Art 838

Roberts vs Leonidas
129 SCRA 33
FACTS:
Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was
survived by his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his
two children from a 1st marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce. Grimm
executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his 2nd wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in
March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed
in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two
wills and a codicil for probate in April 1978, and was issued upon consideration of
the stipulation between the lawyers for Maxine and Ethel.
In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding
in Manila, entered into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement
provided that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal
representatives (administrators) of Grimms Philippine estate and that Maxines
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her which would not be less than
$1.5 million plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa.
Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah
probate proceedings. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine
withdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in
the record. The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which
was already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be
set aside, and that Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for
the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that
they were defrauded due to the machinations of the Ethel, that the compromise
agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died
testate so the partition was contrary to the decedents wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent
Judge for lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Ethels motion to dismiss
HELD:
No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed.

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a

person who died testate should be settled through an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and
other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the
testate case.
Nepomuceno vs CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the
petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly
stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the Will, but the legal wife
and children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on
the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with Nepomuceno. The wills
admission to probate was deemed an idle exercise since based on the face of the
will, the invalidity of the intrinsic provisions is evident. The appellate court,
however, declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but such
was denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last will and testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?
HELD:
As to the first issue, the court acted within its jurisdiction. The general rule is
that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might become
an idle ceremony if on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
On the second issue, as to validity of the disposition to the petitioner:
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by
reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought
by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions. The records of the case do not sustain a finding of
innocence or good faith on the part of Nepomuceno:
a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits its indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee
b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance
of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence. In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity
of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the testator at the start of the
proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived
with as a husband, was already married was important. When the court ruled that
Jugo and the petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it was a finding
that the petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void.
The giver cannot given even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very
wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
Caiza vs CA
268 SCRA 640
Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of

the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was
declared incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person
and estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a
suit to eject the spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City.
Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the
property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of
the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be
raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that
through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to
vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they **
(were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while
they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent
** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also
alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first
letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's
house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will by which she "bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Caiza but it was
reversed on appeal by the Quezon City RTC. Caiza sought to have the Court of
Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that attempt.
It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the
"defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as
evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while
"said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be
the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire
on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in
their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority
to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond
the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Caiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by
this Court's leave, substituted for her.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring
said action; and
2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's
death.

Ruling:
On the first issue, the Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by
Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and
legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it
may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case
there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters
of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take
possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the
management of her properties.".
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person,
to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to
custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both
real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage
the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it

from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful
for this purpose.
On the second issue, as already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the
pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition,
arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward
is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule
affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen
Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's
nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they
were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.
"SEC. 18.
Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Sanchez vs CA
279 SCRA 647
Facts:
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a lot owned by her parents-in-law. The
lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo
Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez, Lilian Sanchez, Nenita Sanchez, Susana Sanchez and
Felipe Sanchez. Thereafter, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the
name of Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been
executed by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not
affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot,
thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the
aforesaid lot with the MeTC. MeTC decided in favor of Teria. RTC decision affirmed
the RTC. CA dismissed the case and held the proceedings closed and terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it deemed the special proceedings closed
and terminated?

Held:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of
the estate may be made when the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, had been
paid. This order for the distribution of the estates residue must contain the names
and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record,
particularly the trial courts conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing requirements
already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates
have already been paid. Thus, the court has essentially finished said proceedings
which should be closed and terminated.

Art. 839
Coso vs Deza
42 Phil 585
FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her
for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to
the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario
Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is
alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence
alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that
Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that
effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative,
with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of
testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person

sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testators free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of
its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does
not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be
practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in
favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made.

Pascual vs Dela Cruz

28 SCRA 421

FACTS:
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving
descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque,
Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged
will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was
named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz
contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law
were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her
properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature
of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

ISSUE:
WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and
influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.
HELD:
No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the
deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for
she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only
Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her
sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina
Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any
objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the
jurisprudence on this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano,
L-18979, 30 June 1964.
The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to
establish actual undue influence and improper pressure exercised on the
testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter,
in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything
unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything
that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestantsappellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix,
placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be
painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and
destroy the free will of the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were
really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then
proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr.
Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue
influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult
for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative or friend
is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her
will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her,
thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged
person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of
a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
during her lifetime.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina
de la cruzfell short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or
influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son,
to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of
her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
The probate of the will was allowed.
De Aparicio vs Paraguya
150 SCRA 279

Art. 850
Austria vs Reyes
31 SCRA 754
FACTS:
Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante
mortem of her last will and testament which was opposed by Ruben Austria
and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. However, such opposition
was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing. The bulk of
the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and
others whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally
adopted children. Subsequently, upon Basilias death, Perfecto was
appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the formers will.
Ruben and the other petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin
and that the five private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in fact been
adopted by the testator in accordance with law, hence they should be
rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as heirs. The
court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court
delimited to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the
will and disregarded the matter of the genuineness of adoption. Upon denial
of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower courts
orders restricting their intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event
there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is
false.
RULING:
Article 850 provides, The statement of a false cause for the institution
of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will of
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity
of such cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
2. The cause must be shown to be false; and
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever

false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of
heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her
will to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed
her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not
bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free
portion of her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored and doubts
are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the
part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes
of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it effect.