Towards A Political Anthropology in The Work of Gilles Deleuze

TOWARDS A POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
IN THE WORK OF GILLES DELEUZE
FIGURES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 13

Editorial Board
PHILIPPE VAN HAUTE, (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands)
ANDREAS DE BLOCK, (Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium)
JOS CORVELEYN, (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium)
MONIQUE DAVID-MNARD, (Universit Paris VII Diderot, France)
PAUL MOYAERT, (Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium)
VLADIMIR SAFATLE, (University of So Paulo, Brazil)
CHARLES SHEPHERDSON, (State University of New York at Albany, USA)
Advisory Board
TOMAS GEYSKENS, (Leuven, Belgium)
ELISSA MARDER, (Emory University, Atlanta, USA)
CELINE SURPRENANT, (University of Sussex, United Kingdom)
JEAN FLORENCE, (Universit Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
PATRICK GUYOMARD, (Universit Paris VII Diderot, France)
ELIZABETH ROTTENBERG, (De Paul University, Chicago, USA)
JEFF BLOECHL, (Boston College, USA)
PATRICK VANDERMEERSCH, (University of Groningen, the Netherlands)
VERONICA VASTERLING, (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands)
HERMAN WESTERINK, (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands)
WILFRIED VER EECKE, (Georgetown University, USA)
RUDOLF BERNET, (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium)
ARI HIRVONEN, (University of Helsinki, Finland)
JOHAN VAN DER WALT, (University of Luxemburg, Luxemburg)
STELLA SANDFORD, (Kingston University, London, United Kingdom)
CLAUDIO OLIVEIRA, (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
PAOLA MARRATI, (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA)
ERAN DORFMAN, (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
MARCUS COELEN, (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt, Mnchen, Germany)
RODRIGO DE LA FABIN, (University Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile, Chili)
RICHARD BOOTHBY, (Loyola University, Maryland, USA)
TOWARDS A POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE WORK OF
GILLES DELEUZE
Psychoanalysis and Anglo-American Literature
Rockwell F. Clancy
In loving memory of John Mr. John Makin,

one of the best guys Ive known.
May this suffice until The Kampehout Diaries
matches in the literary genre what Potverdekke! is for music
Youre missed.
2015 by Leuven University Press / Universitaire Pers Leuven / Presses Universitaires de Louvain.
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All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication
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Cover illustration: YuQing Ying, Barbie on Table
Cover design: Griet Van Haute
Lay-out: Friedemann BVBA
The metaphysicians of Tln do not seek

for the truth or even for verisimilitude,
but rather for the astounding.
They judge that metaphysics
is a branch of fantastic literature.
Jorge Luis Borges
(Tln, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius. Labyrinths.
New York: Penguin, 1979. 34.)
In psycho-analysis nothing is true except the exaggerations.
Theodor Adorno
(Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life
Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott. New York: Verso, 2002. 49.)
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements 11
Abbreviations 13
Preface
From Psychoanalysis and Literature to Political Anthropology 15
Introduction
Deleuze, Politics, and the Problem of Human Nature 17
1. Politics and the Problem of Human Nature: Political Anthropology

17
2.Deleuze and the Problem of Human Nature: Philosophical Anthropology 23
Chapter One
The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis 33
Introduction: Psychoanalysis as Idealism and D.H. Lawrence

33
1. Philosophy and Literature in Lawrence
35
2. Psychoanalytic Reading in Freud, Bonaparte, and Lacan
37
3. A Note on Pollyanalytics and Problem of Critique
40
4. Praxis and Philosophical Anthropology in Marx and Engels
42
5. A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in Descartes 44
6. Experiential Unity and Transcendental Subjectivity in Kant
47
7. Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method in Hegel
49
8. Marx versus Descartes, Kant, and Hegel
56
9. Lawrences Conception of the Unconscious
59
10. Lawrence and the Psychoanalytic Tradition: Drive Theories and
Individuation
63
11. Familial Relations, according to Lawrence
66
12. The Individual and Society, according to Lawrence
69
Conclusion 74
Table of Contents
Chapter Two
The Metaphysics of Classic American Literature 77
Introduction: Language, Literature, and Lawrence

77
1. Classic American Literature and American Identity
78
2. Changing Identity by Changing the Blood
81
3. New Criticism and Reader Response: The Same Old Problem
85
4. Classic American Literature: Conditions Material and Ideal, Body
and Mind
88
5.Spinoza and Lawrence: Parallelism and Classic American Literature
91
6. Individuals, Community, and Sympathy: Lawrence and Spinoza
94
7. Sympathy and Multitude: Anti-Democracy and Fascism
100
Conclusion 102
Chapter Three
Reading Anti-Oedipus from behind with Lawrence 105
Introduction: From a Critique of Psychoanalysis

105
1. A Note on Metaphysics: The Organic Model
106
2. The Specificity of Schizophrenic Experience
109
3. A Materialist Conception of the Unconscious
116
4. Syntheses of the Unconscious
121
5. Connective Synthesis
124
6. Disjunctive Synthesis
129
7. Conjunctive Synthesis
140
8. Social Machines
148
9. Primitive Territorial Machine
153
10. Barbarian Despotic Machine
162
11. Civilized Capitalist Machine
169
Conclusion 178
Chapter Four
Anglo-American Literature as a Philosophical Concept 181
Introduction: to the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature

181
1. The Line of Flight: Exiting versus Leaving
184
2. Anglo-American Literature: Individuals and Community
188
3. Tricksters versus Traitors: Imitation versus Becoming
192
4. Hume and the Exteriority of Relations
196
5. Spinoza, Parallelism, and Affects
200
6. Bodies, Events, and the Stoics
204
7. Assemblages and the Political
207
Conclusion 213
Table of Contents
Chapter Five
The Political Significance of Opinion, Philosophy, and Art 217
Introduction: Opinion as a Problem

217
1. Elements of Opinion
218
2. Development of Opinion in Relation to Chaos: Denial
222
3. Political Significance of Opinion: Creating Consensus
225
4. Elements of Philosophy and Art
234
5. Relation of Philosophy and Art to Chaos: Uneasy Alliance
241
6. Political Significance of Philosophy and Art: Inventing a People,
Making Brains
247
Conclusion 254
Chapter Six
Creating a People to Come 257
Introduction: Liberalism and its Failures

257
1. Inclusive Particularism: THe Political Significance of Philosophy and Art 262
2. D.H. Lawrence, Christianity, and Fundamentalism
263
3. The Meaning(s) of Revelation
264
4. Christianity: Aristocratic and Popular
265
5. Selves: Individual and Collective
267
6. People and Power
272
7. T.E. Lawrence, Arabs, and Exclusivism
275
8. The Creation of Shame as an Affect
275
9. The Political Significance of Literature
279
10. Becoming (with but not like) Arab
284
11. Walt Whitman, America, and Nationalism
288
12. The Specificity of American Experience
288
13. An Alliance with Nature as Fragmented Reality
290
14. The Creation of Relations as Camaraderie
293
Conclusion 297
Conclusion
Political Anthropology, Liberalism, and Deleuze301
Bibliography 309
Index 321
Acknowledgements
The older I become the clearer it is how absolutely dependent I am on others.
The relations I have form the very fabric of my life. There are many persons
whose presence and help must thus be acknowledged, in the process of not
only writing this book but also contributing to who I am. Although long
lists of acknowledgements are admittedly obnoxious and tend to either
emphasize or deemphasize contributions depending on the frame of reference
from which they are being assessed I owe a great deal to many. Every three
to four years of my adult life I have moved to a different place, establishing
new relations while attempting to maintain the old. I have succeeded and
failed in both.
First and foremost, I would like to thank Daniel Smith and Tomas
Geyskens. What I think philosophy is and how it should be done have been
determined by their examples. I must acknowledge the immense amount of
guidance, assistance, and patience given to me by William McBride, Robert
Marzec, and Philippe Van Haute. I am especially grateful to Professor Van
Haute, not only for asking me to publish this book in his series but also
because my understanding of and interest in psychoanalysis has profited
tremendously from reading his books and articles.
The debt I owe to my family is unimaginable: my thanks to Maria,
Rockwell, and Richard Clancy, as well as Kathryn Ryan. Noreen Byrne, Pam
Nicola, Somaieh Emamjomeh, and Ann Chiu are the four women I have
loved. Im continually surprised to discover just what a mark they have left
on me. I hold an abiding gratitude for all my friends from the Chicagoland
area, especially John and Lee Hirsch, Dan and Sue Cates, Kevin and Jennifer
Halloran, Geoff Chunowitz, Alex Mahler, Alex Finn, Kelly and Kathy
Stevenson, and Ben Rooney.
I would like to thank all my professors from Purdue University, but
especially Leonard Harris, Arkady Plotnitsky, Sandor Goodhart, Thomas
Ryba, and Daniel Frank. My friends from Purdue and the (West) Lafayette
area kept me (relatively) sane during my time there. My heartfelt thanks to
Alberto Urquidez, Richard Severe, Brian Ruby, Justin Litaker, David Gauly,
Christopher Penfield, Barry Blankman, Shane Greeno, Sophia and Bodhi
Stone, and Becky Hunter.
I lived in Leuven, Belgium for three years. From there I would like to
thank professors Rudolf Bernet, Roland Breeur, and Paul Moyaert, as well as
all my friends from Belgium, especially Kelly VandenBosche, Thor Sandaker,
Carel Peeters, Carl-Axel, Callan Ledsham, Nicholas Ryan, Anita Jans, Paul
Walsh, and Drew Dalton.
11
Acknowledgements
My interest in philosophy began as an undergraduate at Fordham

University. The person most responsible for my pursuit of the examined life
a turn away from my initial trajectory towards one of corporate greed through
the study of economics is undoubtedly Avery Goldman. Only more than
ten years later, having found myself in similar situations, can I fully appreciate
the immense patience and skill he used in dealing with me as an obnoxious
nineteen-year-old freshman. I owe a great deal to Michael Baur, Merold
Westphal, and James Marsh as well.
I am grateful for the two persons with whom I was the closest during the
final stages of writing this book: Nora first tier Trench Bowles and Bianca
only a child could have mistaken my shoes for theirs Rubino. Finally, many
thanks to my colleagues and the staff from the University of MichiganShanghai Jiao Tong University Joint Institute, especially Heinz Luegenbiehl,
Pamela Mansutti, Roberto Dugnani, Shane Johnson, Roger Han, Silvia Li,
Wendy Dai, and Aki Miao, as well as to all my friends in Shanghai, especially
Jeff Juran and Ying YuQing.
In different ways, I love you all.
12
Abbreviations
Works by Deleuze
B
Bergsonism
D
Dialogues
DI
Desert Islands and Other Texts
DR
Difference and Repetition
ECC Essays Critical and Clinical
EPS
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza
ES Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Humes Theory of Human
Nature
F
Foucault
FBLS Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation
FLB
The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque
KCP Kants Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties
LS
The Logic of Sense
M
Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty
N
Negotiations
NP
Nietzsche and Philosophy
SPP
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy
TRM Two Regimes of Madness
Works by Deleuze and Guattari
AO
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia vol. I
K
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature
TP
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia vol. II
WP
What is Philosophy?
Other works
A
Apocalypse
E
crits
FU
Fantasia of the Unconscious
PU
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious
SCAL Studies in Classic American Literature
13
Preface
From Psychoanalysis and Literature

to Political Anthropology
The following book argues for the existence of a political anthropology in the
work of Gilles Deleuze. I use this term to denote an understanding of political
activity on the basis of philosophical anthropology a conception of human
nature. Deleuzes political thought, I argue, is rooted in an account of human
nature. However, this perspective is by no means an obvious one. Indeed, to
anyone even vaguely acquainted with Deleuzes work, this claim would appear
counterintuitive if not misguided.
Deleuzes thought is generally associated with a tradition known as postmodernism, the most salient characteristic of which is its critique of various
notions such as truth, progress, and subjectivity, all of which belong to what
Jean-Franois Lyotard refers to as meta-narratives. Using an account of human nature to ground ones political analyses is both modern and classical,
placing Deleuzes thought squarely within these traditions. Whereas natures
have traditionally been conceived in terms of essences pegged to unchanging
forms, Deleuzes thought emphasizes time and becomings. Insofar as the
locus of his political thought lies in his collaborative endeavors with Guattari
and their conception of becoming-animal there plays a considerable role it
would appear as though Deleuzes political thought is explicitly disconnected
from an understanding of human nature.1 My project is thus based on approaching Deleuzes thought from a particular perspective, in terms of specific
themes.
I began by investigating two topics in Deleuzes work: his critique of
psychoanalysis and claim that Anglo-American literature is superior to its
Franco-Germanic counterparts. These themes are interesting as their broader
philosophical import is by no means straightforward. At first they appear as the
idiosyncratic eccentricities of a strange French philosopher, an intellectual poster
boy for the youth discontent of the 1960s and 70s.2 However, precisely these
In Deleuze and the Political, the major study to date exploring the political dimensions of
Deleuzes thought, Paul Patton claims Deleuzes political thought takes shape in his works
with Guattari, where deterritorialization is an overarching political norm (9).
2
Especially in English-language scholarship, the tendency exists to tie Deleuze to various
thinkers and themes in a haphazard, rather unintelligent fashion. For an assessment along
these lines, see Franois Cussets Becoming Deleuzian: Deleuze aux tats-Unis, linconnu
et la bote outils, as well as his longer French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and
1
15
Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze
lines of inquiry led to a political anthropology in the thought of Deleuze

from psychoanalysis and literature to political anthropology. Deleuzes critique
of psychoanalysis and praise for Anglo-American literature bear on different
conceptions of human nature and the respective understandings of political
activity they support. Given the increasing polarization of views across the
political spectrum, the major contemporary significance of Deleuzes thought
lies in the way he grounds his analyses of political thought on accounts of
philosophical anthropology.
Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States.

16
Introduction
Deleuze, Politics, and the Problem of Human Nature

1. Politics and the Problem of Human Nature: Political Anthropology
We are in desperate need of political anthropology. Classical and modern
political thought, including the related fields of ethics and law, has generally
grounded its analyses of concepts belonging to these spheres notions such
as justice, rights, and duties in terms of human nature, taking philosophical
anthropology as a touchstone to understand notions belonging to the domain
of politics.
To understand the nature of justice, for example, Plato appeals to an
account of the soul via the polis in the Republic. Similarly, in the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle says man is born for citizenship, that the function of man
consists in this type of life. This activity or action of the soul implies a rational
principle. He reiterates these same points in the Politics, claiming the state
is a creation of nature prior to both the family and individual and that by
nature man is a political animal.1 In early modern thought, Hobbes appeals
to human existence in a state of nature to explain the basis of sovereignty in
the social contract. Likewise, Spinoza claims that the positions he develops
throughout the Political Treatise proceed from the necessity of human nature
(308). With good reason, however, the mainstream of contemporary political
thought has largely abandoned such an approach.
In these contexts, human nature has been conceived as inflexible and
unchanging, an essence in terms of which the characteristic behaviors of
individual persons and groups of people can be understood. Given the existence
of competing and mutually exclusive accounts of philosophical anthropology,
one can conclude such accounts result more from socially and historically
contingent factors such as cultural, ethnic, and religious orientations than
the convergence of these conceptions on any matter-of-fact regarding what
it means to be human. Such accounts imply and support competing and
mutually exclusive conceptions of the good life, which often result in or justify
strife if not terrible atrocities between persons and groups of people. Given
Insofar as the polity is an outgrowth or reflection of human nature, on this understanding,
the polis versus the family is the most sovereign and self-sufficient social unity, an outgrowth or reflection of the highest part of human nature. See Hadley Arkes discussion of
these points and their contemporary significance in First Things: An Inquiry into the First
Principles of Morals and Justice 12.
17
the increasingly globalized and pluralistic nature of the world, abandoning

this strategy has itself been understood as a precondition for an analysis of
notions belonging to the political domain, a line of thought associated with
liberalism.
Slavoj iek describes its program as one where politics should be purged
of moral ideals (Living 34). In this respect liberalism conceives itself as a
politics of the lesser evil, where its ambition is to bring about the least
worst society possible, thus preventing a greater evil, since it considers any
attempt to directly impose a positive good as the ultimate source of all evil
(iek, Living 38). Evidence of this shift begins with Hobbes, an effort to scale
down the ends of politics, to remove from political life those questions about
the highest moral ends which proved so enduringly contentious, and which
were so often productive of civil war (Arkes 15). In a different tradition but
similar conceptual vein, Jacques Rancire asserts that Hobbes criticized the
position of the ancients as being utopic in its assertion that human beings are
by nature cut out for the polity (76); one must refute the very idea of some
kind of natural political aptitude in the human animal that would predestine
them to any good other than simple survival (77). In these respects, the
thought of Hobbes and the liberal tradition it inaugurates departs sharply
from Aristotle and the natural law tradition.
The merit of liberalism thus consists in neutrality with respect to these
competing conceptions. Its central idea is that government should be neutral
toward the moral and religious views its citizens espouse. Since people disagree
about the best way to live, government should not affirm in law any particular
vision of the good life. Instead, it should provide a framework of rights that
respect persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own
values and ends (Sandel 4). This neutrality acts as a negative principle in
which making robust claims with respect to human nature is itself bad, as the
good consists in establishing a broad framework of negative rights that allow
people to discover and pursue such accounts for themselves.2 Versus robust
claims regarding the nature of morality, the good life, etc. based on thick
conceptions of personhood or human nature liberalism sets aside such
questions.3 However, this shift in perspective is itself problematic for at least
two reasons. The first concerns the possibility of this approach whether one
See Isaiah Berlins formulation and defense of negative rights and freedom in Two Concepts
of Freedom.
3
John Rawls says, accepting the political conception [of justice] associated with liberalism
does not presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral doctrine (Priority of Right 450).
2
18
Introduction
can ever fully divorce philosophical anthropology from political thought. The
second concerns its desirability whether this approach is itself beneficial.
With regard to the first, William Galston says every contemporary liberal
theory that begins by promising to do without a substantive theory of the
good ends by betraying that promise (143). Referring to the characteristic
error of anti-perfectionist liberalism, Robert George unpacks this claim as
follows: [liberalism] falsely purports to justify a regime of law that is strictly
neutral on the question of what makes for a morally valuable lifewhich
itself presupposes no particular position on the question of what makes for a
morally valuable life (159). Hence, while Rawls claims to remain neutral with
respect to such questions, attempting to bracket comprehensive doctrines,
justice as fairness itself implies a specific conception of human nature, where
human beings are rational and disinterested while at the same time being risk
avert.4 All cooperate because collective wellbeing depends on this cooperation
(Theory of Justice 15). Behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows the position
they occupy in society, such that no one is prejudiced in the principles they
choose (Theory of Justice 18).
At times, however, Rawls endorses a kind of moral formation indicative of
the paternalism to which liberalism is supposed to be opposed.5 According to
George, Rawls is thus committed to a conception of the person and the good:
The persons in the original position choose liberal principles because they are
persons as a certain form of liberalism conceives them (133). The neutrality
at the heart of a liberal conception of justice thus implies a conception of
human nature as rational, disinterested, and risk avert.6 Similarly, against
those who champion only negative freedom and a liberal conception of right,
Charles Taylor argues this emphasis is itself already informed by a broader
conception of the good life indicative of a conception of human nature.7
Hence, as much as one might like and try, it is difficult if not impossible to
divorce an understanding and analysis of the political from human nature.
This gives rise to a second issue concerning the liberal tradition the
desirability of such an approach. A certain reflexive urge to understand
human existence is itself characteristic of human nature. Contemplation and
One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation as rational
and mutually disinterested (Theory of Justice 13).
5
He says that certain initial bounds are placed upon what is good and what forms of character
are morally worthy, and so upon what kinds of persons men should be (Theory of Justice 32).
6
In this respect Rawls appeal to economic rationality is telling: the concept of rationality
must be interpretedin the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most
effective means to given ends (Theory of Justice 14).
7
See, for example, Whats Wrong with Negative Liberty?
4
19
reflection on human nature is itself intimately linked to a uniquely human

form of existence: contemplation and reflection on what being human
consists in. It is precisely this tendency that leads Heidegger to approach the
broader question of Being through being human, a being whose existence
is itself an issue.8 As became increasingly clear to Heidegger, however, this
activity is by no means exclusively individual but also concerns community.9
This perspective becomes much more explicit in his later works such as The
Origin of the Work of Art and The Question Concerning Technology.
This urge stands at the heart of religious belief and practice, the liberal
and fine arts, the social and even hard sciences. Attempts to divorce an
understanding of political thought from philosophical anthropology thus
stifle this inherently human urge to explore and stake out claims regarding
what being human consists in. Heideggers own commitments to National
Socialism might be understood from this perspective. His talk of the rootedness
of a people, their world, earth, etc. and Nazi propaganda concerning race,
blood, history, etc. all point in this direction, towards this urge within human
beings to understand and establish themselves in a certain way. As is clear,
far from idle speculation, this tendency results in real-life consequences. Its
social-political manifestations are evident even today.
The rise of nationalist parties throughout Europe, religiosity in the form of
evangelical Christianity and its political sway in the United States, and militant,
fundamentalist forms of Islam are its contemporary manifestations. The
emphasis on cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and inclusive universalism
that dominated the late 80s and 90s has given rise to an intense backlash. The
soft political philosophies associated with cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism,
and inclusive universalism, expounded by the likes of Richard Rorty and
Jacques Derrida ones of the lets wait and see variety where people engage
politically while recognizing these engagements as ultimately groundless or
always in need of revision10 have given rise to an intense backlash. One
recognizes the counterpoint to these intellectual strands in the political work
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically
distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case,
this is a constitutive state of Daseins Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a
relationship towards that Being a relationship which is itself one of Being (Being and Time
32).
9
This is already apparent in Being and Time when he writes, Dasein has grown up both in
and into a traditional way of interpreting itself Its own past and this always means the
past of its generation is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something
which already goes ahead of it (41).
10
For example, by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and by Derrida in Specters of
Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International.
8
20
Introduction
of iek and Alain Badiou, philosophy of religion, and the new atheists.
The emphasis both iek and Badiou put on militant action and the
role of the party in their political thought are evidence of this backlash, the
formers discussions of political decisions and the latters talk of fidelity to
an event.11 At a recent conference I overheard another participant discussing
his involvement in the Occupy movement. He recounted the events of a
night when he was arrested at a party. After describing his initial resistance
and struggle with the police, he said something along the following lines: I
know that people become cops for different reasons, but at a certain point
you just have to say, Fuck them! I fucking hate all cops. Theyre all evil! In a
vastly simplified manner, I suspect this mentality lies at the heart of iekian
and Badiouian political thought, a breaking point at which one is finally fed
up with attempting to understand and make oneself understood.
Although the use analytic philosophy makes of intuitions in conceptual
analysis has always seemed bizarre to me that which seems to push thought
forward, not only in philosophy but also other disciplines, are ideas furthest
from commonsense intuitions the role these play in philosophy of religion
seems especially problematic. Here the commonsense intuitions on which
one relies in conceptual analyses clearly result from the particularity of ones
belief community or tradition.12 On the other end of the spectrum, public
atheists such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens,
and A.C. Grayling seem as intolerant of religious belief and people as those
they criticize.13 Biologist Kenneth Miller points towards this intolerance
putting evolutionary thought in the service of atheism as one of the major
reasons religious people reject evolutionary theory. This concerns less their
ignorance or confusion regarding the science involved and more the way this
militarized Darwinism-in-the-service-of-atheism threatens their worldviews,
undermines the way they think about themselves and the ethical views these
self-conceptions support (Miller 169 ff.).
See Badious relatively accessible albeit incomplete account in Ethics 40-44. In that
work Badiou explains his own hostility to contemporary consensus on questions of
democratic-liberal procedures, human rights, and our much-vaunted respect for cultural
difference (107). Describing the political act, iek says, the unity and law of a civil
society is imposed onto the people by an act of violence whose agent is not motivated by
any moral considerations (Living 32). This perspective fuels his endorsement of Leninism:
With Leninthe point is that revolution ne sautorise que delle-mme: one should take
responsibility for the revolutionary act (Living 33).
12
For example, see Alvin Plantingas Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism.
13
See, for example, Richard Dawkins The God Delusion and Daniel Dennetts Darwins
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.
11
21
These instances point towards not only the inability of divorcing political
thought from philosophical anthropology but also the perils involved in
attempting to do so. In the case of both individuals and community, a strong
tendency exists to understand and stake out claims concerning the nature of
existence. On both sides of the spectrum, in political, social, and religious
matters, people have grown increasingly impatient, weary of bracketing or
refraining from staking their claims with respect to differences between right
and wrong, conceptions of the good life, and ultimate accounts regarding the
nature of human existence. The intense, emotional nature of these current
tendencies is only explicable as reactionary phenomena, reactions against
the lets wait and see mentality, the inclusive universalism characteristic of
cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and liberal ideals.
The tragedies of the 20th century consist not only in the mass murder
facilitated by modern technology but also the relative inability to learn from
and respond to these events in a proactive manner. Be it famine and war
on the African continent or the rise of school and workplace killings in the
United States, the tendency exists to refer to these events as senseless, as
incidental and, therefore, disconnected from one another.14 This is a mistake.
At the beginning of the 21st century we stand in a similar position with
respect to a number of fundamental human concerns as in the 19th century
nationalism in the political sphere, lack of or inefficient regulation of economic
markets, simplistically reductionist understandings of psychopathology by
psychiatry These should be understood in a systematic manner, at the basis
of which are the natures of the terms involved and their relations individual
persons, groups of people, and relations between the two. Far from claims of
the type People are fundamentally x good, bad, selfish, evil, altruistic, etc.
an enquiry into human nature an account of philosophical anthropology
should be in the service of and guided by broader cross- and inter-disciplinary
concerns, ranging from the advisability of certain types of biological research
and technological endeavors, the nature of psychopathology and end-of-life
decision-making, to economic and healthcare policy. The thought of Gilles
Deleuze points in this direction.
14
Regarding the systematic nature of problems on the African continent, see Teju Coles
criticisms of the Kony 2012 campaign in The White Savior Industrial Complex.
22
Introduction
2.Deleuze and the Problem of Human Nature: Philosophical

Anthropology
I believe a worthwhile book, Deleuze once said, can be represented in
three quick ways. A worthy book is written only if 1. you think that the
books on the same or a related subject fall into a general error (polemical
function of a book); 2. you think that something essential about the subject
has been forgotten (inventive function); 3. you consider that you are capable
of creating a new concept (creative function) Henceforth, for each of
my books, abandoning necessary modesty, I will ask myself 1. which error
it claims to correct, 2. which oversight it wants to repair, and 3. what new
concept it has created (qtd. Dosse 112). Abandoning necessary modesty, I
hope to have written a book on Deleuze that is worthwhile, according to these
criteria those of Deleuze himself.
Polemically, the error of most works on Deleuze lies in their poor
understanding and even worse explication of his thought. In large part,
scholarship on Deleuze suffers from the absence of close reading and critical
commentary explications of texts by Deleuze are rarely central features.
More often than not, scholars refer to his concepts and ideas as though they
were self-evident, parroting his terminology as if everybody already knew what
Deleuze said.15 First and foremost then, I hope to have written a book that
presents Deleuzes thought in a clear fashion without sacrificing precision.
Indeed, in the English-speaking world, the field of Deleuze studies awaits
what H.S. Harris, John Findlay, and William Richardson were to Hegel
and Heidegger scholarship, scholars capable of closely reading and carefully
commenting on texts, tracing the background and wider milieu in which
philosophical thought takes place.16 This leads to a second error regarding the
way one approaches Deleuzes thought, and concerns an oversight I would
like to repair.
Reading an author is never simply an exercise in regurgitation. The
approach one takes to a work ones expectations and motivations itself
determines the nature of the reading that results. This is nowhere more
apparent than in the work of Deleuze himself. Regarding how to approach
Deleuzes thought, the broad consensus exists that Difference and Repetition is
his magnum opus, that his earlier works in the history of philosophy lead up to
Franois Zourabichvili criticizes this presumed familiarity (5).
In these respects, Daniel Smith is a remarkable exception, as well as Paola Marrati, Anne
Sauvagnargues, and Franois Zourabichvili within French-language scholarship on Deleuze.
See, for example, Daniel Smiths Essays on Deleuze and Franois Zourabichvili, Paola Marrati,
and Anne Sauvagnargues La philosophie de Deleuze.
15
16
23
and culminate in Difference and Repetition, while later works, including those
co-authored with Flix Guattari, are explications and further developments of
explicit themes or nascent ideas already present there. This perspective is by no
means groundless.17 However, Deleuze himself seems skeptical about the idea
of a masterwork, a book that would be understood as an authors definitive
statement.18
Inventively, I claim works on Deleuze to date have overlooked the rather
anomalous and transitory nature of Difference and Repetition. Although various
concepts and themes appear there as the culmination of Deleuzes intellectual
development for example, the notion of habit and its development in
relation to both Hume and Bergson, the image of thought, the eternal return
in Nietzsche, a doctrine of the faculties as a reconceptualization of Kantian
thought many others appear there for the first time only to quickly drop out
again.19 Rather than a masterwork, it appears more as a loose amalgamation
of his earlier books on figures and themes in the history of philosophy. One
might understand Difference and Repetition as Deleuzes feigned attempt to
think on his own to do philosophy rather than the history of philosophy.
Here it would be an instrumental response to the stringent requirements
of the French academy of his day, where one was required to produce an
original work to make some hitherto unexplored claim regarding the nature
of accepted philosophical thought for the sake of achieving a doctorate
In the Preface to the English edition of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze himself declares
the following: All that I have done since is connected to this book, including what I wrote
with Guattari (DR xv). At the same time, however, the nature of this connection is specific:
the third chapter [on the image of thought]serves to introduce subsequent books
up to and including the research undertaken with Guattari where we invoked a vegetal
model of thought: the rhizome in opposition to the tree (DR xvii). He reiterates this same
point elsewhere: One might call this study of images of thought noology and see it as the
prolegomena to philosophy. Its what Difference and Repetition is really about, the nature of
the postulates of the image of thought (N 149). See Pattons commentary on this point, that
Deleuzes earlier criticisms of the image of thought condition his later political work with
Guattari (Deleuze and the Political 132).
18
Regarding an understanding of Madness and Civilization as Foucaults master work, Deleuze
asks the following: does Madness and Civilization already contain in principle everything
else, for example the conceptions Foucault came to form of discourse, knowledge, and
power? He answers, Certainly not. Theres something great writers often go through:
theyre congratulated on a book, the books admired, but they arent themselves happy with
it, because they know how far they still are from what theyre trying to do, what theyre
seeking, of which they still have only an obscure idea (N 104).
19
See Smiths discussion of the appearance and disappearance of the concepts of simulacrum
and univocity in Deleuzes work in The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and
the Overturning of Platonism and The Doctrine of Univocity: Deleuzes Ontology of
Immanence, respectively, both of which are included in Essays on Deleuze.
17
24
Introduction
and obtaining a better university position.20 Even if one treats this as a

serious philosophical work rather than a professional requirement, however,
it still appears as though Deleuzes thought moves in a different direction
after Difference and Repetition, especially in his collaborative endeavors with
Guattari. The three most salient features of this transition concern Deleuzes
abandonment of a doctrine of the faculties, critique of psychoanalysis, and
praise for Anglo-American literature. These three themes, I argue, go handin-hand.
In the third place then, creatively, drawing attention to the nature of this
discontinuity between Difference and Repetition and the co-authored works
with Guattari leads to a Deleuzian account of political anthropology, an
understanding of the political based on philosophical anthropology. But what
does this creativity consist in and how does it develop?
Many works on Deleuze claim to use or employ his thought in a creative
manner, to be written in a Deleuzian spirit of creativity. By and large these are
terrible, poorly written and difficult to understand. If these works are born out
of creativity, if they result from a Deleuzian prescription to use his thought
in a creative manner, one wonders if it wouldnt be better to do the same old
thing in a spirit of traditionalist conformity.21
Rather than any shortcoming in the thought of Deleuze, in Englishlanguage scholarship, I suspect this results from the vogue of French thought
in the Anglo-American world, as well as the intentional obscurity characteristic
of post, post-World War II French philosophy, often referred to as poststructuralism or post-modernism. Indeed, versus Deleuzes published booklength manuscripts, one is struck by the clarity of his explanations in seminars,
interviews, and shorter texts. The creative nature of Deleuzes work did not
itself result from letting his thoughts run wild, from a sloppy show of false
erudition masquerading as the employment of someone elses thought.22
Describing the manner in which one should approach an author with
whom one engages, in a spirit of both admiration and critique, Deleuze writes
the following: You have to work your way back to those problems which an
author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he does not say in
Difference and Repetition takes precisely this form, Deleuze claiming philosophy has always
conceived of difference on the basis of identity. Instead he will think difference in-itself.
Indeed, after his defense, Deleuze expressed his desire to leave Lyon and obtain a position in
Paris (Dosse 178).
21
I am in full agreement with Zourabichvilis claim that the dichotomy between exposition
and use as it concerns Deleuze is a false one (4).
22
On this score see Jean-Jacques Lecercles Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature as well as my
review of that book.
20
25
what he says (DI 139). Deleuzian creativity consists in this, the first step in
the kind of creative reading Deleuze himself engaged. A philosophic theory
is a developed question, and nothing other. By itself, in itself, it consists not in
resolving a problem, but in developing to its limit the necessary implications
of a formulated question (ES 119).
Given the vast body of work on Deleuze in existence today both positive
and negative, written out of a spirit of both admiration and with the aim of
critique it seems strange no one has yet attempted to rediscover the questions
Deleuze himself asked, the nature of the problems animating his thought. I
would argue that the answer to this question the question to which Deleuzes
thought is an answer is a conception of human nature, the question of
what being human consists in. From Empiricism and Subjectivity tellingly
subtitled An Essay on Humes Theory of Human Nature published in 1953,
to Immanence: A Life written in 1995, Deleuze constantly and consistently
returns to the question of what being human consists in issues related to an
account of philosophical anthropology.
However, the claim anything akin to a traditional account of human
nature can be found in the work of Deleuze should seem strange. This seeming
strangeness results from the way accounts of human nature have traditionally
been conceived.
In the first place, this concerns a conception of nature and its relations
to an account of philosophical anthropology. Natures have traditionally been
understood in an essentialist manner, based on the model of an unchanging
form that which makes a thing what it is. An account of human nature
in these terms then would refer to a fundamental distinction between the
existence of human and other types of beings, a difference in kind rather
than degree. The problem then consists in conceiving Deleuzes conception of
human nature in these terms.
Deleuzes philosophical anthropology comes closer to Sartres, which
emphasizes a specifically human mode of existence, although the basis of
this specificity is not an unchanging form. Sartres emphasis is on the way
human beings are, not as an account of essence, but rather, existence and
the parameters this existence demarcates in the formation of an essence.23
Rather than human nature where nature would be conceived on the model
of an unchanging form Sartres philosophical anthropology consists in
23
Given its specific conceptual history, the term essence here is probably inappropriate,
although Sartre never himself ceases to use it. Hence, his dictum that If God does not exist,
there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he
can be defined by any concept (Existentialism 35).
26
Introduction
the elucidation of a human condition, coordinates that form a framework

in terms of which human existence plays out.24 This is precisely Deleuzes
interest in his first book-length monograph on Hume, conditions in terms
of which human nature takes shape, the formation of subjectivity on the
basis of the association of ideas. In this same manner, Deleuzes philosophical
anthropology emphasizes a different conception of nature.
Nature is not conceived as a well-organized whole on the basis of an
unchanging form, but in terms of what Deleuze refers to as becomings,
as a chaotic maelstrom where relations are constantly changing. Here the
difference between human and other types of existence is conceived as one
of degree rather than kind. Philosophical anthropology does not refer to a
fundamental distinction between human and other types of beings. Indeed,
this is precisely how Spinoza Deleuzes greatest philosophical inspiration
conceives the relation, emphasizing the continuity between human nature and
nature in general.25 But the political consequences of these commitments only
become clear from a certain perspective, only after Difference and Repetition
and the Logic of Sense and at the beginning of his collaborations with Guattari,
in terms of his critique of psychoanalysis and praise for Anglo-American
literature.
If Difference and Repetition should indeed be understood as a doctrine of
the faculties, as Deleuze himself declares and his commentators reiterate, then
its orientation is that of the individual.26 Further, insofar as the Logic of Sense
seems committed to the passive nature of events focusing on how these come
to be embodied in states of affairs it implies a kind of immaterialism, an
idealism. These commitments change in the transition to Anti-Oedipus, from
an orientation on the individual to a more complex account of individuals,
community, and their relations, which itself goes hand-in-hand with a shift
towards materialism.27 In terms of their reformulation of fundamental
Describing the role of nothingness the way nothingness acts as a condition of human
existence see Being and Nothingness.
25
We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual natural
entities (Theological 201). [M]anis part of nature, andought to be referred to the
power of nature (Political Treatise 292). On this point, Deleuze writes that man thus loses
in Spinozism all the privileges owed to a quality supposed proper to him, which belonged to
him only from the viewpoint of imitative participation in God (EPS 183).
26
See DR 143, as well as Joe Hughes Deleuzes Difference and Repetition 73 ff. This perspective
results in Hughes misguided claim that the activities of syntheses of the unconscious and
social machines in Anti-Oedipus should be understood on the model of the activities of
faculties (175-177).
27
Vronique Bergen explains this transition in terms of Deleuzes abandonment of Carroll for
Artaud after the Logic of Sense (34). iek judges this as the moment Deleuzes thought falls
off, when Guattari gets the better of him, abandoning psychoanalysis and an event-inspired
24
27
(metaphysical) psychoanalytic commitments, Deleuze and Guattaris political

thought goes beyond iek and Badious simplistic and problematic application
of Lacanian thought to the political sphere, at the root of which involves
conceiving groups as individuals.28 The transition from Difference and
Repetition and the Logic of Sense to Anti-Oedipus can be understood in terms
of Guattaris contribution to Deleuzes thought, which consists in a critique of
psychoanalysis and turn to Marx.
Guattaris own background was in psychoanalysis and activism. As
divergent as these two activities initially seem, in the case of Guattari they
converge on a common objective. Versus various strands of Freudian and
Lacanian thought where the therapeutic objective consists in making the
sick individual healthy, the work in which Guattari was engaged with Jean
Oury at La Borde emphasized group therapy. Just as in the case of political
activism, the focus here is on relations between individuals and community,
interpersonal organization. As a non-hierarchical, non-totalizing means of
organizing and conceiving relations between individuals and community,
Guattari develops the concept of transversality in this context.29 In terms of
both psychoanalysis and Marxism, this leads to an account of human nature
that provides the basis for the political philosophy Deleuze and Guattari
develop in Anti-Oedipus.
Hence, although the locus of Deleuzes political thought does indeed lie
in his collaborative endeavors with Guattari, this is precisely because they
are based on a particular conception of human nature. Since this develops
with reference to a critique of psychoanalysis and the superiority of AngloAmerican literature, only through a thorough exploration of these themes
their broader philosophical significance in Deleuze does this account
of philosophical anthropology and its political significance become clear, a
Deleuzian political anthropology. It does not, however, appear on the basis of
reading either Deleuze or Deleuze and Guattari alone.
ethics (Organs 21). Although I agree with ieks characterization of the transition, far from
being a bad thing, this is precisely where Deleuzes thought becomes relevant politically,
through his critique of psychoanalysis and turn towards (Marxist) materialism.
28
Emblematic in this respect is the way iek sets up Living in the End Times, attempting to
understand the crisis in capitalism at the root of which is group behavior in terms of
Elisabeth Kbler-Ross five stages of grief, meant to apply to the individual alone (xi-xii).
29
See Franois Dosse biographical accounts of Guattaris work at La Borde, his involvement
in political activism and group organization, in Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari: Intersecting
Lives.
28
Introduction
In large part, the poverty of Deleuze studies results from this tendency,
focusing on works by Deleuze alone or those of his immediate contemporaries,
remaining ignorant of the sources from which he received inspiration and the
context in which his thought moves. Central to an understanding of Deleuzes
political thought, the transition from his earlier works to those co-authored
with Guattari, and the significance of the critique of psychoanalysis and the
superiority of Anglo-American literature to these, are the theoretical works of
English writer D.H. Lawrence.
On almost every occasion Deleuze criticizes psychoanalysis or praises
Anglo-American literature, he refers to Lawrences Fantasia of the Unconscious
and Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, and Studies in Classic American
Literature, respectively. Reading these works in conjunction with those by
Deleuze, examining Lawrences commitments and tracing their metaphysical
implications, reveals the extent to which they provide the theoretical
foundation for Deleuzes own thought. Lawrences critique of psychoanalysis
and praise for classic American literature revolve around a conception of human
nature; Deleuzes critique of psychoanalysis and praise for Anglo-American
literature can only thus be fully understood through Lawrence. Whereas
psychoanalysis misunderstands what being human consists in, according
to Lawrence, classic American literature provides an accurate depiction.
Exploring these accounts and tracing Lawrences commitments brings to light
the philosophical anthropology implicit in the work of Deleuze, as well as its
political implications.
On the one hand, both psychoanalysis and Franco-Germanic literature
suppose a conception of human nature where the mind is given priority
over the body, individuals are conceived on the model of self-subsistent
substances, community is conceived as a collection of substances, and the
basis of relations between individuals and community are common goals
and mutual aspirations such that consensus represents the highest goal of
political activity. On the other hand, central to schizoanalysis and AngloAmerican literature is a philosophical anthropology where the mind is not
given priority over the body, individuals are conceived as unique sets of
relations what Spinoza calls bodies community is conceived as wider,
further-reaching sets of relations than individuals, and the basis of relations
between individuals and community is sympathy such that the goal of
political activity consists in the production of shared thoughts, perceptions,
and feelings. Thus, versus the mainstream of contemporary political
thought, Deleuzes work can be understood as contributing to the project
of a political anthropology. The fact this contribution takes shape in terms
29
of Lawrences thought on psychoanalysis and classic American literature is

significant.
On these issues, Lawrence is conservative, bizarrely so when considered in
relation to Deleuze. In terms of psychoanalysis, social and familial relations,
Lawrence defends thoroughly traditional gender roles. Worse still, with respect
to both psychoanalysis and classic American literature, his emphasis on the
body and the importance of strong communal relations seems indicative of
proto-national socialist sympathies. Indeed, through and through, Lawrences
work is saturated by sexism and political conservatism. Rather than becoming
embarrassed by or dismissing these tendencies in Lawrence, I argue the merit
of Deleuzes political anthropological project consists in taking these seriously,
considering what is plausible in these thoroughly conservative, seemingly
antiquated lines of thought.
Refraining from making strong claims regarding the nature of the good
life, morality, etc. is indicative of an attempted neutrality in contemporary
political thought. Tied to the liberal tradition, as an ideal this neutrality itself
arises from and is based on an account of philosophical anthropology similar
in nature to that criticized by Deleuze in psychoanalysis and Franco-Germanic
literature. Insofar as increasing social and political polarity characterizes the
contemporary situation, the account of human nature on which this ideal is
based seems thoroughly misguided. When taken up by Deleuze, the merit
of Lawrences thought consists in making sense of the strong contemporary
backlash against neutrality with respect to claims regarding the nature of
human existence. This is precisely because of the conservative lines of thought
that permeate Lawrences accounts of psychoanalysis and classic American
literature.
This is by no means an endorsement of either Lawrences conservatism
or other rather wild accounts in his work. Rather, the point is to discover
what is plausible or redeeming in these.30 Only by engaging in these lines of
thought can one hope to combat them, understanding the allure of sexism,
nationalism, and fundamentalism forms of conservatism in terms of which
the backlash against liberalism develops.
These should not be understood as aberrant movements, accidental
deviations from the universal norm on which liberal thought is based. Insofar
as these ideals are themselves rooted in a conception of human nature, this
backlash should be understood in terms of philosophical anthropology. In
30
[A]pplying my mind to politics, Spinoza says about his own approach, from the very
condition of human nature I have laboured carefully, not to mock, lament, or execrate,
but to understand human actions (Political Treatise 288).
30
Introduction
terms of their emphasis on the body and reconceptualization of individuality,

community, and relations between the two, the thought of Lawrence and
Deleuze makes sense of this tendency and these movements, pointing towards
a political anthropology in terms of which they can be better understood and
addressed.
31
Chapter One
The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

