Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
arrative,
Histo
DAVID CARR
Tim e, Nor
rofive,
an d
llistory
Studies in Phenomeno g
lo y and
Existential Philosophy
CllNfllll\L ED1ro
n
James
David Cm
Edward S. Casoy
Stanloy Cavol l
CONSULTINC
Rodorlck M. Chisholm
Hubort L. Oreyfus
Wllllam Earlo
J. N. Findlay
OagRnn Follosdttl
Marjorle Crene
OlHor Honrich
Don lhJo
Emmonuol Lovlnas
Alphonso Lingls
M. Edfe
EDITORS
Wllllnm L.
McOri do
J. N. Moh ant
y
Maurico Natans
on
Frodorlck Oluf
son
Paul Rlcoour
John Sallls
Goorgo Schredor
Calvin O. Schrag
Robort Sokolow
ski
Horbort Splogolbors
Charlos Thylor
Samuo) J. Todos
Bruce W. Wll11hlru
Time, Narrave,
and History
DAVID CARR
\\,,
!Dm'..dl.
Jn6, IJJICIC... <llil.d aru:t:JlY.
l'llJrlH!f' Jr:
lin!it:L
n mme
Zt
rnr:m
lDIZffi Zll:B
tmit6
:i..
m.Sena.
!JCJ
:53-s..1l
J5B.!( '?}:-('E-.'!
"'41$
9-C
t;:
S>'l
111-c
love
Contents
ix
Acknowledgments
Introduction
18
18
21
30
40
45
46
52
57
65
III
73
73
A Dispute
80
86
4. Being in Time
94
IV
100
1. The Problem
100
102
vii
viii
Contents
3. Historicity and Narrative
4. A New Problem
V
Fromlto We
menology
Cornrno
Expenence and Common
n
Ac1on
t.
Acknowledgments
members of that august body have probably heard more about this
project than they ever wanted to know, but they have patiently
153
153
168
163
177
187
1 would like
ix
Introduction
1.
the term, as used today, has two radically different senses. What 1
want to do here corresponds, in fact, to neither of them.
history has addressed itself to the whole of human history and asked
after its origin, the nature of its unfolding, and in some cases its
ultimate destiny. Associated primarily with certain thinkers of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [Vico, Herder, Hegel) and
often debunked as a disreputable and fruitless enterprise, this ap
proach has given way, in the late nineteenth and the twentieth cen
Timo, Narrativo an
d HJstory
sult,
seoklng
d
foJlowe
o
to do f r h
Kantlans
l r cal elenco w he lleo_
had dono for natural sdonce. From that bc
h
1\8 n Jng lh r
ough 11 81 k.111
at the hands of twentfoth-century Anglo rnor1ca
n Ph .l o.to te
1
criticai phlosoph y of history has boon e
ph v veJ
r od
Wlth w lhe
n
histor y can legitimately be callod a scienco
f so, how
h
J
Jt 1 er
i rs
pares wHh the scJence oi natura. PlifJosop 11o
h
Colll
ave
.
f
questions m many di ( erent ways, some attorn tl ng
10 r
P
educ0 hl
to social and thence to natural scienc e . at the ono e
lory
xtrom
ra dica lly soparate and aut
arguing for historys
ono rnou
ff
eh11rac1e r
the other. The latter are fn e ect argufng that lt Is lna
11
PProprf ate
lo tJle
natural scfence as a standard and are thu
.., objoctl ng t
0 1 h o
parfson ltseJ f, but t hey are occupfod wJth Jt nonothel
Com.
oss
thfs
about
me
s
developmo
strlko
nt
Is not s m
What
o uch Ih0
1PPro.
prlaten ess of t he com par ison ltsolf as the fact that th
rougho ur.
t e
focus of phllosophlcal reflcctfon fs on history as
an e tab/ls
hed ,
nd llhe11ll
: y
:
ana worod Ihe
ie
1d
a6 l orher1
0orlan'1
e
1/oblectJva
d Ihe
1
n
a
h w
lhe
enet ;
the afms, intorests, and skiJls oi thcfr professfon. Th13y are theo
and the philosopher thon asks how, on tho basis oi thls mcagre
thcy can nevar dfrectly know. ln othor words, how does the historlan
move from a total ignorance oi the past to JmowJedge of m
This approach thus suggcsts, without saylng lt fn so many word1,
l11troducllon
of
hlstorlcol put. u ordlnory pouon8, prior to and l11dopondontly
lho
ln
llko,
would
J
'
Or
vo
t
ro
o
l
ln
adopllng lhe hltorlcaJ.cognlll
.
followlng, to arsue.
J wlll not coll thl "connocllon" to lho put "knowlodRo" of li. lnco
witr
li la customory to rcsorve tho lullor word for what 11 ai lo1ut
oylng
arn
ranlod by somo agrood-upon eplatomlc procoduro1. Whol I
11 thoro for
Is lhot ln a noivo and proclonllllc woy tho hlatorlcnl po1t
wo oro
whothor
ali o ua, that li figurei ln our ordlnary vlow of thlngs,
call non
hlstorlans or not. Wo hove what tho phonomonologl11ta
whlch
po11t
hltorlcnl
tho
themotJc or prelhomol/c aworenou of
exporl
our
or
o,
exporlonc
unctlon1 H background for our pro1ont
woll, of
ence oi tho proaont. Tho hlatorlon hu lhl oxporlonco 88
lhe
what
1
li
1on10
a
ln
hlslorlan.
a
course, prior to bocomlng
and
oxplldt
makoa
ho
or
ho
whon
hlstorlan sockt to roplace
oi
thcrnatlc clalmt about the past. Yet lt lt mlsloodlng to spoak
doo
poel
tho
o(
aworonou
bac:kground
vague
thl
1lnco
lt,
rcplac:lng
world.
that we
of thot
aro sclontlsts or not, and that we mlsconstruo both tho nalure
our
thot
0
1
o
upp
1
wo
lf
sdonce
or
l11hrnont
accompl
contact and tho
through
or
1
sclontlst
at
huve
we
what
1
nature
only awarenoH oi
1ran1Ctltld11n1a/ Ph
1. gdmund Hu.,11rl, The Cr/1/1 of Eumpeun Sc/111c:.-1 and
1070), Pr> rna-uo.
nomenolo1y. Ir. O. C.m 1Evn11on: Northwlttrn Unlver1lly Prou,
TWle,
1
at
b.aYe h.
when he
mind here: the idea expressed
d
och
of
we are the former do we becorne
and only
:
historic al world IS always there," sai d
.. and the
.
from
the
outside
t
but
is
intertWined
not only observes
wit ft[insie
ths means something more int
verwebt)."2 Clearly
resting th
e
.
.
.
an
. 1stoncal
merely that subject and obJect of h.
inquir y are of
the
species. Giambattista Vico's idea, also frequently em h . SilJle
p
Dilthey, that we can understand history n a wav
,, we can
s with
by Dilthey
beca
Dilthey,
kn
-Or
e(
t."'lbe
d
:drv
!Slzed by
..
:
exte:
they say in a general way about temporality than on what they tell us
about historcity. It mght b e said that 1 shall follow more the spirit
:I
lntroduction
"
social levei, with the help of a theory of narrative, takes the analysis
see that by its means we shall move, by a round-about route, into the
h tty ..1
e 'd
thou 1
ing behind aJtogether th 1. ea of su b'Jectiv ity itse]
t Q
f lbe
13
COrn bi
of phenomenology, narrat1ve theory, and Hege 1.
n a ti o
.
ian
. d'
Phe
t
n
amve
a
an
m
to
o
1spensabl e co
. .
rne n 1 li
wiJI permit us
nd Jhon
0 0....
.
for o
'
e
1
th
d
ea
1story:
h
o
f
of
a
ing
ur ,....
soci
stand
al subJect
"'d--
that .
movable, and above ai l d evelopmentaJ.
1s fle .ber.
Jci
le,
I hope in this brief preview to have given read
ers som
e
i.dea
to expect and of what I fer:ently hope they wiJI
of w
not e
h
P
can
quahfy
follows
as a philosophi
that what
ect. J be at
fl
caJ
J ev
ec
t
o
th
re
t n on h 1 e
but it is not "philosophy of history" in any of
ist
e usual
scnse
gtatef
work done in ali of these fields and with
u
lJ
y
ali these m
on
.
.
ethods,
seeks to establ1sh 1ts su b'Ject matter on its
rny
.
.. L
0
..
w
n and to
ar._
.
.
e1iar t
methodolog1cal course. II it thus runs
its ""'
the risk of s
.
....
.
eeming
an d met hodologica 11y eclectic, I
toa diff
would prefe r
i,
.
--:
t hat r1s
k to th
posed by a pre determm
ed methodologic
.
e
o
al Sua
ne
- i.tJa
cket I sh
that 1 am neither a historian (except
ouJd a
in 8 mod est
dd
.
sense, of
phy) nor a wr1ter of or expert on
Philoso..
Jiterary narrat .
ives
. At best
philosophically reflective and
1 "'
admiri'ng read
"' a
er of b0th
These prefatory remarks wil
l also ser v
s an exp
exc se for the fact that 1 see
lanation
m to take so
and
o
g
to get r
sub ect matter history. I
und to my
have
o
explai
.
ned that I a
'.
m look1ng
behmd h1stoncal inqui
as it were
ry to its roots .
.
.
m
.
ord
mary
even there 1 find 1t
expe
nen
necessary to spea
ce. But
'
k at some J
m
t abo
d iv1duai experience
eng tu
ut o ur
of
the
p ast and of
.
.
t'ime m
gethng on to that of
general befo
the historic al
re
st and historica
shall tal k a good
l tirne, just as J
deal about storyte mg and
at the levei of
narrative in
individual expe .
pene
ral and
.
.
'
nence' bef ore
the spec
commg to narra
1fic ally historic
tive in
al sens e. I h
ope th at what
contribute, alo
I have to say
ng the way to
will
o r und ersta
ence and exis
ndi ng of indiv
tence' but ;h
idua
.
l
experie d1scu ss1o
nary ehara
n w'Jl
1 have a certa
cter until
.
in
.
prelimi
.
it
finds Its ra1s
.
h1st ory Th
on d'"t
e re m the discu
us the pres
ssi
on
of
ent study, th
.
ough it hard ly
quali fies as a story,
__
.
6
"'
:i::
'
;:
ri
5. G. W.
F. He l
Phenom
Presa, 197
enology of
7), p.
.
Spirit ' tr A.
V. Miller (Oxford:
1.'
Clarendon
.,
Introduction
egmnm
b
the
that only from the perspective of the end do
middle make sense.
2.
follow
The foregoing remarks have been designed to introduce the
relation
in
them
ing study by stating its basic questions and situating
be
to other philosophical problems and methods. A word needs to
said now, for the further orientation o f the reader, about previous
work related to my subject.
All three emphasized the role of narrative in the historian's work and
Booth and Kenneth Burke, Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, and
especially of Frank Kermode are regarded as classics in Anglo-Amer
};
8
trat es
oory
)- ars h
structuralist literar
.
&s fe&t1.1 l\N..
' '
"li
na
M'dtt\'e. Bu1 ldtng on the earli .
1'ed
strong emphas.is on
'Yor k of '
such as Vladimir Propp and
European Jinguists.
a
principally Roland Bart hes A 1lll n lak0
the Fronch theorists.
Gre1lll&s-
'
ha\-e pro duced significa nt stu des
...d
Claude Bremond.
of
\\
structure.''
development, philosophy of hist
These two lines of
d
allel. without much reciprocai . nry n theol\,
of literature ran par
.,
ce
ue
ln
\.
d en un...
.
n
n nate;") Metah1 story in 197
11
the appearance of Hay
whose author is neither 8 p h 1.1 3 Thi tremely influential book.
080Pher l'lot 4
. by trammg
but a h'astonan
of ideas d
Jiterary cr1tlc
Ws on Uie
ll
analysis of literar)' narratives, especia y those of t e ru t
5
ralists
and ol Northrop Frye, and applies them in dcta il to
Ci
cla ssical historians and philosophers of history of th
ll&trau
'
sUnlil
":111ll8s
n eteenth
: 0ntro.
s:
"asi
n: tb
tratJon.
oi
p roduce
u:i
:::::: ::::r
Universi
10. Northrop Frye The Anotomy of Cr111c1sm
.
.
{Pr1nceton:
Prlncetlln
Preu. 1957i
Unlvenlty
M.:l
Tu
UJl
lntroducrio11
tor. Rlcocur
ls solf-proclnlmed to bo, non-narrotlvo ln charnc
l cvcn ln
proson
11
ro
clalms that ln hlddcn forrn tho normtlve structu
and
their work.
ot lho bogln
Puttlng this brlof survoy togothor wlth what wns said
tho rolntion bo
ning of thls introductlon. it should bo oasy to soo
focus of thoso
The
t.
twoon this prcvlous work and tho prosont projcc
luts boon lho
ro,
studios of narratlve, whothor ln h.istory or ln lltorntu
a story Is told
writton work (books, artlclos, novols, plays) ln which
in mony cnses
about tho past or about fictional evunts. Tu be suro,
propnr by tho
quostions are asked (though thls Is not considorod
so that the
story,
tho
structurolisls) about how tho author conslruclod
g it.
crootln
ln
act
examination Is shlfted from thc texl to tho aulhor'5
struc
not lhe
Many of th eso studles, moroovor-though agnin
vc ond the
nnrrati
the
n
botwee
rolution
turalists'-are lntorostod ln tho
n for
occosio
lhe
and
n,
attenlio
events it portrays. But at tho conter of
public consumptlon.
y is sintilur. but
My own rosponse to tho narrative analysis of histor
led from whot 1 sald
with an lmportant difference, as might bo oxpoc
/rom tho IHoral'y
earlier. 1 too want to shift the focus "backword"
to tho hlstorlon's
products, but neithor to lho eulhor's cruotive act nor
tho lutter to tho
OVOt\
d
boyon
Is
roeus
sciontific procedure. Instead my
both.
es
procod
historlcal expcrionce that tios bohlnd cmd
tute a critl<.:ism of
The shlft of focus 1 am proposlng doos nol constl
loln. ln fact, whnt
the narrotlvlsts llke that of Mundolbaum und Golds
lons. For if 1
I shell do mey provido a rusponso to lhoso critics' objoct
os our vory oxpo
am rlght ln lhlnkJng thol nerrutivc slruclure porvud
tly of our con
ondon
lndep
rlonce of time and social exlstonce.
hove a wuy of
sholl
wo
templating the past as hislorlans, thon
but window-drosslng
answoring the charge that narrotlvo is nothlng
odgo of the pnst.
ar peckaglng, something lncidontol to our knowl
dtud eliove.
t!I. SM Mandullium'I 1nd Gold1tt1ln wor._,
1V
th!!
:
::?' t:b.:t.
"'e.
'
speaks
presupposition17
thattnt.
a:,
lollig
C\to
untold stoIY in the past waiting to be tolclta Th.is :re lS a b\ie b:it
principal way we distinguish historicaJ from fic
tionailS, he
l11e
narrath-e structure. p articularly the dosing off of llarrati "es . \'ei
sequenee ft
ewmts provi ded by lhe storys beginru ng and
..
end
hoe S'lru
e\>ents h
!beco
such.
individual
dilemma:
p..
t:'r:nu'lth
..
acc.epted procedure
..
facts
not yet described in a context of narrative form."22 As he puts
it in
other essay: stories are not lived but told. Life has no beginnings,
.
Hatory,
1978i
17. lbid p. 147.
18. lbid., p. 143.
19. Ibid., p. 145.
20. lbid.
21. lbid.
22. lbid., p. 1 47.
23 Mink, Hlslory and
..
"
fntroduction
in the events naITated. Namitive imposes on the events
lt
ol the past
sons rather than giving the causes of human ection. 23 The .. nar
rativists" of the 1960s then further refined the idea of history's auton
enacted, what desire is gratified," he asks, "by the fantasy that real
events are properly represented when they are shown to display lhe
to perception in the form of well-made stories ... ? Or doos it pre-24. Carl C. Hempel, "The F\inction of General l..aws ln Hltory," The /oumol o(
Philosophy (1942) and "Explanatlon ln Sclence and Hlstory" ln Fronllen o( Sclence
ond Philosophy, ed. R. Colodny (Pittsburgh: Unlverslty o( Pttsburgh Prosa. 1962
25. William Dray. "'The Hlstorlcel Explanatlon of Actlona Roconsldered" ln Phil<no
phy ond Hislory, ed. S. Hook (New York: New York Unlvel'1lty Presa. 191\3
26. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativlty ln lhe RepreHntatlon of Reallty" ln On
Norrolve, ed. W. J. T. Mltchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981
27. lbid., p. 4.
l2
e be 1.1
Ves lhe
.
"moral
authority"
establish
while Mink still
motive is to
insists on
a
a d eeper d isagreem
'
cogmt1ve mot1ve. Bu t th ere 1s
ent Min k do
es n t
.
of narrahve
m
and
.
1es wntten at t he sa rne period,3 1 that historia n d
arhc
8 .raw o th
n e
"p1 ot-structures" i d entified by Northrop Frye as Roma n ,
ce, eomed'
.
'Irage dy, and Sat1re. But they do not do so consciouslv
, . of course
smce th e th mk of th emselves as tellin g us simp
ly wie es eigentlic
.
gewesen; m fact they would vehemently
deny such Jiterary msp1ra
.
rJon. These P1 ot-structu res are simply "cu l tu ra
Hy provided ruies for
story-telling"32 m
Western culture, and writers of narrative
seize on
.
them w1thout rea l izi ng they are doin
g so .
Thus when Mink asserts that he and Whit
e hold the view that "we
ake such stories" he may
be overlooking a difference of opi nion on
JUSt WhO "we " are, a n d
what constitutes "mak ing." We. shall have
.
occas1on to return to th is
pom
. t. ror
r::o our present purposes, however, il
wa1:8
l.
Wii
ff
Her
Ow An list" in ibid., p. 238 .
is ;,or
y, pp. 7-8, a d
13
Introduction
i s more important t o stress what they do agree on: that the narrativa,
the past a narrative structure that the past does not "really" have .
That Mink and White should hava taken the analysis of history in
twean narrativa and the real world. To be sure, fictional stories do not
virtua of their form. That is, they are capabla of representing the way
ever they are not consciously held to be fictive."34 As for the struc
spoken of at ali. lt seems that tha latter view may motivate the
methodological principie, if we consider tha few remarks that
are
let
turale des rcits" Barthes says that "art knows no static"; that is, in a
story everything has its place in a structure while tha extraneous has
been elimi nated, and that in this art differs from "life," in which
Universlty Press,
35. Seymour Chatman, Story ond Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell
19 78). p. 47.
14
.
" (com m uni
everything is "scrambled messages
cat 1on s b
.
ld
Barthes thus evokes t he o questJo n abou t the reJat io frou 111e81
n
o . art a i
h ve, as d oes Min k, a n d ar
wi th respect to narra
rives
.
.
.
11t th elld life
ti
conclusion: t he one is constJtu onall y incapabl e of ''
rePre ""
senr1
the other.
118'
Ricoeur
Paul
draws
that
toget
her the t
We noted
u dy
of fite
narrative and the analytic philosop hy of history
he Pl'
esen
his Temps et rcit a complex theory of narrative' w ich
i.s
uprio8 llJ
r
with
s
spect
neutral
to
re
the disti n c i on
initially to be
betwee
8eti
.
n his
t
and fiction. And for R 1coeur, too, the probl em of re r
es
.
P e11ttio ory
seen m the fact that
n is
centra1 importance. Th.is is
Of
the key1
'
o
e 1
nc
c
p 111
Ricoeur's account is that of m imesis derived from Ar1st
ot e 8 P
,
oetics
At first R1coeur s theory seems to run counter to the
'Phasis
the
others
on
discontinuity
in
have found
between
a ive
"real world." ln his studies of Janguage and litera t . and lhe
' Ri coeur has
long resisted the structuralists' denial of ali conn t
io bet
ween a
text and the world beyond. ln Temps et rcit he put n
h
e structu
raJ
"co figu a t'1n 1" a1spct of narrahve m
a central posit n b
io
ut in or
51Sts
on s1 t uatmg 1t m re atlon to the world of human 8 et 10n
'
from wh'e
h it
is drawn, and on which it has its effects as it is read an
d aprei.ated
.
It is for this reason that Ricoeur maintain s the( ter.r;!
Jesis, but
he declines to translate the term "representation" or
1m1tation"J' ior
he bel.teves t he re1ation between the narrative and its
.
world is much
more comp 11cated t han t h at traditio nal translation
sugg1 ests. ln work.
lng out how this is so he reveals himsel f to be much c
os er to Mini,
White, and the structuralists than he at first appears
He does not go
so far as to say w1t
h them that the world of action is si m 1 h .
P Y e aohc
.
m alntammg
mstea
.
.
:
:
0;
36.
37
38.
39.
.
Barthea "lntroduct1on
RIcoeur. p. 113.
lbid., p. 88.
fbfd . p. 100.
40. lbid., p. 13.
1 analyse
..
p 7
Introduction
15
shows not
This brief survey of important recent views of narrative
a feature
as
strictly
ed
consider
being
only that narrativa structure is
struc
that
that
said,
we
as
also,
but
of literary and historical works,
various
The
works.
such
to
only
ture is regarded as one that pertains
that stories or
approaches to the problem of representation reveal
world they
real
the
from
ed
separat
to,
histories are considered alien
that
follows
It
itself.
form
e
narrativ
the
of
e
profess to depict becaus
e"
"life-lik
be
really
,
reasons
ral
structu
for
,
cannot
fictional narratives
biogra
as
such
es,
narrativ
tional
non-fic
other
or
and that historical
their subject
phy, journalism, etc . . must inevitably impose upon
n dresses up
vizatio
narrati
best
At
s.
posses
not
does
it
matter a form
and, if we really
reality, reflecting our need for satisfying coherence,
"escape" from
an
is
It
g.
thinkin
l
wishfu
from
believe it, derives
41. lbfd p. 102.
(Paris: Seuil, 1975).
42. lbld., p. 1 1 . See Rfcoeur, La Mlaphore vive
ore vive, pp. 305-21.
43. Temp el rcll, p. 13. See La Mroph
.
45.
16
.
is an i'dea pu t forwa rd b
t (and this
y ll
wo
At
reality.
White7 ) narrative seeks to put acros 8 rth&$
s
.
.
Illorl) ,11d
.
picked up bY.
rests of power and m ampul ation
"l"'
inte
the
m
ld
"
wor
of the
h
av
theor1sts
e
cont
these
.
ributed .h-o
. w is that whi le
., U ch
.
My v1e
t
have m1sund ers t ood
hey
t
ativa
narr
of
its
o
1 o llt
-o
dn
a
n
underst
t
. g th e d iscon
& iI\ t
re
.
'
t mu1ty
'
..
1 WO ld .. By stressm
be twn
v
u
r
the "rea
ltt
"
tive, they have not only mis cast
regards narra .
the t tnd
.
.. 1l. fe. as
elat
the m1sun ders tan dmg ol both terms
i uted to
es p.... : ton
but contr'b
1
'"' Jy
the latter.
.
.
. g t he contmu1ty bet
l be stressm
ween nur
rati.Ve
As I sal'd , 1 sha l
.
nt
w1ll
ot
take
accou
the
nd
my
for
but
m
.
life
of
yday
c
l
ever
aitns 8 &
Ut
istorica narrahves ..represent . " Inste
ad 1
how literary and h
a
of
U
features
every
narrahve
day exporie
begin by uncovering
nce ll
.
.
ll
.
d
wmg a certam commu mty of fo.r
action. u 1 succeed in sho.
m bet
account
my
m
n
may have so e
" life" and written narrahves.
irn p
.1c:a
.
on
i
representati
of
But
that
problem
s not m y
.
tions for tbe
.
ini11,1
.
concem. To the extent t hat 1 discuss narrahve at all in it s l
it
. erary
guise, I shall be stressing the fact that it arises out of an
d lS P
re.
.
an d communi cat ion .
figured in certain features of l t' fe, achon,
H'istor.
.
.
ical and fi ctlonal narrahves w1 11 revea 1 t h emse )ves to be not
d'1stor.
.
.
.
hons of, demais of, or escapes from reahty, but extensi ons and
e
r
urations of its primary feat ures.
t
h
strongest and most influe ntial thinkers in recent
literary theory
philosophy of history. But while the disco ntinu
ity view predo i.
nates . tbere are dissent ing voices. One of
the mos t eloq uent is th
l i terary critic Barbara Hardy, who hold
s that "narrativa, like )yric
. not to be
dance, is
regarded as an aesthetic inventio
n usE:d by artlsts
to control, mam. pulate, and orde
r experience , but as a primary
act of
.
mmd transferred to art from
life. The novel merely heighton isola
s,
tes
ad a alyses the narrativa
er Wilhel m sehapp,
a renegade phenomenologist writing in
:
;
17
lntroducllon
I have made grateful use of ali these studles, some of whlch apponrod
since 1 began this project. Naturally I hopo to Improve on thom; I flnd
that each puts the emphasls on a dlfforent sido oI what 1 try to
prosent as the oveal l phenomenon. None succoods, ln my vl ew. ln
doing justice to the soci al dimonslon of narratlve whlch Is nocossary
for the full comprehonsion of hl st ory.
One further note: 1 must admlt that my p roc ed u ro may soem to
exhibit one mothodologically suspect feature. 1 aim to show that full
1976
1981
Press.
1970).
of
Chlcaso
A M'
e
r
u
t
uc
tr
S
al
or
p
e
The T m
of
Experience and Action
e to
1. From Real Tim
"
"
the
but also "pre-thematic"; that is, it is an awareness in which
historical past is involved in ordinary experience even v1hen we are
not explicitly think ing about it. As we said, it has the char acter of a
11background., for present experience.
We have indicated that the place to look for this awareness of the
ure
ast is our ordinary experience of time and that the key to its nat
1s the n arrat'lve or story-telhng character of that experience. But we
.
have JUst encountered precise ly among some theorists who make the
,
stro ngest connection between narr
view t hat if
ativa and histor"
J the
od'inary
t
exprience has an identifiable
. .
and describable structure a
.
all t as certa1nly not
narrat i va structure. lt will be our purpose in
th.is ehapter then ' t0 '
d 15Pl ay son1ething of the temporal character of
18
19
very well
All this confuses the issue because, as these theorists
1.
44-45.
20
esent or depict is n
kn ow, what stories and histories. repr
ot PUreJ
Y
uff
es
i
enc
,
per
act
ons
e
an
.
an
1
hum
d
x
s eri
but
.
s
physical events
ng
fi , 'in
ty o f pro 1ect ing mean1ng o nto
an achv1
or
d
cluding the hum
s
ts.
Thu
the
even
r
ph
othe
ysi
nd
ca
J
cal
world
meaning in physi
kas
bac
ays
dr
p
alw
or
sphere of o
o
, but
pera.
fi nd l'ts way into stories
.
.
h
t
h
at
an
ms
1t
um
see
n
Ji
But
rea
ty, i order
v1ty.
tions for human acti
to
.,
"
n
t
e
b
wee
art
t
an
tras
d
con
"life
p
shar
," is be
make good on the
g
i
the
of
tick
ng
del
mo
clo
the
to
g
ck.
rdin
Hay d
con stru ed acco
enti
as
d"
pres
ng
worl
e
th
itse
"
of
lf
as "a m
recall, speaks
::
:
White, we
n
s
But how plausible is the idea of huma event as n "me re se
e
quence"? Is this an accurate way to describ the temporal char acter
,. p.
Zr
-
.
';;
1:!
V 19 72).
21
account
is
ened presence is st1 presence and does not equa1 pastness. But
Brentano does not go nearly far enough. for the notion of memory
does not give us all we need. As 1 hear the present note sound. l could
remember notes from different points in my past experience-yester
day or ten years ago-that have no connection with the note 1
am
hearing now. What is. unaccounted for is the just-pastness. the very
previousness of the previous note. in virtue of which 1 bear two notes
are
entirely different.
4.
e, and History
Time, Narrativ
22
o
fiel d the pr es ent i s its focu s and the 1USnd f
ufi eJ d " Jike the VlSU ai
t-pas
t
h it stands out. 7 Consc io
und a gainst whic.
u
s
kg
n
ro
ba
e
e
e
s
.
th
s of
forms
olve s retenhon a s t h e h or1zon-con scious
inv
Ys
wa
1
a
nt
n
es8
the prese
.
nd
ou
gr
of this back
.
of foreground and backg round , and their co
Tlus combination
.
.
present note (Hus ser l cali s 11 1mpressionarreof
ess
sn
ou
c1
1,, )
ns
co
.
lates,
zon,
past
hor1
t
the
go
o
of
ss
ma
usne
ke
cio
up our
.
and retentional cons
.
c
a
a
t
1
u
1ts
.
1ng,
occu
d
rre
soun
nce ar ha
melody's
Pexper1ence of the
,,
.
the
1n
.
note
a
usual
ber
s
ens
"remem
e
to
o
st,
f
that
pen1ng. By contra
1
.
