G.R. No.

214132

February 18, 2015

SEALANES MARINE SERVICES,

CHRISTOPHER
vs.
ARNEL G. DELA TORRE, Respondent.

INC./ARKLOW

SHIPPING

NETHERLAND and/or
DUMATOL,Petitioners,

RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision dated April 24, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 130641, which affirmed the .Decision dated February 28, 2013 and
Resolution dated April 24, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in NLRC LAC09-000747-12-0FW, entitled, "Arne! G. Dela Torre v. Sealanes Marine Services, lnc./Arklow Shipping
Netherland and Christopher Dumatol," which upheld the disability award by the Labor Arbiter (LA) of
US$80,000.00 in favor of Amel G. Dela Torre (respondent), pursuant to the parties' Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
1

Factual Antecedents
The respondent was hired by Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. (Sealanes), a local manning agency,
through its President, Christopher Dumatol (Dumatol), in behalf of its foreign principal, Arklow
Shipping Netherland (petitioners), as an able seaman on board M/V Arklow Venture for a period of
nine months at a basic monthly salary of US$545.00. An overriding CBA between the respondents
union, Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the Philippines, and the Netherlands
Maritime Employers Association, called "CBA for Filipino Ratings on Board Netherlands Flag
Vessels" (Dutch CBA), also covered his contract.
3

The respondent embarked on January 21, 2010. On August 1, 2010, during the crews rescue boat
drill at the port of Leith, Scotland, he figured in an accident and injured his lower back. An X-ray of
his lumbosacral spine was taken at a hospital at the port, but while according to his attending
physician he sustained no major injury, the pain in his back persisted and he was repatriated. On
August 4, 2010, the respondent was referred by Sealanes to the Marine Medical Services of the
Metropolitan Medical Center. On August 5, 2010, an X-ray of his lumbosacral spine showed, per the
medical report, that he sustained "lumbar spine degenerative changes with associated L1
compression fracture." The next day, a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan of his lumbar spine
revealed an "acute compression fracture body of L1; right paracentral disc protrusion at L5-S1
causing minimal canal compromise; L4-L5 and L5-S1 disc dehydration." Again on December 16,
2010, an X-ray showed "compression deformity of L1 vertebra; L2-L1 disc space is now defined but
slightly narrowed". On January 27, 2011, his fourth X-ray still showed a "compression fracture, L1
with narrowed L2-L1 disc space; no significant neural for aminal compromise."
4

The respondent underwent several physical therapy sessions, and finally on March 10, 2011 the
company-designated physician assessed him with a Grade 11 disability for slight rigidity or one-third

loss of motion or lifting power of trunk. Nonetheless, he was informed of the assessment only in May
2011, or more than 240 days since the accident.
5

Rulings of the LA and the NLRC

On May 20, 2011, the respondent filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical reimbursement,
underpaid sick leave, damages and attorneys fees. On July 30, 2012, the LA rendered judgment
awarding him US$80,000.00 in disability benefits as provided in the Dutch CBA, plus 10% as
attorneys fees. In particular, the LA held that such an award cannot be made to depend on the
company-designated physicians disability assessment which was issued more than 120 days after
the accident, especially if despite treatment for more than 240 days the respondent was still unable
to return to his accustomed work.
6

On August 31, 2012, the petitioners appealed to the NLRC contending that the disability benefits due
to the respondent should be based on his Grade 11 disability assessment issued by the companydesignated physician. On September 21, 2012, the respondent also filed his appeal assailing the
denial of his medical and transportation expenses.
7

In its Decision dated February 28, 2013, the NLRC affirmed the award of total disability benefits to
the respondent noting that he continued with his rehabilitation even after the companys Grade 11
disability rating issued on March 10, 2011, indicating that its disability rating was intended merely to
comply with the 240-day limit for the company-designated physician to either declare him fit to work
or to assess the degree of his permanent disability. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied on April 24, 2013.
On petition for certiorari to the CA, the petitioners raised the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AWARDED MAXIMUM DISABILITY
COMPENSATION AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO [THE RESPONDENT] DESPITE THE
FOLLOWING:
a. Private respondent was assessed with Disability Grade 11 only by the companydesignated physician within his 240-day period of treatment;
b. Under the POEA-contract and the Dutch CBA, disability benefits of seafarer shall be
based on the medical assessment of the company-designated physician.
c. Under the POEA-contract, benefits are awarded based solely on gradings and not by the
number of days of treatment.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
8

Ruling of the CA

The petitioners maintained that the respondent is not entitled to maximum disability benefits under
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC),
the Dutch CBA and this Courts decisions, in view of his Grade 11 disability rating as assessed by
the company-designated physician. But the respondent pointed out that, at the time the said rating
was issued, he was not completely healed but had to continue with his physical therapy sessions
even beyond the maximum 240-day period allowed under the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation (AREC), implying that the companys disability rating on March 10, 2011 was
temporary; that since his treatment exceeded the 240 days permitted, his disability is now total and
permanent.
9

In its Decision dated April 24, 2014, the CA ruled that the seafarers right to disability benefits is
determined not solely by the companys assessment of his impediment but also by law, contract and
medical findings. Citing Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, Section 2, Rule X of the AREC, the
POEA SEC, the parties CBA, and the employment contract between the parties, the appellate
concurred that the respondent was entitled to total permanent disability benefits.
10

11

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

In this petition, the petitioners insist that the CA erred in disregarding the petitioners partial
permanent disability rating of Grade 11 under the POEA SEC schedule of disability benefits, even as
they pointed out that the respondent failed to refer his assessment to a neutral third doctor as
provided in Paragraph 3, Section 20(B) of the POEA SEC.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition.
It is expressly provided in Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code that a "temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than [120] days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules," shall be deemed
total and permanent. Section 2(b), Rule VII of the AREC, likewise provides that "a disability is total
and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X
of these Rules."
As to sickness allowance, Section 2(a), Rule X of the AREC, referred to in Article 192(c)(1) of the
Labor Code, reads:
Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of
such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive
days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not
to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall
be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120
days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or
impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.

For its part, the POEA SEC for seafarers provides in Paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) thereof that: 3.
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has
been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting
requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and binding
on both parties.
True, under Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA SEC, it is the company-designated physician who should
determine the disability grading or fitness to work of the seafarer. Also, under Article 21.4.1 of the
Dutch CBA governing the parties, it is the doctor appointed by the companys medical advisor who
shall determine the degree of disability suffered by a seafarer:
21.4.1 DISABILITY COMPENSATION the degree of disability which the COMPANY subject to this
Agreement is liable to pay shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the COMPANY'S MEDICAL
ADVISOR.

