Albert Rojan T.

Padilla
Succession Cases Comparative Analysis
Flora vs. Prado
Facts: The property under litigation is the northern half portion of residential lot issued in
the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr. After the
death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa married Bonifacio Calpatura. Narcisa then decided to sell
the northern portion half of the lot to his brother on law, Tomas. A Deed of Absolute Sale
was subsequently executed by the parties.
Floredeliza, the daughter of Tomas, built a duplex on the northern portion of the lot with a
firewall and paid for the corresponding taxes. Maximo also built a small house. The
respondents, who occupied the southern portion of the lot did not object to the said
constructions.
Several years later, respondents then filed to the RTC to declare the sale null and void as the
transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas
was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa's children tried to redeem the mortgaged
property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was
transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half
portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a
period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of
the title; that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the
northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only
P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.
In their answer, petitioners countered among others, that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the
property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and
1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; and that the consideration of the
sale in the amount of P10,500 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; and that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price
for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the
remaining balance. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision with the modification the sale in
dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-Narcisa
Prado in the subject property.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property was properly divided among the heirs upon the
death of Patricio Prado Sr.
Ruling: . Yes, the property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of
the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her
share in the conjugal partnership. While the other half is to be divided by its surviving heirs.
As a result, Narcisa as the owner of the said northern portion, has the right to sell the said
property and therefore, there was a valid contract of sale between Narcisa and Tomas.

De Borja vs. Vda de Borja

Facts: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of her wife Josefa Tangco
upon her death. While a widower, Francisco had taken a second wife, Tasiana. He was
appointed executor and administrator while Jose de Borja, his son of his first wife was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator while
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings upon the death of Francisco and was appointed
special administatror.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. Thus, Jose and Tasiana entered into a
compromise agreement to put an end to all of the pending litigations. However, Tasiana
argues that compromise agreement was not valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the
agreement was ade, the will was still being probated.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has
not yet been probated.
Ruling: Yes, the compromise agreement was valid. As a rule stated in the case of Guevara
vs. Guevara The presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement
and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy.There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the
estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a
hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Tasiana
was Franciscos compulsory heir and her successional interest existed independent of
Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not
probated at all.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Bailon-Casilao vs CA
Facts: The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination
of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar
their present action.
A parcel of land os co-owned by the Bailons namely Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe,
Nenita and Delia, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, (Nenita being
represented in this case by her children)Bernabe went to China and had not been heard from
since.
Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato. Rosalia, then sold the
remainder of the land to Ponciana. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado land
which the Delgado had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. John Lanuza, acting
under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of land to
Celestino. In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is.
It appears that the land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of
Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon , then in that
of Donato Delgado, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name, and finally in the name of Celestino
Afable, Sr. The Bailons, filed a case for recovery of property against Celestino Afable. In his
answer , Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and
said that the Bailons areguilty of laches.
It was then declared that Afable is a co-owner because he validly bought 2/6 of the land
(the shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio).
CA affirmed affirmed the decision. Prescription does not apply against the Bailons because
they are co-owners of the original sellers. But, an action to recover may be barred by laches.
CA held the Bailons guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of laches can be applied in the case.
Ruling: No. As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked. If
prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against
the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent
by operation of law the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa.

Alejandrino vs Ca.

Facts: When the spouses Alejandrino died they left a lot to their children namely Marcelino,
Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio . Upon the death of the spouses, the
property should have been divided among their children. However, the estate was said not
followed the proper procedure. Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of
the lots from her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. Aa third party named
Nique, also purchased portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia ,the alleged seller to Nique, later questioned the sale in an action for
quieting of title and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Nique and declared him the
owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew
the same. Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had
been declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. The
trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement between
Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Ruling: Yes. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Laurencia was within her hereditary
rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become
final and executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a
motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he
was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the
estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by
the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings,
(3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the
intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had
acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed
to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its
effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.

