ONCE AGAIN ON EUSEBIUS ON ARISTOCLES

ON TIMON ON PYRRHO*

I should perhaps apologize for devoting a longish paper to a very well-known

document, which has been glossed again and again by every historian of
Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism.l My excuse for doing so is double: first, there is
a general agreement, I think, on the crucial importance of this document for
any attempt to reconstruct Pyrrho's thought; secondly, I would like to offer a
new, and I hope reasonable, reading, of some of the most disputed points in it.
The text comes from Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, Bk.xiv, ch. 18,
paragraphs 1-5 ( = Aristocles fr. 6 Heiland = Pyrrho test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
See the Greek text in the Appendix to this chapter). Eusebius, as is well known,
writes at the beginning of the fourth century AD, with the aim of exposing the
absurdities and inconsistencies of most pagan philosophy. He makes abundant use of some good sources, in particular the Peripatetic philosopher
Aristocles of Messina, whose date has been recently pushed back from the
second half of the second century AD to the end of the first century BC. 2 The
work of Aristocles used by Eusebius was an important treatise in ten books,
with the title /7ept ^iXooo^ias. Most of Eusebius' chapters 17 to 21 comes
from Book vm of Aristocles' On Philosophy, dealing successively with
* Afirstversion of this paper was delivered in May 1992, before the Cambridge B-Club. Many
searching objections were presented to me, in particular by Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede
and David Sedley; others, no less impressive, were communicated to me in carefully written
letters I received from Jonathan Barnes, Marcel Conche, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi and Nick
Denyer. I thank them all warmly. If I did not draw from this salvo of criticisms the conclusion
that I had better not publish the paper, it is because I still have a hunch that it is basically on the
right track. I have attempted, in this new version, to answer the most powerful objections
directed at the original one. Thanks are also due to Michel Poirier for his Greek expertise.
Finally, I must acknowledge that I received the first insight into the views I am here expressing
from two sentences in Groarke 1990, p. 81 n. 1. A propos of the possible influence of Indian
thought on Pyrrho, Groarke writes en passant. 'Buddhism eliminates all individuality and
duality, establishing that things are indeterminate and unmeasurable and that beliefs are
neither true nor false. All distinctions are eradicated and no category is more applicable than its
opposite' (my emphasis).
1
The bibliography of the subject is more or less identical with the general bibliography on
Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism. Up to 1980, such a general bibliography has been compiled by
L. Ferraria and G. Santese in the second volume of Giannantoni 1981. Cf. also Decleva Caizzi
1981, pp. 17-26, and now Barnes 1992, pp. 4295-301. The most important publications will be
quoted or mentioned, I think, in the paper.
2
Cf. Follet's notice in Goulet 1989, s.v. Aristocles de Messine. Aristocles apud Eusebius, PE
xiv. 18.29 contemptuously speaks of 'a certain Aenesidemus, who quite recently (ixOes /ecu
7Tpu)rjv), in Alexandria in Egypt, tried to revive this [Pyrrhonian] rubbish'. If Aenesidemus
wrote around 40 BC, as is generally agreed, Aristocles cannot have written this way much later.
190

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

191

Xenophanes and Parmenides, the Sceptics, the Cyrenaics, Metrodorus and

Protagoras, and finally Epicurus. The extracts usually include a short doxographical section and a long critical section. Eusebius quotes directly from
Aristocles' book, which he seems to have to hand; at any rate, in the extract in
which we are interested, he claims to quote Aristocles' ipsissima verba or nearly
so (cSSe TTTJ irpos Xe^iv k'xovTOs, XIV, 17.10).

Here is the translation I propose of this controversial text: 3

[Title of the chapter]: Against the people called Pyrrhonian Sceptics, or
Ephectics, who declare that nothing is graspable.
(1)

It is necessary, first of all, to inquire about our knowledge; for if by nature

we are unable to know anything, it will not be necessary to look at the
rest.
(2) There were some people in older times who told such a story; Aristotle
contradicted them. Pyrrho of Elis gained some fame by saying such
things (LOXVO fxev rotavra Xeycov /cat TIvppcov 6 'HAetos), but he himself

did not leave any written work.

In any case, his disciple Timon (6 8e ye fjLaOrjrrjs avrov TL/JLCOV) says
that it is necessary, for whoever is to enjoy happiness, to look at the three
following points (cfrrjol 8eiv rov fjueXXovra evSai/jLOvrjoetv eh rpia
[1*]

First, how things are by their nature {irpcorov ^ev,

ravra

OTTOLOL 7re</>u/ce TOL

TTpdyfjuara)',

[2*] Secondly, in what way we must be disposed towards them (Sevrepov Se,
rt'va XPV rpoirov rjfjb&s rrpos avra Sta/cetcx0at);

[3*] Finally, what the benefit will be for people who are so (reXevralov e, ri
Trepieorai rots OVTOJS e'xovoi).
(3) [1]
(la) As for things, he [i.e. Timon] says that he [i.e. Pyrrho] declares
them equally indifferent and unstable and undecidable 4 (ra yiev ovv
irpdyfjuard (f>7]otv avrov a7TO<f)aLveLV eir larjg ahid<f)Opa /cat

dorddynqra

/cat dv77t/cptra),
[lb] that for this reason neither our sensations nor our beliefs are either
true or false (Std TOVTO \vf\re r d ? alodiqoeis

TJJJLOOV jji-qre ras

86as

aXr)deveiv rj ifjevSeodcu).
[2]

[2a] For this reason then, that it is necessary not to trust them (Std
TOVTO ovv fjirjSe TnoTeveiv aurats" 8etv),
3

The numbers in plain type are those of the traditional paragraphs; those in bold type are mine,
and will be useful for my discussion. When discussing the views of scholars who introduced
other symbols, I shall adapt the latter accordingly.
The meaning of the three adjectives, and the question whether eirioiqs goes with the three of
them or only with the first, have been hotly discussed. But not much depends on it for the points
I am here discussing. I adopt the translation given in a paper to which I am much indebted
(Stopper 1983, p. 274).

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SCEPTICISM

[2b] but to be unopinionated, impartial and unwavering5 (dAA' d8odorovs

Kal OLKALVLS Kal OLKpaSdvrovs

etvat),

[2c] saying about each one that it no more is than is not, or that it both is
and is not, or that it neither is nor is not 6 (irepl evos eKaarov Aeyovras on
OV fJL&AAoV OTIV 7] OVK GTIV Tf Kal OTL Kal OVK OTLV rj OVT GTLV OVT OVK
<JTLV).

(4)

[3] Now, for the people disposed that way Timon says that the benefit will
be first abstention from assertion (d^aciav), then absence of trouble
(drapagiav), and Aenesidemus says pleasure.
(5) Those are the main points of their sayings (rd /JLV OVV Kecf>dAaia rcov
Xeyofievcov); let us see if they speak rightly (el opdcog Xeyovoiv).

I shall here mainly concentrate on the controversial meaning of the inference

marked by Sid rovro at the beginning of the sentence I have numbered as [lb]
(not the following inference, also marked by Std TOVTO at the beginning of [2a]).
This inference has been labelled as 'a zany inference' by Stopper (1983, p. 293
n. 53); and I shall hereafter designate it as 'the zany inference'. I have two
claims about it: first, that we should not attribute the zany inference to Pyrrho,
but to Timon; and secondly, that it is not a zany inference at all. I shall first
argue in some detail in favour of these two claims, about which I feel myself
reasonably certain. Then, in the second part of this paper, I shall try to draw,
from the results of the first part, some more general and more speculative
consequences.
To begin with, I shall briefly recall the complex, many-layered structure of
Eusebius' text. As indicated above, Eusebius is quoting Aristocles, presumably verbatim. Aristocles himself relies on Timon (C.320-C.230); but his
relation to Timon is certainly not of the same nature as the relation of Eusebius
to him. Aristocles devotes the whole section to the critical account of the
opinions of a group of people, 'called Pyrrhonian Sceptics or Ephectics' (this
phrase comes from the title of chapter 18, a title which also seems to stem from
Aristocles himself)- He essentially considers them as ancient representatives of
an epistemological version of scepticism, i.e. of the claim that we are by nature
unable to know anything (cf. 1). After noting that versions of epistemological
scepticism were already known to Aristotle, and impugned by him, Aristocles
introduces Pyrrho as a man who uoxvoe roiavra Xeycov. The meaning of this
sentence is unclear between (a) 'Pyrrho was very good at saying such things'
and (b) 'Pyrrho gained some fame by saying such things'. I have adopted (b),
5

These three adjectives too have been carefully dissected by the scholars, but their exact
meaning does not matter much either for my discussion. I adopt here the translation offered in
another recent paper to which I owe a great deal (Ausland 1989, p. 406).
The above translation of this all-important sentence corresponds to one of its possible
syntactical analyses, probably the most usual. Stopper 1983, pp. 272-4 contrasts it with - and
rejects it in favour of- the following one: saying that it is no more than it is not, or it both is and
is not, or it neither is nor is not. I am inclined to prefer the usual construction, but here again the
choice does not have any bearing on my claims.