.,
"
n
d
eco
or
ary
on
ecti
mem
ol
"rec
or
of
y") is to
with
"
spatial perception once again: the past which 1 retain, like the spatial
background, is constitutive of the presence (note that the word has
'
7. Ibid., p. 31
(52).
8. lbid., p. 35
(57).
9. lbid., p. 158.
10. lbid., p. 39
(62).
'
23
are
our defense, and Husserl 's, we can point out that it is not the con
ceptualized or objective space of geometry that we are using as an
analogy, but precisely lived or experienced space, just as we are
speaking here of lived or experienced time and not time "in itself or
"as such." It is just as well, however, to heed the warning and to
remind ourselves constantly of the limits of the analogy even as we
continue to p rofi t by its use.
The analogy can be pushed one step farther. We started with the
problem of "hearing the melody,'' and pointed out that we do not at
any time hear ali the notes in the melody. Still, we do speak of
hearing the melody, and this convey s the fact that it is the melody as
a whole, and not the individual notes, that is the object of rny
awareness. Now just as a spatial thing reveals itself to me only one
side at a time, but such that the side is seen as a side of the thing
which is my object, and not as an object in its own right. so the
melody reveals itself one note at a time, and each note is heard as
"presenting" the melody, not as standing on its own.11 ln spite of all
the obvious differences between the temporal and the spatial object
(the order of presentation cannot be reversed, the object does not
outlive its presentations, it is not differently presented to different
observers, etc.) this analogy is useful. It enables us to invoke the
Husserlian difference between internal and external horizons: those
that belong to the object, such as its hidden sides, and those from
which it stands out as an object. ln the case of the melody, our use of
the foreground-background analogy must be subtly differentiated.
Within the melody, notes that are given in any moment as past,
present, and future are like salient and hidden features of the object.
But the melody as a whole also stands out against the background of
the "silences" before it begins and after it ends.
What Husserl offers us is the counterpart of the well-known phe
11.
24
..
which spans future and past. Like the spatial horizon, the hori zons
ely be
of the future and the past recede
indefinitely, and it woul d sur
"
mi. sta ke to identify r etention
and protention with "short-ter m mrn
entt on
ory and expectation.
As we h ave seen what distinguishes ret
fro
on, " i.s
oW
ongoing ' presen
t experience. As with the horizon of sp a ce, h
,
much in
ll
obiective term s)
is "taken in" by these horizons wi
te
ccording to th
e qui
e eh aracter of the
u in f a ct, b
aJ
,
foreground
m
and
extens1ve.
.
va:Y
e
}-{
n
t
u
Y h as correctly pointe d out, a p re
tEta.n flux
.
n of
or B e 0 .
ers
1
ct
u
a
..
d
tr
re
pure
tlrne as is
v
110
is as much an abs
i 1111 to nu
a e
b
zau on into
we
hmeless points. ]us t as
- -
rtoe M
N"
th (
)bn., The H UR\aJ\leau.Pont Phenomen
Jin SmJ
Co
ology o'
hiea Preta
tr.
on
Percep
t
i
i
. yl,9621 pp. 3-t.
12 Mtu
"'
25
Tbis leads to one more thing which must be noted before we part
compa.ny with our version of the Husserlian approach to time-con
sdousness. Husserl. by limiting himself to the auditory example.
seems at times to beliew that he has bracketed not merely the spatial
aspeet s of the sound but all externai reference altogether. as if he had
,.o._ .,.
...
,.
n.me,
26
sciousness. But it
of
l in the strict sens e t ha; "'
ona
'
t
nte
e
i
ll
sti
is
just a tone.
ust
eard and the hearing of it s
o farn
. h bet ween the o J ect h
.
r
1s
u
d.1sttng
we
. , w it h Husserl, to the temporali ty of the o b
. atten 1on
have p8ld
riencing that temporalit
Jec:t
ma nne r of expe
y fo
an
y}
elod
(the
ur
our consciousness. But 8
s' the flow of
se
l't
h
em
t
e
es
exper1 enc
.
presuppose, even 1'f 1't d oes not equa 1
es
do
n
ss1o
. .
, a
tion of succe
Another way to put it is this: w h
.
ns.
ptio
perce
e
n 1
success1on f
mel odY that is happen1ng, my ex
a
.
as
such
hing
pe..
. .
exper ience somet
is
an
it
even
ens:
t.
happ
No
that
w
h
strictJy
. 1.1self somet ing
ce is
.
nen
,
t
ed
even
not
fledg
fo
fulla
m
is
e
it
hat
b
t
u
t
say
o nly
we would have to
l
later
a
recol
for
or
ech
o
er,
n
observ
of
mine
for a poss1'ble externai
.
.
.
e
ce;
t
1
exp
ien
JUS
own
have it.
my
:
That is, I do not experience
.
someth1ng h1dden from me. This can be
Still, its temporality is not
entional experiences , such as
best seen in cases of genuinely non-int
of sadness.15 These are experie nces
8 throbbing tooth- ache or a wave
fO
..
that I h ave, not objects that 1 encounter. But they do begin and end,
and thus endure, even develop and change. To say simply that 1 have
said that I live t hrough them.16 ln the sarne manner, 1 live through the
does comprise a vantage point (my body) which i s its own "lived
through" spatiality. Like the vantage
point in spatial perce ption, the
teporality of an experience
of a temporal objec t is not itself an
ob1ect bu t 8 stru ctu ral
feature of the experience .
Thus lhe life of consc
iousness i s no more an undifferentiated
Bergsonian continuu
m than are the experienc
ing
ed events ha ppen
und s. It is articulated into
experiences: acts of awaren ess. feel
mgs, ep1sodes
m
which b egm an d
end, experiences wh1 ch are co
Posed of other ex
periences and
s
combine to make up Iarger one
Acco rd'ing to
Huss erl's th
eory, 1ntentional experience s are at leas t
partly diffe
rent1ated b y
what they are of. Thus when 1 he ar the
m elo dv
J the me J
not
ody 18
only distinguished from oth er even ts; mY
]
See Husserl's dis
cus .
tr
.
.
(New
lnvestJgat1011s.
16. IS li
Husser) 's
1970),
n. PP 5 72-76:
540.
n
elfahren. See ib1d P
.
S.
Flar
27
17.
History
rative, a nd
r
a
N
nrne.
the melody as a who le
S Part of
so lh
a
d
e
c
n
2e
e ri e
p
co
the
x
plex
of
e
r
ex
part
m
s
p
i
e ienc e
roush as
h n ote
h
e Of
t
1C
d
e
\16
9
8
li
iS
ce 0{ it
8XP8rten
on that the flow of con scious
od Y
lH
o this noti
t
th mel
i
tu
nter
e,
aroun
d
encou
liv
us,
we
)
08
rn.
ed
... shell be re
i
s
vni
t s (eve nts
ec
as
J
ob
1
a
phases fi gure as parts Wi
tempor
like the
thin
tio ns whose
ura
fi
n
of co 8
x
our
o
accou
the
e
nt
pl
clud
of
m
1 co
s now con
phe.
s Let u
e
l
o
h
w
l'ity of expenence by re
pora
tem
1arge r
the
flect.
h to
?,
l
p
nomenolog
mplished.
1
a
h
w
n
o
g
can be seen in the investi
in
ists' strategy, as
ga.
log
o
men
no
The phe
t
are
on
Y
b
kn
est
1
p
eauo
Mer
wn ls to
. h H usserl a nd
ic
tlons for wh
! ::s ::
rience
who attempt t o begin with
they discover instead a complex inter
as 8 causall y additive process,
ees. lhe
and disco ncertinglY GO
Prote
ten . At lhe
very least lonat future is still determined to sotne rdi
nation to
tnalntai
pea our bodily equ ilib riu.ro and
n the
Ves. th
at is, our very capacitY to coii
. " "
.
,"
11
e::
surprt.
c7ill '
29
ones, are now parts of a different whole: what they are "heard as" is
revised retroactively. Thus many of the temporal wholes whose parts
far as our experience is concerned. The fact is that both before and
they
after the surprising turn, it is as parts of a temporal whole that
were experienced.
ve temporal experiThus the configurational character of our passi
ntional forward reference
ences has as a crucial component this prote
rienced as a function of
in virtue of which present and past are expe
this is true even of the
what will be. It is important to stress that
30
racten
tence
z
exis
ed
an
m
as
u
h
an
that
d
e
aciive
e rgu
.
even its supposedly passi ve
that
,
and
tence
exis
a
l
c
t
i
c
aap ects,
en d. pra
. .
d
b
determine
y
chv
ultimately
1ty.
are
To some ex.
l ike perception,
of
perceph
ogy
phenomenol
on,
with its emph
tont Merl ea u- Ponty s
a
orientation,
admits
and
nt
this
moveme
,
tho
ily
d
o
ugh he is
sis on b
as
perception
pre-practic
view
al" and "anony.
more inc li ned to
'
mous. That is, the p rocess of perception establishes us in a worl d
which becomes the field of practice, the condition of the possibility
'
'
ct of the phenomenon of
3 T h e Tempo rol
ity of Action
the
u sser l's he lp.
das
the mann
tu
er in whic h
a s truc
is
e
m
expe
rienc
t
i
ed
d
co
n
If
gured time Our
an
ex
to
h an
fl
31
32
, and Histo ry
Tim e. Na rrotive
t ive
..
..
the
exam ple
example
and simple action. It is true that there are some small-scale, purel y
mental actions, such as doing quick mental calculations, which
would be even simpler because they do not seem to require any
bodily movements. But it is more valuable for our purpos es to
overt
choose
example not just for its simplicity but because it involves ele
ments included in the standard d iscussion s of action. And
of
those is bodily movement.
Let us note first that the action unfolds i n temporal phases , li ke
melod y. The purpose of the action is to bit the bali in a certain way.
which is thus the temporal as well
as"the teleological en d
action-though it could be argued
, interestingly, that the
through," which occurs after the
ball is bit, is part of the means
end which precedes it. ln gene
ral one is incli ned to thi nk it
15
that means temporal ly prec
edes the end of the act io n, just
ao
one
the
of tbe
''follow
to the
stans ad
a it
---
-::::-:::-:
::-:-:---:- Reaton--:--:------
-::-:
---
..
ctJ
a
f
n
d
and Causes," ln
LaWfc IJJBlc
33
1 serve the tennis ball by drawing back my right arm, tossing the bali
into the air with my left, etc., each of which is a distinct action
describable in its own right. Such is the interrelation of the elements
of a tennis serve, however, that an accurate description would have to
sound l i ke this: the sort of arm movement required to hit the bali at a
certain height, the kind of toss designed to place the bali in the path
of the racquet, etc. ln short, each of the phases must be described
precisely as a phase of this action and cannot be described indepen
dently in terms applicable to other contexts. If it be thought that the
sarne sort of inseparability from context applies to the tennis serve
itseJf. that is, as an element in the game of tennis. it can be countered
that the action can be performed in repetitive practice, aimless vol
leys. etc., without having the function it has. and without falling
under the rules applying to it, within the game. To the conceptual
inseparability of the elements of the serve corresponds, we might add
a kind of psychological and even physiologica.l inseparability. We do
not think of the elements of the action as separate actions performed
in sequence, nor could we easily perform one of the elements, even
in a mimed demonstration, without combining it with the other
movements that make up the action as a whole.
Granted that this action unfolds in time, not in a series of sub
actons but rather in what we choose to call interdependent phases.
we must note further, and still in parallel with the experience of the
34
d
spe
i
v
o
a
el
ro
p
m
p
f
o
r
as
in d
k
a
s
a
o
f the
' h
the acti o n , past an d fu t u r
" l ocated .
h a s e s of
e. A
p
.
e
iv
s
re t
u ca s
and ret en hon ap p
he
oth e r s e
of p roten t1on
li ca bte
s
t
ce
n
h
o
c
.
HusserJ ia n
the age nt 's point of view o n lhe a t ere?
gi n g in
e io
n
i
r
b
n
After a ll , bY
in effe ct reverhng to a p h enorn e
not
we
re
n
a
ol
t,
&i:c
e mus
a1
in deed w
treatm ent?
ee d be useful provided one frees
epts can ind
.
o ne8
.
n
c
o
c
Thos e
d1gm of pass i ve ex peri
para
elf
ted
unsta
enc
he
t
ro
f
suffici en t ly
i ar, that is always operative i n Huss erl 's i n ' er.
v
u
e
c
stiga
.
part1
cepti on 10
avoid the sugges hon that my a
hould
s
.
ne
o
cu on .
.
.
rt1 c u 1 ar,
is
u. ons ln pa
1
1ng
a m s1mp ly obse
'
d
l
f
o
u
n
whose
y
.
Iod
e
rv
m
in
a
g
hke
. II
a process
not to th e temporal object
ble
para
com
is
n
'
0
or
ac t1
event
an ything my
to
rather
but
my
'
tem
ience,
p
exper
or
al exper1.
hich I
.
1
1er
ear
term1
our
with
nol
ing
ogy
,
keep
m
in
y
acu o
is
en ce of l. t. Th at ,
. , But
1
"1
th
1ve
one
roug
h
but
.
unter
enco
thi s exn.
.
.
is not an even t 1
.
passive a connotahon, espec1all y as regards the
press1o n a1 s0 has too
action the future 1s not someth1ng expected
future. ln the midst of an
.
.
l y to come,
t, not somet h'1ng w h'1c h 1s s1mp
or pre figured in the presen
.
.
by the achon 1n whi ch I am
it is something to be brought about
engaged. If we are to use the term protention i n connection with
.
the future state in whi ch my racquet connec ts with the ball and
sends it on its way is not mere ly some thing I expec t to happe lt is
n.
the outcome or comp letio n of what I am
doin g. ln an important sense
it is what 1 am do ing .
. The sae cau tion must be mad e abo ut usin g the not ion of reten
tion, wh1ch for Hu
sserl is a species of me mory. ln the sens e of the
tenns serve, the mo
vem ents wh ich preced
e my present pos ition are
not simply succes
si ve states of my
bo dy wh ich 1 reme mbe r' they lead
up to and prep
are the way for
present an d future.
lf one take s the
se cau t ians 1nt o
acc ou nt on e can usefu lly appea l to
the concepts
of proten ti. on
an d ret en tio n wh
porality of ach.
en de scr i bin g t he te m
on ' for th ey
.
"""'
0ffer certa 1n
intimate and
imp orta nt adva nta ge s. 1 u e
com plem en
ta ry interre1
past , whic
ahon of presen t, futu re, an d
h we f li
owed Husse
rl in rendering me tap ho rica ll y as
kind of for
egrou n d-b
8
a ckgrou n
.
d or front- back
or
rela tion , is an u np
35
d Hlst ory
ro t i ve , a n
r
a
N
r1 rn e '
t t.he re is a pecu lia r fi rst
rn 't s tho
d
Pets
o
e
36
on
o tn h
ut he rejects it a s misl ea d t
b
"d
8
V
I
n
f
o
of
cu
ng
a
m
n
o
w
l
prob ve o n our o
int of v iew.;l& M o st d i s cu a n d
tern a \ p o
t
ss
he
d to t oX
perspec l
repudiate other as
are
to
try
i on s
h
ic
p
h
w
p
-r; com
enY
.
m
ects
o
8
in
1 U us
of
mp t lon of d i screta oven t s in s
in clu d
a Y
l 't
a
tead
s
t ts a ss u
u
s
a
h
c
f
o a
s u
ai n th i s observar s perspect lvo . 20 B u t ?f
na lysi (s e
a
s
t
e
o
m
at
t hi
tt u .
ess) m
s
mate since i n most casos t h c i
s proc
u
i
t
o
i
g
U
le
l
i
n
t
s
s
or
u
n
cont
e is
r1 s1 08
w led ge of p h ysica 1 eve nt s an
er surp
o
.
kn
th
i
ur
e
o
h
n
d
is
even
u on w 1t
externa i o b serve rs . The
connee
n
as
i
ity
..a
eu
pac
_
s
In ista 'ra t,
our ea
e
tt. on5 in
ac
n
treatment,
a
h
a
m
as
suc
Hu
of
t
s
l
me
of bu
su
di d t
t he re
a P ly i ng
o
tion.
is onl Y in
'
'
ac
of one's ow n
m
s
m
or
erf
p
ribe correctly th i s per for
the
tand and desc
d
rnance ,
ers
un
to
If we wi 5h
to
put
d
as1
nee
.
d
e al togethe
parti cu lar, we
r the
ora1.a ty m
.
and its temp
t
a
t
p
e
on
e
and
e
re
c
n
a
or
l
d rep s n
x
em y
ta
. log of cau sati o n. m
tnrmmo
action
such
simple
as
a
the
of
u
one n
8 t the level
.
der
Es eciall y
it
the
future
of
idst
com
the
m
pleti
i
n
on
em
I
of my
discussion. w hen
b
i
o
s
as
the
f
on
l
avai
t
c
1
d
able
evidence,
.
somet hing I pre
'acti. on is not
.
that springs to m i n d by habi tual associa.
nor is it 8 mere expect ation
tion.
th e occurrence of the
future state. But they do not capture the obvious fact that th is future
occurrence is something l
effect.
lflre:
37
2 7 . Alfrerl Sd1"tt, Tlu' PhtmQmt1nolngy o/ tho So lal World, tr. Ctlrf(t Wlh
.fnsdorlck l.Ahnffrt (Ev1niitorn Northwtt1h1m Unl vctre l t y t>rttu, 1 U67), pp. 490.
2ft. lhld,, p, 6 1 .
20. lbld., p. 62.
ao. ll1l d . , p. &u,
iJ 1 . fJ . p, h4.
and
Tim e.
38
Narrative. on d History
r
trY1
c
erve
h an
.
relatlon to one s own ac
externa l obs
es ari se i n
u
m
u
e
o
m
.
n
o
s
, b
att1t
. ud e does
eis and as a privahon of th e so rt of ut
lev
x
Je
m
co
con.
only at rather
the case of an actio n l i ke h
we ha ve in
itr
n
e
m
age
n
scious eng
r such a " basic action " that it is hl i dt g
fo
st
e
n
ugg
.
s
and
tenn is bal i To
d in a d etached way
observe
ely
ctiv
e
.
fl
re
se
e rns to
n 1 ess
.
unconsciou s u
1
y anyth ing bu t h lin
clear
is
It
er.
geth
alto
enon
d : it .
miss the h om
is
consc
anyone
d
.
If
ious
P en tUn1
_....
a
ulate
of wh t h
U1 artic
e IS
d1rected ' strU C
a
e
t
h
b
11
f
h
1
.
e
serving
trie
er
s
play
to
o bserve
. the tennis
. is
1t
.
domg,
.
h
,
e
is
sure
however
to
, .
de,
mis s the ba
the outsi
li
himself as i'f from
.
ut
o
1
b
d
y
'
l
. ns a re i
ed-o
arr1
actio
dly-c
ar
htforw
mpor-.
Such simple, straig
right but beause they are the ce nt
ral
tant not only in their own
'
s
achon
nge
where
long-ra
reflec
x,
tio
comple
n, con.
element in more
a
d
ly
involve
.:-t
genuine
.
are
This is why it is
templation , and det chment
18
rn'
_,-
'
50
admits that "once the action begins," the goal i s not just pictured but
also "wished for and protended. " This means that for the agent it is
c
i t tou s ex p ressi o
Y
n of Heid egger 's from hi s a nal ysi s
of everyda
yn ess t n Bei
ng an d T'ime. ln
ccupati on s
everyday conc erns a nd preo
the agent
, say s He'd
.
of
1 egger, 1s
always sich vorweg , ah ea d
32. lbid.,
p. 61.
39
ti ve , ond H is tory
T im e . Narro
40
zi. ng .. backward" in time the vari ou s ph
i
n
a
as
rg
o
i. n
es o
of the end
to its rea\ization , mu st n
s
roean
f th.
the
ot b
re
a
h
ic
h
s
w
n
ac\io
. s still rooted in the present . Thou gh h
e
t
i
t
h.
en
s
he ag
co
fact that t
ncell\ .e
present . Any retrosp ecuv
the
\
.
in
l
ti
s
is
e
e
h
ls
re
e
le'"" e
in the tutu .
'&' l\\ i
pleted) can o nly be a
com
as
b
it
k
on
c
ing
qU s
action tlook
z ack.nowledges by speakin g of th e fu
Q i ret
h
e
t
S
ure
s
.
tion a
S nAr,
r 1 pel'fett.
case with passive exper1ence , prote nti on e
'
n
h
s
As
s it with present and pa st , bu ses th
uture and unite
t
e
g
s
en
e "1
ulnerable to the real futu
h
v
s
o
fi
stand
,
ed
\e
ni
re w h
act1on . thus u
eh t
wa
t
est
n
d
1
h.
y.
ru
s
i
the
re
in
al\
s p ect it
.
action
the
on
e
i
d
ru
s Pet
1nt
.
hap 8
the passive expenence, but the nat
' erent ftom
u
r
not dtf
e
.
.
of th
. the cas e of a u
.
e
.
tment or surpr ise is different in
n
i
c
o
pp
sa
d1
on , s1 rn
. .
.
.
.
'f\
e emphas1zed , lt is an int enb o n or P u rp
t' \ y
because, a5 we hav
o
se
.
.
r
.
a
th
.
h
1nted . It i s a matte
ation that is d isappo
r of t e
than a mere expect
.
future are relate d. What I exp ect
Y
in Pa s
in which present and
.
siv
e
and outcome of w ha
t 1 Q.
experience is th e continuahon
D tn
n
o
t experiencing. But 1n actlon, the future is the completed execu tion w
0f
wbat l am doing. The outcome dep end s on me.
..
w:r
'
\.
ln thls sense the future, and thus the succes s of the whole aet'
ion ,
.
.
may be more vu\nerable and frag1le in the case of acti on . But at th
same time, tor the agent it is more detennin ed, less open to variatio
than the passively protended future. Also, it exercise s more retroac
tive control. so to speak , on the present, since it governs not just my
view oi thlngs but what l am doing. B oth experience and action are to
a \arge extent in the thrall of the future , but of the two action is the
more
so
4.
..
",
p<>5ped
41
and octfon. ln the other. For experlence and for action, t hen, i n
end spaces between them, that space can figure in our experience
and ection. And by the sarne token, t ime may be conceivable as a
Bergsonlan dure pure or as a sequence of now-points, but i t i s l ived
movements that make up the action, etc. As we have seen, the part
whole relation here i s a specifically temporal one, and distin guish
able as such from other instances of this relatlon: spati a l , for exem
ple, or conceptual. The movements t hat effect the tennis serve, like
lhe notes ln a melody, must relate to each other in a temporal way,
and not, for exe mple, i n a purely spatial way. Both t h e notes and t h e
movements could have merely spatial values, such as the arrange
achieve the melody or the ection by rea lizing them one after the
othor. unloss t h e propor order is followed. Action and events are thus
temporal Gestalten of whose parts, in their temporal arrangement,
the subject has a protentlonal -retentional grasp: a changing and flow
lng grasp, to be sure, slnce the whole is grasped successively from
cach of lts parts, each time (metaphorically speaking) from a d i f
ferent " perspectlve."
lt is l rnpo rt a nt to stress this last point in order to avoid the tend
en.cy to place the subject ln some position above or outside the flow
of events l n order to account for hls grasp of the whole. ln trying to
describe the role or function of future and past ln present experience
nm e.
42
s
P tes eh
.
"
ym8 a
sa
t t
d
'
e to d eny preci s e l y Wh
o
b
v
d
a
l
u
t
wo
s
u
o
m
n
o
we
si
a
s
t
e
.
pr
w
x
e
a
is
1
y
h.
genu1ne
t
tem
p ora l e h
.
us . To use
a mely the
ara ct te
ere . n
h
e
rn
r
r
of
Th e past i s past, gone , n o l on ge r a
to a ffi
.
tPVin
et U a i
"' g
on.
cti
a
'M_
d
than I exp ect it.
h 11e
ce a n
t urn ou t other
To a
ex pe.rie n
a
Y
m
d
n
ve an
a
.
t yet
on i s alway s to be engage d n
acti
fut ure is no
80
t
u
r o
o e
ce or to
ged i n its pha ses " a ll at n n of
enga
were
1
ex peri en
I
f
o ce
me
.. t a ti
s
It
ase
y
orall
exte
temp
ph
nd
e
a
its
d exper1.
8 . h sa m e t h i n g :
e
.
.
e
n
c
t
e
be
d
wo ul d not
and unfold 1ng act l on.
d
e
loy
dep
m ra JJ
event . a te . Y
ust strik
. e a balance betwee n two
tveJ y we m
ipt
ex.
scr
de
Th u s
t
the
presen
1n
e
by
tre
erenc
ati
inh
n
ur
g i t as a
n
r-st.ressing o
tre mes : ove
ss1
stre
ng
over
and
our
n
op e n es s
from Past a n d fut ure,
to
isolati ng
poral
pers
upra-tem
s
pe
a
s
a
cti
t
i
ve.
It rnay
by trea ting
.
past an d fu tu re
n
y
ta1
t
cer
me
h
from
p
a
ive
sical prej u.
ex tre mes der
be t hat these two
.
the form er, we have already made referen ce to th
.
dices As regards
e
as
elves
our
passi
of
ve receivers
conceive
and synthetic power of the "ego" to the point where an almost God
like perspective is attrib uted to it.
lt may be as well t hat the two extremes rest on a tendency to favor
be indined to think of the present as being cut off from the past (it
d
not fit i n with what has gone before} a n d the future (it sh atters
our pectations of wha t wil l come
of
next}. The response t o this sort
d
on
para igm is that it confirms
rather than denies the role of rete nti
a nd protenti on. With
out a tempora l Gestalt includin g p ast a nd future
there wou ld be no
pa st pattern to disturb no expectati on to sh tter
,
.
And as we p
omted out i n the last
n maY
section , while such i ntrus io
rob us of and
leave us s a ch1.
ns {a
ng
ex pec tat io
r
e
for
e
concret
certain
.
very
U s
n u ed
COord t Y ttua tio n ), we are sti l l left " counting o n " the co n ti
ion of our b
f the
'
0d ies
and the further general coh erence 0
wor ld a
rou nd u s
.
Th e intell e
ctu
the
rt of routi ne aJi' st' ext reme , by cont rast , may favor a s exa mP J esives
acti v1 t i s
in wh 1c
e that. are eh ara cteristic of so m uc h of 0u r 1
h we d e
a 1 ca pa
t tY
bl y w t h our
rn. ueh as
go pre
t
surround ings a n d t h i n gs
expecte
me
d H
fs
rnel es s
o
w
e
e
n
o
a
i
m y seem to be i n possess
"l aws "
:
hat
go er
e ast
s
g he e
s
P
a n d fu '-n t
b havi or of things a n d pers on , o uni
r0 b l
tu
.
e
ut
"' o u s
ern t 1'
P
caJ iy (
e ad o
of
.
pr
e
e
rhe
r
..
,
s
vents
es
i
l
a n rl r
,u o
US
e
a
r
"' P P are n t ly t i melessly } b a fo
.J.
The
43
l11HlbHUy '' agont, but siso of the fact that in action we a l ways make
taluln 111 ff rea ponto to the claim t hat human events exhibit i n them8llvo no structuro apart from constituting a "mere sequence." We
have ottomptod to bring out something of the richness and complex
lty or tho 1tructure of passive experience and action at their most
bule lovol.
ll lt truo t hat we have not gone very far toward making good on our
TI1e 8tructuros
acolo. To moko thls polnt properly we must get beyond the simple
actlons nnd oxperiences we have u sed as examples and move to more
complox ond long-range phenomena. We must also bring i n reflec
tlon, planning, and deliberation, which are gen uinely and i mpor
tontly involvod in the more complcx tempora l i ty of extended actions
ond oxparloncos. We reserve ali this for the next chapter.
1t was necossory howover to begin i n the present chapter with the
slrnpl.est oct lons and expericnces because they constitute the basis of
evoryth l ng that comes after. We cou ld cal l them build ing blocks or
basic olomonts lf thls d i d not give the misloading i mpression that
1olr rolot lon to oach other is merely cumu lativa or aggregat i ve. ln
f et, we sha l l find thot this relation is not unl ike the one obta i n i n g
amonR t h o parts o f the experiences and actions already discussed.
1'ho phenomena wo have described are basic in a sense other than
boing building blocks, and the im portance of beginning with such
$mllllscole phenomena, when our ultimate purpose i s to get to the
lar-go-scalo h lstorical temporal ity which extends beyond even the
lndtvlduals, is two-fold.