It was held in Kestrel that the POEA SEC provides merely for the basic or minimal acceptable terms
of a seafarers employment contract, thus, in the assessment of whether his injury is partial and
permanent, the same must be so characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities in Section
32 of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the AREC
implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. According to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially
injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his
injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents
him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as may be the case, then
he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, the Court ruled that it is of no consequence that the seafarer
recovered from his illness or injury, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes total permanent disability:
15

Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as
a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of
his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no
consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the
illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work

for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and
permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the
employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work. (Citations omitted and italics
supplied)
16

Thus, that the respondent required therapy beyond 240 days and remained unable to perform his
customary work during this time rendered unnecessary any further need by him to secure his own
doctors opinion or that of a neutral third doctor to determine the extent of his permanent disability.
Concerning the joint and solidary liability of the manning agency, Sealanes, its foreign principal,
Arklow Shipping Netherland, and Sealanes President Dumatol, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995", as
amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 10022, reads:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90)calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with
the developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
[be] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency
is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and
shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign
country of the said contract.
x x x x (Italics ours)
Thus, every applicant for license to operate a seafarers manning agency shall, in the case of a
corporation or partnership, submit a written application together with, among others, a verified
undertaking by officers, directors and partners that they will be jointly and severally liable with the
company over claims arising from employer-employee relationship. Laws are deemed incorporated
in employment contracts and the contracting parties need not repeat them. They do not even have to
be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly stipulated, but also
the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
17

18

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192718

February 18, 2015

ROBERT
F.
MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
November 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CAG.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between
petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
1

The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition.
Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On
January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State
as required under Article 48 of the Family Code." The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter
was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.
3

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital
life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even
more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and
oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not
appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When
Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating
another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in
her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he
who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother
who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not

want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she
spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when
he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house
when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for
marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila
(Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the
CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such
ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but
merely constituted a ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:
4

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short
of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a
court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called
upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution, stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments
and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant
the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.
6

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP
TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE
MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of
any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz
exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that
she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her

from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that
the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a
married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is
suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was
not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short
of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the
same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of
marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion
between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996
RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision
unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondents Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in
1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the
present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a
"Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a
minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately
denied the material allegations of the Appellants complaint and declared that it was the Appellant
who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present
recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for the
reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a
modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.
There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
8

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr., the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
9

10

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x.
xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Roberts evidence failed
to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged
incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior.
Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that
her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity
for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing;
to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
11

12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,
and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines, the
Court ruled that the respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with
a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a
trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
13

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz.
There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was
subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based
entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity
of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court
stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on
evidence. Thus:
14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it
was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered
by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of
nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes
of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was
duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the
Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and
reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement
for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested
by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and
having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares
and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First
Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot.
N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent
but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
15

In Santos v. Santos, the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
6

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera, the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in
our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon
1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of,
17

Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioners argument is without
merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution
dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution,
the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husbandrespondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child,
he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and
on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and
alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later
very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his
mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his
wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitionerappellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitionerappellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing
and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as
follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different
set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an
elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court
(Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no
ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husbandrespondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the
court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in
stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the
original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT
was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A
cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095
of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxxx
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon
1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of
psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpretations
given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts,
but they are not controlling or decisive.
20

1wphi1

In Republic v. Galang, it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
21

serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient
and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence,
this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue
such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such
proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that
need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193855

February 18, 2015

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
VIRGILIO LARGO PERONDO, Accused-Appellant.

PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the December 3, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00738 that affirmed in toto the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 58, in Criminal Case No. CBU-66693 finding appellant Virgilio Largo Perondo
(appellant) guilty of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and imposing
upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ofP500,000.00.
1

Factual Antecedents
An Information containing the following accusatory allegations was filed against appellant:
4

That on or about the 20th day of July 2003, at about 10:45 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without
authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer one heat sealed
plastic packet of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, locally known as "SHABU" containing
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment on October 7, 2003. After the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Police Senior Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas (PSI Salinas), a Forensic
Chemist, and buy-bust team members SPO2 Benjamin G. Genzon, Jr. (SPO2 Genzon) and PO3
Simeon A. Tapanan, Jr. (PO3 Tapanan). From their testimonies, the following version of the incident
emerged:
On July 20, 2003, SPO2 Genzon, SPO1 James Estrera (SPO1 Estrera), PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento
(PO3 Sarmiento) and PO3 Tapanan were briefed regarding a planned buy-bust operation to be
conducted against appellant on that same day in Brgy. San Roque, Cebu City. During the briefing, a
civilian asset was designated as the poseur-buyer and two 50-peso marked bills were given to him
as buy-bust money.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the target area and, upon arrival, strategically positioned
themselves 10 to 15 meters away from the barangay hall where appellant was seen standing. The
poseur-buyer approached appellant. After briefly talking to the latter, the poseur-buyer took out the
50-peso marked bills from his pocket and gave them to the appellant. In exchange, appellant handed
over to the poseur-buyer a small plastic pack containing white crystalline substance. The poseurbuyer examined it and then touched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the transaction
was already consummated. The members of the buy-bust team then rushed to the scene and
arrested appellant. They recovered from him the buy-bust money. Anent the plastic sachet, PO3
Tapanan retrieved the same from the poseur-buyer while PO3 Sarmiento wrote thereon appellants
initials. A qualitative examination conducted on the contents of the plastic sachet by PSI Salinas later
revealed that the substance is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted against him. Instead, he claimed that at
around 9:15 p.m. of July 20, 2003, he was eating and watching television at a barbecue stand when
he was suddenly arrested by SPO1 Estrera, PO3 Sarmiento and PO3 Tapanan. He was then taken
to a police station and interrogated on the identities of big time drug dealers in Cebu. Because he
was not able to provide any information as he is not even from Cebu, the police officers blottered an
incident implicating him in the alleged sale of shabu.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and convicted appellant of
the crime charged. In its May 30, 2007 Decision, it disposed of the case as follows: Accordingly, this
court finds the accused GUILTY as charged and hereby sentences him to Life Imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
6

The pack of shabu, Exhibit "B", is confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, which was approved by the RTC. Hence, the entire records of the
case were forwarded to the CA.
8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his Brief, appellant maintained that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the offense charged
because: (1) the members of the buy-bust team could not give an accurate account of what really
transpired during the alleged operation; (2) there was no pre-operation report submitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA); (3) the poseur-buyer was not presented as witness;
and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti.
10

On the other hand, appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), averred that: (1) the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the offense charged; (2) the failure to present the
poseur buyer as witness is not fatal since his testimony would merely be corroborative to the
testimonies of the police officers who positively identified appellant as the seller; (3) the presumption
of regularity on the part of the police officers was correctly applied by the RTC since no improper
motive was attributed to them; (4) a pre-operation report to the PDEA is not a requirement under
R.A. 9165; and (5) the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the confiscated drug.
11

Agreeing with the OSG, the CA ruled as follows in its December 3, 2009 Decision: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 58 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
12

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

13

Hence, this appeal.

Issue
Appellants lone assignment of error in his Appellants Brief filed with the CA which he adopted in this
appeal per a Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief is as follows:
14

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATING

SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
15

Our Ruling
There is no merit in the appeal.