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

193

because it makes a fairly neat contrast to the sentence which follows, namely:
'but whereas he himself did not leave any written work, his disciple Timon
says, etc' Aristocles thus seems to say: Pyrrho is credited with having been a
notorious proponent of epistemological scepticism; but unfortunately I
cannot substantiate this reputation by producing direct evidence, because we
have no direct evidence from Pyrrho at all. Then Timon, Pyrrho's disciple, is
introduced in the story, but visibly as a second-best solution (see the contrast
between avros \xev and 6 he ye jjLadrjrrjs avrov). Aristocles does not even
suggest that Timon is an especially authorized disciple; he does not introduce
him as Pyrrho's 'spokesman' (TTpo^rrjs), like Sextus, M 1.53.7 He claims
to give what Timon said (jfirjoi, three occurrences in the text, in (2), [la] and
(3)), but he does not refer to any definite work; only later on in the chapter
will he mention Timon's Pytho and Silloi. Many people have suggested that
Aristocles' source here is the Pytho, since this work apparently was a prose
work, unlike the Silloi, and Aristocles is going to quote precisely from the
Pytho in 14. But, according to Diogenes Laertius ix. 111, Timon's prose works
amounted to 20,000 lines, so that there is no certainty at all about the Pytho
being the source here as well. And of course it is important to notice that the
whole extract is labelled, at the end of it, as a summary (/c</>aAcua).
A summary of what, and a summary made by whom? Certainly not a
summary of what Pyrrho said, made by Timon himself, since Aenesidemus
(first century BC) is mentioned in the text (as he will be later on in the chapter,
11,16 and 29). Not even a summary of what Timon said, made by Aristocles,
since it is presented as a summary of what was said (rd)v Xeyofjuevajv) not by one
man only, but by a number of people, whose views will then be scrutinized,
after having been summed up (note the plural in transition at the end of the
extract: oKei/jtofjieda 3' el opdtbs Xeyovoiv). Hence, I suppose we are dealing at
best with a summary of what was supposedly said by the Pyrrhonian Sceptics
in general, made by Aristocles himself (or an intermediate source), on the basis
of something that he had good reasons to think that Timon, Pyrrho's disciple,
had said. We can only hope, at the very best (to quote Stopper 1983, p. 271),
that 'Aristocles, hostile though he was to Pyrrhonism, [was] an honest
reporter.' But we cannot expect him to report about anything other than what
he says he is reporting about.
If he is an honest reporter about what he claims to report, we have to look
very carefully at his report. And here will be my first question: what exactly
does Aristocles say about what Timon was saying about Pyrrho! Surprisingly
7

This point has been criticized by Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, who claims (in correspondence)
that ye has very often (and very often particularly in Aristocles) an emphatic force, so that we
should think, on the contrary, that Timon is presented by Aristocles as a very good source, as
Aristocles needs him indeed to be, in order to polemize with him in the following pages. I do not
deny that at all, (after all, a second-best solution is a second-best solution); but I maintain the
trivial truth that Aristocles would have been happier, in order to polemize with the 'Pyrrhonian
Sceptics', to have something to quote from Pyrrho himself. And it is equally true that he does
not say anything explicit about the privileged status of Timon, of all Pyrrho's disciples, as a
witness to Pyrrho's thought.

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SCEPTICISM

enough, as far as our passage is concerned, the Timon-Pyrrho question has

been largely ignored by modern interpreters, whereas the perhaps less
important Aristocles-Timon question has been much discussed. Modern
scholars are almost unanimous in considering our text as a crucially important
document about Pyrrho's thought, tacitly relying on an assumption of
transparent faithfulness on behalf of Timon, supposed to be Pyrrho's 'spokesman' and just that. 8 They usually have no qualms in quoting a part or the
whole of our text as indiscriminately reporting Pyrrho's views, or Timon's
views (assuming that they are identical), or, at their most prudent, Timon's
views about Pyrrho's views.
But that is still not to be prudent enough, it seems to me. We must actually
resist the temptation to assume that Timon attributes or refers to Pyrrho,
either explicitly or even implicitly, everything that he says or is supposed to say
in the Aristocles document, and this for a very simple reason: whereas we find
in our passage two occurrences of the phrase TL^uyv <f>rjoi, we find one sentence,
and only one, beginning with the more complex phrase (f>rjoLv OLVTOV arro^aiveiv: (frrjGiv, i.e. Timon says; avrov arro(j>aiviv, i.e. that Pyrrho declares. It is
the [la] sentence, which deals with TOL Trpay^ara: 'Timon says that Pyrrho
declares rd Trpdyfiara equally indifferent', etc. If this sentence, or the sentence
beginning with these words, is the only one which Timon explicitly attributes
to Pyrrho, we must conclude, a contrario, that the rest of the text, either in part
or wholly, contains things which were at least not explicitly attributed to
Pyrrho by Timon. 9 Thus we have an urgent task to perform, or to try to
perform: namely, to determine where we have to put the end-quote sign, in
order to demarcate what is explicitly attributed by Timon to Pyrrho from what
is not so.
When trying to answer this question, we come across a very disputed point,
namely the syntax, meaning and value of the clause [lb], beginning with Std
TOVTO (the first occurrence, which is in [lb], not the second one, which is in
[2a]). At least two syntactic problems are raised by this clause, I think. One of
them has been raised by Stopper: there is, he says (1983, p. 293 n. 53), 'a strange
asyndeton in the text': the Sid TOVTO clause has indeed no linking particle with
what comes before. I shall come back to this question later on. But another
syntactic problem has, as far as I can see, been largely ignored. Most people
seem to construe, more or less explicitly, the infinitive proposition jjur/Te TOLS
8

The only frank exception I know of is Michael Frede, who sounds a note of warning in Frede
1973Fernanda Decleva Caizzi objects that it would need very clumsy Greek sentences, with three
infinitives, to express each time explicitly that Timon says that Pyrrho said that, etc., and that it
was unnecessary, since the master-pupil relation between Pyrrho and Timon had been laid
down from the outset. But the fact is, precisely, that such a clumsy phrase (perhaps not so
clumsy after all) is used once and only once (<j>r)Giv avrov dno^aiveLv), and then not at the
beginning of the report. Precisely at the beginning of the report, we do have a sentence with
three infinitives (8eiv, euSou/u-ovqcreiv, pXeneiv), but it is simply prefixed by TIJACOV <j>rjoi. Let us
add, above all, that there was a very simple and economical way of expanding the scope of
(f>r)oiv avrov airofyaivziv to both [la] and[lb], by writing ra fxev ovv irpdy^xard (f>rjGiv avrov
a7TO<f>aLVLV in LGTJS aoia<j>opa /ecu a.Grdd[ir\ra teal aveniKpira ^cfvai), Sia rovro /xrjrc ras
alodrjoeis TJ/JLCOV firjre ras ooas aArjOeveiv 7/
i/jSd

