Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
2014 Bar
Dean Ed Vicente S. Albano
JURISDICTION
1. CONCEPT
**
B.E.G.
B.E.G.
**
B.E.G.
**
B.E.G.
Where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute
to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D.
1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
8. COMPROMISE IN THE BARANGAY
B.E.G.
Facts: Petitioner has no cause of action against the defendants because the
Patent title issued in favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of
Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the lapse of one year following
the entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds
SC: The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land
that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be
public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void.
The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no
longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority
being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately
owned. Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over
the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in
1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of
the public domain.
***
***
B.E.G.
***
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying
the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein
notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of
action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so
severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same
would be a nullity
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3)
12. parties
Real Parties in Interest
Indispensable Parties
Necessary Parties
Goco v. CA
An action for annulment of certificates of title to property into the issue of
ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief generally
prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the lands true owner. The real
party in interest in such action therefore is the person claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner
The petitioners demand the annulment of respondent Catlys titles because
they allege that these included portions belonging to the Municipality of
Calapan. This allegation is a clear recognition of the Municipalitys
superior interest over the lot. In instituting the action for annulment of
respondent Catlys titles, what the petitioners are asserting is a right
that is not personal to them, but to that of the local government. That
they are lessees who were granted by the Municipality of Calapan the option
to purchase the portion they occupy does not suffice to constitute as parties
with material interest to commence the action.
Salvador v. CA
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in
the land sought to be partitioned must be joined as defendants in the
complaints. All co-owners and persons having an interest in the property are
considered indispensable parties and an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of said persons. 39 It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is concerned, Jose is an
indispensable party. Strictly, the rule on indispensable parties may bar a
partition of Maria's estate. Considering, however, that such estate or its
partition are but incidents in Civil Case No. 5000 and Civil Case No. 5174,
and the parties have not offered any objection to the propriety of the
determination and partition of her estate, then in the light of Section 11 of
Rule 3 (Misjoinder is not a ground for dismissal) and Sections 1 and 5, Rule
10 (Amendment of Pleadings to Conform with evidence) of the Rules of
Court, and following the rulings of this Court in the 1910 case of Alonso vs.
Villamor 43 and the 1947 case of Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 44 an amendment of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to implead Jose Yabo as party plaintiff would
be in order.
B.E.G.
Arcelona v. CA
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny
this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The
fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to
petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion the tenancy
relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil
Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as
indispensable parties.
Stronghold Inc. v. Cuenca (BERSAMIN)
Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial
interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.30
Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to
dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought
not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a
person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over
a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded.
The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or
defending an action at law are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that the
actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to
avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within
certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
Boston Equity Resource Corp. v. CA
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has
no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her
presence will avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein,
is solidary. It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to
"proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. It is not mandatory for him
to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, For to require the creditor
B.E.G.
***
B.E.G.
**
We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned
earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and
property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion.
The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and
was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo
Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear
in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and
established jurisprudence.
15. class suit
Oposa v. Factoran
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection
of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm
and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
B.E.G.
10
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Citizen Suit under Writ of Kalikasan
**
VIP
B.E.G.
11
suit. This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene
herself initiated and was actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his
heirs, assigns, or associates, virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees
unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the period
material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub,
Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have several
residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not speculate on
the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she
and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her
case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the
dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three
new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain
as it turned out, that the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
Spouses Rigor v. Financial Leasing Corp.
doctrine of complementary contracts construed together
There is no dispute that the words shall only preceding the designation of
venue in the promissory note, standing alone, is mandatory and restrictive.
However, the deed of chattel mortgage executed to secure the loan obligation
provides alternative venues. Should we disregard the venue provision in the
deed of chattel mortgage as mere surplusage as contended by petitioners?
The chattel mortgage constituted over the two dump trucks is an accessory
contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory note. Provisions
of an accessory contract such as a surety bond must be read in its entirety
and together with the principal contract between the parties. The promissory
note and the deed of chattel mortgage must be construed together.
The rules on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and
his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. As correctly pointed out by
private respondent, Dagupan City is the more convenient venue for both
parties considering that private respondent has a branch office in the city
while petitioners reside in nearby Tarlac. From this standpoint, petitioners
futile insistence on an exclusive venue in Makati City smacks of a dilatory
tactic to evade or at the very least, prolong the payment of a just obligation.
The case has been pending for four years on account of the question of
venue to the detriment of private respondent which is simply collecting on an
outstanding loan obligation.
Davao Light & Power Corp. v. CA
corporation
The plaintiff being a private corporation undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the
plaintiffs principal place of business as alleged in the complaint and which for
purposes of venue is considered as its residence.
In Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, this Court explained why actions
cannot be filed against a corporation in any place where the corporation
maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled that to allow an action to be
instituted in any place where the corporation has branch offices, would create
confusion and work untold inconvenience to said entity. By the same token, a
corporation cannot be allowed to file personal actions in a place other than its
principal place of business unless such a place is also the residence of a coplaintiff or a defendant.
The same considerations apply to the instant case. It cannot be disputed that
B.E.G.
12
13
**
B.E.G.
Under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any new
matter alleged by way of defense in the answer (or comment as in this case)
is deemed controverted should a party fail to file a reply thereto. Except in
cases where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a reply
under oath is required otherwise the allegation of usury is deemed admitted,
or is based on an actionable document in which case a verified reply is
necessary otherwise the genuineness and due execution of said actionable
document is generally deemed admitted, the filing of a reply is merely optional
as the new matters raised in the answer are deemed controverted even
without a reply. Considering that the allegation that VELUZ was guilty of
forum-shopping is a new matter raised in RUDECONs comment, such
allegation should have been deemed controverted when the petitioners did
not file a reply thereto and it should not, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
have been deemed unrebutted.
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS (RULE 8)
14
B.E.G.
15
**
**
**
VIP
B.E.G.
16
dismiss.
But apart from opposing defendants motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked
the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer, altogether
disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the
case. Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcias prayer and
simultaneously denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and declared her in default,
it committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court
denied her motion to dismiss. She still had at least five days within which to
file her answer to the complaint.
Castro v. Pena
can execute
It provides that when a complaint states a common cause of action against
several defendants, some of whom answer, and the others make default, "the
court shall try the case against all upon the answer thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented by the parties in court." (Emphasis
supplied.) It is obvious that under this provision the case is tried jointly not
only against the defendants answering but also against those defaulting, and
the trial is held upon the answer filed by the former; and the judgment, if
adverse, will prejudice the defaulting defendants no less than those who
answer. In other words, the defaulting defendants are held bound by the
answer filed by their co-defendants and by the judgment which the court may
render against all of them. By the same token, and by all rules of equity and
fair play, if the judgment should happen to be favorable, totally or partially, to
the answering defendants, it must be correspondingly benefit the defaulting
ones, for it would not be just to let the judgment produce effects as to the
defaulting defendants only when adverse to them and not when favorable.
Pinlac v. CA
Finally, the conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo is void finds
support in Rule 10, Section 5(c) of the then Rules of Court, which provides:
"(c) Effect of partial default. -When a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented."