First, lt pormit s us to correct the view that structu re i n genera l and
narrativo structu re i n particu lar i s i m posed upon a human experi
doe
44
t
no
f. urthe
act i ons can
r '' a ct of will . " Thoug h t a nd tn oVe
r
o
''
.
n
0
it1
rn
VO l
e
d
n
e
1
t
a re
acti o n cal
i n fact i n se parab Je, a nd t
h a
cted a nd
e
n
n
o
rc
e
logi call y in te
e acce p t the threat i t enta il s o f nalysis
w
if
en
i n fin .
rk ' ev
ue
of
action
doe s not wo
ther
a
k
i
n
g
e
s
pe
is
n oth i
e are
w
as
g
regress . A s lo
n g rnore
ic h have bot h . mental and ph ys ica l 8 8Pe
wh
s
n
o
ti
cts as
th8 n a c
rahty, a n d ergues t hat wh
mpo
bas1c
te
rns
ce
n
a tegy co
ere We are
.
Our own str
i
at
h
b
s
,
w
as
act1on
1c or i rred
and
u cib l e .
. n g of expe rien ce
is
1
eak
.
sp
Wh
1
e
J
t
h
ence.
ere Is n eces
sequ
era
m
a
n
s
a
tha
ri l Y a
m o re com p1 ex
d
n
a
nce
ac
exper1e
hons
,
ng
th
erlyi
is is n ot
. 1 or d er und
an
.
sequ ent1a
b
y
ce
n
r
f
tse
er1e
J
exp
,
ap
t
our
a rt f o m
figu re in
the
order that can
b
d
te
events
n
represe
and
Y
a cti ons Th
ni zation
e
.
con fi gurati o nal orga
en
sequ
ce
b
not
1s
,
ut
then
c
o
n
s,
t
g
fi
even
u
r
ed sebedroc k of hu man
quence.
.
a n d d evot ing so m u c h
w1th
g
nnin
begi
for
n
o
de.
Our secon d reas
s a n d exper iences is one that
scri ption to these small -scale action
cannot be fully appreciated until later, but we can menti on it now in
35. lt sho
uld be n ote
d th
Actio n , w
a
II
Temporality and
Narrative Structure
ln the previous chapter we dealt with the temporal structure of
pusive experience and of action, ln the interest of discovering how
the past (the historical past in particular) figures in our experience.
we need to look at the over-all temporal structure of experience. We
have indicated that the key to this structure is its namttive character.
We began by countering the view we found prevalent among many
theorists of nanative that human experience is in itself devoid of
structure, or at any rate of nanative structure. We tried to show the
configurational character of the most elementary and basic experi
ences, thereby demonstrating the inaccuracy of the claim that at
some fundamental levei human events
are
..
merely sequential in
their temporality.
What we have done so far goes some distance, but not far enough.
toward establishing our point. It is true that temporal configuration
has been seen by some (Ricoeur and Min for example) as essential
to narrative structure. And if we have shown that configuration
inheres in experience itself, then what we have said counts against
their view that such structure is overlaid or imposed upon experi
ence by a retrospective and "literary,. effort extrinisic to experience
itself. But the narrative character of experience is a much more
complex affair than the notion of configuration alone indicates, and
can be demonstrated only if three criticai hurdles are negotiated.
1. Surely narrative structure is not merely configuration, but con
46
e, and History
Time, Narratv
"'
ti'"
i
s
r
e
t
c
h
t 1 on a l chara
ey "1\411. 1ll
be on d the m to the knds of act1ons and
ents
Y
l ned. extend
ratives 1 .
nar
with
late
norm ali Y 859oc
answer these fi rst two questi on
are able to
a in
we
if
.
n
Eve
3
lhe
ve
a
re
lv
na
invo
es
that
m
h
rr
o
,
ed
than tu
lt can be argu
.
ve
s
at
t1
affi rrn
rr.
ization of events. 10 ou r concept of 8 narrau
an
org
l
ora
mp
certain te
of events but also a story-teller an
ssion
e
progr
only
d an
8
belongs not
it may be thought that
And
told.
is
story
the
this
audi ence to whom
cter
a
chara
that
story
a
is
fn
1
d
relate
pr
n
incipie
imparts to the events
s
Unles
fe."
we
lf
are
real
ab
le to find
to the occurrences of
tructure
2. N a rrat tve 8
i
denied
l.
We have h
ad occasi on
11ot
t o designa te
just hvo but
nfigurations
as
co
temporal
.
three sorta
111
of p h en ome na
serl's exa t'
P 1e of a tem
Hus
T
y
he
melod
pora l
,
J
x e ie nced object, w
Pliclty of dis
exist as 8
as
to
seen
Ungu s a
rta1
l o p has es
t empora l
arran ged intemally in a ce
order an
d se off e
t i
what 80
xternaUy from lts ..surroundings," tha
ts b efor
e
after. Simil
feealJ, to
the
ar features are at tributa ble , o
of lhe m
P(trlen c
o h
e l d as exp
0 0f t
t i s. t 10111
tha
,
h
Y
0
e
erienced
rneJod
fta o
lt ta s
nd b
lncludln
ke its configurational cha.r acter /foJl,
g ita
er artkul
Principie
aUo n, its externa i dern ar cs a
of un1ty
4 w o shall
see, experiences can 8180
ITIU .
correi:
1i.ect.
47
such features even if their object is not a temporal object. Finally, our
example of an action was analyzed as a temporal configuration in
much the sarne terms, with account taken of the differences between
an experience and an action.
The kinship between these structures and narrative configuration
should be obvious: each constitutes a temporal closure, which can
only be expressed by speaking of a beginning, a middle, and an end.
This is of course the set of concepts that is associated by Aristotle
with the wholeness or unity of the action of a tragedy1 and that is
most often invoked by the theorists we mentioned as a mark of
narrativa structure. A sequence, a series, or a process can the
oretically be endless, but an event, an experience, or an action is
something that begins and ends.
To be sure, even this notion must be further specified. A purely
physical event, remate from human concern, can also be said to
begin and end, and thus to have a middle in between. But from the
start we have limited ourselves to human experience, so it is events
as experienced that have concerned us. What counts about the mel
ody as an exemple of an event is that it is heard as beginning, and
each of its phases is heard in anticipation (whether correct or not) of
an ending. True, a melody has perhaps more internai structure and
unity than other sorts of experienced events: a tree sways in the
wind, a dog barks, a friend passes in the street. But each of these can
be noticed, observed for its own sake, and distinguished from other
events around it. To the extent that this happens it is grasped in
protention-retention by the person who experienes it. Even the most
unarticulated or instantaneous of occurrences, like a loud bang or a
sudden extinguishing of ali the lights, is experienced as an event
with a certain temporal thickness which assures it the status it
deserves alongside other events that develop in more leisurely fash
ion. Such an event is more than the mere difference between two
states. at least for experience, for it must be experienced along with
the two states it separates. The sudden black-out, itself perhaps
without discernible thickness, is the middle of an event that begins
in light and ends in darkness.
Other events can be seen to contain more complex temporal struc
ture, even if they are of very short term. A movement ca:a
ba 8
departure from A and arrival at B, or can go from rest to motim1
and
back to rest. ln the latter case, beginning and end in
some 1J(jl1t1'3
1. Ariatotle, PoeUcs, 1450b27, 1459a20.
48
t
1t
h
e
is
exper
cases
ienc
these
er,
ali
whetherin
ning note or chord. ln
expe rien ce, who mak es the connec.
protention, retention, or direct
note or chord) between be ginning
tion (identity of state or place or
J
by the intervening depar.
and end, and experiences it as separated
ture." Insofar as the event consists of unfolding and distinguisha ble
phases, each of these is experienced either as a beginning, oras an
end, or as an intervening phase which gets its sense and its place by
we have been using that term. I can explore with my eyes or hands an
object (say a statue) which we would designate not an eve nt but
thing. But my visual or tactile observation of it is itself an event with
its own duration, its own beginning, middle, and end. As we saw in
the previous chapter, this experience is not an event that 1 encouner,
n
onfigurtio
nless I reflect, but one I live through. Yet its temporal c
irte
18 one of which
I have a protentional-retentional awareness, in v
d1s
of wh'ich 1't has for me
, and 1't 5. d
ion
ulat
its
artic
unity,
its
inner
.
ze
hnctness from other experien
recogn i
ces and actions. It must be
he
on t
too that when we spea
k of observation or explorat1o n we 8re
bc>rderhne bet w
.
een passive experiences and actions.
or
. A t'o s, fi n lly
!!'
so
I
hases
pr en ona ly
.
s
o
i
and
va
p
retent ionally hold together the r u
l
ther
that mak t
o
u . The "prin
d
el
t
gi n
cipie" by which they are h
and orga iz
o
t
ar 1culates the
n
action even more clearly i
nin g, middle
d ar e
en d. Though teleological and temporal en
differen t con
oin
ep s an d can
ten c
of
st
o
diverge, as we saw they m
cide; an d th
cal
e same is tr
en ti
d
i
t
o
u
e 0f th e closely related though n
.5 jts
concepts of
1
m1'd dl e a n
n
.
o
u
c
d m ean s. The
in1ti atio n,
beginning of an a
nta
which b
or
l 1ew il
ears Wit hin
tio n of acti
it. than ks to the protentiona
on b 0 th
sa
mea ns or .
, as we
i
er
m1
P0snts first
th
ddle
ra
and
Or
end.
08s
or Pr1mar1.
Q
s
e
ly t 0 th e en
retrospe
uza
d which then organi z
ctively th .
e
nte
rvening step
it
tion.
i
s and stages toward S rea
CJosely as
afl
so ciate d
.
With t he me
t on
i
c
a
l kewise inti
of
l re are
ans-end structure
rnately
e 1 at d t
t
certa in
c
tr
o its beg inning-middleend s u
features
a cu n
r
8 ares With
phenomena disc ussed 50 8
.
::
'
'
d
11d
which the events of stories are arranged into coherent wholes. Yet
these structures are often spoken of by some theorists, as we have
seen, as if they were imposed on meaningless data by the act of
.
e btween the hved
mad
n
ofte
is
ion
arat
sep
the
One way in which
is to say that the narrahve arrangement
realt
1 y and the Uterary artifice
. 11i 1"tself
tempora l or der to insrn.
o f even ts d eparts altogether from the
.
rauss
L'ordre de succession FKURQaORJTXHs e rsorbe dans une VWUXFWXa
matricielle atemporelle. "3 Gre1mas, Bremond, and others tend to de.
logize narrativa, taking its temporal features as a mere surf
e hrono
.
h. b
ace
aspect, mere sequence, and. ana1.yz1ng anyt ing eyond pure sequen.
tiality as atemporal, quas1log1cal structures and relations. After
characterizing a narrative as a message" being transferred from a
t(sender" to a "receiver," structuralist analysis typically draws up an
inventory of the existents (persons, gods, nations) portrayed in the
text, then a similar inventory of "occurrents" (events, actions, transactions). The latter are then treated, following Propp's original mathematical metaphor, as "functions" into which the former enter in
various combinations. The abundance of terminology borrowed from
mathematics and artificial intelligence often permits us to overlook
the fact that the events portrayed unfold in time and that the arder of
their unfolding is important to their significance.
Many of the structural features we have been speaking of here can
indeed be seen to have a "logical" air; we have already spoken of the
deductive and the deontic logical analyses of the meansend relation.
The idea of problem and solution reminds us of mathematics. Even
the notion of departure and return makes us think of-indeed pre
supposes-the relation of identity and difference. And it is certainly
true that there is a distinction between purely logical and purely
temporal relations. But it must be noted that even if the above
mentioned structures do "partake of the logical," these structur:s a
to be f?und here, where we have located them, namely in the midst 0
experience and action, not in some higherlevel linguistic con
struction or recons truchon
of the experiences and actions
volved.
10
They a
structures and relations that exist for the experiencer or the
agent in the process of experiencing or acting; they constitute the
1
2. Mink, "Histo
.,
SchaPP
15
111
---
51
1t is a
as
i
ff of human exper1enc e and achon.
insofar, that s,
elements are the stu
.
52
AV'j
2. Complex a
53
many stamps 1 need to acquire but 1 need not acquire them in any
particular order. But to build a bookcase, or to reach my home by
See chapter III , pp. 90-91 for a furtber: development of this point.
Ti.m e.
54
temporal content .s
eern
gu i sh ab l e
n
i
st
di
s i 1l
nd
everyt
h.
le
a
ents
ing
a
ev
t
rn
tifi
fr
<fef
as
o th
b
iden
n
u
o
1
W
e
e.
bJ
da
the Renaissance, the l
h
to
ge
8tnue1
n
nitely e:xp a n
a
ec
c e l\
meas ura
scientifica llY
u red in light - years. Sin ce We h &e, l'ldt
s
a
e
rn
ts
.
ave ic e ve n
ucell
tbe astronom
80 events, or more parhcularly of v
m
e e t
u
h
f
o
ere
opposed to think able or co a th81
speaking h
. nc eabJ e (as
r
pe
c
ex
t
d 80 far ln el ther direction of rn e1Vabie1
are h umanly
e
e
oc
n no P r
we obvio usly ca
d as events, one can he ar 8 rn 81nitude
re
e
sid
on
e
s e od Y
. ie nces
As for exPer
or
ert or see the World
conc
a
ar
he
an
e r.gh
. 's fght o ne c
1
.
e
8
'
0
n
see a b ird
- l fe crisis or exper1ence (live throu ) e
nce a rn i d i
the
can exper1e
.
War
rld
.
.,
Second Wo
0act1ons sueh 1 ong-term ande
as
e
t
gn
a
i
s
e
d
ornp
.
u
And finaJJy, we
.
ng
tt
k
ge
an
,
e
i
b
d
oo
uc
a
ahon ' ra is' .
writing
as
s
klng
rt
n
e
a
ga
cated und
. at some more or
. to b eg1n
sa1d
be
le
can
se
ss
e
th
e
a
s1.1y
chi.1d . Ea eh of
.
to procee d to 1'ts end through various inter
and
t
poin
Je
fiab
.
identi
s.
mediste step
.
uais, and before that we shalJ have to ask what kind of temporal
configuration the "Jifetime" itself is. For the present we restrict
I t is not
tequired.
merely that a longer attention5P Jd
and t t
be h e
m ore a. nd more
toge th er
disparate elements m ust
and re l
n
ate d Nor
0 pe
18 .1t m
Jea ves
85
55
drink, and visit the washroom, 1 need to "pick up the thread" of the
story and re-establish myself in the retentive-protentive frame of
mind. To do this, 1 may need to consult my memory, reawaken
certain scenes from the first act, etc.
Likewise, returning to my workbench after a pause, 1 need to
remind myself of what 1 have done and what needs still to be done.
The sense of "where 1 stand" in the project, which was so clear to me
while I was immer sed in it, now needs to be restored by an act of
56
. .
n, of cou rse, is soho
lanning. Del iber atio
.
h1n
uet
b
g re.
deh bera tion or P'n the midst of ach on ut a 1so, and Perh
rn
aps
h
quir ed not onl Y 1
a t dist ingu ishe s ore
. ali before it begins. ,aa ny cas e, a
exp er1 enc e frorn the p these
typi c .Y ,, mponents of act1on and
re-refl
.
ec.
"reflechve co. ,, we have spo ken of so far 1s
e the t
her
t
tha
.
ernporal
b
k
.
.
tive "immers1on
apa rt, rok en dow n into
. nce or action 1s ta en
it
d
d
s
object exper1e
rn
s
Thi
ely.
arat
eh that each can be .atte nh e to .sep
eans of
't
.
elemen s, su
round''
e pos 1ho n of ."backg
upi es t fl
occ
er
Jong
no
't
or
.
.
l
course that
sed
focu
is
n
a
. n" that it has when my pre- re ech ve atte
. nho
''h oow
to
not
is
s
Thi
c.
mah
the
s
ome
say,
future Instead it bec
.
present Or
.
isola
in
ed
V?1'e view
however, that any such elemen.ts or VXEDFaRQ
n of whi ch we are
tion. The recollection, expectatlon, and deh ber aho
.wh ose pur pos e is to organize or
speaking here are practical aRQFHUQV
Thu s the elements
reorganize these elements 1nto a un1fied who le.
rrel atio n. It is the
are taken together and con side red in the ir inte
es them atic .
whole as an interrelation of par ts whi ch bec om
d her e is what the
The kind of reflective stan ce we hav e in min
ns to take stock, to
Germans call Besinnung. Sich besinnen mea
the term Sinn sugremind oneself where one stan ds. Its rela tion to
erie ncin g, or living
gests "making sense" of wha t we are doi ng, exp
diff eren t sen se from
through. The term is used by Hus serl in a ver y
-dir ecte d but conthe term Reflexion, whi ch ind icat es the self
5 The term Besinnung
templative and epistemic con scio us inte ntio n.
stic , in the work of
is even more important, and mor e cha rac teri
as the bas ic units of
Wilhelm Dilthey. Both Hus serl and Dil they tak e
exp erie nce s, which
conscious life what they call Erlebnisse, live d
rati ons unified from
they both view as temporal who les or con figu
mse lve s dep end ent
within. Such Erlebnisse, furt her mo re, are the
figu rati on of conscious
Parts of larger wholes whi ch mak e up the con
Jife.
used
serl, so for Dilthey, the exp erie nce of mu sic is often
aIRUHus
Dil the y des crib es our
to illustrate the tem por alit y of c0n scio us life.
, but in suc h
following melody, hea ring the not es one by one
eac h not e is experi
that past and future dete rmi ne the pre sen t and
6
85 belonging to the tem por al wh ole wh ose par t it is. But
HaFHG
s the mel ody not
Dilthey goes one step furt her tha n Hus serl . He use
wa:
15 of Carte
.
. 72. 5. On HusserJ's use of Ref1 ex1o
on
sect1
pare
com
g,
nnun
Besi
and
n
63)
s1aniache Meditation
19
off,
Nijh
s
en, ?d. S. Stressar (The Hague: Martinu
75, wlth the late
aQGHGto Die Krisis der europiHschen Wissensc
ed. W. Biemel aXVFQaWDSS
r:fatten.
7. Ibid., p. 234.
8. Ibid., pp. 196-98.
N ar ra tiv e, an d H is to ry
Ti me,
ar a t
58
ts an d ac ti. on s th e ch
en
e ers lllay
ev
he
t
th
JJ
to
in
ay
w
f
s
1t
s
a
nd
e st o
m ad e o
m in or it y fi
r;r. ln
e.
er
sel ec ho.n is d nl y a sm a 11
th
is
ic
at
e st
th
i
al
:
in
ft
Je
is
g
in
th
ib le b
en ga ge 1n, an
T he se Je ct io n is po ss
.
nd
co
se
to
G
H
Y
a
,
8
lif e, by co nt ra st
en ce an d eh ecause
di
au
th
bo
ay
w
a
in
pJ ot
T hi s first po in t ea aKH
as th a pr in ci ;:c te rs
id
ov
pr
e
dg
le
ow
kn
his
as Sc h J eanfodr
th e st or y- te lle r NQRaT
e,
ic
vo
a
iv
at
rr
na
e
o es
s Th
.
m ay no
.
do no t (or th
.
re
tr an eo u
es pa c1 alfly in la ti on to
y,
1t
or
lu di ng e ex
th
au
of
e
ic
vo
e
t is th
.
. . a po s1. ti. on o vo lu nt ar y ser.
ex c
.
1n
is
r
tte
Ja
Kellogg po1nt ou
. t e ne r9 Th e
qu aU y im po rt ant,
1
th e re ad er or. is w ha t w ill be re ve aJ. ed an d w he n. E .
.
po te nh aJ Jy , si nc e th e
g
t
as
Je
at
e,
ic
vi tu de regard 1n
vo
c
n1
. e voice is an iro
nc es of
eq ue
co ns
ed
nd
te
t
1n
e
1v
a
th
.
rr
as
na
J
e
.
eJ
th
.
w s th e real. as. w .
o
kn
aG.p r1 m ar dy in the
G
ER
JJ
er
HP
-te
us
th
story
1s
y
on
1r
Th1s
to the
th e characters' ac tio ns .
te r; bu t Jt is re la te d
ac
ar
ch
d
an
er
Jl
te
yor
the
reJation between st
no le ss th an th os e of
,
ns
io
at
ct
pe
ex
r
ei
th
audience as well, si nc e
di sa pp oi nt ed .
as a fu nc tio n (and
characters, ca n be ru de ly
en
se
ba
n
ca
r
lle
te
ye st or
n to
Th e ironic st an ce of th
ra l po si ti on in re la tio
po
m
te
r
he
or
s
hi
of
t}
e
th is is the th ird poin
th e ex po st po si tio n, th
is
is
th
lly
na
io
nt
ve
on
the events of th e story. C
ia n an d (u su al ly } the
or
st
hi
e
th
by
ed
ar
sh
ad vantage of hi nd si gh t
po si ti on permits
is
th
t,
ou
ts
in
po
to
an
As D
ts and
teUer of fictionaJ st or ie s.
r re la ti on to }a te r ev en
ei
th
om
10
fr
d
ve
ri
de
ts
ts th em se lv es .
descriptions of even
en
ev
e
th
in
ts
an
ip
to pa rt ic
en in
thus often in ac ce ss ib le
ca n ju st as w el l be se
ts
en
ev
yor
st
e
th
r
te
e
But this st an dp oi nt af
nt ou ts id e or ab ov e th
oi
dp
an
st
a
as
k,
in
M
n.
1
the fashion preferred by
d se es th ei r in te rr el at io
an
ce
an
g1
a
at
in
l
al
events which takes th em
of ti m e, or at le as t of
s
nt
ai
tr
ns
co
e
th
om
fr
Th is apparent freedom
se lf in th e di sp ar ity
it
ts
es
if
an
m
es
im
et
m
following the events, so
te lli ng . Fl as hb ac ks
r
ei
th
of
r
de
or
e
th
d
ts an
between the or de r of ev en
rm s th e au th or ity of
te
n
ai
rt
ce
un
no
in
e
ho m
and flashforwards bring b h
au di en ce .
the narrative va i ce over ot ch ar ac te rs an d
e no t ju st a se qu en ce of
lv
vo
in
to
s
em
se
y
or
st
e concept of
WGaPth
a0Q
pu t it th e ex is te nc e of.
gg
lo
eJ
K
d
an
s
Je
1 8
ho
Sc
'
y
d . . events but, as .
ts : th os e of st orto
en
ev
e
os
th
tuh ree 1stm h bl e po in
of
ew
vi
d' guis an d h ts of
ay seernf a
teJJ
1ence'
be su re ' th es e th re e m
t
au
To
.
er,
rs
te
ac
ar
e
no
1n
po
ew
coincid m
vi
e
th
.
to ld fr om
m e case s.
be
s
ay
e so
m
y
.kn
or
st
character or .m a eh ar ac t 8 ic
e au di en ce ow
er vo e. H er e ev en th
. ri
e aJ so H .
Th
tiv e, pp . 24 0- 43 . Se
Sc ho les an d J<ello
rra
Na
of
XUa
W
D
1
e
N
of +LVWRa-
-1 8.
; 6aUXFWXUH
Ph il arr ati ve , pp. 12
1
an to, AnolyticaJ
15 1 .
os op hy of Hi sto ry, p .
White
'
59
mo re or less than the character and ali points of view seem identical .
e ut even a fi rst - person account is usually narrated after the fact, and
the selection process is witness to the difference in point of view
bet wee n participant and teller. ln any case the very possibilit y of the
disp arity among the three points of view seems enough to establish
thi s point , which is that the events, experiences, and actions of a
1 1 . On telling the story of a baseball game, see Hexter, The History Primer, pp. 1 7587.
12. See Introduction, p. 12.
rratve, an d Hl st ory
T1. m e, Na
60
of iden t i t y. s ince we ca n n a rrat
u osti on
e ev
q
s
u
a
ent a
h ' J e t h ey a re goi
No
t
u
B
w
g.
.
t
Jn
fac
ak
e
n
th
g
.
spe
o
r
n t he
es a fte
se
wn Jl v
ce fo r u s beca u s e th at 18 ali w
en
u
se
of o ur o
q
e
e
r
a
e
r
m
e
a
ln a
ke u p
events m e
e
po s l t io n to se .
t m u ch t ruth to t h e fo rcgoi ng a n al ysi s . u t
B
ub
d
o
o
n
d acti o n wh c
ce
n
a
perien
e
of
x
The re is
s
re
i hh t
e fe atu
th
f
o
Y
ae
an
negloc ts m
. vest i gation 80 fa r. Even at the l evei of Passiv
m
r
u
0
e
.
in
.
turn ed u p
to wh i ch w
.
the present 18 n o t somet h 1ng
es
c
e
en
r1
a
r
e
ex pe
shor.t-term . 1
fro m fu t u re and past . A s we h ave s een wl h
n
o
t
1
a
l
ISO
.
.
con fi ned i n.
d
8 va n tage po1 n t wh J C h opens mto fu tu re
k
e
li
a
re
n
JS m o
l
H
ser
us
. fra med an
H
po ssib Je for us J' f 1. t ls
d set off
sen t 1. 5 on ly
pre
e
Th
t
pas
.
.
ge
1
1
Y
env1sa
ona
d futu re.
.
rote nt l
ed pas t and a p
.
.
'
aga in st a reta m
an d ex pe r i e n ces 1 n w h 1ch we a re pre.
s
action
the
of
. tru e
is
If ths
. 1
e of those l onger-term a
bed ' i t i s ali th e more tru.
nd
refl ecti ve Y a bsor
.
.
.
our
re
1
reflech
u
re
ve
wh1ch
q
and
ons
urati
nfi
c
del
g
ib
more com P lex o
essen ce of t h e refl echv e a nd d el 1' berati ve sta nce
erative atten tio n . The
the future and lay o u t the whole a ct i on as a
r activity is to antici pate
, a s requir ed by the e nvisaged
nified sequence of steps and stages
end. This prospec tive-retrospec t i ve princip ie of organization, thou gh
'
The obvious rejoi n d er here, of course, is that the future i nvoJ ved in
. ali such cases is only the envisaged or projected future, and t he agent
has
only a quasi-h indsi ght, a n as-if retrosp ection at his or her dis
posai . What is essent iaJ t o the story
teller's positi on is the adva ntage
of real hind sight, a real freed
om from the cons traint of the present
assu red by occupy
mg
a pos1h
on after, a b ove. or outs1de
th e eve nts
61
for the most part. our negotiation with the future is successful.
being lived and lived in being told. The actions and sufferings of life
can be viewed as a process of telling ourselves stories, listening to
those stories, and acting them out or living them through. And here I
am thinking only of living one's own life, quite apart from the social
dimension, both cooperative and antagonistic, of our action, which
is even more obviously intertwined with narration. Sometimes we
must change the story to accommodate the events, sometimes we
change the events, by acting, to accommodate the story. It is not the
case, as Mink seems to suggest, that we first live and act and then
afterward , seated around the fire as it were, tell about what we have
done , thereby creating something entirely new thanks to a new
perspective. The retrospective view of the narrator, with its capacity
for seeing the whole in all its irony, is not in irreconcilable opposi
tion to the agent's view but is an extension and refinement of a
vie wpoint inherent in action itself.
To be an agent or subject of experience is to make the constant
13. See Introduction, p. 10.
istory
Time, Narrative, an d H
62
e w ay th e story.feller does. Jt
th
tly
ac
ex
in
e
tim
nt
.
rmou
w of ev en ts by gathe
flo
e
th
e
at
in
m
do
t
attempt to su
e narratJve aaJth.ern
th
of
p
as
gr
d
ar
w
ck
ba
is the DWWHPaW:Orward
rr at io n co ..tttMut1nk
na
at
th
e
ev
Ji
be
to
ht
e rg
fl ti ng or ns es
.
h
together in tr teh eorists ar
ec
re
1nutatfn
St
an d the othe
ning ra th er t fan. JU
ea
m
es
B
t
n intert wJnedg
something, creaexfsts in de pe nd en t 1y o 1t. . utfna frr at io '
1 1tself not m
f
. . h
somet. hl ng'thth acton does th1s 1n t e co ur se o f e
ereJy
ge s of boo,ks.