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

I95

. . . ipevSeoOac [lb] as dependent on avrov ano$alviv\ so that

Pyrrho is made directly responsible for the Sid rovro clause, i.e. for the zany
inference, for its contents as well as for its logical link with what comes before.
According to this analysis, the text would mean: Timon says that Pyrrho (a)
declares the things indifferent etc., <and (b) declares > that for this reason
our sensations, etc. This analysis I do not hesitate to call wrong. Why? Because
in the previous clause, namely [la], we find the verb <j>r]oiv (subject Timon),
followed by an infinitive proposition (avrov drr offtake iv, subject Pyrrho),
which is itself followed, not by a second subordinate infinitive proposition
dependent on a-no^alveiv, but by an attributive construction (airo^alveiv ra
TTpdy^iara dSid</>opa, without any eivai). On the face of it, therefore, it is much
more natural to consider that we have indeed two infinitive propositions, but
coordinated, and both dependent on faoiv (subject Timon): the first one
having avrov (i.e. Pyrrho) as its subject, and airocfraiveiv as its verb; the second
one having pnqre ras alodrjceis etc. as its subject, and aX-qdeveiv rj ifjevSeadai as
its verbs. The meaning then is: Timon says (a) that Pyrrho declares the things
indifferent, etc., < and > (b) that for this reason our sensations, etc. This is the
analysis which I venture to call right, not because the alternative one is
grammatically impossible (some colleagues who are good at Greek have told
me that it was quite acceptable), but because it is the simpler and more natural
of the two possible analyses: nothing tells against it, I think, and absolutely
nothing compels us to prefer the other one. If this argument is not totally
mistaken, we can thus conclude that the zany inference was not attributed by
Timon to Pyrrho. The scope of the quotation of Pyrrho's views by Timon,
opened by avrov airocftaiveiv, ends with aveiriKpira', it includes [la], it does not
include [lb]. And if Timon did not attribute the inference to Pyrrho, the most
economical and likely hypothesis is that he made the inference himself. He said
himself what followed from what he said Pyrrho had said.
Let us turn at present to the meaning of this inference. If it is a zany
inference, well, we have just succeeded in exonerating Pyrrho from a zany
inference. But we have charged Timon with a zany inference. Now, is it a zany
inference?
A long time ago, Zeller suggested, without explanation, that we should read
Sid TO instead of Sid rovro. The meaning of the logical sequence then became
the following: 'things are indifferent, etc., for the reason that our sensations,
etc' The motivation of this proposal is clear enough; it is very well explained
by Stopper, the most confident modern supporter of Zeller's emendation. I
quote him (1983, p. 293 n. 53):
How does Timon's remark about the senses connect with his remark about the
dSia(j)opta of ra Trpay/xara? The transmitted text is clear: since things are
indifferent,/<9r that reason (Sid rovro) our senses are unreliable. But that is a zany
inference, as a little reflexion will show. Moreover, it leaves a strange asyndeton
in the text. The inference should go the other way about, as it does in later
scepticism. We should accept Zeller's Sid TO for Sid rovro, which restores sense
and syntax at one blow.

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SCEPTICISM

And Stopper goes on: 'I am not assuming that Timon thought in the same way
as later Pyrrhonists and then emending the text to suit this assumption: the
received text is wholly puzzling as it stands, and the emendation is compelling
without any such assumption.'
Let us develop the Zeller-Stopper position a little, before trying to challenge
it. What makes the inference 'zany', and the emendation of the text 'compelling', is a natural enough, but quite determinate interpretation of the three
Pyrrhonian adjectives kir Lorjs dhidcjyopa KCLL doraO/ji^Ta KCLL dverriKpira. The
first thing which comes to mind is indeed to give to these adjectives a
'subjective' meaning, i.e. a meaning which includes a reference to our own
cognitive and discriminating capacities: 'things' are dhid<j>opa in the sense that
we cannot differentiate them; they are dordd^ra in the sense that we cannot
assess them; they are dverriKpna in the sense that we cannot make any decision
about them. 10 If we give to the three adjectives such a 'subjective' meaning, the
SLOL TOVTO inference is zany indeed: for it does not make sense to say first that we
are unable to differentiate 'things', and then that/or this very reason our senses
and beliefs are unreliable. Our epistemic powerlessness, if anything, is the
ground for the indifference of 'things' understood that way; it cannot be a
consequence of it. Once turned upside down by the emendation, the sequence is
faultless: our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false; then how are
things? They are equally indifferent and unstable and undecidable.
There are two big drawbacks to this reading of the text. First, how can we
know, or simply assert, that our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor
false? This assertion seems only to be made possible on the basis of a long and
sophisticated scrutiny of the credentials of such sensations and beliefs11 - a
scrutiny which should be at least mentioned as an all-important step on the
Pyrrhonian road to happiness, if it is to be conceived in this way. Secondly, and
still more seriously, it seems totally forbidden to ask the question 'then how are
things?', since Aristocles' text is absolute clear on the injunction (however
puzzling it might seem on behalf of Pyrrho) to look first at the nature of things
{-npojTov JJLV, 67701a TT(f)VK Ta TT pay paT a). How could we obey this injunction
if we had to look elsewhere (i.e. at what Aristocles calls 'our own knowledge')
beforehand?
That is, I suppose, why a number of modern scholars reject Zeller's
emendation, albeit for various reasons. 12 But they have to try to escape the
10

11

12

Quite consistently, Stopper 1983, pp. 274 and 292 n. 50 argues that if the question is obscure as
far as the two first adjectives are concerned, the 'subjective' sense is indisputable in the case of
the third adjective aveiriKpLTa, so that the same type of sense should be transposed to the two
others.
Still quite consistently, Stopper writes (1983, pp. 274-5): 'Pyrrho urged, no doubt on the basis of
some of the arguments later collected by Aenesidemus, that "our perceptions and our beliefs are
neither truthful nor liars"' (my emphasis).
Let us notice that in order to keep the manuscript reading, it is not possible to rely on the
recurrences of Sid TOVTO in Aristocles' following critical considerations (5.3; 7.1), for these
recurrences go back to the 8LOL TOVTO in [2a], not to the one in [lb]. The criticism launched at
10.1-2, moreover, seems to imply that the Pyrrhonians did not say wherefrom they had learnt
to say that all things are dS^Aa.

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

I97

quite real difficulty this emendation was meant to dissolve. Roughly speaking,
in order to give a plausible meaning to the zany inference without emending
the text, it was necessary to find for the three Pyrrhonian adjectives of [la]
another meaning than the 'subjective' one which had prompted the ZellerStopper position. These attempts, I think, are mainly of two kinds: either you
take the adjectives to refer to 'objective' properties of 'things', properties
which 'things' have quite independently from our capacities or incapacities to
assess them, and you deduce the epistemological impotence of our sensations
and beliefs from this so to speak intrinsic inapprehensibility of things; or you
take the same adjectives to refer to the 'moral' indifference of'things', and you
try to show that a destruction of the epistemological claims of sensations and
beliefs is a kind of middle term between the awareness of this indifference and
the attainment of happiness. The most detailed attempts to argue these two
solutions to the puzzle have been put forward, I think, by Decleva Caizzi
(1981) for the first one, and by Ausland (1989) for the second one. I do not find
those attempts to be satisfactory; but since I want to come as soon as possible
to the constructive part of this paper, I shall say only a few words about each of
them, hoping, however, not to be unfair to them.
According to Decleva Caizzi (1981, 225-7), the logical succession does
indeed go, as the received text clearly implies, from the 'nature of things' to the
impossibility of sensations and beliefs to be true or false. In order to make this
move legitimate, the three adjectives which describe the status of'things' must
have an 'objective' meaning, i.e. to designate properties which 'things' do
possess in themselves, independently of any relation to our cognitive capacities. Decleva Caizzi suggests the following meanings: 'without differences
between them' for aScdfopa, 'unstable' for darafyx^Ta, 'confused' for aveiriKpira. The inference from the 'things' having such a 'nature' to the unreliability of our senses and judgements is then glossed in the following way: 'Timon's
words [i.e. his words in la] do not refer to a dichotomy between a reality which
remains unknown and a world of phenomena, i.e. ofappearances of something,
but imply the negation of the concepts of <j)vcns and r68e n\ it follows that,
once the notion of being as determination is dissolved, everything is reduced to
appearance, for which it makes no sense to speak of truth or error'. Here
Decleva Caizzi seems to be clearly indebted to Marcel Conche's nihilistic view
of Pyrrho (in Conche 1973), which relies on the same distinction between the
notion of an 'appearance of something' (which is the very basis of the later,
'phenomenistic' neo-Pyrrhonism) and the notion of 'sheer appearance' or
'appearance of nothing' (which would be, according to Conche, the genuine
Pyrrhonian notion). Whatever we may think of this interpretation, it is hard to
attribute such a view to Timon, since he is credited (by DL ix.105) with the
typically 'phenomenistic' formula: 'That honey is sweet I do not posit, that it
appears to be so (^cuWrcu) I admit' - a formula which Conche can only
accommodate by saying (1973, p. 57) that 'the Pyrrhonian thesis is immediately betrayed when it is expressed'. In addition to these general difficulties,
Decleva Caizzi's suggestion does not properly fit our text: Timon does not say