In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial Decision those who filed
responsive pleadings. Considering that petitioners in their complaint stated a
common cause of action against all the named respondents, the court a quo
should have heard the case as against all respondents, the defaulted
respondents included. However, the trial court, unmindful of the above-quoted
rule, proceeded to receive evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
respondents. The trial court's disposition is not only violative of the rules but
also a clear negation of the defaulted respondents' limited rights.
Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted respondents may present
which would be applicable to the situation of the defaulted respondents
should inure to the benefit of the latter. The nullification of OCT 614 adversely
affected the answering respondents for they all share the same mother title.
In effect, the court a quo pre-judged the case even against the answering
respondents, for how could OCT 614, the mother title, be valid for one set of
respondents and null and void for the other respondents? In fine, the Partial
Decision was procedurally flawed.
B.E.G.
17
Heirs of Manguiat
Further, we likewise affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60770, setting aside the partial decision of the trial court for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. It ruled that when the trial court
declared the BUTEL in default, allowed petitioners to present their evidence
ex parte and rendered a partial decision holding that petitioners are the
owners of the subject property, such was tantamount to prejudging the case
against respondent JDC. The trial court ruled that petitioners validly acquired
the subject parcel of land without any consideration of the evidence that
respondent JDC may present to substantiate its claim of ownership over its
aliquot part of the subject property.
The trial court should have followed the Rules of Court in this situation. Sec.
3(c) of Rule 9 states that "when a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented."
Therefore, the answer filed by a defendant inure to the benefit of all the
defendants, defaulted or not, and all of them share a common fate in the
action. It is not within the authority of the trial court to divide the case before it
by first hearing it ex parte as against the defaulted defendant and rendering a
default judgment (in the instant case, partial decision) against it, then
proceeding to hear the case, as to the non-defaulted defendant. This deprives
the defaulted defendant of due process as it is denied the benefit of the
answer and the evidence which could have been presented by its nondefaulted co-defendant.
AMENDMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING (RULE 10)
24. amendment; matter of right; matter of discretion
PPA v. WG&A
The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for hearing,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with
intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending
Section 3, Rule 10, to wit:\
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court
that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon
the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court,
and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of
action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in
B.E.G.
18
**
the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10
is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially
alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however,
when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests
of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
25. amendment to conform to evidence
Dela Cruz v. Concepcion (PERALTA)
2 scenarios
The foregoing provision(Amendment to conform to evidence) envisions two
scenarios, namely, when evidence is introduced in an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interjected; and when evidence is offered on
an issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection was raised.
When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be
treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. On the other
hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be admitted where its
admission will not prejudice him.
It is noteworthy that when respondent presented the evidence of payment,
petitioners did not object thereto. When the receipt was formally offered as
evidence, petitioners did not manifest their objection to the admissibility of
said document on the ground that payment was not an issue. Apparently,
petitioners only denied receipt of said payment and assailed the authority of
Losloso to receive payment. Since there was an implied consent on the part
of petitioners to try the issue of payment, even if no motion was filed and no
amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for
admitting respondents testimonial and documentary evidence to prove
payment.
Maunlad Savings & Loans Bank v. CA
The record shows that petitioner Maunlad Savings made no timely objection
when private respondent introduced parol evidence to explain the
circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the promissory note.
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds
therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence,
the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after
the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by
reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence
will form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence
and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence. Thus, the objections of petitioner Maunlad
Savings on the hearing of October 12, 1998 and January 23, 1991 amounted
to no more than a belated attempt to remedy its neglectful act of prior implied
consent to the presentation of parol evidence on the terms of the agreement
between the parties.
26. amendmed and supplemental pleading
Ada v. Baylon
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or
add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with
the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a
supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that
B.E.G.
19
the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in
the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new
facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right
of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental
complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
**
B.E.G.
20
**
Hence, this Court entertains serious doubt that a copy of the notice was
indeed received by the banks counsel, considering the absence in the
records of the registry receipt, coupled with (1) Mr. Caynos claim that he was
not an employee of Gella, Danguilan, Nabaza & Associates law firm; (2)
respondents admission that Mr. Cayno was an employee of the petitioner
bank, and not of the banks counsel; and (3) the denial of the banks counsel
of having received the 20 September 2000 notice.
RULE 14
29. manner of service [of summons]
Santos v. PNOC Exploration Corp. (Sec. 14)
Facts: Petitioner claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an
action in rem
B.E.G.
21
B.E.G.
22
Sec. 16.
V
***
B.E.G.
23
B.E.G.
24
amount. As such, only a personal service of summons would have vested the
court jurisdiction over BDB. Where the action is in personam, one brought
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.
This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, an
action against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action
quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. This is so inasmuch as, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res.
Davao Light & Power Corp. v. CA
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is
applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located
as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co.,
Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 [1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379
[1967]).
The Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its
articles of incorporation the place where the principal office of the corporation
is to be located which must be within the Philippines (Sec. 14[3]). The
purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite
place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
BPI v. CA
- manager
Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel.
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary
to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom
service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the
service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him.
Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service
of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the
branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the
persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the
corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.
RULE 15, 16 & 17
B.E.G.
25
B.E.G.
26
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for
reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of
Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion, or
no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15,
Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the
motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously
comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the
court.
35. grounds for MTD
Effect if Denied; Granted
Baez v. Concepcion (BERSAMIN-2012)
The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the orders
denying his motion to dismiss. It is settled, however, that an order denying a
motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a petition
for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari
challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is issued.
To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only delays
the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts. 20
But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is
issued without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is because as to
such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
The exception does not apply to this challenge. The petitioner has not
demonstrated how the assailed orders could have been issued without
jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nor has he convinced us that he
had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
fact and in law, he has, like filing his answer and going to pre-trial and trial. In
the end, should he still have the need to seek the review of the decision of the
RTC, he could also even appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. That, in
reality, was his proper remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mendiola v. CA (BERSAMIN-2012)
-Appeal
of
Denial
of
Motion
for
Reconsideration
(R-37)
The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration in the list of issuances of a trial court not subject to appeal
was by reason of such order not being the final order terminating the
proceedings in the trial court. This nature of the order is reflected in Section 9
of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which declares that such
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.
However, the Court has interpreted the proscription against appealing the
order denying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for
reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for
reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
B.E.G.
27
However, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to approve
certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court
effective on December 27, 2007. Among the amendments was the delisting of
an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
of what are not appealable.
**
Upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court
should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of
Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
37. dismissal; nolle proseque
Pua v. Deyto
dismissal [due] to failure to prosecute; with prejudice; res judicata
Facts: Pua claims that the untimely demise of his counsel caused the delay in
prosecuting the case.
B.E.G.
28
B.E.G.
29
was unjustified.
*
RULE 19
39. Requisites of intervention
Asias Emerging Dragon v. DOTC
The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the
Court had already adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either
conveniently overlooked or stubbornly refused to accept.
Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 040876CFM were already settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then
there is no point in still allowing his intervention. His Petition-in-Intervention
would only be a relitigation of matters that had been previously adjudicated by
no less than the Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of
Pasay City in Case No. 04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without
departing from or running afoul of the final and executory Decisions of this
Court in Agan and Gingoyon.