8
pa
e
th
in
s,
or
th
18
au
of
. th e cour
. d w it
. t ert w1n
aait h ewfiset . 8t the 'hands . be1. ng 1n
h
e
se of
ion
HJ te r t
at
rr
.
na
of
ak
t
in g to th e simpJe fact tha
Wh en we Spe
rr
fe
re
t
no
e
ar
e
w
at
th
life, t should be noted
IJing storfes. lt is
te
to
HG
RW
a
GH
V
a
n
tio
sa
nver
great deal of everyday co
e fo rm of anecdotes
th
in
8
ly
aJ
c1
pe
es
,
es
iv
certainly true that narrat
a large part of our
up
e
ak
m
f,
el
es
on
t
ou
about acquaintances or ab
e narratves in social
es
th
of
le
ro
e
th
d
an
s,
conversationaJ exchange
But ou r Jnterest
y.
ud
st
of
t
ec
bj
su
g
in
at
fascin
communication can be e
co ns ti tu ti ng the sense
in
le
ro
its
to
d
ite
m
H
is
fn narrafive to this point
e Jivfng through,
ar
e
w
ts
en
ev
e
th
d
an
ged in
of the actfon we are enga
sh ap e an d coherence to
ng
vi
gi
d
an
y
Jl
ra
po
m
lts role in organizing te
e ar e having them.
w
as
ng
vi
ha
e
ar
e
w
riences
the sequence of expe
iv es m ay pJay such a
at
rr
na
l
ta
do
ec
an
d
ne
to
Some of the above-mentio 14
th e st or y of an accident
lJ
te
e
w
n
he
w
t,
ou
ts
role: as Schapp poin
on so as to affect the
ti
en
rv
te
in
r
he
or
s
hi
ek
a doctor or Jawyer, we se
or next chapter.
ei
qu
se
s
it
s
ap
rh
pe
or
story,
subsequent course of the
st or y itself; but it need
e
th
of
rt
pa
be
ay
m
rs
Telling the story to othe
e
not be.
sc us si on of th e narrativ
di
a
in
at
th
is
it
hy
w
ify
This may help cJar
w, re la tiv el y late, that
no
ly
on
is
it
ce
en
r
pe
character of everyday ex
po in te d out that
y
ad
re
al
e
W
.
ge
ua
ng
k of Ia
telling, 85
we have begun to spea
of
t
ac
al
rb
ve
a
is
it
at
ion is no t th
what fs essential to narrat
ts J of view on
in
po
r
(o
t
in
po
n
ai
rt
es a ce
such, but that it embodi
ct ur e refers not onrelys
ru
st
a
iv
at
rr
na
e,
or
m
er
1 f eato
sequence of events. Furth
a
on
ti
za
ni
.
ga
or
f
e
th
to
tof such a pJay of pomts o v1ew but also
be gi nn in g- m id dl e en d,
as
s
rm
te
ch
su
in
es
o the events themselv
an d th e Jike. Wine
on
ti
ti
pe
re
rn
tu
re
eur
rta
tion, depart
'
'
sus.penslon-resol lu
pe
es
ur
at
fe
al
on
ti
th
ni za
at aJ
PDQaIQth
ese structures an d or ga
.
to ev d
no t th e QDUUDOLJCJLaa
or
er
th
he
w
n
tio
ac
d
f exP
perence an
st ru ct :: aythexac
o
rm
fo
e
th
or e t of narrat1ve st ru ct ur in g ta ke s
verbaJizatf 011 .
di ce we
en
au
to
h
er
U
f
te
Thit 11 true even 0 t o re)atJon of story14 ,
63
Th is calls for the kind of Besinn ung which "makes sense of the
acti on or experien ce, and in which 1 (the narrator) tell or remind or
expla in to myself (the hearer) what 1 (the character) am doing. None
the one addre ssee stands in for the other. lt is also clear that the
individual canno t be treated as if he did not exist in a social situa
tion; it is clear that the socia l milie u is some how constitutiva of what
the indiv idual is. Part of this is no doubt the fact that others are
called upon to hear and to acce pt the narrativa accounting that the
indi vidu al gives of his or her actio ns and experiences in mak ing
r
sense of or cons titut ing them temp oral ly. Self-refle ction and othe
to
refle ction seem to go hand in hand . But it may be a false ques tion
r,
ask whe ther o n e i s mor e imp orta nt or orig inal than the othe
64
"
ti"fi ed o
begmn i ng of this chapter and
have thereby s u bsta ntia l ly jus
ydaY
use of the term "narrati ve
of e ver
to charact erize the stru ctu re
life.
. tly to tbe
.
We ean give
t h'is point further suppo rt by a p pea l i n g br i e
ve
atl .
rr
a
work of Pau l R '
n
icoe ur. Speak ing of the temporal c h ara cte r 0f
d'18tin8
R'icoeu r characteriz
es " em plot men t" (mis e en intrigu e) 85 Jile
on
between eve nt
th e n
th
1
i
5uc
8 .an d story, unifyin g the chronol ogi ca w
o ,
.
eh ro nolog1cal Th
toward 8 o
usa o n or an
endi ng. Thi s gives t o th e s
is as i
eve nts its wh o
d it
n
,
t lle
nes s an d its
e
e
n th
l
po
i
n
"
d
t
ifl
.
"
,
theme
or
h
t o nat ura l or
en
er of ti me
were reversed : "rea d i ng th e
.
65
begi nning and the beginning i n the end, we also leam to read time
the reca pitulat ion of the initial conditions of a
itsel f back ward, as
cou rse of action i n its final conseq uences . .. t s
'lll e differen ce between Ricoeur's account and ours , of course, i s
this view, transposed from its original reference to literary and histor
ical texts, would perhaps claim that in our conversations with others
or with ourselves we "dress up" our experiences in narrative form,
but in doing so invariably falsify them.
What we have been arguing, by contrast, is that narrative form is
not a dress which covers something else but the structure inherent i n
66
, and H is tory
Tim e' Na rra ti ve
ns1
prehe
al t er
or com
us
Y
rn
b
s. A _
experien cea ble
we sai'd b e fore , we ma y an al
as
ory,
the
.
ta
Yh. ca Uy
w1th the sense-d a
treat its d isti n gui sh ab le t
and
nce
ern p
perie
.
orai
d is member ou r ex
r1en
expe
ce
we
th
But
e
t
.
c
rn
i
tin
a
s
s
d
re
P
arts o
. t hey we
f
phases as 1f
from t h e co n fig ur
.
e
sens
heir
t
et
g
ch
au
whi
o
S
n
s to
. pora l wh o J e
tem
. .
..
which they bel ong.
thus social in a sense, i n even the solitary story-t ell ing we have
attributed to the individua l. It would be a mistake to think that
narrative is "natura l " i n t he sense that it is u nrelated to and un
Nor does narra tiva seem .. natural" in the sense that it is related to
thanks to science
we are penetrating the appeara n ces to fi n d t he
.
. behind
reaJ hes
them. Olafso n i n effect remin ds us that both a re. a fter
m
1
t.
5
.
ex
s
,
o ur app ro ach like Ola fs on'
ten t phen
om en o 1 o
10
1 1"
i
ca
g
to br
.
l
w
n tQ v 1e
r
e
e
. w
rack
b
o
e
t
the .. in itself i n rd
a nd des .
t.ribe th e
"fo r us .
B ut wh o
are ..We
he
..? A
t
n ot h er sen
se of .. natu ra l " is u n i versal 1n
---
P. '{'b'
ondo
.
L
The
(
n
No
at1o
rru i 'M Imagin
!son.. The
Seie nti. Si.
tbl
c l tnl .
d .od
an
l
of J\ction
3e oi M.. .
Y
h
n Sc
P. Wilfred _::. u ars. .. Phil OS0p
1 96J i
i
"'
ed
l --tQ eitce, Pel'Ception and
oUt 1
!iI1ty (Lo ndon : R
At8arb.r.
Tull
. l97S}.
0nd
litrd ),
19
'11.
Diol
ectic
Listeners ..
al
c l e arly
d o s i g ned
to
capture
the
u n i ve rs a l
"essenc e "
of
con sclou sness l n a l l its posslble instantiati ons. And it is in just this
tens o that lt i s s o convlncin g: lt la hard for us to think of a person not
guish a
intern al l y struct ured i n n a rra tiva forro, and const itute distin
are exte r n a l ly
ble them os wHh in our expe rienc e, it may be that they
we have disrelatod to one anot her ln more ways that just those
cussed.
y versus the univerThe who le que stio n of the cult ural rela tivit
it our disc ussi on of
salit y of n a rrat ive stru ctur e w i l l have to awa
two reas ons . The first is
hist o ry for 8 fuJJ er treo tme nt, and that for
side rati on of the soc ial
that tha t d iscu ssio n w i l l be attended by a con
h J
69
21.
22.
Olafson, p. 1 0 2 .
lbid., p. 103.
n d Histo ry
ra t ' ve ' a .
r
a
N
Tim e .
. b o k in d1cates), we have se en h
70
t at
S o
h
the
l e of
o
rt
a
nt
for
b
l
m
p
tt
i
th
ore
e
e
m
th
a gent
y
a
r
de
h
attenti o n ( as
i
t
ons
it
a t us c
a s a possibil y. And if the re i. an
d
future h as a st
8ge
.
s
en v 1s
an
o n ( to u s e a n
rnere lY
feren ce " in a c t 1
o
th
ng
1
h
.
r
et
re
m
e
so
of
w ar d
ce extends backward not s o
. o n a i " bsc k
u
n
re feren
tn
.
s
i nte
1
th
u
ch
en
. 1 spo n di n
de d futura, corre
nns th
g to t
Ola fso n 's te
t h e p rote n
f
rn
h
s
e
presen t a . tent i on wh ich con s h tute s the a ct i on
in
f rom t h e
e
a
v
s
cfl
e
.
p
a
ret ros
seems n o ess 1n vo lve d
pros ""
rcti vea 1 i nt e nti on
.
n
o
' fur
at1
r
.
u
.
is con fig
com plex ach ons th a n in the .
e
mor
wh ole. 'fh
d
8 rnd . .
. .
. 1 aroer-term a n
' h we fi rst enco u n t ere 1 t , 1 n sp 1te of t h e sh '
thennore. i n ..
ic
l ft
.
en s i n wh
refl e chve , reco li e ch ve fra rn
pi e ph enom
re
mo
8
to
e of
. on
nti on -rete nti
from prote
mind .
a rt to human events the "sto ry " li k
res wh J'ch i m p , ,
e
It is these fea tu
we
as
h
,
t
c
spe
ave
a
see
ng
n
y-telh
.
Whil e
d ven 8 "stor
character an e
n
etw
t
b
h
ee
e
con
sh1p
ceptual ap.
. . ht into the rela tion
OJafson ,s ms1g
.
and the ba s t e structure of ac 1on is a va l i d
proach ol t he huma ni ties
needs th e se refine ments 1f we are ful l y
and importa nt one, his theory
er of that structure .
to appreciate the genu inely "narrativ e" charact
d
These features are better re cog n i z e by two other philosop he rs ,
Schapp, i t is to be invo ve
or caught u p
l d
(verstnckt} in the
story of that p arti
cul ar act ion as bot h tell er and
ador (or agent
.
or cha raeter) 24
1n b oth theori es
cnti
a
a
n
s
e
e
one
can
ipatioo of the .
idea of a n .
mterp lay among
-.0 to outl ' ne
h
poi nts of vie w whic h we
.
i m the la st
secho n, and
ing in &reat
which we sha ll be developer deta1 1
.
One not ion
.
that is
. shared
bY 11 these
the1.1 d 1ff
. erences
concurring views , whatever
th
eir
'
.
ad
p
the
van tages, a
narraPrreern inentJ
nd the . r shortcomi ngs is t hat 0f
.
y
i
racticaJ
.
eh
aracter o
n
i ve 15 associ
.
f
n
a rra t i ve struct u re . Whe
ated r .
n hsto
P
1
marily
ri
wi th its embod
nd
hy, its
<>&rap
1
iment i n fict1on .
very
a
funcrt
o
" n
.88 sen se o
n may h e coun ted
f
t
h at te
eit her " ae sthe ti c ( i
fict ion lf t s
.
used t
nn) or " cog
in
o Pro
n 1h ve," respe
ely. Th at 15'
d u ce
ctiv
a Wo rk
f
nf
---one o
.
'
'
2J.
24.
MacJ t
Scti.
o Yre,
!ter Virt
u
PP. Pa
sal rn .
e,
...
p. 1 9 7
ty o nd N
arro t a. va Str
enterta i n men t ar
uct ure
d
i
v
ers 1. o n, h
.
71
u
t
i
prachca l . ln his
h n a ny cas e
tory it i s
not som ethi
t ho u g t
ng direetl
t o wa r d s kn o w i ng
of as an
Y
ex
p
, t he Past ;
ressi on of or m
a
ean
"
s
co
wo rd s . eve n t h o u
.
Rn 1tiv
e ins tru m
g h he an
ent
,
"
in
d
.
M ink's
ot he r s. ha
ce ss ln
ve grave
th at ro le.
do ubts abou t .
its sucWe have trie d to
show th at h
.
. fo re it
narrative i s prac tic
has eit her of
a l , and t h t
thes e functions
n
tw
o s enses :
un fo ld s i n a s equ
fi
rst,
pra
ence sh ap e
ctice or acti on
.
d h Y heg inn
ing , mid dle,
pensio n.re solu tio n
and end sus
me ans an d
en d . Sec on
grasp of these ele m
d the refle ctiv
e, narratin g
ent s the s t ory
-te
llin 8 aspect of
prach cal fun ction of
.
acti ons, has the
hol din th e a
ct on together
and doing so . i f
orga
s.
,
nizin g its parts
nee d he , i n t h t
.
e face of eh
N arrah on has this
ange d ci. rcumstanc
es.
practica 1 fu nch.
.
on ' as we saw
.
passive expe r1en
,
ev
en
w
ith
our
ce t' nsofa r as
we nee d .1. t t
keep rac of what is
going on arou n d us.
Thi s is not t me
ho n t e so ci al
ho th in di vi du al an d
d1 m en sio n of
co ll ect i ve ac i n. i
n w h1 ch narrativ
a di scourse
pla ys an ev en m or e ob
v'io us l y p ra ch ca l
role. Bu t even if we h
fro
r
th at an d l i i t ou rs elv
es to th e i nd i vi du al 's
or
ga
ni
za
tio
or er ow n ex pe ri nc
an d a cti o n , t h is pr ac tic al ro le is ce
ntra l.
To be su re, h a v 1 n g int rodu
ced thi s d ist inc tio n betw
.
een the " prac
hca 1 : the "ae sth eti c," an d
the .. co gn itiv a," we may hav
e to qu alif y it
som ew hat . If we thi nk of nar
rat iva as .. organi zin g " . . ma k'ing
sen se
of an d ren der ing "co hcr ent
"
our
act
ion
and
experienco, we can
.
Tem p o ra
li
pure l y cog n i t ive i nter est. Neverthe less, their capa c ty for a pract lal
l
fu ncti o n may attes t to the man ner of thoir relahon to the socia
ng.
con text of act ion a n d exp erie nce from wh ich they spri
and History
Na rrati ve,
.
e
m
,
Ti
72
,
o i nt th en perhaps . b y sa yin
p
r
u
o
se
rep h r a .
-hte rary s t ruc t ur1 ng an d g that lla
ld
u
o
h
s
h e p re
e
t
W
n
i
s h an
t.
o Ie
t1 l tt
embo d i rne
n i ts 1 iterary
. e has its fi rs t r
i
d
e
g
oy
rauv
or
nt s
. t 1 5 em P I
for
i
.
e
r
pure
or
1
c
fo
Y
.
eti
cog
e
es th
nit ive
Pu r
re a l l) fe b
u re l y a
p
e
b
a
m Y
,, h ere is l og1 ca 1 , not rea l l y te m po r
poseS which
e
r
o
a 1 . 'fh
f
e
e o f b
s
u
at is
prachca
r
a
l
u
ve
o
ha
rol
d
. ve s ma Y
e, the
An
,
u
a
n
rr
a
a
n
r
ar
.
r
r)'
. e ra
i. t h eir a b senc e ; th ey, o
ve
w h ile ht
e xis ts even n
e
n the
c
n
e
n
e
P
O
ex
t her
l
Stru cture o f
ri' s e out of a rea. wor l d a l re a dy o rgan .
a
d
n
a
n
1 zed .
w i' t h 1
pa1ns to point ou t.
at
han d . e xis t
n
e
n
be
e
v
a
h
Th ey
we
s
a
n
1
rn
h
ay t
narrati ve fas
effect o n the s oci
a
. cu1 ar con texts , have an
al
8
n
rtt
d Per
tim es, i n pa
ar narrahves , stor 1es . or
ticul
par
ng
i
s
t
c
o urs e
y sugge
s of
so nal wo rl d b
thing
some
t
h
ey
i
s
elf
do
its
n
ure
ot
create
. . o n But t h e s truct
an ct
actt
.
the
On
contrary
wn.
o
r
.
i
n
thei
ou
r view t
worId on
hey
im ose on t h e
P
'
c tu re fro m the human world in w h c
u
tr
s
.
ve
t
a 1
i h t hey
get the tr narr
that
they
origin
owe n ot onl y
.
to this
thei' r
have t he1 r ori'gi' n lt is
(a
capac1t
world
y
real
we
the
woul
d mai nta in
c't y to represent
,
they have, contra Ha yd en White et a l . ) but a l so the very i d ea of
undertakin g such a represent ation .
.
'
But this is not t h e place to argue for the capacities and p urposes of
fictional or historica l narrativ es. Our presen t preocc upation is still
the world of action and exper ience as it exists a part from its repre
sentation in these l iterary genr es. It i s this wor ld
we can design ate as 1
practical in a very broad sen se: bro
a d eno ugh to inc lud e el em en ts of 1
both the aest heti c and the
cog niti va; too bro ad to per mit eith er of
tose interests to be
pu rsu ed ex clu siv ely. It i s i n th is broadl y prac
tacai sphere, as w
e have tri ed to s h ow
th at na rra t i ve ha s its first and
cont inuing ro l e
that of organ 1z1ng
and stru ctur 1ng our experiences
and our acti
ons .
'
,;
1
III
are
.
dito 8t ht fur don Munn, . sny Sthl\
hl
!
Go
"016
line
notho r potson by lon rnln "'- his llf Pn. tn ttn1,
k n o w n
o- 8 t o"'
1g
to
t
na\t own t dontlty for
th"t wo M0, d
ore
boen.1
e'8
O
h
""
'Whht
wh
f
he's done
of s u c h a story. ScJuipp 's vfows aro ofttm 801 18 11u
"
l ess a quo
artu re f totl1 hJs toachor J ht 0 1 8 Ill. d 81
ra dfca l d ep
stt
"Wh
if they wc
t
tu
l
p
o
s
1nvo
o
o
ud
8Ubsto
o 11
ntfaJ 501, a
ievod to l
,m1 o t t me )
o
derlying thu now of xporlaneo. Yet
too
un
n
de \
1 8nlf
onst itutes Hsolf for Httolf. 8o to sp
::
uok.
t the 680 c
wro
Geschtchhf'; or. as oru1 could iu1y. in ono p088'bJo tr th.,
u nlty of tt
chichte' th0 ur1ity of a tory.:.
tlon of Ges
f
imUorly. tho question o p o r8ona J fdontlty 1
s
.
ntyre
Maci
Fo
y of Hfo," whlth 18 runlly t
f
hot
Into thdt o thu "unit
74
;
r::i
:
;
HU88()trtl
:
ansla.
..
"
wive'ble
oi81
whole of a IHo and Hs coho renco and unity. & For Macintyre one owt1
life can be vlowud as a story in which one functions as both author
t
nfng nd end) and t he i
r fntorMeJ structure, Wo noto d in the la
afn
chapter that as Jargo
l'-scoJe. complox phenornena those molut
nd
their Integrity atJd
structu re even though thoy are fntcrruprod a
criss-crossed in
ra l
out experience by other like p ho no meno Notu
and oc al ev
t
of others
ents, such os tho movo
ments and ocUons
around us ' oro co fl
n gutcllions we follow through ti mo f r1 8P 1 to 0( their
discontinui
ti0 sorno of
fc1 rmod
our rnoro complex actions are p e r
.
..
'
75
more comprehensive grasp which takes them all as mine and estab
lishes the connections among them. My "life," in the sense in which
Dilth ey and Macintyre use the term, is of course composed of all the
experiences I have and the actions, small-scale and large, short-term
and long, in which I engage. But like each of them singly, it is itself
something temporal which unfolds in time and whose phases I
survey prospectively and retrospectively from within an ever-chang
ing present. As such it seems to call for the same sort of description
we have so far used, in connection with events, experiences, and
actions, and to invite us to look in it for similar principles of unity,
coherence, and structure. Can my life be regarded as an event I
experience, an experience I have (or live through), or perhaps an
action I perform? Is it thus the sort of "story " in which I am character,
story teller, and audience all at once?
-
is the
Wahrheit. 7
and
198-99.
16
new i
rellgjou or political. in which
"'
o(1
fequi
. r.oJ. U and
ur
e
fut
I
ne
of
o
oneself. and
. ast.
choana1y1 $ Ind -
on o ne s p
a
U
J
ret
r
p
nte
rel
i
a
h
wit
nd
.
r d'
of
l
sort
a
ve
ar
n
s1m
1
ten
f
o
vo
1
eraPY
.
, c hoth
.. v
0f p.
f Omlt
a IC.I
)fy
ver. I -0n1, u.ua
. j
:rospecu
at.
iO
1n keep'ng with what we hav e sat'd j t . not a.s if 8 story
being
nted for even ts that originally had n ""aa
inve
or
on
d
se
n
Impo
o e; rat L
"'
in terms of one story are n ow seen
d
live
re
we
t
event th
-ample ' what was live d as the innocent self .aa Pa.rt of
another. J" !0r o..-i
ante
ures as now seen as a hfe of sin or
pleas
life's
of
a 1
punu it
tfe of
d t he sa I vation of mankind is
an
n
volutio
r
e
world
n
.ervle...
"" to
.
ow seen
ent
us1asm,
h
of
1
d
.
.
tion
alis
ina
m,
comb
an
ful
d
youth
gu
a
aJ
llibility.
.
an
as
recast
Oedipal
drama ti nged
Early family Jife is radically
With
.
ce
len
vio
d
an
teX
Most of ua do not experience these radical bre aks and revisions
but most engage in some form of autobiographical revis ion, ofte
occasioned by the transitions and stages of life. We are composing
and constantly revising our autobiographies as we go along.
Dilthey attempts to penetrate further into the nature of the under
standing that is sought in this sort of reflection on one's own life, and
(Zusammenhang} is the
it?
a. Ibid P. 2s1
9 fLl
u1t.d. 201
l
j
O"'
ry b e longs
the no rion o.f the devel
opment of 8
life (Entwicklung}, its un
fold tng
'
accordi n8 to a patte
rn not imposed
on it fro m above or outside
b ut ar is .a ng. out
0f 1'ts own internal shap
ing
(Gestaltung) of itself 1 1 T
h e cate gory of
mea
n
i
ng
is
thu
s
central for
the understanding of the c o .
urse of life b ecause .
enc
it
omp
asses and
orders the things we value
d the purposes we purs
ue. Meaning in
z:a
10. Ibid.
p. 232.
12. Ibid., p. 233.
13. Ibid.
1 t. Ibid.,
rrative, an d History
-r
jJ me Na
ely because he does corne J
t recis
a
t age over his s ubj: pc
an assess the w hole. 14 At the ong afltt
d
sam e
death of the fi r st
t; ,,.._
. 0 .,
., hind sight can be defi nit'"
.
1a
r
to
-o.ae no
e
h1s
r
blograp her s
..
end of history to have J
1
the
0
f
or
J e
a1
w
a
to
e
a
v
would h
meaning/' 15 Thus the ProbJ t
rmine its
ernarma. .
te
.
de
c
to
ne essary
ani'ng and retrospection is a quite ge ne c ir1t141
......
e
m
en
e
rat o n
,16
relaUon betw
seen
have
and is not
e.'q'
nto)
a,.
Jitn n
p c ialJ D a
ect
other authors ( e s b o y
t
o the
h ic a J reflection.
auto o O'r ap
l's
us
'd
vt
di
in
the autobiograp hical l
ev 1
does begin at
.
e
h
t
Dil
and h s
l.
Stil
y
b
In
all
of
wh
i
firs
at
.
h
e
t
ther
e
H
h
le
a
s
ca
t
pp
.
say ah...
remarks are a
find three features o f .narrative structure th at We uvut
Bosinn ung we
.
have
d in our discussion of events, experienc e
tere
Oun
c
en
y
d
s and
olrea
cterize d by the bac kward ref.e rence, whe
chara
is
Jt
J
1
actio ns.
reb,Y the
.
. descr
.
th eir
rece1ve
1p
series
hon
8
a
of
es
nd
thear si.g
unfoId.mg phas
Dnto,
Like
Dilthey
.
oint.
con
n
end-
e
cts t his W
nificance from the
it
1t
more
sees
gene
and
ral
tive
Jy
ec
a
persp
s
a
s
an'
n
arrarIVe
the histori
. l tempora J
t
e
specia
h
of
ide
a
The
rela
tion betwe
struc ture. 2)
e
we
found
earlier
instantiated in the
wholes and parts. which
par
of
life,
is
here
treated
activities
and
as
a
ticular events
feature of life
.
as 8 whole 3} In the notion of the search for self-unde rstanding, and
18
:1n
.
'
spectators of, agents in. and tellers of a story which, in this case, is a
life-story.
differences. In several very important senses life, for the person who
liv es it, Js not Jike an experience he Jives through, an even t he
exper j ence s,
H.
15.
16,
Ibid., p. 237.
lbi d p. 233
Otnto i\no/).rt.
ico I
.
'
Philosophy of History.
p. 151.
79
after-l ife must deal somehow with this paradox, which would lend
to the putativ e heavenly retrospection a character which is odd at
best, and in any case very different from our normal way of looking
back on things we really experienced or did.In this sense one's life as
a "whole" is very different from those other temporal wholes we have
examined so far.
The same can be said of the interrelation of its parts. Events are
unified by being parts of larger events.Actions subserve larger-scale
actions. But the events of someone's life may make up a larger event
only in the trivial sense that they all happened to that person. As for
life as an action, it is true that the "greats," about whom biographies
are written, are often treated as if their whole life were a combination
of means leading up to the end of becoming president, writing
symphonies, etc.It is perhaps by analogy to such persons that some
hold the view that one's life has or ought to have some single purpose
or end, the performance of some particular action or the production
of some product. Few of us, however, lead such single-minded lives.
Even for those whose lives are centered in some "profession" or
"vocation," such a conception fails to do justice to the complex
relation between such an activity and the other spheres of life in
which all of us are inevitably involved: the private, the public or
civic, the family, the emotional and sexual, etc. To v iew these
spheres and the relation among them as a means-end relation is
surely simplistic from several points of view. An individual's life is
taken up in a multiplicity of larger-scale practical endeavors, such as
raising a family and pursuing a career, or gardening and enjoying
music. which simply run parallel rather than serving each other as
means or serving some larger end beyond them.
Again it may seem that those activities are unified only because
they are the activities of one person. Aristotle remarked that, in
effect, such a unity is not narrative unity: "An infinity of things befall
... one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and
in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be
80
..
clear
it
the
ake
n
.
. that when
Thsaese cons iderations m
.
we Ila
.
.
tory e should not ex
fe-s
"li
nd
p
ect
scale of ..life" a
" ll d
1on that we fin d
r
nnec
erco
.
int
nd
in
"'
""
intemal un Uy a
e
e
t
.
s
n
ex
'f
,
e
a
en
c
n
e
p
such
s, and
h e-eve t
which make up
0 113
.
however,
that
ude
_ It
questions
co ncl
to
ng
wro
of
u nit
would be.
y
and
or that the concept of n arr
not arise at aJI
arave s t
w hol cness do
ru
. u
bility. We shall fin d other clues to this appJ
,
fi nds no ap Plica
cab1hty f1 .
1 th ey s concept of Zu
in w h'1chD'l
way
ne
s
o
o
ider
m
ns
rnenha
we co
n8
ued.
purs
her
has been furt
th }othe
th
ac/lllerits
with history proper, that the latter introduces the concept of Zusarn
men hong.
We have already remarked that Heidegger in this early work shifts
ati
ond Tiime, P 373 (references are to the German pagin
on
81
roj
which determine the organized usefulness of equipment.20
p ects
Thus we encounter here again the prospective-retrospective structure
of temporality.
20.
2 1.
p09 ition''
8
a. r
....
dl
"
8 n ll
in 8
l
me
y
f
Js
the
als
reve
a
to
t:U
t
i et \t
e
i
c
om
at
t
h
wh
o
t
c
e
bt
0
o
Y
ar
J
b
u
ei ng Qt:1
e
n
y
e
rld
gag
.
m
r
i
me
n
t
I
w
o
has n o partic
n
he
i t
P
being "d o
against the backdrop or tny n ecta 111
ut
all m y very
"
n
be'ng sta
. The bottom dro s on ..b i
.
dless
n
gener al. My
ou
gr
y
p out ef ng.
li a rl
ears1 ecu
o tny
ll thus app
P 0 prived of a gro und it seem s bereft of se
e.
i
er
e
w
t
s
k
f onbeing always looms at t heed ,
w
. orl d, a
. ro p o n
e
g
be
is
th
r we res i st what lt e of 0ur
ge
Though
e
ei
d
g
H
to
g
ordin
rev6
nos8 a cc
conscious
a 1
' Imme rsed in our everyday concerns we
fro
g
s.
lve
e
urs
o
o
rn
about
with anything too lo ng,
ever
' b red if we stay
p
project to ro
e and ex citing consumed with idle chatt n he
r n
look-out for
which
w
g
e
i
ou
n
ad
nnu
rt
of
B
e
s
s
e
ld
d
o
th
r ss i ts d
elf
too busy to a ffor d
we are doing. We assum
.