Introduction: Psychoanalysis as Idealism and D.H. Lawrence
At various points throughout Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari refer
pejoratively to psychoanalysis as a kind of idealism.1 Criticizing a conception
of desire they associate with psychoanalysis, for example, Deleuze and
Guattari write the following: The three errors concerning desire are called
lack, law, and signifier. It is one and the same error, an idealism that forms a pious
conception of the unconscious (AO 111 emphasis added). Hence, despite their
various and far-reaching criticisms of psychoanalysis, at bottom these have
as their common root a fundamental philosophical error, namely, idealism.
Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of psychoanalysis are more fundamental
than the Oedipus complex, neurosis, castration, an understanding of desire
in terms of lack, etc., taken piecemeal and by themselves.2 As components
of psychoanalytic thought, these result from more basic metaphysical
assumptions assumptions regarding the nature of reality of a specifically
idealistic nature. Their schizoanalytic project consists in reformulating
psychoanalytic thought in terms of materialism.3
On the basis of what Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus alone,
however, it is not clear in what sense they understand psychoanalysis to be an
idealism, what this conception of psychoanalysis has to do with a common,
philosophical understanding of idealism, or why this should be a bad thing.4
Although various secondary works have addressed the relation(s) between
psychoanalysis and the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, to the best of my
For example, see AO 24, 111, 118, and 308.
Regarding attempts to reconcile the thought of Deleuze and Guattari with Lacan, which
I find misguided, see Philippe Mengues Le concept de clinique dans lesththique
deleuzienne and Daniel Smiths The Inverse Side of the Structure: iek on Deleuze on
Lacan. See Philippe Van Haute and Tomas Geyskens A Non-Oedipal Psychoanalysis?: A
Clinical Anthropology of Hysteria in the Works of Freud and Lacan concerning Lacans move
away from an understanding of desire in terms of castration and lack with his formulas of
sexuation.
3
See, for example, AO 75.
4
The present study follows Michael Baurs concise yet comprehensive definition: The
term idealism in its broadest sense denotes the philosophical position that ideas (mental
or spiritual entities) are primary and lie at the very foundation of reality, knowledge, and
morality, while non-ideal entities (such as physical or material things) are secondary and
perhaps even illusory (Idealism 1078).
1
2
33
knowledge, no author has taken up this issue specifically, their characterization

of psychoanalysis as an idealism.5 Indeed, given the strange nature of this
claim, it is not even clear how one would go about addressing much less
resolving these queries. The present chapter takes up these questions.
A variety of bedfellows accompany Deleuze and Guattari in their critique
of psychoanalysis, from literary authors and ethnologists to philosophers and
psychoanalysts. Freud and Lacan themselves figure prominently throughout
Anti-Oedipus, as well as Lvi-Strauss, Nietzsche, Marx, and Reich. Given
the intellectual milieu in which Deleuze and Guattaris critique moves,
these engagements are understandable and their significance (relatively)
straightforward. More often than Deleuze and Guattari discuss the work of
either R.D. Laing or Lvi-Strauss, however, they refer to the English writer
D.H. Lawrence.
How or why Lawrence should figure prominently in Deleuze and
Guattaris critique of psychoanalysis an author whose central literary themes
seem to be of a thoroughly Oedipal nature, as notorious for his sexism as
for his proto-national socialist proclivities is not clear. This connection
appears bizarre to anyone familiar with either Lawrences reputation in
general or literary works specifically, providing understandable grounds for
an outright dismissal of its significance.6 Only through an exploration of
this connection, however, can one fully understand Deleuze and Guattaris
characterization of psychoanalysis as an idealism, as well as schizoanalysis as a
materialist reformulation of psychoanalytic thought. Lawrences engagements
with psychoanalysis themselves imply deeper metaphysical commitments that
animate his criticisms of and reformulations of psychoanalysis. According
to Lawrence, psychoanalysis supposes a dualistic understanding of the
relationship between mind and body, where the mind is given ontological
as well as explanatory priority. Deleuze and Guattaris characterization of
psychoanalysis as an idealism and its materialist alternative can be understood
See, for example, Monique David-Mnards Deleuze et la psychanalyse: Laltercation, Tomas

Geyskens Painting as Hysteria: Deleuze on Bacon, Eugene Hollands Deleuze and
Guattaris Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, Christian Kerslakes Deleuze and the
Unconscious, Slavoj ieks Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences and Deleuze
and Psychoanalysis: Philosophical Essays on Deleuzes Debate with Psychoanalysis.
6
See Ian Buchanans Deleuze and Guattaris Anti-Oedipus where he dismisses the importance
of Lawrences thought for an understanding of Anti-Oedipus. He does the same in Deleuze
and His Sources, Buchanans response to Anneleen Masscheleins Rip the Veil of the Old
Vision Across, and Walk Through the Rent: Thinking Through Affect in D. H. Lawrence
and Deleuze and Guattari. This essay by Masschelein is one of the few texts to closely and
carefully consider the relation between Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari.
5
34
in these terms, a trajectory within the history of philosophical thought that

runs from mind-body dualism to idealism.
The ontological and explanatory priority given to the mind in Cartesian
dualism leads to transcendental idealism in Kant, which results in the type of
idealism characteristic of Hegelianism. Likewise, what begins as mind-body
dualism in the work of Freud ends in the linguistic idealism of Lacan. As an
alternative, Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari emphasize an understanding
of human existence in terms of material conditions. Instead of dualism,
Lawrences alternative implies a materialism, a train of thought that can
itself be discerned within the psychoanalytic tradition. Deleuze and Guattari
formulate their own account in this same tradition, implying a Marxist
materialism contra Hegelian idealism. Central to these lines of thought are
familiar philosophical anthropological issues concerning personal identity and
the unity of consciousness, the nature of individuality and relations between
individuals and community.
Through an exploration of Lawrences work on psychoanalysis in
conjunction with the history of philosophy, this chapter explores the
intellectual background necessary to make sense of Deleuze and Guattaris
characterization of psychoanalysis as an idealism. To do so, I focus on
Lawrences conception of the relationship between philosophy and literature,
a problem regarding the possibility of critique and social change this
relationship raises, and his conceptions of the unconscious, familial relations,
and the individuals relation to society. This explication takes place against
the backdrop of the history of philosophy, which serves to clarify Deleuze
and Guattaris understanding and criticisms of psychoanalysis as a kind of
idealism, as well as how this understanding and these criticisms bear on a
broader, further-reaching critique of a conception of human nature an
account of philosophical anthropology.
1. Philosophy and Literature in Lawrence

Published in 1921, Lawrences first book on psychoanalysis, Psychoanalysis and
the Unconscious, was poorly received. Lawrence went on to write a second
book, expanding and developing his criticisms of psychoanalysis, Fantasia
of the Unconscious, published a year later in 1922. In its foreword, after
admonishing critics and lay readers alike to simply stop reading the book to
just put it down because they will not understand it Lawrence explains his
own understanding of the theoretical work in which he is engaged.
35
For Lawrence, the role of literature is primary to that of philosophy; literature

and art are in some sense superior to philosophy: This pseudophilosophy
of mine pollyanalyticsis deduced from the novels and poems, not
the reverse. The novels and poems come unwatched out of ones pen. And
then the absolute need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental
attitude towards oneself and things in general makes one try to abstract some
definite conclusions from ones experiences as a writer and as a man These
pollyanalytics are inferences made afterwards, from the experience (FU 57).
Although philosophy here plays a role, Lawrence says his theoretical and
philosophical commitments derive from literature rather than the reverse,
that literature and art are closer to and, therefore, more capable of grasping
experience than philosophy. Theoretical reflection or philosophical doctrine
the need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards
oneself and things in general stands in a position twice removed from life,
such that for philosophy to have bearing on life, it must first turn to art to
cultivate insights. The perspective one takes towards art is itself indicative or
an outgrowth of the metaphysical commitments to which one subscribes,
the view one takes towards the nature of reality. Lawrences approach marks a
sharp point of departure from the mainstream of the philosophical tradition.
Since its inception, the field of philosophical aesthetics has attempted to
establish guidelines and criteria to judge the merits of artistic works. These
have been employed as either theoretical measuring sticks to judge what does
and does not count as art or as guidelines used by artists themselves in their
creative endeavors.7 Such approaches demean creative, artistic expression at
the expense of interpretive, philosophical understanding. In such a scheme,
art is subordinate to philosophy. Nietzsche reacts against these rationalizing
tendencies in The Birth of Tragedy, linking them to the death of tragedy in the
works of Euripides. Lawrence is also reacting against these same tendencies,
noting the fact that his theoretical (philosophical) reflections follow from his
literary works (art) and not vice versa.
In book ten of the Republic, for example, Socrates condemns the poets, saying art is acceptable
only if it serves political ends a kind of socialist realism. The criteria he uses to reach this
conclusion are the same as those employed by Lawrence in describing his own approach
and touching on the relation between literature and philosophy: For Socrates art stands in a
position twice removed from reality, producing copies of things which are themselves copies
of forms. Similarly, in the work of Freud as well as forms of literary criticism that take
psychoanalysis as their touchstone artistic works are understood and judged in terms of
psychoanalytic meta-theory, forced into a predetermined theoretical constellation to which
they have to answer.
36
The fact that Lawrence begins a book on psychoanalysis by describing

the relationship between philosophy and art is significant: Deleuzes own
turn away from psychoanalysis and turn towards Anglo-American literature,
after all, coincide. Central to the thought of both Lawrence and Deleuze is
a relation between psychoanalysis and an understanding of the relationship
between philosophy and art. Both react against the way psychoanalysis
turns to literature to legitimate its own meta-psychological theories. Just as
in the mainstream of the philosophical tradition, here art is subordinate to
psychoanalysis, mere fodder for its interpretive exercises.8 This approach is
indicative of metaphysical commitments that bear on an understanding of
human nature, one where the mind is given priority in relation to the body.
2. Psychoanalytic Reading in Freud, Bonaparte, and Lacan

If psychoanalysis were simply a therapeutic practice with a set of (somewhat
outlandish) theoretical axioms to explain its practice, then it seems unlikely
that psychoanalysis would arouse the perennial interest and disgust it does.
These reactions would be totally disproportionate to their cause. What
psychoanalysis offers, rather, is a conception of human nature, an account of
what it means to be human. What is unique and at times especially interesting
and disturbing about psychoanalysis account is the centrality of madness,
sexuality, irrationality, violence, etc., a far cry from either Plato or Aristotles
account of human nature as gregarious, contemplative, etc.9 Psychoanalysis
relationship to literature is best understood against this backdrop, turning to
literature to legitimate its own meta-psychological theories. It might be said
to do so in one of two ways, either literature confirms psychoanalytic theory,
or psychoanalysis tells a plausible story about the meaning of literary works.
Freuds Delusions and Dreams in Jensens Gradiva is a perfect example of
the first tendency at work.
Published in 1906, Freuds theory of dreams as wish fulfillment was already
becoming well known. However, the development of his theory of dreams
goes hand-in-hand with the development of his theory of neurosis, central to
which is an account of the ambivalence of the emotions, childhood sexuality,
Deleuze and Guattari constantly and consistently criticize psychoanalysis as merely an
interpretive endeavor. See Freuds description of psychoanalysis as an interpretative art in
The Question of Lay Analysis 220. Regarding psychoanalysis as an interpretive endeavor,
see Psycho-Analysis 238-239 as well.
9
See Philippe Van Haute and Tomas Geyskens Confusion of Tongues: The Primacy of Sexuality
in Freud, Ferenczi, and Laplanche xi-xxii for a fuller elucidation of this account.
8
37
repression all forms of perceived unsavoriness belonging to psychoanalysis.

The focal point of Freuds interests in this essay are Jensens descriptions of
Norbert Hanolds delusions and dreams in Gradiva, specifically, that these
descriptions confirm psychoanalytic theory. Based on Jensens characterization
of Hanold, the descriptions of the latters delusions and dreams coincide with
what a psychoanalytic practitioner would expect to find a narcissistic patient
attempting to re-establish relations with the external world through a love
object that resembles himself (Gradiva 90). Hence, without any knowledge
of psychoanalytic theory, but only an acute understanding of the human
condition, Jensen confirms in a literary work what psychoanalysis discovers
in clinical practice (Gradiva 44). Although this is by no means the only
manner in which Freud engages with literature, it is a way of conceiving this
relation that nevertheless dominates his thought.10 Whereas Freuds interest
in literary authors consists in their confirmations of psychoanalytic insights,
Bonapartes are different.
Marie Bonaparte (1882-1962) was a princess, writer, and psychoanalyst
one of Freuds early adherents and a close confidant. Her concern is with
the ways the meaning of literary texts are determined by and should be
understood in terms of the psychoanalytic biography of its author, consisting
in well-known psychoanalytic themes such as ambivalent feelings towards
ones parents and repressed wishes. This is the approach Bonaparte takes
in her reading of Edgar Allen Poe. She analyzes Poes texts in terms of his
childhood and the relationship with his wife via his relationship with his
mother.11 Once again, the controversy surrounding such readings consists in
their emphasis on especially offensive psychoanalytic themes, those central to
an understanding of human nature.12 Whereas Freuds method of legitimating
psychoanalytic meta-theory thus consists in pointing out similar discoveries
by different methods, Bonaparte shows that without psychoanalytic insights
literary criticism is deficient: Important meanings in texts are overlooked and
undervalued without a psychoanalytic theory of human nature.
The importance of Lacans engagements with literature might be said to
consist, primarily, in legitimating psychoanalytic practice on the basis of a
structuralist interpretation of psychoanalytic accounts of human nature. This
is especially evident in his Seminar on The Purloined Letter. Following
Shoshana Felman, it seems best to understand Lacans interest in the
See also, for example, Psychopathic Stage Characters 307-308 and An Autobiographical
Study 33 and 63-65.
11
See Selections from The Life and Works of Edgar Allen Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation.
12
See Shoshana Felmans account in Turning the Screw of Interpretation.
10
38
Purloined Letter as a metaphor for psychoanalytic practice, a story that

explains Lacans unique contributions to psychoanalytic technique and the
conception of philosophical anthropology it implies.13 There he says that the
true subject of the Purloined Letter is the signifier, emphasizing the primacy
of the symbolic order (E 21).
Versus Anna Freud and the ego psychologists, Lacan does not think the
goal of psychoanalytic therapy is to strengthen the patients ego through
identification with the analysts (Fink 3-5). This would entail a primacy of the
imaginary register, an account of human existence where identity with oneself
and others is possible and plays a primary role. Rather, according to Lacan,
identity is determined by difference (E 6-7). The goal of analysis is not the
identification of the patients desire with that of the analysts but to confront
the patients lack-in-being, felt in the subjects non-coincidence with itself
and the cosmos, insufficiency in pleasure, lack of meaning, etc. (Fink 37).
This therapeutic innovation is a result of Lacans structuralist understanding
of human nature.14 Because of language, the imaginary register or function of
identification cannot be primary.
In Lacanian meta-theory, ego identification would involve identification
in desire, becoming like the other by desiring what the other desires as well
as an object of the others desire (Four Concepts 243).15 Since human beings
occupy the symbolic register, desire is always insufficient.16 Language creates a
On this see On Reading Poetry: Reflections on the Limits and Possibilities of Psychoanalytical
Approaches 147.
14
Structuralisms fundamental insight might be stated as follows: Although language is
dependent on human beings for its existence, language exists prior to individual persons.
Insofar as meaning is a fundamental component of human existence, and language
conditions meaning, human beings owe their existence to language. Emile Benveniste writes,
for instance, that it is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject
(729). Lacan says that language exists before any strictly human relations are established,
before the subject (Four Concepts 20). I return to this more fully in chapter three.
15
One could argue this marks a difference between Freud and Lacan. Freud says, for example,
that identification with the father precedes object cathexis of the mother (Ego and Id 31).
Freud takes up the question of identification in terms of object relations at greater length in
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. He discusses the relation between identification
and desire in terms of being and having, writing that it is difficult to give a clear
metapsychological representation of the distinction (106). Taking up Freuds scheme, Lacan
seems befuddled as to why this caused Freud so much trouble. See his discussion of these
points in Four Concepts 256-257. I am grateful to Herman Westerink for a series of emails
concerning these points.
16
This is a uniquely human form of desire similar to that introduced by Hegel in his masterslave dialectic, the desire for recognition (E 436). For this reason, Lacan thinks the human
child depends on its mothers love or her desire much more than biological satisfaction
(E 463).
13
39
gap between pleasure, the signified, and its articulation, the signifier, putting
an irreducible distance between the articulation of desire and its fulfillment in
pleasure.17 The order of the signifier, or symbolic register, excludes from the
beginning any totalization of the subject, or a coincidence with itself in terms
of what it wants.18 Since the meaning of desire always refers to something other
than pleasure, by its very nature desire is lacking; it always leaves something to
be desired (E 349). In The Seminar on The Purloined Letter, Lacan refers
to this as the signifier that signifies an absence (E 17).19
Hence, identification in desire is impossible. Neither I nor the other can
articulate what it is either of us wants. A pure and simple hole is the others
answer to the question of what he or she wants (E 465). For this reason, a
relation of simple identification is ultimately impossible. This split subject
results from the bodys inscription in language. I can only strive after but
never arrive at unity (Van Haute 26). Lacans use of literature is thus closer
to Freuds than Bonapartes. Lacans aim consists in legitimating his structural
reformulation of psychoanalytic theory and technique, emphasizing the
centrality of language and various functions (maternal/imaginary, paternal/
symbolic) as opposed to bodies and actual people.
In these respects, psychoanalytic reading devalues literature by giving
primacy to theory over art, turning to literature for the sake of legitimating
meta-theory. Lawrence and Deleuzes critiques of psychoanalysis are intimately
linked to issues of philosophical anthropology, which are in turn connected
to the relation between philosophy and literature. Lawrences account of the
relation between philosophy and art further highlights and supports this claim.
3. A Note on Pollyanalytics and Problem of Critique

Versus psychoanalytic readings that turn to literature for the sake of
legitimating psychoanalytic meta-theory, a reading of literature such as the
one Lawrence proposes consists in engaging with literature for the sake of
cultivating novel insights regarding the nature of existence. On Lawrences
account, his theoretical work his pollyanalytics is the result of his
novels, poems, and experiences. Writing is closer to life than theoretical work,
See Four Concepts 154 where desire is described as a remainder of demand, which results
from its articulation in signifiers.
18
See Philippe Van Hautes Against Adaptation: Lacans Subversion of the Subject A Close
Reading 32-33.
19
Elsewhere he identifies this signifier with the phallus and la chose or das Ding.
17
40
i.e., philosophy. Consequently, the theoretical work will succeed or fail to

the extent it is capable of drawing conclusions from the novels, poems, and
experiences. The theoretical work is general, whereas the novels, poems, and
experiences are particular, and the generality of the theoretical work should
always answer to or base its general metal attitudes on the particularity of
the novels, poems, and experiences. But Lawrence seems to suddenly renege,
moving in a direction opposite that of his original commitments.
He says literature and art themselves suppose and are based on philosophy,
a certain metaphysics: even art is utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you
prefer it, on a metaphysic Men live and see according to some gradually
developing and gradually withering vision. This vision exists also as a dynamic
idea or metaphysic exists first as such. Then it is unfolded into life and art
(FU 57). Despite initial appearances to the contrary, however, Lawrence is
not here reneging on his previous position regarding the primacy of art to
philosophy, suddenly re-privileging theoretical or philosophical insights at the
expense of artistic and literary ones.
Rather, Lawrence is adding further nuance to his account of the
relationship between philosophy and art. He says that all art begins with
some type of philosophy, metaphysics, or construed as broadly as possible
a guiding conception of reality. This metaphysics governs ones life and
actions including literary creation and this conception of reality unfolds
in these activities, although no one need be explicitly aware of it. The
problem, says Lawrence, is that the conception of reality with which people
are working is sadly degenerate and, as a result of this degeneracy, so too is
art. In Lawrences pollyanalytical project, and Deleuze and Guattaris
schizoanalytic project by analogy, both philosophy and art should play
a critical, prescriptive role. They have the capacity to change the ways
people think, perceive, and feel.20 However, Lawrences account of the
relationship between philosophy and literature here raises a problem, one
that opens onto and further establishes its connection to philosophical
anthropology.
This problem concerns the implicit commitment to the position that by
changing the way one thinks about reality in general (metaphysics) one changes
the way one experiences and depicts reality (literature), thereby changing the
way one lives (life), and so on and so forth, and vice versa. Conceived in these
More specifically, together these comprise what Deleuze refers to as modes of existence. In
this respect, Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the political, I argue, is modeled on the
creative activities of philosophy and art.
20
41
terms, the solution to the problem of lifes restoration via philosophy and
literature becomes a catch-22 in which one thinks, experiences, depicts, and
lives differently by thinking, experiencing, depicting, and living differently. If
both philosophy and literature are degenerate, then it would be impossible to
work oneself out of this vicious circle. The form of this problem opens onto a
broader one concerning the possibility of critique and social change, thinking
and acting differently: If the ways one thinks about oneself and the world are
determined by the parameters of the social order in which one is raised and
exists, then it seems impossible to think and act beyond these confines. One
must turn to philosophical anthropological commitments to resolve these
problems.
These problems themselves result from regarding the relation between
mind and body dualistically, where psychical processes play a dominant and
determining role. On this account, a change in thought comes before and
precipitates a change in action: The body is determined by the mind, such
that by thinking differently one experiences differently, and only then does
one depict and live differently. However, neither Lawrence nor Deleuze and
Guattari conceive of these problems and their solutions in these terms.21
They subscribe to different metaphysical suppositions concerning the relation
between the mind and body. To understand not only their criticisms of these
positions but also their positive alternatives, it is necessary to examine the
philosophical traditions in which these commitments are grounded.
4.Praxis and Philosophical Anthropology in Marx and Engels

As the wellspring of critical theory, Marx and Engels thought deals with
questions concerning the possibility and means by which critique and
social change occur. For them these questions are intrinsically connected
to an account of philosophical anthropology, highlighting a predominately
materialist conception of human nature.22 One can locate the most salient
characteristics of this account in the German Ideology, against the backdrop
The analogue in Deleuze and Guattaris thought is the question of how desire comes to desire
its own repression. I return to this in chapter three.
22
This is one where the body, material conditions, and physical processes play a larger, more
determinative role than the mind, ideal conditions, and psychical processes. Of course, my
reading here runs exactly opposite to that of Althussers highly influential account in Reading
Capital. However, this is not to disregard the change in Marxs attitude concerning human
nature from his earlier to later works. See William McBrides The Philosophy of Marx 84-88
on this.
21
42
of their criticisms of Hegel and the young Hegelians, based on the role labor
plays as a physical activity determinative of human existence.23
The young Hegelians share with Hegel a predilection to think of human
nature in terms of intellectual activity. Their emphasis on religious matters
evidences this trend: The ability to create gods is a uniquely human capacity
that results from the intellectual activity of projection. Marx challenges this
predilection and its resulting emphasis, evident in, for example, his criticisms
of their theological orientation (Manuscripts 55). Whereas Hegel and the
young Hegelians focus on ideal (thoughts and ideas) conditions of human
existence, Marx and Engels emphasis via Feuerbach is on material conditions
of human existence.24 Marxs turn to political economy can be understood in
this light, a concern with concrete conditions as a heuristic for understanding
collective, productive behavior and its potential for reform, rather than with
the individual and intellectual activity of a theological nature (McBride 15 and
39). Marx and Engels commitments bearing on philosophical anthropology
concern this point.
They explain the difference between humans and other types of beings on
the basis of material rather than ideal conditions: Men can be distinguished
from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin
to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their
physical organization (German Ideology 114). This difference is the ability
to create and manage material means of subsistence: By producing their
means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life
(German Ideology 114). Whereas animals have to rely on the given conditions
of their environments to survive, human beings have the capacity to manage
their environments as well as themselves. This mode of production must
not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence
of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals,
a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part
(German Ideology 114). Not only do human beings have the ability to build
shelters, plant crops, etc., but also the capacity to exercise in order to better
build shelters, learn in order to plant better crops, etc. As individuals
This characterization places Feuerbach with the young Hegelians based on the formers
account of the relationship between human beings and God(s). Although Feuerbach
is a materialist and Marx credits him on this point see The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 54 Marx is nonetheless critical of the type of materialism he espouses.
For instance, see Marxs first thesis on Feuerbach in Theses on Feuerbach 107.
24
This is not to say, however, that Marx is committed to a strict materialism or the determinism
it implies. See McBride 15 on this point.
23
43
express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The
nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining
their production (German Ideology 114). Hence, insofar as human beings are
considered from a material perspective capable of creating and managing
material means of subsistence it can be said that what sets them apart from
animals is the ability to create and manage themselves.
Marx refers to this uniquely human capacity as praxis (sensuous human
activity). Under more specific social and historical conditions, however, labor
is a species of this genus the process by which raw materials are imbued with
value.25 Insofar as the material world becomes valuable as a result of labor, and
labor is considered a species of the genus praxis, labor creates not only material
value but also ideal meaning.
To more fully appreciate the significance of this account laying the
groundwork in terms of which to understand its import to Deleuze and
Guattari it is necessary to turn to the thought of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel.
These three thinkers form the core of a tradition that begins with dualism
and results in the idealism against which the thought of Marx and Engels,
Lawrence, and Deleuze and Guattari are working. Contrasting Descartes,
Kant, and Hegel with Marx and Engels allows for a better understanding
of the non-dualistic, materialist commitments in the work of Lawrence and
Deleuze and Guattari. Not only do these commitments facilitate an answer
to the question concerning the possibility and means of critique and social
change but also the role philosophy and art play towards this end.
5.A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in

Descartes
Central to the role philosophy and art play in the possibility of critique and
social change are familiar philosophical anthropological issues of personal
identity and the unity of consciousness how and why one thinks of oneself
as an individual. Exploring this account in Descartes reveals the theological
motivations guiding his thought, helping to make sense of Deleuze and
Guattaris frequent characterizations and criticisms of psychoanalysis as
theological in nature.
25
Engels generally refers to labor as the activity directed towards the production of exchangerather than use-value. See McBride 88 on this.
44
Descartes accounts for the unity of consciousness with a substance theory

of mind. Consciousness is a unity because the mind is a unity.26 This discovery
is based on the certainty of Descartess own thought that whenever he is
thinking Descartes can be certain that he exists in some way. Descartess
justification for asserting the existence of mind on the basis of thinking is
the result of a metaphysical supposition regarding the relationship between
substance and attribute, actor and activity, based on an assumed ontological
hierarchy.
According to Descartes, substances are more real than attributes, and
actors are more real than activities: Neither could thoughts exist as attributes
without being attributes of a substance, nor could the activity of thinking
exist without the existence of an actor to perform it. 27 Accounting for the
unity of consciousness is an easy step from here.
Consciousness is comprised by thoughts and the activity of thinking, and
thoughts and the activity of thinking belong to and emanate from the mind.
Since the mind is a substance, it exists independently, in and through itself
alone. Insofar as thoughts and the activity of thinking belong to the mind,
they belong to and originate from one and the same mind. This account is
motivated, however, by concerns of a specifically theological nature rather
than disinterested philosophical inquiry alone.
Written as a letter to the Sorbonnes theology faculty, the Preface to the
Meditations is explicit in this respect: Descartess objective is to offer definitive
proofs for Gods existence and the souls potential immortality. Insofar as the
basis of Descartess account is a substance theory of mind, he has an easier time
proving the possibility of the souls immortality than, for example, Aquinas.28
Is it not one and the same I who is now doubting almost everything The fact that it is I
who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of making
it any clearer (Meditations 19).
27
For his discussion of this point with respect to formal reality see, for example, Meditations
117. Further, God possesses more reality than substances, attributes, and modes. For this
reason, Deleuze says the scholastic and Thomistic legacy of analogy is present everywhere
in Descartes (EPS 163). On Descartess account strictly speaking and in an absolute sense
neither the mind nor the body are substances since neither exist independently of other
things in and through themselves alone. It seems inconceivable that thoughts should be
free-floating properties that do not belong to some substance. See George Dickers Descartes:
An Analytical and Historical Introduction 54 on this point. In response to Hobbes, Descartes
writes the following on this: it is certain that a thought cannot exist without a thing that
is thinking; and in general no act or accident can exist without a substance for it to belong
(Meditations 124).
28
Aquinas epistemology relies on the senses more than Descartess. Except in the case of
beatific vision, the intellect always needs a material image from which to abstract a form.
Hence, whereas the mind is (potentially) independent of the body in a Cartesian scheme,
Thomism depends on material conditions to explain not only the individuality-particularity
26
45
One of substances defining characteristics is its independence, that that it

can be conceived independently of other entities (Dicker 54).29 As a finite
substance, however, in Descartess account, mind is always already dependent
on an infinite substance: Mind can only ever be conceived in relation to God.30
Although this is perhaps not surprising after all, Descartes is happy to invoke
divine concurrence throughout his analyses as a metaphysical supposition
for explanatory purposes the fact that ones experience of being human
is never independent of ones experience of the divine secures Descartess
position in a line of thought that runs throughout the early church fathers,
Hegel, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis a line of thought Deleuze finds
objectionable.
Augustines claim, for example, that our hearts are restless until they rest in
thee is an experience of lack characteristic of human existence, tied to the divine
as the subsequent fulfillment of this lack. Hegel associates absolute knowledge
with a kind of divine knowledge, one that supposes an understanding of the
whole to understand parts, which takes place in a discursive, historical fashion.
of substances, but also the experiential basis of knowledge. However, this means that
Aquinas has a harder time giving an account of how souls subsist independently of their
bodies. Specifically, it is much more difficult for him to describe how disembodied souls
either experience pleasure (reward) or pain (damnation) in an afterlife; at the very least
it complicates his account. For a further discussion of these problems, see, for example,
John Wippels Thomas Aquinas on the Separated Souls Natural Knowledge. At the same
time, however, Aquinas less dualistic conception of the soul-body relationship has a positive
side from a theological perspective: It makes the doctrine of bodily resurrection seem more
plausible.
29
Modes can only be conceived of in terms of the entities (substances) of which they are
modes. They cannot be conceived independently of substance.
30
This becomes clear in light of meditation three. Rebutting charges that the attribute of
infinity belonging to the idea of God is merely a negation of his own finitude, the root
of the problem lies in the following: there is more reality in an infinite substance than a
finite one, and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior
to my perception of the finite, that is myself. For how could I understand that I doubted
or desired that is, lacked something and that I was not wholly perfect, unless there
were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own
defects by comparison? (Meditations 31). See his discussion of this in Principles of Philosophy
210 as well. This line of thought is itself the result of the Protestant theological milieu
in which Descartes was working, influenced by the likes of Issaac Beekman and Willem
Teellinck. See Herman Westerinks The Heart of Mans Destiny: Lacanian Psychoanalysis and
Early Reformation Thought for an excellent discussion of this point. Insofar as thinking is
conceived in a discursive fashion (an activity that moves from premises to conclusions,
resulting in more knowledge from less, durational in nature or taking time to achieve, etc.),
then this activity and the substance of which it is supposed to be an essential attribute
is inconceivable apart from God. For example, understanding, willing, doubting, etc. are
forms by which I recognize the substance which is called mind (Mediations 157).
46
Similarly, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, human existence is characterized by a

lack brought on by ones inscription in language.31 The same line of reasoning
and descriptions of this type are even more evident in Levinas thought, where
he refers to Descartes specifically.32 Hence, although Descartes is certainly not
unique in these respects, insofar as his work sets the stage for much of early
modern as well as contemporary thought, noting exactly how and where his
dualistic account of mind bears the marks of a vestigial theology is important.
A connection exists between dualistic accounts of the relation between
mind and body and a theological worldview, a connection Deleuze and
Guattari find in Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, in terms
of their related methodologies and accounts of desire. Insofar as Hegelian
philosophy is, in large part, a response to Kantian commitments, to better
understand this connection, it is necessary to examine how Kant accounts
for the unity of consciousness. Further, examining this account lays the
groundwork to understand what Deleuze and Guattari mean by both
syntheses and paralogism of the unconscious.33
6. Experiential Unity and Transcendental Subjectivity in Kant

Kants concern with the unity of consciousness stems from Humes criticisms
of substance theories of mind. According to Hume, one never discovers the
self as a mind substance, such that the unity of consciousness cannot be
pegged to that of a substance. Kant follows Hume in his criticisms of such an
account, but is well aware as seemed to be Hume that explaining the unity
of consciousness without a substance theory of mind poses acute difficulties.34
Experience presents itself in a unified fashion, and there must be a reason
for this unity. Based on the particular conception of experience with which
Kant works, he identifies transcendental subjectivity as this condition.
Versus imagistic accounts of experience where experience is comprised
of something like images or pictures Kants conception of experience is
thoroughly propositional where experience is always of something, that things
I return to Hegel shortly, more fully describing the relation between Hegelian philosophy
and Lacanian psychoanalysis.
32
See, for instance, Emmanuel Levinas Otherwise than Being 25 and Ethics and Infinity 91.
Although this line of thought is especially evident in Levinas phenomenology, it is also at
work in Husserls later thought. See, for example, Richard Kearneys The God Who May Be:
A Hermeneutics of Religion for an explanation along these lines.
33
I return to this at length in chapter three.
34
See, for instance A Treatise of Human Nature 635-636. I return to a fuller elucidation of
Deleuzes engagements with Humes thought in chapter four.
31
47
appear in a certain way. Experience must thus be the result of judgments;

judgments condition the possibility of experience.35
The activity of judgment consists in the process of applying concepts to
intuitions, the activity of synthesis.36 Since experience supposes concepts,
contra empiricist accounts, these concepts cannot be derived from experience.37
Rather, they are a priori. Concepts make experience possible in the first place.38
According to Kant, however, the activity of synthesis itself requires and
presupposes more basic conditions, pre-categorical conditions of possible
experience.39 These are a subject of judgment and an object of experience,
what Kant refers to as transcendental subjectivity or apperception, and the
object x. Experiential unity results from synthetic judgments, but judgments
suppose the transcendental subject and object x as their co-constituting ground.
The object x is an organizational focal point for the way the transcendental
subject brings concepts to bear on intuitions in judgments (Gardner 157160). Kants clearest description of transcendental subjectivity is in terms of
an I think capable of accompanying any and all experience. This subject is
by no means anything substantial but merely an empty representation that
accompanies experience.40 Although the transcendental subject should not be
conceived in substantial terms, thought has an inevitable tendency to do so.
This tendency results in an illusion of reason, mistaking a logical function
for a substantial entity, what Kant calls paralogisms particular types of
illusions regarding the nature of the self. The different transcendental illusions
See Anthony Savilles Kants Critique of Pure Reason 34-37.