All
the
elements
Sale of Shabu were proven in this case.

of

the

offense

of

Illegal

In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1) [the]
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti."
16

In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of illegal
sale of shabu. Appellant was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation as the person who sold the shabuto the poseur buyer. PO3 Tapanan testified, viz:
Q It was SPO2 Benjamin Genzon, Jr. who conducted the briefing?
A Yes, sir.
Q How was the briefing conducted? A We have two (2) P50.00 peso bills to be used as
buy[-]bust money.
Q Who will do the role as poseur[-]buyer? A Civilian asset.
Q Did you reach the place where you were to conduct buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was that place?
A Barangay San Roque.
Q When you were already there, can you tell this court what happened?
A Our poseur[-]buyer was already talking with the subject.
Q Was he alone at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you from the police asset and the subject?
A About 15 meters.
Q In that place did you actually see what happened?
A Yes, sir.

Q What did you see?

A The asset was touching his head as a pre-arranged signal which shows that the
transaction was already consummated.
Q When you saw the signal, what did you do?
A We immediately approached him.
Q When you said "we" what do you mean, who were with you?
A SPO1 James Estrera, PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento and SPO2 Benjamin Genzon, Jr.
Q When you reach[ed] near them, what happened?
A We arrested the subject.
Q What did you recover from the subject?
A (A) Small plastic pack of white crystalline substance and two pieces P50.00[-]peso bills
used as buy-bust money.
xxxx
Q Do you mean that the shabu was in the possession of the accused?
A The two pieces of P50.00 peso bills [were] in his possession but the shabu was in the
possession of our asset.
Q When you x x x already arrested the suspect, what did you do?
A We informed him of [his] constitutional rights.
xxxx
Q After you informed him [of] the nature of his crime and his rights, what happened next?
A We detained him.
Q If the suspect Virgilio Largo Perondo the accused is inside the court room, can you still
identify him?
A Yes, sir. (Witness points to a person who is raising his right hand and who when asked [of]
his name answer[ed] Virgilio Largo Perondo.)

Q When you said you were able to recover one small pack of shabu and 2 pcs.
[of] P50.00[-]peso bills, where are these now?
A We submitted [them] to the crime laboratory for examination?
Q I have here Exhibit "B," a small pack of shabu that was examined by PSI Mutchit Salinas
per Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003, look at this and tell this Honorable Court whether
this is the very same small plastic pack of white crystalline substance that was recovered
from the possession of accused Virgilio Perondo?
A Yes, sir, this is the very same evidence.
Q How do you know?
A [It has] the initial[s] [of the] name of the accused.
Q Who wrote the initial[s]?
A PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento.
Q Were you around when that was marked?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who brought this item to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A I was the one.
Q Was there a letter-request attached to the specimen?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q I will show you this letter request, please go over this and tell this Honorable Court if this
[is] the one that you are referring to?
A Yes, sir.

17

SPO2 Genzon corroborated the testimony of PO3 Tapanan on material points. He testified
as follows:
Q On July 20, 2003, where were you assigned?
A At Police Station 3 Legaspi Extension, Cebu City.
Q At around 10:45 in the evening of the same day, can you remember where you were?

A We conducted a buy-bust operation at Brgy. San Roque, Cebu City.

Q Who was the subject of the buy-bust operation?
A Virgilio Largo Perondo, sir.
Q Who were your companions during that time?
A SPO1 James Estrera, PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento, PO3 Simeon Tapanan.
Q Where did you conduct this operation?
A At Brgy. San Roque near the barangay hall.
xxxx
Q If this Virgilio Perondo [is] inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, maam, the third person sitting from the last. (Witness pointed to the third person
sitting from the last who when asked answered to the name of VIRGILIO PERONDO.)
xxxx
Q When you arrived at the area where you were supposed to conduct the buy-bust
operation, what did you observe if any?
A It was 10:45 in the evening and the subject was near the barangay hall.
Q What did you observe near the barangay hall?
A He was there actively selling dangerous drugs.
Q To whom was he selling these dangerous drugs?
A To our asset who acted as our poseur[-]buyer.
Q How far were you when the accused sold these drugs to your asset?
A I cannot exactly recall, ten (10) to eleven (11) meters.
xxxx
Q What did you observe while you were ten (10) to eleven (11) meters away from the
accused?
A The suspect and the poseur-buyer had a conversation.

xxxx
Q What happened next after you observedthat the accused and the poseur[-]buyer had a
conversation?
A The poseur[-]buyer got the buy[-]bust money from his pocket and handed it to the suspect.
In return, the suspect gave the small plastic packet containing white crystalline substance
believed to be shabu to the poseur[-]buyer.
Q What happened next after the exchange of the buy-bust money and the shabu?
A The poseur[-]buyer first examined the plastic pack at the same time signaling us that the
transaction was consummated then we rushed up towards them.
Q After the signal was given[,] what did you do next if any?
A We hurriedly rushed up to the suspect and the poseur[-]buyer then we introduced
ourselves as police officers and arrested the suspect for x x x violation of [S]ec. 5, [A]rt. 2 of
R.A. 9165.
Q What happened next after you arrested the accused?
A We informed him [of] his constitutional rights.
Q What happened to the plastic pack which you said your asset bought from the accused
and which you said contained shabu?
A We brought it to our office and madea letter request for a laboratory examination to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
Q You said that there was a letter-request to the PNP Crime laboratory for the examination of
the said plastic pack. I am showing to you what had been previously marked as our Exhibit
"A," is this the same letterrequest which you said your office prepared for the transmittal of
the shabu to the crime laboratory?
A Yes maam, because there is the handwriting of PO3 Tapanan.
Q If the said plastic pack which you said PO3 Tapanan brought to the crime laboratory as
shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, maam.
Q What would be your basis?
A The initial[s] of the accused.

Q [I am] [s]howing to you what had been marked as our Exhibit "B," can you tell this
Honorable Court if this is the same plastic pack which PO3 Tapanan, Jr. brought to the crime
laboratory?
A This is the one maam.

18

Forensic Chemist PSI Salinas, for her part, examined the confiscated crystalline substance weighing
0.05 gram and found it to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This finding is
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003.
19

It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of illegal sale of
shabu. "Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation." Here, the Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. The RTC and the CA are one in finding that their
testimonies were direct, definite, consistent with one another in relevant points and also with the
physical evidence. It bears to stress that the "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
Court of Appeals," as in this case.
20

21

The
not
prosecution
appellant.

presentation
indispensable
of

of

the
to
the

poseur
the
case

buyer

is
successful
against

The Court is not impressed with appellants insistence that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is
fatal to the prosecution. It must be noted that whatever relevant information the poseur-buyer may
have was also equally known to the police officers who testified for the prosecution during trial. This
is considering that they all participated in the planning and implementation of the buy-bust operation
and were all direct witnesses to the actual sale of the shabu, the appellants arrest immediately
thereafter, and the recovery from him of the marked money. Hence, the testimony of the poseurbuyer was not indispensable or necessary; it would have been cumulative merely, or corroborative at
best.
22

There
was
no
motive on the part of the police officers.

evidence

of

improper

Appellant failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. There is no evidence on
record to corroborate his self-serving declaration that the charges against him were fabricated for his
failure to give the names of those engaged in illegal drug trade in Cebu. Thus, there is no basis to
suspect the veracity of the statements of the police officers who testified against him.