While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006,
dismissed the Motions for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina,
it also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly
litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts. This does
not mean, however, that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being
allowed as intervenors or that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted
by the trial courts. The fate of their intervention still rests on their interest or
legal standing in the case and the merits of their arguments.
SJS v. Atienza
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the
right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
Looyuko v. CA
Facts: FGU foreclosed on Mendozas real property. After the foreclosure
proceedings became final and executory, Mendozas creditors filed a motion
for intervention arguing that they have interest over the properties and that
they should have been impleaded in the foreclosure proceedings. Was the
motion for intervention filed by the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in Civil
Case No. 82-9760 proper considering that the case was already final and
executory?
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal
action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding
dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where
the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the
intervention may be based. Here, there is no more pending principal action
wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. may intervene.
In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the
B.E.G.
30
assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the Court granted intervention despite
the case having become final and executory. It must be noted, however, that
in both these cases, the intervenors were indispensable parties. This is not so
in the case at bar.
A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an
indispensable, party to a foreclosure proceeding. Appropriate relief could be
granted by the court to the mortgagee in the foreclosure proceeding, without
affecting the rights of the subordinate lien holders. The effect of the failure on
the part of the mortgagee to make the subordinate lien holder a defendant is
that the decree entered in the foreclosure proceeding would not deprive the
subordinate lien holder of his right of redemption. A decree of foreclosure in a
suit to which the holders of a second lien are not parties leaves the equity of
redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and unaffected. The
failure of the mortgagee to join the subordinate lien holders as defendants in
the foreclosure suit, therefore, did not have the effect of nullifying the
foreclosure proceeding, but kept alive the equity of redemption acquired by
the purchasers in their respective execution sales.
Quinto v. COMELEC
Pursuant to the foregoing rule (Section 1, R19), this Court has held that a
motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are
satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or
interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even
beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher
interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard
even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition
for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the
Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final
and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice
and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the
parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison
-no interest
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that it has sufficient legal
interest to warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it rendered the
subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials
and employees.
B.E.G.
31
**
B.E.G.
32
***
VIP
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises
or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing
expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion,
the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to
the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence,
badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such
unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the courts precious
time, if not pointless entertainment.
RULE 33
42. demurrer to evidence; criminal & civil
Bernardo v. CA (CRIM)
In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right
to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case.
If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied.
If he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave
is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the
case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to
B.E.G.
33
the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether
the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary
upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he
was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave
is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to
dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present
evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is
grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not
present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However,
any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the
accused to the appellate court.
Rivera v. People
no appeal if granted
remedy Rule 65
Facts: The sole issue for resolution is whether or not the assailed decision
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside to allow petitioner to
present evidence despite the demurrer to evidence filed. Petitioner prays that
in the interest of justice he be allowed to present evidence in view of the
severity of the penalty imposed on him which is imprisonment of about 140
years.
We recognize the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure,
not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated. That the Court has the power to
set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in
our jurisprudence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt.
It appears from the aforequoted TSN of the hearing on September 29, 2003,
that counsel for accused, Atty. Belarmino, asked for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence but was curtly ordered to file the same even without
leave of court.
Due to the precipitate filing by the defense of the demurrer to evidence, the
Sandiganbayan determined petitioners guilt based only on the prosecutions
evidence. To our mind, the presentation of evidence by the defense would
resolve any doubt as to petitioners complicity and avoid possible miscarriage
of justice. Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State
security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more
generously. The Rules on procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. When they are rigid and strict in application,
resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the
B.E.G.
34
35
provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure
RULE 34 & 35 (Judgment on the Pleading & Summary Judgment)
43. Distinctions
Monterey Foods Corp. v. Esejose
- no issue
- remedy Rule 45
A summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to
avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Its object is to separate
what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and
substantial so that only the latter may subject a party in interest to the burden
of trial. Moreover, said summary judgment must be premised on the absence
of any other triable genuine issues of fact. Otherwise, the movant cannot be
allowed to obtain immediate relief. A genuine issue is such issue of fact
which requires presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that the Court of Appeals
did not commit any reversible error in affirming the assailed orders of the trial
court.
**
Clearly, the judgment finally disposed of all the reliefs sought in the
complaint. The order granting summary judgment was akin to a judgment on
the merits made after a full-blown trial. Its consequent execution, therefore,
may issue as a matter of right in favor of respondent unless appeal was
seasonably made therein, which petitioners failed to do. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
RULE 37
44. grounds for new trial & reconsideration
Neypes Principle
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that
a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Yu v. Tatad
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
B.E.G.
36
37
cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC.
Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment of the MTC.
RULE 39
46. execution pending appeal
Maceda v. DBP
The execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal is governed
by Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. --(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal -- On motion
of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial
court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may
be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts look with disfavor
upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final
character. In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution is
usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to
be ascertained on appeal.
There are three requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending
appeal:
a.
b.
c.
Underscoring the importance of the requisite good reasons, the Court ruled
in Ong v. Court of Appeals:
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a
matter of course. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must
exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice,
it may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.
Moreover, the reasons allowing execution must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.
In the present case, the trial court, pending the appeal, ordered the immediate
release by the bank of (1) the unreleased amount of the loan agreement and
(2) the sum needed to complete the construction of the hotel, subject to the
filing of a bond of equivalent amount.
B.E.G.
38
The good reason invoked by the trial court was the urgency resulting from
almost twenty years of delay and the yearly increase in costs that made the
completion of the hotel construction more difficult.
We are not convinced. There is no guarantee that petitioner can indeed
complete the project, even if the sum referred to in disposition (e) is
immediately released. It must be underscored that this was the amount
needed to finish the project way back in 1987 and was based on 1987 prices.
Equally unjustified is the release, pending appeal, of the remaining portion of
the loan in the amount of P1,952,489.10. As the trial court itself has held in
1987, the award of more than P17 million under disposition (e) was the
amount needed to finish the project. Consequently, there was no urgent need
for the unreleased portion of the loan. The said amount was relatively
minuscule compared with that needed for the remainder of the hotel project
and would have little effect on its completion.
More important, the compelling reason given by the trial court for allowing
execution pending appeal is far outweighed by the injury or damage that
private respondent would suffer if it secures a reversal of the trial courts
judgment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal, petitioners would be hardpressed to make a complete restitution to private respondent, to which they
already owe more than P5 million the amount of their original loan plus
accrued interests. In any event, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there
is no likelihood that DBP, a government-owned and -controlled corporation,
would fail to answer its obligation if the trial court Decision is affirmed.
Bell Carpets International Trading Corp. v. CA
Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature
execution of judgment, such as "deterioration of commodities subject of
litigation.
BF Corporation v. EDSA Shangrila
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal. We hold that it did
not.
First. Execution pending appeal is not to be granted except for good reason
to be stated in a special order. For the general rule is that only judgments
which have become final and executory may be executed. In this case, the
issuance of an order granting execution pending appeal is sought to be
justified on the plea that the [r]espondents dilatory appeal and refusal to pay
petitioner the amount justly due it had placed petitioner in actual and
imminent danger of insolvency.