This is determinate rather than reflective judgment. My only concern here is with determinate
judgment. I return to Deleuze and Guattaris account of the syntheses of the unconscious,
which should be understood along these lines, in chapter three.
37
On an empiricist account, concepts result from abstraction: Experience is ordered in
a law-like manner and cognition abstracts concepts from this experience. But if Kants
characterization of experience as propositional is correct, the problem for empiricists lies in
explaining experiences law-like manner in the first place, how experience is possible if the
mind is tabula rasa and concepts only result from experience by abstraction.
38
Whereas Kant begins with the average persons experience of medium-sized sensible
things, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattaris transcendental philosophy begins with the
schizophrenics experience. I return to this in chapter three.
39
See Sebastian Gardners Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason 145.
40
At the ground of this [transcendental] doctrine [of the soul], Kant writes, we can place
nothing but the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which
one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every
concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented
than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts
that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least
concepts (Critique of Pure Reason 414).
35
36
48
share a common error, ascribing existence to that which exceeds the bounds
of (possible) experience, employing transcendent criteria to immanent
experience.41
Transcendental subjectivity is the activity of thought in general, the thought
of an I know not what that brings unity to experience by virtue of the fact that
experience occurs within one and the same consciousness. The transcendental
subject likewise supposes the object x as an object or event in general, in
terms of which experience is organized. Although these two conditions are
equiprimordial co-constituting grounds of any and all possible experience
Kant allows the duality between them to subsist. The philosophy of Hegel
takes shape in terms of the relation between transcendental subjectivity and
the object x as conditions of possible experience. His notion of Spirit and the
import of the dialectical method develop at the crux of this subsistent duality
in Kant.
7. Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method in Hegel

The thought of Hegel is best understood in terms of its relation to his
philosophical predecessors: He takes up and pushes further a number of
objectives introduced by Fichte and Schelling whose work relies, in turn, on
Kant. Within this philosophical lineage, two issues are of particular interest:
Hegels notion of Spirit and his dialectical method. Examining each in turn
and the relation between them reveals the connection between theological
tendencies in Hegels thought and his social and political commitments.
Deleuze and Guattari find these same strands at work in psychoanalysis, and
through their elucidation a connection can be established between Deleuze
and Guattaris criticisms of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian philosophy.
According to Hegel, Kant is wrong to leave the distinction between
transcendental subjectivity and the object x intact. Since transcendental
subjectivity supposes the object x and vice versa, as mutually supporting and
co-determining conditions of any and all possible experience, the difference
between the two should ultimately be resolved. Spirit is the ground into
which Hegel resolves this distinction, which is a quasi-divine form of socially
and historically conditioned collective self-consciousness. For this reason, his
analysis takes the form of an account of the way Spirit comes to be manifest
both socially and historically, as the self-conscious realization of itself as the
Immanent criteria then are the opposite of transcendent ones. They appeal only to what is
given in (possible) experience.
41
49
ground of both subjectivity and objectivity. Hegels dialectical method informs

his conception of Spirit. This method is ultimately a solution to problems of
historical and cultural relativism.
Traditionally conceived, knowledge is of that which is unchanging,
episteme. According to Aristotle, for instance, having episteme consists in
understanding a things cause or explanation.42 The cause or explanation of a
thing is its form: Forms explain the regular characteristics and characteristic
activities of things, and forms are themselves unchanging. The 18th and 19th
centuries experienced an influx of information regarding peoples from all
over the world, an awareness that, historically and geographically, beliefs and
practices regarding, for example, religion and politics differ significantly. This
presents problems to philosophical accounts of knowledge.
Empirical facts regarding the wide variance of peoples behaviors, religions,
etc. call into doubt the existence of unchanging forms. If forms existed and
were unchanging, then one would expect the characteristics and characteristic
activities of people to be relatively invariant, but this is precisely not the case.43
If unchanging forms do not exist, then it seems as though knowledge would
be impossible.
The picture of philosophy and history with which Hegel works is full of
struggle and strife. Precisely because of its initially chaotic appearance, Hegels
philosophy is an attempt to make sense of this mess. His philosophical endeavor
can thus be considered a theodicy (Findlay 330). Whereas traditional theodicy
attempts to justify Gods goodness on the basis of a story regarding the divine,
as a critical post-Kantian philosopher, this route is closed to Hegel. He needs
immanent criteria to justify historys cruel march. Hegels contribution is the
unique way he carries out this task, resolving apparent contradictions and
showing how and why things and concepts that at first appear different from
one another are ultimately the same, justifying historys violent character in
the process. In this respect then, the goal of Hegels dialectical method is an
explanation of difference in terms of identity.44
He does so on the basis of two movements. The dialectical method shows
that things and concepts that at first appear to be different are based on a more
originary, logically prior unity and can be understood in terms of a higher,
See, for example, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b8-12.
With regard to this problem in Hegels thought, Alexandre Kojve writes the following:
Knowledge is related to Time that is, to change. But since Time is now without limits,
change never stops. Hence, there is no eternal or definitive Knowledge: there is no episteme,
there is only doxa (108-109).
44
This is precisely the way Deleuze frames Hegels thought in Difference and Repetition.
42
43
50
temporally posterior unity (Kojve 87). Although these two movements

are separated for heuristic purposes, Hegels genius lies in collapsing them:
According to the criteria of the method itself, these two movements must
be resolved, forming a more originary-higher unified-explanatory movement.
Hegel collapses arche onto telos, forming one focal point used for the sake of
essentialist explanation (Kojve 194).45
Although human behaviors and political organizations change and
are changing in and with time, if an unmovable Archimedean point could
be established in terms of which to understand and explain these, then
philosophical understanding and explanation become certain in terms of
this point. Necessity becomes a feature of each and every one of historys
movements if the point (arche-telos) towards which all these movements are
tending is itself necessary.46 When difference is understood and explained in
these terms as the reason for, as both ground and end, historical violence
then violence ceases to be meaningless. Violence takes on meaning in terms of
the philosophical understanding and explanation carried out in light of this
point. On this basis, an initial connection can be established between Deleuze
and Guattaris criticisms of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian philosophy,
a methodological connection.
In Hegelian philosophy, one can only fully understand the meaning or truth
of parts on the basis of the whole, just as in Lacanian psychoanalysis the whole
only receives its structure and, in turn, individual signifiers their meaning on
the basis of a privileged signifier that signifies lack, what Lacan variously refers
to as the phallus, das Ding, etc. Further, to account for his transition from
individual forms of consciousness to a social world, Hegel invokes the notion
of desire, which is described as an attempt to utilize external objects for ones
own ends, consumption being the simplest, most animal-like form. Desire
then is the mechanism by which an individual relates to a community, at the
very least because the individual relies on a community to fulfill his or her
instinctive, biological needs (Kojve 6-9). Hence, a second point of continuity
This move is a response to the advent of historical consciousness and its concomitant
epistemological problem, and should be understood in terms of Hegels theodical
predilections. Once again, Kojve succinctly describes the conundrum as follows: One
must say that events in the World, as well as the World itself, are contingent: hence there is
no absolute Knowledge relating to them. But if, per impossible, Gods designs and His creative
will were known, there could be a true Science of the World (109).
46
In Aristotle: The Desire to Understand 44 and 51, Jonathan Lear describes this same line of
reasoning at work in Aristotles understanding of the relation between the physical sciences
and metaphysics, calling it hypothetical necessity. In fact, Lear goes so far as to invoke
Hegels description of the relationship between history and philosophy in the preface to the
Philosophy of Right to introduce this notion in Aristotles thought (23).
45
51
between the thought of Hegel and Lacan becomes apparent with regard to
their respective conceptions of desire.
Lacans account of desire is modeled on Hegels in two ways. First, in both
cases desire plays a decisive role in the individuals relation to a community.
Second, a central feature of their accounts is the non- or a-biological
nature of desire, the fact that versus either need or demand in Lacan, or
consumption in Hegel the aim of a uniquely human desire (desire of desire)
is not the fulfillment of biological needs. In fact, desire of this type can have
a consequence exactly the opposite of the organisms survival, as is evident in
Hegels master-slave dialectic.47
The highest, most human form of desire is the desire to be desired, which
supposes ones recognition as a person. This initiates a life and death struggle
wherein one participant refuses to fight to the death and agrees to become the
others slave, the slave working to support the master. However, the slave takes
on a position of superiority to the master since the slaves labor supports both.48
The resolution of this dialectic only occurs when both the master and slave
partake in labor, supporting themselves as well as the state for which they labor.
The state takes the place of another person, recognizing everybody equally
under the law.49 This is what Hegel understands by freedom, Spirits central
characteristic as a form of consciousness: the I that is the we and the we that is
the I.50 From this perspective, it becomes clear why and how Hegel considers
See, for example, Kojve 45 and 248 regarding suicide for a further discussion of these
points. For this reason, it is not surprising that Lacan associates desires movement with the
insistence of the signifier, which he also associates with the death drive.
48
On this point, Kojve says the following: History stops at the moment when the difference,
the opposition between Master and Slave disappears: at the moment when the master will
cease to be Master, because he will no longer have a Slave; and the Slave will cease to be
a Slave because he no longer has a Master (although the Slave will not become Master
in turn, since he will have no Slave) (43-44). As is well known, Kojves reading of the
Phenomenology takes the master-slave dialectic as its focal point. For this reason, his reading
is obviously open to criticism. However, I am in agreement with a view proposed by Paul
Moyaert: Even if Kojves reading is off, he manages to accomplish what few scholars of
Hegel do; Kojve makes Hegel interesting. Furthermore, it is in terms of Kojves reading
of Hegel, which significantly influenced the French intellectual milieu, that Deleuze and
Guattaris criticisms take shape and can be understood.
49
For a discussion of the way in which this takes place in terms of the dialectic where the
slave as the particular and the master as the universal give rise to the citizen as individual
see Kojve 59-60 and 234 ff.
50
Findlay gives a nice description of this same point regarding the active and passive powers
that constitute objects in Hegels interpretation of Kants third analogy in the Logic (219).
This point should be understood in light of his later lectures on the philosophy of history,
specifically, the development of Spirit throughout history, its three basic stages Oriental,
Classical, and German and their classification in terms of freedom for one, some, all. See
Hegels The Philosophy of History on this.
47
52
Spirit the arche (origin-ground) of individual consciousness and philosophical

explanation. However, he also thinks that Spirit can be considered the telos
(goal-outcome) of individual consciousness and philosophical explanation.
Since each form of consciousness coming before that of Spirit needs
additional philosophical suppositions to support its claims, the dialectic moves
in accordance with a search for these postulates. It stops with the discovery of
Spirit, however, because Spirit is a complex enough form of consciousness to
require no further suppositions. This conclusion is related to Hegels end-ofhistory thesis, the claim that history came to an end with the advent of the
19th century Prussian state.51
Only when everybody works together to imbue raw nature with meaning
does one become conscious of the fact that ones proper orientation within
the world results in self-consciousness. The conditions for the possibility of
such a realization, says Hegel, are of a specifically social-political nature.52
Just as a search for an account of consciousness adequate to experience drives
the dialectic to Spirit as the necessary and sufficient condition of preceding
accounts (arche) so too does the search for a social-political milieu adequate
to Spirit drive the dialectic to constitutional monarchy as the final cause
directing earlier forms of social-political organization in which Spirit cannot
be realized (telos).
In relation to the dialectical method as a solution to the problem of
relativism, it is absolutely necessary that Hegel reach a point at the end
of the dialectic that is neither contingent nor changing but necessary and
immutable. If Spirit reciprocally supposes and conditions the 19th century
Prussian political milieu and is the necessary outcome of earlier forms of
consciousness and social-political milieus, then earlier forms of consciousness
Regarding an understanding of Spirit in these terms, he writes that The ethical substance
is actual substance, absolute Spirit realized in the plurality of existent consciousnesses; this
spirit is the community as conscious ethical essence It is Spirit which is for itself in that
it preserves itself in its reflection in individuals; and it is implicitly Spirit, or substance, in that
it preserves them within itself (Phenomenology 267). This is not an empirical claim, one that
would concern the end of movement or lived temporal duration. I claim neither that history
came to an end with the advent of the 19th century Prussian state, nor that Hegel thought
history came to an end empirically speaking with the advent of the 19th century Prussian
state. Rather, this position is metaphysical in nature: Hegel invokes it as a metaphysical
supposition for the sake of establishing a fixed point in terms of which to undertake his
essentialist analysis of history.
52
On this score, Hegel writes that As actual substance, it [Spirit] is a nation, as actual
consciousness, it is the citizens of that nation. This consciousness has its essence in simple
Spirit, and the certainty of itself in the actuality of this Spirit, in the nation as a whole; it has
its truth, therefore, not in something that is not actual [transcendent or extra-sensory], but
in a Spirit that exists and prevails (Phenomenology 267).
51
53
and social-political milieus can themselves be conceived as necessary in

relation to this fixed point.53 In Hegel this process is intimately related to
theological commitments.
Spirit is a quasi-divine entity, such that its process of unfolding in history
and being realized in historical world consciousness is tantamount to the
working out of Gods plan in history, as well as the conscious realization
of this plan as divine.54 The 19th century Prussian political organization
and Christendom are, for example, concrete instantiations of Spirit as the
necessary outcome of historys movement. Foregone political arrangements
and religious systems can only be understood in terms of these fixed points,
which retroactively give previous political arrangements and religious systems
a sense and meaning. In this respect then, a profoundly Aristotelian line of
reasoning animates Hegels philosophy.
As was mentioned previously, for Aristotle episteme consists in understanding
a things cause, explaining the characteristics and characteristic activities
things evidence with reference to the expression of an essence through the
development of form. The development of a things form ultimately results
from God, what Aristotle refers to as the unmoved mover. The unmoved
mover initiates the movement in and through which the development of a
Succinctly describing the nature of this movement, Kojve writes the following: Generally
speaking: the historical movement arises from the Future and passes through the Past in
order to realize itself in the Present or as temporal Present (136).
54
Nicely capturing the relation between the two movements of the dialectic, Kojve describes
the process in terms of Christian scripture, terminology borrowed from the Gospel of
John: Indeed, on the one hand the (eternal) Concept situated in Time i.e., the Word
rises up through its meaning to the entity revealed by this meaning; and on the other
hand, this entity descends through the meaning toward the Word, which it thus creates
as Word out of its phonetic, sound-giving, changing reality. Without the Word, Eternity
would not be represented in Time, and consequently it would not be accessible to Man.
And without Eternity, the Word would have no meaning and would not raise Man
above Time and change; there would be no truth for Man (106-107). Although noting
the Christian origin, Kojve says that Hegel is Platonic on this point (106). However, it
seems as though this position is best characterized as neo-Platonic in nature. It should
be pointed out that various non-metaphysical readings and interpretations of Hegel
exist, ones that sift through his thought for insights regarding, for example, political and
epistemological thought while leaving aside or throwing out many of Hegels more robust
metaphysical commitments. See, for example, Christopher Yeomans Freedom and Reflection:
Hegel and the Logic of Agency and Kenneth Westphals Hegels Epistemology. These readings
are uninteresting to me as Deleuze clearly does not subscribe to such interpretations,
and I do not think that Hegels broader thought can be divorced from his metaphysical
commitments, nor that ones views regarding, for example, either politics or epistemology
can be divorced from metaphysics, from fundamental commitments regarding the nature of
reality.
53
54
things form occurs as a final cause.55 Since material things are composed of
not only form but also matter, they are also not entirely actual but in a sense
only potential. The unmoved mover is entirely actual and, hence, completely
immaterial. The development of form is the movement from potentiality to
actuality, and in this way the development of form is an attempt to imitate
the entirely actual existence of the unmoved mover. As an object of love that
each and every thing attempts to imitate, the unmoved mover is the final
cause towards which the development of form and the expression of essence is
tending.56 Hegel is explicit in this analogy.
Knowledge of the absolute idea achieved in Hegels encyclopedic
philosophy is tantamount to the thought of the unmoved mover, the final,
self-sufficient, and totally immaterial cause directing history to its zenith,
the focal point in terms of which all other forms must be understood (Logic
324).57 The end of history is the telos towards which the dialectic is working,
the specific historical and social point at which Spirit comes into existence.
Unlike Aristotle, however, Hegel need not appeal to transcendent criteria a
transcendent entity, the unmoved mover to explain this movement.58 His
commitment to an end-of-history thesis obviates this necessity. As opposed to
appealing to the mystical activities of an unknown God, Hegel need only look
out his window to discover the activity directing history the reason, as a final
causal, history has unfolded as such.59
See especially Metaphysics Lambda 1069a18-1076a4.

Regarding a reading of this type, see Aryeh Kosmans Divine Being and Divine Thinking
in Metaphysics Lambda. He says the divine mode of being one finds in lambda is the
principle of a more general mode of being the being of substance one finds in the central
books of the Metaphysics, as the formal explanatory principle of being in general (165). It
serves as the link between an understanding of substance-being and general ontology an
understanding of being as such (174). For similar approaches, see Michael Fredes The
Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotles Conception of Metaphysics, as well
as Gnther Patzigs Theology and Ontology in Aristotles Metaphysics.
57
For further commentary on this point, see John Grier Hibbens Hegels Logic: An Essay in
Interpretation 145-146, as well as Findlay 48. When Hegel takes up the question of the
family, for example, he explains and justifies its place in a broader public order, that of the
state (Philosophy of Right 122).
58
See Kojve 162 on this.
59
In a profoundly Hegelian vein, Lacan says the stages of psychical life are organized around
castration. He writes that the fear of castration is like a thread that perforates all the states
of development. It orients the relations that are anterior to its actual appearance weaning,
toilet training, etc. It crystallizes each of these moments in a dialectic that has as its centre a
bad encounter (Four Concepts 64). See Four Concepts 180 where he describes the objet petit
a as the lost object around which the drives circle as an eternally lacking object.
55
56
55
8. Marx versus Descartes, Kant, and Hegel

Marx and Engels deal with many of the same themes as Descartes, Kant,
and Hegel.60 However, they place greater emphasis on material rather than
ideal conditions in their understandings of human existence. This is also the
case with Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari. Given the generally esoteric
nature of Deleuze and Guattaris expositions, however, to clearly understand
their commitments with respect to philosophical anthropology, here Marxs
account acts as a touchstone to understand the way it tacitly inform Lawrences
work, on the basis of which Deleuze and Guattaris own account can be
understood. The present section deals with the way Marxs materialist analysis
in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 can be understood as
providing different grounds for the unity of consciousness in Descartes, the
pre-categorical subject-object nature of experience in Kant, and the reason for
social change in Hegel.
Descartess account of the unity of consciousness in terms of his substance
theory of mind and psychical activity is anathema to Marx. Marx does not
deny the role the intellect plays in human affairs, but merely explains ways of
thinking and intellectual activity on the basis of actions and physical activity,
and not vice versa. Praxis receives ontological and explanatory priority in
Marx. Precisely this perspective causes him to deny consciousness unity.
Marxs account of alienation can be understood in theses terms, as claiming
consciousness is not one.
As was mentioned above, insofar as the material world becomes valuable
as a result of labor, and labor is considered a species of the genus praxis, labor
creates not only material value but also ideal meaning.61 Marx highlights
the fact that not only does labor imbue raw material with meaning through
the creation of artifacts that establish a world according to human needs as
ends, but the created artifacts and the world they constitute also reciprocally
determine and give meaning to human beings that create them. Given a
capitalist mode of production where the goal is the production of capital
and labors division is a mechanism to more efficiently extract surplus value
from labor for this end a process of misidentification occurs, what Marx
These are, after all, of perennial philosophical concern, themes concerning the nature of
human existence.
61
Describing the relationship between praxis as labor, the production of commodities, and the
production of the worker in terms of praxis, Marx writes the following: Labor produces not
only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity (Manuscripts 57).
60
56
refers to as alienation.62 The role this activity plays in the production of

a human world is not only unclear to workers but also materially nonexistent. Workers do not share in the spoils of the commodities they
produce.
Hence, this activity cannot be understood as a uniquely human capacity
by which people create themselves. A rift is thus established, a discontinuity
between the way people create themselves (existence) and the way they think
of themselves (essence). For this reason, the source of ones being seems to
be different from or alien to ones self.63 This discontinuity is no less real
because of its contingent character. Usurping ones productive activities for
the sake of extra-sensuous objectives the production of capital in which
workers will not share the world is drained of practical, sensuous goals
the transformation of ones environment and self for the sake of survival by
which objects and subjects receive meaning. Marxs further difference from
both Kant and Hegel might be understood on the basis of these commitments.
Kant introduces the notion of transcendental subjectivity to account for
the unity of consciousness in terms other than substance. Unlike Kant, the
conditions of experience Marx identifies are material in nature. For this reason,
he can explain the subject-object nature of experience described by Kant in
terms of praxis. Rather than the pre-categorical conjugate transcendental
subjectivity-object x, Marx accounts for both the subject and object in terms of
the productive laborer (as subject) and produced commodity (as object). One
and the same physical activity is responsible for the production of both subject
and object. The fact that experience evidences a subject-object form can be
explained with reference to the concrete conditions according to which labor
is organized (Marx, Manuscripts 58).64 Kants philosophy with its emphasis
This fact expresses merely that the object which labor produces labors product confronts
it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer (Manuscripts 57).
63
In the conditions dealt with by political economy this realization of labor appears as loss of
reality for the workers (Manuscripts 57-58).
64
This conception of an undifferentiated, neither subjective nor objective productive power
lies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the unconscious and desire in
Anti-Oedipus. With respect to these notions, generally scholars either dodge the issue completely Eugene Hollands entry on Desire in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts is emblematic
in this respect: The aim of this essay is not to explain what desire means, but to show how
the concept gets constructed and how it works (53) or get it wrong, explaining desire in
polymorphous, early Freudian terms basically, an account of desire in which its objects
and aims are variable. For an excellent description of Freuds account, see Van Haute and
Geyskens, Confusion 107 ff. Although a conception of this type is by no means totally divorced from Deleuze and Guattaris view, it does not fully capture what they mean by desire.
I return to this in chapter three.
62
57
on the subject-object ground as the most basic condition of judgment and,

therefore, experience is, thus, a sort of ideology. It results from and attempts
to justify as foundational a type of experience oriented in and conditioned by
a particular social-historical milieu.65 Kant takes this experience for granted,
never considering the possibility that social and historical factors condition
it. Although this possibility stands at the forefront of Hegels thought, just
as with Kant, Marx accounts for the transition between social and historical
milieus in a different manner.
According to Hegel, the end of history is the telos towards which the
dialectic is working, a specific political milieu embodying Spirit that pulls
thoughts and ideas forward as a final cause the reason for social and political
change. Although neither Marx nor Engels think that history had or has come
to an end, they are nonetheless teleological thinkers: The highest (final) form
of social and political life is not a constitutional monarchical state in which a
newly-minted bourgeois class has increasing say in government, but a system
in which private property no longer exists or plays a much smaller role so
that workers own and control the means of production (McBride 17). For
Marx and Engels, this is the logical outcome of a number of contradictions that
plague capitalism (McBride 93). Socialism and then communism result from
the resolution of these contradictions.66 Hence, whereas Hegel works with a
very specific telos, a specific social-political organization towards which history
is tending, explaining the cause and nature of social and political change,
Marx and Engels are more ambiguous and do not appeal to a determinate
telos (the end of history) to explain how or why revolutionary changes in selfconsciousness and social-political organization are or are still capable of
taking place. Rather, their theory of labor provides this explanation.
An argument for an analogous case an analysis of the way Descartess philosophy is an

ideology that results from an increasingly wealthy but politically stifled bourgeois class
can be found in Antonio Negris The Political Descartes: Reason, Ideology, and the Bourgeois
Project. In chapter three I orient my reading of Anti-Oedipus from a similar perspective,
noting that its experiential reference is specific to schizophrenia.
66
However, Marx and Engels descriptions of socialist and communist societies are few and
far between, and, on the basis of these descriptions, it is difficult to arrive at their precise
characteristics (McBride 117). The closest they come is a number of negative descriptions
that they describe in terms of, for example, the annulment of private property and the
abolition of the present state of things. See especially Manuscripts 68 and 70 and German
Ideology 126.
65
58
Understood in terms of the uniquely human activity by which human

beings transform themselves and their environments for the sake of
subsistence, any social-political organization in which praxis as labor is
utilized and directed against these ends seems doomed to fail; it is riddled with
contradictions. Capitalism works in accordance with just such a logic, which
precipitates change. This conclusion is important to the investigation at hand
for two reasons. First, the cause of social and political change (and upheaval)
lies in material rather than ideal conditions. On this account, the ultimate
reason for change lies in neither new ideas nor different ways of thinking but
concrete material conditions.
Second, this perspective results from more fundamental metaphysical
issues regarding the relation between mind and body. In Descartes, Kant,
and Hegel, the mind and psychical processes are given ontological as well
as explanatory priority: The mind is more real than the body and for this
reason psychical processes explain physical ones. At bottom, such a dualism
is ultimately an idealism. This is not the case in the thought of Marx and
Engels. Lawrence orients his own critique of psychoanalysis in precisely these
terms.
9. Lawrences Conception of the Unconscious

Lawrences criticisms of psychoanalysis can be understood in terms of his
commitments regarding the relationship between mind and body, which are
components of a broader philosophical anthropology that runs throughout
his work. These come to the foreground in his conception of the unconscious.
For Lawrence, the term unconscious denotes a much broader range
of phenomena than in traditional psychoanalytic parlance. Neither the
content of the unconscious with which he is primarily concerned result from
repression67 nor does Lawrence think there is anything uniquely psychical
Although Lawrence understands this to be a psychoanalytic commitment, it is by no means

something for which Freud argues. In fact, Freud claims precisely the opposite: Everything
that is repressed must remain unconscious, but at the very outset let us state that the
repressed does not comprise the whole of the unconscious (Unconscious 109). At other
points, however, Freud claims that the repressed is a prototype of the unconscious. For
instance, see Ego and Id 15.
67
59
about the unconscious.68 Describing his own project, Lawrence says that we
have actually to go back to our own unconscious. But not to the unconscious
which is the inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness (PU 13).
On Lawrences account, the psychical content of consciousness is the result
of unconscious physical processes, but these processes are neither analogous to
nor representative of the content to which they give rise.69 Rather, Lawrence
is interested in what he calls the true unconscious. It is not a shadow cast
from the mind [a representation]. It is the spontaneous life-motive in every
organism where life begins the unconscious also begins like a unit of
force (PU 13).
Unlike a psychical, representative account of the unconscious where
the unconscious is something specifically mental that simply mirrors or
represents conscious content in an inverted fashion Lawrence conceives
of the unconscious as a physical reality, likening it to a unit of force.
Consciousness develops in relation to this unconscious, physical reality, from
the development of the coordination of a number of somatic processes.70
Since these processes come before consciousness, Lawrence says they should
be considered unconscious. Hence, everything traditional psychoanalytic
theory considers preconscious is in Lawrences scheme unconscious, as
well as phenomena that might be called a-conscious, insofar as they are
not typically related to discussions concerning the nature or make-up of
Regarding the content of the unconscious, Freud writes that of many of these latent states
we have to assert that the only point in which they differ from states which are conscious is
just in the lack of consciousness of them (Unconscious 112). These latent states are like
images, and the distinction between conscious and unconscious states is explained in terms
of the amount of consciousness, mental energy, or libido attached or cathected to these
images. On this same score, Freud writes that psychoanalysis regarded everything mental
as being in the first instance unconscious; the further quality of consciousness might also
be present, or again it might be absent (Autobiographical Study 31). Here the content of
the unconscious are the same as those of consciousness, except that the former are lacking
in consciousness. Although Freud is quick to point out especially in earlier works such
as Interpretation of Dreams that processes that govern the unconscious are different from
those that govern consciousness, his model of the unconscious is essentially that of a mirror,
where images in the unconscious are just distorted representations of those in consciousness.
69
He says that the unconscious contains nothing ideal, nothing in the least conceptual, and
hence nothing in the least personal, since personality, like the ego, belongs to the conscious
or mental-subjective self (PU 30).
70
The primal consciousness [unconscious] in man, he says, is premental, and has nothing
to do with cognition. It is the same as in the animals The mind is but the last flower, the
cul de sac life and action take rise actually at the great centers of dynamic consciousness
(FU 74).
68
60
consciousness.71 In this manner, a number of sociological and political factors

enter Lawrences analysis. Before being able to examine the implications of
this broadened horizon, however, it is necessary to turn to Lawrences account
of these somatic processes and their development.
According to Lawrence, the body should be conceived as a cross, with a
horizontal as well as a vertical axis, which divides the body into quadrants,
or what he calls centers.72 Lawrence gives each of these centers a specific
name, saying that they are responsible for the operations of each of the
major organs located therein.73 These centers are as follows: first, the lower
front, the solar plexus which controls the assimilatory function in digestion
(FU 76); second, the lower back, the lumbar ganglion;74 third, the upper
front, the thoracic plexus; fourth, the lower back, the thoracic ganglion.75
Lawrence associates each of the five senses with one or more of these centers
(FU 93-104).
When these centers develop properly and are coordinated with one
another, the lower centers of the body are responsible for the passions or
emotions, while the upper centers are responsible for knowledge. Although
this account is admittedly wild, rather than dismissing it wholesale, one should
look towards its plausibility: Philosophically, this consists in an explanation of
On this score, Lawrence writes that the unconscious is that active spontaneity bringing
both mind and body forth from itself the unconscious brings forth not only consciousness,
but tissue and organs also (PU 42).
72
These four centers control the four greatest organs. And they give rise to the whole basis
of human consciousness The horizontal division of the diaphragm divides man forever
into his individual duality, the duality of the upper and lower man, the two great bodies
of upper and lower consciousness and function. This is the horizontal line. The vertical
division between the voluntary and the sympathetic systems, the line of division between the
spinal system and the great plexus-system of the front of the human body, forms the second
distinction into duality (PU 43-44).
73
He says, it is the solar plexus, with the lumbar ganglion, which controls the great dynamic
system, the functioning of the liver and the kidneys. Any excess in the sympathetic
dynamism tends to accelerate the action of the liver, to cause fever and constipation. Any
collapse of the sympathetic dynamism causes anaemia. The sudden stimulating of the
voluntary center may cause diarrhoea, and so on. Nevertheless, the whole of the great
organs of the lower body are controlled from the two lower centers, and these organs
work well or ill according as there is a true dynamic psychic activity at the two primary
centers of consciousness Any excess in the sympathetic mode from the upper centers
tends to burn the lungs with oxygen, weaken them with stress, and cause consumption
(FU 96-97).
74
It is from the lumbar ganglion that the dynamic vibrations are emitted which thrill from
the stomach and bowels, and promote the excremental function of digestion (FU 76).
75
On the upper plane, the lungs and heart are controlled from the cardiac plane and the
thoracic ganglion (FU 97).
71
61
mental activity and the intellect on the basis of the body; psychologically, it
consists in a theory of the drives that can be oriented within the psychoanalytic
tradition. Before or without this coordination and proper development, the
activities that result from the various centers might be conceived as drives.
This account thus points towards a theory of the drives in Lawrence. Its
import consists in an emphasis on material conditions in an understanding of
human existence. Lawrences account of the unconscious then is a somatically
grounded theory of the drives
As was mentioned above, Lawrence thinks that contemporary philosophy
and literature both of which depend on experience and life are sadly
degenerate. This degeneracy is a result of the mis-development and miscoordination of these drives. Lawrence highlights the fact that both experience
and life concern other people; they are extra-individual in nature, as are the
drives. The drives can only be understood and develop properly in relation
to other people.76 In this respect, the thought of Lawrence anticipates that
of French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, specifically, their mutual criticisms
of Freud regarding sexuality.77 For Lawrence, the development of sexuality
is never autonomous but always depends on other human beings. Hence,
to right the degeneracy of modern life, Lawrence returns to a theory of the
drives, understanding them individually and in interaction with one another.78
In this account, however, Lawrences commitments are themselves informed
by and can be oriented within the psychoanalytic tradition.
The whole circuit of the drives, he says, is established between two individualsneither
is a free thing unto-itselfthe very fact of established polarity between the two maintains
that correspondence between the individual entity and the external universe which consists
in all growth and development (PU 28).
77
Laplanche reproaches Freud because Freud understands the development of sexuality as a
process that occurs autonomously, independently of other human beings. Freud conceives
of sexuality as an autocentric or ipsocentric process that develops from the inside out (Van
Haute and Geyskens, Confusion 108).
78
He says that the whole of modern life is a shrieking failure. It is our own fault. The actual
evolution of the individual psyche is a result of the interaction between the individual and
the outer universe every man and woman grow and develop as a result of the polarized
flux between the spontaneous self and some other self or selves. It is the circuit of vital
flux between itself and another being or beings which brings about the development and
evolution of every individual psyche and physique (PU 46).
76
62
10.Lawrence and the Psychoanalytic Tradition: Drive Theories and

Individuation
Unlike the drive theories of either Adler or Jung but similar to those of
Freud Lawrences theory of the drives is dualistic in nature.79 He conceives
of the drives as falling into two distinct categories. Whereas both Adler and
Jung reduce the functioning of the drives to a single undifferentiated energy
aggression or Will to power and libido, respectively Lawrence and Freud
maintain a duality. In Freuds early work, this distinction is between ego
instincts that aim at the preservation of the individual and sexual instincts
that aim at the preservation of the species. In his later work, this distinction is
between eros, which brings together the components of individual organisms
and groups of individuals, and thanatos, which tears apart individual organisms
and groups of individuals. Freuds theory of the drives thus undergoes a shift.
This shift concerns not only the lines along which he makes the distinction
between the drives, but also the way he conceives of drives in general.80
In his 1915 The Unconscious, Freuds account is close to Lawrences,
where Freud conceives of the drives somatically, in terms of the body.81 Bodily
drives give rise to their correlates in mental life. In his later work though
Freud breaks with this understanding. He says the problem with this account
concerns the difficulty involved in identifying all the bodily processes to which
mental processes would correspond.82 Were it not for this indeterminacy one
would be justified in focusing attention on these bodily processes.83 Further,
Instincts is the English translation of the German Trieben in the Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, but by most accounts is more
appropriately rendered drives.
80
For his own succinct account of this transition, see, for instance, Beyond the Pleasure Principle
52-53 and Psycho-Analysis 265.
81
He says that by the source of an instinct is meant that somatic process in an organ or part
of the body from which there results a stimulus represented in mental life by an instinct
(Unconscious 76).
82
The conscious processes [in mental life that he earlier recognizes as correlates of processes in
the body] do not form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves; there would
thus be no alternative left to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes which
are concomitant with the psychical ones and which we should necessarily have to recognize
as more complete than the psychical sequences, since some of them would have conscious
processes parallel to them but others would not (Outline 29).
83
If so, it of course becomes plausible to lay stress in psychology on these somatic processes,
to see in them the true essence of what is psychical and to look for some other assessment of
conscious processes (Outline 29). Succumbing to philosophical prejudice, Freud says that
the majority of philosophers, however, as well as many other people, dispute this and declare
that the idea of something psychical being unconscious is self-contradictory (Outline 29).
According to Deleuze, this is precisely the approach Spinoza takes. On the basis of Spinozas
mind-body parallelism, Deleuze elucidates a methodology one could employ (SPP 17-19).
79
63
after his introduction of the death drive, Freud characterizes the drives as
inherently conservative in nature.84 However, this characterization obfuscates
the nature of the drives: Aside from Freuds rather tenuous interpretation of
spotty evidence, following an evolutionary perspective, one might assume the
drives are expansive and adaptive in nature.85 Despite this shift in perspective
by Freud, Lawrences dualistic account can nevertheless be oriented within the
psychoanalytic tradition.
The lesser know Hungarian psychoanalyst Imre Hermann (1889-1984)
subscribes to a theory of the drives similar in nature to that of Lawrence.
Like both Freud and Lawrence, Hermanns theory of the drives is dualistic
in nature. The distinction he makes is between an instinct to cling and
an instinct to search.86 For Lawrence, the corresponding categories are the
sympathetic drives or those to be with others, which result in the desire for
and identification with others and the voluntary drives or those to be by
oneself, which result in a desire to be alone and individual.
Lawrence associates each set of drives with specific persons appropriate
to them; these drives only develop properly when they are in the right
types of relationships with the right types of persons.87 Unsurprisingly,
Lawrence associates the drives and their development with members of the
family, specifically, the mother and father. Consciousness, says Lawrence,
is the product of the development of unconscious (a-conscious), somatic
(a-psychical) processes, which only reach their proper fulfillment in relation to
Instincts are described as tendencies inherent in living substance towards restoring an earlier
state of things: that is to say, they would be of a conservative nature (Ego and Id 183).
Regarding his further characterization of the retroactive nature of the drives, which aim
at returning the organism to an inorganic state rather than self-preservation, see Beyond
Pleasure Principle 36-39, 57, and 59 as well.
85
Regarding the nature of the instincts according to Darwin, see, for example, On the Origin
of Species 156 ff.
86
For an especially lucid account of Hermanns psychoanalytic drive theory and its relation to
attachment theory, see Van Haute and Geyskens From Death Instinct to Attachment Theory:
The Primacy of the Child in Freud, Klein, and Hermann.
87
Again, Lawrence is striking in his anticipations of Laplanche: Development must be
both individual and extra-individual That is, in the first place there must be the other
individual. There must be a polarized connection with the other individual or even
other individuals It may be that one circuit of spontaneous consciousness may never
be fully established. This means, for a child, a certain deficiency in development, a psychic
inadequacy. So we are again face to face with the basic problem of human conduct. No
human being can develop save through the polarized connection with other beings. This
circuit of polarized unison precedes all mind and all knowing (PU 44).
84
64
other persons. He says this goal consists in the development of individuality.88

Here Lawrences understanding of the end or goal of mental life is strikingly
similar to Jungs.
According to Jung, life consists in the process of the individual adapting to
external circumstances, integrating elements from the shadow and collective
unconscious into the persona, in relation to a specific social milieu. Jung calls
this adaptive process individuation.89 Failure to adapt or individuate, says
Jung, ultimately results in schizophrenia (Jung 40-44).90 Lawrences account
here closely tallies with Jungs.91 Although Lawrences theory of the drives is
dualistic, whereas Jungs is monistic, Lawrences account of the end or goal
of the mind is much closer to that of Jung than Freud. For Freud, the end
or goal of life is essentially the reduction of tension, whether it takes place
under the sway of the pleasure principle or death drive as its quintessential
manifestation, the Nirvana principle.92
For the end, the goal, is the perfecting of each single individuality, unique in itself which
cannot take place without a perfected harmony between the beloved, a harmony which
depends on the at-last-clarified singleness of each being, a singleness equilibrized, polarized
in one by the counter-posing singleness of the other (PU, 22).
89
I use the term individuation to denote the process by which a person becomes a
psychological individual, that is, a separate, indivisible unity or whole (Jung 418). He
further writes that the goal of life consists essentially in the constant adaptation of the
primordial patterns of ideas that were given a priori. These need certain modifications,
because, in their original form, they are suited to an archaic mode of life but not to the
demands of a specifically differentiated environment (Jung 382-383).
90
Versus Freud, for Jung schizophrenia rather than neurosis is the general model of
psychopathology. See Eric Alliezs discussion of this in Deleuze avec Masoch 228. I return
to this at length in chapter three.
91
Perhaps this is not entirely surprising as it was David Eder who first introduced Lawrence to
psychoanalysis. One of Freuds earliest English translators, Eder sided with Jung after his split
from Freud. See John Turners David Eder: Between Freud and Jung on this. Lawrence even
describes development in terms of individuality: The goal of life is the coming to perfection
of each single individual. This cannot take place without the tremendous interchange of love
from all the four great poles of the first, basic field of consciousness To stress any one mode,
any one interchange, is to hinder all, and to cause corruption in the end, which would be the
analogue of schizophrenia in the case of Jung (PU 41).
92
Freud writes, it is an established fact thatfeelings of pleasure-unpleasure govern the
passage of events in the id with despotic force. The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle.
But not the id alone. It seems that the activity of the other psychical agencies too is able
only to modify the pleasure principle but not to nullify it The consideration that the
pleasure principle demands a reduction, at bottom the extinction perhaps, of the tensions of
instinctual needs (that is, Nirvana) leads to the still unassessed relations between the pleasure
principle and the two primal forces, Eros and the death instinct (Outline 85). See his similar
characterization in Beyond Pleasure Principle 56.
88
65
Further, Lawrence comes close to recognizing something similar to

Jungian archetypes.93 In his very last work, Apocalypse, Lawrence refers to
Jung and his conception of the archetypes explicitly, putting it to use for his
own purposes.94 For both Jung and Lawrence, the process of individuation or
psychical development concerns the integration of these archetypes.
Once again, this process never only concerns the individual but also a
community, a group of individuals in relation to which the bodily drives
develop and, in turn, psychical development occurs. Thus, versus a line of
philosophical thought running from Descartes through Hegel that gives
privilege to ideal over material conditions, and psychical rather than physical
processes in an understanding of human nature which has its psychoanalytic
analogue in the move from Freud to Lacan Lawrences account implies a
thoroughgoing materialism. As a recasting of psychoanalysis in conjunction
with Marx along materialist lines, Deleuze and Guattaris schizoanalytic
project must be understood in terms of these commitments. As with Marx,
for Lawrence this materialist perspective opens onto and informs concrete
political concerns. Modern social ills, claims Lawrence, can be explained in
terms of the family. Since the family is the first social unity to which the
individual is related in terms of which the development of the drives takes
place he explains wider social relations with reference to familial ones.
11. Familial Relations, according to Lawrence