;: :
::
e that lim
sense of wha t
e Will
to the over-a 11
g
ro
d
its
un
d
n
ft
will
an
d
ct
r
e
jus
o
j
t ificati on t
eac h p
80 on, and tha t
n
.
t
jec
p
her
anot
ro
according t o He1 degger, to se ekin g refug
All this is equiv alent,
e in
anonymous
everyon
and
e-a
n
al
o
r
s
ndp
e
i
m
no-on e in
das Man, the
.
with
eable
every other . What t
interchang
is
dual
indivi
each
whi ch
he
1
contrast,
1
reveals,
by
death
we
on
I
y
with
confrontation
face it, is the
radical my-own-ness (/emeinig keit} of human existence. D e ath is that
which utterly individualizes or isolates (schlechthin vere.inzelt), says
(Selbstheit).26
is is, of course, Heidegger at his most "existe alis " the aspect
t,
nti
of his early work
most influenced by K i er k a
e g ard mo st akin to his
contemporary Karl
Jas pe rs, and most importa
nt for the French existen tialists ' esp
.
.
ecial) Y ] P. S artre
. In the terms of our own d1scuss1on,
1.
Jin
ng what Heid
egger says to our
conception of the narrative fea
tures of h uma n
existence or
"life" as a whole wh at seems d ecisi ve to
Heidegg er in
the
f
co n cept of authenticity
authorship
is rea lly the pro blem 0
He ta k es
up Dilthey's
..
notion
ical Besin
hood
'
of autobiograph
2.-.. Ibid
pp, 266, 240
.
25. Ibi
d.,. p. 329
26. Ibid.,
p. a 16
83
intimate possible relation between the self and the various stories of
which human reality is made up, including even one's own life
story.29
Macintyre, having himself introduced the notion of the human
agent as both actor in and author of his own story, immediately
retreats from the notion of self-authorship. "We are never more (and
sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives," he
27.
28.
29.
30.
A
.
,,.,l m
,
y 1s an 1 11us1o
n of rnod
ticit
en
t.
uth
Schapp Pr
{a
e
o
r
ni
tt
dea
i
6
h
nd
t
.
the
course
social wo
het
. Of
l\tidu
ss
e
n
d
terms ' t
e
rld
r
.
con sr.
.
If-cen te
s
ongoing stories not
nd se
t
a
.
and
s
m
les
Hs
Of
ro
a
of rn
o c 1 aJ
y rn t ,
.
JShe d s
I.
b
d
un
erstoo
aa.ifl&
be
ta
d
s
as
to
e
1s
a
'
e
.
c
m
n
a
Preste
tt
er of a
ex i
.
n
a
m
H
die parts dete rmined by the alread
rn.
they say. 0.
ut
o
y eXrs
g
n
ri
e
s
ttng
d
caught up in alr
ing an
eady o
finding onese lf
.
I
es
ro
ng01n
r of
g
repertoa
wn Jife story. And this .is not
o
e's
on
g
h n
u d'm
d
.
an
on
g
i
s
.
.
e
storie
or desiring to be God.
Thus th e two authors who have heretofore done the most with the
What are we to make of this dispute and what effect does it have on
our co nception of the connection between narrative and personal
identity?
.
Jt might be thought that by
ing
us a story without - a story-te IJ er,
hout an
.
org a n1z
ing princip
le.
.
The S If and th
85
author. The distinction between these two has always been impor..
and embodies the voice of authority vis..a-vis his audience and the
voice of irony vis-a-vis his characters. just as if he were the author.
What counts in the complex interrelationship of story-telling, ac
cordingly, is not authorship at all, but just narratorship.
This serves Schapp's and Maclntyre's narrative strategies very well.
Dnied the kind of authorship envisaged by Heidegger, the individ
u al is not left, as the latter seems to think, a blind auton1aton. Just as I
,
Time
86
tt
r
is
a
m
rac t1ve an
of
He1 degge
d in l
the st ory
onse to
llan
p
es
r
s
.
i
d
h
d
in
t
y
l
ea
ad
to
gh
m
,
t
eq
ot,
m
u
n
u
ho
s
T
a ely . Y reoe
.
With
g, '1t d
c1
n
1
v
n
alt
philosopher, or with the full
at
th
spects co
y
d b
r
e
a
s
ai
n
r
1
g
e of
ems
bY 0.1 t h ey s concep
the probl
tion o
to the fore
ht
g
.
ou
f th
ena b r
tern phng to try to r
e
phenom
ebens. It is
el
L
au
des
v
1
ns
a
e
enh
or
.
zusamm
alists' concern with authenticit y b y vie w
nti
e
t
1
s
. . 1
.
1ng 1't
.
the Ex
d
ind ustnal socie
tr 1v1a 1ze
. on of the malaise of mo ern .
ty
and th
essi
as the expr
e
adr1. f t 1n a chaotically
Cast
roles.
'
al
on
chang1.
tr a d I t i
f
o
.
n
w
n
o
brea kd
a ced with a plurality of social rol
. 1nd'1 v 1'du al is f
es ags
e
h
t
ty
cie
so
tion, and if h
produc
mass
of
ts
objec
e reJect
85 the
s
.
standard.1zed
ac
k
h
upon
b
ims
thrown
.
elf.
y
el
t
a
m
h
T
e
i
ult
call for
is
these ro I es he
. p, whether one believes
horshi
it c ap able
1 ty or se l f aut
of
authentci'
the
that
behef
1nd1v1
the
dua
l
really
is
ulti mately
realization or not,
s
lf.
Critic
such as Macintyre are
but to himse
has nowhere else to turn
suggesting that the alternative is a false one, but it is uncle ar how it
can be avoided short of a return to "traditional" society. Whether
such a thing ever existed, and if it did, how its return could be
effected.
are
is u n clear whether the ind ividual in such a society would be any less
s ubj ect to the features of existence which Heidegger brings into the
open.
e , wh1ch
.ts sepa rate from t he pro
.
p; and th
e secon
or ship,
Which hi
d is the legitimate
problem of auth
s op Po n
s
e nts 0ver1
10 tu
1 su e
ook. Let us examine each of these 5
rn
We have
already
!J.
seen th
lem at
8 pro
at narrati ve
e
the lev
m
o
c
coherence can be
el of
sed
Par t1cular
.
-cros
s
ex perienc
s
ri
C
.
s
es and a c tion
'
87
what
we are
with a larger project and the other actions that belong to it. It be
comes detached from its original purpose and stands isolated i n time
from its surroundings; that is, from what precedes and follows it.
The larger project, of which it and other sub-actions are parts. has
disintegrated for us, has lost its wholeness, completeness, or co
herence.
What Heidegger's concept of Angst cal ls to mind is that such
disintegration can at times be rad icalized and general ized in a per
son's life, and can apply not to some particular project but to the
whole complex of projects in which the individual is involved and
their interrelation. Nothing "makes sense" any more, we tend to say,
.
where "making sense . is just that idea that each item stands in a
means-end or similar relation to the others. that the whole i s going
somewhere and hangs together.
Heidegger's portrait of inauthentic existence contains two d isti nct
features: the concept of anonymous authorship and i n ter
changeability expressed i n dos Man is one; the other is that of idle
chatter, the frantic pursuit of novelty for its own sake. the "ambigu
ity" i n which every project loses its d istinctness.31 This second
feature emphas izes the degree to which human existence can be full
of activity and talk, yet empty of "meaning"-that is, again. of co
herence and interconnection. Whether this form of existence is a
(fa lse) respon se to the ground lessness reveale d by anxiety. or i s itself
the very incoherence revealed by anxie ty (and for Heidegger it seems
to be both) , it is clear that it exhibits the radical incoherence whereby
the ele ments of life become detached from each other and fai l to add
3 1 . Heidegger, pp. 16775.
at ive , an d His t o ry
T..i m e , Narr
88
eid egger 's well-cho se n wor '
d Zer
. is i n H
e1n
Das
.
le
stre
who
u p to a
d, d i sc on necte d .32
u t .
se
er
d
isp
'
d
e
stract
fragmen ted d1.
y h ere t h at t h i' s asp ect of
renth etica l l
the
ote
ul
sho
We
n ize the kern e l of
recog
to
s
u
tru th
m its
ity
of inau thenti c
P ' vist s we critic i ze d in chap ter o n e Lou n t he
.
is Mi L
arrat 1
n
views of the. n
be reca I I e d , s u gges t th
i
l
l
w
it
.
.
ers
at h
nd oth
,
te
1
en
ayd
H
g but mere sequence w i thou t be Utn an
l f 1 s not h i n
g1. nn i n
e
.
.
1ts
i
n
..
ty
reali
m
o
t
s
h
s
i
n
i
ce
es
ere
U
en
coh
tia y ali
t narrative
"
en
or end and tha
1terar y o r h 1 s t orica l 1m agin a
l
e
h
t
by
out
u o n.
sed fro m with
We
.
. ' unpo
1t
' s view, t h at narrati
1
h
t
t
o
ion
osit
ve
opp
co
n
herenc
have argu e d, i
e
ien ce or a ction
exper
ntary
eleme
most
the
th
a
even
.
1 t is
.
beIongs t o
the very fact of hav i ng an e:xp
of
re
featu
ural
ruct
eri' enee
an essen t 1'al st
n.
tio
.
or perform ing an ac
'
nce of H e i d egger s noti on of Ang
porta
m
i
the
now
ing
st
In admit t
_ ng
i
ow
l
for
l
a
m
o
fact
s
n
i
are
ethin
we
g
we have
and of Zerstre u tsein
y
el
m
that
a
n
t
a
start:
higher levels of
tacitJy recogn ized from the
complexity something special i s req u i re d , i n the way of a reflexive
0ti on
t!
or
to
fusion but also of experi ences of extrem e bored o m and tedi um.
8
,, Are we being inconsist ent in a d m
i tt i n g t h e possi bility of such
so
mere sequen ce when we
have l i n ke d narra t i ve coh eren ce
in
closely with the very
essen ce of h u m a n exper i ence ? Yet th e
f
cohe nce of the
pe o
t
ble
mere
ssi
y
seque nce i s not s o much a po
e
experience as it is
the dark and l oo m i n g o u ter l i m i t o f ex peri ence, th
e
chao wh'ic h s
p riene
and oppos ed to order. I
8
t i s t h e threat th at ex d
will
e J
s over into its
opposi te. Th i s i s a thre at whi ch is, adm i
P
in va ing
degrees, perm
ane ntly pre sen t a t the per i p h ery 0 0
con sc1 ou sne
ss ' th e very h
t reat a n d p os s i b i l i ty of ma d n ess.
It may see
ere
m para d ox .
wit h Jll
Wh
s
1ca
ao
h
J
t
o
c
i dent i fy tem p o ral
seq u ence
of tbe
at i s more
ng
i
k
c
ti
orde red and rel i a b l e tha n th e
89
metronome or the bea ting of the hea rt? Yet this steady beat is trad
i
tio nal ly associated with disi ntegratio n. dissolution and death,
with
th o lac k of form. whi le form is existence and life. Succeed ing mo
ments are the san ds of tim e flowing away; they are l i ke an insi diou
s
erosi on or an unravell ing of fabric. "Tim e like an ever-roll ing stream
bears all its sons away." Sequence und ermines existence itself.
Does this mean that the .. struggle" of existence is to over
come time
itse lf? Certain ly it is often thought that only refuge in etern ity tri
umphs over the ravages of time. But all this supposes that time is
iden tified with mere seque nce. Huma n existence and action as we
ha ve describe d them consis t not in overcoming time, not in escaping
it or arresti n g its flow, but in shapin g and forming it. Human time in
our sense is configu red time. The narrative grasp of the story-te ller is
not a leap beyond time but a way of being in time. I t is no more alien
to time than the curving banks are alien to the river, or the potter's
hands to the clay. Mere sequence is like the "prime matter" of the
philosophers and theologians. It is not something we coul d ever
experience. It is a l imiting concept: the thought of what lies beyond
our experience, yet has a force of its own which runs counter to it.
like a gravitational pull. The experience of the pull of chaos is our
only experience of mere temporal sequence.
The problem with theorists such as White and Mink is not that
they postulate the possibility of such a meaningless sequence, but
that they turn things upside down: they place it at the heart of human
experience, giving us as sad and depressing (and inaccurate) a pic
ture of human reali ty as we can imagine. Then they propose narrative
coherence as a fanciful but d istorting and alien superimpo sition, a
drea m of coherenc e where in fact there is none. For them, the mad
ness is to suppose that the real world has narrative coherence, while
the hard -nosed rea list su pposed ly recognizes it has none.
While it is often an arrest ing intelle ctual manoeuver to turn things
on their heads , can we not say that those views merely express the
fru stration that come s of too high expec tation s? It is true that some
literary narrati
have some thing defin itive about them that life
ves
never has. They do not just end: they give us what Kermode calls "the
sense of an endi ng" in whic h, happ ily or sadl y, all the threads of the
plot are neat ly tied up and everythi ng is expl aine d. Life , to be sure, is
not like that . But are we just ified in con clud ing that , sinc e the events
of o
neatly as those of a good story, they
90
"
out.
side circumstances and other peo p l e , we manage. Our lives may not
be works of art or things of beau ty, but we muddle through neverthe
less and actually get thi ngs done. What is dreamlike or fanciful is
not, as Hayden White claims, to think that our lives have coherence
but, on the contrary, to imagine (perhaps because we read too many
from it. When plans go awry, when things fall apart, it is by reference
t o or by contrast with story-like projections, "scena rios," that they do
. so. What occurs "ran d omly" in " mere sequence ," "one thing after
another," etc., is, i n terms of human rea l ity, the privation precisely f
narrative coherence. I n the last chapter we referred to the radw
announ cer describ ing a basebal l game to his audie nce as it hap pns,
his to ri l
and compared his activity to that
of the mere chronicl er of
events . He simply describe
wh ich 11
s what happens in the order i n
t orical.
happens. B ut the
point often made against t he idea of a hi s
oss t
chro nicl e a 1 ies
91
literary imagination.
deaJing with the future or otherwise with a rea lity that does not
always match our desires and expectations. But, as we have pointed
out. this is a practical and not an aesthetic affair, a matter of coping
account for our own action as wel l , even to ourselves. That is, we
acc ount for the parts by appealing to the whole. As we have seen,
92
Ti m e, Narrative, and Hi s t o ry
en ce i . ,.
who h 1i..ew 1se us
of
level
the
eve
at
ryd ay ac ti
In tyre use it
o n ands that
.
Schap p and M ac
self.
to descn. be the his torian'
tha n m erely
.
s b acklY
ra th e
ard
.
Ma ci n tyre goes o n to see a moral dimen s 1
nts
eve
h
past
n
look at
. n
ere
uestio
What a m I to do? ' '
. .. 1 can only an swer the q
1
1
1f
as we
1 can
f w hat story or stories d o I fi nd
n
o
io
st
q
e
u
rior
h
rn yselJ
answer t e P
. t . s not a 1 ways possib
.
a
l e to co
1, ,,33 To be su re. h e admi ts 1 1
part.
.
rne up
co m p 1 ai ns-as do som e
er: " Whe n someone
of thOse
Wl' th an answ
a
h
or
s
h
t
th
d
er
f
'
I
1
1
e i s mean i
com mit s u 1 c1 e-w h o attem pt or
g1ess
II
.
.
h
nshca
co
y
aracte
s
c
mpl
p
perha
ain ing that
and
the
h e 0r she is often
1g1
bl
"
1
1
nte
un
e
to
e
1
becom
them
has
,
tha
ife
l
t it Jach
narrative of their
aware ness,
"34
any pomt. .
ing: "the narrat ive has become unin.
But notice Maclntyre's word
a n a rrative , d earl y esta b.
telligib le," as if there simply were such
l ished, and the i n d i vi d u a l 's pro b l em is merely a J ac k of
confusion
es
33. Maclntyl'b
p. 201.
... lbld
3..
. .. p. 202 .
ven
cho ose among poss
i bl e alternati ves , e
93
con duct and the story which renders it intellig ible. For I am respon
sibl e not only for the particu lar action itself but also for the story or
sto ries in which I "find myself" involved.
In the terms of o u r narrative metap hor, this mean s that while I may
not write the story, I choos e the story in which I am cast as a
topacs to t h e 1 ndi Vi d
.
ua l cau
is to rela te t h ese
g1ii
primary co ncem
.
llp
authen h ca 1 1y. He1.d egge r wants to
.
a of exi sting
shoW t L.
m th e d ram
'
.
ri t and contin ue a tra d ah on . emul ate heroea fro ....1411
'
Dase m can nhe
rn
tru e to them, even defer to the ir "a utb the
and
l
loya
be
on.ty "
past an d
_ ..J b y one s h a' ston. ca 1
ateu
pos
indic
iti
..
o
"fate
n
8
an
d d.o all
even act Out
one realiz es that all these are
ded
provi
y.
ll
ntica
che>sen.
thls authe
te manner. The differe ce,
resolu
a
in
over
in oth
n
freely taken
ting
unreflec
and
follo
blind
wer
the
and
t he Ptou
words. is between
ion
dit
tra
a
of
r
.
and conscious beare
When one reads Being and Time bac kward thro ugh the Sartrean
94
hard to see how Macintyre and others can avoid this aspect The
story which knits together and renders coherent and whole the loose
4.
Being in Time
8:8
as. Heidqger,
PP. 372
-404.
P!:
95
as
thi ng. N or yet does it merely accumulate "traces" of what goes by.
does a path which bears the footprints of those who have passed.
Each of these metaphors for human temporality has been tried. and
each contains some truth. but all are inadequate.
Like the Here in relation to the space we perceive, the Now is a
vantage point from which we survey the past and the future. To exist
humanly is not merely to be in time but to encompass it or "take it
in" as our gaze takes in our surroundings. It is not that I exist in t h e
present and then happen to have the capacity t o envisage t h e future
and remember the past: rather, human reality is a kind of temporal
"reach" or "stretch"; what Heidegger calls an Erstreckung.36
grasp. It is by virtue of this grasp that the phenomena have for us the
beginnings and endings which make them wholes and set them off
from their surroun dings, as well as the internal articulat ion which
This is also true of the story whic h encom pases all the partic ular
storie s in whic h the indiv idual is invol ved, that is, the indiv idual 's
life-st ory, bound ed by birth and death . As with all the partic ular
narratives (expe riences and action s) in whic h we consc iously par36. Ibid., p. 374.
96
.
to tel l i t , to o u rsel ves a nd
.
1 ive
s s tory is
oss1 b J
thi
P
.
.
o
t
y to
ticip ate ,
i. t agai n a n d aga in, rev is in g
II
e
ret
to
e
i
t a s We
thi s cas
go
others; an d m
l
are
a
s
we
way
that
tell
i
ean
ng it w
m
not
es
do
e
.
are
alon g. Th is
'
m omen t now w1' th t h is.
y
no
an
w
t
a
1
W
d
't
ne
h t ha
t
acti. vely con cer
or sma J J . B u t the wh ol e
le
e-sca
larg
.
nce
of
erie
'
l
1
p
fe i.s
.
pro1 ect or ex
.
w h o 1 eness is a n un derl y
its
with
cern
con
i
ng and
nd
always there, a
,
th
d
n
a
you
,
ood
l
l
a
h
d
the
chil
in terven1
con cern. Birt h ,
ng
.
,, .
recurring
1
are
a
1s
ways
)
"now
with
ever
ea
ch
wher
{
of us,
stages up to now
t
to
b1ec
u
s
iscov
ay
ery and rei n.
ilia r, yet Jw
unchangi ng and fam
1 n a d ever-ch ang.
plementi ng this ever-g
terpretat ion. And com
ct of d eath, as certain in its inevitability as
ing retrospect is the prospe
mo me nt of arri val.
it is uncertain i n its manner and
ity has tu rned on
The whole quest io n of authors h i p or au thentic
t h e fact that at no level, and certain ly not at the scale of the li fe story
.
'
"':
of
t ma.intain and if necessary
to restore the narrati ve co herence
time itself, to preserve
it aga i n s t this i nternal dissolu tio n i n to its
com ponent parts .
e
What is at stake
at the level of events and exp eri en ces is th
tem poral coher
... 8t the
en ce 0f my surro u n d i n
gs the i r "makin g sense
I eve1 of m y
hal
act i on8 an d pro1
c ces s. W
u
s
ects
and
,
their
n
o
i
t
e
l
p
m
co
is at stak e o
e
n the pla n e 0
. s my o wn coheren ce as a s e ll th
f
"I
f
'
1
e
i
u nit y a n d
ntegr ty of m
y pe rs o n a l i d e n t i ty
i
Ma cinty
r
e ma y be
t a u tho
righ t tha t at t h is
el f do es n o
itsel f that
s
the
evel
l
i s , cre
.
tern
.
a te 1 tse I f ex
nih1 lo out of the chaot ic n igh t 0f .
P<> ral io co
h eren ce
y ts a
B u t t h e na
struggle
rr
life-stor
a
v
ati
e coherence of
no neth 1
an
ess , an d
s
na lly l
a
res
p on s i b i lity wh i ch no o n e e l lt
ift en ti
rey fro
f
ia a st
rn the sho u l d e rs o f the one who J i ves th a t Jt n
ruggl e
W i th t w
s ee
o as p ect s
one t0
, f u r thermore as we ha ve a 1 rea d y
1 1. ve o ut
s lJ
or J i ve
Part
up t o a p lan
o r sm
r
a
o
e
tive.
ge
l
,
r
narrativ
or
gen eral
lb
t h e othe
ra
e ;rs
t is con
r to contruct or cho os e t h a t n ar d js
s
tr
a i nd b
als a
ced Wi
Y t h e c h o i c e of the second . But th e s eco i ses
f :
t h co n
s tra i n t s
ut re P
rese nt,
. At i ss u e i s a whole w h i h cornP.r
a nd P
ua'
c
H on o
a st Th e
r facu
I si
C i. ty ), w 1 .
Pas t (wha t the existen tia lis ts ca J 1 0
.:
h 1 e su
.-.
ss 1
bjcct to r
e i n te rp reta t i o n ne vert h eJ e
'
"
CUlar
'
'
{o r lack
ain
ch
mak
hi
e
ces
me
the
n
rie
pers
on
e
p
I
am,
for good or ill.
ex
.
Seen in t is hgh t the problem of the unity of self can be seen as
together the roles of narrator,
character, and audience
that of bri nging
spok
b
e
fore.
we
It
may
be thought that modern philosophy
of wh i ch
there
that
is
no "problem" of unity. Hume show
teaches us
ed that the
found
in
be
to
exper
not
ience
;
Kant agreed and concluded that
sel f is
recog
nized
instea
be
d
as a condi tion of the possibility of
it mus t
exp erience. If the unity of consciousness is assured at such a rudi
menta ry level , why should it become an issue, a matter of concern
and even anxiety? After all, experiences and actions must already be
or
design.
o
The events I experience have one or another kind of c herence
(depending, say. on whether they are natural or human events); the
actions in which I engage have another sort of coherence. determined
primarily by the means-end relation; m y l i fe-story, as the multi
plicity of these experiences and actions, has yet another kind of
coherence-has, or, as in the other cases as well, should have and
may fail to have.
The point is that in all these cases we are aware of the past
elements of any temporal sequence as part of the tempora l whole in
which they figure. It is true that we may focus with varying degrees of
explicitness on particular elements of the past (or p resen t and future.
for that matter) : reflective stock-taking or deliberation may req
precisel y that I take a pa rt the sequence and exa mi ne its ele men m
1
detail . (Where am I? d i d I a d d the salt and then stir in the eggs? (.an
put it in the oven now ?) A
t such moments we move toward .1
tte ntion 15
thematic attenti on to the past
for its own sa ke. But su ch a
a c i. n as a
sr n
1 part of the practica l narration that consti tutes a n t o
1
tion
ec
whole , and the past is
nn
o
c
still viewed in light of its
present and future in
n
an ongoi ng pro) ect. Before the past ca
partau..,..
d am
.
an ob'teet 0f conc
.
ern in its own right i t i s of interest an
.
to us heca use of .lts
relati on to present and future.
r of
characte
Remi n d mg ou rselves in h
l
t i s way o f the practica
.
_.i.en
.
.,
aris
11
.._
nanauve
e
....- n m ts us to touch
w
i
h
on another issue wh i c
ol
eSS
we mo on to
ve
,consi der history : what o f the truth or truthful/I t lb
our awarenes s f
o t he past? \Ve
uch a boU tai>!
h ave spoken so m
coherence of sto
r to
pg cer
8
ry, parti cularly of a life story. it msY a p
Ptecede .
un
o
t
rn" )iftt!
OV&r rut h , or to s u ggest a sus p iciouss
here001t
of truth " i n these met1ers In order t o rnake ntt }
h eory
sto""'
ie111ten":d
,
.T co eren t
h
o
w
t
n
ra t her t haD ething d1
ange.
c
rew
iust
Y
'
rite ( h
t h pasn y,
cannot easi ly convi nce o W'S8lves t hat solll
t ff
:
beCX>
ot
we
99
just as I cannot pretend to have added salt and expect the souffle to
turn out well, so I cannot pretend to a talent or capacity I never had
and then expect to put it to use. Many of our plans go awry (and
parts change not i n themselves but in their relation to the other parts
IV
Temporality and
Historicity
and lives
dlvidu als .
does
it mean, in this conte
exactly
xt t0 m?v e
But what
beyo nd the
social?
Obviously we canno
the
to
. dividual
't entirely
.
in
I eave the
' .
ua l behmd, smce society ls comp osed of.
ind1v1d
uals Furth
1n divid
.
' ma be thought th at our way of propos in g the to
er,
ic commits
Y
1t
us to
and
the
individual.
indiv
idua
the
l's
ex
penence and
re taining
actio n
.
0 central pos1t1 on . It w111 b e recalled that we exp 1 aine
,
d our inquiry
I a
1
s con cep t
mg
usser
'
s
k'
H
1
vo
by,.in
of the lifewor Id
init ially
and then
nh.
c1e
1ogy from tt.
ana
fic
que
an
stioning a nd th ..
g
win
dra
eonzmg
1
.
H usser argue d, ta ke place within a human con
abo ut nature , .
text in
'bl e to us prior to and indepen
access
1s
re
natu
which
dentlY 0f our
_
similarly presc1 entific and pre-thematic way? And can we not bett r
e
understand history as a disciplined inquiry, and the historical past
0f.1n
1. The Problem
ast
d epen d ent 1 y f
o its thematization in
to and m
prior
s
has a certain statu
historical inquiry. Our proposal was that i t has this status by "figur.
ing" in the general structure of human temporality along with the
present and the future, and that this structure is a narrative structure.
But the historical past Is not limited to the individual's past, and
lies
may even be thought of as defined, at least in part, as what
ical
beyond the scope of the individual's memory. Furthermore, histor
al
accounts are arguably not primarily o r directly about i ndlvid
l
nca
'
t
expenences,
actions, and lives, but only incide ntally. The hJS 0 e
If th
past, we could say, is the social not the individual. pas t.
r
fu
l
i
u
.
foregoing account of time and na ative is going to prove fr
1
ten
our understanding of history, we shall have to find a way of ex
100
101
soc ial o
e o nd
ntext.
We mu
i.t b
ere JS a pre-thematic social past w h
t ask
th
e
r
ch
e
t
, by an
h
w
vidual,
is
alogy o
a
f
u
indi
n
cti
e
on
th
of
of
a
our
l
t
arg
n
er SOCIa 1
accou
ternpora
one th'is, we shall ha ve to d
d
g
vin
l't
emo n strate
d ha
.
I t
the nar 1 y.
f.O '
rative
of th 'is soc1a empora 1ity. We sh a ll t t
r
e
ct
a
18
ch.ar
ry 0 show, in fac t I
chapters,
uing
that
ens
th
ere
e
' n
a narrati
and th
ve social
thS
. tim
1al actio e
1dua tempora1 1ty to the exper'ien
n
s ind1v
ces,
e
o
act
d
io
as
ns,
Temporolity and Hi
s! or1.c1.1 y
! :;
histor ical world and our pre theor etical manner of living and acting
in that world?
"
"
hing the
Seen in these terms, the first step must be that of distinguis
, eve
past
specifically histo rical past from the specifically individu al
vt
Pro
.
al
d'ividu
the m
thou g h both
are to be considered in relation to
.
ch
i
wh
e of
sio nally we can
do ing this. som
envisage different ways of
only
the past
have already been
have discussed
mentioned. So far we
--
1. See Introductio
n. above.
--
r1111c.
tOl
c <><. 'c
11 1
o
th
po
not
do
ld
i
s
s
cou
llrtod
b
ly bo l'tl m .
thus
outsi
. d wh ich
e n1 b 0
on
his b ''.rth.
s d'1roct oxpcrionce . 1
tod.