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that, since 'things' are indifferent, 'it makes no sense to speak of truth or error';
he says that since 'things' are indifferent, it makes perfectly good sense to say
that our sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false. If this means, as
Stopper (1983, p. 292 n. 53) quite reasonably suggests, that they are 'neither
constant truth-tellers nor constant liars', then it is perfectly meaningful to say
that they sometimes tell the truth and sometimes lie; the only trouble is that we
cannot say when they tell the truth, and when they lie.13
On the other hand, Ausland (1989) powerfully argues in favour of giving to
the three Pyrrhonian properties of'things' a 'moral' meaning, mainly relying
on the well-known use of ahia<j>opa in the ethicalfield,with the specific sense of
'neither good nor bad'. In this long and important paper, Ausland does not
dissimulate the trouble he faces when trying to account, in this perspective, for
the zany inference: 'it is still unclear', he says on p. 407, 'what the reference to
our senses and opinions is doing in the argument and, in particular, why they
are untrustworthy (.. .) on the basis of the nature of things'. It seems difficult
indeed, as a matter of principle, to infer a conclusion bearing on the
unreliability of sensations and beliefs from a statement about the ethical
'indifference' of'things'.
I shall not try to sum up the very complicated and even tortuous moves,
occupying no less than twenty pages (407-28), by which Ausland tries to solve
this problem. Rather unexpectedly, Ausland first invokes a definitely epistemological argument set out by Diogenes Laertius (ix.92-3), which he finds
'parallel' to the Timonian argument from [la] to [lb], and having 'a definite
affinity' with it. This argument in Diogenes Laertius explains that neither
aiod-qcis nor vorjois can distinguish truth from falsity, that no other faculty
can help us to make a decision between opposite Sdcu concerning objects of
sense or of thought, and that this undecidable conflict eventually suppresses
any fxerpov by which we could think it possible to determine anything. This
argument, as can be seen, is thoroughly epistemological, and it deals explicitly
with matters of truth and falsity. How can Ausland hope to extract from it any
help for his moral interpretation of our Timonian passage? I must confess that
I do not understand very well what he says on p. 413: 'The argument in
13

Variants of Decleva Caizzi's position (or so I think) have been orally presented to me by
Michael Frede and Myles Burnyeat. According to Frede, the zany inference is not zany at all as
it stands, because there are many reasons, independent of the unreliability of our senses and
beliefs, which could support [la], and from [la] it is easy to infer [lb], since according to [la]
there is nothing left for the senses and beliefs to be reliable about. In the same vein, Burnyeat
claims that [2c] explains why the inference is not zany; which I take to mean that the intrinsic
indetermination of 'things' similarly removes the ground for senses and beliefs to be reliable
about anything. I remain unpersuaded, because (i) it seems difficult to see how any general
pronouncement about the 'nature of things', such as [la] in the standard view, could be made
without any examination of our cognitive ability to grasp it (that is what prompted Zeller's
emendation, which however meets all the problems mentioned above), and (ii) [2c] is not an
'objective' statement, but expresses what we should say (Xeyovras), i.e. in what way we should
be disposed towards the 'things', given their nature [2*] and the unreliability of our senses and
beliefs [lb]; so that [2c] is a consequence of [lb], not a ground for it.

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

I99

Diogenes shows how the Pyrrhonians could argue from claim [la] in Timon's
argument, through applications on the successive levels of appearance and
opinion, to claim [lb] in such a way as to make claim [2a] a reasonable
inference from the latter.' Ausland's general conclusion is a little clearer, if not
completely clear:
Ancient skepticism (. . .) comes first into view as a philosophy which takes its
beginning, not from a challenge to account for our cognitive access to an external
world, but rather from the problem of human happiness. The Pyrrhonian way to
the good life relates a human disposition productive of undisturbed calm [3]
directly to an undecidability inherent in practical affairs [1]. But the critique of
our senses, opinions, and reason [lb + 2a] that it includes for the sake of
demonstrating this relation is not pursued in a fashion suitable to the intention of
exposing any comparative or general unreliability of our several faculties in
relation to external things, but is instead practised with a view to showing it
wrong for us to exercise a preference between competing claims on our choice
that are similar in dignity. Viewed from this new (really old) perspective,
Pyrrho's skepticism stands revealed as integral, and not incidental, to his moral
philosophy.
(pp. 427-8;figuresadded are mine)
This conclusion shows that, in Ausland's view, Pyrrho was indeed an
epistemological sceptic, but en passant: his epistemological scepticism, instead
of being an end in itself, was only a moment in the demonstration of his main
concern, i.e. his ethical indifferentism. 14
I cannot help finding that, throughout the long and tortuous moves effected
along these pages, the tiny and precise problem of making sense of the zany
inference has somehow fallen out of the picture. In any case, I cannot see, from
his paper, what exactly Ausland's answer would be to the simple question: how
and why does [la] provide the reason (Sta TOVTO) for [lb]? I find his paper
convincing in many respects; but on this particular point I find it rather
disappointing.
Now, it is time to come to the solution which I venture to offer as the obviously
correct one. The complicated and ingenious moves of Decleva Caizzi, Ausland
and others are, I think, superfluous and in some sense misguided, because, in
fact, there is a much simpler way to get things right, and to draw from [la] to
[lb] an inference which has absolutely nothing 'zany' in it. We have just to
suppose (i) that 'our sensations and beliefs' are Trpay^xara,15 and (ii) that the
proper way for sensations and beliefs to be ahia<f>opa /ecu aorddix^ra KOLL
14

15

Cf. also the programmatic statement: 'it remains unclear why and in what way [lb] acts to
mediate the clearly symmetrical formulations of [la] and [2]' (p. 407, my emphasis). The
'epistemological' statement [lb] is nothing more than an intermediate link between two (in
Ausland's view) 'moral' statements, [la] and [2].
In the ordinary, predicative sense of'are', not of course in the sense of identity. This is to avoid
possible misunderstandings (Fernanda Decleva Caizzi told me that she found it hard to
swallow that Pyrrho's Trpay/zara might be conceived of as alodrjoeLs KOLI Sof at; but this is
miles away from what I mean).

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av7TLKpira is to be neither true nor false. Then everything falls into perfect
order.
Point (i) is the crucial one. Formally speaking, it obviously provides a trivial
Barbara: All Trpay/xara are indifferent (according to Pyrrho) [la]; all our
sensations and beliefs are (special kinds of) rrpdyixara [implicit premiss];
therefore, all our sensations and beliefs are indifferent. From the structural
point of view, the legitimacy of bringing sensations and beliefs under rd
TTpdyfjuara is wholly confirmed, I think, by the following remark. The first
question [1*] bears on the nature of rd irpdy^ara, and only on that; the second
question [2*] bears on the right attitude we should adopt irpos avrd, i.e.
towards rd -npdy^ara. The answer to the second question begins with the
second hid rovro [2a], which introduces the advice or invitation to adopt a
certain attitude (SeiV). So it is not artificial at all, but on the contrary
mandatory, to consider [lb] as a part of [1], i.e. as a part of the answer to the
question concerning the nature of rd TTpdyfiara; therefore, sensations and
beliefs are introduced into the story as (a kind of) TT pay par a. This point is also
put beyond any doubt, if needed, by the fact that question [2*] asks for the
right attitude to adopt towards rd rrpdyfjuara (note the neuter npos aura),
whereas the first element of the answer to this question, namely [2a], describes
the right attitude to adopt towards sensations and beliefs (note the feminine
avrais). This would simply not be possible if sensations and beliefs did not
count as rrpdy^ara. As such, they have certain intrinsic properties, described
in [lb], which dictate (through the second Sid rovro) the right attitude to adopt
towards them.
This account of the argument is therefore supported by good and strong
reasons, I believe. However, I realize that it is a somewhat difficult and
paradoxical task to defend my claim. The bringing of sensations and beliefs
under rd -npdy\xara must be both perfectly obvious and somewhat unexpected: perfectly obvious, on one hand, since it gives a straightforward
justification to the zany inference; and somewhat unexpected, on the other
hand, since the text has been read by dozens of learned and careful people,
none of whom has ever read it this way, so far as I know. In other words, if I
claim to correct a misreading, I must also explain why this misreading has been
so widely shared. Such a peculiar mixture of acceptability and unexpectedness
must be accounted for. But it can be accounted for, I think, both conceptually
and historically.
From the conceptual point of view, I assume that the word rrpdy^ara
usually refers, in Greek, to external 'things' or 'states of affairs', particularly,
but not exclusively, when they have some relation with our activities
(irpdrreiv), i.e. when we can by ourselves obtain them or bring them about; so
that bringing our own sensations and beliefs under rd 77payyzara must sound
prima facie slightly paradoxical. However, this usual connotation is perhaps
unduly strengthened by our usual translations in modern languages, whether
we adopt 'things' or 'states of affairs'. It is almost a commonplace to point out
that, for ancient philosophers, mental items are not of a radically different type