Lawrence identifies two major drives, to be with others and by oneself,
associating each of these with respective parts of the body, the stomach and
back, and persons, the mother and father. These drives only develop properly,
and proper psychical development only thus occurs, when they are in the
right types of relationships with the right types of persons.95
Describing this overlap in terms of symbols, Lawrence says the intense potency of symbols
is part at least memory all the great symbols and myths which dominate the world when
our history first begins, are very much the same in every country and every people (FU 55).
94
Describing the conscious apprehension of these collective, unconscious archetypes, Lawrence
writes that when a boy of eight sees a horse, he doesnt see the correct biological object we
intend him to see. He sees a big living presence of no particular shape with hair dangling
from its neck and four legs His unconsciousness is filled with a strong, dark, vague
prescience of a powerful presence, a two-eyed, four-legged, long-maned presence looming
imminent (FU 125-126). Jung places particular emphasis on the significance of the horse
in his own account of the archetypes. See Jung 187-188 on this. Lawrence clearly has the
case of little Hans in mind here.
95
Lawrence writes the following: just as a child in the womb grows as a result of the parental
blood-stream which nourishes the vital quick of the foetus, so does every man and woman
93
66
Lawrence begins his account with the solar plexus, which is responsible for
our first feelings of sympathy, the drive to be with others. The navel marks and
reminds us that we used to be a part of another human being, our mother.96 In
vitro, our umbilical cords sustain and nourish us through gestation, after which
point we become our own beings. The navel serves as a reminder of this.97
This explains, thinks Lawrence, why the solar plexus should be considered the
first sympathetic center, as the point at which we were first joined to another
human being and from which we seek to rejoin others.98 On the other hand,
the lumbar ganglion is the first center of individuality, or the source of the
drive to be by oneself. Again, Lawrence gives a physical explanation for this
point, that the back is hard and muscular.99 For this reason, it allows one to
stand upright, independent of others. Lawrence associates this center with the
father.
Whereas the mother is responsible for the sympathetic activity associated
with the solar plexus, the father is responsible for the childs individualistic or
voluntary activity. Just as the mother awakens the sympathetic drive in the
child, the father is a strong, independent figure the child emulates, developing
the voluntary drive.100 If these two tendencies are not balanced, then the child
suffers.101 The father should be stern with the child, says Lawrence, allowing
grow and develop as a result of the polarized flux between the spontaneous self and some
other self or selves (PU 46).
96
Surely our own subjective wisdom tells us, what science can verify, that it [the source of our
sympathetic yearning] lies beneath the navel of the folded foetus (PU 19).
97
There at the navel, the first rupture has taken place, the first break in continuity. There is
the scar of dehiscence, scar at once of our pain and splendor of individuality (PU 20).
98
On this score, he further writes that the powerful, active psychic center in a new child is
the great solar plexus of the sympathetic system. From this center the child is drawn to the
mother again, crying, to heal the new wound, to re-establish the old oneness. This center
directs the little mouth which, blind and anticipatory, seeks the breast From the great
first-mind of the abdomen it moves direct, with an anterior knowledge almost like magnetic
propulsion, as if the little mouth were drawn or propelled to the maternal breast by vital
magnetism, whose center of directive control lies in the solar plexus (PU 21).
99
He writes that It is the great difference between the soft, recipient front of the body and the
wall of the back. The front of the body is the live end of the magnet. The back is the closed
opposition (PU 44).
100
It needs as well the presence of men, the vibration from the present body of the man
from the great voluntary center in the man pass unknowable communications and untellable
nourishment of the stream of manly blood, rays which we cannot see And these rays, these
vibrations, are not like the mother-vibrations the true male instinct is to avoid physical
contact with a baby (FU 73).
101
He writes that any lack of this vital circuit, this vital interchange between father and child,
man and child, means an inevitable impoverishment to the infant (FU 73).
67
it to be independent.102 Hence, this development can be understood in terms

of somatic drives, first yearning for and identifying with the mother, next
seeking independence and emulating the father.103 However, this is only half
the story; the rest takes place in the upper two centers.
From the lumbar ganglion, the child turns outward again, sympathetically.
This time, however, the sympathetic activity is governed by the upper part
of the body, the thoracic plexus. At this stage, its activity is no longer purely
emotive but evidences the first signs of intellect. Rather than a drive, it might be
described as attention, attention first to the mother and then its surroundings,
immersing itself in the data of sense consciousness. This first activity is
supplemented by that of the thoracic ganglion, which is the correlate in the
upper part of the body of the lumbar ganglion, responsible for individuation
and voluntary activity.104 As a result of this center, the child need not remain
immersed in the data of external consciousness but can return to a place of
individuality to contemplate this data.
Only at this point, says Lawrence, at the end of the development and
coordination of certain drives, emotions, and knowledge always in relation
to other human beings does consciousness proper occur. This development
is not a one-time process but ongoing, where these processes are understood
as various superimposed layers. However, according to Lawrence, this process
has gone terribly awry in modern life.105 Consciousness fails to develop the
way it should. Degeneracy in philosophy and literature, life and experience,
are symptomatic of and further contribute to this failure.
The business of the father, in all this incipient child-development, is to stand outside as
a final authority and make the necessary adjustments the father by instinct supplies
the roughness, the sternness which stiffens in the child the centers of resistance and
independence, right from the very earliest days (FU 87). For this reason, Lawrence says that
the father should establish a rule over them, a proud, harsh, manly rule. Make them know
that at every moment they are in the shadow of a proud, strong, adult authority (FU123).
103
Although Lawrence associates the sympathetic and voluntary drives with the mother and
father, respectively, there is no reason these should be gender specific.
104
But, says Lawrence, if this activity alone worked, then the self would utterly depart from its
own integrity; it would pass out and merge living beings are kept integral by the activity
of the great negative pole (PU 38). From the thoracic ganglion also the unconscious goes
forth in its quest But what does it go to seek? Lawrence answers objective knowledge
(PU 38).
105
The whole of life is one long, blind effort at an established polarity with the outer universe,
human and non-human; and the whole of modern life is a shrieking failure (PU 46).
102
68
12. The Individual and Society, according to Lawrence

The problem, says Lawrence, is of a two-fold nature. In the first place,
contemporary education places too much emphasis on the development of
knowledge in the upper centers to the neglect of the passions in the lower
self.106 In the second place, to compensate, the drives associated with the lower
centers seek illicit satisfaction, perpetuating this cycle. Lawrence places his
hope in social reform. Social reform can address both these issues and, thereby,
solve the problem to which they give rise. Again, this is in stark contrast to the
mainstream of psychoanalytic thought.
According to Freud, for example, perennial unhappiness and discontent
plague modern human existence, and these cannot be assuaged via social
reform. If one takes Civilization and its Discontents to be Freuds last and
definitive statement on this score, then the reason for the difference between
his conclusion and Lawrences is two-fold. First, by the time of Civilization
and its Discontents, Freud makes the death drive responsible for a generalized
human aggressiveness that threatens any and all social order. The Christianly
imperative to love thy neighbor as thyself is an ideal enacted for the sake
of counteracting these aggressive tendencies in human nature and protecting
civilization (Civilization 143). At the same time, however, this ideal stifles
the drives Freud associates with eros, including the sexual instincts. This
same tendency lies at the basis of civilized sexual morality, which results in
widespread unhappiness. Versus Freud, no analogue to the death drive exists
in Lawrences thought. For this reason, the dominance of the Christianly ideal
is a contingent fact rather than a necessary condition. The development of
modern civilization is conditioned by neither the suppression of a generalized
human aggressiveness that results from the death drive nor for this reason
does it depend on the Christianly ideal. Through a better understanding of
the drives and their social development, thinks Lawrence, civilization can do
without this ideal.
Second, Lawrences understanding of the end or goal of the mind is very
different from Freuds. Whereas Freud conceives of happiness in terms of a
To impose any ideals upon a child as it grows is almost criminal. It results in impoverishment
and distortion and subsequent deficiency a dislocation or collapse of the great voluntary
centers, a derangement of the will. It is in us an insistence upon the one life-mode only, the
spiritual mode. It is a suppression of the great lower centers, and a living a sort of half-life,
almost entirely from the upper centers. Thence, since we live terribly and exhaustively from
the upper centers The powerful lower centers are no longer fully active, particularly the
great lumbar ganglion, which is the clue to our sensual passionate pride and independence,
this ganglion is atrophied by suppression (FU 90-91). On this score, see FU 102 as well.
106
69
reduction in tension via the expulsion of energy, for Lawrence the end towards
which the principle operations of the mind are working is not pleasure but
individuation in the Jungian sense, a process of integration. Before being
able to understand why this process goes awry, one should understand its ideal
development within a broader social perspective, how full integration with the
world and individuation would occur.
Although the development of the lower centers begins with the father and
mother, these are only starting points. Ideally, ones sympathies broaden to
include not only ones mother but also other people. Further, the ways one
sympathizes with other people should not be the same as with the mother.107
Assuming the behavior of the father has been appropriate, one will have
become an individual who no longer needs the support of the maternal
tit, who develops relationships with others that are different from the early
familial ones.
This is never really the case for Freud, either de facto or de jure. Familial
relations serve as the model for all other types of relations, in terms not only
of the types of objects one loves but also the ways one loves them.108 Although
the influences of familial relations include racial and national traditions, just
as with contributions one receives to the super ego from authority figures,
Freud always conceives of these as substitutes for parental figures.109 On the
other hand, according to Lawrence, ones sympathies include other men
and women with whom one is engaged in collective, constructive projects
As development occurs, says Lawrence, new relationships are formed, the old ones retire
from their prominence. Now mother and father inevitably give way before masters and
mistresses, brothers and sisters yield to friends A whole new field of passional relationship.
And the old bonds relaxing, the old love retreating (FU 140). Lawrence further expands on
this point in FU 170-171.
108
The parental influence, says Freud, includes in its operation not only the personalities
of the actual parents but also the family, racial and national traditions handed on through
them In the same way, the super-ego, in the course of an individuals development,
receives contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers
and models in public life of admired social ideals (Outline 16).
109
On this score and as the first object, Freud says the breast is later completed into the person
of the childs mother, who not only nourishes it but also looks after it and thus arouses in
it a number of other physical sensations, pleasurable and unpleasurable. By her care of the
childs body she becomes its first seducer. In these two relations lies the root of a mothers
importance, unique, without parallel, established unalterably for a whole lifetime as the
first and strongest love-object and as the prototype of all later love-relations for both
sexes (Outline 70). For Deleuze and Guattari it is absolutely essential that one recognize
the immediate import of social, political and economic relations. Although familial relations
always mediate these extra-familial relations, this is the result of the social-political-economic
milieu in which we find ourselves. I return to this in chapter three.
107
70
that leave one emotionally and intellectually fulfilled.110 The problem is that
contemporary life lacks projects in which one can direct and develop the
activities of ones bodily centers, properly developing these activities through
constructive interactions with other human beings, becoming individuals in
the Jungian sense.
Lawrences criticisms have the following in mind: First, the increasing
specialization in manual labor, relegating peoples affective activities to the
performance of menial tasks that play no visible role in larger productive
enterprises. For this reason, people are alienated in Marxs sense of the term
separated from the productive capacity (praxis) to change their environments
and themselves in the process, which constitutes a uniquely human existence.111
Second, the rise of white-collar work, confining peoples intellectual activities
to the performance of operations as tedious and insignificant as their manual
counterparts. Failing to find fulfillment in these projects, people regress to
earlier stages in intellectual and affective development, and the drives revert to
the objects with which they were originally associated. Of foremost concern
to Lawrence is the impact this dynamic has on relations between men and
women.
On Lawrences account, women naturally love whereas men are naturally
loved.112 However, these roles have switched: The male is the sensitive,
sympathetic nature, the woman the active, effective, authoritative. So that the
male acts as the passive, or recipient pole of attraction, the female as the active,
positive, exertive pole, in human relations. Which is a reversal of the old flow.
The woman is now the initiator, man the responder. They seem to play each
others parts (FU 132). According to Lawrence, both parties are dissatisfied
with this arrangement, but still yearn to love and to be loved, but not each
He says that at this point the heart craves for new activity. For new collective activity. That
is, for a new polarized connection with other beings Is this new craving for polarized
communion with others, this craving for a new unison, is it sexual, like the original
craving? Not at all. The whole polarity is different A new, passionate polarity springs
up between men who are bent on the same activity Is this new polarity, this new circuit of
passion between comrades and co-workers, is this also sexual? It is a vivid circuit of polarized
passion. Is it hence sex? It is not What is the dynamic contact? a unison in spirit, in
understanding, and a pure commingling in one great work. A mingling of the individual
passion into one great purpose When man loses his deep sense of purposive, creative
activity, he feels lost, and is lost. When he makes the sexual consummation the supreme
consummation, even in his secret soul, he falls into the beginnings of despair. When he
makes woman, or the woman and child the great center of life and of life-significance, he
falls into the beginnings of despair (FU 142-143).
111
See my above discussion of Marx.
112
In love, it is the woman naturally who loves, the man who is loved. In love, woman is the
positive, man the negative. It is woman who asks, in love, and man who answers (FU 133).
110
71
other. Since men no longer have grand constructive projects in which to

engage, says Lawrence, neither their intellectual nor affective capacities have
appropriate outlets, and, as a result, men become more like boys who yearn
for sympathetic outlets modeled on those they experienced during childhood
in their relationships with their mothers.
Obviously, on Lawrences account, these men are poor models of paternity,
and future generations of boys fail to properly activate the voluntary or
individual activity that results from the lumbar ganglion. Since men become
more like boys, women can no longer love these men. They will, nonetheless,
crave an outlet for the activities of their sympathetic centers. Since their
husbands are incapable of fulfilling this role, says Lawrence, women direct
their sympathetic activities at the only other persons close at hand, their
sons.113
According to Lawrence, women attempt to treat their sons like men,
arousing not only their passional activity but also their intellect. Freud himself
considers a similar account in his early work in connection with the seduction
theory.114 Whereas for Freud this awakening results from an actual assault of a
sexual nature, for Lawrence it results from an intellectual assault.115 According
to Lawrence, the inadvertent, premature awakening of sexual awareness in
He says that at the very age dangereuse, when a woman should be accomplishing her own
fulfillment into maturity and rich quiescence, she turns rabidly to seek a new lover a
new sort of lover, one who will understand her. And as often as not she turns to her son
Seeking, seeking the fulfillment in the deep passional self; diseased with self-consciousness
and sex in the head, foiled by the very loving weakness of the husband who has not the
courage to withdraw into his own stillness and singleness, and put the wife under the spell of
his fulfilled decision; the unhappy woman beats about for her insatiable satisfaction, seeking
whom she may devour. And usually, she turns to her child. Here she provokes what she
wants. Here, in her own son who belongs to her, she seems to find the last perfect response
for which she is craving. He is a medium to her, she provokes from him her own answer.
So she throws herself into a last great love for her son, a final and fatal devotion, that which
would have been the richness and strength of her husband and is poison to her boy (FU
156-157).
114
In The Aetiology of Hysteria Freud writes, for example, Where there had been a relation
between two children I was sometimes able to prove that the boy who, here too, played
the party of the aggressor had previously been seduced by an adult of the female sex, and
that afterwards, under the pressure of his prematurely awakened libido and compelled by his
memory, he tried to repeat with the little girl exactly the same practices that he had learned
from the adult woman (208). See Three Essays 223 as well.
115
In this way, he writes, personal sex is prematurely evoked, and real complexes are set
up. But these derive not from the spontaneous unconscious. They are in a way dictated
from the deliberate, mental consciousness, even if involuntarily. Again they are a result of
mental subjectivity, self-consciousness so different from the primal subjectivity of the
unconscious (PU 31).
113
72
childhood results from an arousal of the childs upper, intellectual centers.116

The consequences are two-fold.
First, if one attempts to reason with a child emblematic of treating a child
like a grownup that has not yet developed the activities of the lower centers
on which this reason is based, then not only will the child not understand,
but any type of reasoning that does take place will also be poorly developed.117
Second, insofar as the mother attempts to arouse the childs lower, sympathetic
centers, she further stunts the childs development. She attempts to draw the
child close, making it love her through the activation of its passional centers.118
The mother expects the child to reason like an adult before developing the
drives for independence that result, initially, from the activation of the lumbar
ganglion. In this way, the mother confuses the child. The child becomes
absolutely dependent on the mother, falling in love with her, a relation as
of two adults, either of two pure lovers, or of two love-appearing people who
are really trying to bully one another (FU 151). Given this dereliction, the
childs development is severely stunted. It never develops the drives associated
with independence and, therefore, thought.119 The childs own way of
loving never develops further than this unthinking devotional love for the
Although it is the aim to establish a purely spiritual dynamic relation on the upper plane
only, yet, because of the inevitable polarity of the human psychic system, we shall arouse
at the same time a dynamic sensual activity on the lower plane, the deeper sensual plane
once we arouse the dynamic relation in the upper, higher plane of love, we inevitably evoke
a dynamic consciousness on the lower, deeper plane of sensual love (FU 153-154). For this
reason, Lawrence cannot be considered a strict materialist. I return to Lawrences implicit
conception of the relationship between mind and body and its relation to Spinozistic
parallelism by explaining his conception of classic American literature in chapter two.
117
Lawrence writes that instead of leaving the child with its own limited but deep and
incomprehensible feelings, the parent, hopelessly involved in the sympathetic mode of
selfless love, and spiritual love-will, stimulates the child into a consciousness which does not
belong to it, on the one plane, and robs it of its own spontaneous consciousness and freedom
on the other plane. And this is the fatality. Long before puberty, by an exaggeration and an
intensity of spiritual love from the parents, the second centers of sympathy are artificially
aroused into response. And there is an irreparable disaster (FU 151).
118
This, says Lawrence, is the peril of our particular form of idealism. It is the idealism of love
and of the spirit: the idealism of yearning, outgoing love, of pure sympathetic communion
and understanding (FU 150).
119
Lawrence says that instead of seeing as a child should see, through a glass, darkly, the child
now opens premature eyes of sympathetic cognition. Instead of knowing in part, as it should
know, it begins, at a fearfully small age, to know in full. The cervical plexuses and the cervical
ganglia, which should only begin to awake after adolescence, these centers of the higher
dynamic sympathy and cognition, are both artificially stimulated, by the adult personal loveemotion and love-will into response, in a quite young child, sometimes even in an infant.
This is a holy obscenity (FU 151-152).
116
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mother.120 It is thereby incapable of joining in sympathetic relations with

others, for the sake of collective, constructive projects.121 Once the child grows
up, his wife will be as disappointed in him as his mother was in his father, and
the whole cycle will repeat itself. According to Lawrence, this is the true root
of the Oedipus complex.122
Conclusion
An analysis of Lawrences criticisms of psychoanalysis against the backdrop
of the history of philosophy and psychoanalytic tradition provides a
groundwork to better understand the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. In
his reflections on psychoanalysis, Lawrence says literature and poetry should
be given priority over philosophy. His quasi-philosophical reflections follow
from his literary works rather than the reverse. In a similar manner, according
to Deleuze and Guattari philosophy is a creative, practical enterprise.
Their interest in literature is of a philosophical nature, what literature can
teach philosophy about life. This view breaks with the mainstream of the
philosophical tradition, which privileges philosophy over art.
This same tendency exists in the relationship between psychoanalysis and
literature, which becomes apparent by examining the ways Freud, Bonaparte,
and Lacan conceive of literature. This examination also establishes a foundation
to better understand psychoanalytic commitments, especially those of Lacan.
One of Deleuze and Guattaris central criticisms of psychoanalysis in AntiOedipus can be understood along these lines: Psychoanalysis fails to adequately
take cognizance of the experience of its patients. Just as Lawrence recognizes
the centrality of his literary works, life, and experience in the creation of his
pollyanalytics stressing an appropriate understanding of the relationship
The hour of sex strikes. But there is your child, bound, helpless. You have already aroused
in it the dynamic response to your own insatiable love-will. You have already established
between your child and yourself the dynamic relation in the further plane of consciousness
You have done what it is vicious for any parent to do: you have established between your
child and yourself the bond of adult love: the love of man for man, woman for woman, or
man for woman (FU 153).
121
This, says Lawrence, is fatal. It is a sort of incest. It is a dynamic spiritual incest, more
dangerous than sensual incest, because it is more intangible and less instinctively repugnant
(FU 153).
122
To anticipate Deleuze and Guattaris account, it is not that psychoanalysis invents the
Oedipus complex. Psychoanalysis does, in fact, discover it. Psychoanalysis discovers Oedipus
everywhere it looks. However, for both Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari this discovery
does not means that the Oedipus complex is inherent. Rather, it is the result of social and
historical conditions.
120
74
between these two Deleuze and Guattari hold a similar view concerning the
relationship between life and theory.
According to Lawrence, not only life and experience but also philosophy
and literature are sadly degenerate. This degeneracy results from while at the
same time further reinforcing the degeneracy of philosophy and literature.
This opens onto a broader question concerning the possibility of critique
and social change, the possibility and means by which existing social orders
can be criticized to arrive at alternatives. The apparent circularity involved in
Lawrences answer to this problem results from a particular understanding of
philosophical anthropology, specifically, that the mind and psychical processes
have ontological and explanatory priority over the body and physical processes.
Marx addresses the possibility of critique and social change, while at the same
time offering a novel perspective on philosophical anthropology.
For Marx and Engels, the human animals capacity to transform its
environment and itself in the process through sensuous activity or praxis
distinguishes it from other animals. Versus Descartes, Kant, and Hegel,
who give ontological and explanatory priority to the mind and psychical
processes in their accounts of human existence, for Marx and Engels praxis
determines a specifically human mode of existence. This background provides
a basis to understand the philosophical implications of Lawrences critique of
psychoanalysis.
According to Lawrence, there is nothing specifically psychical about the
unconscious. Rather, any and everything not specifically conscious is unconscious. Consciousness results from the proper development and coordination
of bodily drives. Despite his criticisms of psychoanalysis, Lawrences claims
can themselves be oriented within the psychoanalytic tradition. His commitments come close to those of Hermann, Jung, and Laplanche. Lawrences
conception of the unconscious is a dualistic, somatically grounded theory of
the drives: The drive to be with others and the drive to be by oneself are rooted
in the stomach and back. The development and coordination of these drives
is not an autonomous process that takes place within the individual alone.
Rather, it always depends on others, first and foremost ones parents. Unlike Freud, however, Lawrences account of this development extends beyond
the family. If the development and coordination of the drives take place in a
proper manner, then these relations should neither resemble nor be modeled
on those of the family. But at present, claims Lawrence, this is rarely the case.
Rather, contemporary society is plagued by neurosis, which results from
the Oedipus complex. On this point then, Lawrence is in agreement with
Freud when he identifies the Oedipus complex as the nuclear complex of
75
psychopathology. But for Lawrence this fact is contingently rather than

necessarily true. The Oedipus complex is a result of social and historical
conditions rather than being constitutive of human nature. Chief among these
conditions, thinks Lawrence, is the absence of grand, constructive projects in
which people can engage, properly developing somatic drives that, in turn,
foster the development of mental life.
76
Chapter Two
The Metaphysics of Classic American Literature

Introduction: Language, Literature, and Lawrence
One comes across the following while reading through Deleuzes Coldness
and Cruelty, his second book-length study dealing with literary figures:
[F]or Masoch as for Sade, language assumes its full value in acting directly on
the senses (17 emphasis added ).1 As with Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms
of psychoanalysis as a kind of idealism, however, on the basis of what Deleuze
writes in Coldness and Cruelty alone, it is by no means clear what he means
by language acting directly on the senses or why languages fullest value
consists in this rather than, for example, conveying information, entertaining,
etc.2 Regarding language and literature, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari
make similarly obscure claims.3 As with their criticisms of psychoanalysis, I
argue these claims concerning both language and literature can only be fully
understood in terms of Lawrences theoretical work, his account of classic
American literature. The present chapter explores the way Lawrences accounts
of language and literature influence Deleuzes.
Implicit to Lawrences account of classic American literature is a quasimaterialist, -parallelist understanding of the relationship between mind and
body one where the mind is given neither ontological nor explanatory
priority over the body eluded to in his account of literature changing the
blood of a people. As with the claim psychoanalysis supposes a dualistic
understanding of the relationship between mind and body that results in a
kind of idealism introduced in the chapter one, however, this is by no means
obvious on the basis of what either Lawrence or Deleuze write alone. For that
reason, it is necessary to examine the traditions of philosophy and literary
criticism in which this re-conceptualization occurs, noting exactly where they
stake their claims. Here Spinozas doctrine of mind-body parallelism plays a
central role.
Published in 1962, his first book-length study devoted to a literary figure is Proust and Signs.
For similar bewilderment at these claims by Deleuze, see Ronald Bogues Deleuze on
Literature 195.
3
For example, that minor literature consists in creating a people to come, and that literature
consists in experimentation rather than interpretation. See AO 106, 133, and 370-371 and
D 36 and 41, respectively.
1
2
77
This first shift in perspective results in a second commitment, one

regarding the nature of and relations between individuals and communities.
Whereas a dualistic-idealistic perspective results in an understanding of
individuals as substances, communities as collections of substances, and
the relations between them in terms of goal-directed activity, a materialistparallelist perspective consists in an understanding of individuals as modes
(aggregates of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings), communities as larger,
further reaching modes, and the relations between them in terms of sympathy
(shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings).
Through an exploration of Lawrences account of classic American
literature, the present chapter explores the role Lawrence says it plays in
the development of the identity of the American people, the way it does so,
the relationship between mind and body implied by this account, and its
consequences for an understanding of the nature of and relation between
individuals and community. This exploration serves to better understand
broader claims Deleuze makes regarding language and literature for example,
what it means for language to act directly on the senses and that literature
creates a people and consists in experimentation the way commitments of
this type constitute his conception of Anglo-American literature, and how it
differs from Franco-Germanic literature specifically, how this understanding
bears on a further-reaching re-conceptualization of human nature.
1. Classic American Literature and American Identity

In Studies in Classic American Literature, Lawrence examines the works of Edgar Allen Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman,
among others, elucidating the relationship between the literature of these
authors and the American ethos and the role that classic American literature plays in the formation of a uniquely American identity.4 Contra his contemporaries, Lawrence finds value in classic American literature. He thinks it
The literary critic Norman Holland also thinks literature plays a role in the formation of
identity. He writes that identity recreates itself, or, to put it another way, style in the
sense of personal style creates itself. That is, all of us, as we read, use the literary work
to symbolize and finally to replicate ourselves. We work out through the text our own
characteristic patterns or desire and adaptation. We interact with the work, making it part
of our own psychic economy and making ourselves part of the literary work as we interpret it.
For, always, this principle prevails: identity recreates itself (124). Versus Holland, Lawrence
(and Deleuze) places less emphasis on the role of the psyche (mind) and interpretation in his
account of the way literature contributes to identity formation.
78
performs an essential service to and shows an important tendency in the

development of the identity of the American people.
After acknowledging the shortcomings of American literature in his time
(the first quarter of the twentieth century) Lawrence lauds classic American
literature: There is a different feeling in the old American classics. It is
the shifting over from the old psyche to something new, a displacement.
Characterizing the nature of this displacement, he writes that displacement
hurts. This hurts. So we try to tie it up, like a cut finger It is a cut too.
Cutting away the old emotions and consciousness (SCAL 7-8). In classic
American literature, something is being destroyed, namely, old emotions and
consciousness how people feel, perceive, and think about themselves and
others. This is the first movement in a two-part process of what Lawrence
refers to as sloughing and rebuilding.5 However, determining the nature
of these old emotions and consciousness is difficult. Lawrence mistrusts the
early American writers; he calls them liars: The old American artists were
hopeless liars The artist usually sets out or used to to point a moral and
adorn a tale. The tale, however, points the other way, as a rule. Two blankly
opposing morals, the artists and the tales. Never trust the artist. Trust the tale.
The proper function of a critic is to save the tale from the artist who created
it (SCAL 8). If one takes them at their word, then the stories of classic
American writers contain moral messages. Lawrence disputes this claim. More
specifically, he doubts that the morals intended by the authors are the same
as those contained in the stories. Deleuze employs a similar hermeneutics of
skepticism in his own work.
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, he describes the critical philosopher as a kind
of genealogist.6 On Lawrences account, the literary critic performs a similar
function, determining true morals in literature, uncovering the types of forces
and wills that determine their authors the modes of existence their writing
implies. Putting this method into practice, Lawrence asks why people came to
This process can be understood in terms of the dualistic drive theory Lawrence develops
in Fantasia of the Unconscious, shedding light on what Deleuze and Guattari refer to
as decoding-coding, which leads to/is part of the process of deterritorializationreterritorialization in Anti-Oedipus, as well as being central to their account of the creative
natures of philosophy and art in What is Philosophy?
6
The philosopher uncovers the types of wills and forces that animate phenomena, the modes
of existence implied by statements, thoughts, and feelings: Any given concept, feeling or
belief will be treated as symptoms of a will that wills something. What does the one that says
this, that thinks or feels that, will? It is a matter of showing that he could not say, think or
feel this particular thing if he did not have a particular will, particular forces, a particular way
of being (NP 78).
5
79
America: Which forces seized these authors and what modes of existence do
their writings imply?
The general reply, says Lawrence, is religious freedom: Europeans
immigrated to America to practice their religions freely. Lawrence, however,
doubts this claim.7 If Europeans did not come to America to practice their
religions freely, then why did they come? They came largely to get away that
most simple of motives. To get away. Away from what? In the long run, away
from themselves. Away from everything. Thats why most people have come
to America, and still do come. To get away from everything they are and have
been (SCAL 9). According to Lawrence, the early Europeans immigrated
to America to escape themselves, more specifically, to escape European
forms of identity based on social, political, and religious organization, which
determined the thoughts, perceptions, and feelings of these people.8
According to Lawrence, however, this is an unreal expectation.9 A positive
movement must also be operative, one of establishing a new identity to
replace the old. The problem with the American people, says Lawrence, is that
they undertake a purely negative movement without a corresponding positive
one.10 Classic American literature accomplishes both, supplementing this
negative movement with a positive one. It destroys the old European identity
He [the early American] didnt come in search of freedom of worship. England had, claims
Lawrence, more freedom of worship in the year 1700 than America had (SCAL 9).
8
Describing the social and theological paradigm from which the early Americans were
escaping, Lawrence writes the following: What did the Pilgrim Fathers come for, then,
when they came so gruesomely over the black sea? Oh, it was in a black spirit. A black
revulsion from Europe, from the old authority of Europe, from kings and bishops and
popes. And more. When you look into it, more. They were black, masterful men, they
wanted something else. No kings, no bishops maybe. Even no God Almighty. But also,
no more of this new humanity which followed the Renaissance. None of this new
liberty which was so pretty in Europe. Something grimmer, by no means free and easy
(SCAL 11). Lawrence claims the early Americans fled Europe to escape hierarchical social
orders, both religious and secular, as a revolt against these paradigms. This entire mentality,
says Lawrence, is summarized in their motto, Henceforth be masterless (SCAL 9).
9
[V]ery well, but it isnt freedom. Rather the reverse. A hopeless sort of constraint. It is never
freedom till you find something you really positively want to be. And people in America have
always been shouting about the things they are not (SCAL 9-10)
10
This is, once again, a parallel in Lawrences thought to that of Deleuze and Guattari. This
second movement should be understood as one of recoding, which results in or is part
of the process of reterritorialization. According to Deleuze and Guattari, these two
movements are part of the same process and, therefore, always go hand-in-hand. The issue at
the heart of this problematic is, basically, that of a break-down (negative without positive)
versus a breakthrough (negative and positive), which Deleuze examines at length in On
the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature and Deleuze and Guattari touch on in What
is Philosophy?
7
80
and establishes a new American one.11 The work of Edgar Allen Poe represents
this purely negative movement: Poes work is the clearest manifestation of
the negative movement, what Lawrence calls sloughing the skin of the old
European identity.12 Without a second, positive movement, say Lawrence, the
process is not really art.
Why does Poes work succeed in accomplishing this first movement but not
the second? Regarding this point, Lawrence writes the following: [The work
of Poe] is an almost chemical analysis of the soul and consciousness. Whereas
in true art there is always the double rhythm of creating and destroying
(SCAL 70). Hence, Poes work is an analysis of the soul and consciousness,
constitutive of this purely negative movement. But for precisely this reason
Poes exclusive emphasis on the soul and consciousness his work is only
capable of carrying out a negative movement.
2. Changing Identity by Changing the Blood

Classic American literature enacts a two-part process of sloughing and rebuilding, shedding the skin of the old European identity and developing the
identity of a new America and a new American people. Classic American
literature thus has the capacity to create a people, establishing new ways
of thinking, perceiving, and feeling. The short stories of Edgar Allen Poe
emphasize the first movement. Alone, however, they are insufficient.
According to Lawrence, the poetry of Walt Whitman represents the highest
accomplishment of the second movement. This claim is based on Lawrences
broader commitments regarding the ethical function of art, as well as the
implicit metaphysical commitments regarding the relationship between mind
and body on which it is based.
As we have said, the rhythm of American art-activity is dual. (1) A disintegrating and
sloughing of the old consciousness. (2) The forming of a new consciousness underneath
(SCAL 70).
12
Poe has only one, the disintegrative vibration. This makes him almost more of a scientist
than an artist. He is absolutely concerned with the disintegration-process of his own
psyche Moralists have always wondered helplessly why Poes morbid tales need have been
written. They need to be written because old things need to die and disintegrate, because the
old white [European] psyche has to be gradually broken down before anything else can come
to pass But Poe is rather a scientist than an artist. He is reducing his own self as a scientist
reduces salt in a crucible (SCAL 70).
11
81
The essential function of art, says Lawrence, is moral. But a passionate,

implicit morality, not didactic. Although what Lawrence means here by a
passionate, implicit morality is less than clear, his defining this morality
in contradistinction to one that would be didactic is instructive: Art is not
prescriptive. It neither tells people what they should do, how to live, nor
does it inform them as to the nature of a number of traditionally recognized
ethical themes such as, for example, the nature of the good and duty. What
Lawrence means by morality in this context can be understood in terms of
what Deleuze call ethics. In both cases, their emphasis is on the body rather
than the mind.13
The central problem with which Deleuze is interested in Spinoza: Practical
Philosophy is why people live so poorly: how they are separated from their
powers of acting and what might be done about it. However, far from
a prescriptive ethics in which formulas are offered for determining ethical
behavior, the focus of Deleuzes inquiry is descriptive, outlining why people
are miserable in terms of Spinozas philosophy, the dominance of sad
passions, mistaking effects for causes, etc. and what they might do about it.
If an implicit ethical preoccupation runs throughout Deleuzes work, then it
is certainly an attempt to answer these questions. Time and again, in relation
to these questions, he returns to Spinozas proclamation we do not even know
what a body can do (NP 36, EPS 255, and SPP 17-18).
As I showed in chapter one, these are precisely the concerns Lawrence
raises in his work regarding psychoanalysis: He turns to a theory of bodily
drives and examines their (mis-) development for the sake of answering these
questions. Published only a year later, it should come as no surprise that his
book on classic American literature takes up analogous problems in a similar
vein. When Lawrence says that art is moral, a passionate, implicit morality,
this claim should be understood in terms of what Deleuze calls ethics, rather
13
In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze draws a distinction between what he refers to as

morality and ethics. Whereas morality is conceived as the dominance of the passions by
consciousness the subordination of bodily passions to intellectual consciousness the aim
of ethics is to discover unknown powers of the body and the mind (18-19). Deleuze refers
to this as a typology of immanent modes of existence (23). His conception of ethics as a
typology of immanent modes of existence consists, in the first place, in a categorization
of different ways of living. In Todd Mays Deleuze: An Introduction Deleuzes thought is
explained in terms of the difference between the metaphysical implications of the following
ethical questions: How should one live? How should one act? How might one live? In
this sense, ethics is closely related to the activity of the philosopher and literary critic as
genealogists, which consists in uncovering and classifying the types of wills and forces that
determine peoples thoughts, perceptions, and feelings the mode of existence these imply
as I showed in my previous discussion.
82
than a list of prescriptions or regulative principles that guide ones conduct.14

On Lawrences account, art is moral to the extent that it has the potential to
bring about a change in the self, a change in ones identity.
As with Deleuzes reading of Spinoza, Lawrences emphasis here is on
the body rather than the mind. He says that art changes the blood, rather
than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind follows later, in the wake
(SCAL 180). Hence, whereas Lawrence associates the negative movement of
classic American literature with the destruction of old forms of consciousness,
its positive movement consists in changing the blood and, thus, establishing
a new identity. For this reason, he claims the work of Whitman marks classic
American literatures high point: Now Whitman was a great moralist He
was a great changer of the blood in the veins of men. Surely it is especially true
of American art, that it is all essentially moral. Hawthorne, Poe, Longfellow,
Emerson, Melville: it is the moral issue which engages them Sensuously,
passionately, they all attack the old morality. But they know nothing better,
mentally. Therefore they give tight mental allegiance to a morality which all
their passion goes to destroy (SCAL 180). Although American writers besides
Whitman are concerned with and critical of the way people live, according to
Lawrence, they are incapable of arriving at anything better.
The contours of this problem are the same as those regarding the problem
of critique mentioned in chapter one: Lawrence says these authors attempt
to change the way people think of themselves and others changing their
identities by changing the way people think. Like Poe, they emphasize
the mind and psychical processes at the expense of the body and physical
processes. These authors thus betray their project, affirming the idealism at the
heart of the old European identity they attempt to overcome.
According to Lawrence, Whitman is the first and only classic American
writer to succeed where his predecessors fail, breaking with an understanding
of the relationship between mind and body in terms of a dualism that results
in idealism.15 Whitman is an important author to both Lawrence and Deleuze
for this reason, since he does not conceive of the mind (soul) as superior to the
body. His understanding of the relationship between mind and body allows
Both conceptions of ethics are similar to what Foucault deals with in his later work via
Pierre Hadot as a set of practices that form the self, technologies of the self. See especially,
The Subject and Power, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,
and The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom. See Pierre Hadots
Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault as well.
15
Whitman was the first to break the mental allegiance. He was the first to smash the old moral
conception that the soul of man is something superior and above the flesh There! he said
to the soul. Stay there! Stay there. Stay in the flesh. Stay in the limbs and lips and in the belly.
Stay in the breast and womb. Stay there, Oh, Soul, where you belong (SCAL 180).
14
83
Whitman to carry out the positive movement of establishing a new American

identity, a process Lawrence describes in terms of freedom.
According to Lawrence, freedom consists in and results from not only the
negative movement of escape but also a positive movement of determination.16
But given this characterization, it is unclear how the process Lawrence describes
fundamentally differs from the movement of freedom in Hegels dialectic, a
movement that consists in understanding, accepting, and embracing a given
social order moving from particularity to universality to individuality.
According to Lawrence, freedom does not consist in doing what one likes
but first accepting the fact one is determined, as a precondition for establishing
a positive identity.17 In this respect, Lawrences account of freedom is indeed
close to Hegels. However, whereas Hegel gives ontological and explanatory
priority to ideal conditions in this process different ways of thinking, new
ideas, etc. for Lawrence, as for Marx and Deleuze and Guattari material
conditions are given both ontological and explanatory priority in this process.
Here Lawrence evokes an account of the relationship between consciousness
and the unconscious in terms similar to those of his theory of the drives from
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious: He claims
that consciousness is the result of the coordinated interaction of a series of
unconscious (preconscious, a-conscious) physical processes. The conscious,
choosing self (subject) is the result of unconscious, somatic drives. Moreover,
Lawrence refers to these drives with the term IT.18 In English translations of
Men are free when they are in a living homeland, not when they are straying and
breaking away. Men are free when they are obeying some deep, inward voice of religious
belief. Obeying from within. Men are free when they belong to a living, organic, believing
community, active in fulfilling some unfulfilled, perhaps unrealized purpose. Not when they
are escaping to some wild west. The most unfree souls go west, and shout of freedom. Men
are freest when there are most unconscious of freedom. The shout is always a rattling of
chains, always was (SCAL 12).
17
In a similar vein, Spinoza claims that human beings can only be free by frankly recognizing
that and examining the ways in which they are determined, and this recognition is the
first step in the process of becoming free. See Spinozas Ethics III Pref. as well as SPP 70.
Henceforth, all references to Spinoza are to his Ethics unless otherwise noted.
18
Lawrence says that Men are only free when they are doing what the deepest self likes
Because the deepest self is way down, and the conscious self is an obstinate monkey. But of
one thing we may be sure. If one wants to be free, one has to give up the illusion of doing
what one likes, and seek what IT wishes done Thats why the Pilgrim Fathers came to
America, then; and thats why we come. Driven by IT. We cannot see that invisible winds
carry us, as they carry swarms of locusts, that invisible magnetism brings us as it brings the
migrating birds to their unforeknown goal. But it is so. We are not the marvelous choosers
and deciders we think we are. It chooses for us, and decides for us But if we are living
people, in touch with the source, IT drives us and decides us. We are free only so long as we
obey. When we run counter, and think we will do as we like, we just flee around like Orestes
pursued by the Eumenides (SCAL 13).
16
84
psychoanalytic works written in German, the term Id is the English reserved

for the German Es the term Freud uses to denote the seat of the drives.
In German, Es is simply the third-person pronoun it. Given Lawrences
knowledge of German, one can assume he here uses IT instead of Id to
translate the German Es. What Lawrence calls IT can be understood in
terms of not only psychoanalytic drive theory but also Marxs philosophical
anthropology: a pre-subjective/-objective raw productive capacity. In this
respect, Lawrences account of classic American literature connects to the
problem of critique discussed in chapter one.
In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says the only way to correct a
variety of social ills that plague modern life is by returning to an examination
of the drives, examining how they develop ideally and what has gone wrong
for the sake of correcting these ills. In Studies in Classic American Literature,
he frames this problem in a similar manner.19 Hence, taking together these two
points, Lawrences claim here is that the first step in this process is recognizing
and accepting the fact we are only conscious, free, choosing subjects because
of the coordinated interaction of a series of determined, somatic processes. In
this way, Lawrence thinks literature serves a social function: Classic American
literature consciously destroys the old European identity and unconsciously
through the blood establishes a new American identity.
But what does Lawrence mean when he says literature changes ones blood,
that Whitman succeeds in establishing a new American identity by changing
the blood of the American people? To make sense of this claim, one would
have to understand literatures specifically political function. Understanding
the way literature is political goes a long way in understanding how and why
Lawrence says it changes the blood.
3. New Criticism and Reader Response: The Same Old Problem