The contention is without merit. As we recently held in Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court of Appeals:[6]
It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and
not a natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress
and on the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the immediate
execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as
Falcons situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may
be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the
corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are
showings of other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency
of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to the
latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988]),
B.E.G.
39
that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he
rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within
competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending
appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its
basis for finding good reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court
can appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason
in upholding an order for execution pending appeal which may have been
issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where the motion
for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance
with Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Nor does the fact that petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P35 million
justify the grant of execution pending appeal. We have held in a number of
case that the posting of a bond to answer for damages is not alone a
sufficient reason for ordering execution pending appeal. Otherwise,
execution pending appeal could be obtained through the mere filing of such a
bond.
**
B.E.G.
40
41
decision in Civil Case No. 7281 has indeed become final and executory. For
if the subject decision has already reached finality, then the conclusion of the
appellate court is correct that the dismissal of the reconstitution case would
not prevent respondents from reviving and thereafter executing the said
decision.
A decision issued by a court is final and executory when such decision
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, such as when after the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, no appeal has been perfected. In
the case at bar, it is an undisputed fact that when the records of the original
case were destroyed in the fire there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of the record on appeal filed by petitioner.
A motion for reconsideration has the effect of suspending the statutory period
after which an order, decision, or judgment, in connection with which said
motion was filed, becomes final. In effect, such motion for reconsideration
has prevented the decision from attaining finality.
***
VIP
The findings of the Court of Appeals that notwithstanding the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration, the decision in Civil Case No. 7281 has become
final and executory by reason of laches cannot be sustained. As discussed
above, the doctrine of laches cannot operate to lend finality to the decision
since petitioners failure to pursue the motion for reconsideration was not due
to her negligence or abandonment, but was rather brought upon by the
dismissal of the reconstitution case. Therefore, it is clear that the case has not
reached finality at the time the records of the case were burnt.
48. remedy of 3rd person
Santos v. Bayhon
The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only
when no third-party claimant is involved. When a third-party, or a stranger to
the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may
vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which
may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor.
Ching v. CA
exclusive property levied upon terceria
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has
the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000
shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines;
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had
the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No.
142729.
In Ong v. Tating,49 we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of
the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the
court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the
property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or
interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution
may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon
application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
B.E.G.
42
**
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on
attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband
claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not
liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file
the motion for said relief.
49. res judicata
Requisites
Dela Rama v. Mendiola
The decisive issue posed by petitioner is whether or not the specific
performance case (Civil Case No. 97-0734) is barred by the petition for
declaratory relief case (Civil Case No 96-1725 and CA-G.R. SP No. 44094)
on the ground of res judicata.
There is res judicata where the following four essential conditions concur, viz:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
It is true that the first case was a special civil action for declaratory relief while
the second case was a civil action for specific performance. However, the
difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial.
The philosophy behind the rule on res judicata prohibits the parties from
litigating the same issue more than once. The issue involved in the
declaratory relief case was whether respondent has rights over the property
which was reconveyed to petitioner considering that he waived all his rights
by executing the Agreement to Sell and Buy. In the specific performance
case, the issue involved was the same, that is, whether respondent was
entitled to the property reconveyed when the petitioner failed to comply with
the terms of their agreement embodied in the same Agreement to Sell and
Buy. Respondents alleged right in both cases depends on one and the same
instrument, the Agreement to Sell and Buy. Clearly, respondents ultimate
objective in instituting the two actions was to have the property reconveyed in
its favor.
B.E.G.
43
44
The above provision (Sec. 47, R49) outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13
Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its
concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as
a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of
a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are
bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.
Noceda v. Directo
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact
becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them.13 Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondents
ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.14
Cruz v. Sandiganbayan
civil case res judicata to civil case
But this Courts recent ruling in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell, of which petitioner
Cruz was the responsible officer, was a transferee in good faith and for value
of the same TCCs subject of the criminal casesraises the issue of whether
or not such ruling bars the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of
this petition.
Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any
future case involving the same parties although for a different cause of action.
Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but not necessarily
identity in causes of action.
B.E.G.
45
In the present case, the OMB charged petitioner Cruz, acting in conspiracy
with others, of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 in connection with
the transfer of fraudulently issued TCCs to Pilipinas Shell. The main issue in
this case is whether or not Cruz, Pilipinas Shells Treasury head, connived
with the officials of the One-Stop Center and others in unlawfully giving,
through manifest partiality and bad faith, unwarranted benefits to DKC by
processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas Shell, knowing that DKC,
the transferee, had been a dormant company.
This Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[28] There, the Court
categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in its acquisition of the
TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for
value of those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a
party to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. Indeed, there
existed, said the Court, no evidence that Pilipinas Shell was involved in the
processing of the One-Stop Centers approval of the transfer of those TCCs
to Pilipinas Shell.
**
The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the
same. Although it was respondent Task Force that investigated the
irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the ultimate
complainant in the criminal casethe party that suffered the injurywas the
government, represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
latter also represented the government in the tax case against Pilipinas Shell.
Petitioner Cruz, on the other hand, represented Pilipinas Shell in all the
transactions in question. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the
criminal cases represent substantially identical interests. The principle of res
judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the criminal
actions against Cruz.
APPEALS
49. when appeal deemed perfected
- meaning
- residual powers
**
**
VIP
***
B.E.G.
46
Gonzaga v. CA
no errors assigned
It must be pointed out that petitioners invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court under Rule 65 when an appeal under Rule 45 is the proper remedy and
should have been filed. Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65, the
remedy of certiorari may only be availed of in the absence of any other
remedy (no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law) in the ordinary course of law open to the petitioner. In
the instant case, the CA had already finally disposed of the case with the
issuance of the Resolution denying due course to petitioners petition for
review of the RTCs decision, and the Resolution denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, the remedy of an appeal under Rule 45 was then
already available to petitioners. Petitioners then had 15 days from their
receipt of the Resolution within which to file a petition for review under Rule
45. Instead, they filed the instant Petition for Certiorari. Clearly, the proper
remedy in the instant case should have been the filing of a petition for review
under Rule 45. This Court has repeatedly ruled that reviews under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and the remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made a substitute for a petitioners failure
to timely appeal under Rule 45.
Thus, under Sec. 5(f) of Rule 56, a petition for certiorari interposed when an
appeal is proper and available may be dismissed.
RULE 57
55. grounds for issuance of attachment; contemporaneous service
Davao Light case (1991)
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as above
indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of
attachment (and/or appointments of guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to
the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the
complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court and
however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot
bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the
court's authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond,
and of the order of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5 of Rule 57,
but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also
explicity directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all
such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to
apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor and thus accord him the
opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a
counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint
pursuant to Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing
dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16, or
demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.
Tanchan v. Allied Bank
B.E.G.
47
48
RULE 58
57. period of TRO
58. requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction
MIAA v. CA
- no right
MIAA asserts that K Services has not shown any clear and unmistakable right
to the protection of a writ of preliminary injunction. MIAA argues that the effect
of the injunction is to force MIAA to extend the life of a contract that already
expired by operation of its own provisions.