Moreover, appellants defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, frame-up is viewed
with disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a common ploy in prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. For these defenses to prosper, they must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. However, none exists in this case.
Besides, appellant should have filed the proper charges against the police officers if he was indeed a
victim of frame-up. "The fact that no administrative or criminal charges were filed lends cogency to
the conclusion that the alleged frame-up was merely concocted as a defense scheme."
1wphi1

23

The
presented
laboratory.

seized

item
for

was
examination

the
in

same
the

item
crime

Appellant contends that the testimony of PSI Salinas, the Forensic Chemist, was insufficient to
conclude that the sachet of shabu she examined in the crime laboratory was the same illegal drug
allegedly seized from him. This is due to the fact that the specimen, when turned overby PO3
Tapanan to the crime laboratory, was received by one PO1 Abesia and not by PSI Salinas. And since
it was not shown that PSI Salinas knew of the manner with which PO1 Abesia handled the specimen
or of what happened to the specimen while it was in the latters custody, it cannot be reasonably
concluded from PSI Salinas testimony that it was the same drug allegedly seized from appellant.
Appellants contention does not adversely affect the identity, integrity and probative value of the
seized shabu. Indeed, the Crime Laboratory Request shows that it was PO1 Abesia who received
the seized plastic sachet with white crystalline substance fromPO3 Tapanan on July 21, 2003.
Notably, however, Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003 reveals that PSI Salinas immediately
conducted an examination on the specimen submitted and released the result thereof on that day.
The span of time that lapsed from the time the specimen was received by PO1 Abesia until the same
was examined by PSI Salinas was, therefore, too short to be considered consequential. Also, the
marking placed on the seized item by PO3 Sarmiento matches the label of the heat-plastic packet
containing white crystalline substance that, per said Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003, was
examined by PSI Salinas. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the specimen submitted was the
same one examined. Besides, appellants claim that the same may have been altered is just his
mere speculation and nothing more.
24

25

Lastly, appellant's argument that the buy-bust operation is fatally flawed for failure of the police
officers to coordinate with the PDEA .deserves scant consideration. Coordination with the PDEA is
not a crucial requisite of a proper buy-bust operation; it is not invalidated by mere non-coordination
with the PDEA.
26

27

All told, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165.
The Proper Penalty

R.A. 9165 imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
PIO million for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity. However, with
the enactment of R.A. 9346, appellant shall only be penalized with life imprisonment and fine, as
correctly imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. It must be added, however, that appellant
shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
28

29

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
00738 which affirmed the Decision dated May 30, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 58, in Criminal Case No. CBU-66693, convicting appellant Virgilio Largo Perondo alias Bayot
for Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 9346,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he shall not be eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194606

February 18, 2015

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ALFREDO REYES y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.

PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 03459, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated June 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6931, finding Alfredo
Reyes y Santos (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
1

Factual Antecedents
On June 30, 2005, an Information charging appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended, was
filed with the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union. Its accusatory allegations read:
3

That on or about the 29th day of June 2005, in the City of San Fernando, (La Union), Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer two (2) heat[-]sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as
"Shabu," weighing ZERO POINT EIGHTY TWO (0.82) gram and ZERO POINT EIGHTY FIVE (0.85)
gram with a total weight of ONE POINT SIXTY SEVEN (1.67) [grams], without first securing the
necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
4

Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial conference,
trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On June 28, 2005, a confidential informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) office in Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando City, La Union and reported to SPO1 Rene
Acosta (SPO1Acosta) that appellant was selling shabu. SPO1 Acosta relayed the information to his
superior officer, Senior Inspector Reynaldo Lizardo (Sr. Insp. Lizardo), who formed a buy-bust team
and designated SPO1 Acosta as poseur-buyer. The CI contacted appellant by cellular phone and
introduced SPO1 Acosta as a buyer of shabu. SPO1 Acosta then talked to appellant and they
agreed to meet at around 6:00 a.m. the next day at the monument located in Barangay Madayedeg,
San Fernando City.
On June 29, 2005, SPO1 Acosta and PDEA Agent Ellizier Ignacio (Ignacio), who would act as backup, arrived in the designated area at 5:30 a.m. Ignacio positioned himself 10 meters away from
SPO1 Acosta. Appellant arrived after 20 minutes with the CI and approached SPO1 Acosta. The CI
then introduced SPO1 Acosta to appellant as the buyer of shabu. SPO1 Acosta asked appellant if he
was the same person he talked to over the phone the previous night. When appellant answered in
the affirmative, SPO1 Acosta asked him if he has the stuff and if SPO1 Acosta could see them.
Appellant thus handed over to SPO1 Acosta two plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. SPO1 Acosta then made the pre-arranged signal by removing the towel from his
shoulder to indicate the completion of the transaction. Ignacio thus rushed to SPO1 Acosta and
together, they arrested appellant.
Anent the seized items, SPO1 Acosta took possession of the same up until they were brought to the
police station. Thereat, he marked them with his initials "RA." On the same day, Sr. Insp. Lizardo
prepared and signed a Request for Laboratory Examination that SPO1 Acosta delivered together
with the seized plastic sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office in La Union. Police Inspector
Valeriano Laya II (P/Insp. Laya) conducted a qualitative examination on the contents of the plastic
sachets and confirmed the same to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
5

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the accusations against him. He claimed that on June 28, 2005, he was on board a
bus bound for San Fernando City, La Union to discuss a business proposal with his wifes nephew,
Rolando Pinon,Jr. (Pinon). However, Pinon was not around when he arrived in the early morning of
June 29, 2005. Tired from the long journey, appellant boarded a tricycle and instructed the driver to
take him to the cheapest hotel. While on their way, a car suddenly blocked the road and three of the
four men on board the vehicle alighted and pointed their guns at him. He was instructed to board the
car and taken to Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union. Upon their arrival, his captors ordered him
to face the wall and take off his clothes. They also confiscated his bag and then asked him why there
was shabu inside. He denied possession of the same. Appellant spent the night in detention and was
brought to the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union the following morning.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found appellant guilty as charged and disposed of the case in its June 12, 2008
Decision as follows:
7

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Reyes y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of [O]ne [M]illion [P]esos (Php1,000,000.00).
The accused, who is a detention prisoner, is credited to the full extent of his preventive
imprisonment.
The confiscated 1.67 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," is
turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Regional Office, San Fernando City,
La Union, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC approved the notice of appeal filed by appellant. Hence, the entire records of the case
was transmitted to the CA where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03459.
9