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201

from physical items: they are just the same type of natural items, differentiated
only by their 'inner' or 'outer' location. 16 So there is nothing to prevent our
sensations and beliefs counting as Txpdy\xara after all. 17
From the historical point of view, it is still easier to account for the
impression that bringing our sensations and beliefs under rd TT pay para is both
an obvious move and a slightly unexpected one. On the basis of the
grammatical structure of the sentence, I have already claimed that [la] was
explicitly attributed to Pyrrho by Timon, but that the zany inference was not,
and that this inference was drawn by Timon himself. The mixed impression we
have in front of this inference can thus be accounted for by the distribution of
roles between our two characters: the song sounds strange, because it is a twopart song, written on a single line. I suggest that Pyrrho, when he talked about
ra Trpdy/jLara, had in mind external 'things' or 'states of affairs' - presumably
in so far as they are related to our practical activity - and nothing else; so that
he would have been himself somewhat surprised by the unexpected application of his statement to sensations and beliefs. But after a moment of
bewilderment, he would probably have conceded to Timon that there was no
compelling reason to reject this application. x 8 Our sensations and beliefs, after
all, are TTpdyfjuara of a sort.
If I may indulge in following up this sketch of a historical novel, I shall
venture to say that it could perhaps also account for the 'strange asyndeton'
(Sta TOVTO without a particle) which was pointed out by Stopper, if it is an
asyndeton at all. 19 I do not claim to be able to explain how Timon's
intervention managed to leave this trace in the text; but I would be fairly ready
to admit that if there is any asyndeton here, it is, in some way or other, a textual
trace of Timon's intervention.
So much, for the moment, for bringing our sensations and beliefs under TOL
TTpdyjjLara. What I have still to do is to account for the fact that the supposed
Timonian syllogism, instead of mechanically applying Pyrrho's statement
16
17

18

19

Cf. e.g. the interesting remarks of Everson 1991, pp. 131-2.

Perhaps it is not completely irrelevant to point out that in the Charmides 169A, Plato brings
together, under the label ra ovra ('things that are'), various items like science, sight, audition,
sensation, desire, will, love, fear, belief, movement, heat. Within such a list, it seems to be the
case that the items which would have a special claim to be called TT pay \xaTa are mental items
involving some sort of internal object, like all kinds of presentative or representative acts or
states of mind - or, by extension, their internal objects themselves. For instance, according to a
famous passage in Sextus, M vm.12, the Stoic 'signified', orjfxaLvofxevov, was defined as 'auro
TO TTpdyfjua which is revealed by the vocal sound, and which we apprehend as subsisting in our
thought'. However we understand the word TTpdyyia here, this definition shows that a npayfia
may perfectly well be an item which has no existence at all outside the thought.
I do not claim that Timon brought our sensations and beliefs under the concept of TT pay para
exactly in the same sense as Pyrrho himself had understood this concept (I shall come back to
this later on). Pyrrho would have to accept an extension of his notion of it.
It has been pointed out to me from various sides, either that the asyndeton is not in the least
strange in the style of K<f>d\aLa, or even that 8LOL TOVTO does not need any particle at all,
especially when followed by fxr/Te . . . /X^TC (Fernanda Decleva Caizzi learnedly refers me to
Plutarch, Anim.procr. IOI8B6, Philoponus, Aetern. mundi 278.28 and 439.14; Simplicius In De
Cael. 563.7; Plotinus, Enn. 5.1.7.20 and 6.7.16.20). In consideration of these objections, I
would not rely too heavily on this argument.

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about irpdyfiara to sensations and beliefs (and thus getting to the conclusion
that sensations and beliefs are dhid<f>opa /cat dardOfjirjTa /cat dveTrt/cptra),
draws the conclusion that they are neither true nor false. This is quite plain
sailing, in comparison with the previous question. It would be fairly uninformative to say that sensations and beliefs have the three general Pyrrhonian
properties of'things': what is interesting is to know what specific aspect these
properties take on, when applied to sensations and beliefs. What are the
relevant 'differences' they do not exhibit? What sort of 'stability' are they
deprived of? What kind of 'decision' are they unable to allow? Since their
ordinary claim is to discriminate between what is the case and what is not the
case, it is clear that the relevant form of loss which they suffer from being
brought under ret Trpdy^ara, as characterized by [la], has to do with their
power of giving access to truth and avoiding error; e.g. the relevant difference
in reference to which they are dhid<f>opa is the difference between dXiqdevtiv
and ifjevSeodaL. In this way, let us notice that we can completely clear away the
difficulty some people have felt in understanding why the text says that
sensations and beliefs are neither true nor false, instead of saying simply that
they are false. If all of them were false, they would not be any longer
'indifferent' with respect to the relevant difference, namely the difference
between truth and falsity: they would be uniformly 'differentiated', through
being always on the same side of that difference.
In addition to that, it might be suggested that there is, between the
Pyrrhonian properties of 'things' and the Timonian properties of sensations
and beliefs, a relationship exactly similar to that between the Pyrrhonian
'things' themselves and the Timonian sensations and beliefs. In other words:
just as Pyrrho's -npay^ara quite probably did not originally include sensations
and beliefs, so Pyrrho's properties of 'things', expressed by the adjectives
d8id<f)opa /cat darddiJLrjTa /cat a^eTit/cptTa, quite probably had originally
nothing to do with truth and falsity. But just as it was both defensible and
unexpected to bring sensations and beliefs under Trpay^ara, so it was both
defensible and unexpected to consider being neither true nor false as a case of
dbia<f>opia.

So far, I hope to have shown that the zany inference from [la] to [lb] does
not come from Pyrrho, that it comes from Timon, and that it is not a zany
inference at all. I am fairly confident that these results are correct. I would now
like to raise the question of what consequences we can draw from them; and
here I must confess that what I shall say is much more speculative.
Within the small section [1], if I am not mistaken, [la] is explicitly attributed by
Timon to Pyrrho; [lb] is not, and we have found good reasons to think that [lb]
is the result of a personal intervention by Timon. Can we extract from that a
general rule, and extend its bearing over the whole passage? In other words,
should we consider that everything in the text which is not explicitly attributed
to Pyrrho is implicitly not attributed to Pyrrho, and should be similarly
attributed to Timon? Since only [la] is explicitly attributed to Pyrrho, the

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203

application of such a rule would be extremely damaging for the master, and
extremely generous for the disciple. We would have to take away from Pyrrho,
and to give to Timon, an enormous part of the text, namely: the whole
description of a philosophical programme for happiness, the division of this
programme into three main points, the second half of the fulfilment of part [1]
of this programme, and the whole fulfilment of parts [2] and [3]. This would be
a bit frightening, and also a bit silly: Pyrrho certainly did not describe 'things'
as indifferent, etc., just for the sake of describing them that way. That is why I
am not inclined at all to such a maximalist proposal. On the other hand, we
must admit that the whole piece is very tightly articulated: the threefold
programme is first described, and then carried out, in closely related terms: the
repetitions of ra Trpay/zara, SiaKeia&u, Trepiefvcu, are especially striking.
Moreover, within each section, ternary sets are conspicuously present: the
three Pyrrhonian adjectives in [la], the three other adjectives in [2b], the
probably ternary structure of the Sceptical formulas in [2c] again, the three
results of the Sceptical attitude according to [3] - even if they are somewhat
perturbed by the insertion of Aenesidemus' 'pleasure'. The texture of the piece
is thus so closely knit that it seems very hard to dismantle it, and to try to
render to each of the two Caesars the things that are his own. The job can only
be done in a very tentative way.
Nevertheless, I think that some plausible arguments should be given a
chance. Timon was probably rather more of an independent thinker than is
usually believed; his intellectual and human personality seems to have been
quite different from Pyrrho's. In any case, there is one big difference between
them, namely the fact that Pyrrho wrote nothing, or hardly anything (cf.
Sextus, M 1.282), whereas Timon was a prolific writer, in vastly different
literary genres (cf. DL ix. 110-11). So it could be legitimate to leave him at least
a fairly important role in the literary shaping of Pyrrho's teaching. Nevertheless, whatever we may think about the extent of his intellectual independence,
he is obviously a devoted, almost fanatical disciple of Pyrrho. Whatever he
says and writes, he probably takes it to be quite faithfully true to his master's
thought. Therefore, it is certainly very unlikely that Timon would have taken it
upon himself to change the overall meaning and intention of Pyrrho's
philosophy. When he presents it as a quest for happiness (quite unexpectedly
after Aristocles' own epistemological introduction in 1-2), he is certainly
neither innovating nor wanting to do so. His own dialogue with his master,
reflected in fragment 48 of the Silloi and in fragments 67 and 68 of the
Indalmoi, shows that he felt himself fully entitled to attribute to Pyrrho such a
basically eudaimonistic intention.
As far as the threefold programme for happiness is concerned, its schoolmasterly style and its rigidity might be ascribable, to a certain extent, to some
sort of Timonian reshaping; but it is hard to believe that the contents and
succession of its three steps are completely foreign to Pyrrho's original
thought. In particular, first asking a question about the 'nature' of T<X
, a feature which looks fairly strange to the reader of the neo-