For Lawrence, the primary function of classic American literature consists in
bringing about a change in identity changing the way people think, perceive,
and feel, thus changing the ways they live. At its apex, says Lawrence, classic
American literature accomplishes this by changing the blood of the American
people.20 As with his criticisms and positive reformulation of psychoanalytic
Nowadays, he writes, society is evil. It finds subtle ways of torture, to destroy the lifequick, to get at the life-quick in a man. Every possible form society is evil, evil, and love
is evil. And evil breeds evil, more and more (SCAL 87).
20
As I show in later chapters, Deleuzes understanding of literature is closely analogous to
Lawrences and as is already evident from what he writes in Coldness and Cruelty with
19
85
commitments, to make sense of Lawrences account regarding literature, it

is necessary to orient this within the tradition of literary criticism. In at least
two respects Lawrences conception of literature departs sharply from the
mainstream of the tradition of contemporary criticism. Turning to an account
within this tradition similar to that of Lawrence and Deleuze helps to clarify
these differences.
Written in 1980, Tompkins The Reader in History: The Changing
Shape of Literary Response is a reaction against the then growing movement
within literary criticism away from new criticism and towards reader response
approaches. In that article, Tompkins criticizes reader response approaches,
noting that, despite their novelty with respect to new criticism, the former
shares with the latter two misguided premises (201). First, both conceive of
literary works as relatively autonomous, self-standing entities that exist for
the sake of themselves alone. Second, literature conveys meaning, and the
role of the critic is to discover these meanings. Tompkins goes on to outline
various conceptions of art and literature throughout history, showing that
these commitments are relatively recent and by no means universally shared.
Before examining Tompkins article, it would be good to briefly outline the
most salient features of the approaches she criticizes, those of new criticism
and reader response approaches.
Generally traced to the work of John Crowe Ransom (1888-1974), new
criticism is an approach to literary texts that attempts to bring a scientific
legitimacy to the study of literature. It assumes literary texts convey universal,
invariant meanings, and through the dissection of literary texts critics can
discover these meanings. The locus of meaning in this case is objective. It resides
in the text and is conveyed by the form of the text, which includes elements
such as language, voice, and syntax. From a reader response perspective,
the locus of meaning is subjective. It resides in the reading subject. For this
reason, literary texts do not convey universal, invariant meanings. Rather,
since the locus of meaning resides in the reader, the meaning of texts changes
depending on a variety of subjective factors such as, for example, the readers
disposition.21
According to Tompkins, these accounts are based on the abovementioned,
misguided premises. However, she thinks these commitments are based on
the even more fundamental supposition that literary and artistic works are
21
respect to language assuming its full value in acting directly on the senses equally strange.
On this last point see Wolfgang Isers The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach
54. For a nice overview of reader response approaches, see Elizabeth Flynn and Patrocinio
Schweickarts Gender and Reading: Essays on Readers, Texts and Contexts.
86
a-political, that literature and art exist apart from politics.22 This predilection
is evident, says Tompkins, in the emphasis reader response approaches place
on the individual reader.23 Even after rightly acknowledging the role the reader
plays in the constitution of a works meaning, this approach confines itself to
the effects the literary text produces on the individual reader.24 In this manner,
reader response approaches exclude the possibility of investigating the effects
literature and art produce on a community the political role they could be
said to play and, for this reason, are not that much different from those of
new criticism.25
But, says Tompkins, approaches such as these based on the premise
that literary and artistic works are a-political are in the historical minority.
By and large, art and literature have been conceived in terms of their social
functions. For this reason, literary and artistic works have been conceived as
neither relatively autonomous, self-standing entities that exist for the sake of
themselves alone, nor as vehicles to convey meaning such that the role of the
critic would be to uncover these meanings.26 According to Tompkins, literary
and artistic works should be regarded as existing to produce results, and the
critic should analyze and guide the artist concerning these anticipated results.
These two claims are based on a more fundamental assumption regarding
the nature of language. Tompkins writes that a literary work is not so much
an objectas a unit of force whose power is exerted upon the world in a
The belief that literature is above politics and does not act directly to bring about results has
determined the way contemporary reader-centered critics define their task (Tompkins 210).
23
Whereas in the Renaissance, literatures effects are often conceived in socio-political
termsmodern reader-critics understand effects as entirely a matter of individual response
(Tompkins 210).
24
She says that whatever their moral benefits are said to be, the consequences of reading are
normally confined to the self considered in isolation (210).
25
Tony Bennetts Texts in History: The Determinations of their Readings and their Texts is
a nice example of an attempt to escape this tendency, investigating the social and political
conditions of reading the affects literature produces on communities, and the political role
they could be said to play. See especially 66-68.
26
Describing such a conception in Greek thought, Tompkins writes the following: The
integration of art and politics in Greek thought affected the status accorded to literary texts,
a status which, in turn, reflects ancient attitudes toward the power and function of language
(204). Tompkins describes the role of the critic in a Greek paradigm; her description comes
close to both Lawrences of the critic as one who uncovers the true moral message of
literary works and Deleuzes of the philosopher as symptomatologist that analyzes forces
that seize phenomena. Regarding the role of the critic, Tompkins writes that he faces toward
the future and writes in order to help poets produce new works; insofar as he looks back it is
only to provide rhetorical models for works yet to be written. The text as an object of study
or contemplation has no importance in this critical perspective, for literature is thought of
as existing primarily in order to produce results and not as an end in itself (204).
22
87
particular direction (204). If literary works are themselves units of force,

then so too is language, as a constitutive element of literary works.27 Here
there is not a clear or definitive demarcation between words and things.
Language is not the result of a spiritual faculty the rational soul unique
to human beings.28 Words have the power to affect bodies, just as bodies have
the power to affect words.29
With this framework in place, one is now in a better position to make
sense of Lawrences claim that in its positive movement classic American
literature brings about the formation of a new identity by changing the blood.
Lawrence conceives of language in a manner similar to that of Tompkins
characterization. An account such as this implies a certain understanding of
the importance of material over ideal conditions to human existence, which
implies an understanding of the relationship between mind and body.
4.Classic American Literature: Conditions Material and Ideal, Body

and Mind
As I showed in chapter one, Lawrence is critical of psychoanalysis because of the
philosophical anthropology it implies, more specifically, that psychoanalysis
conceives of the relationship between mind and body dualistically. As is
now becoming clear, for Lawrence, psychoanalysis foil is classic American
literature Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattaris critique of psychoanalysis and
praise for Anglo-American literature are related in precisely this way. Lawrence
claims the work of Whitman represents classic American literatures apex since
In chapter three I return to Deleuze and Guattaris account in Anti-Oedipus of the emergence
of language as a mnemotechnics involving a relationship between the eye, voice, and body.
28
For example, regarding the way Descartes conceives of an innate language capacity
as the point of demarcation between animals and humans and, therefore, the basis of a
philosophical anthropology, see Discourse on the Method 140-141. For an interesting account
of this issue and its relation to consciousness in the work of Descartes and Hobbes, see
George Macdonald Ross Hobbes and Descartes on the Relation Between Language and
Consciousness.
29
Foucault conceives of language in precisely these terms when he writes the following:
Literatureleads language back from grammar to the naked power of speech, and there
it encounters the untamed, imperious being of words (Order 300). The fact that Foucault
refers to Antonin Artauds work in The Order of Things as emblematic of this tendency is
suggestive and establishes a connection between the conception of language mentioned here
and that of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. See Artauds The Theatre of Cruelty: First
Manifesto regarding a naked language of the theater (245). Such an understanding might
be said to privilege pragmatics, insofar as language is conceived in terms of what it can do
in terms of its power. On this point in the thought of Deleuze, see Bogue 98.
27
88
Whitmans work is the highest accomplishment in establishing an American

identity. Whitman succeeds in establishing a new American identity by
changing the blood, effecting a change in the blood of the American people.
This claim can be understood in terms of the relative importance it
attaches to material over ideal conditions in an understanding of human
existence: Literature changes the blood and body rather than the intellect
and mind. Lawrence conceives of the relationship between mind and body
in two ways, both of which shed light on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattaris
commitments regarding language and literature, as well as their philosophical
anthropological commitments regarding the relationship between mind and
body.
The first is a relatively straightforward materialism where the most basic
constituents of reality are physical in nature. In this scheme, language and
literature exert a force that changes the blood as a component of the material
body. This would be in line with Lawrences criticisms of psychoanalysis
described in chapter one, his claim that Whitman succeeds in establishing the
new identity of an American people by changing their blood, and similarities
between Tompkins account of literature and the relationship between words
and things on which it is based. Words are conceived as packets of material
stuff quanta of force that interact with themselves and other bodies, causing
changes in both. There are good reasons to believe both Lawrence and Deleuze
have something like this in mind.
The quotation with which this chapter begins regarding the way language
reaches its highest function when acting directly on the senses seems to
support this position. In this way, language would be more than merely a
material substratum to convey ideas worked on by the mind and its psychical
processes of interpretation to wrest meaning. Although it would certainly
serve this purpose, language would reach its highest function when acting
directly on the senses.30
Precisely this conception of language stands at the heart of Artauds account
of theater, which he refers to as a theater of cruelty. His account is a reaction
against a conception of theater in representative terms, where spectators
would be shown things to think about, which correspond to a text. Here
the text would be like the mind of the theater and everything else its body.
In the work of Francis Bacon, Deleuze describes the Figure with reference to a similar
distinction: The Figure is the sensible form related to a sensation; it acts immediately upon
the nervous system, which is of the flesh, whereas abstract form is addressed to the head and
acts though the intermediary of the brain, which is closer to the bone (FBLS 31).
30
89
The conception of theater Artaud envisions breaks with this understanding.31

He conceives of a theater that would act directly on the senses rather than
one where sensibility is mediated by the mind. Central to this account is a
conception of language: We must now consider the purely material aspect of
this language. That is, of all the ways and means it has of acting on sensibility,
a conception of language along materialist lines, similar to that described in
Lawrences account of classic American literature (Artaud 243).
Along similar lines, describing the nature of material signs in Prousts
work, Deleuze writes that they are true signs that immediately give us an
extraordinary joy, signs that are fulfilled, affirmative, and joyous (PS 13),
such that to refer a sign to the object that emits it, to attribute to the object
the benefit of the sign, is first of all the natural direction of perception and
representation (PS 29). Although Deleuze ultimately argues against the latter
claim that signs should be referred in an uncomplicated manner to the
objects that emit them his claim that objects emit signs speaks volumes
about the metaphysical underpinnings on which he thinks Prousts work rests.
Further characterizing this framework, Deleuze writes that neither things
nor mind exist, there are only bodies: astral bodies, vegetal bodies. The
biologists would be right if they knew that bodies in themselves are already
a language. The linguists would be right if they knew that language is always
the language of bodies It will come as no surprise that the hysteric makes
his body speak. He rediscovers a primary language, the true language of
symbols and hieroglyphs (PS 92-93). According to Deleuze, all things are
thus composed of bodies. The fact he here refers to the hysteric as one who
rediscovers a true, primary language is striking. As I showed in the previous
chapter, Freuds move away from a physiological perspective and the cathartic
method he initially develops while working with hysterics, and towards a
psychological perspective and the development of psychoanalytic technique
proper, marks the introduction into his thought of a dualism, an emphasis on
the mind at the expense of the body.
31
Describing his alternative, Artaud says that instead of relying on texts that are regarded as
definitive and as sacred we must first of all put an end to the subjugation of the theater to
the text, and rediscover the notion of a kind of unique language halfway between gesture
and thought what theater can still wrest from speech is its potential for expansion beyond
words, for development in space, for a dissociative and vibratory effect on our sensibilities
(Artaud 242).
90
However, it is precisely because one finds such a strikingly similar

conception of language and materialist commitments in Artauds work as
well as in Deleuzes conception of material signs in the work of Proust that
a wholesale ascription of this account to Deleuze seems unwise.32 After all, in
the Logic of Sense Deleuze goes to great lengths to distinguish between three
conceptions of language and the metaphysical commitments on which they
depend: height, which he associates with an idealist conception of language
and Plato; depth, which he associates with a materialist conception of language,
the Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche, and Artaud; surface, which he associates with a
conception of language that falls between these two, the Stoics, and Lewis
Carroll.
Furthermore, in his own account of Anglo-American literature, not only
does Deleuze make reference to his earlier work on the Stoics, praising their
conception of language and the relationship between words and things it
implies (D 47-50), but also especially lauds the work of Spinoza (D 44-47).
The greatness of Spinoza, says Deleuze, consists in his emphasis on the mind
and the body. Spinoza opts for neither dualism nor idealism (mind but not
body), nor materialism (body but not mind), but parallelism (both mind and
body).33 Given the profound influence of Spinoza on Deleuze, it is necessary
to turn to Spinoza, examining his commitments regarding the nature of
substance and its relationship to modes, which will serve as a springboard to
discuss Spinozas account of parallelism.
5.Spinoza and Lawrence: Parallelism and Classic American

Literature
Spinoza argues that if substance is self-subsistent, then only one type of thing
can truly be called substance. In this respect, Spinoza pushes the thought of
Descartes to its limit. By Descartess admission, neither minds nor bodies
Bogue characterizes this account as a minor use of language, one where sound is
deterritorialized. He seems to mean by this something like sounds being detached from the
objects they are normally meant to designate, such that the sense of these sounds becomes
neutralized, becoming merely sonic vibrations (104). In this way, one would no longer be
able to distinguish between words and things. However, this seems to be only one minor
use of language, a schizophrenic use Deleuze associates in the Logic of Sense and Essays
Critical and Clinical with the work of Artaud. On the significance of Artaud to Deleuze
concerning this schizophrenic language, see Anne Tomiches LArtaud de Deleuze: du
schizo au mmo 167.
33
I return to these themes in greater length and detail in chapter four, which is a close reading
of Deleuzes essay On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature.
32
91
are truly self-subsistent; rather, both depend on God. Only God is truly a
substance.34 For this reason, according to Spinoza, only one substance exists,
which he identifies with God.35
Thus, thoughts that appear to originate in the mind of an individual
subject are impersonal alterations what Spinoza calls modes of an allencompassing substance, God (IP25C). The difference between minds and
bodies entities whose essential characteristics are thought and extension,
respectively is one of perspective: Mind entities and mental states are modes
conceived under what Spinoza calls the attribute of thought, whereas bodily
entities and physical states are modes conceived under the attribute of
extension (IIP21S).
In this way then, affects of the mind and psychical processes correspond to/
have their parallels in affects of the body and physical processes, just as affects
of the body and physical processes correspond to/have their parallels in affects
of the mind and psychical processes.36 Unlike reductionist tendencies on
either side of the philosophical spectrum, Spinoza neither attempts to explain
psychical processes exclusively on the basis of physical processes (materialism)
nor attempts to explain physical processes exclusively on the basis of psychical
processes (idealism) (SPP 18). A consequence of this view the one to which
Deleuze clearly gives priority in his explanation of Anglo-American literature
is that, versus mind-body dualism, in mind-body parallelism neither the
mind nor the body has ontological or explanatory priority. The body is as real
as the mind, and changes in the body explain changes in the mind. In terms
of the ethical and political consequences of this perspective, the treatment of
ones body is as important as the cultivation of ones intellect.
Related to these commitments is the way this shift in metaphysical
suppositions determines an understanding of aesthetics. More specifically,
mind-body parallelism has important consequences for Lawrences conception
of literature and the associated activities of reading and criticism as well as
Deleuzes by extension. First and foremost, the value of literature and the
activities of the author, reader, and critic alike cannot be understood on the
basis of the mind and psychical processes alone. A search for meaning in
literary texts via interpretation is only one way of engaging literature, implying
See chapter one where I refer to Descartess claim in the Principles that when he speaks of
substance with respect to man and God he does so in an equivocal fashion.
35
Spinoza writes that except for God no substance can be or be conceived (IP14C3).
36
Spinoza writes that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same
substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now that. So also a mode of
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways
(IIP7S ).
34
92
that priority is not given to ideal over material conditions in an understanding

of human existence. To better understand this alternative, it is necessary to
turn again to Lawrences account of classic American literature, this time
attempting to understand it from the perspective of mind-body parallelism.
According to Spinoza, for every physical state and process there exists
a corresponding mental state and process, and vice versa. Hence, mental
states and processes have the potential to change in a non-causal fashion
physical states and processes, and vice versa. On such an account, as opposed
to regarding literary texts exclusively as bearers of meaning that affect metal
states, one can also regard literary texts and the words of which they are
composed as sources of action that affect physical states what Tompkins
refers to as units of force. This casts Lawrences account of classic American
literature differently, especially his claims regarding the work of Poe and
Whitman.
From this perspective, Whitman is the first American author to break with
traditional mind-body dualism and is important to Lawrence and Deleuze for
precisely this reason. Whitman no longer conceives of the mind as superior
to the body, nor does he think the body is superior to the mind. Whitman
might be said to subscribe to a doctrine of mind-body parallelism, which
allows his writing to carry out the positive movement within classic American
literature, building a new American identity by changing the blood of the
American people. From this perspective though, the way Whitman manages
to accomplish this task is different from that described above where words
would act directly on the body, on the blood. This shift in perspective entails
a different understanding of Poes work as well.
The negative movement within American literature carried out by the likes
of Poe would be a psychical process that changes the mind, a disintegrationprocess of the old European form of consciousness. Given a doctrine of
mind-body parallelism, this psychical process has a corresponding physical
process the movement undertaken by the early Americans when they escape
from Europe, sailing away in their ships and coming to America. Hence, Poes
work and coming to America would be part of the same negative movement
that constitutes one aspect of classic American literature. Both are part of
one and the same process considered under the attributes of thought and
extension, respectively.
Whitmans poetry works in the same manner. His writing changes peoples
blood by changing their minds. Whereas the work of Poe results from the
negative movement of people to American, the work of Whitman brings
about the positive movement of a change in the blood of the American people.
93
A Spinozistic reading of Lawrence thereby conceives of literature in its

capacity to change the way people live their modes of existences as collections
of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings in terms not only of psychical but also
physical processes.37 Its emphasis is on the way words and bodies have the
potential to give rise to psychical and physical processes and states, rather
than on reading and criticism as interpretive endeavors that seek meaning. A
shift in identity occurs as a result of this sloughing and rebuilding, one where
psychical processes and affects of the mind have their parallels in physical
processes and affects of the body, so that changes in the former automatically
imply changes in the latter.
Classic American writers before Whitman, says Lawrence, were unable to
create the kinds of literature capable of enacting this change. These authors
rallied against the old European identity but were incapable of arriving at
anything better mentally, in terms of their thoughts. They came to or were
born in America, hunted with native Americans, travelled broadly, and joined
whaling ships. Although these authors freed themselves from the fixities of
European modes of existence and their concomitant identity-morality in
terms of the ways they lived they were incapable of writing in such a way as
to initiate psychical processes whose corresponding physical processes would
give rise to these modes of existence and types of lives in other people. For
this reason then, these authors were still tied to the old European identity, says
Lawrence. Whitman correctly identified the mind-body relationship and was
capable of bringing about this transformation, in terms not only of the themes
about which he wrote but also the ways he wrote about them.38
Although this change in perspective concerns primarily the kinds of
relations that exist between mind and body, it is not limited to these. Such
an account has broader, further-reaching implications for other aspects of
philosophical anthropology, specifically, the nature of individuality and
community, as well as the kinds of relations that exist between them.
6. Individuals, Community, and Sympathy: Lawrence and Spinoza

The priority in importance given to ideal over material conditions in an
understanding of human existence is never itself an isolated commitment.
Rather, it implies broader, further-reaching motivations and consequences,
37
38
On the significance of this point to practical concerns, see SPP 90.

With respect to the work of Whitman, Deleuze refers to the latter as style. In chapter six
I return to themes in Whitmans work in an analysis of Deleuzes Whitman, included in
Essays Critical and Clinical.
94
which are of a social, political, and theological nature. It should come as no

surprise then that this shift in perspective regarding the relationship between
mind and body in the thought of Spinoza, Lawrence, and Deleuze entails
an altered perspective regarding conceptions of and relationships between
other philosophical anthropological claims, specifically, those concerning
individuals and community. In Lawrences work, however, this is by no means
obvious on the basis of what he writes alone. Rather, one must understand
these implied commitments through the lens of Spinoza and Hegel.
A shift in perspective regarding the relationship between mind and body
implies a different way of being with others, a different way of conceiving the
natures of and relations between individuals and community. In his account
of classic American literature, Lawrence models these on his conception of the
open, indeterminate road, one without a goal. He says that the great home
of the soul is the open road. Not heaven, nor paradise. Not above. Not even
within. The soul is a wayfarer down the open road. Not by meditating.
Not by fasting. Not by exploring heaven after heaven, inwardly, in the manner
of the great mystics. Not by exaltation. Not by ecstasy. Not by any of these
ways does the soul come into her own Only through the journey down
the open road. Exposed to full contact. On two slow feet. Meeting whatever
comes down the open road. In company with those that drift in the same
measure along the same way. Towards no goal (SCAL 181).
These descriptions by Lawrence of the souls adventures down the open
road should, in the first place, be understood in contradistinction to the goaldirected activity that relates individuals and community in Hegels thought.
For Hegel, the actualization of ones individuality consists in a dialectical
process whereby the particular recognizes as its ground the universal.
Concretely, this process consists in a persons recognition of as ground and
proper orientation within a wider social milieu. The social milieu to which
Hegel refers is specific, the political order of the 19th century Prussian state
Kojve later associates this with Western liberal democracy. This account then
presents two distinct but related conceptions of goal: first, individuality as the
outcome of ones proper orientation within a wider social milieu; second, the
coming to fruition of a particular political order as the realization of historys
march. In both cases, these act as teloi towards which the development of a
person and that of a community are tending.
Moreover, these two developments are part of one and the same movement
towards the realization of Spirit in the world: A persons development
towards individuality supposes and is conditioned by this development of
the community in terms of recognition, just as this development of the
95
community supposes and is conditioned by a persons development towards

individuality as the end of history.39 Hence, when Lawrence describes the
mode of existence of the open, indeterminate road, one without a goal
this way of being with others he implicitly rejects an understanding of the
relationship between individuals and community along Hegelian lines.
Deleuze and Guattari are critical of both Lacan and Habermas for similar
reasons, because they conceive relations between individuals and community
in terms of goal-directed activities. In this respect, a line of continuity runs
from the thought of Aristotle to Hegel, through Lacan and up to Habermas,
one where relations between individuals and community would be a result
of the natural outgrowth of a potential in individuals that finds its ends in
a particular relation with a community, variously explained in terms of the
development of form and Spirit (Aristotle and Hegel), a proper understanding
of desire (Lacan), or the inherent telos speech-acts have towards truth
(Habermas).40 All of these imply a tacit commitment to a kind of thought
based on the theological notion of final causality. Spinoza is, of course, highly
critical of this thought.41 However, a positive conception of the relationship
between individuals and community follows from this, what Lawrence calls
sympathy, which can be understood in terms of Spinoza.
Tentatively, one could say sympathy consists in shared thought, perceptions,
and feelings between individuals and community. It is a prerequisite to
dialogue, agreement, and orientation towards mutual goals and interests
through which community arrives at consensus.42 Philosophy and art cultivate
sympathy by creating new ways of thinking, perceiving, and feeling.
Describing this notion in terms of Whitmans contributions to the
formation of the American ethos, Lawrence says that the soul is not to pile
up defences round herself She is to go down the open road, as the road
opens, into the unknown, keeping company with those whose soul draws
them near to her, accomplishing nothing save the journeythe soul in her
subtle sympathies accomplishing herself by the way (SCAL 182 emphasis
See my previous discussions of these points in Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method
in Hegel in chapter one.
40
With regard to Habermas, see especially Theory of Communicative Action vol. 1 Reason and
the Rationalization of Society as well as On the Pragmatics of Communication.
41
See, for instance, IV Pref., as well as the way this constitutes a fundamental rejection of a
theological worldview in SPP 20 and 60.
42
This supposition lies as the heart of Spinozas claim as well as one of a similar nature
in Hobbes Leviathan 120 that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire
anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good
because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it (IIIP9S).
39
96
added). The soul should not be conceived as having a specific place proper
to it. Lawrences emphasis here is on random encounters and chance events,
remaining fluid and being exposed to life.
One can thus understand Lawrences conception of sympathy in terms
of Spinozas claim that a things perfection consists in its capacity to affect
and be affected. This capacity is central to the formation of what Lawrence
calls the soul a condition for the way the self develops with others,
joining forces to itself in the production of novel combinations.43 Lawrences
conception of sympathy and its relation to an American mode of existence
supposes experimentation, experimentation with new modes of existence,
ways of affecting ones body and mind, and being affected by other bodies
and minds in turn.44 In this manner, one achieves the fullest-potentiality for
affection, and life becomes active and affirmative.45 For Lawrence and, as I
show in following chapters, Deleuze and Guattari, this has concrete social and
political ramifications.
Describing these in terms of the literary works of James Fenimore
Cooper, Lawrence writes the following: What did Cooper dream beyond
democracy? [H]e dreamed the nucleus of a new society. That is, he dreamed
a new human relationship. A stark, stripped human relationship of two men,
deeper than the deeps of sex. Deeper than property, deeper than fatherhood,
deeper than marriage, deeper than love (SCAL 59-60). First and foremost,
Lawrence describes this mode of existence as one beyond democracy. The
relationships on which it is based are deeper than sex, property, fatherhood,
marriage, and love, and he says they are specifically masculine in nature. This
mode of existence should be understood in terms of Lawrences criticisms of
psychoanalysis.
On this score he writes the following: Meeting all the other wayfarers along the road. And
how? How meet them, and how pass? With sympathy, says Whitman. Sympathy. He does
not say love. He says sympathy. Feeling with. Feel with them as they feel with themselves.
Catching the vibration of their soul and flesh as we pass (SCAL 181). For his further
characterization of this relation, see SCAL 183-184.
44
See SPP, 40 and 125 regarding experimentation in Spinozas thought. On Deleuzes reading,
random encounters and chance events are necessary in the move from knowledge of the first
to knowledge of the second kind. It is only through being affected favorably by another body
that one seeks to inquire what it is about that other body that agrees with ones own (their
commonality) that causes and allows one to discover the common notions. See SPP 54-58
and TRM 192 as well.
45
According to Deleuzes reading of Spinoza, a things perfection consists in its capacity for
affection (SPP 97-104) and the Ethics can be considered an ethnology of man and animal
insofar as it considers their capacity for being affected (SPP 27). See also SPP 124-127 and
EPS 95-96 and 217.
43
97
According to Lawrence, the ideal ends towards which both physical and
psychical life are developing are powerful, creative collectives in which men
engage in grand constructive projects. He refers to the emotional source of
these projects as a religious impulse, and says all other relations are ultimately
in its service, including sex, family, etc. However, contemporary life lacks these
grand constructive projects. Men do not have creative, constructive projects
in which to engage, devoting their time and energy to their wives and families
instead. For this reason, says Lawrence, women are incapable of loving these
girlish men. Women turn to their sons for love instead, which disrupts the
physical and psychical developments of their sons and results in the Oedipus
complex.46
Hence, although Lawrence still conceives of the development of both
individuals and community in terms of an ideal telos, because of his Spinozistic
predilections with respect to the relationship between body and mind, this telos
is not longer conceived as a final cause that pulls this development forward,
as is the case in Hegel. Rather, physical and psychical processes related in a
parallel fashion push this development forward.47 Central to this development
on both Spinoza and Lawrences account is the notion of sympathy, which
Lawrence describes at various points with the term vibrations.48 Lawrences
implicit account of individuals, community, and relations between them as
ones of sympathy has a Spinozistic character, which should be understood in
contradistinction to Descartess account of mind as substance.
See my previous discussions of these points in chapter one.
Describing the difference between ancient and early modern political thought in these
terms, Deleuze writes that the law of nature is no longer referred to a final perfection but
to an initial desire, to the strongest appetite; detached from the order of ends, it is deduced
from appetite as its efficient cause (EPS 259).
48
He says that every continent has its own great spirit of place. Every people is polarized
in some particular locality, which is home, the homeland. Different places on the face of
the earth have different vital effluence, different vibration, different chemical exhalation,
different polarity with different stars: call it what you like (SCAL 12). Lawrences use of
the word sympathy in his work on psychoanalysis to denote what I described in chapter
one as a drive to be with others is, obviously, different from his use of the term here. Points
of convergence exist between Lawrences description here and Deleuze and Guattaris claim
in What is Philosophy? that thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the
earth (WP 85). Regarding relations between family members, for instance, he writes that
a family, if you like, is a group of wireless stations, all adjusted to the same, or very much
the same vibration. All the time they quiver with the interchange, there is one long endless
flow of vitalistic communication between members of one family, a long, strange rapport, a
sort of life-unison. It is a ripple of life through many bodies as through one body (FU 72).
But these vibrations are by no means either personal or even specifically human: It is the
rushing thither and the rushing thence of vibrations expelled by death from the body of life,
and returned back again to life (FU 184).
46
47
98
What appear as thoughts originating in the mind of an individual mind

substance, on Descartess account, are, by Spinozas interpretation, impersonal
alterations or modes of one all-encompassing substance.49 For this reason,
Spinoza cannot say that individuality consists in being a unique mind
substance, as does Descartes. Rather, individuality consists in a unique set
of relations, distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest,
speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance (IIL1). Individuals
are modifications of one and the same substance expressed under different
attributes. Concretely, this means individuals are best understood as unique
aggregates of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings.50 As opposed to collections
of individual substances, communities are larger, further-reaching aggregates
of modes and alterations of a single, all-encompassing substance than are
individuals collections of sets of relations that mutually reinforce and
strengthen each other.51 In a sense then, ones body is a community as is the
Milky Way galaxy.
Rather than conceiving relations between individuals and community in
terms of goal-directed activity, relations between individuals and community
consist in sympathy. From this we understand how it can happen that we
love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only (as they say)
from sympathy or antipathy (IIIP15S). For this reason, each of us strives, so
far as he can, that everyone should love what he loves, and hate what he hates
wants the others to live according to his temperament that from the same
property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate,
it also follows that the same men are envious and ambitious (IIIP31).
Relations of sympathy that constitute and bind both individuals and
community, and individuals to community, result from a common human
disposition, one that gives rise to both compassion and envy and ambition in
human relations.52 As with an understanding of individuals on this account,
these relations are contingent in nature, determined by chance encounters with
The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not
constitute the form of man (IIP10), but rather, the essence of man is constituted by certain
modifications of Gods attributes (IIP10C).
50
Deleuze refers to these as unique chances, packets of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings
determined by chance encounters with the environment they inhabit and other individuals
with whom they interact. See D 30 on this.
51
Spinoza thus writes that if we precede in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that
the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways,
without any change to the whole individual (IIL7S).
52
I return to this point at the end of the chapter, noting its relation to anti-democratic, fascistic
tendencies that run throughout the thought of Spinoza and Lawrence. I return to these
issues at length in chapter six.
49
99
the environment and other individuals. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
invoke precisely this understanding of community with their conception of
multitude. However, the way they describe this concept is much different
from Spinoza.
7. Sympathy and Multitude: Anti-Democracy and Fascism

Hardt and Negri employ the notion of multitude to denote something like
a group of persons capable of acting in a radically democratic fashion for the
sake of productively changing the world.53 Although this account roughly
corresponds to the above description with respect to Spinozas thought in the
Ethics, what Spinoza means to invoke with his notion of the multitude is less
than clear.54
Negri first deals with this notion extensively in The Savage Anomaly. There
he rightly says that the term multitude appears principally in the Political
Treatise, Spinozas most mature work, but it is a concept that lives throughout
the maturation of his philosophy (8). Negris descriptions of this notion are
overwhelmingly positive.55 However, his interpretation is suspect as it flies in
the face of Spinozas characterizations of the term in the Political Treatise.56
Spinoza describes the multitude as being directed by one mind (301), and he
says that in establishing an aristocratic government sole will and power
should be given to a supreme council so that it may be as independent as
possible, and in no danger from the multitude (348). He describes the
The other head of the imperial eagle, they write, is the plural multitude of productive,
creative subjectivities of globalization that have learned to sail on this enormous sea. They
are in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities and events that impose
continual global reconfigurations on the system (Empire 60).
54
Deleuze writes the following in his Preface to Negris The Savage Anomaly: Bodies (and
souls) are forces. As such they are not only defined by their chance encounters and collisions
(state of crisis). They are defined by relationships between an infinite number of parts that
compose each body and that already characterize it as a multitude (TRM 192). Although
what he writes seems to endorse this conflation, given that Deleuze never himself describes
this as multitude in his own work on Spinoza, as well as the fact that multitude is written
in scare quotes, one can assume he had misgivings regarding Negris characterizations.
55
Negri further characterizes this notion as a new quality of the subject, which opens up to
the sense of multiplicity of subjects and to the constructive powers that emanates from their
dignity, understood as totality (8). For a similar characterization, see Savage Anomaly 21.
56
For example, Spinoza writes that Inasmuch as men are led, as we have said, more by
passion than reason, it follows, that a multitude comes together, and wishes to be guided, as
it were, by one mind, not at the suggestion of reason, but of some common passion that
is, common hope, or fear, or the desire of avenging some common hurt (316 emphasis
added).
53
100
multitude as something closer to a group of mass-minded plebs fueled by

emotion rather than as a collection of productive, creative subjectivities that
join together with constructive powers that emanates from their dignity. In
his characterizations of this notion, Negri relies more on Spinozas account in
the Ethics than the Political Treatise (Savage Anomaly 135-136).
This matters as a strong anti-democratic sentiment runs throughout
the work of both Spinoza and Lawrence. In Spinoza, this sentiment is best
described as aristocratic in nature, evident in his characterizations and
misgivings of what Hardt and Negri unequivocally laud as the multitude.
Spinozas characterization of human nature is by no means a bright one. In
Lawrence this is even more apparent.57 The sentiment that runs throughout
Lawrences thought is best characterized as a proto-fascism, evident in the
emphasis he places on themes such as the body, blood, and land of a people.
By contemporary standards, Lawrences thought is both thoroughly sexist and
racist.
Both Spinoza and Lawrence greatly influence Deleuze.58 One might
thus wonder what Deleuze makes of these anti-democratic, aristocratic, and
proto-fascistic strains in Spinoza and Lawrence, or even the role these play in
Deleuzes own thought. Rather than chalking up these engagements to cherry
picking, a general contrariety, or misguided academic silliness on Deleuzes
part, I prefer instead to assume he finds something redeeming in these
tendencies. The question then becomes what precisely this is: What is it about
these anti-democratic, aristocratic, and proto-fascistic strains with which
Deleuze feels compelled to engage? As with Spinozas claim that what is good
in sympathy follows from the same disposition that gives rise to what is bad
in antipathy, so too for Deleuze does anti-democracy, aristocracy, and fascism
follow from a common human disposition, a claim that can be understood
from the perspective of philosophical anthropology.59
Democracy in America, he writes, was never the same as Liberty in Europe. In Europe
Liberty was always a great life-throb. But in America Democracy was always something antilife. The greatest democrats, like Abraham Lincoln, had always a sacrificial, self-murdering
note in their voices. American democracy was a form of self-murder, always. Or of murdering
somebody else Men murdered themselves into this democracy (SCAL 59).
58
In To Have Done with Judgment, a short essay written near the end of his life, touching
on a variety of themes central to Deleuzes thought, he writes the following: Breaking with
the Judeo-Christian tradition, it was Spinoza who carried out the critique [of judgment],
and he had four great disciples to take it up and push it further: Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence,
Kafka, and Artaud (ECC 12).
59
I return to this in chapter six.
57
101
Conclusion
Lawrence says that classic American literature establishes the identity of the
American people through a two-part process of sloughing and rebuilding,
destroying the old European consciousness and establishing a new American
one. The work of Poe especially accomplishes this first movement, whereas the
work of Whitman represents the highest development of the second. In this
account, Lawrences conception of the literary critic is close to Deleuzes of the
philosopher as a genealogical typologist. This is important because Lawrence
does not think early settlers came to America to practice religious freedom
but simply to get away from the old European forms of social and political
organization. However, for Lawrence this movement of escape is purely
negative, which results in a false freedom.
For the sake of achieving true freedom and establishing a new identity, the
American people must also undertake a positive movement. Lawrence says
classic American literature accomplishes its positive movement of establishing
a new American identity by changing the blood of the American people. For
Lawrence and Deleuze by extension this claim signals a commitment to the
importance of material over ideal conditions in an understanding of human
life. Just as understanding Lawrences criticisms and re-conceptualization of
psychoanalytic notions within the tradition of psychoanalysis gives a clearer
picture of his commitments, so too does understanding his conception of
classic American literature through the tradition of literary criticism.
Despite its turn to the reader as the locus of meaning, reader response
approaches still conceive of literary works in an a-political manner. This
supports an understanding of literary works as relatively self-subsistent
entities existing for the sake of themselves alone and critics as interpreters of
meaning. Although these understandings are prevalent among contemporary
criticism, throughout history they represent the minority view. Rather than
quasi-spiritual entities that bear meaning, words are conceived as things that
act directly on bodies. Thus, literary works are themselves units of force,
thoroughly embedded and working in the social milieus in which they
arise and operate. The critic categorizes relations between words and things,
different types of forces.
Whereas Lawrence thus criticizes psychoanalysis for its implicit dualistic
commitments, he lauds classic American literature because it gives neither
ontological nor explanatory priority to the mind. There are two ways this
alternative can be conceived, both of which are important to Deleuze. The
first is a straightforward materialism, where any and all things are conceived in
102
material terms. The second is a parallelism, one where neither mind nor body
has either ontological or explanatory priority. It becomes clear that a shift in
perspective with respect to the relationship between mind and body results in
a second with respect to the nature of and relations between individuals
and community.
Whereas the dualistic-idealistic perspective results in an understanding
of individuals as substances, community as a collection of substances, and
the relations between the two in terms of goal-directed activity, a materialistparallelist perspective consists in an understanding of individuals as modes of
substance aggregates of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings community as
a larger, further-reaching mode of substance, and relations between the two
in terms of sympathy, shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Hardt and
Negris use of the term multitude designates a community of this type in
Spinoza.
However, whereas their conception and use of the term is overwhelmingly positive, Spinozas is anything but, which highlights anti-democratic
tendencies running throughout his thought. These are even more pronounced
in Lawrence, which are proto-fascist as well as profoundly sexist and racist.
Given the influences of both Spinoza and Lawrence on Deleuze, this leads
one to consider the significance of these lines of thought to Deleuze. Rather
than writing them off, these lines of thought are of profound importance to
Deleuzes broader political commitments.
103
Chapter Three
Reading Anti-Oedipus from behind with Lawrence