!u
outside
es
i
before
1
l
n
Y
mp
anot
o wI111t s1
her
1
1v
uu
l
s
d'
'd
l
ln
a
con
tho
ut
be
ever,
b
wHncss
a 1 , .. how
to t\
"hi storlc
(
o
nd
e
events
.
on
.
l
d
ns
or1ca
of
cou rse
se
ombor hist
the 1
o n ll y rtm
s
1d
por
1.
in them by perform
thus
10 ac tively involved
ing o
ti
c ons
v i du11l can 8 5? '1 In t his secon d s onso. historical action a
s nd 0"
ton co
dctinied his
n ifica nce : a nd much that lios b 0nts
sig
social
o
oyon
e of gon
d
a
. ro thos
n1e mory as well as much withi n that scop
s
one
f
0
.
o f
.
.
tho sco Po
' 0
. 1
storical m tl11s sonso. If the his to ric
.
a l Past
tain Y not hi
coursc'. 1s cer
Is
1
ersona
post,
b
ut tho soc
1 no t nrnre l y tho non-p
.
iallY sig.
Y
dmg
accor
l t o th o md'1v 1d
of rol o1mg 't
u al is
. . t , th en our task
rnol'll
.
nificant pas
1 or tl1e i nd i vid
ls o more compI icated . r.
. d',
a
if
tcd
ica
ua l 's ru1a.
.
clearly Ill
e
date d before tur
in general should bc I uc1
n ing lo
.
lion to soc1. e ty
an element of that relation. Soci a l exi st ence a
as
past
s
ty
socie
nd
.
.
must be exammod ma general way before tho so cial PaS
I
SOCl.81 t'me
t
rge and be un d erstood m ats p ': pe pla ce.
in p articular can eme.
.
be addressed m a way whach as cons istent
Can all the se questi ons
the investigations com
pleted
with. but also appropria tel y enlarges.
so far?
that both were seeking something like a pre-thematic role for h i story
discip li ne. Since we are at least partially indebted to them for our
view of temporality, it will be useful for us to e xa mine briefly and
evaluate critically th ei r excursions into the domain of history. We
shall see that it is po ssible to learn a great deal, both p o s i tive and
a nd
10
3
) o 1'doggc'r ,s 0e Ing ond Ti
usod. -i
me, In which
ot conf
tho
h
co
w
n.
1e
y figures prominently, was publishod 1n
'011
lO ri'clt
1927 6 n
f h ls
d.
t
103
aft
er
4,
wh
i
l
riod
e
w r i ti ng The
e
coPl o
10 tho p
Crisis o
wss 011IY0 cos . . . , that Husserl mode hi sto ric it y 8 ce
ntra l co Euro.
ci 11
ncorn In
f1 S
hod certa inly rood Heid
l
ssor
u
H
11re o
work
(!uo
ooc r s success
.
n
w
ful
blS o d w hi le ho hod many cnt lclsms of it, he may I b' .
n t is ins
tan
ce
.
b<JOk on
fl uonco
. i s pupl 1 . A more complicate
d by h
d but prob ably
en tn
e
b
b11ve
,,10 picturo of tho 1 inos of I n fl uen e
c here would po1
ecc u r 0
nt to
more
oy. even thou gh t his pilosophor had
th
l
i
O
of
died
lo
o
1
r
19
n
.
Y
12.
ke
egger s h omnge to Di lth
tho
ndy notod I'l o id . .
ey at th.e hr
lrc
a
.
VO
'"'ISin
ho
t he direction of history.
It is also possible to argue, as I have done elsewhere. that Husserl
But it is not our task here to sort out and answer these questions of
n
2 Heidegger, Being and Time. p. 377 (reference Is to the Gorman poginalio i
3 See Dihhey, Ge
sammelte Schriften, vol. VII. pp. 277-78.
h e .. n Joh
b4. L. Landgrebe, "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Gelsteswlssensc a
Isch.
(1928
fil Philos ophie un d phelnomenologisch e Forschung 9
s phiJosophie nd Phi!nomcnologie. lionn. 9
1 30:
1 n Northwcstt>,rn
u
S
U : ee my Phenomenology and the Problem of History (Evans 0
n1verily p
ress, 1974), espec ia lly chapter II.
104
benJ
con.
neverthe l ess con
long recognized that his phenomenology must deal with the problem
of intersubj ec tivity, and he finally arrived at a published formul ation
of this problem in the Cartesian Meditations (1929). He recognized
6. Heidegge
r, pp. 59-{;2
7. Husserl,
cartes1on
105
. Prior to this, Husserl seemed
t0 beJ'eve
. e Crisis. ..
of Th
tha t th e
purs uit of theo
. 'dual con scio usness, 1n its
ret1ca 1 und e
ind1v1
rs tand
uld simply transcend its con crete social sit uatt.
on and
1. n g. co
go
to the trut h. What he fi nally saw in the 1930s w
.
as that the
.
d1rectly
.
ry urs uit of theoretical truth ts conditioned
. .
and d e tem1
P
ve
1ned by
,
. .
.
recog
mhon
f
o
h'
s
t
serl
1s
ts manifested in
Hus
h'1s famous
h.1s tory.
in The Cns1s and related texts of the natural .
sciences, of
tre at me nt
.
(geom etry m pa rticular ), and finally of
philosophy 'tmathematics
saw that even if it is the nature of conscio
self. Hu sserl
usness o
pursuit of truth, the individual always
inherits this
enga ge in the
pursuit as an ongoing activity of the society in which he or she takes
it up. The incipient scientist also builds on the results already ob
While the cognitive life of the ind ividual owes its birth to the
social context , and depends on the same context for its success, there
: :
of
-gr_ee
Husserl, The
Crisis
Vl:Ollletr y "
.
10. Ibid .
., PP. 103-189
.
esp
'in
Qng
78) on the.
.ix 51x (PP. 353ecially append
106
of
engaging in it.
.m cumu1 ative
work of predecessors and continue
and additive .
_.i
.
c
1
cr11 1 zi:u
.
ion, m fact mistakes are made and past work need s to be
r
.
g new. co
and undone. This
regression involves not only provid1n
ol
. the d
rected answers to old questions but. just as often, attacking
questions and posing new ones in their place.
dition of a
.
In sum, the individual's engagement in the ong oing .
n
.
d al co
11 Y constituted endeavor is essential to w hat 10diVI U
soc1a
rf
.
eCt5 eve
sciousness is about. and !ts relation to that trad'itt on aff
a st
e
1
t
.
.
also. a
thmg it
d oes: ce rta i n ly its active pursui t of truth b ut
r d.
possibly, even its more passive perception of the wo J
br i eflY 10
to re fer roblelll rJ
We have already ha d
occasion in chapter III.
to th
H eidegger 's cha pte r on historicit and its relation
fi refelil11ce
spec i
e
r
o
authenticity.t3 We must examine it now with m
nd
d'
av a
.11 These ifficulties
are explored in my PhenomenoIo...,
H1story.
12. Husserl.
The Crisis P
36 9
13. Chapter Ill. pp.
94_'.95' abo.
tne
prob
lelfl 4
s es my, he mtro
d uces h is chap ter
the indiv1'd ual'. d t'
0n h'1stor..
ic1ty by
turning to t he m d'1v1'dua l's b'irth and origins. It is he re that h
e takes
,
.
up D ilth ey s expression Zusammenhang des Lebens and .
invokes
.
. ,
aga in the wh olness.. of D asem s b emg, speaking now of a
"reach
encompassing birth and death. Dasein is this reach, at least if it
is
authentic: it is the temporal self-integration of itself. Heidegger
calls
this its Geschehen, the term which lies behind Geschichte and
Geschichtlichkeit.14
..
'
he
h.a
-14 lt 'd
nei e
ts. I bid gger. p 375
p
16. Ib id " . 376.
17. b d.. Pp. 117-25.
I i .
18. lb'ld . p. 384.
p . 385.
..
108
sub?ry
which makes up the true unity of the self Only the fragmen tation of
.
inauthentic existence cuts off the dimensions of time from each
other, splinters the temporal into a sequence of moments an d cal
forth an act of gathering together or restoration (Zusammen ho lenf
we
Only in inauthentic existence are we cut off from the past so th at
have to reestablish our links with it.
and fu7iisof
But all this seems only to concern the past . pres ent.
one's own life-the stretch between one's own birth and dea
l
of
true that Heidegg er dra ws , as we have seen, on his earl i er thoe
he
f
'
odel s or
1 sem, suggesting thst 1he
M.t
ives of others prov1de
n
rnensio
.
factual content of ou; c- .;f.lenhc
ci al di
existence. Thus the so
e
d Heid s
Of D sem appears as,,
1 'ty an
1:1e importa nt to its aut hent'c1
la tion be'
ger introduces into
hi:> discussion a concep tion of the re lt and
.
tween the self
y, Joya Y hU 5
and otc,e:ts which is one of sohdant
er t
.
emulat ion. To the
H i de
integration of past with pres ent
histor
adds the integr
ssion
ation of self with others in his discu
109
Thus the charge that Heidegger never gets heyon
d the isol r
ic1'ty.
a ton
individual be fore h'is own death is incorrect
Da . d H
of th e
v
has
oy
doubt
no
is
i
as
'
that
Heidegger is here
w 21 There
compensating
sh o n .
.
.
for
k the socia 1 with the inauth en
ncy to 1m
tic.
hi s tende
extent does he balance his empha
But to what
sis on the future
b
of the past? If others are important wh
_Y
displaying the role
Y
spec16.
T he k'md o f tempora l integ
ration that H e1'd egg
call y past ot hers.1
er
.
envisions for t he m d'1v1'dua 1 se:ms not to extend in any necessary
way beyond the bounds of the mdividual's life. U others are impor
tant, why will contemporaries not suffice?
The only hints toward an answer to this que stio n arepro ided
v
when Heidegge r begins his chapter by linking birth to death and
when he refers briefly to the concept of "generatio ns."22 To be born is
to have parents, and to belong to a "generation" is to stand in re lation
to previous (and subsequent) generations. Though he does not say it,
Heidegger apparently conceives the paradigm cases of those models
for our "repetition" to be our parents . Heidegger considers essential
here not the biological sense of the sequence of generations, but the
fact that traditions, styles of life, ideals, and values are not just
handed over to us by others but are first of all handed down by our
elders when we are young. Heidegger leaves imp licit the idea that
soc i al existence is generational, that a family persists through time in
a way that differs not only from the persistence of a thing but also
from the tempora l integrity of an individual. It might be tho ght t at
.
Heidegger has touched on only half the problem, since the mdivi
from them 1
u a l, whil e linked
to his elders, must also free himself
ds adut
s ometim es
violent and rebellious ways. But Heidegger
relation
ing
br iefly, in
eat
p
e
"r
somewhat more g ent eel terms, that the
even a
and
to the pa
t
i
st may involve a rejoinder (erwidem) to
d isavowal (Wideruf)
of it 23
e h pare n t
en
ce
it seems clear t at Heidegger has somethin g l ik 1
H
ch1'Id rel
r re 1at1onsh i p
ation in mind. It is true that the elder-younge
bellion'
Whi ch can crn
lation and re
cially involve the diale ct ic 0f emu
, in
m
For exa ple
can e
b repl'teated in other contexts th an the fami ly.
c
om
mi
the co
c
German c de
ntext which
Heidegger knew well, the
is 1 s call e d the
lllU nity,
thes
the professor who supervise s a doctoral
-2
o .
1
. avid Couze ns
Tirn" 1?
lJnive
.
.
Hoy, "History. Historicity
Heidegger and
Philosoph y. ed.
.
Modern
Historiograp
hy 1n BeinS and
a
110
h1
u1
well, as exemp I.1fi ed precise l y m the re atio
re belli on as
shi
P be.
Academic colleagues of
tween Husserl and Heidegger.
coUrse,
'
. ,
ate
d
cognitive
en
eavor,
so we find o rse
engaged in a common
v h
in the realm of the historicity described by Husser l. H eid e s
Y
contrast, seems to be saying that the relationship of older to
.
nger
.
.
I
parhcu
ar
pro1ect
m ord er to ex ist n
generations needs no
o project
except living itself, which is the only purpose, it could be argu ed.of
the family. Heidegger's treatment suggests that like Freud he believes
u l
e:
yor.
g
in
.
v u
pass
ze
.,.,
- ro
:
These and other differences between the two notions of histor i dly
ch
es the present
world in to interl ocking complexes of s gn ifi cance all accomplished
'
on t h e back ground of Dasein s thrown ness or facticity,
to
and
hipJ
of relatlo
nsl:ip between authorship (or narrators
of l ife.
this. pie
.1sto ricity add to
What, now, do
h
f
0
ns
s
i
o
the two discus .
to an uiter
ture1 F'
Ind'avi'dual
the
. i..
....
..
..,.
tVV'
kers
irst
, as we saw both thin
. nr p-"UPPo5t u
subjec
- --
'""'
tonci.,
h.
15
f
.
dU4'
hve
s
0
context. Both disc uss on
.
the
indi
VJ
5
.
the
ntial to
tias
be. re I a on with others is somehow esse
Jation. but one -'
.
re
a.I ing There are
u of this
ractd ur
doubtless many aspec
th-e cha
rra
of
e
teady turn
h
t
.
in ed up an our d1scuss1on
lvd an
bu n
tive in
ao d
rna ternporality. This is the idea
Pl ay of
three points of view. not only those
thiS wt pc>lll
te l ler
but also
\'e seen
that of audience. We h
ru re
l n
too
th h
..
that character
that
a
---
112
.
nt even in the individual's organi zatio n of h'
view 'is prese
is or her
.
.
hfe. But we saw that this audie
nce's .
experience. action. and .
1
Point
. vo 1ves, 1s
a ways someh
latlon l't m
ow
v1ew, and the interre
quasi.
:i:
address.
Most people have had the experience that they do not quite know
what they mean or intend until they try to com municate it to others.
113
Iy ex1stmg alongside my
rath er than s1mp
rs
.
ow n beeom .
e
o
th
.
of
.
es its
an d pnor con d.1hon.
backgroun d
s to suggest something similar
when 1t comes
Hei degger seem
.
to
authentic
mode of existence. Others
an
at
ng
rl
.
vi
can serve as
ar
.
.
already constitute an ac
use their hves
complishment
models beca
.
while my own .is sh.11 m question. To be sure, everyone 's life, at
whatever age. is constan tly "in question" in Hei degger's sense, and it
may be one of the illusio ns of youth that the lives of the old are
accomplished. just as it may be an illusion on the negative side that
they are set in their ways. But the illusion, if it is that, may neverthe
less be important in these cases. The point is not that others are
"older" as such but that their life (or work) represents a background
The content is all the more affected, of course, when the speaker si
'
d
erl an
Now t he concept of historicity, as put f orward bY Huss
.
s that rJJY
H eidegger, adds a cruci al el ement to this pictu re. It af firm take a
existence .
ers can
connectio n with the
actions and experiences of oth
foflP
.
ation. a What
special form, apart
from th e relation of reciprocal narr
ccesso ts .1..
we can descn'be as the
re!ation of predecessors and su
.
>"
fll pli
c
..t
lS indcate d is
a priority, not
o 0f ac 0
only of time but al s
0 the WO'
ment . In the case
of the ongoing scientifi c project I take
beCorJJeS
or..
already accom
be!
p1 ished by others. The end of another's w
hiS or-
d
the beginni ng
e
fi
h
poraries,
"
workJ
208 Schutz in liter
i 1. Schutz:
uck
5
.
The Phe nomen
ology of rhe Socio! World P.Sch ti and Tho"" ss.
:lrOduces
ers
e
e
e
th
st
ity
.
See
NA
rthw
Univ
lrne
of
distinctions
I
mak
h
g
nn,
Th
e
r
l
e
e ern
31 p. 9t. ruc r u res of the Life-World (Evanston: 0
-;--
114
concerns and activities can be placed, and in terms of which they are
focus on the past, or any particular part of it, for its own sake. The
past is involved only in so far as it figures in the larger context which
includes present and future.
ion
mportance of con figurat
been wronly
;
r 8
115
the individual, not only of what h e or she is doing but even more
d
1
in
at th
the
Y in the manner of a vague horizo n for
e oth
er extr
. . nal ist" we
trad1t1o
e me woul
d perhaps be that "proud
Instead
?ess
116
.
seems at times to emerge from u .
earlier who
.
.
e1deo
1
ment'1one d
.
vi dua1 ,25 "'.6ers
g port rait of th e aut henhc mdi
sin
confu
1n
sometimes
" grasp" or "reach " that constit utes the i either
r
al
po
d
.
n i v1du
case the tem
al'1
.
nders tandi ng reach es back to inclu de a conti
If
se
e
U
u ulll
n
narrativ
of
scope . These m ak e up a trad ition sin
cessors in its
ce the
'
Prede .
1
n
a
d
d
h
or
ong
a
own
pass
wh
at th e ind . tr
tion is to
.
.
essentia1 func
v1dual
.
f
ways
o
exist ing.
way of proJects and
the
n
i
up
takes
4.
A New Problem
phenomenon?
What Husserl and Heidegger ask is: to what extent and how is the
social past implicated in what the individual does and is? In our
terms this means: to what extent does the story of my action or my
life require reference to the prior actions or lives of others? In answer
ing this question we learn something about the way individuals
interact, and we discover a peculiar form of temporality (what
called the relay-for m) which governs the interconnected actio ns n
lives of different individuals. But what we learn is still somethi
about particular actions and individual lives, namel y that the soc
Histcr
But is h istory about parti cular actions and md1 vidual hves?
.
,,1
.
""
.
.
.
r1ans often write about tt1em
the h1ston
, and we certa m l y thmk 0f
. d' du
t tn IVI
process as bemg made up
in some sense of the things tha
d 0ot
cer
al do. .Yet we also
thir1k of history as be ing prop erly con n jons.
, n
prim arily with
individ uals but w i t h group s: peop les
.
i
1 v1dual
.
1
s bet
.
rica
ong. U we
process
histo
with what h
tify the
as generally
.
.
1'den
consists
i nterested
of the events
the n it
acti v1.1.1es, and
. tor ians,
h 1s
careers of
. sprea d out over hme.
groups
of
this
inning
chapte
r we raised th
At the beg
e quest t.on
of how to
md 1' v 1' d ua l temporahty and the
o
m
fr
ind1v1'dua1
rnove
.
past
to th e
We spo k e of movi ng beyond the 1 nd
. tori cal.
hIS
IVI'du a 1 to the
.
.
. al
Certainly the notio n of historicity succeeds in do
past.
ing
thi
s since
they a
. .
1
place for suc h enh hes . Do their accounts leave a place for
such
enti ties? To th e e tent that our account so far has dealt with
the
.
social, everything it says could be conceived in terms of one-to
-one
relatio nships betwe en persons; that is, both the role of audience
to a
particular narrative, and predecessor to a course of action
or an
individual life, can be fulfille d by individuals. Thus everythi ng so
far
which goes beyon d the individ ual is either a simultaneity of such
relationships or a series of them spread out over time.
An account which does justice to what is genuinely historical , by
contrast, would speak of what is proper to groups as such. And if we
wish to keep our focus on the connection between time and narrative
in relation to h istory, something needs to be said about
the tem
porality of groups, and about the manner in which narrative organi
zation can be s a i d to characterize that temporality. Clearly the notion
of historicity, a s
discussed so far, does not give us this, and it is this
we must seek here.
1 18
l vc.ro1
exper1onc1
. Is tho
desert' bed . An d lt
have
we
ind
ure
ivld ua 1 to.
.
sp oct .i ve struct
Who
.
nc o ro 1 os i n our n orr a t 1
ter-auche
charac
tor
.." 1 nterpre.
v
narra
.
p l ays the
.
ora l ity and in our d '1 scu ss ion of tho p robl em 1
tahon or temp
o au
.
t hat h istory as t ho
. e r consistent
thus al t oge t h
socl 1
thorshI' p Jt is
8
Pt
.
. uel's
if at a l l . on h hortz on or. t h e tn d'1v1d
oxporience
shou l d appear.
the inchv1dual that h i story has the "pm-thorn
As we sa w. it Is for
at1c
a l l along. In dee d it is hard t o see ho
w the
status we have sought
ma ti c could ha vo any meaning except in rolello
n otion of the pre-the
n
indi vidu al sub ject .
tho
for
atic
them
is
t
wha
to
account , though It may also
To be sure, such a first-person
be
e
contents of an i so la ted , lndivtd.
h
t
about
t
o
termed "subjective," is n
Its method
would still unacceptably l im i t its options in dea li n g with this topic.
Groups would have to be discussed w i t h respect to their bclng/otthe
con scio us individual subject. This docs not mean, of c u rse . thal
s eem s
to mo t hat
o
could be treated only as "objects" i n t h e narrow sense. Social
grou p s are thematic objects of observation and inves ti gation for ''
ciologi st s and anthropologists, who aspire to a det ach ed and "objec
they
of::i.
f
Tu m p oro l l t
y Ond 1 11 1"
011 _1;
lt y
up tho c.:h1mco of opply1 r18 to ot
vo
l lQ
i
g
l!il 01 ttti
18 to
nCl) 11 11.1
pllo n 8 or tom portillty Hfld hort'"
c
rl
s
h
o
Ah
" tlVO I Il!lt
t h0 d
I , ..., .,,(! 1m1nrg1Jd i..vI <if
. . t I gn.t 1 on. !\'
1or those ttt"
.aorller
lnvos
.
- " ' ea
"
m
l 1n
ur
0
we hoV\I.
.Oll i\ , h
st-porsoi\ occo u nt . Thu11, wliut ho r ,,
11
tlr
6d
h
t1l
to
o
unti1n1.inol
t
oaI141 (}f
8r) p rouc h t 0 tl 10. group
.
800lfl8 flUI'"
I
'
..
tt
""
...
U
I
llrI Y to
40Y I
be ' lhl td 1>e ,
group Is o pproochod na
o
h
t
r-.
nt:
o
n
110 It oltho
acco u
r 11 10 ob
1rl(;1 Qf
ntl on or I n lht rtlotlo11 to n ubJcct.
g
l
t
os
v
n
t
y woy to 011copo t h i s couso
quoni o? Wral rn
le t hore a n
tg .ht biiKln by
l
oo k at ft P<>811lbl n phon
8ocond
a
omonolo
toking
1.co
R
c l t1ppr<J8
. th lo
sold such <mtHlo8 wou l d hllvo 1..
" UIJ
gro up11 . Wo
fll 1 llUro
d U !Jhjl'tl
I
r
for t h o indlvlduo o ot hos t 08 80mot hl no
wh l cli n
gurod in tho wr
Jf Id
1m
Tiws
llt
l
.
rolutlon
l
<
l
u
o
l
v
nd
wou l d iuom to 'VU
o{ tho i
' " 1 1 l0 8 1Bltltl n
"
I)
1. , 1
Po i n t 0r sue: I.1 an I n vost igo t ion . ut wo could lnvokti 8. Uoot
i amo ua
t
on
t
w
n
,
I
I
d
o
l l11ou; wo hnvo nlrood y
dist incti o n bo o
mnd<l Uitl 'm thlt
disti nctio n In effoct in our d l 8Cu8slon of lntof8ubjocllvlty l!nd 118
tfllo
In histo ricity. Since gro u ps oro compoaod of I ndi v i dua l poriont.
would th o I-thou rolotlo n not bo rnoro opproprluto 8trittlog point
than tho 1-lt? 11rnt ls, shou l d 8 u ch a phonornonolosy not 91,11m11(,h
groups via tho second ro th or tho n tho thJrd potto n?
Tho obvious objectio n to this la that wh llo groups au; eompo80d of
lndlvicJunls thoy aro no t thom11olvo1 lnlviduol pureun1 but c:ollfit.
His tory
T.1m e . Narrati ve. and
120
ulti
ropl y that his concern is not ontol ogical that e..
is l may
11
nom enoI og
1
ed
not in whcthor gro ups re ally ore large
ercs t
lnt
is
t
sc.a
6
that h
that
so,
ar
we
appe
refer to the
m and
fact thAt thoy
th
In
but
persons
such .
troat th em as
should favor such an app roach b
.
..
hou ght that we
-'-<Ul se
.
.
It migh t be l
of groups. By trcall ng the 5,,,. 1
n
ctivizallo
. . 0ffect
subjc
1
a
V\.lt.I
'1t penn 1ls m
h t be ab le to find
e person we m1g
of
In
alogue
it
an
.
.
gro up as an
and action at least slm
organ ization of experience
ilu
or
I.
ily
ora
.
.
temp
,
.
..
'
red "from t hc ms1 de m the m d 1' v1d ual. The
to what we dlscove
.
adopt ing e quas1 -seco d-per son approach lo the
trouble is that in
phenom cnolog 1cal first-person account ls
u the subject of the
from the inside t all but again stand.!
group
lly viewing the
: !
it
O\'CT against it. Though
which will permit something like a view "from the inside. " But the
answer should be obvious! I am precisely inside a group by being a
12\
m ple . wou ld be a d iscu ssion of lndt
lor ex a
vlduaJ
5 W hl c:h ts
o n ab ou t the gro up.
d i sc us si
.
8
"
'-allY
I
si gn a J s t h at a certa n methodolo gka l ah Ut la
But t hls
reqhu1 red U
t
o
come
l
lnt o our view
U p as we s
. Cle ar 1 Y t e
.
the gro
P hethat of the first perso
logi cal perspe.ctive,
n s 1n...
, ,1ar w \ b
.
&i.u
hc
0ornono
e-rvt h i n g as 1t extsts for the Indivi dual or fi
vieWS ev J
ln
rus
gu
the
.
a l s worl d . o bscures one of the distinctive L- - 1 ..t .
cU
.
\..Wlfac e,l.3t1cs of
In v i d u
y t hat the individ ual can be ..
Up wh ich is precise l
.L "
mentuer
the gro
I
am
subje
not a .. member" of
t
c
s
ou
i
c
n
s
o
c
'
8
the
th a no
c 1 see or
ft. nS
of the other persons I encounter, or of my world. All th
or
e
us .
.
ese
.
as it were. i t a ct as a su b') ect and as an individ ual .
leave me .
But u
a i cipates m a group and says "we," my individu
ne w ho p rt
ality
effaces itself before a su bj ect larger than
efers to or
itself. Has
a place for this? Husserl often says that the
henomeno logy
overall
enl gical a nal ysi s is the complex
pheno
atrix for
ego-co
gito
.
v
cogilolu m . lnte rsubJect1 1ty enters the pictu re for him only by raising
the problems of the cogitatum cogitan s. This may be too rigid 1
framework for som e of Husserl's successors. such as Heidegger or
Merleau-Ponty. B u t do any of them make room for a cogilamus?
we. "
'
__
From l to We
From I to We
1. In Search of the Tran
s-In divi
dual S u b
Ject
i
narylook
lved.
We are proposing to treat the
group not as obje
ct but as
Does this mean we are tre ati
SUb'Jett
ng groups as analo
gue s of per
s
we pointed out, groups
ons
?
often do take on
subjective or
characteristics for us. In
pers
onal
ord ina ry speech and
in ma ny
political and journalistic dis
forms <i
course, we sometimes
ascribe to grou
such thing as actions, attitud
ps
es, traits of character,
even emotions,
which see m properly to app
ly to individual person
s. Nations act,
classes feel outrage, families
mourn, etc. What is the
status of such
talk? Do groups as such have
thoughts and intentions, and
act ac
cording to them, as persons do?
Do they have feelings and experi
1. See
.
,
the collection Modes of lndiv1duo/Jsm
ond Collectivlsm
122
123
whether social reality
can be acc
eba tes is
d
s
e
.
e
ounted
for
111 th
nc e t o facts . a b out m d'1v1'dua1 s. Indivi
fere
du
110
re
ali
1
sts hold
bY
ma
ult
tel
re
y
i
a
co
mp
es
osed of ind
te1'f
50c eti
. 1
iv idual
sO
1 ation of soc1a
since
s, any
events would
... 81
n
a
have to trace
.
I' pl te ?xP
.
th
em to
tue
e
co
nt
nst
parts. Ho hsts
i
f those
argue that
corflbehav1or 0 c
soc
i ty
idu
ly of ind iv . als but als o of the
tbe
relatio ns am e
ot rne r
.
n
s
t
1
s
. nal a nd economic re ahons, for
ong
oriSj
' u
example) and
c
(inS t 1 t t lO
that the
..,
can
als
no
du
eve
t
ivi
n
b e understood
..
the"
f 1nd
. .
apart fro
ior 0
m
any description of how in
behav
'"-us
l"
ns.
o
divi
t'
dua
1
s
ls act w'll
l
e
r
t i "societ al facts,"
e
s
to use Mandelbaum'
t}lo
ose cer a n
s ter m.2
.
resoPP
1is
'
"
1v1
the
is
d
m
ua
d
t s who generally
it
s
te
b
d
s
want to hold
e e
p In t h
tentiona l terms, and who see in holis
m the threat
ta 0 in
n
e
m
of
J1 to
. st1. c and deterministic expla nation which reduc
o
es individch8n1
e
rn
8
gs in a social mach'me. They tend to be
o mere
advocate s of
uals t
rat r than Erklaren when it comes to dealing with hum
n
e
h
te
an
vers
refer a Collingwoodian "reenactment" which
t
looks for
even s;
peopl e act rather than laws w i h o
. ld link their
the reas
to its anteced ents. An d it
ally
s
is md1v1duals
cau
whose
behavior
th'1s way, e1"th
ndersta nd m
er
u
qua
e
md'1v1'd ua 1s or as
ns
.
tlO
ac
w
'de al types. We can do th'is b ecause we are individu
Weben. a n 1
als
can observe other individuals directly, and are capable
urselves,
of
.