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Pyrrhonian classical texts, can hardly be the product of a personal initiative by

Timon: as we shall see later on in more detail, putting this question first would
already have been unexpected from his point of view.
Things become a little more problematic when we look at the fulfilment of
the threefold programme. Within point [1], as we have seen, [la] is certainly
Pyrrhonian; and [lb], I think, is certainly Timonian. Of the two remaining
points, let us first look at point [3]. Aristocles explicitly gives it to Timon
(TLJJLOJV (f>rjaC). Indeed, the sequence 'first a</>aaia, then drapagta is possibly a
piece of genuine Timonian pedigree; for we read in DL ix. 107 that, according
to Timon and Aenesidemus, the Sceptic reAo? is the en-o^, which brings with
it drapa^ua like its shadow; the substitution of eiroxf] for dcfxxoia in the first
position (as in Sextus, PHi.S) might be the role of Aenesidemus in the story. Of
course, the third item in answer [3], Alv7)oir)ixos 8' rjSovrjv, cannot come from
Timon. If I had to guess what the third item was in Timon's original answer - 1
assume, with many people, that there was a third item - my own bet would be
for evhaiyLoviav, rather than for diradeiav or eTro^^, which have been
suggested by various scholars: it would be strange indeed to promise us
happiness at the beginning, and not to say at the end that if we follow the recipe
we shall eventually get it. But even if Timon might be responsible for an
ordered sequence d</>aoia - drapa^ia - evhai^ovla, this obviously does not
mean that the three corresponding notions were unknown to Pyrrho himself.
The most interesting and problematic case is answer [2]. It seems perfectly
clear that [2a] is so closely linked together with [lb] that there is no question of
dissociating them: they are, from the grammatical point of view, on the same
level (the infinitive helv in [2a] has the same syntactical status as the infinitives
aXiqdzvtiv 77 ifjevSeodaL in [lb]); and the necessity of our mistrusting our
sensations and beliefs is a direct consequence (cf. the second Sta TOVTO) of their
intrinsic indeterminateness in respect to truth and falsity. If [lb] comes from
Timon, then [2a] must come from Timon as well. 20 But what about [2b] and
[2c]? Concerning [2b], we must remember that [la] is the only absolutely
20

David Sedley noticed that the vocabulary in the sequence [lb] -I- [2a] is typically Hellenistic, by
contrast with the context. In addition to that element of confirmation, I am happy to register
here the agreement of Fernanda Decleva Caizzi on the substantial part of this claim, namely
the close interdependence between [lb] and [2a] (the question of Timon's authorship and
intentions apart). She writes (in correspondence - parenthetical remarks are hers): 'There is no
reason why [lb] and [2a] should not have been added by some witness more faithful (but in
what sense can we speak of a faithful witness?) to Pyrrho.' She adds, however, in the form of an
objection to my claim (parenthetical remarks still hers): 'If the author was Timon (and not
Aristocles summarizing the Sceptical source - Timon or a Sceptic later than Aenesidemus?), I
still do not see any difficulty in interpreting [lb] as the consequence which Timon believed (that
Pyrrho believed?) to derive from [la], and [2a] as the linking sentence which makes it easier to
explain [2b]: [2a] is not the direct answer to [2*], but that which makes it possible to understand
it in relation to [la]'. But I subscribe to everything in this. Most valuable for my claim is the last
sentence in particular: if [2a] is not the direct answer to [2*], but that which makes it possible to
understand it (i.e. to understand the direct answer to [2*], namely [2b]) in relation to [la], that
implies that the logical dependence of [2b] (quite probably Pyrrhonian) on [la] (certainly
Pyrrhonian) was somewhat unclear; this very lack of clarity might have prompted Timon to
insert the sequence [lb] 4- [2a].

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205

certain Pyrrhonian bit in the whole text; and we must also be sensitive to the
fact that the three adjectives in [2b] are obviously meant to answer to the three
adjectives in [la]. Even if we do not totally accept the valuable attempt by
Ausland (1989, pp. 389-97), to establish a close term-to-term correspondence
between the two triplets, we cannot deny that at least some sort of correspondence obtains between them. The outcome of this argument is that Timon's
personal intervention, beginning with [lb], must come to an end with the end
of [2a], and that with [2b] we find Pyrrho again, or at any rate what Timon was
ready to attribute explicitly to Pyrrho. Let us bear in mind that we have found
good reasons to think that the first item in Pyrrho's own eudaimonistic
programme was (rather unexpectedly from the point of view of the standard
Sceptical moves) to inquire about 'the nature of things'; if so, it is only natural
to think that the answer to this first question was followed, in Pyrrho's own
plan, by a carefully articulated answer to the question of which attitude we
should adopt towards 'things' of such a nature.
For reasons which are not exactly the same, I am inclined to think that the
famous formulas of [2c] also belong to Pyrrho, or at least to Timon's official
Pyrrho. This is not the right time and place to discuss whether we should
construe the complex [2c] sentence as threefold, as I believe with most
commentators, or as fourfold, as do some people who incline to see here an
echo of the Indian tetralemma, which Pyrrho supposedly came to know in his
far away travels. 21 In any case, the use of the ov /JL&XAOV formula, which
governs [2c], is of course very well attested by other pieces of evidence
concerning Pyrrho himself (in particular DL ix.61); and there are no grounds
for doubting that he might have recommended saying at least the kind of things
which we find in [2c], whatever might be the exact meaning he wanted to give
them.
If what I have said thus far is not complete nonsense, I come to the conclusion
that our document is a piece of philosophical cutting, in which we can hold
Timon personally responsible for the insertion of sections [lb] and [2a]. Now,
these two sections are the only ones, in the whole text, which bear a distinctly
and unequivocally epistemological character; I mean, the only ones which
introduce the notions of truth and error, and the names of cognitive events,
faculties and states like sensations, beliefs and trust. On the face of it,
therefore, what Timon is responsible for might be called the epistemological
twist to the whole story. 22 1 shall now briefly show that such a conclusion is in
21

22

Cf. n. 6 above. The tetralemma is a form of argument favoured by Indian thought, and having
the following structure: p , not-p, p and not-p, neither p nor not-p.
This epistemological twist does not seem to be perceived as such by Aristocles; but it is
obviously what motivates his q u o t a t i o n of this s u m m a r y of Sceptical views, in spite of the
contrast betweeen the epistemological perspective opened u p by him in his own introduction
and the eudaimonistic perspective opened u p by the beginning of the s u m m a r y he is quoting.
M o s t of his objections, in what follows ( 5-26), are directed to a version of epistemological
scepticism; he does not directly attack Pyrrhonism as a way to happiness (cf. however some
observations on the supposed utility of the Sceptic view in 16-17).

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agreement with some other things we know about Timon; and I shall end by
trying to say what we should infer from that concerning Pyrrho's own
philosophical stance.
First of all, Timon's epistemological concerns are fairly well attested by
other pieces of evidence. We know, for instance, that he had written a book
Tlepl aladrjoecov (DL ix. 105), in which he produced the typical expression of
sceptical phenomenalism that I have already mentioned: That honey is sweet I
do not posit, that it appears to be so (^alverai) I admit.' Such a phenomenalist
position seems also to be attested, whatever its exact meaning, by the famous
line in the Indalmoi, quoted by various authors (DL ix.105, Sextus, M vii.30,
Galen, Dignosc.puls. 1.2): aAAa TO (^atvofjievov iravrrj oOevei, ovnep av eXOrj (it
is in view of this line that I said earlier that it was very unlikely that Timon
himself might have put a question about 'the nature of things' first in his
personal philosophical agenda). We also know that he had found an opportunity to use his satirical bent even in epistemological discussions: according to
DL ix. 114, 'he was constantly in the habit of quoting, to those who would
admit the evidence of the senses when confirmed by the mind (npos rovs ras
alodrjozis fier^ TnfjLapTvpovvTos rov vov iyKptvovras), the line "Attagas and
Numenius came together"'; whatever the exact meaning of this joke, its
upshot is obviously to disparage both senses and the mind; and it is interesting
to notice that it was a polemical weapon, apparently directed at a quite definite
epistemological position (namely a non-Epicurean version of the theory of
iTTijjLapTvprioLs), within the framework of the epistemological discussions in
which Timon was constantly engaged (ovvexes re eiriXeyeiv elajdei). Besides
jokingly taking up his stand in epistemological discussions, Timon seems to
have also dealt quite technically and seriously, in his treatise Against the
Physicists, with some of the most fundamental problems in the theory of
science, since we know that, in this work, he was calling into question the use of
first principles adopted eg vTrodeoeous (Sextus, M 111.2).
Still more importantly, we know that Timon was much interested in
Arcesilaus, even if this interest was of a rather ambivalent nature. According
to Diogenes Laertius IX.I 15, he attacked Arcesilaus in his Silloi (this point is
largely confirmed by several fragments of the Silloi, namely fragments 31-4);
on the other hand, the same Diogenes Laertius informs us that (quite probably
after Arcesilaus' death) Timon praised him in a work entitled The Funeral
Banquet of Arcesilaus. According to Numenius, quoted by Eusebius, PE
xiv.6.5, he even went so far as to call him a GK7TTLK6S, which is probably not
literally true, but might reflect some shadow of the truth. From all this
evidence, it seems to emerge that Timon first presented Arcesilaus as a
dishonest rival and plagiarist of Pyrrho, mixing up Scepticism with the worse
'sophistical' tradition; let us say, by the way, that Timon's representation soon
made its mark, since his contemporary Aristo of Chios, in a famous line - quite
in tune with Timon's parodistic vein - depicted Arcesilaus as 'Plato in front,
Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle'. The best if not the fairest way of
disparaging the originality of Arcesilaus' cognitive scepticism was of course to

