going to trial haphazardly.
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong
indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication
facilities for areas without these facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative,
is without evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the
automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal
reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic
joint venture has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to
manufacture on its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010
elections.29 This arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing subcontracting of significant components of the automation project.
The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely,
petitioners cannot expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.
G.R. No. 196231
September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, !vs.!OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts
On Aug. 23, 2010, Mendoza held hostage a busload of tourists from Hong Kong
to protest his dismissal from service and the supposed delay in the resolution of his case.
He was killed after an 11-hour standoff, which also resulted in the deaths of eight of his
hostages an incident that strained the relationship between the Philippines and China.
The Office of the President dismissed Gonzales from service for gross neglect of duty and
misconduct in office in connection with his alleged failure to act on Mendoza's appeal for
nine months. Gonzales was then-Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other law
Enforcement Offices.
While speaking with Gonzales over the phone at the height of the hostage-taking crisis,
Mendoza berated Gonzales for allegedly demanding P150,000 from him in exchange for
the settlement of his case. Investigators at the time looked into the possibility that the
alleged cash demand could have fueled Mendoza's anger, leading him to shoot his
hostages.
Gonzales had denied the accusation and said he was merely "framed up." He also
questioned Aquinos authority to order his dismissal.
Gonzales said the power to exercise administrative discipline over him is "lodged
exclusively" with his boss, then-Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, who resigned from
office in May 2011. Gutierrez's resignation came a few days before she was to be tried by
the Senate impeachment court for betrayal of public trust, among other charges.
Gonzales also denied sitting on Mendoza's extortion case, saying he should not be blamed
for the delay. He noted that it only took him nine days to act on Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration appealing his dismissal from service.
Issue
1. DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?
2. WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT?
Ruling
1. YES. THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION
8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE
POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after
due process.
2. NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE
REMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF
PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.
PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE
QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT
CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.
Mendoza was dismissed from the police force in 2009 for allegedly extorting
money from a traffic violator in 2006. His case was under review by the Office of the
Ombudsman at the time of the hostage-taking incident.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while the President's power to remove
a deputy Ombudsman is "implied from his power to appoint," it does not "diminish the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free
it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence.
The court, however, said the President can remove a deputy Ombudsman on two grounds:
that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, which is through impeachment,
and;
that there must be observance of due process.
The grounds for impeachment of a public official are culpable violation of the
15

Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust.
The Supreme Court said that the findings of Gonzales' neglect of duty or misconduct in
office did not amount to betrayal of public trust
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Political Law Review Case Digest SBCA AY 2013-2014, Commissioner Sarmiento