Mondoido vs De Roda
FACTS: Ricardo de Roda awarded two public writings, forcing Lazaro Mondoido to sell a
portion of land, which he was to inherit from their grandparents, receiving P200 as advance
payment. At the time of the granting of such deeds there was already a legal settlement in

the Court of First Instance of Cebu property of his grandfather Eduardo de Roda. With minor
differences, the first document is written as the second.
Thereafter, the plaintiff presented fulfilling demand asking the two contracts. The defendant,
as
administrator of the goods relict of Richard de Roda, presented two defenses: (a) that such
deed sare void as it concerned future inheritance, and (b) that the action is barred. When
Edward died, he left his children and grandchildren as heirs. Ricardo, in representation of
his father, inherited the 3/24 parts of the goods of his abuelo. When Ricardo died,
subsequently
his relict goods were distributed to Eduardo. Ricardo her late grandfather and his sister
Roberta
received in that to or their participation in the legacy of Edward, which was administered by
the widow of Richard, Roberta giving this to their participation in the products of that
heritage.
Issue: Whether or not, the agreement of the two scripts concerned future inheritance.
Ruling: Yes. No doubt they are written in a way that one cannot be sure if Ricardo was
selling his participation in the estate of his late grandfather Edward alone or in those of his
grandparents Edward and Antonina, but even if he had promised to sell its participation in
the estate of his grandfather and grandmother, the promise of sale in terms of the latter
property is null and void in value because it refers to selling future inheritance. Antonina
Ricardo Sepulveda lived even if awarded the scriptures, but there are zero in for goods that
Ricardo recibria the intestate of his grandfather Edward, because such goods were already in
process relict of court settlement when the otorgo. Los Ricardo rights to succession are
transmitted by operation of law from the time of death (art . 657, Code Civ Spanish.) Ricardo
was already owner of the 3/24 parts of such property, by way of royal heritage, present and
future.

Barretto vs Tuason

Facts: The mayorazgo was founded by Don Antonio Tuason on February 25, 1794. On June 4
of the same year, Don Antonio died in the City of Manila. The appellants in this case are the
brother and sisters Benito, Consuelo. Rita, surnamed Legarda y de la Paz. These intervenors
claim participations in one-fifth of the properties in two capacities: First. is descendants of
the younger son Pablo Tuason, and, second, for having inherited from their parents the
participations in one-fifth of the properties which were sold to the latter by certain relatives
of the founder. They likewise claim the share to which they would be entitled in the
participations of certain relatives of the younger daughter, Eustaquia Ma. Tuason, who sold
said participations to the defendants. We will hereafter have occasion to pass on this
contention in discussing the four assigned error.
The recipients of the fifth of the revenues of the mayorazgo are indicated in the sixth clause
of the instrument of foundation, it states:
"It shall be his duty to set apart one-fifth of the net revenue derived from the entail each
year, and that one-fifth part shall be divided into eight parts, giving one to each of my eight
children, and in their absence, to my grandchildren, but upon the understanding that if one
or more of my children should die without succession, the part belonging to them shall be
distributed among my children and other descendants of mine according to their needs and
as prudence may dictate to him, so that, when the time arrives that none of my children are
alive, it shall then be always understood that said fifth part shall be applied to all those of
my descendants who are poor, the apportionment to be made by him prudently according to
their needs and therefore the possessor of the entail is hereby charged to discharge this
duty with conscientious scruple.
Issue: Whether or not the descendants of Don Antonio Tuason subsequent to his
grandchildren are entitled to succeed a fifth of revenues of his properties.
Ruling: Yes. If the descendants of the younger children, subsequent to the grandchildren of
the founder, are granted under certain circumstances the right to possess
the mayorazgo itself, with all its properties, it does not make sense how it can be said that
these descendants, subsequent to grandchildren, the sons of sons, were prohibited from
receiving a fifth of the revenues of said properties. The intention of the founder was not to
restrict the grant of the usufruct of the fifth of the revenue by limiting it to a certain number
of generations of the younger children, but that he intended to extend it to all of the
descendants of the latter. If this is so we should apply to the case the rule of law of
the Partidas (Rule 28, Title 34, 7th Partido), which says: "Privilegia recipiunt largum
interpretationem voluntati consonan concedentis." (Privileges are to be interpreted with
liberality in accordance with the will of him who grants them.)