Introduction: From a Critique of Psychoanalysis
If Deleuze and Guattaris engagements with psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus
simply had as their aim a criticism of psychoanalysis, then there is good
reason to doubt the importance of this book. Although the work of Freud
and psychoanalysis sets the stage for and provides a broad framework in terms
of which psychological theory and practice develop, many of its guiding
suppositions remain speculative and dubious.1 Psychoanalysis represents a
small, somewhat marginal position within contemporary psychology. This
is especially true in the United States where psychoanalysis has always been
less popular than in Europe and South America. Today drug therapy in
conjunction with different strands of cognitivism and behavioral therapy is far
more influential than psychoanalysis. Hence, the importance of Deleuze and
Guattaris criticisms of a position that has always been somewhat marginal
and whose influence is today negligible is open to doubt.
As was mentioned previously, if psychoanalysis were simply a therapeutic
practice with a set of somewhat outlandish axioms to explain its practice,
then it seems unlikely psychoanalysis would arouse the perennial interest and
disgust it does. Rather, what psychoanalysis offers is a conception of human
nature. Deleuze and Guattaris engagements with psychoanalysis should be
understood from this perspective.2
The criticisms and positive positions Deleuze and Guattari develop in AntiOedipus aim not merely at psychoanalysis as such. Rather, following Lawrence,
their target is a much broader and more influential conception of human
nature implied by psychoanalysis. This account privileges ideal over material
conditions in an understanding of human existence, conceives individuals on
the model of substance, community as a collection of substances, and relations
between the two in terms of goal-directed activity, animated by mutual aims
For instance, the extent to which Freudian theory itself relies on a discounted form of
Lamarckian evolution, as well as whether one can establish a fundamental discontinuity
between human and animal life on the basis of psychopathology.
2
Insofar as these engagements are themselves related to Deleuzes claim that Anglo-American
literature is superior to its Franco-Germanic counterparts, Deleuzes praise for AngloAmerican literature can be understood from this perspective. I return to this connection in
the next chapter.
1
105
and shared interests. Given the centrality of these suppositions to Western

philosophical accounts of human nature, Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms
in Anti-Oedipus bear less on the radical aspects of psychoanalysis such as
madness, sexuality, irrationality, and violence and more on the traditional,
thoroughly conservative commitments it implies.
In the first place, this concerns two competing conceptions of the
unconscious, an idealism that forms a pious conception of the unconscious
(AO 111). For this reason, the groundwork developed in chapters one
and two guides the present analysis, using Lawrences understanding of
the unconscious, familial relations, and relations between individuals and
community as touchstones in a reading of Anti-Oedipus, showing how Deleuze
and Guattaris criticisms, re-conceptualizations, and commitments closely
tally with those of Lawrence.3 Furthermore, for Deleuze and Guattari, as for
Lawrence, these have a political dimension. What they find objectionable in
these commitments are their implicit affinities with features belonging to the
philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel via Lacan. Hence, in this chapter I chart
the metaphysical suppositions that animate Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms
of psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus.
1. A Note on Metaphysics: The Organic Model

To understand the positive positions Deleuze and Guattari develop in AntiOedipus, one must first understand the implicit metaphysical assumptions
against which they are working, as well as the framework in which they stake
their claims. In the first place, these can be understood in terms of their
criticisms of the organic model, what they refer to as the organism, and
their development of an alternative, what they call the body without organs.
The major characteristics of these positions are already familiar.
According to the organic paradigm, the most basic constituents of reality
are substances, unities whose behavior is determined by a form, in turn
determined by a telos acting as a final cause, prescribing the development of
not only individual substances but also the relationships that exist between
them. For example, the form human being prescribes the organs and proper
3
Deleuze and Guattari are explicit in their debt to Lawrence (AO115). On some points,
Lawrences account and Deleuze and Guattaris diverge sharply. For example, unlike
Lawrence, Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion of a natural telos towards which human life
is tending, and they claim that broader social and political relations are contemporary with
familial relations familial relations are themselves types of social and political relations. See
my discussion of these points in Lawrence in the previous chapters.
106
functions of these organs in relation to each other, to realize a functioning

human being as well as a properly functioning community.4 Likewise,
the form democracy prescribes the constituent units of democracy for
example, elections and juridical equality and the proper functions of these
constituents in relation to each other.5
This paradigm supposes a micro-macroscopic conception of reality, one
where larger macrocosms are composed of smaller microcosms. Deleuze
and Guattari credit Bergson with recognizing and criticizing this position.6
Microcosms fulfill their ends by engaging in relations with other microcosms,
constituting the macrocosm in the process. In turn, the macrocosm conditions
the development of individual microcosms and the relations that exist
between them. Both are conceived as closed systems engaged in a movement
similar to that described by Plotinus as emanation from and back to the One.
Hegel conceives of relations between individuals and community in precisely
this manner.7 For Deleuze and Guattari then this organic model implies
According to both Plato and Aristotle, for example, human beings are naturally gregarious
creatures. For this reason, without a faculty of speech, human beings would not enter into
political communities.
5
Describing this paradigm in their criticisms of both mechanistic and vitalistic models,
Deleuze and Guattari write the following: From machines, mechanism abstracts a structural
unity, a unity that functions as a form, in terms of which it explains the functioning of the
organism. Vitalism invokes an individual and specific unity of the living, conceiving of this
unity as a substance, which every machine presupposes insofar as it is subordinate to organic
continuance, functioning as a telos determining the substance through its form (AO 284).
6
With his general conception of microcosm-macrocosm relationships, they write, Bergson
brought about a discreet revolution Likening the living to a microcosm is an ancient
platitude. But if the living organism was thought to be similar to the world, this was
attributed to the fact that it was or tended to be an isolated system, naturally closed, the
comparison between microcosm and macrocosm was thus a comparison between two closed
figures, one of which expressed the other and was inscribed within the other (AO 95-96).
7
Insofar as the macrocosm is itself thought to be a closed system, the trajectory of each
substance hits the wall of a closed macrocosm conceived as its telos, and then bounces
back again to determine the form of a substance. On this point, see my discussion of
Kojve 106-107 in Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method in Hegel in chapter one.
On this basis, Hegel retrospectively determines the relative ends and forms of all worldhistorical constituents, such that they accord with the absolute end of world history and
Spirit. Regarding Bergsons criticisms of micro-macroscopic relations understood in terms
of Hegelian finalism see B 104-106. Deleuze takes up these same themes in his work on
Proust. See PS 112-113 regarding the way micro-macrocosmic relations of whole and parts
constitute a great Organism, where the meaning of the part must be discovered in the
whole to which it belongs(PS 146). The claim is that Hegel discovers what was given from
the beginning, what was there all along, and for this reason the Hegelian dialectic is a
false movement. Regarding the whole never being given see B 131-132 and B 112 and the
dialectic being a false movement B 44.
4
107
commitments of a political nature.8 Thought is itself conceived in terms of the

state, and they describe the state in organic terms, where it defines thoughts
goals and paths, conduits, channels, organs, an entire organon. There is thus
an image of thought covering all of thought (TP 374).9
This marks a point of continuity between Deleuzes earlier work and his
later collaborative endeavors with Guattari. Deleuzes criticisms of the image
of thought in Proust and Signs, Nietzsche and Philosophy, and Difference and
Repetition take on a political dimension in his work with Guattari. Deleuze
and Guattaris criticisms of the organic model and the alternative they propose
are thus thoroughly political in nature.10 In Anti-Oedipus, they couch their
criticisms and begin to develop an alternative in the work of Samuel Butler.11
Following Butler, Deleuze and Guattari reject both vitalism and mechanism,
as these share the same paradigmatic organic model, where one accounts for
the unity of both living beings and machines in terms of their functions, in
terms of their ends.12 Deleuze and Guattari reject an understanding of wholepart relations in terms of goal-directed activity, a substance metaphysics where
the basic constituents of reality would be independent, self-subsistent entities
understood in terms of final causality.
Their alternative can thus be understood in largely Spinozistic terms.
Here individuals are conceived as modes or unique chances, packets of
Describing the connection between the political state and conceptions of thought, they
write the following: The State as the modelfor thought has a long history: logos, the
philosopher king, the transcendence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic
of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, man as legislator and subject.
The States pretension to be a world order, and to root man (TP 24).
9
See TP 24 on this as well.
10
Deleuze himself says that politics comes into play with Anti-Oedipus, see TRM 66, although
Paolo Marrati argues that even before the beginning of his collaborations with Guattari,
Deleuzes thought is political, and it is in terms of his criticisms of opinion that the political
import of his philosophy should be understood (206). Marrati establishes this connection
via Plato. Just as Platos criticisms of opinion are political in nature implying and resulting
in a criticism of the status quo so too are Deleuzes criticisms of opinion political in nature
(215). Both Alexandre Lefebvre and Philippe Mengue follow a similar approach in their
readings of Deleuze on opinion, likening Deleuze to Plato via their mutual criticisms of
opinion. See The Image of the Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza 60 and 267, and The Problem
of the Birth of Philosophy in Greece in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze 178. I return to
this in chapter five, linking Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of this organic model in AntiOedipus to their criticisms of opinion in What is Philosophy?
11
[Butler] shatters the vitalist argument, they write, by calling in question the specific or
personal unity of the organism, and the mechanist argument even more decisively, by calling into
question the structural unity of the machine (AO 284).
12
Given these criticisms, those that describe Deleuzes philosophy as vitalistic in nature on
the basis of his engagements with Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson seem misguided.
8
108
thoughts, perceptions, and feelings determined by chance encounters with

the environment they inhabit and other individuals with whom they interact.
Community is understood as a larger, further-reaching aggregate of modes or
alterations than individuals, and relations between individuals and community
are conceived in terms of shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings, what I
describe as sympathy. Taken together, these stand at the heart of a worldview
Deleuze and Guattari develop, one based on what they call the body without
organs as an alternative to the organic model.13 Deleuze begins developing
this alternative even prior to his collaborations with Guattari.14
Whereas Deleuze criticizes thinkers within the mainstream of the tradition
in his earlier work seeking out alternatives in the likes of Spinoza, Nietzsche,
and Artaud only with the help of Guattari and beginning with Anti-Oedipus
does he become capable of accounting for the seeming plausibility of this
dominant tradition and its organic model why it is so convincing. Deleuze
and Guattaris task in Anti-Oedipus is thus two-fold: Not only do they describe
this alternative a worldview based on the model of the body without organs
but Deleuze and Guattari also show on the basis of this alternative why
the organic model is so convincing, why it represents the mainstream of the
philosophical tradition.
2. The Specificity of Schizophrenic Experience

Given the broad influence and seeming plausibility of the organic model,
one might wonder why Deleuze and Guattari opt for the model of the body
without organs rather than the organism. An answer to this question concerns
the specificity of the experience on which Deleuze and Guattari base their
analyses.
The philosophical methodology Deleuze and Guattari employ in AntiOedipus is transcendental in nature, beginning with experience and deducing
See TRM 20-22 for his clearest, most succinct account of the body without organs.
This is nowhere more apparent than in Deleuzes book on Proust, to which he returned
multiple times throughout his life. For example, versus the logos of philosophy conceived
as a huge animal or organism Deleuze says the pathos with which Proust works belongs to
the vegetal realm (PS 174-175), a claim that clearly anticipates the notion of the rhizome
Deleuze and Guattari develop in Thousand Plateaus. In addition, versus a philosophical
image of thought where truth acts as the natural telos of thought, assuring agreement
between minds philosophy as the expression of a universal mind Deleuze claims Proust
establishes an image of thought against philosophys, one where impressions force one to
think. See PS 94-95 on this.
13
14
109
conditions for the possibility of this experience. Their methodology consists

in what Deleuze earlier refers to as transcendental empiricism, discovering
conditions of real rather than possible experience, where the conditions
deduced are no wider than those of the experience they condition.15 The major
difference between Deleuze and Guattari and figures traditionally associated
with transcendental philosophy for example, Kant, the German idealists,
and Husserl is the nature of the experience with which they begin.
Transcendental philosophy generally begins with a kind of commonsense
experience, an experience of medium-sized sensible things such as, for
example, writing paraphernalia and dining utensils, insignificant facts such as
Recognition, everyday banality (DR 135). As with Kant, the central feature
of this experience is its pre-categorical, subject-object nature: Any and all
experience has the form of an object for a subject, of an object being recognized
by a subject.16 In this way, transcendental philosophy locates conditions of
possible experience in a knowing subject. Since Deleuze and Guattari begin
with a different type of experience, they reach different conclusions.
The type of experience with which they begin is that of schizophrenia, the
experience of the schizophrenic.17 This shift alters the trajectory of Deleuze and
Guattaris subsequent analyses. Whereas commonsense experience consists in
the subject-object form, their interest is in the fact schizophrenia does not
evidence this form. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari say schizophrenia consists
See TRM 309 where the ambition of Anti-Oedipus is described as Kantian in spirit. See DR
56-57 and 143-144, as well as B 30 where Deleuze refers to Bergsons method as a superior
empiricism that goes towards concrete conditions of experience.
16
For example, Descartess description of the transformation of wax when held over a flame in
the Meditations, Sartres analysis of the inkwell as being-in-itself in Being and Nothingness,
and Heideggers description of the bowl as constituted by nothing in The Thing.
Although Husserls concern is always with more abstract entities, such as those belonging
to mathematics and the self, in all cases, these are more or less conceived in terms of objects
for which medium-sized sensible things always provide the experiential model. As I show
momentarily, taking medium-sized sensible things as an experiential touchstone marks
the transition from Pre-Socratic to Aristotelian philosophy. See John Elof Boodins The
Discovery of Form on this. I am grateful to Patricia Curd for drawing this point to my
attention.
17
Since how is stupidity (not error) possible? is the object of a properly transcendental
question (DR 151), so too is how is schizophrenia possible? What are thoughts structures
such that schizophrenia is a possibility? In fact, Deleuze claims that everything new and
interesting in psychoanalysis comes from psychosis. See N 15 on this point. Deleuze
says that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought (DR
148), that stupidity, malevolence, and madness are structures of thought as such (DR
151). See Holland, Anti-Oedipus 2 regarding psychosis as Deleuze and Guattaris point of
departure.
15
110
in an experience of production, an apprehension of nature as a process of pure

production (AO 2-3). This is an experience of a chaotic maelstrom, where
things are coming into and going out of existence, in which the schizophrenic
is involved.18 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze says the world of difference
is a chaotic one without identity (57), such that line of continuity can be
drawn between schizophrenic experience and the worldview it implies, and
what might be broadly construed as a Pre-Socratic worldview.
Whereas the organic model takes as its touchstone an experience of
medium-sized sensible things as the basic constituents of reality artifacts
such as tables and chairs and livings beings resulting in a metaphysics
involving substance, form, and teleology, Pre-Socratic worldviews focus on
very large and small non-sensible things as the basic constituents of reality
atoms and vortexes, elements and forces.19 The medium-sized sensible things
the organic model takes as primary are explained as amalgamations of material
stuff coming together and falling apart, depending on the operative forces.20
In the metaphysics Deleuze and Guattari develop in their transcendental
analysis of schizophrenic experience, the analogue would be as follows:
partial objects, flows, detachments from signifying chains :: material stuff
de-, re-, coding, and de-, re-, territorialization21
:: forces
In this respect, the schizophrenic experience on which Deleuze and Guattari base their
analyses in Anti-Oedipus seems to be the same as what they refer to as a too-sudden
destratification in Thousand Plateaus (503) and chaos in What is Philosophy? (118).
19
With regard to the very small, in fragments 195 and 216, Heraclitus says all things are in
motion at all times but that this escapes our perception. See Jonathan Barnes Early Greek
Philosophy 206 concerning Democritus account of atoms as well. See G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven,
and M. Schofields The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts 2nd
ed. 307 regarding love and strife as forces in Empedocles, as well as Aristotles criticisms of
Empedocles use of chance to account for development. See Patricia Curds The Legacy of
Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought 154 for a discussion of hot and
cold as basic, genuine entities for Anaxagoras.
20
Paradigmatic in this respect is Empedocles account of the development of the parts of
animals in fragments 375 and 376. See Kirk, Raven, Schofield 302-312. In fragment 555,
Leucippus and Democritus are said to subscribe to the position that what exists differs
only by contact, rhythm, and turning. See Barnes 207 for a discussion of the way that,
according to Democritus, forms are separated from the whole by a whirl, and Curd 162 for
a discussion of Empedocles position that all mortal things arise from the mixture of roots.
This position leads Aristotle to criticize the Pre-Socratics for not distinguishing between
generation and alternation, that mixing does not result in real coming-to-be or passing away
(Curd 214), that generation is simply alteration (Barnes 207).
21
I return to in-depth explanations of all these notions.
18
111
Taking the schizophrenic at her word, Deleuze and Guattari search out
conditions for the possibility of her experience. Since this experience and the
worldview it implies are radically different from the dominant organic model,
so too must be its conditions. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari do not
locate conditions of possible experience in an independent, self-subsistent,
knowing subject a conception of subjectivity based on the philosophical
notion of substance.22 In this respect though, Deleuze and Guattari are by no
means unique. In large measure, they owe a debt to Lacan.
Lacans doctoral dissertation is a symptomatology, distinguishing dementia
from psychosis (Psychose paranoaque 13). Taking Binswangers phenomenological psychology (Daseinsanalyse) as his point of departure, Lacan explores
psychopathology in terms of its broader relation to personality (la diffrence
nosologique), asking to what pathological experiences and behaviors are responses. He says psychosis is not simply a physico-chemical deficiency but
concerns conceptual structures, the development of personality in relation to
a social milieu, the comportment of a subject (Psychose paranoaque 346-347).
Understanding Lacans mature work from this initial trajectory, his approach
can be understood as asking what conditions of normal experience psychotics
lack, such that their symptoms are supplemental responses.23 The answer Lacan gives is the name of the father, a function according to which language,
the symbolic order, is organized.24 The name of the father consists in a lack
in the signifying chain that makes possible the meaning of each and every
other signifier in terms of their difference from one another, as well as the difference between words and things.
For Lacan, it is a signifier that signifies an absence.25 Without the name of
the father without this lack meaning formation is impossible. The schizophrenic can distinguish neither words from words nor words from things. In
schizophrenia, language is powerless to create distance from reality, from the
See Claire Colebrooks Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed 69 regarding the manner in which
transcendental philosophies are generally founded on a subject.
23
See TRM 24, where psychoanalysis is described as asking the question of what the
schizophrenic is missing.
24
Regarding Lacans description of insanity as misrecognition misrecognition regarding ones
nature as a fundamental lack see E 135 and 140. Concerning his claim that a breakdown
in the name of the father causes psychosis, see E 479 and 481. See Van Haute 230-231 for a
discussion of this point as well.
25
See E 17, as well as AO 110 for a synopsis in terms of an illegitimate understanding and
employment of the disjunctive synthesis. I return to this shortly.
22
112
body.26 The schizophrenic is foreclosed from the symbolic register and the
realm of meaning, and her delusions are attempts to make up for this loss
in the register of the real and realm of perceptions (TRM, 24). Although
schizophrenia is also Deleuze and Guattaris point of departure, the direction
they travel is different. Lacan begins with schizophrenic experience, but his
touchstone is commonsense experience, and in this way his thought implies
the organic model.27
The name of the father plays a similar role in Lacan as does the notion of
the whole in Hegel. Whereas for Hegel individual parts must be understood
in terms of the whole, for Lacan a missing part structures the whole. The
name of the father is an absence that allows for the possibility of relations of
difference, thereby structuring language and establishing meaning, structuring
experience.28 In this respect then, Lacan approaches schizophrenia in terms
of the questions: What happened to the schizophrenic? What happened to
the conditions for the possibility of her experience such that this experience
fails to tally with the organic model? Lacans answer is an absence of
lack.
Deleuze and Guattari give a different account since they ask a different
question. Rather than asking what happened to or is wrong with the schizophrenic, Deleuze and Guattari take schizophrenia as their touchstone. As
opposed to assuming something above and beyond schizophrenic experience
transcendent to this experience against which schizophrenia could be assessed and judged their critique is immanent.29 The immanent nature of this
critique should be understood in Kantian terms.
Kants critical methodology consists in invoking only what is necessary
to explain experience, conditions immanent rather than transcendent to
experience. To account for the experience of objects, for example, one need
not posit the existence of mind-independent objects. Rather, one can simply
assume a certain givenness (the manifold of intuitions) and its organization
in judgments (the categories), in terms of an object (the object x) and for a
See Van Haute 230 on this, as well as Van Haute and Geyskens, From Death Instinct 57
regarding the same point in the work of Melanie Klein.
27
At the same time, however, in Des noms-du-pre 18, Lacan mentions as a historical fact and
seems to tacitly endorse neurosis as the touchstone of analytic experience.
28
Deleuze and Guattari characterize and criticize this Lacanian perspective in the following
terms: [A]n Oedipal organization is imposed on the psychotic, though for the sole purpose
of assigning the lack of this organization in the psychotic (AO 123).
29
For example, see AO 57 regarding their criticisms of Freuds reduction of Schrebers delirium
to neurotic categories of familial constellations.
26
113
subject (transcendental apperception).30 At the basis of Deleuze and Guattaris

thought in Anti-Oedipus lies a similar approach.
Rather than using commonsense experience as their touchstone and asking
what happened to the schizophrenic, Deleuze and Guattari use schizophrenic
experience as their touchstone and ask what happened to the normal person,
why most peoples experience is not schizophrenic. As with Kant, Deleuze and
Guattaris answer concerns the assumption in existence of more than is given
in experience, the common root of transcendental illusions. They distinguish
between two different ways experience can be understood and organized,
either legitimately or illegitimately.31 Invoking Kantian terminology, Deleuze
and Guattari refer to the latter as paralogisms. Whereas for Kant paralogisms
These do not appear in Kants critical philosophy as transcendent notions for example,
a substantial subject based on the philosophical notion of substance but as regulative
ideas or logical functions, to confer on the concepts of the understanding a maximum of
systematic unity and extension (KCP 19). They act as a focus or horizon within perception
providing for a maximum of systematic unity (DR 169). Just as intuitions are blind without
concepts, so too is the understanding disordered without reason. The understanding and its
concepts need the postulates of reason to function properly, although they are not given as
objects of possible experience. See Kant 590 ff. regarding the role the postulates of reason
play in the organization of theoretical knowledge, Saville 84-86 for a discussion of the way
reason directs understanding in its operations, and NP 82-94 regarding Deleuzes criticisms
of Kant versus Nietzsche with respect to the notion of critique. See DR 168 where Kants
account of ideas is described in similar terms. It is no mere accident, however, that reason
falls into such errors. Kant exposes the speculative illusions of Reason, writes Deleuze,
the false problems into which it leads us concerning the soul, the world and God. Kant
substitutes, for the traditional concept of error (error as product in the mind of an external
determinism), that of false problems and internal illusions (KCP 25). Hence, transcendental
illusions are internal to reason. They arise inevitably from the nature of reason itself.
31
The way Deleuze and Guattari employ the term repression throughout Anti-Oedipus
should be understood in terms of organization or determination, which has the potential
to but need not necessarily result in oppression. This terminological point is crucial as it
allows for an understanding of Deleuze and Guattaris central claim in Anti-Oedipus that
the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw
so clearly and, that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: Why do men fight for their servitude as
stubbornly as though it were their salvation? How can people possibly reach the point of
shouting: More taxes! Less bread!? As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some
people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are
starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually
out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated
and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not
only for others but for themselves? Reich is at his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses
to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and
demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated
in terms of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes, they wanted fascism, and it is
this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for (AO 29). In other
words, how and why does desire desire its own repression.
30
114
concern the interaction of understanding and reason, for Deleuze and

Guattari these paralogisms concern the nature of the unconscious, what
they call paralogisms of the unconscious. As in Kant, these paralogisms are
determined internally rather than externally. They result from the unconscious
itself. Insofar as Deleuze and Guattari use the terms unconscious and desire
interchangeably, one can thus say that the paralogisms result from desire: The
paralogisms consist in a certain configuration of desire. Deleuze and Guattari
refer to this configuration when they say desire desires its own repression.
Desires repression does not consist in keeping persons from doing what
they want.32 The political significance of Deleuze and Guattaris account of
desire should not be understood in terms of a free-loving paradigm where life
would be better if people simply let it all hang out. Rather, the novelty of the
position they develop consists in the fact persons could do exactly what they
want and be all the worse as a result. In this respect, Deleuze and Guattaris
position concerning desire is close to Foucaults concerning power.33
Since Deleuze and Guattari use the terms desire and unconscious
interchangeably, to understand this it is necessary to turn to their account
of the unconscious, the specific nature of the libidinal investments in the
economic and political spheresto show how, in the subject who desires,
desire can be made to desire its own repression (AO 105). Desire desiring
its own repression consists in an understanding and employment of the
syntheses of the unconscious, which gives rise to and supports a conception of
experience and worldview they associate with the organic model.34
For a reading along these lines, see Judith Butlers misguided characterization in Subjects
of Desire, as well as Patton, Deleuze and the Political 106 where he seems to characterize
Deleuze and Guattaris political philosophy as one that consists in freeing schizophrenic
desire.
33
Conceiving power as something negative, says Foucault, results from a juridical notion of
sovereignty. He characterizes this position as one where the state would be understood in
terms of the rights of the individual, where the fundamental manifestation of power would
be the law. To understand power relations, says Foucault, one must not begin with primitive
terms but the relations themselves, insofar as the relations determine the terms on which
they come to bear. Hence, instead of asking ideal subjects what part of themselves or what
powers of theirs they have surrendered, allowing themselves to be subjectified [se laisser
assujettir], one would need to inquire how relations of subjectivation manufacture subjects
(Essential Foucault 294). See Foucaults similar description in Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison 194, regarding the way power is positive rather than negative, producing
reality itself, a new micro-physics of power (139).
34
Desiring-machines they write, make us an organism (AO 8).
32
115
3. A Materialist Conception of the Unconscious

Deleuze and Guattari make the rather esoteric claim that on the basis of its
conception of the unconscious psychoanalysis constitutes a kind of idealism.
This should be understood in terms of Lawrences critique of psychoanalysis,
oriented in terms of the history of philosophy. Lawrence thinks Freudian
psychoanalysis supposes a dualistic conception of the relationship between
mind and body ultimately resulting in a kind of idealism. The trajectory of
this path can be discerned from Descartes through Kant to Hegel, which is
also apparent in a line of thought that connects Freud to Lacan through LviStrauss, one that results in the linguistic idealism characteristic of Lacan.
Lawrences re-conceptualization of psychoanalysis can itself be understood
in terms of a variety of competing commitments within the psychoanalytic
tradition. Deleuze and Guattaris critique of psychoanalysis should be
understood in these same terms. Hence, Anti-Oedipus concerns less a
wholesale rejection of psychoanalysis and more a critique of central Freudian
and Lacanian suppositions, ones of a metaphysical nature.35 In the first place,
this concerns two competing conceptions of the unconscious.
Freud has a largely psychic, representative account of the unconscious,
modeled on and determined by the mechanisms of primary or psychic
repression, based on neurosis as its starting point and touchstone.36 In other
words, Freud conceives of the unconscious as something specifically mental
that simply mirrors or represents conscious content in an inverted fashion,
understood in terms of biological processes of actively giving up thoughts
and behaviors that are adaptively disadvantageous, which results in pathology
if not sufficiently carried out.37 In this way then, a Freudian conception of
the unconscious invokes the organic model, conceiving of psychic processes
in an essentialist manner on the basis of naturally occurring teloi. Although
Deleuze and Guattari do not doubt this is how the unconscious appears to
psychoanalysis, they argue for a different account.
Theirs is a largely somatic, creative conception of the unconscious,
modeled on and determined by mechanisms of secondary or social repression,
See Four Concepts 72 concerning Lacans frank admission of an ontology.

Regarding neurosis as psychoanalysis starting point and touchstone, see TRM 24 and
N 15. See Aetiology of Hysteria 278 where Freud says neurosis acts as the touchstone of
psychoanalysis.
37
Regarding repression as a natural biological process, see Van Haute and Geyskens, Confusion
107 and 128.
35
36
116
based on schizophrenia as a starting point and touchstone.38 In these respects

then, their conception is strikingly similar to Lawrences. On this view, the
unconscious is anything not specifically conscious, including pre-, non-, or
a-conscious phenomena. There is nothing specifically psychical or mental
about the unconscious. Equating the unconscious with desire, Deleuze and
Guattari write that structures do not exist in the mind, but in the real; there
is nothing mental about desire (AO 97). Here Deleuze and Guattari clearly
have Lacan in mind when they refer to the real versus the registers of
the imaginary and symbolic. Elsewhere, they say that delirium is at work
in reality, we saw only reality all around us, taking the imaginary and the
symbolic to be illusory categories (N 144).39 Their frequent claims that the
unconscious and desire are productive rather than representative should be
understood on this basis.
In the work of Deleuze and Guattari, desire has an idiosyncratic meaning,
having little to do with need, wish, demand, etc. Although these are all ways
desire is experienced, it is neither identical with nor can it be reduced to them.40
Rather, it is closer to what Spinoza means by conatus and Nietzsche by will, and
in all cases concerns a conception of power.41 However, this is not a power one
desires, strives for, wills, or possesses. This would be to understand power in
terms of representation. Deleuze goes to great lengths to distinguish Nietzsches
philosophy of power from both Hobbes and Schopenhauers, comparing and
contrasting but ultimately criticizing the latter.42 Rather, for Deleuze via
Deleuze and Guattari endorse Reichs position that one can identify a turn for the worse in Freuds
work when psychic repression is given precedence over social repression, when Freud accepts
the idea of a primary anxiety that supposedly touches off psychic repression (AO 117). See
AO 118-119 for a further discussion of the primacy of social repression, as well as its relation to
psychic repression. I return to these points shortly. Regarding schizophrenia as a starting point,
Deleuze and Guattari write that the relationships of neurosis, psychosis, and also perversion
depend on the situation of each one with regard to the process, and on the manner in which
each one represents a mode of interruption of the process Each of these forms has schizophrenia as a foundation; schizophrenia as a process is the only universal (AO 136).
39
I return to the significance of this claim with respect to Lacan below.
40
To a certain degree, they write, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very
outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us
choose between production and acquisition. From the moment that we place desire on the
side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which
causes us to look upon it as primarily a lack (AO 25).
41
Hence, in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze equates desire, conatus, and power. See 5862 and 97-104 on this.
42
According to Deleuze, both Hobbes and Schopenhauer conceive of power in terms of
representation. At bottom, says Deleuze, both Hobbes and Schopenhauer conceive of
power as an object, as a thing. Since one can possess things, it is assumed one could also
possess power, that power is something after which one could strive. For this reason then,
power could be represented. One could have an idea of power and then strive after it in
38
117
Nietzsche, power is something everyone always already possesses. Nietzsches

doctrine of will to power concerns less the desire to possess or achieve power
than techniques for feeling the power one already possesses.43
For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari equate desiring-production with
social-production; they equate desire with labor.44 Hence, rather than basing
their conception of desire on the model of need, wish, demand, etc. central
to which are psychical operations that entail giving priority to the mind
over body Deleuze and Guattari base their conception of desire on power,
power each and every individual always already possesses, about which there
is nothing specifically psychical.45 Desire is something one does, part of each
and every action one takes.
In this respect then, Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the unconsciousdesire is best understood in terms of Marx and Engels conception of praxis,
an undifferentiated, neither subjective nor objective, productive force
through which human beings transform themselves while transforming their
environments.46 In fact, so as not to mistake what Deleuze and Guattari mean
by desire with need, wish, demand, etc., every time they refer to desire one
might replace it with labor, understood here as a species of the genus praxis.
Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the unconscious-desire can thus be
understood as what people do, the physical processes by which people shape
themselves while shaping their environments rather than as the inverse,
reality. For Nietzsche and Deleuze by extension power is productive in nature, a creative
force (NP 57-59). According to Deleuze, one should not conceive of power as an object one
might or might not possess as a thing after which one strives. Central to this conception of
power are psychical processes of ideation and mentalization. Hence, although Deleuze and
Guattari credit Kant with formulating a productive conception of desire, they criticize this
conception for being mental. The reality of the object, they write, insofar as it is produced
by desire, is thus a psychic reality (AO 25). With respect to psychoanalysis, this results in
the following: The whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected to the requirements
of representation (AO 54). It involves a conception of human nature and desire where
psychical processes are given ontological and explanatory priority.
43
With regard to Kafkas work, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: One would be quite
wrong to understand desire here as a desire for power Kafkas idea has nothing to do with
this. There isnt a desire for power; it is power itself that is desire. Not a desire-lack, but a
desire as a plentitude, exercise, and functioning (K 56).
44
The truth of the matter is that social production [labor] is purely and simply desiring-production
itself under determinate conditionslibido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any
psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces
and the relations of production (AO 29).
45
Regarding the way representation constitutes psychoanalysis idealism, see N 17 as well.
46
The objective being of desire, they write, is the Real in and of itself. There is no particular
form of existence that can be labeled psychic reality. As Marx notes, what exists in fact is
not lack, but passion, as a natural and sensuous object (AO 26-27).
118
mirror image of consciousness (representation), or a mental state that consists

in need, want, wish, etc.47 Similarly, for Marx and Engels, praxis separates
human beings from animals and for this reason stands at the center of
a materialist philosophical anthropology discernible in their thought.48
However, this separation is constituted by a difference in degree rather than
kind.49
Non-human animals might also be said to transform themselves through
processes of transforming their environments, and it seems as though one
could establish ranks and categories to determine more and less human
animals on this basis. This discontinuity between categories such as man and
animal, culture and nature also plays a central role in Deleuze and Guattaris
conception of the unconscious. They make clear not only that there is nothing
specifically psychical about the unconscious in fact, they say the opposite,
that it belongs to physics but also that the body without organs and
intensities are themselves a part of the unconscious and physical in nature.50
They are constitutive of this undifferentiated process of production. On this
basis, one is in a position to understand the central role that secondary or
social repression plays in Deleuze and Guattaris account of the unconscious.
Whereas for Freud primary or psychic repression determines the nature
of psychical organization that, in turn, determines the nature of social
organization, for Deleuze and Guattari secondary or social repression
determines the nature of social organization that, in turn, determines the
See Holland, Anti-Oedipus 13 regarding desire as power and power as labor in connection
with the thought of Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 48 for a
discussion of desire as something one does, as well as Negri, Savage Anomaly 10 where the
conception of power puissance (potentia) versus pouvoir (potestas) Negri develops in the
thought of Spinoza is described as the productive activity of labor. He returns to this in
Spinoza: une hrsie de limmanence et de la dmocratie 7.
48
See my previous discussion of these point in Praxis and Philosophical Anthropology in
Marx and Engels in chapter one.
49
Taking up this line of thought, Deleuze and Guattari write that the unconscious is an
orphan, and produces itself within the identity of nature and man (AO 49). This continuity
between human and animal life stands at the center of Deleuzes reading of Bergson,
where differences between human and animal life are said to originate from an initially
undifferentiated lan vital (B 95), such that all degrees of difference exist in a single nature
(B 93). However, his later claim that stupidity (betise) characterizes human thought and
life uniquely that animals are protected from stupidity calls the characterization of this
continuity into doubt. See DR 150 on this.
50
The unconscious, they write, is Rousseauistic, being man-nature, an undifferentiated
process of production that involves the transformation of subjects as much as of objects, of
culture as much as of nature (AO 112). [I]n reality the unconscious belongs to the realm
of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself
(AO 283).
47
119
nature of psychical organization.51 The things people think, feel, and believe
are the result of wider social milieus or mode of existence in which they
arise and to which they belong. Since Deleuze conceives of individuals as
collections of unique sets of relations between thoughts, perceptions, and
feelings, secondary or social repression determines individuals as specific sets of
relations via social organization. However, just as there is nothing specifically
psychical about desire, neither is there anything specifically human or organic
about this process. It concerns and involves non-human nature and artifacts
as much as human beings and living creatures.52
Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the unconscious-desire as a vast reservoir
of productive power that concerns and involves human nature as much
as nature proper, living things as much as inorganic stuff. At bottom they
develop and argue for the view that the world one inhabits and the way it
is perceived results from the organization of this power. In this respect then,
the unconscious-desire is the most basic constituent of the transcendental
philosophy Deleuze and Guattari develop in Anti-Oedipus.53 The originality of
their project consists in the fact that Deleuze and Guattari use schizophrenic
rather than commonsense experience as their touchstone.
Taking schizophrenic experience as their touchstone, Deleuze and Guattari
describe the unconscious-desire in somatic, productive terms.54 Central to its
See AO 118-119, as well as Holland, Anti-Oedipus, 10 regarding social repression as
determinative of psychical repression. Here one should keep in mind the claim Deleuze
makes regarding ethics, symptomatology, and the role of the philosopher which I discussed
in chapter two: The philosopher uncovers the types of wills and forces that animate
phenomena, the modes of existence implied by statements, thoughts, and feelings (NP 78).
52
See AO 285 for their discussion of Butlers claims that human beings constitute the
reproductive organs of vapor-engines just as vapor-engines constitute the reproductive
organs of human beings, N 178 regarding Deleuzes conception of a non-organic life taking
place through silicon rather than the organic life of carbon, and D 52 concerning the role
the stirrup plays in the assemblage to which it belongs, transforming the medieval world.
53
Hence, their conception of desire is close to what Deleuze earlier associates in Bergsons
thought with a singular duration comprised of an infinite number of fluxes (B 82) calling
it a new monism (B 74) and later refers to as a transcendental field a stream of prereflective, impersonal consciousness Deleuze associates with life in general (TRM 384).
After writing Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari say their notion of assemblages is
meant to replace that of desiring-machines from Anti-Oedipus. As opposed to characterizing
this relation as one of replacement, however, it seems more accurate to say their notion
of assemblages more clearly brings out what is already at stake in desire. One should
understand Deleuze and Guattaris conception of desire retrospectively through that of
assemblages. Hence, when they say that assemblages are hodgepodges and Hodgepodges
are combinations of interpenetrating bodies, one should understand the nature of desire in
terms of interpenetrating bodies (TRM 177).
54
Summarizing this contribution, they write that the schizoanalytic argument is simple:
desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machine arrangement desiring-machines.
51
120
productive nature are what they refer to as the syntheses of the unconscious,
the principles by which this productive power is organized. Deleuze and
Guattari identify three syntheses of the unconscious: the connective,
disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses of the unconscious. Both the world
one inhabits and the way it is perceived result from this organization, result
from these syntheses.
4. Syntheses of the Unconscious