.
. .
o
urselves in other s1tuahons.
i g
ma mm
are thus the champions of liberal
These h orists
individualism
.
g. N
see a s soc1 aI engm
they
eenn
one of them wants to
agamst w hat
take the mentalist'.c and voluntaristic properties of individuals and
.
8 1 them t o societies cone1ved as macroperso ns. lnd ed hey
:
think such an application even more d angerous to md1v1
du.
.
. th an they do socia l mechanism. The choic e and fr eedom of the
ahty
.
.md.IVI'dual perso n might seem even more threatened 1f
the l atter .is
d
tool
the
as
of a n over-arching personal'1ty carrym
conceive
g out its
own designs.
For their part the holists, though not always the deten . .
mmsts ?r
mechanists portrayed by some of their opponents, have no _
mterest m
this version of holism. Of the notion of a
"group mind" Ernest
Gellner says: "I take it no one is advoc
ating this serious y."3 An ony
.
.
Quinton , in arguing for a form of holism
(or at least against 1 d1v1du
::
:hy
(London:
124
ion y of
such attr
1
i
8
U
t
hons
ments about individuals.
in t0 hat
Sta
There are no doubt many reasons why
te
the 1de
of a c
subject is not taken seriously today. One
oll)ll)
of the
e
the resolutely third-person perspective
from w '. W ve r, is s \Jl\al
c the
social reality is viewed. Discussions
Problely
such as t
e e b
individualists and holists are primarily
at
e bet of
epistemol
:
.
.
1
og1c
a)
.
o do og1ca I d1scuss1ons a b out how socie
<ln d een
t y can
in
et)i
be kn
tifically. They often turn on questions of
ow n
S c ie
what c a
b
e di
served: individual behavior can be, some
say but in . rectly 0o.
s t itur1
economic relations cannot. The argument
ona1
also turns .
and
oft.en 0
onto Iog1ca
I commitm
ents a bout the nature of
n basi
societ . it
c
is com
of individuals and their behavior; all else
posed
is me y
a c onc
addition.
ept u
al
Such considerations of what is and what
can be know 1
n eave
first person only the role of (single) scientific
t 0the
observer st a .
ndin g
against society which is his or her object.
over
If we propose to consider society as subject
rather tha
b'Ject, We
are not suggesting straightforward ontologica
l claims ::
out
what
society is or about how it is known by an
observer . We
P pose
instead an investigation which is methodologic
ally anchore
d in the
first person. Stale d m
th"is way our proposal is famil
i ar: it cou
ld be
said that modern philosophy, from Descartes on,
h as been cha
rac.
terized by just such an approach. Here the human
su bject is not
simply treated as an item in the known world about
whom various
claims are advanced, including claims about his ability
to know.
Rather, all knowledge claims are initially suspect: they
are sus.
pended until they can be warranted in the direct experience
of the
knower. Descartes insists that each of us consult his own experience
and draw everything from that .
But this reference to "each of us" reminds us that of course the
methodological first person of modern philosophy is precisely sin
r!i
Yet this is not quite true. In the eyes of some thinkers, at least, the
(197}. p. 17.
125
to We
f ro m I
.
re generalized
. d al and acquires a mo
ind1v1 u
ject must gra d uate
o the
pp ns the sub
fr
Jted
Jllbefore th is ha
hysical
ty to one of metap
J 1sc
th at
gic al pnon
I
o
e
dee m
0
t
rn
h
that
te
t5116. trll
1. t who believed
of ePis
.
11 ts
s a rea is
a
w
rtes
(l)S
jtiOll
1. dly be affirmed on th e b as 1s of
a
s ll pesca
t
d
il't!l s pe we b world coul v
e of
go beyond the evidenc
of t e
f!O i" as
he h ad to
ce
ten
0i r1l t ..., 8)itY bod. even if
exis
.
d evidence for the
r/ do v lllet
determi n e
y
II
a
i cult'i es
ced, and d'ffi
ebieetive e ration
s than convin
s stl es to th d O the rs were les
cartes.s
Des
from
led
status
ells
f Go
s external
id'
d to th e
for the wor
ed5 1ut6 o
The world was reduce
1 ism
a11 p1aevidelle forms o f id ea
L
z
conceived by H ume
an d eibni ' or
var10u s
.l.1111
erke ley
B
to
n
i
)
. of a ment a l
(
nd s
as we can know it,
status, a s far
"'' of Jlll
e
h
t
1ePtst 35 having
.
ao
distinction hemt o this picture the
.ntroduced
al'
ct
i
o
h
w
c0'15tfll 111
empirical subject wh en speak'mg
ta l and the
a
n
It ,s tr anscend e
This distinction is
the wor ld it knows.
the
onstru. cts
h ave seen 't
1-een .nd which c
l
interpreters
but some
1111
ial in K an t
or
you
takes place it is not
the usly controvers
ui.ne know ledge
olono
.
at when gen
o
.
a umversal sub'iect m
but
jng th
s,
affi rllly par .i u 1ar pers on, who know
is
c
lY
on
ent
goes,
argum
t
1 dividuals, so the
Lor an ehoW all share. n
.
sorn
perspectives or .sub1echve 1mwhich
any fleeting changing
.
sent so m
to attain to a single wor 1d to
is
re
scientifically
P
But to know
.
n
o
s
l
When you
si
of universal and necessary aws.
Pres
ture as a set
a
n
at
is
t he same thmg we
amve
.
fi 0 r mathematical truth 1t
W sc1enh c
1 erences
andikn a h same th ou ght we think, whatever the d'ff
thu t e
.
bJoW and s
personal histories which make us d'1stmct
ubjective s t a t es or
. dividuality lies error; when we t h'mk t he truth we
1
indiVldu als. n m
'
Thus Kant is linked with Averroes s mterpretahon of
are all one.
ks a 11 true
God w ho t hm
the Universal Thinker is
I
,\ristotIe i n wh'ch
.
th ugbts eith er on his own or through us. Spmoza, though not an
1
similar views about the relation of God as thinker to the
11:4115'
f'
':rsJll
'
inus
'd-1
had
phy does lead by this path beyond the individual. But can this path
t. It is based on the
questionable e pistemological
premise (an ancient one, to be sure)
tin order to
know some thing the mind must be
or become like its
1 ::Thus a universal object known
requires a universal subject. It
r. confuses
1
the specific iden tity of
what is thought with the
umencat ide
n t1 tY of the acts
or occasions of its being thought, and
'
120
Time, Narrative
' and H'IS1 o
ry
mokos tho further illegitimate
move fro
m the se
Identity of the subject who thinks
the
These ar8
un
Um ents for
subjoct make the same erro r as
h
a lln
does psy c
1\-e
ologi sm,
Whllo tho latter argues from the
but in re
partic ular
p itYI
t'-1
t
hough t
universality of its objects, the form
to the'lerse
er ost u ate
:
.
non.
the un
iv er sai1
ob1ccts and cone 1ude that the sub'i e
ct mu st bI e u
Ii
'Y
OIV ets
al as W
Somo or the bost offorts of twcnticthcentury og.ic
ell
, semant
epistemology, beginning with Husserl
ics, an d
and Frege, ha
.
ve bee11 d
evoted
t o sor tmg ou t th e universe11ty of objects of h 8
t ou h
of mea nin
Itself from the particularities of thinking,
'
g
and h. e 11
is gen eral
ly
difficult to discern any real progress in philoso
ptw
1Y h ere at leas t
som e
worst confusions have been exposed.
of
to
vers.1
of
a
\ d
tho
to
still not
be applicable to
to
ill
th.tt
Jmilln1l ar
t.S
n y conshfoNttion of the matter convinces
o
1
alwass
saying
tual
d
i.:dif-
::
pnd
..
be ..
127
from I to We
const
n
ean that it
11et11t>e
d oe s not m
.
d
as
d
the
S
ive
mstea
conce
1
be
aside it can
0 'fh
d to cast
ieaso
e n ee
rsal to appear.
w
h
enables the unive
bic
wh'ich
)'
iar
some readers of Hegel's attack on Schelte rm e d
.
n
ents remind
m
1
u
r
' ts no acc1a
' S
e g
Phenomenology o, p m t this
Il tbes
the
o
t
face
Pre
forward by Merleau-Ponty
n Ih
ments were brought
li ng i
'
ilar arg u
Sim
, for th'mk'mg l't cou Id
t.
d
ihon
d en
"intellectualist' tra
wh 0 le
the
t
ns
agai
ms of intersubjectivity and communica
ass the proble
by
r
o
avoid
a universal thinker.5 Merleau
the abrupt shift to
a
m
y
b
tion
oach with phe
ing the intel lectu alist appr
s c trast
Ponty
h always re
whic
)
his
own
and
1 ogy (in this case Husserl's
wa
nomen o
t
Iy true that
1s
am
l
't
cer
d
n
A
ecti vity as a prob lem.
rded I intersubj
the
adopted the distinction between . transcenden
ga
Husse r, even if he
.
ego, did not use the former to md1cate a transta! and the empirical
of his more superficial commentators to the
individual subject. some
's transcendental ego is singular (it
cont rary notwithstanding. Husserl
way), it constitutes
is simply you r I, considered in a very special
. ,
tries to transce
nd the individual but hold onto its first-person
1s
at wh.ic.
'
h 1t
amves
sh11
singuJ stl ll an l. We are still in
search of an account which centers
.
ic
rnetb:olog
ally on not the I but the we
2.
Moving be
he\
':u appr!orneology
hints about ho But
if
we
Oil
w to mm"e
beyond them.
8- of ptjca.
p.p. 6-M.
128
.
To begin with, both seem to want to exte nd the1r
.
first
nce
an
f
d
temp
o
ex1st
s
accoun
orality
singular
to entities be Person.
nd the
individual. Heidegger m one passag e extends th
not
e
ion of
Geschehen (the root of his concept of histori city, as w
saw) t
o the
community . the people" (Gemeinschaft , Volk.). This
e c
g
common destiny (Geschick) is not a mere collectio n o f hehen or
ndiV iduai
.
fates, he assures us, but derives f rom our "being toge th er .
n the 't.:1.
....,e.,
m communicat
Mi
"
5111 of
historicity, as we saw, centers on the relation of history to
the au t n.
e
ticity of the individual's existence.
..
reveals that he takes this notion very seriously. He ascribes not only
even
something
like
corporality"
..
pagination
an
pru
384 (reference Is again to the Germ6-26.
8
"Heidegger on Being a Person." Nous 16 (19 }i P/acx:ountabtY
John Haugeland
nit
an Interpretation of Dasein as a "primordial institution" and a u
lslng. thOUgll l
which permits of being applied to groups. Haugeland's propo sal Is prom
find It hardly in accord with Heidegger's text or intentions.
7. Husserl. CartesiQll Meditations, pp. 126-29.
9. Ibid . p. t 32.
z .,-ei ll!
9. Huuerl. The Crisis, p. 188.
lct1Vil 6t.
1
10. See Husserliana, vol. XIV, Zur Phlinomenologie der lntersu b'e
Tei/, ed. I. Kem (The Kague: M. Nijhoff. 1973). pp. 2()()-04.
404.
129
from I to We
'
we retu
is
'thin
i
.. re constituteadrewco
nstituted by
5
80
dure
'
conditioned
accomplishments of others.
But this d escri ption of what we called the relay-form or predeces
sorsuccessor relation important as it is, misses something crucial
ror analy sis of such an activity, even from the point of view of the
mdtvidual part'1c1pant,
ime.
H
ts clo
e1degger
's
treatmen
t of this phenoms
d to his
ue elll ely tie
concept o f the "worldhood of the world."
lties o
f our
world h e
argued ther e , are not primordially
11
. ff
11saerl,
Ca
rtes1a
. n
Med'Jtatio
ns, p. 132
.
130
Time, Narrativ
e'
liJsr ory
encountered as "things" or ..
0 bJocts
" ror ou
r p
tion. Tt rny are first of all th
orc0Pi l.
e equip ment
o n n
a n d Co
I nvol ved In our everyday doa
tnpte
d
lin
es of
nd Projects
O
or her persons must b e underst
!!qui
Cosiu.
.
u e
o
n th i s sa
me con ncoun terP111e111
not items of equip m ent of
cours e , b u t
te .
th ey are n
Pe... With
o f our perception either 0
ot
'
th
pp
osi ng the
&s o'""'lls
sta nd a
r o b
pro blem ol "our k no w led ge
rd
'1'
of other mi
eP ste
nds , " H
ll'l
o logi
eide er
others are encountered pri m ar
l'ttls
il
fi
f
for the m
&
os t Pa ..
"a c ross" equipment as a
fun cti
t h ro
the work
.
u.,L
world tn
.
e ngaged toge th e r . u
Wh
ond
:d
ic h
....
....
_
als, When I say .. We built this house..
, my use of we is
in this ta.1eoci
.
...a
w e to the senes
of statements: '"I b uil t th
re1uc1
h
. e . ouse and you bi:il
... . .. e tc. 0therusesd
th t) house. and he built the hous....
r.1
course. a
tex
the
J
have coa,xed from
actions. """"' ....
The e.xamples w&
.
-"
Ol'
cts
oje
pr
on
a
ted actiOl1
Heidegger are ol comm
di!Je.rentt
dy
g of this stu
that at the beginnin
eclve
u.sstrl
From I to We
131
discussion of tempora1.
a.nd throughout our
tty we
.
. I n k eep . g with
Pe
e"
tion
that proc edure. bef
m
tinc
d
h
n1ssi
ore
t is dis
r-- tsino
1 th e not'ion of common action'we sh
rnore detai
ould
.
Jllain
.08 In
cansdcfl h nat ure o f common or co11 echve experience smce we
e
.
1 ogy with
Ut t
the description of pas
sk .b<J d {u sserlia n ph enomeno
,,ssoe
}810
k
first
to
it
for
clues.
we can loo
They are to be f und
nee
calls the "first and lowest level" o f mtersserl
Hu
ie
1
at
si
1n w
rience.
?
e.'<Pere h
Y
el
s
ity.
blectiv sit uation wh'ich Husserl seeks to account for in the fifth
sic
h
1be ba.
w at Schutz later called the face-to-fac e encou ter
su
.
t1on is
Medita ndi viduals13-descnbed of course from the first-person1
n
We sh a 1 l see that with a slight shift in standbelll'ee
nt of view .
. u1 poi
from this discussion which
n
lead beyond
ar
emer g e
su its can
an
d
or
e
l
pOint. re
s1mp
straightf
ts
ward
one-toTh'
ure.
d
e
wn proc
.
l{uss erl' s o
s
rs
for
ng
unde
mean
the
tandi
tams
groups
con
y
d
unter alrea
one enco
.
as such
es from Husserl s analysis is that this encounter
emerg
arly
What cle
ves a third element, the common
ts essentially i
ri l\\'O subjec
my world, but as a consciousness
m
1s
other
world. The
surrounding
for him as well as for me. We
world
the
the world a n d
be is also for
east . then, this particular place in which we stand
share at the vary l
. The si mp lest way of summarizing Husserl's
and face each other
vity from my perspective is that I encounter
.:count of intersubjecti
. a perspective which is not my
'\()(]ter perspective on the world
no_l
tlWD-
132
Time, Narrative
'o n d
H i.sto
ry
IIOW thoy nt In with my own
In re Iotlon
to
th
e s urr
porc.e I vo. 11 ioro Is a alnRlo
.
ou
system
From l to We
nd1n
of interlock
ing P
gs
111on wor Id which ostob llsh
erspec
os Itse lf In
ti
every fa
tor, and II Is a s ysh)m of whi
ce.to f Vesonthe
ch both p
ace e
articip ant
s are a
mu It l p II
. dty of actual ond possib le
ware
modes
.
givennes
1116 01 porcolvo r, this sys tom
s that
b elongs stri
Y to us . W
good 1 luHsorllon schomo. subject
"&to
e ca
- mo d es 01
give nness-o
use
the
to closcrlho this slluntlon b ut
.
b1
.
tho s ub feet
.., &i
in this cas
ven
e
not coslto b u t cogilornus.
is no t
l but
iwe,
Every foco-to-foc:o oncountor
.
scorns in
this sense
to establ
WOro I utlons I1lp and o \VOsub
.
jcct shared amo
ish
ng its parrc .
1pant s. H
sor I l nc I ood u sod tho torm Vorg
cme in sc h
UJ.
fl ung e ta
a'
( s blishment ri
community or communalization)
to descn b e suc
.
h a sit uati
on.
cttn such a minimal relationship
b e relevant to the
e xist
. ence
nttturo of socio) groups?
r..om
we
;ethe
traJlSform
mean.
members
and were not unaware of it either. But now they perceive that it is as a
group t hat they are oppressed or threatened or under attack. The
Yorn
focus.
"'''"'-l'. lht-m Into a group which the members recogniie as such. \"ell
if thciy do not rush to offrr assistance, individuals begin sto
o.ne tmolht r. C<'lm pa ri ng their impressions and spec ulati ng abo:.il the
ri,slns 1tnd further .-ff ts of the accident. Their cxistenO? as a Sta:fl
Ol;\)' be furtht'r prolonst-d. of course. if they become 1-ally in\
H witnc.sst' B\at that is le important for our purposes th&:! !ht
St'l\se of part ic ipa tion that indhiduals attach to the
unitt'd by
St'\"ttors at a thNtre or sports ewnt are similarly
'l\\m)tl Sl)( tt Ir to which tht?y am witness..
what i5
It tnust bi stn..:St'd. of
un.--e, that for our pur
nd
'' td eiach otht'r ns its mt-mbt-rs.. Co.llections ol indi
Od
Bui
and
u11known
Coun.
133
en
1s mva de d or threati
y
commum
med into a
.
iransfor
.
beco es the
outsi de. What a mere lY a fctua l 1tuahon
ened from
. of something new. S1m1larly, Marxists beheve that the existence
basis
' h 1s an o b' echve
fact m capitalist
hic
f cl asses,
and p position o
class
consciousness
mto
d
the
when
indi
transforme
society. can be
group
a
to
which
belong
is
do
in
they
united
that
viduals perceive
subject: -e.
rl """',- certainly take them to exist and that their taking them to
'
se
=a
. w1th
:;1
.
"'
"
he
.
experi
both md
134
llld
h a we w h1. ch persis
n1
se 1ves wit
ts as a subject
fy theni.,
throughou
t.
This already suggests that the temporality
of
up . t
fers significantly from what we treated unde
s ence
r th
ea d
in
g of <licity, and this w i l l have i mportan t
consequen
.
.
ces f
.
o f h"1stonca 1 time. Before we
un derstan dmg
take up this por
thto ic. IJlll1I.
ever, we need to turn from com mon experien
ce back t
0
common action with which we started .
We turned to common experience partly to
demonstrate that and
.
.
how the we-sub1ect
can exist
even there; for its
inVOI\'etnent. Ill
.
.
co 11 ective action is m some ways more obvious
. We have .!.....;..
touched on some of the main featu s of such
action. Inste:d'
;
.
common ob1ect we have a comm on obiective or result be achieved,
to
The comm on projec t is "artic ulated " into sub-tasks d
istributed
among the participants, such that the proper agent cannot
Llll
e thellle d
be anyd
sustain the we-subject. At the same time this subject transcends their
o1>;ec' as. . and is depe ndent on its own mterna I cohes1veness for
e
t
sid
u
o
f!OID
stence.
ned exi
5ustai
15
which common experience and common action
.
'
in
Y
r wa
and produce the other. In the
Ano!he
the one may in fluence
ed i.s th8t
are relat
experience of threat or
common
the
ups created by
se
of
se
ted may then act to defend itself; the
ca
p thus constitu
t
cfangef .o gro removal of the external threat becomes the common
ih ati
o
n rrd which all efforts are collectively bent . In the other
ann l
ob
:.t.r 1ve towa
on of common action creates the
.
l"
bviously the prosecuti
eir
bY th
difeC!IOn .
tion. This is
fort
e
l
is
ob1ect
pants in a common endeavor, the
conun;de.nl.
: J
pi'
common situation they all face. But such a group can exist without
collective action resulting: oppressed communities may be perfectly
uni ted, but only in their suffering, with no prospect, or no pert:eived
hat
.
on experience. In a general way we can say t.
occasion for comm
.
.
su
con
b
ffi
not
d"
for
ut
c1ent
1hon
necessary
a
is
nce
c;olJ)JIIOD experie
action
to
e
occur.
group
a
must
collectiv
for
order
common action: in
as such and are aware of a
r.-Ost whose members recognize each other
com
8;
135
from I to We
01;.
SOcie;y
136
n
d
Sartre, th is a
.
..r by t1it
c:a
" and
0fi /'
n
aspects
whether
a
n
the
experience ca
e
which is the
instead
ng
14. J. P.
-
15. Ibid., p. 39 1 .
19. Ibid p. 393.
1 7. Ibid.. p. 38.
I ff*lll:
c;.I ,-
131
We
Fro m I to
e 's tenn "se
gested by Sa rtr
hat is 1 u g
w
enda
n
a
h
ate t
pursui ng &eparate
JJlot
s j d e, ea ch
i n U.
by
e
d
i
ore
s
, st
m
to-face encou ntet
Jllllch
ked in a face..i are Jl
loc
JU
are
e
v
er we
nce.
litY: '
h oth
o m m on experie
fla
to eac
d
w
cal led a c
te
nst i tu tion of a
, n ly be
u1a
co
describe the
.
c;erta
to
pt
n
ca
em
actio n, two
r att
. .
,.-ti ich
c and common
t I ll ou
,
B tha
n ex pen en e
mo
com
.
answered befo re we
It JTIo re1at1 on to
w hich must be
en
1
aris
..A
have
.
tions
,ub 1
porality of su c h groups
t que
d escri pt ion of the tem
com
interrel a ed
the
to
ler
a ul
of conflict rela ted
ex peri en ce
a wwy of
co m mon
00 o
he
c.an go oW
t
ty1 Seco nd , is theTe
IS
c
.om m u m
e
n
first b
ui
,
. d u a I1 in a co m m un i ty 111ch
ce of a gen
vi
'
eicpen en
i fferen t md1
d
I':\-
--'
of
n
o
ni
u
d i n a s i ngJ e tu b'J,
the
ge
g
mer
n
.
not su b
nces are
desGl.b.i
iste
ex
grau infus1on
i ndi vi dual
ot denying that
n
tbat
are
We
?
d
into a
reserve
can be SW'ept up
mehOW p
bu
t indi viduals
tha
ce,
sten
are
p
exi
B ut such gro'll t
dot me into
become a5 one.
all
ich
wh
n in
eTOUI, and their
common act io
tional and dang
ns often irra
actio
their
ephemeral,
ory. How d o we di
ies probably illus
munit
com
d
i
ne
ng to
status as genu
we have been seeki
omen a from what
I, but i.
e
tinguih such phen
rl
a large
that is not merely
ine d
Kribe. a group subject
poral un ity su$1a
ca n pers i st as a tem
1
ye
d
an
ral
ly
plu
e
in
u
gen
from wit in by its mem bers?
before us the
because they bring
These questions are re lated i f o n l y
a plu rali ty al
t can obta in among
... .. possib le rel atio nsh ips tha
n differen
extreme to total, u
1 ividuals, from all- 0ut confl ict at one
of
cal concept
..d union at the other. In crit iciz ing the epl.stemologi
not
for
s ch apter,
?ermandental" subj ect , in the first part o( thi
to the soc ial
ate
ttmg the d i versi t y- w i t h i n - u n i ty app rop ri
i t1. Jn
o rld w
i t h e Ger ma n id eal .s
e recal l e d He gel 's cri tici sm o
th the
WJ
.
to be faced
1 notion of the
group-in-fus ion we seem
ub
IOcial
-ncept, not a p l uraJ 5 jec.
l a lent oi that epistemologica l co
tivtty,
er level.
t e re prod uct ion of sin gula r su bject1vit y at a h i gh
blem al
Onq again we
because the pw
. are pu t in m i n d of Hege l,
SOclal un
ity- th . -div e rsi ty, and of its con nection with conflict and
m
6PP<>sillon
nd that
s one of the c h ief motivating conc:ena behi
PhilOsop
hr s worlc
.
fn ao
me
,
well -It n wn page5 of h i s Phe nom enology of Spirit Hegel
_
desert
a
8l9ts us
a ise. NoC
on of how a gen uine comm unity might "r
only d
ae, he re. Ph
flict; he
con
osite.
1 ate uch a
n&&es
com mu nit y to it s opp
b
ri
.
menU
ele
It
out of con fli ct and preserves certai n
prove
i tself. A bri ef exa min a1io n of these pages wi l l
Pful for
us fo seve-r
al reason s.
aion
their
'
::
te
Sa
that
heflict Withi
138
Tim e , Nar
rative a
n d 11ist
ory
The pa ss ag e i n qu
es ti' on m ark
.
. s th e
of its tru e su bj
first ap
.
ec t: Ge i s t or
Peara
. .
sp mt.' a n H
n. cefi i
d egel .
sp m t, d escribes
n lie
it in terms f
&els
.
1n his
am1
i,.,_,
.
har to us:
r
I . "18 Th is
st te
' si gn al s a co
"a n I th
fere
ncern for
at i. s
""Ill
the
We, \\I nee
to
firs t pers
on ly su bs tan tiv e
a e
on l
bu t als o meth
h
P u ral Whi aqs
odol ogica l H
!
str uc t us on ho w to
. ege '
ch 11
move beyo nd
s a
.
th e sing
of Hu sse rli an ph en
rn
ula
can ot
r eth
om en olo gy b
e iploy
olo
g
ic
ing
e
ll1
a
n:
kn
a
ow
n a n d co nf us ing h
Proce u
.is onc a l
Wh ich, by
coi nci de
c1s ely : phe nom eno logy.
n ce 1
a
Furth
r as e
a ll ed Pre.
s p i ritual subject or comm
sai d, Heg l
uni
g t arise;
. el s us hoWa
that is he
sto ry, a " l i kel y sto ry "
i
s tellin
not about part"
.
g us a
icu Iar h i st
app hc abl e as a con cep
o
.
ri
c
al e
tua l des c 1 p t io
' n t ma ny
nts but
h
v
of t ern .
from I to We
P:roach
!:
;:
;p
Hegel does
the
those
tion of a series of mistakes and of the subsequent unmasking of
experi
from
a
we
learning
call
mistakes
our
mistakes. Le rning from
18.
of Spiri!.
P 1 lO.
139
-20. Ibid
" p p. 105-110.
140
Time,
Narrative a nd Lr
'
n 1sto,...
reaIIy end s. But even
r
,
wh
ere
it is more
.
or less sa
IS th e self (Hegel call
ti. sfac
s it self-cons .
tor11
c1ousnes
s) Whic
The sel f asserts its abi lity to
h is ity l'esol\'ed
stand 0n its
own; its S
o
inde pen den ce.2 1
elbsts utcolllt
Ondi
&keit '
Hegel may be suggesting
ot
that the seIf
Certa1. nt
ness of
odem thought is a
Y
an
d
se
.
fun
ction of the
lf-cen
possession of nature" env
increased "
isaged by 0
rnas t
esc
.
lndery
artes an
growth of science and technology
d realiz
.
ed
But the s1t
.
the
in
'
uat
i
on is de
w h en one of the se confident
stab'i
selves encou
'led
nters anoth
t he other may seem just a
er one
part of the s
li0 rne
urroundi n
g
master to serve my own needs
.
world I tnu
and mainta.
st
m my independen
trouble begins if he takes the same
ce. But
view
to
war
d
me. The .
.
eac h of us as an mdependent or
existence
rJ
self-stand ' g se .
If is chaII
m
enged by
t he othe r. We are caught up in the
struggle over th .
e tndepend
and dependence of self-consciousness
ence
.
our
As
last sentence indicates, Hegel is
now desenbtng
.
. .
.
a s1tuar100
m w h ic
" h it 1s appropriate to use the we of
.
common ex ene
.
nce. F.ach
p
.
.
.
of the parti es to the situa tion is aware of the
existence of the oth .
.
er1n
.
rel ahon to a thir element, the common su
rrounding world which
_ relation
define s their
to each other. But their common experience
is
an unstable one; it is a problem crying out for a solution . The ensuing
pages of the Phenomenology describe various false conceptions d
how to solve this problem, which derive from mistaken conceptions
of what the struggle is really about . But Hegel seeks to render these
by its mitak
must be the outco me of an experience that learns
'
experience (his fa
Before we examine Hegel s account of that
-
eed to w.
enslavement) e n
dram a of life-a nd-d eath struggle and
w
Phe
0f the
rs to rad ers
que stio n of t h e sort that often occu
seems
He
t7
u
bo
HegeI talking a
IY is
.