10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 17, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTCs judgment of conviction. It ruled
that the prosecutions evidence duly established the consummation of the illegal sale of shabu and
that the seizure, handling, custody and examination of the seized drug were well-documented and
undertaken in an uninterrupted manner.
11

Persistent, appellant filed the instant appeal. When asked to file their supplemental briefs, both
parties opted not to file any as there are no new issues to be raised. Appellants Argument
12

13

14

Adopting the same issues he raised in the CA, appellant argues that the prosecution was unable to
establish the elements of the illegal sale of shabu by failing to identify him as the seller of the shabu
and to prove that payment was given in consideration thereof. He also asserts that there is no proof
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu was preserved in accordance with
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of R.A. 9165. Aside from the fact that the marking of the
seized items was not done immediately after seizure in the presence of the persons mentioned by
the said law, not even a single photograph of the seized items was taken and submitted by the
apprehending officers. Appellant likewise calls attention to the absence of marked money in the buybust operation, the failure to provide him with a counsel immediately after his arrest, and his
detention for more than 24 hours. According to appellant, these considerations disqualify the
arresting officers from enjoying the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty.
Hence, more credence should have instead been given to his defense of denial.
Our Ruling

Appellants conviction must be sustained albeit with modification.

All elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs must be proven; receipt of appellant of payment for
the purported sale of shabu was not established in this case.
The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, has the following elements: "(1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor." "The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction."
15

16

In this case, SPO1 Acosta positively identified appellant as the person he transacted with and who
handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in court. However, and as correctly pointed out
by appellant, the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of establishing the element of
consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu. SPO1 Acosta practically admitted in his
testimony the lack of consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu delivered to him by
appellant, viz:
Q Then, after that, Mr. Witness, what happened?
A "Do you have with you the stuff?", thats my word.
Q You asked him if he [has the] stuff?
A Yes, maam.
Q What was his answer?
A "Yes", thats his word.
Q When he answered, "Yes", what happened?
A "Can I see it?", thats my word.
Q What happened after you asked him you wanted to see it?
A I was not sure if it was from his bag or from his pocket, but he brought it out from his side
and told me that this is the one.
xxxx
PROS. BONDAD:
Q After that, when he brought out the stuff and showed the same, what happened
afterwards?
A Then he gave it to me.

Q When he gave it to you, what happened?

A When I got hold and confirm[ed] that it was shabu, I took off my red towel from my
shoulder as a pre-arranged signal and informed the accused that I am a PDEA member.
Q When you informed the accused that you are a police officer assigned at PDEA, what
happened?
A Then, "You are under arrest and you will now go to our office". We informed him of his
constitutional right.
17

xxxx
Q During your cross-examination, you stated that you did not get the serial number of the
money which you are supposed to use during the transaction supposed to be between you
and the accused because the reason was that, it was not actually buy-bust but only delivery.
A Yes, maam.
Q Why did you say that it is only a delivery and there is no need for you to go through the
procedure of pre-dusting the money and getting the serial number of the money you are
going to use?
A First and foremost, it is a delivery. In attempting to sell, there is no need to give the money.
The moment that I saw the shabu and I [was] already able to get hold of it, there is no longer
need for me to [get] the money.
18

Clearly, the element of receipt of payment for the thing sold is absent in this case. Hence, the
offense of illegal sale of shabu against appellant cannot stand. However, this finding does not
necessarily result in appellants exoneration as will be discussed below.
Appellant is guilty instead of illegal delivery of shabu.
The Information states that appellant did "wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell and deliver" to PO1
Acosta plastic sachets containing shabu with a total weight of 1.67 grams. Thus, the charge against
him was not confined to the sale of shabu. To deliver a dangerous drug is an act that is also
punishable under the same Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, which provides:
19

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos ( P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such transaction. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Article I, Section 3(k) of the same statute, the term "deliver" means "any act of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration." On the other hand, "sell" as defined in Section 3(ii) refers to "any act of giving away
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any
other consideration."
To establish the guilt of an accused for the illegal delivery of a dangerous drug, there must be
evidence that "(1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery" is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
knowingly made the delivery with or without consideration.
20

In this case, there was a prior arrangement between SPO1 Acosta and appellant to meet. During
the scheduled meeting, SPO1 Acosta introduced himself and asked appellant for the shabu.
Appellant responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu and handing over its possession to
SPO1 Acosta without receiving any payment therefor. Appellant had no authority under the law to
deliver the shabu since he was working as a carpenter at the time of his arrest. Appellant likewise
knowingly and voluntarily made the delivery. On the basis therefore of the charges against appellant
and the evidence presented by the prosecution, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
delivery of shabu under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
1wphi1

21

The police officers complied with the chain of custody rule and Section 21(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165.
The Court disagrees with the contention of appellant that the police officers did not comply with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165,
which reads as follows:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.- The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over the items;

In this case, the Certificate of Inventory prepared by the police officers belies the contention of
appellant that there was no compliance with the above-quoted provision. While the said certificate
was signed only by the DOJ representative, the failure of the police officers to include the signatures
of the other persons enumerated under the subject provision does not affect the evidentiary weight
of the subject shabu as the chain of custody of the evidence remained unbroken. In like manner,
the absence of photographs of the seized shabu does not render said drugs inadmissible or impair
the integrity of the chain of custody of the same. As established by the prosecution, the police
officers immediately arrested appellant after his delivery of the sachets of shabu. They took him to
the police station together with the seized items and conducted an investigation on his commission
of the criminal offense. The Certificate of Inventory was prepared and Sr. Insp. Lizardo made a
formal request for a laboratory examination which SPO1 Acosta personally delivered on the same
day to the police crime laboratory together with the sachets of shabu marked with his initials "RA."
PO1 Florendo received the items and delivered them to P/Insp. Laya, who conducted qualitative
tests on the contents of the sachets that had a total weight of 1.67 grams. The results confirmed that
the sachets contained shabu. During trial, PO1 Acosta identified the sachets of shabu marked with
his initials "RA" as the very same sachets given to him by appellant. He likewise identified appellant
to be the same person who delivered the seized sachets of shabu to him. Undoubtedly, the shabu
inside the sachets marked "RA" that was submitted for laboratory examination and tested positive
was the same dangerous drug delivered by appellant to SPO1 Acosta during the operation and the
very same item presented during the trial. Considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items were properly preserved, strict compliance with the requisites under said provision of
the implementing rules may therefore be disregarded. Moreover, the marking of the seized sachets
of shabu a few moments prior to its transfer to the crime laboratory complies with the requirement
that such marking be done immediately upon confiscation since it was undertaken while the shabu
was still in the police station. There is also no doubt that the marking was done in the presence of
appellant since he was also in the police station at the time of the marking. The short period in which
these events occurred ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.
22