In Kant, synthesis refers broadly to the way concepts are brought to bear
on intuitions, in term of which experience is organized. Working together,
the faculties of imagination and understanding carry out the syntheses of
apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. In Deleuze and Guattari, this
term has a loosely analogous sense. Whereas for Kant the activity of synthesis
results from intellectual faculties of cognition, for Deleuze and Guattari they
result from the productive forces of the unconscious-desire. The syntheses of
the unconscious not only organize experience but also create reality.55
According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is nothing specifically psychical
about the unconscious-desire. Rather, this refers to what people do.56 The
syntheses of the unconscious describe the principles according to which reality
is produced. However, Deleuze and Guattaris discussions of the syntheses
are among the most difficult to sort out and comprehend in Anti-Oedipus. In
large part, this results from a subtle yet important distinction. They describe
the syntheses of the unconscious in two distinct yet related ways: in terms
of how the syntheses are employed how they produce reality and how
they are understood how they are understood as producing reality. The
way one understands the syntheses to produce reality makes a difference to
the ways they are employed or produce reality, and vice versa. According to
Deleuze and Guattari, the syntheses of the unconscious can be understood
and employed in either a legitimate or illegitimate fashion. The latter gives rise
The order of desire is the order of production; all production is at once desiring-production
and social production. We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of
production, for having shunted it into representation (AO 296).
55
[O]bjects, persons and symbols depend for their distribution and very constitution on
desire as libido (DI 195).
56
If desire produces, they write, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive
only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that
engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real
is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire (AO 26).
121
to what they refer to as paralogisms of the unconscious, mis-understandings

and -employments of the syntheses.
Like their use of the term syntheses, Deleuze and Guattaris use of
paralogisms has a sense roughly analogous to that of Kant. Paralogisms
occur when one mistakes a logical function for a substantial entity, thereby
mistaking the nature of the self, conceiving of the self in substantial terms, the
self as substance.57 For Deleuze and Guattari, although the paralogisms result
from the unconscious-desire, this development is socially and historically
conditioned: Misunderstandings concerning the nature of the syntheses of
the unconscious give rise to their illegitimate employment, which leads to
further misunderstandings. Unlike Kant, the purview of their discussion is
not experience in general but the realm of psychoanalytic meta-theory and
therapeutic practice.
Hence, their criticisms are directed against psychoanalytic suppositions
specifically, the fact that psychoanalysis supposes more in existence than is given
in experience, misconstruing the nature of the syntheses in the process, which
in turn leads to their illegitimate employment.58 A mistaken understanding
and employment of the syntheses supposes and reinforces notions belonging
to the organic model.
In the first place, this concerns the way psychoanalysis attempts to
understand schizophrenic experience in terms of commonsense experience,
assuming commonsense experience as its touchstone and then asking what
happened to the schizophrenic. Given the specificity of the patients, case
studies, and clinical work on which Freudian meta-theory and therapeutic
practice are based, however, neurosis provides the model for commonsense
experience, insofar as neuroses are themselves understood as caricaturish
exaggerations of general human dispositions, pathological variants of common
human tendencies and characteristics.59 More precisely then, psychoanalysis
assumes neurotic experience as its touchstone. Taking schizophrenic experience
as their point of reference, Deleuze and Guattari show where psychoanalytic
See my previous discussion of these point in Experiential Unity and Transcendental
Subjectivity in Kant in chapter one.
58
Here their use of the terms legitimate and illegitimate should not be understood as
good and bad, as designating a good (legitimate) versus a bad (illegitimate)
metaphysics. Rather, an employment of the syntheses is illegitimate from the perspective of
experience, when one supposes more in reality than is given in experience.
59
The Belgian psychoanalyst Jacques Schotte (1928-2007) refers to this as a pathoanalytic
perspective on psychopathology. See Van Haute and Geyskens, Non-Oedipal Psychoanalysis
for an excellent discussion and development of this position with respect to hysteria. In
many ways, a perspective such as this characterizes Deleuze and Guattari approach to
schizophrenia in Anti-Oedipus.
57
122
theory and practice go astray. Time and again, they criticize psychoanalysis
for attempting to understand schizophrenia in terms of neurosis, for forcing
schizophrenia into categories belonging to neurosis. On this point, Deleuze
and Guattaris critique of psychoanalysis tallies with Lawrences.
At bottom these concern the Oedipus complex. Their mutual criticisms
are directed against the way psychoanalysis understands pathology specifically,
and human nature in general, in terms of the conceptual architecture
involving familiar psychoanalytic notions such as childhood, family members,
and familial relations. Following Lawrence, Deleuze and Guattari criticize
psychoanalysis because of the primacy it gives to these elements and the way
this leads to misconceptions regarding the natures of individuality, community,
and relations between the two.
As with Lawrence, in the background of Deleuze and Guattaris analyses
in Anti-Oedipus is the claim psychoanalysis supposes a metaphysics.
Psychoanalytic notions imply and are conditioned by the notions of substance,
form, and teleology. As in Kant, these are not themselves given in experience
but are nonetheless used to structure and make sense of experience (ideas
in the Kantian sense). Each notion implies the others, such that substance,
form, and teleology go hand-in-hand.60 For this reason, an illegitimate
understanding and employment of one of the syntheses of the unconscious
is never distinct from an illegitimate understanding and employment of the
other two. Experience is different depending on whether one does or does not
suppose these notions.
In brief, the syntheses of the unconscious are understood and employed
illegitimately when one supposes the notions substance, form, and teleology.61
First, supposing substance leads to an illegitimate understanding of the
connective synthesis, which in turn results in supposing the existence of what
Deleuze and Guattari call full persons, the central importance of parents to
psychoanalysis. Next, supposing the notion of form leads to an illegitimate
understanding of the disjunctive synthesis, which in turn results in supposing
the existence of particular types of familial relations, the relation between
children and parents as described by psychoanalysis. Finally, supposing
teleology leads to an illegitimate understanding of the conjunctive synthesis,
which in turn results in supposing particular types of relations between
families and society, familial relations and their dynamics as archetypes of
For example, in its most robust sense, the notion of form refers to the expression of essence,
implying an end that guides this expression a telos that determines a things characteristics
and its characteristic relations.
61
Since the purview of Deleuze and Guattaris discussion is psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic
notions, my own explanation takes this same perspective.
60
123
or models for any and all broader social relations. To make sense of how the
syntheses would be understood and employed in a legitimate fashion, it is
necessary to more closely examine each of these in turn.
5. Connective Synthesis
Describing the nature of the connective synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari write
that desire constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are
by nature fragmentary and fragmented (AO 5). To understand what they
mean here, one should keep in mind the following: Deleuze and Guattaris
conception of desire as creative and productive, the relation of their worldview
to a broadly Pre-Socratic one, and the relation between the body without
organs and Spinozistic substance where individual things are conceived as
modes and modifications of one substance expressed under different attributes.
Rather than substances as enformed matter, for Deleuze and Guattari the
basic constituents of reality are partial objects, flows, and detachments from
signifying chains, analogous to matter in Pre-Socratic schemes and modes in
Spinoza.62 Just as Spinoza makes attributes responsible for the organization
of modes and modifications of substance, and the Pre-Socratics conceive
of forces as bringing together and tearing apart amalgamations of material
stuff, so too do Deleuze and Guattari think the syntheses of the unconscious
organize partial objects, flows, and detachments from signifying chains.
The first step in this organization is bringing together various partial objects
and flows, connecting them. They distinguish two ways this process can occur
and be understood. The opposition here, Deleuze and Guattari write, is
between two uses of the connective synthesis: a global and specific use, and
a partial and non-specific use (AO 70). They align these two uses with an
illegitimate and legitimate understanding, respectively. The former involves
the assumption of substance, such that realitys basic constituents would be
enformed matters. Partial objects and flows would then be understood as
belonging to or coming from substances (AO 71). The latter involves the
recognition that, at bottom, reality consists in partial objects, flows, and
detachments from signifying chains, by nature fragmentary and fragmented,
brought together in various ways. To determine the sense in which Deleuze
and Guattari consider partial objects, flows, and detachments from signifying
chains basic constituents of reality, however, requires understanding the sense
in which partial objects would belong to or come from substances.
62
They say that the body without organs is substance itself, and the partial objects, the
ultimate attributes or elements of substance (AO 309).
124
Their use of partial objects is inspired by psychoanalytic thought. These

refer to objects through which various instincts achieve their aims, understood
apart from the persons to which they belong. For Freud, the novelty of this
discovery consists in the fact the sexual drive is independent of its object.63
The mothers breast is an object through which the hunger of a child satisfies
itself, for example, through which the ego instincts of self-preservation achieve
their aims.64 This is important because the human animal is not born with
a ready-made set of instincts. Rather, in terms of both the individual and
species onto- and phylo-genically the nature of and relations between the
instincts change. According to Freud, the sexual instincts are originally spread
throughout the body the entire body is an erogenous zone (Three Essays
150) tied to those of self-preservation, what he calls anaclisis.65 A process
of development occurs during which certain instincts dominate while others
fall to the background, changing their aims and objects in the process.66 The
child moves through developmental stages, oral and anal, satisfying its sexual
instincts on different objects depending on the stage.67
Once the child reaches the stage of genital sexuality, instincts of sexuality
and self-preservation are ideally distinct, taking different aims and objects.
In addition, various partial and polymorphous drives now coalesce, taking as
their object the other, full person.68 At this stage then, the instincts discover
what has been there all along, another person to which the partial objects
belong, through which the instincts satisfy themselves. This stage is especially
important as it necessitates developing relations with others.69 Initially, the
Freud calls these drives partial first because they do not arise from the body in its totality,
and furthermore, because they function relatively independently of each other (Van Haute
and Geyskens, From Death Instinct 55). See Three Essays 166 where the discovery of partial
drives and objects originates in perversions.
64
For this reason, the breast is the prototype of every object loved. See Three Essays 222 on this.
65
See Three Essays 182 on this, as well as Autobiographical Study 35.
66
Freud says an effluence of sexual drives present themselves in early childhood, a childhood
sexuality that succumbs to repression during latency, before reawakening in puberty (Three
Essays 200). During this phase, the sexual instincts mix with those of self-preservation and
vice versa.
67
The Oedipal stage is preceded by an oral-cannibalistic stage, one where sexual activity is
not yet distinguished from the ingestion of food and a sadistic-anal phase dominated by
the activity-passivity distinction. Here the muscle system is the locus of mastery and sexual
excitation in activity, and the intestinal canal the source of sexual excitation in passivity (Van
Haute and Geyskens, From Death Instinct 76).
68
A normal sexual life, Freud writes, is only assured by an exact convergence of the
affectionate current and the sexual current both being directed towards the sexual object and
the sexual aim (Three Essays 207).
69
With the arrival of puberty, changes set in which are destined to give infantile sexual life its
final, normal shape. The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly auto-erotic; it now
finds a sexual object (Three Essays 207).
63
125
sexual instincts are autoerotic, and at puberty they take an external object.
Given the thoroughly hetero-normative social and cultural values to which
Freud subscribes, the development of genital sexuality entails finding a mate
and creating a family, propagating the human species.70 This constitutes the
form of a healthy, mature sexuality. However, Deleuze and Guattaris own
engagements with the notion of partial objects focus on the work of child
psychologist Melanie Klein (AO 44-45).
Klein was an innovator in the field of infant and child psychology. If Freud
is psychoanalysis father, then Klein is certainly its mother. According to Klein,
parents are not initially the primary constituents of a childs metal life. Since
children are not yet aware of their parents as full persons, familial relations
cannot be the primary organizational matrices according to which the mental
life of the child is ordered. Parents only become terms for the child during
a later stage of development, after two earlier states that Klein refers to as
the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Rather than mothers and
fathers what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as full persons the primary
constituents of a childs mental life are partial objects, parts of the parents
bodies and other objects in the childs perceptual and affective fields. Kleins
account of the role of the mothers breast during this developmental process
is, perhaps, the most well known.
While the child occupies the paranoid-schizoid position, it perceives
neither the mother nor the mothers breast. Rather, the child perceives either
a good or a bad breast, depending on whether the breast is dispensing milk or
pulling away. Hence, the significance of the breast and mother consists in the
connection of a partial object (the breast) and a flow (of milk). The child
attempts to integrate the good while warding off the bad, a process analogous
to what Freud describes as the constitution of a primordial pleasure ego.71
During the next phase in development, the child realizes one and the same
breast both nourished and disappointed it all along. The good breast is also
the bad breast. The child now constitutes the mother as a total person from
which this full object is taken.
According to an illegitimate understanding of the connective synthesis, say
Deleuze and Guattari, Klein assigns partial objects to full persons.72 Although
The sexual instinct is now subordinated to the reproductive function; it becomes, so to say,
altruistic (Three Essays 207).
71
See Van Haute and Geyskens, From Death Instinct 65 regarding the way incorporation is a
precursor to identification in this scheme.
72
Partial objects now seem to be taken from people, write Deleuze and Guattari on this
point, rather than from the nonpersonal flows that pass from one person to another (AO
71).
70
126
Klein discovers that parents and familial relations are not primary, she betrays
the novelty of this insight, ultimately giving primacy in this roundabout way
to the role of parents and familial relations. Two important points should be
mentioned in connection with these accounts. First, failure to move through
and out of these stages achieving universal developmental benchmarks along
the way results in psychopathology. Second, features of Freud and Kleins
accounts resemble those of the movement of the Hegelian dialectic.
With respect to the first, a certain ambiguity marks Freuds work regarding
the possibility of a healthy, mature sexuality. Although this is posited as an
ideal, it is by no means clear that anyone ever actually achieves it that a
healthy, mature sexuality free of psychopathology is possible. One can
discern in Freuds work two competing and mutually exclusive perspectives
on psychopathology, one in which psychopathology is merely an accidental
feature of human existence, which is avoidable both in principle and fact, and
another in which psychopathology lies at the very heart of human existence,
which no one ever completely avoids.73
In this respect, the existence and realization of what Deleuze and Guattari
refer to as full persons persons corresponding to the integration of partial
objects through which instincts satisfy their aims is merely an ideal. It is an
idea of psychoanalytic reason, one that grounds and guides psychoanalysis.
For the sake of meta-theory and therapeutic practice, psychoanalysis
assumes the existence of a developmental stage characterized by a coalesce
of the drives. This ideal acts as an explanatory touchstone in terms of which
psychoanalysis makes sense of earlier stages and aberrant states of these drives
and object relations. Psychoanalysis falls into errors paralogisms when it
assumes the existence of this merely ideal state in reality, when it posits more
in existence than is given in experience. This stage has implicit ethical and
political significances, functioning as a majority standard, a model of identity
and normality in relation to which deviations can subsequently be detected
Following Schotte, much of Van Haute and Geyskens work focuses on the nature of these
perspectives and their broader philosophical anthropological significance. See Van Haute
and Geyskens, From Death Instinctxx, where they claim that if psychopathology is
understood strictly from the perspective of trauma, then this opens the way to normal
psychical development and a normative conception of normality, as well as Van Haute and
Geyskens, Confusion 128, regarding organic repression as a natural process that entails a
difference in degree rather than kind between normality and pathology. Van Haute explores
this line of thought in Lacans work. See Van Haute 32, where the impossibility of a
totalization of the drives entails the impossibility of a healthy, mature, adult sexuality in
relation to the genital other, and Van Haute 155 for the way Lacans conception of object a
undermines such a totalization.
73
127
(Marrati 208).74 With this perspective in mind, one is in a position to

understand the way features of this account resemble ones in Hegels thought.
Hegels conception of Spirit can be understood in terms of Kants postulates
of reason. Hegel collapses self, world, and God, forming an explanatory archetelos for the sake of carrying out an essentialist analysis of history.75 Later
stages in history and historical development are understood as ends that pull
social and political development forward.76 In this way, the end of history and
19th century Prussian state function in an analogous manner in Hegel as a
pathology-free, mature sexuality in psychoanalysis. In both cases, these act as
ends towards which processes of individual and communal development are
tending and in terms of which they are understood, implying an understanding
of reality in terms of the organic model.77 However, if one jettisons the notions
of substance, form, and teleology, then there is no reason to suppose these
partial objects come from or eventually constitute full persons modeled on the
notion of substance.78 Neither is there a necessity nor an inherent order to the
way partial objects and flows are thought of and brought together.79
The question now becomes and the onus falls on Deleuze and Guattari
to explain why and how people so commonly and prevalently think of
collections of partial objects and flows as substances determined by forms,
determined in turn by teloi. Their answer concerns a second synthesis of the
unconscious, what they call the disjunctive synthesis, which records relations
that exist between partial object and flows.
On this point, Marrati further writes that it makes discrimination possible, or even calls it
forth (208). I return to this shortly and in chapter five.
75
For an explanation of Hegels thought along these lines, see Michael Baurs From Kants
Highest Good to Hegels Absolute Knowing. Similarly, in a profoundly Hegelian reading
of Kant based on the Critique of Judgment, Deleuze writes that the accomplishment of
freedom and of the good Sovereign in the sensible world thus implies an original synthetic
activity of man: History is this accomplishment, and thus it must not be confused with a
simple development of nature. The idea of last end implies a final relation of nature and
man; but this relation is made possible only by natural finality (KCP 74).
76
On these points, see my earlier discussions of Hegels thought in chapters one and two.
77
Regarding this point, Deleuze and Guattari write that they do not believe in a primordial
totality that once existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at some future date (AO 42).
78
Deleuze and Guattari write the following: There is no sort of evolution of drives that would
cause these drives and their objects to progress in the direction of an integrated whole, any
more than there is an original totality from which they can be derived (AO 44). See AO
324 for their further discussion of this point.
79
It is clear that such a totality-unity, write Deleuze and Guattari, is posited only in terms of
a certain mode of absence, as that which partial objects and subjects of desire lack (AO 72).
74
128
6. Disjunctive Synthesis
Recording refers to the relation between the way partial objects and flows
are organized the relations into which they enter or ways they are connected
and the way they appear, and vice versa. In the first place, recording can be
understood in terms of meaning in terms of the formation of meaning, how
and why things have the meanings they do.80 Here the importance of what
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as detachments from signifying chains comes
to the forefront.
The meanings of things are neither inherent and invariable nor determined
by forms and ends towards which they are naturally tending. Rather, their
meanings are extrinsic, resulting from the variable relations into which they
enter, which are determined by and determine in turn their conjunction
with detachments from signifying chains. The significance of this claim
is related to and can be understood in terms of Deleuze and Guattaris
engagements with structuralism, more specifically, its psychoanalytic variants.
The target of their criticism is a Lacanian perspective in which the formation
of meaning depends on relations determined by lack. This lack acts as a telos
that determines forms of relations, in turn determining their meanings.81
When psychoanalysis becomes structural, say Deleuze and Guattari,
everything is interpreted in terms of parental figures and Oedipal, familial
relations.82 For this reason, despite the deference they show to Lacan throughout
Anti-Oedipus criticizing his students rather than Lacan himself Deleuze
and Guattaris criticisms of psychoanalysis most primarily concern its Lacanian
variants.83 Their main criticism concerns the way a structuralist interpretation
of psychoanalysis results in an understanding of desire in terms of lack, what
Deleuze and Guattari associate with a theologically-inspired insufficiency in
being (AO 111). Related to this is the way such an interpretation results in a
kind of linguistic idealism, where the concrete, material conditions of human
existence are ignored, demeaning the importance of clinical experience, the
See Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 94 regarding the way codification concerns the attribution of
meanings.
81
Once again, the previously discussed affinity between Hegel and Lacan should be kept in
mind here.
82
Deleuze and Guattari find this introduction especially odious: Structural interpretation
makes Oedipus into a kind of universal Catholic symbol, they write, beyond all the
imaginary modalities. It makes Oedipus into a referential axis not only for the pre-oedipal
phases, but also for the para-oedipal varieties, and the exo-oedipal phenomena (AO 52).
83
For instance, see AO 73, 308, and 360.
80
129
specificity of the patients experience.84 Since their criticisms directly concern

the formation and nature of meaning, it is necessary to examine Lacans
commitments on these points in greater depth.
Lacanian psychoanalysis works with three registers, in terms of which
mental life takes place and its functions can be understood. For Lacan as
with Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of Lacan the imaginary and symbolic
are the most important. These are responsible for relations of identity and
difference, which condition language and give rise to a meaningful human
world and can be understood as developmental stages constitutive of
subjectivity, community, and relations between the two.85 Lacan associates
the imaginary with what he calls the mirror stage, a developmental phase in
the childs life that lasts from its sixth until eighteenth month. This is also a
structuralist function that explains personal identity, one that Lacan attributes
to the mother (E 75-81). Through its identification with those around it,
the child develops a personal identity. The third register, that of the real,
concerns anything falling outside the registers of the imaginary and symbolic,
anything that cannot be conceived and described in terms of language and
meaning. One cannot know or say anything positive about the real by its
very nature.86 In this way, Lacan gives priority and primacy to language and
They write that the function of Oedipus as dogma, or as the nuclear complex, is inseparable
from a forcing by which the psychoanalyst as theoretician elevates himself to the conception
of a generalized Oedipus (AO 51). Regarding the way Lacanian psychoanalysis is a kind of
linguistic idealism, see my discussions in chapter one.
85
See E 6-7 regarding the way identity and imaginary relations are determined in difference
or by symbolic relations. The other acts as an interjected ego ideal that gives the ego a fixed
vantage point aside from language, which brings to the ego a (false) unity, one of imaginary
identification. See Fink 18 on this. Initially, however, Lacan conceives of the mirror stage and
imaginary relations as ones that supplement the fundamental prematurity of human birth
(Van Haute 90). Mentioning the imaginary and symbolic registers while referring to their
functions, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: Everything takes place as if Oedipus
of itself had two poles: one pole characterized by imaginary figures that lend themselves to
a process of identification, and a second pole characterized by symbolic functions that lend
themselves to a process of differentiation (AO 82).
86
See Van Haute 292 regarding the imaginary, symbolic, and real. The real is the dumb reality
of brute existence, which Lacan seems to conceive in much the same way Sartre does the
in-itself. Both fall outside the realm of language and meaning. Before, outside, and without
signification, reality has a dumb, de trop quality, and since the subject of the unconscious is
not bodily, says Lacan, every biologizing interpretation of the Freudian doctrine of the drive
must be rejected (Van Haute 27). Since the body makes no positive contribution to the
formation of meaning (Van Haute 287) and no subjectivity exists outside of language,
the status of the subject must be reconsidered in terms of its dependence on language (Van
Haute 285). Lacan thus claims that the Freudian unconscious should be considered as the
sum of the effects of speech on a subject (Four Concepts 126).
84
130
meaning, and from this perspective his work can be considered a linguistic
idealism.87
However, Deleuze and Guattaris discussions regarding differences between these registers with respect to psychoanalysis concern not only Lacan.
Rather, they seem to have in mind the difference between traditional Freudian
psychoanalysis on the one hand and its structural Lacanian variants on the
other.88 Whereas the emphasis in traditional Freudian psychoanalysis is on real
persons and biology, the emphasis in structural Lacanian psychoanalysis is on
functions and language.
Given a structural interpretation, biology and real persons become
increasingly insignificant.89 Rather than allowing the specificity of individual
persons and relations to determine an understanding of the nature of broader
social structures, an account of the nature of broader social structures
determines an understanding of the nature of individual persons and
relations.90 A structural interpretation of psychoanalysis thus demeans the
importance of clinical experience, the specificity of the patients experience.
Just as the coupling of linguistics with anthropology reduces the importance of
field-work in favor of speculation concerning the shared cultural structures of
all civilizations, so too does the introduction of linguistics into psychoanalysis
obviate demands on the analyst to attend closely to the personal experiences of
individual patients.91 The figure of the mother functions as a structure, a mere
See Van Haute and Geyskens, Confusion 106 regarding a characterization of the French
psychoanalytic tradition as one that refuses biological considerations. They say this move can
be understood in terms of a tradition of French philosophy that stretches back to Descartes.
Van Haute characterizes Lacans thought in precisely these terms, identifying an ontological
dualism concerning language and the subject versus the body. Van Haute makes the excellent
point that Lacan follows in a French tradition that includes Kojve and Sartre. For Kojve
this distinction concerns labor and history versus nature, and for Sartre the in-itself versus
the for-itself (Van Haute 286).
88
Highlighting the significance of this distinction, they write the following: Our preceding
criticism of Oedipus therefore risks being judged totally superficial and petty, as if applied
solely to an imaginary Oedipus and aimed at the role of parental figures, without at all
penetrating the structure and its order of symbolic positions and functions (AO 52).
89
Deleuze and Guattari write that the distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic
permits the emergence of an Oedipal structure as a system of positions and functions that
do not conform to the variable figure of those who come to occupy them in a given social or
pathological formation (AO 52).
90
See E 34 regarding the way the signifier constitutes man rather than man constituting the
signifier, as well as Lvi-Strauss Structural Anthropology 353 concerning the way human
beings make themselves through complex bodies of rules. In Tristes Tropiques, he says the
customs of communities act as structures (178).
91
The Interpretation of Utterances, included in Two Regimes of Madness, analyzes classic case
studies along schizoanalytic lines.
87
131
function in a structural Oedipal configuration, one that results in personal

identity through identification with another,92 although this identification is
itself always fleeting and compromised.
Structuralists such as Lvi-Strauss and Lacan take Saussures work on
linguistics as their starting point. Saussures innovation consists in attributing
the production of meaning to a to non-coincidence, the difference between
both words and words and words and things.93 This cleavage then is understood
in terms of lack, a lack that conditions the production of meaning.94
Lacan places this lack at the heart of human existence.95 Human
subjectivity is in some sense always split or fractured, never fully coinciding
with itself (Four Concepts 107). The subject can only ever strive after but never
arrive at unity. The symbolic excludes from the beginning any totalization of
the subject or a coincidence in terms of what it wants (Van Haute 32-33).96
The symbolic is the domain of both language and social life (Noms-du-pre
28), introducing differentiation into imaginary identification, fracturing an
image of oneself as a complete subject, through symbolic signifiers and laws
that govern linguistic relations metaphor (resemblance) and metonymy
(contiguity).97 After imaginary identification in the mirror stage, the next step
in psychic development is symbolic differentiation, which results from the
subjects entry into language and occurs because of the father function the
name of the father.98
The name of the father now occupies the same position in mental life as
that previously occupied by the image of the mother. The father prohibits the
See Tristes Tropiques 100 regarding persons as functions.
Saussure writes that in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether
we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither idea nor sounds that existed before
the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the
system (653).
94
This is what Lvi-Strauss refers to it as the floating signifier. See his Introduction to Marcel
Mauss 63.
95
Structuralism supposes language is unique to human beings, that language is a uniquely
human capacity. For example, Lacan says that symbols introduce something new into
animal life, a new human reality into animal reality (Noms-du-pre 56). For this reason,
an understanding of language is central to an account of philosophical anthropology, for
distinguishing and explaining what it means to be human.
96
Further, see Van Haute 26 regarding the way the split subject results from its inscription in
language.
97
For a discussion of these principles, see E 412-439.
98
Although distinguished for explanatory purposes, these two registers are never wholly
separate or independent from one another. The task of Lacans Seminar on The Purloined
Letter is explaining how these two domains are related. Not only are human beings actually
born into language but also always identify with someone or something.
92
93
132
mother as an object of the childs desire.99 A tension is thereby established

between an object of identification and a law that frustrates this identification.
No matter how deep the renunciation, this image always and inevitably plays
a role by affecting signifiers within the signifying chain.100 As the ultimate
object of desire, all signifiers have a greater or lesser resemblance to this image
governed by the principle of metaphor and they all occupy positions closer
to or further from it governed by the principle of metonymy.
These resemblances and positions order the signifying chain of language,
and desire traces its path on the basis of this lost image. The name of the father
prohibits imaginary identification, thus establishing a tension that maintains
the movement of desire.101 It introduces lack into desire so that one never stops
wanting, a transcendent stock that distributes lack to all the elements of the
chain, something in common for a common absence (AO 208). The whole
of mental life receives meaning and is ordered on the basis of this lack.102
The interaction between imaginary identification and symbolic differentiation
results in the lack lying at the basis of language and conditioning both the
production of meaning and mental life.103
Keeping in mind the organic model, one can thus say that through this
interaction an end is established that is constantly frustrated, which acts as
a reference for differentiating normality from pathology. One is forced to
choose between either continuing to identify with the mother and becoming
pathological or heeding the voice of the father, entering the symbolic order,
and dealing with the lack-in-being this choice entails, an oscillation between
Understood through a structuralist lens, the primordial law against incest should be
understood as one that institutes the imposition of culture on nature (E 229). The Oedipus
complex is thus a myth that takes different forms in different societies but that will always
have to do with the institution of a law that forbids total fulfillment (Van Haute 194).
Lacan thus describes the primal father as introducing the law against incest as a satisfaction
sans frein (Noms-du-pre 87). See Van Haute and Geyskens, Confusion 134-135 regarding
the Oedipus complex as a symbolic narrative as well.
100
See AO 73, where Deleuze and Guattari seem to offer a reading of Lacan in these terms.
101
See E 34 regarding desires inability to satisfy itself except by finding an object thats been
fundamentally lost, as well as Van Haute 124 and 279-280 concerning this lost encounter
with the first other. Deleuze and Guattari describe this process as the extraction of a
transcendent complete object from the signifying chain, which serves as a despotic signifier
on which the entire chain thereafter seems to depend, assigning an element of lack to each
position of desire, fusing desire to a law (AO 110).
102
Hence, the phallus is not simply another partial object but one that gives meaning to them
all. See Van Haute 210 on this.
103
In the Lacanian scheme, even knowledge then is motivated by a lack in pleasure or
dissatisfaction, rather than an overflowing of life as in Aristotle (Fink 155). See Fink 23
regarding the nature of desire as structurally unsatisfiable.
99
133
two poles: the neurotic identification, and the internalization that is said to be
normative (AO 80).
According to Lacan, schizophrenia is a response to a lack of meaning by
the individual. The schizophrenic is foreclosed from the symbolic register,
and her delusions are attempts to make up for this loss in the register of
the real. Although both Freud and Lacan are of the view that psychoanalysis
can do relatively little to treat schizophrenia, this perspective nonetheless
informs much of Lacans thought regarding psychopathology. Hysteria and
obsessional neurosis the two major neuroses, according to Lacan are
conceived as lapses in meaning, attempts by the individual to come to terms
with the questions Am I a man or a woman? Am I dead or alive? In both
cases, the problem is understood say Deleuze and Guattari of Lacan in
terms of a failure of differentiation, foreclosure from the symbolic order that
would allow the individual to understand and come to terms with sexual and
existential difference.104
Psychopathology would thus result from a failure by the disjunctive
synthesis to properly distinguish between different things, to assign one
and only one meaning to each and every thing. As both full persons and
structural functions, mothers and fathers must be understood in an exclusive
and restrictive sense, as being either one thing or another, as being responsible
for either one function or another. Since the syntheses of the unconscious can
neither function independently of nor be understood apart from one another,
to better understand the disjunctive synthesis, it is again necessary to turn to
an examination of the connective synthesis.
For both Freud and Klein, the breast is a partial object. As a partial object
before the coalescence of the drives and the constitution of the mother as a
full person the breast has a nutritive function for the child. Its meaning is
104
Deleuze and Guattari describe this as follows: Commit incest and youll be a zombie and a
hermaphrodite. In this sense, indeed, the three major neuroses that are termed familial seem
to correspond to Oedipal lapses in the differentiating function the familial triangulation
represents the minimum condition under which an ego takes on the co-ordinates that
differentiate it at one and the same time with regard to generation, sex, and vital state (AO
75). Following the path of healthy development, the individual should enter the symbolic
order and lack would become central to the notion of desire. Contra the ego psychologists,
the goal of analysis is not that the patient identify with the analysts desire but that the patient
confront her own lack-in-being. See Fink 37 on this, as well as my previous discussions in
chapter one. Resignation to Oedipus, write Deleuze and Guattari, to castration: for girls,
renunciation of their desire for the penis; for boys, renunciation of male protest in short,
assumption of ones sex. This something in common, the great Phallus, the Lack it is
like the One in negative theology, it introduces lack into desire and causes exclusive series to
emanate, to which it attributes a goal, an origin, and a path of resignation (AO 59-60).
134
determined by its function, in terms of its relation to other partial objects and
flows. The breast emits a flow of milk that nourishes the child, and the child
derives satisfaction from the autoerotic activity of thumb sucking because
it mimics feeding. From an economic point of view, however, such activity
is superfluous. Freud considers activities in which the organism achieves no
discernible advantage to its survival dangerous.105
One cannot make sense of such an activity on the basis of the childs
survival. If all goes well developmentally, however, the child gives up and moves
away from autoeroticism and towards genital sexuality, developing relations
with other people. This stage then acts as an end in terms of which earlier
developmental states can be understood, a wider context in terms of which
partial objects and full persons are oriented and thus become meaningful.
The breast receives the meaning it does is recorded in a certain way
because of its relation to a flow, a partial object through which the drive of
self-preservation satisfies itself in relation to a flow of milk. As a full person,
the significance of the mother is determined in the same way, by the relations
between partial objects and flows that constitute her.106 The significance of
the relation between mother and child is not itself basic but determined by
relations between partial objects and flows. From this perspective, however,
the novelty of Deleuze and Guattaris commitments are unclear, the way
their account diverges from Freuds concerning the variability of the relation
between the aims and objects of drives.107 Central to this discovery, for Freud,
is an understanding of normal as well as abnormal psychical development.
On this score, the position of Deleuze and Guattari diverges from that of
psychoanalysis.
One can discern in Deleuze and Guattaris work two competing perspec
tives on psychoanalysis, especially evident in their treatment of Freud. This
concerns the distinction between an earlier, physiologically-inclined Freud
who thinks in terms of the body and material causes evident in the cathartic
method and a later, psychologically-inclined Freud who thinks in terms
of the mind and immaterial causes evident in the psychoanalytic method
proper and becoming especially pronounced with the introduction of the
See, for example, the tellingly titled section Dangers of Fore-Pleasure in Three Essays 211212.
106
Thus, following Freud and psychoanalytic drive theory, Deleuze and Guattari are squarely
opposed to the primacy of personal relations emphasized by attachment theorists. On this
see Van Haute and Geyskens, From Death Instinct.
107
See TRM 80-81 where desire is explained along polymorphous, Freudian lines.
105
135
death drive.108 Although this distinction can be understood in terms of the

relation between mind and body and the relative importance given to material
over ideal conditions in an understanding of human existence109, it can also
be understood in terms of a developmental model regarding psychopathology
that comes to increasingly dominate Freuds work, appearing hand-in-hand
with the introduction of the Oedipus complex as the nuclear complex of
psychopathology.110
No longer are psychopathologies understood as caricaturish exaggerations
of common human dispositions. Rather, sickness arises when the individual
fails to achieve universal developmental benchmarks. In this way, the idea or
postulate of a mature, adult sexuality free of psychopathology comes to the
forefront. For Deleuze and Guattari, this concerns the way full persons receive
meaning based on relations between partial objects and flows, determined by
an ultimate end of psychosocial development. One only achieves this ideal by
sufficiently overcoming earlier developmental stages as an end towards which
this development is tending and in terms of which it can be understood. This
shift introduces a universalism into psychoanalytic thought with respect to the
importance of familial relations.
Psychoanalysis takes familial relations as its point of departure and reference
(AO 120). The primacy of familial relations as a theoretical touchstone can be
explained by the fact that these are supposedly the first a child knows, thought
to be lived first by the child as a microcosm, then projected into the adult
and social development (AO 174). They serve as the archetypes for relations
For a different, more nuanced, and perhaps better-informed perspective on the relation
between mind and body in Freud, see Antoine Vergotes Husserl et Freud sur le corps
psychique de laction. Vergote develops the notion of a libidinal or psychic body in
Freuds work. This category would complicate an understanding of Freud in terms of a
simple positivism or mind-body dualism. On the relation between mind and body in
Freud, see Jonathan Lears Love and its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of
Freudian Psychoanalysis. Although Lears work on Aristotle is excellent, the problem with
his understanding of psychoanalysis seems to be his incapacity to disengage from Aristotle,
reading Freud as though he were a sagely humanist. I am grateful to Herman Westerink for
these references.
109
See my discussions of this distinction in chapter one.
110
For example, Every new arrival on this planet, Freud writes, is faced by the task of
mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis. With
the progress of psycho-analytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex has become
more and more clearly evident; its recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes
the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents (Three Essays 226). Significantly, this
dogmatic and ominous warning does not appear in earlier editions of Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality but was added in 1920. Regarding Freuds understanding of the Oedipus
complex as the nuclear complex of psychopathology, see Autobiographical Study 55 as
well.
108
136
that a child has throughout its life. Furthermore, childhood and the types of
familial relations established therein have an impact on persons throughout
the rest of their lives. Phenomena such as trauma, guilt, the Oedipus complex,
and castration anxiety produce their formative, lasting effects during this stage
and in the context of these relations.111
Such relations and their effects serve as the foundation for cultural
phenomena such as social organization, religious practices, and the arts.112
In this sense, familial relations are understood as having an inherent and
invariable significance, based on the significance of family members. The
meaning of family members is determined by the functions they serve in the
development of the childs psychical life. Central to this development is the
resolution of the Oedipus complex, giving up ones mother as an object of
desire via the internalization of the fathers cruel voice threatening castration,
which conditions the internalization of social norms and values.
Hence, illegitimately understanding and employing the first connective
synthesis results in supposing that partial objects and flows come from and
belong to full persons, as characteristics or attributes of substances. These full
persons have an invariable meaning conditioned by the role they play in the
development of the childs psychical life the way form is determined by telos.
The mother is desires primary and archetypical object, and the father acts
as the agent of this desires repression. By maintaining that flows and partial
objects come from full persons or tend towards the constitution of full
persons psychoanalysis can ascribe to these persons either actually or as
structural functions a preeminent place in the constitution and development
of mental life.113 Full objects and persons are then coded according to a process
of exclusive, restrictive inscription. As functions, they determine the course of
mental development, either healthy or pathological.
According to psychoanalysis, the identity of the subject is determined
on the basis of these relations; the identity of the child is determined by its
development in terms of Oedipal relations. Being a child consists in taking
Regarding the importance of childhood when dealing with repression, see Freuds account in
Lay Analysis 205.
112
On this score, Deleuze and Guattari write that castration and oedipalization beget a
basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher
formations that integrate it, subject to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social
and cultural production (AO 74).
113
The desiring-experience is treated, write Deleuze and Guattari, as if it were intrinsically
related to the parents, and as if the family were its supreme law. Partial objects are subjected
to the notorious law of totality-unity acting as lacking. The disjunctions are subjected to
the alternative of the undifferentiated or exclusion (AO 120).
111
137
the mother as an object of desire and then giving up this object in accordance
with the fathers cruel voice. The child is only capable of occupying one of
these developmental stages at a time either it clings to the mother as an
object of desire or internalizes the voice of the father and, for this reason,
full objects and persons are understood and recorded as either one thing or
another. Familial relations thus determine what and how people are.114
According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, this exclusive disjunction
is a false dichotomy psychoanalysis pushes on patients. The psychoanalyst,
thus, became the carrier of Oedipus (AO 56). Patients are forced into
what Deleuze and Guattari call a double bind, resulting from an exclusive
and restrictive understanding and employment of the disjunctive synthesis
of recording; the only choice it permits is between the exclusive symbolic
differentiations and the undifferentiated Imaginary, correlatively determined
by Oedipus the double-bind is not the schizophrenic process (AO 110).
The patient misunderstands the nature of her desire. She conceives of herself
as a lack directed at a lost object, seeking to orient herself in a certain manner
towards this lack undergoing psychoanalysis. However, this represents
only one way the disjunctive synthesis of recording can be understood and
employed.
According to a legitimate, inclusive understanding and employment of
the disjunctive synthesis of recording, partial objects and flows can always
appear as one thing and another, and another, and another: The train is
not necessarily daddy, nor is the train station necessarily mommy (AO 46).
Deleuze and Guattari attribute this discovery to the emphasis they place on
schizophrenia, taking schizophrenic experience as the touchstone of their
transcendental analyses.115 They deduce different conditions for the possibility
of experience from those of common sense and neurosis. Schizophrenia
consists in an experience in which partial objects and flows always appear as
one thing and another, and another, and another.
When Oedipus slips into the disjunctive syntheses of desiring-recording, write Deleuze and
Guattari, it imposes the ideal of a certain restrictive or exclusive use on them that becomes
identical with the form of triangulation: being daddy, mommy, or child. This is the reign
of the either/or in the differentiating function of the prohibition of incest: here is where
mommy begins, there daddy, and there you are stay in your place (AO 75).
115
They write that schizophrenia teaches us a singular extra-Oedipal lesson, and reveals to us
an unknown force of the disjunctive synthesis, an immanent use that would no longer be
exclusive or restrictive, but fully affirmative, non-restrictive, inclusive. A disjunction that
remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjointed terms, that affirms them throughout
their entire distance, without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the
one, is perhaps the greatest paradox. Eitheroror, instead of either/or (AO 76).
114
138
The importance of schizophrenic experience consists in the fact it does