Tordilla vs Tordilla
Facts:

Francisco Tordilla, who died leaving as his only heirs his widow, a legitimate son, and a
recognized natural daughter. A contract was entered into between the legitimate son and
the natural daughter in another case and signed shortly before the death of their father.
The contract is in the nature of a compromise and covered two items, namely, first, the
support of the natural daughter which the brother agreed to assume for one year and,
second, a proposed division of their future inheritance upon the death of their father. It is
assumed that appellant has complied with his terms of the contract, and the father died
before the obligation of the brother terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the contract is invalid as it constitutes future inheritance.
Ruling: Yes, the Contract is not valid. The second portion of the contract clearly relates to
the anticipated future inheritance and therefore, is null and void under the provisions of
article 1271 of the Civil Code which reads:
"ART. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not out of the commerce of man, may
be
the subject-matter of contracts."Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect
to future inheritances, except thosethe object of which is to make a division intervivos of the
estate, in accordance with article 1056."Any services not contrary to law or to good morals
may also be the subject-matter of a contract."

Jaboneta vs Gustillo
Facts: Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in
question, which has been presented for probate as his will: Being in the house of Arcadio
Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be written, and

calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses,executed the said
document as his will.
They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when
he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwardsas a witness, at his request, and in
his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed
as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence ofthe other two persons
who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry toleave, took his hat
and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen inhis hand and
put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presenceof Isabelo
Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed asa
witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.The proceedings
probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased,because the
lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that JulioJavellana,
one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of IsabeloJena,
another of the witnesses, as required.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of the last will and testament was proper on the ground
that one of the witnesses did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of another of
the witnesses.
Ruling: No, the purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of
the
testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the
instrument
subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are
vision
and mental apprehension.It is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of
witnessing
the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to
do
so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not
whether
the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign,
considering
his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. The principles
on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the testator and the
witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the witnesses signed the
instrument in the presence of each other, as required by the statute, and applying them to
the facts proven in these proceedings we are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to
the execution of the instrument were complied with, and that the lower court erred in
denying probate to the will on the ground stated in the ruling appealed from. Thus, the
Supreme Court admitted the instrument propounded therein to probate as the last will and
testament of Macario Jaboneta.

Nera vs. Rimando

Facts: At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by
a
doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when
the
other witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.
The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the
witness as
of vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta
v.
Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer
room
while the signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
execution of
the will.
Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other
witnesses in
the act of affixing their signatures.
Held: Yes, the Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in
the
outer room when the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would
have
invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not
done in
the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the
testator
and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.
The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of
the
attaching the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.
In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actuallmy saw
each
other sign but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to do so
considering
their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the
inscription of the signature.

De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona

Facts: On 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of
Severina, was designated executrix. Severina died a few years later, leaving no heirs by
force of law. Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. The appellants
Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not executed in
the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No.
2645 which requires that in cases where the testator is unable to sign, the testator or the
person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the name
of
the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause
does notmention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the
fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the
attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will be considered invalid because (1) the person requested to
sign the
name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) the attestation
clause
does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) the fact
that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the
attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
Ruling: No, the will is still considered valid. As to the first point, it had been held by this
court that
where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his
presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the
validity
of the will is concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his
own or
not .There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is
that
the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the
law
says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by
the

customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction
put
upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather
than the
derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed'
is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. . The testatrix thumb-mark appears
in the
center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.

Garcia v. Lacuesta
Facts : The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The
said will was written in Ilocano dialect. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador'
and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although under the
express direction of the testator. This fact however, was not recited in the attestation clause.
Mercado also affixed a cross on the will. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this
order was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to
recite the facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid.
Ruling: No, the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or the
testator
caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express direction as required by Sec.
618
of the Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held
that it is not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons.
The cross
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid
signature.