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary
for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.
In the instant case, however, the trial courts order of was, on its face, bereft
of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There were no
findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the elements
essential for the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. Absent a preliminary
finding by the trial court that K Services possessed the right to continue as
MIAAs concessionaire, MIAAs termination of K Services was not sufficient in
itself to establish that there was an invasion of K Services right.
Cagungun v. CA
with right in esse
In order to protect their rights, petitioners were forced to file the instant case
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of their property. Petitioners
insist that respondent, in allowing withdrawals in their savings account without
their authority or knowledge is guilty of gross negligence to which it is liable
for moral damages.
The fact that petitioners left the custody of their passbooks to respondent,
through its employee O-I-C Ruperto Reyes, and that they entrusted to Bong
or Ding their deposits will not excuse respondent from being liable.
Petitioners did these things because they trusted and depended on
respondent to take care of their accounts with it. If respondent bank was
really strict in enforcing the banking rule that the passbook must be kept by
the depositor, why did it not do so? For its failure, any anomaly or damage
that might result therefrom should be borne by it.
(relate nalang sa requisite ng P.I)
RULE 60
59. remedies in replevin
RULE 63
60. declaratory relief; jurisdiction
Chavez v. JBC
Well settled is the rule that a petition for declaratory relied must be filed with
the RTC as a rule as there are issues or facts to be resolved. The
Constitution as the subject matter; and the validity and construction of Sec
8(1) Art. VII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as
B.E.G.
49
that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution
process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the
rights under the document to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction
over the petition lies with the appropriate RTC. Notwithstanding the fact that
only questions of the SC as provided in Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes
involved, but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the SC may deem it more
prudent to take cognizance of it. The SC could dismiss the petition but due to
the transcendental importance of the issue involved, it may take cognizance
of the case as an exception.
Republic v. Orbecido
WON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER REMEDY?
YES
The action constitutes a Petition for Declaratory Relief which is granted if the
following are present:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
In this case, the OSG and Orbecido are adverse parties - one for protection of
marriage while the other against it; then it is ripe for judicial determination
because if Orbecido decides to remarry, he may face litigation wherein the
validity of his 2nd marriage may be questioned.
Topacio v. Ong (QUO WARRANTO)
SC declared that the proper petition is a quo warranto proceeding, not petition
for certiorari and prohibition for the former action seeks to declare null and
void. Petitioner claims that Ongs appointment as an Associate Justice of
Sandiganbayan is being unconstitutional. The petition professes to be for
certiorari and prohibition but it shows a quo warranto aspect of the petition.
As a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title of a public office may be
contested directly by no less a quo warranto suit. It cannot be invoked
collaterally even by mandamus or motion to annul the order.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the title to
a contested public office. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised the public office
and may be commenced by the Solicitor General as the case may be, or by
any person claiming to be entitled to public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. There must be a clear right to the
contested office.
RULE 65
61. mandamus v. prohibition
Ongsuco v. Malones
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
-- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.
On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of
a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined,
B.E.G.
50
clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the
clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent
from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the
goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at
the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in
the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus
(compelling performance).
Chavez v. JBC
The petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress
from sending two representatives with one full vote each to the JBC.
Uy v. Lee
- no mandamus to compel production of will
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against
his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to
compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of
law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus
will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted
that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production
of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
whether the same is in his possession or not.
RULE 67
62. no MTD in expropriation proceedings
RA 8974 Far East International v. CA
100% zonal value; pay
RA 8974 specifically governs expropriation proceedings for national
government infrastructure projects.
The RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in R.A. No. 8974, by
requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100 percent of the zonal
value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of the Republic.
B.E.G.
51
FORECLOSURE
63. judicial & extrajudicial
RULE 70
64. 1-year period
65. judgment; immediately executory
City of Naga v. Asuncion
When exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ
of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are
circumstances necessitating such action.
La Campana Corp. v. Ledesma [PERALTA DOCTRINE]
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the
execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the
execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court
may stay immediate execution of the judgment.
Limitless Potentials Inc. v. Quilala
for defendant; not immediately executor
LPI averred that under Section 21 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
decision of the RTC on appeal in ejectment cases should be immediately
executory, without distinction as to in whose favor the decision is rendered.
The Court finds and so holds that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in denying LPIs motion for execution of that portion of the
amended decision ordering RCAM to place it in possession of the subject
areas/spaces. The execution of the judgment pending appeal is proper
only if the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
and not vice versa. This is in accordance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment
is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined
by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of
the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
What LPI should have done when RCAM dismantled its billboards on October
5, 1996 while the ejectment case was still pending in the MTC was to file a
motion with the said court to compel RCAM to restore the possession of the
property to it pending the resolution of the ejectment case. However, LPI
failed to do so.
66. jurisdiction over ownership; damages
B.E.G.
52
Shoemart Inc. v. CA
Petitioner contends that there were four rental increases effected during the
period of unlawful detainer and during the pendency of the case, which
increases were duly proven during the trial. However, according to
respondent court, petitioner failed to present evidence on other approved and
accepted rental increases and since the supplemental complaint limited itself
only to P45,142.00, the award of damages cannot go beyond the said
amount.
Petitioner's recovery is not limited by the amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in
the supplemental complaint as increased rental effective January 1, 1979.
This is not a case of a complaint subsequently amended, the effect of which
is to render the original complaint abandoned or inexistent and let the
amendment take form as the sole substitute upon which the case stands for
trial. A perusal of the original complaint shows that it prayed, among others,
that the defendant (private respondent) be ordered to pay plaintiff (petitioner)
the monthly rental of P34,622.00 "and all other rentals and charges that may
be due until such time that defendant . . . shall have vacated the premises."
Petitioner, therefore, did not foreclose its right to demand increased rentals
that may be recovered expressed in terms of the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property.
This is so because, unlike in an amended complaint, the original complaint
exists side by side with the supplemental complaint. In the case at bar, the
supplemental pleading merely served to aver supervening facts which were
then not ripe for judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. As
aforesaid, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of
the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter.
Agustin v. Bulacans Liwbawan v. Acosta
Guzman v. Guzman
determination of ownership in unlawful detainer
MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its
possession since the respondents had no vested right to the land sine they
are merely the petitioners children to whom no ownership or possessory
rights have passed.
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of
property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special
procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of
entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only
provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of petitioners
transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.
RULE 71
67. kinds of contempt
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
68. venue & jurisdiction
Jao v. CA; San Luis v. San Luis; Nitchen v. Nitchen
B.E.G.
53
The estate shall be settled in the court where the deceased was residing at
the time of his death if he was a resident of the Philippines. If he was a
resident of another country, it should be settled in the court of any place
where he had an estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
shall exercise it to the exclusion of all others. However, the place of
settlement is not a question of jurisdiction but a question of venue.
Frainela v. Banayad
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or
the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the
estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value
of Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot
be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had
perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading
filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should
have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that
the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.
Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same
ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by
any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid
down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People
cannot be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle
of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. No injustice to the
parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack
of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final
and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized
that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu in Tijam.