23

24

25

The police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.
Under the above circumstances, the RTC and CA did not err in giving credence to the narration of
the incident by the prosecution witnesses, who as police officers, are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties. This presumption is not overturned by the assertion of appellant that:
(1) they failed to present the marked money; (2) they failed to inform him upon arrest of his
constitutional right to counsel; and (3) they detained him for 24 hours before the filing of the charges.
The presentation of the marked money is immaterial in this case since the crime of illegal delivery of
a dangerous drug can be committed even without consideration or payment. The positive testimony
of SPO1 Acosta that appellant was informed of his constitutional rights upon arrest also prevails over
the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony to the contrary of the latter. Even assuming that
appellant was not informed of his right to counsel upon arrest, the same will not result in his acquittal
since the rule is that such an infraction renders inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. Here, appellant did not confess or admit the charge
against him and even raised the defenses of denial and alibi. His guilt was established by the
testimonies of the police officers.
26

Lastly, there was no unlawful delay in the filing of charges against appellant since the police officers
had 36 hours from detention to bring him to the proper judicial authorities. The police officers
complied with this requirement since SPO1 Acosta testified that appellant was detained only for
more than 24 hours. Notably, neither proof nor allegation exists on record that appellant was
detained for a period longer than allowed by law. Moreover, it is worth stressing that while a delay in
the delivery of appellant to the proper judicial authorities is a violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, it does not affect the p resumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties
of the police officers in the absence of criminal charges against them.
27

Appellant's denial.
As regards appellant's defense of denial, suffice it to say that we have viewed this defense with
disfavor for being inherently weak which cannot prevail I over the positive and. credible testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses that appellant committed the crime.
28

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the penalty for the unauthorized delivery of shabu,
regardless of the quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of R.A. 9346, only life imprisonment
and fine shall be imposed. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for
parole and ordered to pay a fine of P 1 million. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 17, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03459, which affirmed the Decision dated June 12,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No.
6931, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellant Alfredo Reyes y Santos is declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu penalized under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole and
ordered to pay a fine of P1 million.
29

SO ORDERED.
A.C.
No.
10583
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]

February

ROBERTO
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

18,

2015

BERNARDINO, Complainant,

x-----------------------x
A.C.
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]

No.

10584

ATTY.
JOSE
MANGASER
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

CARINGAL, Complainant,

RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
1

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint against
Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty.
Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.
4

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty.
Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.
6

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
prepared by Atty. Santos states:
7

Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of
said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate. (Emphasis
in the original underscoring supplied)
9

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a
Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining
order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.
10

11

12

The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.
13

14

15

In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she
was about four years old.
A : Yes, sir.

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff,
isnt it?
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her
cousins.
....
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
THE COURT
: Whats the name of the mother?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isnt it?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isnt it?
A : Of course.
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you
requested to be marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from
you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.

THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it
is not the issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly
notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I
read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to
succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant
or any other heir entitled to her estate." Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have
drafted into this document . . . true or false?
16

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the
legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the
wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the
subject of my continuing objection from the very beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically
opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla,
your Honor. That is why thats only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents,
your Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and
impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the
ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a
document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or
five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?

THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to
a share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan".
So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole
[sic]properties for himself. (Emphasis supplied)
17

18

Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal).
This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584. Similar to Bernardinos Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. He also alleged that in representing
Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.
19

20

21

22

Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Mans
Statute" because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of
his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during
his professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of
privileged communication[.]"
23

24

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turlas estate. In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping.
25

26

27

In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that
Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false. Atty. Santos
wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turlas niece. As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla
had other heirs. Atty. Caringal further alleged:
28

29

30

31

14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is
fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac
Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is
some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the
document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the
government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or
any other heir entitled to her estate [sic] . . . [.] (Emphasis in the original)
32

Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turlas affidavit that
Rufina Turla had no other heir.
33

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turlas properties that were supposed
to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income. Lastly, Atty. Caringal
alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.
34

35

In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate. He explained that the
death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he
was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.
36

37

38

As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, "he [was]
representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her fathers estate." Mariano Turlas
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano
Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."
39

40

41

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues.
42

As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his
client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla. According to Atty. Santos,
payment of attorneys fees out of the estates funds could be considered as "expenses of
administration." Also, payment of Atty. Santos legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had
no standing to question.
43

44

45

On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of
the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turlas birth certificate was
registered.
46

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty.
Santos be suspended for three (3) months.
47

It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate
was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty.
Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turlas estate.
48

49

With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law." Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and
prayed for different reliefs.
50

51

However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. The Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
52

53

. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically

proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where
the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely
probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."

....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand
admitted that he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was
the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turlas
daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turlas daughter, the respondent admitted
that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only
the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate
presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turlas mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a
rightful heir to Rufina Turlas inheritance and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of
Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wifes sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a
position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only
heir of Rufina Turla. (Citations omitted)
54

In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of
the Commission on Bar Discipline.
55

Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in the Resolution dated March 22, 2014.
56

57

This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15,
2014, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
58

RULE
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

139-B

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of
law is proper.

This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution.
However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from
three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to
encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case. In Hornilla v. Atty.
Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:
59

60

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
61

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute
Mariano Turlas claim that he is Rufina Turlas sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla.
Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission
on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil
Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I
called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan. So
he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]
properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turlas
standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turlas estate. (Citation omitted)
62

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and
Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
63

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009. It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turlas consent. Still,
respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously
represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the
allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.
64

65

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated Canon
10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that
the respondents act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication
despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina
Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of
justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting
dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyers Oath but was also in violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Emphasis in the original)
66

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest.
With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turlas request to
prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
67

68

This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors Resolutions dated May 10, 2013
and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan elucidated on this courts "plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys" and discussed:
69

70

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the
legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers
stems from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which
includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional
mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Courts
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. (Citations omitted)
71

This courts authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

138

....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
72

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory,
consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.
73

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.

74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist
this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at
best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:

75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that
"a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the Statethe
administration of justiceas an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing." (Citations omitted)
76

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is granted
by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not
be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find
respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014
are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
1wphi1

77

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184618

November 19, 2014

PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION and/or EL TIGRE SECURITY and INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF NESTOR B. VILLAREAL, Respondents.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The twin reliefs that should be given to an illegally dismissed employee are full backwages and
reinstatement. Backwages restore the lost income of an employee and is computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to actual reinstatement. Anent reinstatement, only when it is not
viable is separation pay given.
1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99440, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed therewith by
petitioners Peak Ventures Corporation (Peak Ventures) and/or El Tigre Security and Investigation
Agency (El Tigre), and in effect affirmed the October 18, 2005 Decision and March 20, 2007
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 038029-03.
The NLRC affirmed in totothe July 30, 2003 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR 00-0806823-2002 declaring Nestor B. Villareal (Villareal) to have been illegally dismissed by petitioners
and ordering them to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights, to pay him
backwages and attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. Likewise assailed
isthe CAs September 16, 2008 Resolution which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
4

