TUASON and TUASON v.

POSADAS
G.R. No. L-30885
Jan. 23, 1930
FACTS:
1. Esperanza Tuason made a donation inter vivos of
certain property to plaintiff Mariano Tuason.
Subsequently, she made another donation inter vivos
to Alfonso Tuason, the other plaintiff.
2. When she died, her judicial administratrix paid the
inheritance tax on these two bequests. Furthermore,
the defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR),
collected sums from the plaintiffs against their
opposition and over their protest as inheritance tax
upon the gifts inter vivos made to them.
3. Plaintiffs filed an action against the CIR for the
recovery of the amounts collected from them as
inheritance tax. The judgment on appeal ordered the
defendant to return the amount collected. The
defendant contends that law authorizes the collection
of these amounts as inheritance tax.
ISSUE: WON the donations should be subjected to inheritance
tax.
HELD: Yes. Judgment appealed from is REVERSED.
RATIO:
When the law (sec. 1540, Administrative Code) says
"all gifts," it refers to gifts inter vivos and.not mortis
causa. Both the letter and the spirit of the law leave no
room for any other construction. Such, clearly, is the
tenor of the language, which refers to donations that
took effect before the donor's death, and not to mortis
causa donations, which can only be made with the
formalities of a will, and can only take effect after the
donor's death.

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DISON v. POSADAS
G.R. No. L-36770
Nov. 4, 1932
FACTS:
1. Luis Dison filed a suit for recovery of an inheritance tax
paid under protest to Posadas, collector of internal
revenue.
2. On April 9, 1928, Felix Dison, plaintiffs father,
executed a deed of gift in favor of his only son,
transferring 22 tracts of land to the latter. Such
donation was formally acknowledged by the donor and
accepted by the plaintiff.
3. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is
illegal because he received the property, which is the
basis of the tax, from his father before his death by a
deed of gift inter vivos which was duly accepted and
registered few days before the death of his father.
ISSUE: WON section 1540 of the Administrative Code
subject the plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an
inheritance tax.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Section 1540 of the Administrative Code subjects the
plaintiff and appellant to the payment of the
inheritance tax upon the gift inter vivos he received
from his father and which really was an advancement
upon the inheritance he would be entitled to receive
upon the death of the donor.
Section 1540 of the Administrative Code does not tax
gifts per se, but only when those gifts are made to
those who shall prove to be the heirs, devisees,
legatees or donees mortis causa of the donor.
On appellants argument that he doesnt fall under the
definition of heirs in sec. 1540 because his father, in
his lifetime, had given all his property and left no
property to be inherited is fallacious. The expression in
section 1540 of the Administrative Code "those who,
after his death, shall prove to be his heirs" includes
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those who are given the status and rights of heirs,

regardless of the quantity of property they may
receive as such heirs.

VIDAL DE ROCES v. POSADAS

G.R. No. 34937
March 13, 1933
FACTS:
1. On March 10 and 12, 1925, one Esperanza Tuazon
donated certain parcels of land to the plaintiffs, which
were accepted by them with their husbands.
2. On January 5, 1926, Tuazon died without leaving any
forced heir and her will which was admitted to probate,
she bequeathed the donees the sum of P5000 each.
After the estate has been distributed to each legatees
and before the delivery of their shares, the herein
appellee (CIR), ruled that the appellants should pay a
sum of money as inheritance tax. It includes amount
levied for the donations made by the deceased other
than the tax on their legacies.
3. The appellants paid under protest and filed this case
for recovery of sum of money. The appellee filed a
demurrer to the complaint, which the court sustained
and ordered the amendment of the complaint. In their
brief, the appellants assigned only one error: that the
demurrer interposed by the appellee was sustained
without sufficient ground.
4. The judgment appealed was based on section 1540 of
the Administrative Code.
5. Appellee (CIR) however contends that the word 'all
gifts' refer clearly to donation inter vivos and cited the
doctrine in Tuason v. Posadas.
ISSUE: WON the donations should be subjected to inheritance
tax.
HELD: YES. Judgment AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised
Administrative Code are, those donations inter vivos
that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of
the donor, but are made in consideration of his death.
Gifts inter vivos, the transmission of which is not made
in consideration of the donor's death, should not be
understood as included within the said legal provision
for the reason that it would be equivalent to levying a
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direct tax on property and not on the transmission

thereof, which act is not within the scope of the
provisions contained in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code referring expressly to tax on
inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis
causa.
Such interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the
rule laid down in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs.
Posadas (54 Phil., 289), wherein it was said that the
expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos, because
the law considers them as advances in anticipation of
inheritance in the sense that they are gifts inter vivos
made in consideration of death. In that case, it was not
held that that kind of gifts consisted in those made
completely independent of death or without regard to
it.

ZAPANTA v. POSADAS
G.R. No. L-29204
Dec. 29, 1928
FACTS:
1. Father Braulio Pineda died without any ascendants or
descendants leaving a will in which he instituted his
sister Irene Pineda as his sole heiress.
2. During his lifetime Father Braulio donated some of his
property to the six plaintiffs, his relatives, severally,
with the condition that some of them would pay him a
certain amount of rice, and others of money every
year, and with the express provision that failure to
fulfill this condition would revoke the donations ipso
facto. They were accepted during Father Braulio's
lifetime by every one of the donees.
3. CIR imposed upon the 6 plaintiffs separate inheritance
taxes on the donated properties in accordance with
section 1536 of the Administrative Code. Plaintiffs then
paid the CIR sum of money as inheritance tax under
protest and filed separate civil action.
4. The trial court held in these 6 cases held that the
donations made are donations inter vivos, and
therefore not subject to inheritance tax. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the donation made by the deceased was a
donation mortis causa, and thus imposes inheritance tax.
HELD: No. It was donation inter vivos, and therefor not
taxable.
RATIO:
The principal characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, which distinguish it essentially from a donation
inter vivos, are that in the former it is the donor's

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death that determines the acquisition of, or the right

to, the property, and that it is revocable at the will of
the donor. In the donations in question, their effect,
that is, the acquisition of, or the right to, the property,
was produced while the donor was still alive, for,
according to their expressed terms they were to have
this effect upon acceptance, and this took place during
the donor's lifetime.
o The donations were made in consideration of
the donor's affection for the donees, and of the
services they had rendered him, but he has
charged them with the obligation to pay him a
certain amount of rice and money, respectively,
each year during his lifetime, the donations to
become effective upon acceptance. They are
therefore not in the nature of donations mortis
causa but inter vivos.
Neither can these donations be considered as an
advance on inheritance or legacy, because they are
neither an inheritance nor a legacy. And it cannot be
said that the plaintiffs received such advance on
inheritance or legacy, since they were not heirs or
legatees of their predecessor in interest upon his death
(sec. 1540).