69. extent of power of probate court
Vizconde v. CA
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded
to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property
between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed
and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or
absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
Nunguid v. Nunguid
The authority of the probate court is limited to the ascertainment of the
extrinsic validity of the will, the soundness of mind of the testator, whether the
will was executed freely. It cannot determine the intrinsic validity of the will
except if the preterition is apparent because it would be useless to declare the
will extrinsically valid and yet, intrinsically void as there would be waste of
time of the parties and the court. It cannot likewise determine the validity and
the nature of contracts as the same shall be decided in in an appropriate
proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction. The reason for the above is
because a probate court has limited jurisdiction.
Nepomuceno v. CA
B.E.G.
54
The general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule
is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its
face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The devisee is
invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons
guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it
is also prohibited.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it
to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate
action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Romero v. CA
- no to ownership; except if parties agree
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or
intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
70. appointment of administrator
Santos v. Angeles
In the appointment of an administrator the order of preference is:
a. the surviving spouse or next of kin;
b. the person requested by the surviving spouse of next of kin;
c. principal creditors;
d. other person selected by the court.
The best interest of the estate shall always be considered in the appointment
of an administrator. In case of conflict between the surviving spouse and the
next of kin, the court shall apply the greater interest rule that things being
equal, like when two are competent, willing and can post a bond, the one with
greater interest shall be appointed.
71. powers of probate court
In re Vergara
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P.
Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay
their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.
We find that the trial courts finding of contempt and the order directing the
imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.
B.E.G.
55
Villegas v. CA
Obvien case
B.E.G.
56
Side Notes:
Palaganas v. Plaganas
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by
the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a
foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for
the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter
can be established.
The matters to be proven for the re-probate proceedings are:
i.
the testator was domiciled in such foreign country;
ii.
the will has been admitted to probate under its laws;
iii.
the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings;
iv.
the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same; and
v.
the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
Baltazar v. Lacsa
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to
be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did
not intend the document to be her Will.
The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia
was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the
state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as]
to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." The state of being forgetful
does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a Will.
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly
establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time
of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full
effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.
73. remedies if deprived of share
reopen
B.E.G.
57
B.E.G.
103
Change of
first name
and
surname
(substantial
corrections)
Judicial
proceeding
Notice and
publication:
at least one
a week for
three
consecutive
weeks in
some
newspaper
of general
circulation
(notice
hearing)
108
Change of
first name
and
surname
(typographic
al or clerical
errors)
Judicial
summary
proceeding
(can be
converted to
an
adversarial
proceeding
if there are
substantial
changes
and the
changes
affect the
RA 9048
Change of first
name or
nickname
Administrative
proceeding
Notice and
Publication: at
least once a
week for two
consecutive
weeks (publish
whole affidavit)
The civil registrar
and the Consul
participate in the
proceeding
Venue: local civil
registrar (no
residency
requirement)
58
The OSG
participates
in the
proceeding
Venue: RTC
where the
petitioner
resides
Appeal
decision
with the CA
status of an
individual)
Notice and
publication:
at least one
a week for
three
consecutive
weeks in
some
newspaper
of general
circulation
(notice
hearing)
The Civil
Registrar
participates
in the
proceeding
Venue: RTC
of city or
province
where the
correspondi
ng civil
registry is
located
Appeal
decision
with the CA
Appeal decision
to the civil
registrar General
(head of NCSO)
Republic v. Silverio
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law
provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm.
Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one
of those provided for by the law.
Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged
gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or
B.E.G.
59
a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no
law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical
error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the
entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Republic v. Cagandahan
The Court ruled that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences
that will follow. In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change
in the subjects birth certificate entry is in order. The Court, in deciding the
case, considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. It noted that Cagandahan thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. It
stressed that she has let nature take its course in her development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics. The SC agrees that there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to
the local civil registrar. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court states that courts shall
construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it.
Republic v. Coseteng
What entries may be subject to cancellation (Sec. 2 Rule 108)?
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected:
(a) births
(b) marriage
(c) deaths
(d) legal separations
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage
(f) judgments of declaring marriages void from the beginning
(g) legitimations
(h) adoptions
(i)
election, loss, recovery of citizenship
(j) civil interdiction
(k) judicial determination of filiation
(l)
change of name
The proceedings must be adversarial -- one having opposing parties,
contested as distinguished from ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it.
Republic v. Olaybar (PERALTA DOCTRINE, Feb. 2014)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings
B.E.G.
60
and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary.
In this case, the wife claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. A petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC and other related laws. Aside from the
certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Republic v. Valencia
If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a
party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action. For changes
involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those
are grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and
to seek said changes, it is not only the State, but also all parties concerned
and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and
evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition
or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the
case may be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even
determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein
involved.
Transgender case
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
82. jurisdiction; elements
territory; nature; penalty
power of SC to transfer venue
venue is a question of jurisdiction
RA 8042 MIGRANT WORKERS ACT OF 1995 AS AMENDED BY RA 10022
Santo Tomas v. Salac
- alternative venue in criminal cases
RA8042 provides that a victim of illegal recruitment has the option to file the
case in his place of residence or in the place where the crime was committed.
This is an exception to the rule that venue is a question of jurisdiction in
criminal cases. The law is intended to protect the interest of victims of illegal
recruitments.
Disini v. SB (2013)
The SB has the exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions involving a person
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates, and close associates.
B.E.G.
61
Republic v. Judge
meaning of in relation to office
It means that the offenseneed not be connecte with official duties. It is enough
that it is in relation to office. A public official and employee commits a crime in
relation to their office if the offense was intimately connected with the
information that the office of the offender and perpretrated while he is in the
performance of his official function. Mere allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is
not sufficient. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to the public
office.
RULE 110
83. time; date
Zapanta v. People
no need to allege exact date & time
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is
not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed
at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified
theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of
the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The
petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which
he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as
gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to
enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001"
since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense
of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly, the month of November
is the month right after October.
84. aggravating & qualifying circumstances
Republic v. C??don
rape bro & sis
downgrade
85. duplication of offense
Motion to quash as remedy
Republic v. Dacay
No MTQ; effect
As a rule, there should only be one offense alleged in one information as
duplicity of offenses in one information is not allowed by the rules. However,
the requirement is a mere procedural rule not jurisdictional, such that if the
B.E.G.
62
accused did not object to the duplicity of the information, he can be convicted
of as many offenses as may be proven during trial.
Side Note:
-Duplication
-Remedy
-Prescription
Damasco v. Laqui
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an
accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within
the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it
has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be
to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient
of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before
pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are grounds of a motion to
quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under
Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the
suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89,
which is a part of substantive law. 11 This position is further strengthened by
Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction
of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of
a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.
86. amendment
Rummer v. People
-to change date; formal
-no prejudice
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information as it originally stood would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information, as amended.
People v. Galvez
-4 infos., merged to one.
B.E.G.
63
proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was
subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion
that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists.
-No reservation
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada
1. Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing
a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution.
In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present
case, the institution of a civil action without need of election by the
offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to
this party, there can be no forum shopping.
2. Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses.