Factual Antecedents
On June 16, 1989, Peak Ventures, the owner/operator of El Tigre, hired Villareal as security guard
and assigned him at East Greenhills Village. On May 14, 2002, however, he was relieved from duty
without any apparent reason. Villareal was later informed by the management that he would no
longer be given any assignment because of his age. At that time, he was 42. His repeated requests
for a new posting during the months of June and July of 2002 were likewise declined.
Due to his prolonged lack of assignmentand dwindling resources, Villareal was constrained to claim
his security bond deposits from petitioners. However, he was advised to first tender a letter of
resignation before the samecould be released to him. Out of sheer necessity, Villareal submitted a
letter of resignation. He stated therein that he was constrained to resign effective July 31, 2002
since he cannot expect to be given any assignment for another one and a half months and that he
can no longer afford the fare going to petitioners office. Villareal alleged that the tenor of his
resignation letter was not acceptable to petitioners, who required him to submit another one stating
that his resignation is voluntary. In the first week of August 2002, petitioners released to Villareal his
security bond deposits.
10

11

Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

On August 27, 2002, Villareal filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against petitioners. He asserted that petitioners
have no valid and authorized cause to relieve him from duty and place him on floating status. For
one, he had dedicated almost 14 years of outstanding work performance to petitioners as shown by
his commendation and award. For another, petitioners still had an existing security services
contract with East Greenhills Village at the time he was relieved from his post. Villareal averred that
the dire financial strait brought about by his unjustified relief from duty had made it unbearable for
12

13

14

him to continue his employment with petitioners. Further, his illegal dismissal was effected without
due process.
Petitioners denied the charge and asserted that it was Villareal who voluntarily severed his
employment with them as shown by: 1) his handwritten letter of resignation, 2) a Talaan ng
Pakikipanayam sa Pagbibitiw duly accomplished by Villareal which negates any act of coercion on
petitioners part, and 3) a notarized Clearance showing Villareals receipt of his security deposits
amounting to P12,700.00 and waiver of all his claims against petitioners.
15

16

The Labor Arbiter, in a Decision dated July 30, 2003, concluded that there was no valid and
effective resignation on the part of Villareal; that he was constructively dismissed by petitioners; and
that his dismissal was carried out without due process of law. The dispositive portionof the Labor
Arbiters Decision is as follows:
17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of
[Villareal] by the [petitioners] in the above-entitled case was illegal and the [petitioners are] hereby
ordered to reinstate immediately [Villareal] to his former position withoutloss of seniority rights and
other privileges. The [petitioners are] directed to comply with this reinstatement order upon receipt of
this decision.
Furthermore, the [petitioners are]ordered to pay [Villareal] his backwages for the period from July 3,
2002 up to July 4, 2003, in the amount of P100,800.00, subject to further adjustment or computation
up to the reinstatement of [Villareal] or the finality of this decision, as the case may be.
In addition, the [petitioners are] hereby ordered to pay [Villareal] attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
All other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

18

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the NLRC agreed with the
Labor Arbiters findings and conclusion. Hence, the dispositive portion of its Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioners] appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
19

SO ORDERED.

20

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was likewise denied in a
Resolution dated March 20, 2007.
21

22

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In their Petition for Certiorariwith Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction filed before the CA, petitioners, aside from still insisting that Villareal
voluntarily resigned and is not entitled to the awards made inhis favor, also called attention to the
fact that they already required Villareal to return to work, in compliance with the reinstatement aspect
of the Labor Arbiters Decision.
23

24

On December 1, 2005, Villareal died. The CA, in a Resolution dated August 22, 2007, required
Villareals counsel of record, Atty. Alex B.Carpela, Jr. (Atty. Carpela) to cause the substitution of
Villareals heirs as respondents. However, per Manifestation of Atty. Carpela, the said heirs
cannotbe located.
25

26

27

Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the case. On March 28, 2008, it rendered a
Decision upholding the NLRC. The CA noted that petitioners failed to afford Villareal substantive
and procedural due process when he was relieved from duty and also when he was not given a new
post. And as a result of the unjustified relief and non-posting, his situation became unbearable,
leaving him with no choice but to forego employment. To the CA, this is a clear case of constructive
dismissal. On the other hand, petitioners evidence did not suffice to support the alleged
voluntariness of Villareals resignation.
28

In view of the finding of illegal dismissal, the CA made the following disquisition as to the monetary
awards in favor of Villareal:
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin relief[s] of (a) either reinstatement or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (b) backwages. The award of one does
notbar the other. Moreover, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld fromthem up to the time of actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is not
possible, the same shall be computed fromthe time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the
decision.
The amount of backwages shall be computed from the time he was separated from the company,
that is July 3, 2002 up to the finality of this Decision, as [Villareal] already died. Moreover, since
reinstatement is now impossible, the petitioners shall give separation pay of one month pay for every
year of service to [Villareal] in lieu of reinstatement.
The petitioners must also be held liable to pay [Villareal] attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award. This Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees should
be recovered pursuant to Article 2208 (11) of the New Civil Code.
29

Ultimately, the CA dismissed the Petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

30

n their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners questioned, among others, the award of backwages.
They asserted that the backwages should be computed from the time of Villareals relief from duty on
May 14, 2002 until his actual reinstatement and not until the finality of the Decision. And since
Villareal was actually reinstated and has rendered duty from November 1, 2003 to March 16, 2004,
he is only entitled to backwages computed up to his actual reinstatement on November 1, 2003. To
support this, petitioners presented Assignment Orders dated November 8, 2003 and March 15,
2004, as well as Villareals Daily Time Record (DTR) from November 8-30, December 1-16,
2003 and March 16, 2004. To show that Villareal was paidhis wages and salaries during his actual
reinstatement, petitioners also presented the Payroll Registry Receipts and Bank Advice
Slips. Petitioners further explained that Villareal went on Absence Without Official Leave since
March 22, 2004. After submitting his letter dated June 18, 2004 explaining his absences due to
poor health, nothing was heard from him since then.
31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

Aside from backwages, petitioners also questioned the computation of separation pay. They
contended that the amount should be computedat 1/2 month pay for every year of service and not
one month pay for every year of service as awarded by the CA.
In the Comment he submitted, Atty. Carpela argued, among others, that petitioners are barred from
asserting that they have already complied with the order of reinstatement as to question the
computation of backwages for failure to raise the same at the first instance.
41

In a Resolution dated September 16, 2008, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
42

Hence, this Petition.