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

207

inject retroactively, into Pyrrho himself, the appropriate dose of cognitive

concerns and doubts; and this, I submit, is exactly what Timon had tried to do.
With this operation successfully achieved - and his rival dead - it was easy for
him to display his superior intellectual generosity, and to admit that, after all,
Arcesilaus himself was a OKTTTLK6S of sorts. The attention devoted by Timon
to Arcesilaus makes it quite reasonable to assume, in the terms of Michael
Frede (1973, p. 806), 'that the Pyrrho of Timon's writings represents the
doctrine Timon himself developed under Pyrrho's influence, at a time when
the debate between Academic sceptics and the dogmatists was well under way
and had reached considerable sophistication'. If I am not mistaken, the above
remarks should justify my further suggesting that even when he summed up his
own basic positions, Timon could not keep from making a difference between
what he thought he had directly borrowed from Pyrrho and what he wanted to
add on the basis of his own epistemological concerns.
If he felt like making such an addition, the obvious conclusion we have to
draw seems to be that he did notfindanything properly epistemological in his
memories of Pyrrho's own sayings and concerns. This conclusion, I think,
powerfully reinforces the strictly ethical interpretation of Pyrrho's philosophy, an interpretation which has constantly been, from Cicero (perhaps
already from Epicurus23) to Ausland through Brochard (to some extent) and
others, an unobtrusive companion and rival to the standard epistemological
interpretation. If I am right in my suggestions, Timon, a competent authority
in the matter, is (albeit quite indirectly) the first to testify to this ethical
interpretation being the correct one.
Let us therefore return to the Aristocles passage one last time, in order to see
what sense we can make of what is left of the text, if we mentally suppress the
product of Timon's purposeful intervention, namely the epistemological twist
[lb] + [2a]. If Timon inserted this epistemological twist because he found it
missing in Pyrrho's own teaching, we have to think that the original meaning
of everything else in Aristocles' summary was not epistemological, and that
Timon somehow knew that it was not. Accordingly, we should try to construe
a number of elements in the text in a non-epistemological way. The ethical way
is the obvious alternative. I think it is quite possible, and in some cases almost
mandatory, to do so. Let us examine the main elements in this perspective.
Question [1*] of the Pyrrhonian programme, the question about 'the nature
of things' (TTpdyfjuara), should be construed not as a properly ontological
question, let alone a physical one, but rather as a question about 'things' as
related to our activity (TrpdrreLv), i.e. as goals or ends for our acts of choice and
23

When writing this paper, I had not yet noticed the judicious remarks of Vander Waerdt 1989,
p. 235 ('Epicurus plainly admired his [Pyrrho's] way of life and his tranquillity . . . but may not
have attributed these to skepticism. It was Timon, after all, who established the tradition that
Pyrrho was a skeptic, and this tradition did not win out entirely in antiquity, for Cicero knows
of Pyrrho only as a moralist') and p. 236 ('Colotes' silence about Pyrrho implies, as David
Sedley first suggested to me, that he was not even considered as a skeptic in the Epicurean
tradition').

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SCEPTICISM

avoidance. This interpretation is in complete agreement, I think, with the

initial and overall characterization of Pyrrho's thought given in DL IX.6I,
perhaps on the authority of the otherwise unknown Ascanius of Abdera: 'he
said that nothing is noble or ignoble, just or unjust; and similarly in all cases he
said that nothing truly is (/cat OJJLOLOOS ZTTI Trdvrcjv fjurjSev etvau rfj dXrjdeLa), but

men do everything they do by convention and custom (VO/JLCO Se KCU 0i irdvra

TOVS dvOpcjTTovs rrpdrreiv)', for each thing (eKaorov) is no more this than that.'
The scope of the generalization O/JLOLOOS i-rrl navrcov is, admittedly, not
immediately clear; but the contrast with the following clause (vofxco Se), which
deals with what people do (Trpdrreiv), is enough to show that it does not extend
beyond the ethical and practical sphere. For the same reason, I think that
/jLTjSev etvai rfj dXiqdeia has nothing to do with 'real existence', but is a cryptocopulative phrase ('nothing is really F'), in which the range of the variable F is
restricted to ethical and practical predicates, of the type which has just been
illustrated by examples like KOLXOV, aloxpov, SIKOLLOV and CLSLKOV. The same is
true with roSe 17 ToSe in the last sentence, introduced by ov /xdAAov. The
conspicuous absence of dyad 6v and KCLKOV in the list might be easily accounted
for by pointing out that Pyrrho was certainly not ready to say that indifference
itself was no more good than bad. Now that we have dispelled the ghost of
Pyrrho's epistemological scepticism, we may welcome without qualms the socalled 'ethical dogmatism' exhibited by two famous fragments of the Indalmoi
(67-8 Diels), which used to worry so many people so much, and which I think
is quite compatible with his 'ethical scepticism', since the second bears on
conventional values, which people actually follow in their actions, whereas the
first bears on the second-order value of being indifferent to the conventional
values, which Pyrrho's perfect happiness is supposed to illustrate.
As for the answer to question [1*], namely the three adjectives of [la], these
adjectives can be given a specifically ethical meaning, particularly (in the case
of the first one) in reference to the well-known use of dStcu^opia, ovSev
8ta<f>pL, etc., in ethical contexts. Pyrrho, as we know, is repeatedly associated
by Cicero with two typically ethical indifferentists, Aristo and Herillus. If we
take TT' 1(777? dhtd(f)opa in the sense of ethically indifferent, there are good
reasons to adopt the same type of meaning for the two remaining adjectives,
doTdd/jLrjTa and dveiriKpiTa. On this point I agree with the main claims of
Ausland (1989, pp. 378-406). He convincingly shows, I think, that the
progression of the three adjectives means something like the following: 'things'
(as possible objects for our choices and avoidances) are no more choiceworthy
than not choiceworthy (in' lorjs dhid<j>opa)\ they cannot be discriminated by
any critical instrument, similar to scales (darddixrjra); their equivalent claims
cannot be decided even by appeal to some higher faculty of adjudication
(dv7TLKpira).

A similar account can be given of the three adjectives of [2b] purporting to

describe the attitude we should adopt towards such TTpdy^ara. If we admit
that these adjectives have a genuinely Pyrrhonian origin, it is not particularly
difficult to construe them as describing an ethical attitude, rather than a