<i
nom enology: just wha t, concrete.
tron8 sense
s
a
.
with
ls
ua
d
ivi
d'
m
ng
amo
thro Ugh
to env isag e a con flict
s ggle
h0 tru
independence, w
own
ir
the
ctiara''
of
s
and
lve
mse
the
we. But such !W
munity: a
com
s.
true
a
dult
blish
esta
lly
unti l they fina
lc rly a dtbe
.
nts-are c a
serva
s
11
Y
iou
b
e
nil
re
,
nunu
ters--warriors, masters
. .
origi nal co
erienced the
exp
ady
alre
not
m
of
h
the
eac
,
Hcel
2 1 . Ibid
from I to We
141
" the phen . ers the family someth ing ess t han a genuine comsid
con
a crucial dialectical role in the life of both
tbat be
ugh it has
ven tho .
it, as d so
. If he occas1ona ll y rom nt1c1zes
state of Western history
same hme
recogmzes
the
at
probably
he
,
aries
many of his contempor
feel
lost
we
for
childhood.
nostalgia
of
kind
that he is expressing the
This nostalgia is paradoxical, because most of us would not volun
may gain the upper hand (and have tragic consequences) if we allow
ac ' eve this goal, since the difference of generations and the parent
ch1ld relati
on can never be overcome The one thing parents cannot
ve
.
.
ch ildre
:
n (or children parents, for that matter) is recognition as
depende
nt and seIf
-suffic1ent persons . If we seek that, as aII of us
do We
rnust look
elsewhere .
--
ct!!ndon
Ibid.,Press
p. 268 s ee l
a so Hegel'a Philosophy of Mind, tr. W. Wallace (Oxford:
19
711. pp. 2556.
.
142
'
tshrn
soc1ety 1s
e but the confro
not mterm
arnag
e
.
nt
ntahon of s
.
e
I
f
conac
y
.
agam 1 f all goes well, the capacity for a harmoniou
s bond.
. c lear, as Hege I's celebrated "story" gets underway
Alas, 1t 1s
u that
'
all goes well only rarely-and when it does not the
resu1ts can be
murderous. What may first occur to the individuals whose
indepen.
dence and self-sufficiency are challenged by each other is to
elimi
nate the challenger. But what the latter challenges Is not mere! the
fact but the legitimacy of my independence. If I eliminate him
tory, turns out to have been the real point of the struggle. U I win !get
alternative for both parties . The loser at least keeps h is life, while the
winner gains not only independence but recognition as well. It iJ to
cted
be recalled, too, that the original struggle was over the unrestri
use of nature to satisfy our needs. The servant's acknowledgment 1'
forced to
his master's domination is expressed in the labor he is
perform for him.
and WI
But this relationship turns out likewise to be unstable
at first
satisfying, again because the point of it is other than it
his reoJ
The master may wonder if he is truly legitimi zed since
5ee;
Jacobson
d S C.
111
143
Fro m I to We
to a mere extension
now been reduced
wh has
e
n
o
and feels this reduc0 n t thou gh he suffers
fro rn fh serva
e
if only because he concOrneS i l l
.
self-con scio us,
.., w
Uon. oW
em ai ns
r
is he
es
l
may dawn on him as well that lt
. vcrthe
of b8 oe
e. A nd it
f
i
s
tJoll fears for bi I ns forms nature for the satisfaction of human
.
tra
st'11tlY rkJ on an d
exercised power over nature
this actu ally
of
wo
.
se
.
.
en
gs
n that this power cou I d be
"110 A growi n
min d a susp 1c1o
t's
an
.
eed s.
.
e serv
mcreasmg ly super fl uous to
in th
who now appears
raise
er,
mast
11
tJJ3Y
be 11ion .
t he
ge is set for a re
d on
s . The sta
t e
ces
ties to Hegel's amazing ly compressed
urnwhole pro
b
m ore subtle
Y
t e
an
e are
a re 111
been able to incl ude here. But thes
'fhere
an we have
th
o
,
tlc
but
h
l
sc
ema
e
b
a
by som e to
tat
hat i s thou ght
presen
f
ls
sentia
ened , and inde ed is still
0
most of wha t has happ
the es
u t
acc
eath
dynarni
of hum an relations. The life-and-d
h histo ry
i
8
tn
smal l wars and on the streets of
bappen
.
in our large and
.
.
con tin ues
ggle
to Hege1 ,
'
d
strU
d by omm aho n, accord mg
. Where it is rep lace
. l5
crl
s.
In insti tu our
and d iffere nt s uper vene
genui n ely new
g
m
eth
som
t'ion , or bot h, is the
: :
s;
wi
Y such ind t.h t
have the capacity to tear it apart.
ivid
lla
Yet only the community really is capabl
e of ass
u
r
n
i
ecome
even
g
more paradoxical
s
d 1a lect1c b
ii. Jie
than us
ual.
Withou
pendent individuals there can be no genui
tindthe
ne conun .
.
un ity; Yet . e.
out a community there can be no ge n .
u1 nely
ll'ith.
.
i nd'1v1' d ua ls. A n d the reason for t his is that gen . . in dePende
nt
u1n
.
e
d
tn ePe
.
ndenc
. leg1' t1m1ze
'
d an d recognized by
t hat w h ic h 1s
e 11
o
t
h
ers
.
wh ar
.
e equall
independent. Outside the communi ty, or in
y
hrea k'ing 0
away fro
individuals can only be independe nt-rni nde d
m il
c n onl
y dernand
independence. Only the community can give it o e
m.
This doctrine of the correlation of independen
ce and corn
.
mulllt. y
explains for us why Hegel presents his views in the w
he doe
s.
.
gives us what are essentia lly the three main kinds
re1ahons
.
.
.
that
can ex1st among m d epen d ent-mm ded or self-consci'ouS
tn d'lVtd
. uals;
struggle to the death, dommahon, and community But
theltl is. a
lJ llhap
0tY
order on events. Any of the stages can persist indefinitely, and one
f
w
.
a
w
munity was possible , if at all, only in the mode rn wor
oted
0
we
d'
As
10
iv1 d ual had asserted his demand for ind ep end en ce.
t il
hood bu
d
l
.
hi
.
c
t
os
before, we may long for
a
' t u111J
the ancient city as for 1
mmun y
represents only
the abstract idea, not the real .ity of co
From I to We
145
s
S
y saying something important
al
there i 8
was undoubtedl .
.
aut
y J-{e
wa
lly the future of his own (our
especia
and
l
a
ent
c
res
l
r
e
'
b1 sto
ast ' th P
ting a dynamic schema of social
u t th e p
was also articula
he
but
abO 50ciety.
unlikely that he is telling a single story
era1 . It is
0wnJ
. 0 gen
s 1
ce of the European comm unity. No doubt,
J ati o n
'ble emergen
poss
e
emerged and dissolved again,
th
,,ut
communi ties have
a vv
e. rnanY
s
n
many people enslaved .
se
and
is
have been fought
.
111 b
.
.
.
ny wars
a
rn
s
el is makmg certain claims about the internal
Heg
Ju st a
t
an
rnport
If we suppose that one is
Most 1
of any such commu nity.
st c ture
c
i
m
mutual
a
recognition of its
the
n
through
dy
l describes it,
as riege
d
e
s actually have
m
member
those
for
necessary that
, 1't is not
er
b
m
me
u h a life-and-d eath struggle and a period of domination.
passd. t r ssary
that these remain perman ent possibilities for the
0 c
But .'t. si
mutua l recognition consedua1 s involved , a n d that their
.
.
nd
1 1v1
sing of those possents the surmo untmg .an d surpas
repre
1
quent Y
.
. .
sibilities.
.
this for the md1v1 duals mvolved? Do they
But does it represent
their union as a rejection and surpass
themselves consciously regard
arms that may
ing of violence or domina tion, as a laying down of
must have
Hegel
is
what
this
think
I
again?
always be taken u p
.
poten
actual
and
meant At least implicitly, the internal dynamics,
tial, of the group must be apparent to its members. Hegel describes
;:
--2s. Ib
id" P
Frorn
146
-- not It.
e fuvtstble Hand. -u
,
does indeed speak elsewhere of the ..cu n .
."'!9ll
reas
..
mng of
on
in Us"Ulg
. d'IVl' dua ls to achieve its own en ds E
in
....n I n the stru 661e
nn1 for iDde.
pendence. throughout conflict and dominat o
n
.
i n, an e d IS
.
..
.
bemg
sought" t hat is d ifferent from that envisaged
canby the PirtiQ..
ch
pants, an end we
(who
describe) in retrospect
see but
they
Right,
bee
common
::.
they
fro!!
larger and more powerful than himself is the farthest thing
in a genuine oom
Hegel 's idea of the indivi d ual 's participation
and more poy.'efel
larger
d
indee
is
h
whic
y.
mun ity. Such an agenc
: it is the we. But it exists by virtue
than any of its members. does exist
t
tion of its members.
icipa
par
of the active and asso ciati ve
4.
ive
Gr oup. Time, and Narrat
bis
rod uced here
of Hegel was i nt
on
ssi
cu
dis
ing
go
ng
fore
The
answen
cla im ed . for
th the means. we
w uu
o
text provi des us wi
s 1) H
. uss1on
group
of
ral .
d1sc
r
ou
in
se
.
aro
t
s
tha
?
cruciaJ question
that is genuinely
comm u nal s ubject
a
of
onceive
_
e
we c
con.stitunt ro m Jlict aod
f
indiv iduali ty of its
which preserves the
x penence o con
e common e
th
.
n
ee
tw
H\
be
on
.
1
aruc1pa1.001
What is the relati
ni ty an d p
tbt
mu
om
aod
,i
,_
of
e
c
!\S
...
nc
tio
perie
two ques
the common ex
.it, t'ies together the
llJU"
or
scious
we read
conceptio n. as
g s lf on
rience amo
expe
teo
tial for rlP'
pa
on
-c
Comm
.
e
answers to them
s c nt ams p11c1 1
a
al
y
w
als
ivi du
nysJ
Pendent-minded ind
1 y 5 t he ex
i
ng passib
of com muni
ent
lishm
1ict 's. abi di
1
fljct the estab
.
con
ni. t'10n of
while the recog
confl ict even
use
overcornin8
147
I t o We
w h en
establis hed
is
nitY
ers and
co m m u
of the oth
at the
n d e nee
saY th
pe
e
to
ind
1'h i s is
the
himself .
ledges
e
acknow
them for
,ved
o unt of t h
l
a
nt from
u
e
d
m
s J-lis acc
i
dg
thi
v
e
i
an
'l
h
t
u
s
re
tel 1 s
;,.ch ine acknOvY with even m o
communit y
a
s
the
s
u
f
e
o
es
t}\
d
er.
istence
h i n te d earli
s tJegel prov con t in ued ex
getB
ou t as we
s
d
t
turn
d
p
u
an
t
e
k
1 y an
u
ta
nt
pora 1
J-legel 's help we can
establis lfl bout its tem
with
hus
pter : an exam
etb1n8
this cha
ve account . 'f
of
n
io
t'
'
,orn
d sec
t
narra
. the secon
of the we.
e character
Pon ed i n
to be
ativ
of
arr
n
os t
an d
k e of the ro l e
t
rnporalitY
ence we spo
.
ri
t
e
be
e
wefP
exp
wet
.
n
.-bi
ive or
. tioP o
. on of c ommo
inte rsub1ect
in&
sc u ss i
ba ck to the
event , o r
In our di
ded
h'ch re fers
l l y exten
. corrunon object. w ob " ect as a tem pora
the
the
the unity of
1
tbeb :..rt. If we consi der
extended then
y
l
l
ora
ei't as temp
by a pro1ect1v
SU ,.,...
ience f
ust be procured
m
per
dual
eX
the
'
. di' v i
in
' ' d u al s ,
d iv1
as w1 th the
eness of t h e in
.
...-.rience .
. proca l awar
rec
the
experi1
p.
In
.. s
.,.r
.
this particu 1 ar
to
n
relatio
retr05 pecti ve l'>' gro up in
.
s effected bY 8
event together.
this grasp i
s
.
thi obi'ect or
co m m on
.. e" expenence
may not lea d to
ence: w
on experience
mm
co
h
o
su
e
As we saw.
. or it may l ea d t
at al l, of course
ng
thi
no
to
d
1
lea
.
ac tio n. n d
. : t may
action
over into common
es lead to or pass
do
it
ere
\\'h
t.
de rta kin g
conflic
t up in a ma ss u n
als are not swep
du
ivi
ind
e
h
t
d
e
d
prov i
' ' d ua l acpe ns? In d 1V1
ivi du ali ty, what hap
ind
ir
the
tes
tera
obli
ich
wh
mo n pro jec t; for
ticipants as part of a com
tions are conce ived by par
pro ject ,
anin g is der ived from the
those who perform them. their me
the grou p and not of
which is the undertaking properly spea king of
itself ." or t o a n
the ind ivid ual s . Whatever the grou p may be .. in
ct
extern.al observer, for the part icipan ts i t i s postu lated a s t h e subje
which gives meaning to their behavior, the agent whose action is t h e
ovual l framework of the subact ions they as i n d i v i d u a l s perform.
Hegel's accou nt of the constitution of a community in fact turns o n
.
.
.
.
the notion of a common pro1ect . He begms h i s account with t h e
.
1.
genera i dea of a common s urroun d '1ng world as ob1ect of both experi
.
dd
ence
The life-and-death struggle is fought over t h i s com
lllo
- ..d
rl;sre.
'
.
of nature. for purposes of habitalion and the sat i. sf
.
act io n of
.
needs , remains
constantly at issue in t h e
.
ntat io n among
IX>hfro
persa ns , and t he establishmen t of a
11 envisaged
issue.
community
b
Y Hegel as the sole satisfactory way to deal w i t h t h i s
Th.is is
pa rt of
wha
. t Hegel means when
h e speaks of spirit as t h e
148
1"l lll e
acti o n
, No
of all "
rro ri. v
an d "t
e, o n
an d e
h
e
ach s
un .
d 1-f s
r al W
t h ei r
i tory
rk
by o n e
U nity
o
si
a
Pro
o n ly
d
Jd enti
brou gh
Wo ul d b
ty .'s uced b
t ab
e
t by b
l s
oth. "7
starti ng becau s lsewhe te actio
po
11s
ri t
for the
acti on o;
the "u :ha t is to i.e 8'1Ys,
Whi ch con
n Ov
all ; z
sti t utes
e
ed 'lll plle " ."\\
the corn
that i
ll s
Bu t the
soli
s t
re is
d
rn u ni ty
1
he
ore to t
akes c lll
direc te d
ud n
o
&r
ai
t
u
lll
lll
he corn
u
o
t owar
rn
an ext
on Ptoiect
cla i m s th
erna l
thon acuo11 l'll U0ii
at the c
ob
J ec t o
.
Ssib
o
an co
m
mun1 ty
r th e
po se a n
i s both
e)(ter lltetted .'
d goal"
n
t
he ta
of
I
mmon acf
th in k, th
rtin g Poi Wo rld.
i on .29
at part of
t
c
ain tenance
. Insofar
m_rnon Project s take tho"the
s
t i s m or
at of
om entary
lliean_,
the
e than
co mm on
8l'oup
a ' spon
.
sen ti rnen .
an d art icu
a
t
o
t,
s seu.
e
n
u
"
in
s
ofar as
lated Patt
su
p Sll?ge
it
ern of o
st ant I y to
e
d
i
gu ard itself
. c rnrnon action h &
n a sust . ri
t e
a a nst
the ce ntr
here i n it be
u
eedsatned
cau se of the
ifug l t
en e p n
n epend e
that m ake it
i
nt
es
-rn
d
D
nc
inde ne
up
epend 1 ng o
ss of.th
1
n the siz
an d the nat
e
a
nd cornP1e e .n diVi141duaiJl.1.
ure of its co
)(lly o
m mon task
f the
degrees of
. or tasks, th is Will
organi zation
.
. &loul,I
an d inst it
utio
group membe
u
nal
ran
a
r
rn
.
req
rs m ust
ge e ll'e Yariaus
rn hemse ves
t
ment to the com
art
as
l
P of t ir wbi
muni t
i
o cause, c
. What aJI
auses, or
this shows i s that
for
t e commu
n a n d through
n ity is c onsti
cross-purpose ciits
m embers, which have been
surmounted by th eir mutual recognihoo
and reconc il i at i on. It look
s forward to the carrying--0ut of its common
tasks and it projects its own
continued existence as the condition Im
this con tinu ed activity.
d;
n
enga
:I
r
Wh'l
Ptoj:t
Jbid. p. 264.
Ibid., p. 1 1 2.
Ibid . . p. 26.f.
Ibid.
149
We
from I to
.
e
ification. But if .we. tak
son
per
erov
an
to
t
or
re: it is we
.
to res
thi"ng abstract he
and
there is no
,
nts
1 d
a
t I who act
vo
no
ci p
y but ours,
oa
parti
1and or territor
ts t
o
Y
ot
d
to be carried out, not my
\t'8oattitll e .i i't is n rn
ects that have
h
1
roj
s:
t
.
t has to be assure d etc
but ou r P
t1'6 dO al
a group tha
as
bO
urs
t mY
o
at is
. nce but
as a community t h
, and in our sense
e"1ste
bl.It r-v
i:tO
d
,,,
..
en it
s
y
wh
e
onl
J-{
'Ii j ll
.
egel
s exists when and
.
collt o p 1n
its rne mber
y
b
n
.
ses
t these sen
gtall ..... withi
A.e
the "we" in jus
1 . d fto"
.
and u se
1e
saY
1
1
sai d to d'isp lay th e
o
be
a
h
ld
t
w
'ect cou
bJ
su
s
r
sllS
wee
b
the
nd
erll
pens,
ion ' an d l fe tha t we fou
bas m this hap
experienc e. act
.
re
n
rs.
We
pte
cha
W)ie oral stfllctu of.
her
al subject m ear
1
r m d'1v 'du
experie nces
Jle ternP with the I o
.
i zation not only of
organ
.
ted
arrative
a
1-n
a
c
r
o
nces
o
mp
ass
also of the self who experie
but
the te
II)
f
d
an
1
s
ke
other: to
spa 0uons (chapter
the re each imp lies the
ac
III) As we saw
a
um.tary
am
I
alld ts (chapter
yet
;
be a unitary self .
ady
1
re
a
t
s
u
d ac
act I m
seIf is a
all ence or
eriences and actions. The
Xpert
.
ough my exp
d
thr
, as
n
a
The unity of the former involves
nlY in .
and acti'ons .
.
.
s
nce
seIf o
rie
ose mexpe
anizing principles from t h
1 of
1 erent org
d'ff
unty
hat
w
sorne
poral sequece
er; but in each case a tem
we saw.
itY of the latt
un
e
th
ative
voJved in
temporal form by virtue of a narr
a spec1'fically
er
nd
u
ht
g
is brou .
ective grasp.
llveretrosp
prospec
group, we can say that events of
e the shift to the
mak
w
o
n
conIf we
.
actions undertaken in common are
expenence and
ns
b
-actio
common
su
or
ts
even
together sequences of
. n we gather
d. whe
iute
ti
e,
'ddl
,
nmg
m1
s
g begm
ture comprism
.
tmg onto them a struc
1ec
.
.
ro
.
p
by
b1ect, is constituted as th e unity of
we grou p itself. as we-su
and end 'T'l.
es an d actions. In a11
what we are go ing through or doing. It can be seen that the roles of
agent (we act1 narrator (we tell}, and audience (to ourselves) turn up
t so
t old a b
Tim e N
arra1;
out i t l t
t
o
.
ve . and
,
o ls co
W h at it i s
His1ory
ns t it
a nd wh
.
t
u
e
at it
d b
an d a
d oi ng
cce pted
s
w h c Y a stor
in a k i
These
i nd of selfr i h is tol y of
are th e
efle
ge n ra
ti v
lltt d Corlltii
a ccou n ts r
e l fe
.
ature c e sOc 1 a1
u.
or I t s te rn
s
of
of arr
a th
oral e i
eory
alive st ru
stenc
x
ct u
eb
of I n div
t hat
a
we Use
id u al e
Y pPeal i corrilll
-
xis
d
t
n
'Ii
t o Work
When
ee . Deve) o
di s
o ut
e
ti on
rn n of th i
s wers to
of soc i
s
t he e
a
s at
1 to ica1
h ave ern
su ch a th
r
eory
t
e e
er
s st
th e
gro u
i
o
u
e
n
w it lli
nv
ot
i sa e
p,
the in di .
h is to
f
to mp ora
hichiti.
1 d ual ; Yet t
ric
al
lit y frorn
i
ti
.
kes
W1th 1 n rat h e
the co m
Pos
bl
si
r than
mun ity n
fra m . e an aec 'II 0
ot as an
1
rn
persp e
o
b
iec
With
of ie
t o r en
out
ctive of the
r
com m unal
lly in h
it s tem
1
e
p
ora
x
eri e
-na
P
p Iural "first rrative mode of existen nce itseIf.
&iilll
ce can
Person b
t
not
8roup
ut also be
i t self a first - p
ap
o
o
r a ched by a
lural) P roc
What has b
edu
o sed SO f
Which
and Overly
ar, h owev .
abstract
er
rom sever
mad e co ncr
al poi nts
ete an 1. t
o v
'
w.
contri but i
mad e evi den
on
to
a
n
t , onl y l.
u
we add ress
qu estio ns:
oursel ves
lll sto
to a
of C?iI
1 . What we hav
e describe
as a com mu na l
bee n derived
narrau
from a co mpa
structu
rison to wh
at we
vi d uals. The re
has
is a da nger th
vi
at in re placing
not payi. ng suffi
he
1
W th
cient attention to
in.
the plu ral ity
and how this plura
of
lity functio ns conc
retel y. In
again avoid the ten
words wsu
dency to portray the g
e rnllll
roup
as a
writ large . " When I tell
.
l
myse f a st
order to a i o
person wh o is performin
t ut, it is
g this reflec
ct of na hon.
U we say,
con tras t, in the case of the
group that we tell .
we
IS
I eg 1 h m a te nd app ropriate, prec isel
y because
ty
group, to ask. who tells, who listens
who ct ? u
e m st
n1
t hat w hat was n ly a quasi - intersubjectivity
of narrati\'e structuft
.
.
t h e md 1v 1 dual IS a real intersubjectivity in the group.
2. What kinds of groups are envisaged here? We ha\-e am
excluded groups that exist by external
alone.ml
slri cted ourselves to those that are constituted
mutual
tion and co nscious participation of their members. But "-hat kindsd
l
groups does this include? We c laimed that Hege ' theory ap?!itst
c!oeut
d ifferen t sorts of groups. We saw that for him it probably
th
e
e ou
t
:;rratioalld
ng.to the unity
tUssing the!allie
: shou1:
course orality
o Our di
Ille centerss
OtJnt
' that is
t e 'Wotld
b . a Vi
Thus hellt
only be
rnethSCrjbed
se
gly
f . xceeOudirntheo
elttatit
erstanding of
sertes.
: n:
;
;
r:a
"
,
::: ::
r
d ;
"
::
rl:a
1sten and
of the lurale ig
as
u
classification
by the
s
151
I t o We
na 1ogy
from
. n . the Phen ome
tio
ica
d
n
paradigm for
s om e i
p ' as h is
eo
p
.ri.ere 1s
a
of
ction of h i' s
sp in t
ical proje
tor
ilY ik st or
s
.
i
the
1 'se ri ousl y the b
tl1e fa y0J s8ek
was conside ring
9 ti
oe
,8 ta e
.
. er it seem s he
y
ist 0r of
}(e earh ,
.11cl11 1alee 30 If ...
the stan dard h'
e
ur
p
there
st )lIJ J1i t'.cJl we s r oup s th at fi g
m
li kely that
s etc It is
a
r g
o
ltu
' coif) . of '7'oal -cu reeks. the R . hih is identified as the
s
e
tlle s oat l Jews. th e the "We thatai I d the we that functions
w y, in the Phe
G ist g ner l
v&!1est: t o Jl etw
be c
teriou s a
f e
n
l
a
a
pean
rg
fl
cruci
sing his Euro
cori
ei1le
such a
be add res
of
see
virtue
t
l be
uni ty in
cou d
tute a comm
s
e tod:1osicailY
.
ch
co
the Fren
d aying: we
o JosY= }-l5 eg
and incl uding
111etfle110
gh toge ther. u P to
mon
an s
of our com
orar1 e
/lotfl
throu
1 on . Because
o
a d
not
it did
f
11 ave be conquests N
coot
c e or us that
a
dt
n
g
s a 1s_
through i t.
wlla l!l tion an a st now ha
ves ) who lived
ursel
o
oe'IO ce tbe P hose (' nclu d ing
.. hnung J31
(Verso
" erien
ve for t
. . on w ith reconciliation
l
pe be
i
PJd not ba tual recogn1tonte
tory of modern Euro
nti' ou s his
w of
coll
c
ks
U
Jll
a
see-s
the
a
f{egel 11n urging that
dy strugg le an d
m a bloo
fro
e
al
a11d rnaY b d d ial ectic lY m uni t
Y
f rJlle
m
w
t to be
ne co
com m u ru ty IS mean
of
n
uans. o u. on into a
tio
o
n
I's
e
Heg
t
ean h'istory. niis
doJlll na is clear t ha
n-s tates of Europ
atio
n
t
d
I
s do
eo p les a;1
apply to them , that i ,
to th e p
es i t genuine ly
o
1)
an d
:
se?
apPhe o questions
l's (and our) sen
mu ni' tie s in Hege
m
es tW
o
c
s
as
1
ra1
l u nction
does it ap ply on y to
an d them? an d 2)
t
reaJ y f
ers
d
un
to
tbeY
bel us
does it tltus p
::
Jl
::
::S
-Franois
265.
term5 used by Jean
ity of
Minneapolis: Univers
07-4 08. In th
.
P
uml
4
M8"
B.
and
. P
B n
i.e. the attempt to
P
sm.
moderni
of
condilion
version
is is
rrative. "
4
narrative" or umetana
PostJ!lesota rress. t98 l:a1
tives under a "grand
dern" la
a
an:
r_i
soc1
ar
u
parl
e
um
Mi!lll
ic l
and Marxism. The "postmo
ism
ssiv
.
JO.
I.
Jl. !ii,.;;
Lyotard in The
(tr.;
fef.:
!::efa:
incred
c d
ruth. they may well deserve our
denned as in re .uh!rm
s to historical t
such
ghtforward cl
in the next chapter. that
er
furth
e
argu
11 strai
shall
here a dn
and their
dung d a,s part of the project . of community-building.
Bui I am sugges
at' are a vance
m penuadin8
1
Mir .1
her their advocates succeed ,
ately 8 question of whet
ry may aim
hUto
of
y
_.11d1ty u
soph
philo
t. Hegel's
the community they projec
be read u a
to
be unrealizable. But it should
. .
1
high ,
nce.
al. not as a putative scie
appe
ical
1DOralpolit
mas' Theory
Haber
J.
of
said
be
could
The same
uhty.
indeed
g the wphllos
dialectic ol recognition and reconciliation. While rejectin
projects an ever-widemlng and
b
Y our st
wi th i n " "
J
1
laps
or
not
a
a
ler
s
i
n
h l 11
way o f ask
p
da rd
f J.l is to ry ? 'r
ing a
q
"otlon o
u
.
sur faco f n stu dy in g He
co mos to the
gel are esuon
"'
w h i ch oftAn
his c
Hcab lo outs J d o t h o fra me work of 8
on .
8p
p
t
s
h
h
a
1 tn
c 1os
d
e d con.
h hito r y which h a s been superced ed by e
wor l
ct'fl1 ""
vents?
co pt 1 on of
sib lo tha t o ur not ion o f com mu n i t y is n ot on 1
Y ov l
s. I ' i t Po
r
mat i c and abst ract but a I so somew h at i d eali zed as well? F e Y
e
h
ll
o o
sc
oool wo have stressed t he role of con flict an d poten w.
t 1 8 1 for
i ng H "
o d t h o commun ity as exi sting w
i
b
doscr
ve
a
h
hen confl .
co n flict but
ict
f
i
n
act
many
not
e
com
ift
ll
th
ere
'
o
mun
ar
ut
iti
es
m
uu rc o
in W hlCh
1S Ov
s
t
l
t
u
t
i
ve
of
l
f
co
the
itse
grou
is
p'
and
s ident ity?
in the social world at large , sign ificant for h istory, and important for
us as indi viduals, which we simpl y grow into or find ourselves
These are all questions that can only be a d d ressed by a much more
concrete and detailed elaborat ion of our t heory. It i s t o this task that
tum in our final chapter.