At the present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered
in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to
elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred
from others available to her.
3. Doctrine of Election of Remedies: the purpose of the doctrine of
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an application
of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the
assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis
of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under
the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent
remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is not an election
which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked
shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of
the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the
other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not
made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
4. In the case at bar, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa
cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22
cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other.
Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action
in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes
the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if
both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
People v. Alferez
Nonetheless, petitioners acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not include the
extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. In case of
acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. In a number of
similar cases, we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does
not preclude the award of civil damages.
88. effect of death
89. prejudicial question
B.E.G.
64
Ras v. Rasul
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal pro. prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in said civil action would be necessary determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Zapanta v. Montessa
Jurisprudence has also defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Mercado v. Tan
The accused argued that he already obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
void ab initio. He argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all and, hence, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a lettercomplaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while
the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
Pimentel v. Pimentel
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
a.
b.
B.E.G.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. The
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
65
c.
66
Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counteraffidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the
period she was earlier required to follow.
Artillero v. Casimiro
Preliminary Investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of the parties therein
depen on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights they believe they are entitled to or those that may be derived
from the phrase due process of law. A complainant in a P.I. does not have a
vested right to file a Reply this right should be granted to him by law. There
is no provision in Rule 112 that gives the Complainant or requires the
prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counteraffidavit.
Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman specifically Section
2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable
merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper
government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d)
forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e)
referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receipt of a complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint
utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover,
it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary
investigation should be conducted.
In this Petition, The court does not find any grave abuse of discretion that
calls for the Courts exceptional divergence from the general rule.
91. grant of immunity from prosecution
Republic v. SB (Mercado)
Immunity statutes seek to provide a balance between state interest and the
individuals right against self-incrimination. To secure his testimony without
exposing himself to risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness
can be given immunity from prosecution.
The decision to move for the discharge of Merado was part of prosecutorial
discretion in the determination of who should be used as state witness to
bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless made in clear
violation of the rules, this determination should be given great weight by our
courts.
Ampatuan v. De Lima
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the
approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial
court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be
witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before
resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in
support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following
B.E.G.
67
conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e)
said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the
commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply
and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be
admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court
in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this
Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a
State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the
requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that
an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to
Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 6981.
Quarto v. Marcelo
The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is
a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. RA
No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the
Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he
may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is
the need to take "into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,"
i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. This provision requires that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
RULE 113
92. arrest without warrant
Abelita v. Doria
The seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The requisites of plain
B.E.G.
68
view are:
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm may be an
evidence of a crime.
Uy v. People
Go v. CA
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any
warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an
arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the
presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when
he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none
was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the firearm,
whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest
was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions
under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule
126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest.
Sanchez v. Dimetriou
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner
allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the
petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and
killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six
days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in
fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August
26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay
cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the
B.E.G.
69
trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as
in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is
deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to
the jurisdiction of that court.
Colorado v. Agapito (Friday Warrant -- Grave abuse of authority for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainants
incarceration for two days.)
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day
or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
on a Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made
on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued.
Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of
arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without
recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of
Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10] dated December 5, 1996, providing for
a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on
petitions for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons,
Sundays and non-working holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses.
Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
authority for issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being
prohibited by law.
92. determination of probable cause for issuance of WOA
Law Firm of Chavez v. Atty. Fria
It must, however, be observed that the judges power to immediately dismiss
a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is
clear. In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA, the Court illumined that a clear-cut case of
lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged, viz:
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the
limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause x x x.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, it must
be stressed that the judges dismissal of a case must be done only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on
record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge
should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.
In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order
the presentation of additional evidence.
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he
may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b)
B.E.G.
70
B.E.G.
71
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose
of extradition.
Leviste v. CA
Under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty imposed is more than 6 years the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
circumstances:
1.
B.E.G.
72
accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently
unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other
means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges
against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law.
The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or
innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The
accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
Babanto v. Zosa
A conviction for the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of
virginity would violate the petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
97. double jeopardy
People v. Ivler
According to the Supreme Court, the MeTC is mistaken in finding that the two
cases of reckless imprudence are entirely separate offenses using the basis
that the Second Criminal Case required proof of an additional fact which the
First Criminal Case does not.
The High Court reasoned that reckless imprudence is a single crime, its
consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts.
Among several jurisprudences cited is the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA
1383 (March 29, 1968). A portion from the decision in this case reads as:
"[O]nce convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions."
People v. Balisacan
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon
being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted
y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and
consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in selfdefense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the
police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was
acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of
guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said
B.E.G.
73
testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new
plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has
been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Jacob v. SB
Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 2592225939 is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it
follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional right against double
jeopardy.1avvphi1
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be
demonstrated:
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far
no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.
RULE 116
98. effect if accused refuses to enter plea
99. plea of guilty to lesser offense
Amatan v. Aujero
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser
offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo
Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted
homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either
lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion.
Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when
he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
100. plea of guilty to grave offense
People v. Jalanjani [PERALTA DOCTRINE]
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants
plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
NO. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all
trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty,
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction."We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the
rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or
duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
B.E.G.
74
B.E.G.
75
GRANTED
NOTE: IF the motion to quash is
based on the alleged defect [i.e. do
not constitute an offense] AND the
defect can be cured
THEN the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
IF (1) the prosecution fails to make
the amendment OR
(2) the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect
THEN the court shall grant the
motion to quash. (Sec. 4)
GR: An order sustaining a motion
to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution.
XPs: (1) extinction of criminal
liability
(2) double jeopardy (Sec. 6)
NOTE: IF the order to file another
complaint or information is made
THEN the accused who may be in
custody shall not be discharged or
released
EXCEPT if he is admitted to bail.
Alawiya v. CA (2009)
FACTS: The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that
the officer who filed the information had no authority. The trial court denied
the motion to quash because (1) he who is at large is not entitled to bail or
other relief from court and (2) the authority of the DOJ to file an information
is shared or concurrent with the Ombudsman.
HELD: Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
[i.e. motion to quash] other than an application for bail. However, while
the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
At any rate, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of lack of
B.E.G.
76
B.E.G.
77
B.E.G.
78
right of the State and of the offended party to due process of law. The court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the prosecution
to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion) after a
demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for good
reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. As mentioned, the court
may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer
to evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also
allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it
was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct
the evidence previously offered. In this case, we cannot attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and
did not require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear
weakness of the case at that point.
**
B.E.G.
79
B.E.G.
80
B.E.G.
81
***
B.E.G.
82
***
***
VIP
106. effect if the accused is not brought to trial w/n a period of time
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section
1(g), Rule 1161 and Section 1,2 as extended by Section 6 of this rule, 3 the
1 Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
shall be excluded in computing the period.
2 After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial.
The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
B.E.G.
83
3 Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelvecalendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the
second twelve-month period, the limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelvemonth period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
4 The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30)
days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not exceed thirty (30) days, during which any
proceeding which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his
whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be
considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be
obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to
stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against
the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date
the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the
court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate
trial has been granted.
B.E.G.
84
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of
either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of
its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
B.E.G.