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

209

cognitive one. It is true that the first adjective, dSogdorovs, seems to refer back
quite literally to the epistemological mistrust towards beliefs, recommended in
[2a] (ju/rySe 7TLOTVLV aurafs, i.e. Sdcu inter alia). But, needless to say,
suspension of Sda may bear on practical beliefs concerning the value and
choiceworthiness of 'things', as well as on theoretical beliefs concerning the
existence and nature of external objects. The use of the adjective dSotjaoros is
by no means restricted to abstention from theoretical beliefs, on the contrary:
if Aristo was so firmly attached to the Stoic dogma that the sage will be
aSogaoros (DL vn. 162), it is quite certainly in reference to his ethical
indifferentism; even in the classical neo-Pyrrhonian tradition, the motto
aSogdoTcos JULOVV precisely applies to ]8ios, i.e. to practical life. If there was any
doubt on this ethical interpretation of dho^dorovs, it would be removed, I
think, by the two adjectives which follow, drivels and aKpaSdvrovs, which
pretty clearly refer to ethical attitudes, namely absence of inclination or
leaning towards one side of the scales rather than the other, and absence of any
wavering between the two sides. The metaphor of 'inclining' seems to be
immediately appropriate when the things towards which one is inclining or not
inclining are things to be taken or left, and less immediately when they are
opinions to be adopted or rejected.
And now, what to do with the famous so-called 'Sceptical' expressions of
[2c]? If we leave aside the discussion about the right syntactical construction of
[2c], which has no direct bearing on my theme, the main question is what
meaning to give to eanv. It seems obvious that on any satisfactory interpretation this meaning is not existential, but crypto-copulative ('things no more
are F than they are non-F', etc.); but one can still hesitate about the range of
subjects and predicates we should admit for the subject-variable irepl ivds
eKaoTov and for the predicate crypto-variable. We can quite probably dismiss
the hesitation by observing that the range of the subject-variable must cover rd
TTpdyfxara and only rd 77pay fxara, i.e. 'things' and states of affairs in so far as
they are of concern for our irpdrreiv, since the recommended judgements are
supposed to express the attitude we should have towards those very Trpdyfjuara.
If so, I believe that the range of possible predicates does not extend either
beyond the sphere of ethico-practical predicates, such as 'noble' and 'base',
'just' and 'unjust' (as in DL IX.6I), which could precisely be predicated, by
ordinary people, of the TT pay para understood that way. The limitation of this
range might seem to be excessively narrow: but we should remember that we
have to give exactly the same limited scope, in view of their context, to the
seemingly very wide generalizations of DL IX.6I ('similarly in all cases he said
that nothing truly is'; 'each thing is no more this than that'). If we are still, and
quite naturally, tempted to enlarge the range of possible predicates in [2c], so
as to include predicates like 'white', 'sweet' and the rest, it is just because
Timon changed the context by inserting [lb] and [2a]; leaving aside this
modification, we are entitled to interpret the text exactly as we do the Diogenes
passage, namely in purely ethical and practical terms.
Before concluding, I wish to make it clear that in my view, Timon's

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SCEPTICISM

epistemological shift does not leave what I take to be Pyrrho's main concepts
and advice as they were, i.e. of a strictly ethico-practical significance.
Otherwise, I would have to face a difficulty which has been keenly and lucidly
expressed by Nicholas Denyer (in correspondence). Denyer supposes that the
inference I would like to attribute to Timon is the following one:
(a) [la] Trpay/xara (i.e. things that we can by our actions obtain or avoid) are
uniformly indifferent (i.e. none of them has those properties which motivate
and/or justify their being obtained/avoided).
(b) But opinions are Trpdy^xara (e.g. you might look at your watch in order
to obtain belief about what the time is).
(c) Hence, no belief has those properties which motivate and/or justify
accepting or rejecting it.
(d) But those properties are truth and falsehood.
(e) Hence [lb], no belief is ever either true or false.
(f) Hence [2a], we should not put our trust in any belief.
If that is Timon's argument, its crucial move would be to bring opinions under
Trpdy/jLara in exactly Pyrrho's sense, as appears from the example under (b).
But then, one could address him the following question, still in Denyer's terms:
'why should it be supposed that the beliefs we are urged to live without ([2b]]
are limited to those which affirm that TT pay para (in the narrow, action-related
sense) have ethico-practical properties?' Quite clearly, any 'theoretical' belief,
bearing on no narrowly practical irpdy^a, is not to be endorsed (f) if it is
neither true nor false (e). And similarly, there is no reason to restrict the range
of the subject variables in [2c] to narrowly practical TTpdyjxara, nor to restrict
the crypto-variable for predicates there to ethico-practical predicates: rather,
these variables should 'range over everything which we might have thoughts
about', and 'over every way that we might take anything to be'.
All these consequences do follow, and are indeed damaging, if we suppose
that Timon meant to bring opinions under irpdyixara in exactly Pyrrho's
sense. But I surmise that this was not what he meant to do. The claim that
opinions are rrpdyixara in Pyrrho's sense would be plausible only for a
restricted class of opinions, namely those which we can and do obtain by our
actions; there are of course a lot of opinions which we cannot and do not
obtain in that way. When implicitly stating that opinions are Trpdy^ara of a
kind, I suppose that Timon was exploiting the vagueness of the word
TTpdyfiara, and was simply meaning that they are 'things' of a kind. But this is
true, of course, of'theoretical' opinions as well as of'practical' ones. Then, all
the consequences drawn by Denyer, instead of being unwanted consequences
of Timon's step (b) as read by Denyer, become not only entirely welcome, but
also fully intended consequences of Timon's step (b) as I read it. Bringing
opinions under Trpdyfjuara turns out to be the crucial Timonian swerve in
respect to Pyrrho: it has the double effect of enlarging the meaning of
TTpdyfiara, and of paving the way for also enlarging the range of opinions
which we will be urged by [2b] to live without. After Timon's intervention ([lb]

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

211

+ [2a]), it is plausible to hold that [2b] has received a broader meaning than its
initial Pyrrhonian meaning, and similarly, that the range of the variables in [2c]
has been enlarged in comparison with its initial Pyrrhonian acceptation. And
it is with this broad meaning and this range that, thanks to Timon, we now
associate the label of Tyrrhonian Scepticism'.
It is time to sum up, and to conclude. The trouble with Pyrrho is of course that
he wrote nothing. In order to know anything about him, we are so totally
dependent on indirect tradition, in particular on Timon, that we might well be
tempted to adopt a Tyrrhonian' attitude towards Pyrrho, and to share the
agnosticism of Theodosius, who refused to be called a Pyrrhonist, arguing that
the movement of the thought in somebody else is inaccessible, and that we
shall never know what Pyrrho's inner attitude was (DL ix.70). But we must
resist this temptation: thanks to Timon, we know what Timon took it upon
himself to add to his master's teaching; and we know, by elimination, what this
teaching was like. Modern reinterpretations of Pyrrho have been labelled (by
Stopper 1983, p. 275) as 'heresies to be anathematised'; I confess my own
heresy in similarly religious terms. Jesus was not the first Christian. Marx was
not thefirstMarxist. Pyrrho was not thefirstPyrrhonist. This title should go to
Timon.
APPENDIX

Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica xiv.18.1-5:

npoi TOYI KATA nrppQNA ZKETITIKOYZ HTOI E&EKTIKOYZ

EniKAHGENTAI
MHAEN KATAAHTITON EINAI ATIO&HNAMENOYI.
( i ) ' AvayKattos S' exL ^P TTCLVTOS StaGKeifjaodat irepl rrjs r)fx(hv avTwv yvajoeais '
el yap av (irjoev rre^vKayiev yva)pi,eiv, ovSev en oel 7repl rtov dXXwv GKoneiv. (2)
^Eyevovro fxev ovv Kal TWV irdAai Tives ol d<f>evTes Trjvoe rrjv <f>a)vrjv, ois dvrLprjKv
'ApioroTeArjS'
'Ioxvoe /JLV roiavra Xiycov KCLL TIvppcov 6 ' i f Aeto? * aAA' auT09 fiev
ovSev .v ypa(f>rj /caraAeAoiTrcv, d 8e ye fjLadr^rrjs avrov TLJJLWV (fyrjol Sefv rov fjueXXovra
v8aL[jLOvrjGLV els rpia ravra jSAeTietv
[ 1 * ] TTptOTOV fJLV, OTTold 7T<f>VKTOL 77pdyfACLT<!'

[2*] 8evTpov c), Tiva xpy Tpoirov rjfJL&s npos avrd

[3*] reAeuTcuov 8e, r t TrepieaTat TOLS OVTOJS e^oucrt.
)[]
[la] 7a JJLV ovv TTpdyfJLara <f>rjoiv avrov aVcH^aiWiv TT' ior)s d8id(f)opa
dfjLTjra Kal dvcTriVpira,
[lb] Sid TOVTO jj,r)T rds alodrjoeLS rjfJicbv jjLrjre rds" 86as dX-qOeveiv rj i

Kal

[]

[2a] Aid TOVTO ovv fjLrjSe rnoTeveiv avrals Seiv,

[2b] dAA' d8odoTovs Kal aKXtvets Kal aKpaSdvTovs etvat,
[2c] Trepl evos eKaoTOV Aeyovra? on ov fidXXov OTIV rj OVK eanv rj Kal eon Kal
OVK OTIV r) OVT GTLV OVT OVK GTLV.

(4)[3] Tot? /xevrot ye Sta/cet/xevots" ovrco Trepieoeodai Tificov (frrjol rrpcoTOv fjiev
d^>aatav, eVeira 8' drapa^iav, AlvrjOLorjfjios S' r)oovf]v.
(5)7d fjuev ovv K<f>dXaia TCOV Xeyofjuevcuv COTI r a u r a GKei/jcofxeda S' el opdtbs
XeyovoLV.