John Forbes Nash, Jr.

, renowned mathematician, Nobel Prize winner, Abel Prize

laureate, and subject of the 2001 Academy Award-winning movie A Beautiful Mind, died in a car
accident on Saturday, May 25. In remembrance of his immeasurable contributions to education,
this article plays a non-cooperative game with student-teacher engagement.
Student engagement has been a prominent focus in districts around the nation, yet many
educators believe an equal concentration should be placed on engaging teachers. While
engagement undoubtedly takes many forms, if we operate under the basic assumption that high
engagement is more difficult to supply than low engagement, then we can use giving high
effort synonymously with being highly engaged. The essential question we as educators then
face is this: How do we cultivate high effort by teachers and students alike?
In light of this question, it may be helpful to think of education, particularly as it relates
to the efforts of teachers and students, as a non-cooperative game. In game theory, a noncooperative game is any game in which the players make decisions independent of the decisions
of the other players. Anyone who has even spent one second in a classroom can agree that
education is most certainly non-cooperative; after all, it is possible that the phrase pulling teeth
is said more frequently in teachers lounges than dental offices.
Furthermore, education is also a nonzero-sum game, in that one players gain is not
dependent upon another players loss (as opposed to zero-sum games like poker, chess, and
football). So, under these parameters, we can comfortably say that the game being played in
schools all over the country is both non-cooperative and nonzero-sum, that is, the players
(students and teachers) make decisions independent of each other, and the outcomes can be winwin, lose-lose, or any combination thereof. Encouraged yet?

No? Well thats why Nashs mind was more beautiful than our own. He understood that if
we know the rules to the game and make a few logical assumptions, then we can find the ideal
solution conceptthe point at which neither player has anything to gain by changing only their
strategy. This solution concept is famously known as the Nash equilibrium, and it still has some
pretty significant implications for modern day education.
If your, umgame, lets take a look at an example of the Nash equilibrium in work.
Well be looking specifically at our essential question from above, focusing our attention to the
effort levels of our player groups: students and teachers. We already know the rules of the game
(non-cooperative and nonzero-sum), so lets make our assumptions:
1. The greatest reward (win) would be for the high effort of one group to be reciprocated by
the high effort of the other. Every teachers dream.
2. The greatest insult (loss) would be for the high effort of one group to be met with low
effort by the other. Every teachers nightmare.
3. Low effort is low effort; that is, there are not separate degrees to which one could supply
minimal effort.
The scorecard for these types of games is something called the payoff matrix, andgiven
our assumptionsour payoff matrix would look like this,
Table 1.1: Payoff Matrix
The choices for the column group of players (teachers) is denoted by the second value in each cell.

Teachers

Students

High effort

Low effort

High effort

d, a

f, b

Low effort

e, c

e, b

where a > b > c for teachers and d > e > f for students. If we supply numbers to fit the variables
(e.g. 2 > 1 > 0), the payoff matrix takes the form:
Table 1.2: Payoff Matrix (with numerical values)

Teachers

Students

High effort

Low effort

High effort

2, 2

0, 1

Low effort

1, 0

1, 1

Hefty Implications
Table 1.2 shows two clear Nash equilibria, namely high effort by both groups or low
effort by both groups. The implication for looking at engagement in this manner is that one
groups effort is likely to be predicated by their assumptions of the other group. For example, if
teachers believe that the majority of their students will put forth minimal effort, then the most
rewarding choice for teachers is to put forth minimal effort themselves. Likewise for students, if
they believe that their teacher is just collecting a paycheck, then their optimal choice would be
to supply minimal effort.
Of course, the converse is also true, and its much more encouraging. If teachers believe
that their students will supply a high level of effort, then the teachers best choice would be to
honor their students endeavors with high effort of their own. Similarly, if students think highly
of their teachers level of effort, they would be rewarded by providing an increased level of effort
themselves.
Questions Worth Considering

With the scores tallied and results from our game in, it is clear to see that Nashs work
continues to provide keen insights into the strategies behind the decisions we make as educators
every day. Some questions that may be worthy of additional reflection include:
How is engagement among our students quantified? We might think we know what low
effort looks like, but how do we gauge it formally in our students? (Marzano, Pickering, and
Pollock have developed an Effort and Achievement Rubric to this end).
What does low effort look like in teachers? How can it be quantified? What, if anything,
should be done to hold educators accountable for their own engagement?
What does high effort from students look like? From teachers? What, if anything, can be
done to incentivize high levels of effort from these two groups?
To what degree are effort assumptions based upon cultural competencies, or a lack thereof?
To what degree (or percentage) does each group of players assume high effort by the other?
To what degree (or percentage) does each group of players assume low effort by the other?
The last two questions are especially important since, as mentioned above, the games
payoff matrix implies that the effort-supply choices of both students and teachers will be wholly
dependent upon their assumptions about the other groups effort. Depending upon the answers to
the questions listed above, a few final questions may be worth asking:
How can the assumptions of each group be changed?
Will a change in assumptions correlate to a change in effort?
Will a change in effort correlate to a change in achievement?
Conclusion

The answers to these last three questions mentioned above will determine if, and to what
degree, our little thought experiment is worth replicating at your own site or district. If a
transitive relationship exists between assumptions, effort, and achievement, and if assumptions
can indeed be changed, then programs that target the assumptions of teachers are likely to
produce a positive change in achievement, and should therefore be of high importance to
educational leaders. And when these programs are in place and students and teachers are
supplying maximum effort in perfect harmony and test scores go through the roofwell know
whose beautiful mind deserves all of the credit.