85
**
109. Promulgation
The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. xxx However, (1) [when]
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. xxx (2) [when despite due notice
to the accused or his bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed
to appear at the promulgation of the decision, the promulgation need not be
in the presence of the accused.]
xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Sec. 6)
Villena v. People (2011)
Petitioners now argue that the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of
their respective notices of appeal since they already contained the required
manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-appearance on
the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e., lack of
notice. According to them, their notices of appeal have substantially
complied with the requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
and have effectively placed them under the RTCs jurisdiction. They allege
further that their motion for reconsideration should have been considered by
the CA since they have offered the explanations that their failure to appear
during the promulgation of judgment was due to the change of their
respective addresses, and that their former counsel of record did not inform
them of the need to notify the RTC thereof, much less properly advise them
of the current status of the proceedings. As regards their failure to move for
the lifting of the bench warrants issued for their arrest, petitioners
asseverate that the Rules of Court do not provide for such a requirement
before they could avail of the remedies they seek.
The petition is without merit.
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of
appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this
principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly
avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this
case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure
to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation of
judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners insist that their failure to attend the promulgation of judgment
was due to the lack of notice of the date thereof, allegedly because they
B.E.G.
86
B.E.G.
87
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment. (Sec. 2)
**
B.E.G.
88
in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered from the accused in the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused
who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in
a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property,
or is about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (Sec. 2)
113. deposition of witness in criminal cases
The taking of depositions in criminal cases is addressed to judicial
discretion. (People v. Hubert Webb)
Go v. People (2012)
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of
a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court. To take the
deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge
of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the
witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case.
The Webb Ruling is not on all fours with the instant case because in this
case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule
119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the
accused to due process.
EVIDENCE
114. when not necessary
The following matters need not be proven:
(1) facts subject to judicial notice;
(2) facts admitted or not denied provided they have been sufficiently
alleged;
(3) facts legally presumed;
(4) agreed and admitted facts;
(5) immaterial allegations.
Republic v. Bakunawa (2013)
Although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its
evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when
only one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to
the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiffs
evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the
sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales
B.E.G.
89
**
B.E.G.
90
5 (a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (Rule 130, Sec. 4)
B.E.G.
91
**
B.E.G.
92
***
We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere
child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in
court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable
of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. The Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on
Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight
and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to
who killed her father.
124. Marital Disqualification [during marriage; any matter]
GR: During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse.
XP: In a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. (Sec. 22)
Alvarez Case
(cannot be found; listen to lecture)
Arroyo Case
(cannot be found; listen to lecture)
Husband & Wife Privilege [during or after marriage; confidential matter]
The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (Sec.
24(a))
**
**
B.E.G.
93
***
VIP
***
***
VIP
B.E.G.
94
**
B.E.G.
95
**
*
VIP
B.E.G.
96
***
***
VIP
***
VIP
B.E.G.
97
Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
applicable to the instant case.
The rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a
case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of
the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian,
(the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the
estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan
Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same
which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate
of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
**
**
B.E.G.
98
**
WRIT OF AMPARO
B.E.G.
99
141. Coverage
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Sec. 1)
Tapuz v. Del Rosario (2007)
**
B.E.G.
100
**
Cases
**
B.E.G.
101
already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for
DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind,
the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes
of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of
DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Even if Rogelio already died, any of
the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be
used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.
149. No Violation of
- equal protection clause
- search and seizure clause
- self-incrimination
Agustin v. CA
Tijing v. CA
B.E.G.
102
Where the arbitral tribunal defers its ruling on preliminary question regarding
its jurisdiction until its final award, the aggrieved party cannot seek judicial
relief to question the deferral and must await the final arbitral award before
seeking appropriate judicial recourse.
A ruling by the arbitral tribunal deferring resolution on the issue of its
jurisdiction until final award, shall not be subject to a motion for
reconsideration, appeal or a petition for certiorari. (Rule 3.20, SAR)
152. Separability Clause
The principle of separability of the arbitration clause, which means that said
clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of
the contract of which it forms part. A decision that the contract is null and
void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (Rule
2.2(B), SAR; Art. 16, Model Law)
Gonzales v. Climax Mining (2007)
The doctrine of separability enunciates that an arbitration agreement is
independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated
as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not
automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part comes to an
end. The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially agreement to
the determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies
the arbitration clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the
main contract does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration
clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable.
Cargill vs. San Fernando (2011)
Applying the Gonzales ruling, an arbitration agreement which forms part of
the main contract shall not be regarded as invalid or non-existent just
because the main contract is invalid or did not come into existence, since
the arbitration agreement shall be treated as a separate agreement
independent of the main contract. To reiterate a contrary ruling would
suggest that a party's mere repudiation of the main contract is sufficient to
avoid arbitration and that is exactly the situation that the separability
doctrine sought to avoid. Thus, we find that even the party who has
repudiated the main contract is not prevented from enforcing its arbitration
clause.
153. Remedies
how to enforce
award
B.E.G.
DOMESTIC
petition to
confirm
INTERNATIONAL
petition to
recognize and
enforce
FOREIGN
petition to
recognize or
enforc
103
period of filing
how to prevent
enforcement
period of filing6
**
At any time
after the lapse
of 30 days from
receipt by the
petitioner of the
arbitral award.
6 Belated filing of the petition to confirm will not give a new period for the losing party to file a petition
to vacate. In other words, if a petiton to confirm is filed but the period to file a petition to vacate has
already lapsed, the subsequent filing of the former will not renew the latter.
B.E.G.
104
B.E.G.
105
In Criminal Cases:
(1) the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent
to the moral trait involved in the offense charged;
(2) the prosecution, as rebuttal evidence, may prove the bad moral
character of the accused when the latter opens the issue by
introducing evidence of his good moral character;
(3) the offended partys good or bad moral character may be proved as
long as it tends to establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
XPs to the XPs: (1) proof of bad moral character of the victim in a
murder case is not admissible if the crime committed was through
treachery and premeditation (2) in prosecutions for rape, evidence
of complainants past sexual conduct, opinion thereof of his/her
reputation shall not be admitted unless and only to the extent that
the court finds that such evidence is material and relevant to the
case.
In Civil Cases evidence of the good moral character of a party in a civil
case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in
the case.
As To Witnesses The bad moral character of a witness may be proved by
either party, but evidence of good moral character of a witness is not
admissible unless such character has been impeached.
**
CIVIL CODE
If there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of
proof, it is presumed that they died
at the same time and there shall be
no transmission of rights from one
to the other.
B.E.G.
106
**
B.E.G.
107
respondent was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased
property to China Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two
months before the expiration of said contracts when respondent came to
know of the same after it was notified by said bank. This could have been
the reason why respondent did not anymore pay petitioner the rents for the
succeeding months of December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be
said that there was a change in the nature of petitioner's title during the
subsistence of the lease that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not
apply in this case. Petitioner's reliance on said conclusive presumption
must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the
CA when it entertained respondent's assertion of a title adverse to petitioner.
158. Voire Due Examination of Witness
to determine competency of witness
preliminary inquiry
B.E.G.
108