The Parties Arguments
Petitioners insist that Villareal was not illegally dismissed. He voluntarily resigned from his work.
Hence, he isnot entitled to backwages and separation pay. Even assuming that he is entitled to
backwages, the same should be computed only from the time of Villareals relief on May 14, 2002 up
to his actual reinstatement and not up to the finality of the decision. Neither should Villareal be
awarded attorneys fees as there is no showing of bad faith on petitioners part.
In Atty. Carpelas Comment, he seeks for the dismissal of the Petition as it raises factual issues. He
also points out that the Petition contains a defective verification and certification against forumshopping because while the same was verified and certified by oneCirilo A. Almario (Almario) on
November 6, 2008, the Petition is actually dated November 10, 2008. He thus argues that petitioners
could not possibly verify and certify an inexistent petition. Besides, he maintains that the CA
Decision is in accord with law and jurisprudence.
43

Meanwhile, the heirs of Villareal, namely: his surviving spouse, Julieta Villareal, and his children,
Jocelyn and Lilybeth Villareal, filed on November 10, 2011 a Motion for Substitution of
Parties wherein they prayed to be substituted as parties-respondents to the case. This was granted
by the Court in the Resolution dated June20, 2012.
44

45

Our Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Variance between the date of the Petition and the date when it was verified/certified does not render
the Petition fatally defective.
Before delving into the issues raised by petitioners, the Court shall first resolve the technical defect
pointed out by respondents.
In explaining the variancebetween the date of the Petition and the date it was verified, petitioners
submitted Almarios Affidavit dated May 22, 2009. Almario, the Director for Security Operationsof
Peak Ventures, attested to the fact that the final draft of the Petition was shown to him on November
6, 2008 and on the same date, he read the same and executed a verification and certification of nonforum shopping. He further affirmed that the final draft of the Petition shown to him on November 6,
2008 is the samePetition dated November 10, 2008 that was filed in this Court. He explained that the
variance in dates came about because petitioners wanted the Petition to bear the same date as the
date of its actual filing.
46

"[T]he requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional and x x x the noncomplianceof which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith." With respect to the requirementof a certification of non-forum shopping, "[t]he fact that the
[Rules] require strict compliance merely underscores its mandatory nature that it cannot be
dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances."
47

48

In Spouses Valmonte v. Alcala, the Court held that the variance between the dates of the
verification/certification and the Petition does not necessarily contradict the categorical declaration
made by petitioners in their affidavit that they read and understood the contents of the pleading. In
that case, the Court noted that as the pleading and the verification are prepared separately, a
variance in their dates is a matter that may satisfactorily be explained. It held that to demand the
litigants to read the very same document that is to be filed in court is too rigorous a requirement
since what the Rules require is for a party to read the contents of a pleading without any specific
requirement on the form or manner in which the reading is to be done. The Court stressed that what
is important is that efforts were made to satisfy the objective of the Rule, that is, to ensure good faith
and veracity in the allegations of a pleading, thereby allowing the courts to act on the case with
reasonable certainty that the petitioners real positions have been pleaded.
49

Thus, here, the variance between the date of the Petition and the date it was verified is not fatal to
petitioners case. As explained, any variance does not necessarily mean that no valid
verification/certification was made. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the rules of procedure,
especially in labor cases, ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for theyhave been
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.
1wphi1

50

Villareal was constructively dismissed.

Coming now to the substantive issues, the Court subscribes to the uniform rulings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA that Villareal was constructively and illegally dismissed. Petitioners
anchor their claim of voluntary resignation on Villareals resignation letter, the Talaan ng
Pakikipagpanayam sa Pagbibitiw(exit interview form) accomplished by him, and his notarized
clearance. However, the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents prove
otherwise.
When Villareal was relieved from duty, he was placed on floating status. "A floating status requires
the dire exigency of the employers bona fide suspension of operation, business or undertaking." "It
takes place when the security agencys clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency x
x x" and also "in instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request
the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to it x x x." In the latter case, the employer
should prove that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be
assigned.
51

52

53

As pointed out by the labortribunals, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that there
were no other posts available for Villareal after his recall from his last assignment. Worse, no
sufficient reason was given for his relief and continued denial of a new assignment. And because of
the dire financial straits brought about by these unjustified actsof petitioners, Villareal was forced to
resign and execute documents in a manneras directed by petitioners in order to claim his security
bond deposits. From these circumstances, petitioners claim of voluntary resignation is untenable.
What is clear instead is that Villareal was constructively dismissed. There is constructive dismissal
when an act of clear discrimination, insensitivity or disdain on the part of the employer has become
so unbearable as to leave anemployee with no choice but to forego continued employment.
"Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employmentis
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion inrank and a
diminution in pay." Moreover, Villareals immediate filing of a Complaint for illegal dismissal to ask
for reinstatement negates the fact of voluntary resignation.
54

55

The Court, thus, finds thatthe CA did not err in declaring that Villareal was constructively and illegally
dismissed by petitioners.
Villareals backwages must be computed from the time of his unjustified relief from duty up to his
actual reinstatement; the award of separation pay must be deleted.
The awards granted by the CA in favorof Villareal must, however, be modified.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, an employee who is
unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to (1) reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges; and, (2) full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer viable, separation pay is granted. "[S]eparation pay is
intended to provide the employeemoney during the period in which he will be looking for another
employment." Backwages, on the other hand, "are granted on grounds of equity for earnings lost by
an employee due to his illegal dismissal."
56

57

58

As may be recalled, the CA, in granting monetary awards to Villareal, concluded that reinstatement
is no longer possible since he was already dead. Hence, it ordered the computation of backwages
from the time of Villareals separation from the company on July 3, 2002 up to the finality of the
Decision and awarded separation pay. However, records reveal that Villareal was actually reinstated.
As shown by his duly signed DTRs, Villareal rendered work on November 8-30, December 1-16,
2003 and March 16, 2004. Also, in his letter of June 18, 2004 where he explained his continued
absence from work, he specifically mentioned that he last rendered duty in March 2004. Notably,
these substantial evidence of Villareals actual reinstatement was not disputed by respondents.
Anent the assertion that petitioners belatedly raised before the CA the fact of Villareals
reinstatement,suffice it to say that petitioners could not be faulted for the same. The need to raise
the matter only came up when the said court did not consider Villareals reinstatement and rendered
its Decision ordering petitioners to pay him backwages from July 3, 2002 up to the finality of its
Decision.
In view therefore of Villareals reinstatement, modifications with respect to the awards of backwages
and separation pay must necessarily be made. The award of separation pay mustbe deleted
because as mentioned, separation pay is only granted as an alternative to reinstatement. Regarding
backwages, aside from computing it up to Villareals actual reinstatement and not up to the finality of
the Decision, the reckoning point of the computation as also pointed out by petitioners themselves,
must likewise be corrected. It must not be reckoned from July 3, 2002, the date when Villareal
submitted his resignation letter and considered by the CA as the date of his separation from the
company. Rather, it must be computed from May 14, 2002 or the time he was unjustly relieved from
duty since it was from this time that his compensation was withheld from him. Hence, Villareals
backwages must be computed from the time he was unjustly relieved from duty on May 14, 2002 up
to his actual reinstatement on November 8, 2003.
As to the grant of 10% of the total award as attorney's fees, the same is warranted because Villareal
was impelled to litigate to protect his interests.
59

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99440 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1) the award of full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, shall be computed from the
time Nestor B. Villareal was unjustly relieved from duty on May 14, 2002 up to his actual
reinstatement on November 8, 2003; and (2) the award of separation pay is deleted.
SO ORDERED.