not suppose the notions substance, form, and teleology to make sense of
experience. It thus shows a legitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious
how they are understood and employed in an immanent fashion without
reference to these notions and a concomitant sense of transcendence
(AO 319). Starting with schizophrenic experience results in a legitimate,
non-restrictive understanding and employment of the disjunctive synthesis of
recording.116 Partial objects and flows are conceived in-themselves rather than
as belonging to full objects and persons; parts are conceived in themselves
rather than as parts of wholes.117
Just as with an illegitimate understanding and employment, a legitimate
understanding and employment of this synthesis conditions the structures
and meanings of wider social relations. Whereas the structures and meanings
of wider social relations appear intrinsic and invariable with an illegitimate
understanding and employment of the disjunctive synthesis of recording
based on its assignment of intrinsic and invariable meanings to full objects
and persons given a legitimate understanding and employment of the
disjunctive synthesis of recording, the structures and meanings of wider social
relations appear extrinsic and variable, determined by the variable relations
into which partial objects and flows enter. Detachments from signifying
chains then refer to the nature of variable and extrinsic relations between
partial objects and flows.118
Different types of partial objects and flows can and do enter into the same
relations. They are not specific to the types of partial objects and flows related.
Hence, these relations are themselves detachable from the amalgamations
of partial objects and flows out of which they arise and to which they give
meaning.119
They write that if we discover such a totality alongside various separate parts. It is a whole
of these particular parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity of all of these particular parts
but does not unify them; rather, it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately
(AO 42). For Deleuze and Guattari, this schizophrenic experience is the same as that of the
child: From his very earliest infancy, the child has a wide-ranging life of desire a whole set
of nonfamilial relations with the objects and machines of desire that is not related to the
parents (AO 48).
117
In his engagements with the work of Walt Whitman in Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze
describes fragments and their organization in an open or fragmented whole along similar
lines. I return to the political significance of this account in chapter six.
118
Deleuze describes Spinozas account of essences along similar lines, which he also refers to
as true codes. See EPS 292-293 and 312 ff.
119
Describing this scheme and challenging the primacy psychoanalysis places on parental figures
and familial relations in terms of it, Deleuze and Guattari say, our object choice itself refers
to conjunctions of flows of life and of society that this body and this person intercept,
116
139
Since this perspective does not suppose substance, form, and teleology,
any pre-determined and invariable coding of partial objects and flows on
the basis of and in relation to totalities is out of the question.120 Assuming
these syntheses are understood and employed in a legitimate manner, the
connections and relations between partial objects and flows appear, are coded,
and recorded as ever changing, continuously establishing fresh connections
within this maelstrom of partial objects and flows.121
Just as an illegitimate understanding and employment of the first synthesis
conditions an illegitimate understanding and employment of the second, and
vice versa, so too does an illegitimate understanding and employment of the
third synthesis condition an illegitimate understanding and employment of
the first two, and vice versa.
7. Conjunctive Synthesis
The synthesis of conjunction concerns the nature of subjectivity and the
constitution of groups the way subjectivity identifies with a particular group
in terms of its origin and destiny, as well as the way groups develop in terms of
this identification. In very general terms, the goal of the conjunctive synthesis
consists in determining ones origins processes that form the subject,
connections leading to an understanding of what one is the meaning of the
receive, and transmit, always within a biological, social, and historical field where we are
equally immersed or with which we communicate (AO 293). Although parental figures and
familial relations are important to ones development and the subjects formation, according
to Deleuze and Guattari, they function as partial objects that condition variable relations
occurring in the context of broader social ones, rather than as full persons that condition
invariable familial relations on which broader social ones are based: The family is by nature
eccentric, decentered (AO 97).
120
They write the following with respect to this worldview and its connection to literature:
Maurice Blanchot has found a way to pose the problem in the most rigorous terms, at the
level of the literary machine: how to produce, how to think about fragments whose sole
relationship is sheer difference fragments that are related to one another only in that each
of them is different without having recourse either to any sort or original totality (not even
one that has been lost), or to a subsequent totality that may not yet have come about? It is
only the category of multiplicity, used as a substantive and going beyond both the One and
the many, beyond the predicative relation of the One and the many, that can account for
desiring-production: desiring-production is pure multiplicity, that is to say, an affirmation
that is irreducible to any sort of unity (AO 42). I return to their notion of multiplicity and
its relation to Anglo-American literature in the next chapter.
121
Deleuze and Guattari write that the father and the mother exist only as fragments, and are
never organized into a figure or a structure able both to represent the unconscious, and to
represent in it the various agents of the collectivity; rather, they always shatter into fragments
that come into contact with these agents (AO 97).
140
subject, recording and the conjunctive synthesis brings together the other
two. An understanding and employment of this synthesis already supposes and
conditions either a legitimate or illegitimate understanding and employment
of the other two.
According to a biunivocal and segregative understanding and employ
ment of the conjunctive synthesis, the characteristics and characteristic
relations of full objects and persons are determined by the social ends towards
which they are tending. This constitutes the final element of the organic
model in its relation to the syntheses of the unconscious, whena living
organism appears as a single subject; when the connections become global
and specific, the disjunctions exclusive, and the conjunctions biunivocal
(AO 287). Taken together, one supposes the existence of full objects and
persons (substance-connective synthesis) whose relations are intrinsic and
invariable (form-disjunctive synthesis), which are determined by the ends
towards which they are tending (teleology-conjunctive synthesis).122
Deleuze and Guattaris analyses concerning an illegitimate understanding
and employment of the conjunctive synthesis consist in subjectivitys
identification with a particular extra-familial group in terms of its initial
membership in a family, as well as the role extra-familial groups play in the
development of the dynamics of family relations. Their discussions of these
points take place in terms of psychoanalysis and capitalism. They claim
psychoanalysis works in tandem with capitalism, effecting an obfuscation
regarding the nature of desire and, therefore, human existence.123
Regarding this process, Deleuze and Guattari write that desiring-machines are organic,
technical, or social machinesthe same machines under determinate conditions (AO 287).
By determinate conditions they mean forms into which the machines enter as so many
stable forms, unifying, structuringthe selective pressures that group the parts retain some
of them and exclude others, organizing the crowd (AO 287-288). Desiring machines are
thus conceived as organic because of an illegitimate understanding and employment of the
syntheses, which are themselves conditioned by notions belonging to the organic model.
They mention the notion of teleology specifically: They are the same machines, but not at
allthe same use of the syntheses Only what is not produced in the same way it functions
has a meaning, and also a purpose, and intention (AO 288 emphasis added). Hence,
only when one understands and employs the syntheses of the unconscious in an illegitimate
fashion does desire appear as lack that organizes experience in a teleological fashion: The
desiring-machines on the contrary represent nothing, signify nothing, mean nothing, and
are exactly what one makes of them, what is made with them, what they make in themselves
(AO 288). I return to the way social machines employ the syntheses of the unconscious in
an illegitimate fashion, giving rise to the Oedipus complex, shortly.
123
This results, however, from an illegitimate employment and understanding of the syntheses,
and for this reason the nature of familial relations the role they play in the development
of extra-familial relations and the role extra-familial relations play in the development of the
dynamics of familial relations are by no means immutable. On this score, Deleuze and
Guattari write that these private persons are formally delimited in the locus of restricted
122
141
Since psychoanalysis takes as its starting point familial relations, Deleuze

and Guattari say it operates with a false arche that determines a mistaken
telos the configurations and dynamics of familial relations restrict the
destinations to which one can aim in later life.124 Familial relations act as
models for future social relations, and the Oedipus complex plays a central
role in this development. The emphasis psychoanalysis puts on the dynamics
of familial relations consists in a distinction between familial and extrafamilial relations. In some sense the two are understood as mutually exclusive,
as biunivocal.125 If the child continues to cling to or identify with its mother,
then the child neither begins a family of its own nor develops its own identity.
Its development is stunted. The existence of society depends on the healthy
development of individuals. As a therapeutic technique, say Deleuze and
Guattari, psychoanalysis supposes it plays a central role in this process.
The aim of psychoanalysis is to uncover memories, thoughts, and feelings
that have become unconscious as a result of repression, which influence the
ways people behave, usually in the form of pathological symptoms understood
as the outcome of this process. These memories, thoughts, and feelings are
usually in the order of infantile wishes and desires. If these can be remembered
and, thereby, added onto or integrated into a coherent matrix with the rest of
a patients mental life, then the pathological symptoms cease. Since repression
occurs in early childhood, familial relations are the context for these infantile
wishes or desires and the touchstone for investigating them as their point
of origin. Through free association, dream analysis, transference, and other
psychoanalytic techniques, one rediscovers these repressed wishes or desires.
The realization these are the sources of the pathology is part of the cure:
biunivocalizationso that is what this means (AO 101).
family as father, mother, child. But instead of being a strategy that, through the actions
of alliances and filiations, opens onto the entire social field, is coextensive with it, and
countersects its co-ordinates, it would appear that the family is now merely a simple tactic
around which the social field recluses, to which it applies its anonymous requirements of
reproduction, and that it counteracts with all its dimensions The familial determinations
become the application of the social axiomatic (AO 264). I return to the role of the social
axiomatic in my discussions of the capital machine.
124
See Holland, Anti-Oedipus 40 regarding the role familial relations play in the restriction of
options.
125
Describing the overcoming of the Oedipus complex, for example, Freud writes that at the
same time as these plainly incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the
most significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements of the pubertal
period is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that alone makes
possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of civilization, between the
new generation and the old (Three Essays 227).
142
According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, this is a false dichotomy

in the service of extra-familial authority. They say this dichotomy where
one either enters the realm of the social and internalizes external authority or
fails to do so and becomes sick as a result is itself determined by and in the
service of extra-familial authority.126 Yet again, quasi-Aristotelian, Hegelian
commitments are implicit to an employment and understanding of the
conjunctive synthesis in this manner.
The development of individuals conditions the development of society, just
as the development of society conditions the development of individuals. The
two reciprocally determine and mutually reinforce one another.127 Even before
discovering or positing the importance of familial relations, psychoanalysis uses
as its point of reference broader social relations in terms of which individuals
are oriented, relations towards which individuals are supposedly developing
or tending.128 This biunivocal use, illegitimate from the point of view of
the unconscious itself, has what appears to be two moments; first, a moment
that is racist, nationalistic, religious, etc., and that, by means of a segregation,
constitutes an aggregate of departure that is always presupposed by Oedipus,
even if in a totally implicit fashion (AO 110-111). Deleuze and Guattari
here mention ones belonging to, or alignment with, a race, nation, or religion
social coordinates in terms of which the subjects identity is formed.129
Herein lies the segregative characteristic of an illegitimate understanding and
employment of this synthesis.
Oedipus says to us, Deleuze and Guattari write, either you will internalize the differential
functions that rule over the exclusive disjunctions, and thereby resolve Oedipus, or you
will fall into the neurotic night of imaginary identifications. And everybody knows what
psychoanalysis means by resolving Oedipus: internalizing it so as to better rediscover it on
the outside, in social authority, where it will be made to proliferate and be passed on to the
children (AO 79).
127
See Group Psychology 80, where Freud makes an analogy between the integration of
individuals into groups and his account of the development of the instincts towards genital
sexuality in Three Essays 207. On this point, Deleuze and Guattari say Oedipus presupposes
in itself a certain kind of libidinal investment of the social field, of the production and the
formation of this field that depend on the determinations of the subjugated group as
an aggregate of departure and on their libidinal investment (from the age of thirteen Ive
worked hard, rising on the social ladder, getting promotions, being a part of the exploiters)
(AO 103).
128
Only in appearance, however, is Oedipus a beginning In reality, Deleuze and Guattari
write, it is a completely ideological beginning, for the sake of ideology. Oedipus is always
and solely an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the requirements of an aggregate of
departure constituted by a social formation (AO 101).
129
Regarding a segregative, biunivocal use of the conjunctive synthesis and the way notions
such as race and nation determine familial relations see Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 86.
126
143
Groups are themselves determined in opposition to other groups, how

groups differ from one another. Individuals belonging to different groups then
also differ from one another in terms of their characteristics and characteristic
relations.130 Given the wider social milieu in which the family exists, the latter
takes on special form and meaning.131 These characteristics and characteristic
relations are determined in individuals by the family through a process Deleuze
and Guattari call retention. Through retention, the family determines which
characteristics and characteristic relations individuals have.132 This process
takes place with reference to broader, extra-familial relations onto which
familial ones open, the different ends towards which individuals are tending,
an end that concerns ones membership in a particular group.133
Familial relations are important because of the role they play in the
individuals integration into a wider community. The first step in this process
is a familial moment that constitutes the aggregate of destination by means
of an application, where the third paralogismfixes the precondition
for Oedipus by establishing a set of biunivocal relations between the
determinations of the social field and the familial determinations (AO
111). The biunivocal nature of the conjunctive synthesis thus concerns the
developmental discontinuity between familial and extra-familial relations and
distinctions between various extra-familial groups with which the individual
identifies.134 Persons and people appear as the operative factor in the
formation of subjectivity. On this basis, one seeks out ones origin in a group
for the sake of aligning oneself with this group. According to a biunivocal,
segregative understanding and employment of the conjunctive synthesis,
fostering normal, healthy relations with ones family while ultimately giving
I return to a characterization of the development of individuals and groups along these lines
in chapter five, in my discussion of the political import of Deleuze and Guattaris notion of
opinion.
131
Deleuze and Guattari say, we know in point of fact that the actual factors are there from
childhood, and that they determine the libidinal investments in terms of breaks and
connections that they introduce into the family (AO 99).
132
Retention is the primary function of the family: it is a matter of learning what elements of
desiring-production the family is going to reject, what it is going to retain, what it is going
to direct along the dead-end roads leading to its own undifferentiated (the miasma), and
what on the contrary it is going to lead down the paths of a contagious and reproducible
differentiation (AO 125).
133
Oedipus informs us: if you dont follow the lines of differentiation daddy-mommy-me,
and the exclusive alternatives that delineate them, you will fall into the black night of the
undifferentiated, belonging to no group and, hence, being no one (AO 78).
134
See Holland, Anti-Oedipus 84 regarding the division between familial and extra-familial
relations, and Holland, Anti-Oedipus 39 and 41 concerning the nature of a segregative use
of the third synthesis.
130
144
up these familial ties is a precondition for the development of the individual

as well as society.135
For Deleuze and Guattari, this is all a mystification, describing only
one way the conjunctive synthesis can be understood and employed.136
Since this description and the way the syntheses of the unconscious are
illegitimately understood and employed suppose broadly Aristotelian,
Hegelian commitments, a legitimate understanding and employment of
the third synthesis of the unconscious can be understood along Spinozistic
lines. As Deleuze and Guattari describe it in their discussion of a legitimate
understanding and employment of the conjunctive synthesis, the nature and
origin of subjectivity can be understood in terms of Spinozas account of
individuality.
According to a legitimate understanding of the conjunctive synthesis,
subjectivity results from the conjunction of partial objects and flows with
detachments from signifying chains, as unique sets of relations, tantamount
to Spinozistic individuality.137 For Deleuze and Guattari, what appears as a
subject as substance is, in fact, residue alongside the productive machines,
on and in their interactions with the body without organs.138 In this way,
the body without organs is similar to Spinozistic substance, which Deleuze
and Guattari take as their model rather than the organism.139 The subject is
The fact that the father is first in relation to the child, write Deleuze and Guattari, can
only be understood analytically in terms of another primacy, that of social investments if
it appears that Oedipus is an effect, this is because it forms an aggregate of destination (the
family become microcosm) (AO 179). Further, they say that the primacy of the social field
as the terminus of the investment of desire defines the cycle, and the states through which
the subject passes to evolve solely within the movement of progression or regression
(AO 276).
136
They say the problem is not resolved until we do away with both the problem and the solution.
It is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedipus, it does not intend to resolve it
better than Oedipal psychoanalysis does. Its aim is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order
to reach the real problems (AO 81).
137
The subject itself is not at the center, they write, which is occupied by the machine, but
on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through
which it passes (AO 20).
138
It is a strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body
without organs (AO 16). Regarding the schizophrenic identity as one organized on the
organless body, as a proper name or unique set of relations, see TRM 26.
139
Related to an understanding of individuals and community conceived as unique sets of
relations in which the relations between them are ones of sympathy or vibrations they
write that schizoanalysis would come to nothing if it didnt add to its positive tasks the
constant destructive task of disintegrating the normal ego. Lawrence, Miller, and then Laing
were able to demonstrate this in a profound way: it is certain that neither men nor women
are clearly defined personalities, but rather vibrations, flows, schizzes, and knots. The ego
refers to personological co-ordinates from which it results, persons in turn refer to familial
135
145
neither a substance nor a locus of agency, one with a fixed identity.140 Not only
subjectivity but also community is conceived along broadly Spinozistic lines,
unique sets of relations, chance occurrences that result from the interaction
of partial objects and flows.141 Both individuals and community are the result
of productive processes of connecting, coding, and conjuncting, according to
the syntheses of the unconscious.142 However, when and where this takes place
in relation to which flows and partial objects is undetermined.143
Unlike in Kantian philosophy where the subject is basic where
transcendental subjectivity is pre-categorical and conditions the synthesis
of experience for Deleuze and Guattari the subject is thoroughly residual,
parasitic on the syntheses of the unconscious as forces that bring together
partial objects and flows. The subject is the result of the syntheses rather
than the syntheses being the result of the subject.144 This subject only appears
alongside the syntheses of the unconscious, alongside the syntheses operations
on partial objects and flows what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as desiringmachines.145 Understood legitimately, the conjunction of partial objects
co-ordinates The task of schizoanalysis is that of tirelessly taking apart egos and their
presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing
the flows they would be capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing
always further and more sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity;
and assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with
others (AO 362). See my discussions of these points in chapter two.
140
Rather, in the third synthesis, they write, the conjunctive synthesis of consumption
the body without organs is in fact an egg, crisscrossed with axes, banded with zones,
localized with areas and fields, measured off by gradients, traversed by potentials, marked
by thresholds Phenomena of individuation and sexualisation are produced within these
fields (AO 84-85).
141
Deleuze and Guattari write that in reality, it is a question of encounters or conjunctions, of
derivatives and resultants between decoded flows (AO 267).
142
They write that our choices in matters of love are at the crossroads of vibrations, which is to
say that they express connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions of flows that cross through
a society, entering and leaving it, linking it up with other societies, ancient or contemporary,
remote or vanished, dead or yet to be born (AO 352).
143
See, further, AO 289 and 309 regarding the chance nature of these occurrences. This
maelstrom of partial objects and flows can also be conceived in terms of Pre-Socratic
thought, a primordial soup out of which subjects and objects arise through the interactions
of different matters, because of different forces.
144
Deleuze reiterates this same point in a later discussion of Foucault: The subjects always
something derivative. It comes into being and vanishes in the fabric of what one says, what
one sees (N 108). See Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 52 regarding the syntheses as formative of
the subject.
145
Deleuze and Guattari explain this in terms of desire: Desire is not in the subject, but the
machine in desire with the residual subject off to the side, alongside the machine, around
the entire periphery, a parasite of machines (AO 285). This same conceptual framework
is evident when Deleuze describes the relationship between Heathcliff and Catherine in
Wuthering Heights as one of interpenetrating intensities (N 116), as well as his description of
146
and flows with signifying chains constitutes this residual subjectivity. This
recognition is itself part of the process of coupling partial objects, flows, and
detachments from signifying chains.
In its most basic form, the conjunctive synthesis is a genealogical principle
that consists in the recognition I am Understood and employed in a
legitimate fashion, this recognition brings together partial objects and flows
(connection), giving them meaning based on their relations to one another
(recording).146 Because of the recognition occurring in the third synthesis,
partial objects and flows come to be coupled partial objects and flows become
coded on the basis of these relations. Before this recognition, partial objects
and flows are not yet coded and, for this reason, indistinguishable from one
another. They have no meaning. The subject, full objects, and persons that
arise in the third synthesis function as points of orientation, tying together
partial objects and flows, establishing relations as detachments from signifying
chains between them.
A legitimate understanding of the conjunctive synthesis thus recognizes
that subjects result from partial objects and flows. Although the subject is
a result of the syntheses of the unconscious, the formation of subjectivity
itself reveals the syntheses of the unconscious as the source of subjectivity
and experience. The subject, full objects, and persons lie at the point of
convergence between partial objects and flows. Detachments from signifying
chains refer to relations that exist between the conjunctions of these two
elements. Since no telos establishing a path of normal development exists,
neither does a hard and fast developmental distinction between the familial
and extra-familial. Deleuze and Guattari discuss this in terms of a fourth
psychoanalytic paralogism, that of the afterwards.
In the first place, this concerns a conception of the libido and the primacy
of familial relations.147 A biunivocal understanding and employment of
the conjunctive synthesis results in an understanding of familial and extrafamilial relations as mutually exclusive, where the dynamics of familial
the body and the web of the spider forming one and the same machine, where the slightest
vibration causes the spider to spring (PS 158). Elsewhere Deleuze refers to individuals
as proper names, unique sets of relations (TRM 158). See AO 351 where they refer to
Lawrences account of sexuality as a matter of flows, where people consist in vibrations. See
Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 95 concerning subjects and community being formed in one and
the same way, as amalgamations of syntheses.
146
The unities found are never in persons, write Deleuze and Guattari, but rather, in series
which determine the connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions of organs (AO 142).
147
By joining sexuality to the familial complex, they write, by making Oedipus into criterion
of sexuality in analysisFreud himself posited the whole of social and metaphysical relations
as an afterwards or a beyond that desire was incapable of investing immediately (AO 58).
147
relations determine those of broader social relations the child must first
abandon its earliest objects of desire and identification for the sake of broader
social relations. Psychoanalysis thus supposes desire has an initially familial
quality. Insofar as desires object is specifically sexual in nature, libido must
be desexualized before investing the social field, the process of sublimation.
But if one abandons an understanding and employment of the conjunctive
synthesis in a biunivocal manner, then the mutually exclusive nature of familial
and extra-familial relations disappears. Deleuze and Guattari claim familial and
extra-familial relations are in some sense contemporaneous.148 As opposed to
developmental stages through which a person passes, they are conceived as
different layers constituting one and the same organizational matrix belonging
to desire.149 The nature of familial relations thus determines those of extrafamilial relations, but no less than extra-familial relations determine familial
ones. For this reason to understand social relations and the role these play in
an understanding and employment of the syntheses of the unconscious it is
necessary to turn to Deleuze and Guattaris accounts of extra-familial relations.
8. Social Machines
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious should be conceived as
a vast reservoir of productive material power. The body without organs and
desiring and social machines arise out of and work within this maelstrom.
All of these elements are part of the unconscious, part of desire. Versus such
a conception, in large part psychoanalysis conceives of desire psychically
and in terms of lack. This results from the specificity of the experience with
which psychoanalysis begins, taking neurotic experience as its touchstone,
supposing and reinforcing an organic worldview that results in an illegitimate
understanding and employment of the syntheses.
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: active desiring-production, in its
very process, invests from the beginning a constellation of somatic, social, and metaphysical
relations that do not follow after Oedipal psychological relations (AO 129).
149
They says that the small child lives with his family around the clock; but within the bosom
of this family, and from the very first days of his life, he immediately begins having an
amazing non familial experience that psychoanalysis has completely failed to take into
account (AO 47). Further, Deleuze and Guattari write it is evident that the individual in
the family, however young, directly invests a social, historical, economic, and political field
(AO 166).
148
148
Beginning with schizophrenic experience, Deleuze and Guattari arrive at

different conclusions, one of which is the non-primacy of familial relations.150
Following Lawrence, they do not think social relations are modeled on
familial ones. Versus psychoanalytic theory, Deleuze and Guattari maintain
the primacy of social over familial relations. Familial relations are types of
social relations species of the genus rather than models or outgrowths. In
turn, this commitment grounds the relative importance they give to social
over psychic repression. The importance of familial relations consists in the
types of social relations they establish, the way they form individuals with
reference to broader social relations.151
Schizophrenic experience reveals that familial relations are not primary.
Schizophrenic experience falls outside the mainstream, and this is because the
syntheses of the unconscious do not work for the schizophrenic the way they
do for everyone else.152 Deleuze and Guattari do not begin with the question,
What happened to the schizophrenic? but rather, What happened to
everybody else? Why do the majority understand and employ the syntheses
of the unconscious in an illegitimate fashion, thereby misunderstanding the
nature of desire, subjectivity, groups, and relations between individuals and
groups? As discussed above, their answer concerns the organic model and
metaphysical suppositions that condition it.
The syntheses of the unconscious are understood and employed
paralogistically when one supposes the notions substance, form, and teleology.
However, this is only part of Deleuze and Guattaris answer. After all, the
syntheses are neither personal nor psychical, and the subject results from the
syntheses of the unconscious rather than the syntheses resulting from the
subject. Insofar as these are elements of desire, there is nothing specifically
psychical about these operations. The unconscious is impersonal and material.
For this reason, an explanation concerning how and why one understands and
employs the syntheses of the unconscious in an illegitimate fashion must refer
to impersonal, material conditions. This is precisely Deleuze and Guattaris
approach. Their explanation concerns social repression.
Whereas Freud and psychoanalysis take psychic repression to be a natural
process that provides the basis for civilizations further social repression,
They say their goal is to discover beneath the familial reduction the nature of the social
investments of the unconscious this is the whole task of schizoanalysis (AO 271).
151
Deleuze and Guattari write that it is not a question of knowing whether or not the familial
determinations or indeterminations play a role. It is obvious that they do (AO 91).
152
The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates, write Deleuze and Guattari, for situating
himself at his disposal, because, first of all, he has at his disposal his very own recording code,
which does not coincide with the social code (AO 15).
150
149
Deleuze and Guattari say that social repression is primary. Social repression
provides an initial basis for the further psychic repression of a subject. A subject
capable of psychic repression is itself the result of social repression.153 Although
psychoanalysis solidifies and reinforces a mode of existence belonging to the
organic worldview, psychoanalysis is not itself a sufficient condition of this
mode of existence.154
Psychoanalysis neither invents the Oedipus complex nor does it
manufacture the emphasis psychoanalysis places on the role of parental figures
and familial relations in an understanding of relations between individuals
and community; psychoanalysis discovers these.155 The psychic repression
psychoanalysis and oedipalization inculcate is itself part of social repression.156
According to Deleuze and Guattari, social repression results from the
representations established by social machines, the mechanism by which
the syntheses of the unconscious are employed in an illegitimate manner.157
Social machines organize people in certain ways for specific ends. They arise
out of and organize the undifferentiated productive powers of desire and the
unconscious, and the goal of this organization is recording.
This is necessary because, in its pure state, desire is productive in a
disorganized and haphazard fashion. Desire is evident in this form in
schizophrenia, as an overflowing in production whose frenetic activity never
What we mean, they write, is that Oedipus is born of an application or a reduction to
personalized images, which presupposes a social investment (AO 278).
154
Oedipus is never a cause: it depends on a previous social investment of a certain type,
capable of falling back on (se rabattre sur) family determination (AO 178). Deleuze and
Guattari are unequivocal on this point: Once again, they write, psychoanalysis does not
invent Oedipus; it merely provides the latter a last territoriality, the couch, and a last Law,
the analyst as despot and money collector (AO 269).
155
See further AO 121 and 269, N 17, and Holland, Anti-Oedipus 24, 39, and 52 for a
discussion of this point.
156
The term repression is equivocal. For the sake of the present analysis in accordance
with what Deleuze and Guattari seem to have in mind it can be used synonymously with
determination or organization. Hence, repression is not the same as nor should it be
confused with oppression, where one is kept from doing what one is capable. Although
there are elements of oppression in Deleuze and Guattaris account of repression, this is
neither the whole nor most important part of their story. On the contrary, determination
or organization has the capacity to enhance ones powers of acting. I am grateful to Justin
Litakers having pointed this out to me.
157
On this point, they write the following: Each type of social machine produces a particular
kind of representation (AO 262). The social machine is literally a machineflows are set
apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are
distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations (AO 141). Further, see AO 177,
where Deleuze and Guattari say the social conditions of Oedipus are inseparable from the
paralogisms of the unconscious.
153
150
ceases rather than a lack that yearns for a lost object.158 Characterizing desire
along these lines, Deleuze and Guattari write that if desire is repressed, it is
because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into
question the established order of a society It is therefore of vital importance
for a society to repress desire (AO 116). This is not, however, because desire
wants a different social order or revolution. Rather, desire is revolutionary
in its own right, as though involuntarily, by wanting what it wants (AO
116). Desire is revolutionary in nature because it lacks nothing, because it
is defined as the natural and sensuous objective being (AO 311). Desire is not
a psychical activity that consists in a fundamental lack but an overflowing
of physical power that wants for nothing (AO 296). Insofar as sundry
philosophical theories dealing with the nature of communal organization have
supposed relations between individuals and communities are determined by
goal-directed activity people receiving from others goods and services they
are incapable of providing for themselves, in exchange for providing goods
and services to others159 based on a conception of desire as lack, desire is
revolutionary in nature because it wants for nothing, cannot be oriented or
coded socially.160
Although society depends on the productive powers of desire, cohesive
social organization is untenable on the basis of the haphazard and disorganized
nature of desire. In its pure state, it introduces chaos into the social order a
chaos on the basis of which neither individuals nor community can subsist.
Different forms of coding thus act in the service this objective. Religion, for
example, acts as an antidote to chaos a shield against which people protect
themselves from chaos. Employing parables, myths, and theologies gives
people a framework to make sense of the world in which they live, bringing
a familiarity and regularity to experience that it otherwise lacks. According to
religious scholar Mircea Eliade, neither individuals nor groups can subsist in
chaos, and religion plays a central role in the process of warding off chaos (34).
The appearance of the sacred a hierophany makes orientation possible;
hence it founds the world in the sense that it fixes the limits and establishes
See AO 6-7 for their discussion of Henri Michauxs description of the schizophrenic table,
and Lvi-Strauss characterization of bricolage as a process of schizophrenic production.
Buchanan says that, for Deleuze and Guattari, desiring production exists everywhere but is
only visible in its pure state in schizophrenia (Anti-Oedipus 43).
159
For instance, this is precisely how Plato describes the genealogy of communal life in the
Republic, as well as Hobbes in the Leviathan.
160
Social machines repress the part of this production that does not enter into social production
or reproduction. It is what would introduce disorder and revolution into the socius, the
noncoded flows of desire (AO 173). In this form and from the perspective of society
desire is threatening and must be coded.
158
151
the order of the world (30). Similarly, the sociologist Peter Berger associates
the loss of ones orientation in experience anomy with the individuals
becoming worldless, similar in nature to schizophrenia (21). Thus, according
to Deleuze and Guattari, social machines code flows and thereby excise chaos.
Decoded flows escape coding and, therefore, appear strange and unfamiliar,
reintroducing chaos into human experience.161 The position Deleuze and
Guattari develop then does not imply that coding is bad, where people would
be free if only they could cultivate decoded flows.162
Although recording concerns the disjunctive synthesis specifically, again,
none of the syntheses ever work on their own or independently of one another.
In each case, the recording operation of the second synthesis implies what
Deleuze and Guattari call a surface on which the relations between flows are
recorded, what they call the socius or full body. Their notion of the full
body must once again be understood with reference to the model of the body
without organs.
As opposed to assuming an organic model in which intrinsic and invariable
forms determine substances in terms of ends, amalgamations of partial objects
and flows are related in different fashions by extrinsic and variable detachments
from signifying chains. Each machine has a full body on which the relations
between flows are recorded the body of the earth, the body of the despot,
and the body of capital. The nature of these bodies determines the ways the
flows are coded coding on the body of the earth, overcoding on the
body of the despot, and decoding and axiomatizing on the body of capital
although these bodies never merely act or appear as surfaces of recording.163
The surfaces of recording fall back on forces of production, thereby
determining the nature of these extrinsic and variable relations, making the
surfaces of recording/full bodies on which relations are recorded appear as the
They associate the decoding of flows with a chaos in which human life cannot subsist: the
body without organs is the deterritorialized socius, the wilderness where the decoded flows
run free, the end of the world, the apocalypse (AO 176). This is the reason that Deleuze
and Guattari reject Marcel Mauss exchangist conception of social order, saying instead the
primary task of the socius is coding, which it does in the first place by inscribing bodies. See
AO 185-186 on this.
162
Again, see Butlers account. One can discern this line of thought in Paul Pattons work on the
political implications of Deleuzes thought. See Patton, Deleuze and the Political 136, where
he describes Deleuze and Guattaris notion of deterritorialization as a juridical norm.
163
This socius, Deleuze and Guattari write, may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant,
or capital. This is the body that Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the product of
labor, but rather appears as its natural or divine presupposition constituting a surface over
which the forces and agents of production are distributedwhich now seem to emanate
from it as a quasi-cause (AO 10).
161
152
productive causes of these relations. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this process
as representation. Representation is responsible for both psychic and social
repression and is comprised of two layers, one in depth and the other on
the surface. Its in-depth layer is comprised of three elements the repressed
representative, repressing representation, and displaced represented (AO 184);
its on-the-surface layer involves a conception and account of language, which
comprises the second part of the way relations between flows are recorded.
Social machines then are the second part of Deleuze and Guattaris answer
to the question of what happened to the schizophrenic. Social machines are
their impersonal, material answer to the question of how and why the organic
worldview becomes dominant. The basic tenets of the organic model arise
from these socio-historic formations, where the syntheses of the unconscious
come to be employed in an illegitimate fashion. Each machine gives rise to and
articulates a specific configuration and understanding of the relation between
the syntheses, which gives prominence to one of the three, through whose
employment one comes to assume the basic elements of the organic worldview.
The savage territorial machine misemploys the first connective synthesis,
giving rise to substance and unity in the form of parents the creation of full
persons. The barbarian despotic machine misemploys the second disjunctive
synthesis, giving rise to form and organization through the figure of the
despot. The civilized capitalist machine misemploys the third conjunctive
synthesis, giving rise to the notion of teleology in the form of an infinite debt
desire as lack.164 In this way, psychoanalysis takes up all the elements of the
social machines and incorporates them (AO 304). Having this framework in
place allows for an examination of the specific elements and operations of the
different social machines.
9. Primitive Territorial Machine

To varying degrees, it is supposed that biology determines familial relations.
Sons and daughters are persons who fathers and mothers sire and birth, such
that marriage rules establishing prohibitions concerning sexual relations
between them are based on biology. This is evident in the emphasis placed
on the universality of the incest taboo. Something akin to a form would thus
They say that the savage territorial machine operated on the basis of connections of
production, and that the barbarian despotic machine was based on disjunctions of inscription
derived from the eminent unity. But the capitalist machine, the civilized machine, will first
establish itself on the conjunction (AO 224). See AO 262 as well, where they further discuss
this point.
164
153
determine the kinds of relations into which persons do and do not enter,
and characteristics of persons and the characteristic relations into which they
do and do not enter follow from their natures. Broader social relations then
would simply be the natural outgrowth of familial ones, and rules governing
relations between family members and society at large would result from the
natures of the members themselves.
Implicit to this scheme is the supposition that relations are internal to their
terms. Deleuze and Guattaris perspective is exactly the opposite.165 Persons
are themselves the result of prohibitions, and from this perspective relations
would be external to their terms. Relations determine the nature of the
terms and, in this respect, Deleuze and Guattaris perspective is thoroughly
structuralist.166 This is their first step in explaining the socially and historically
conditioned nature of the Oedipus complex.
With respect to the first synthesis, this concerns an understanding of the
self in substantial terms individuals as relatively autonomous self-subsistent
entities a metaphysical supposition conditioned by the primitive territorial
machine. The territorial machine employs the connective synthesis in an
illegitimate manner and produces full persons in the process, establishing
relations between the flows and partial objects of desire in terms of territorial
representation, supporting a conception of family members as full persons.
This is the process through which social repression takes place, organizing and
determining the productive powers of desire. Flows are coded in and through
territorial representation.
Central to territorial representation is the full body in reference to which
coding takes place, in term of which flows are organized and on which these
relations are recorded. The territorial machine inscribes or records relations
between the flows of desire on the body of the earth; the earth serves as the
full body in territorial representation. However, the full body never appears
merely as a recording surface but falls back on the productive forces of desire,
making it appear as though the earth is productive.167 This claim can be
understood in terms of primitive myths and a perennial understanding of
the earth as a productive source of life. In the savage socius, the body of the
earth and that of the individual are coextensive human beings are part of
The personal material of transgression, they write, does not exist prior to the prohibition,
any more than does the form of persons (AO 71).
166
See Structural Anthropology 50 where Lvi-Strauss claims kinship is not based on nature and/
or blood ties, as well as Tristes Tropiques 314, where he says social relations are not modeled
on familial ones; the chief is not a father.
167
The earth is the primitive, savage unity of desire and production (AO 140).
165
154
the earth and the earth is part of human beings. Eliade explains the perennial
importance of the tera mater as a religious symbol in these terms (138-141).
According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, as a recording surface, the full
body reciprocally determines the nature of both organization and recording.168
Hence, although the connective synthesis is central to the territorial machine,
the syntheses never function on their own or independently of each other.
With this perspective in mind, one can understand their claim that, in
territorial representation, recording takes place through inscription, by
marking the body.
Connections between partial objects and flows are recorded by inscribing
the human body, just as one would the body of the earth, for example,
to distinguish burial sites, trade routes, and other significant locales.169
Inscription designates and prescribes relations between things, giving them
a familiarity they otherwise lack. For example, Ive been here before I
carved my initials in this tree, or, Hes one of us. I can tell from his tattoo.
The on-the-surface layer of representation consists in this, which implies a
conception of language. Here one-to-one correspondences are established
between connections and the recording surface. Deleuze and Guattari refer to
this operation as coding.170
Coding takes place through a relationship between three different parts
of the human body the hand, voice, and eye and they claim the relation
between these elements gives rise to language. The account of language
that Deleuze and Guattari associate with territorial representation is thus
thoroughly material in nature. Language rests on and arises out of sonorous,
corporeal interactions between parts of the body. The hand records relations
by inscribing them directly on the flesh, while the eye sees the pain this
inscription evokes. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari associate this
inscription with the movement of culture, a mnemotechnics that creates a
If the full body falls back on the productive connections and inscribes them in a network,
they write, it must attribute them to itself as though it were their cause It is not content
to inscribe all things, it must act as if it produced them. It is necessary that the connections
reappear in a form compatible with the inscribed disjunctions, even if they react in turn on
the form of these disjunctions (AO 154).
169
The essence of inscribing the sociusresides in these operations: tattooing, excising,
incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and initiating following the requirements of a socius (AO 144).
170
Regarding this system of inscription or non-signifying signs as below or before meaning
see Colebrook, Guide for the Perplexed 115-116. In the next section, I show how Deleuze
and Guattari explain the transition from an account of language in these terms to one where
meaning proper arises.
168
155
memory for human beings.171 Hence, like Nietzsche, their emphasis is on the
importance of material over ideal conditions in an understanding of human
existence.
The psychical faculty of memory is itself the result of a physical process
of inscription. In the primitive socius then, the voice is semi-independent of
graphism, initially independent of writing. Witnessing the pain of inscription,
the eye bridges the gap between writing and the voice, establishing a relation
between these relatively autonomous components. Deleuze and Guattaris
account here is close to Foucaults in The Order of Things; the title of this work
in French, Les mots et les choses, makes the connection explicit.
There Foucault writes that language exists first of all, in its raw and
primitive being, in the simple, material form of writing, a stigma upon things,
a mark imprinted across the world which is a part of its most ineffaceable
forms (42). For the ancients, language was a thing inscribed in the fabric of
the world (43). Words and things become separated from one another, says
Foucault as representation for the classical age and as signification for us
and the eye and ear become separated from each other as well (43). Foucaults
early work concerns identifying discursive formation, their transitions, and
the ways they condition knowledge. Only later does his attention turn to
the reasons for these transitions, which are transitions in non-discursive
formations. Deleuze and Guattari seem to be considering something similar.
The analogue could be stated as follows: on-the-surface representation : indepth representation :: discursive formations : non-discursive formations.172
Connected to this line of investigation, both turn their attention to literature.
Foucault claims that, beginning in the 19th century, literature achieves an
autonomous existence, beginning with Hlderlin and continuing through
Mallarm and Artaud (Order 43-44). Literature shows language in its brute
being (Order 119). Words appear as things. Deleuzes engagements with
literature seem at least in part concerned with the same dynamic an indepth, schizophrenic use of language that he also identifies in the work of
Artaud.173 As opposed to a scheme where writing would be a second-best
representation of speaking, writing is primary and speech only ever secondary
On this score, they write that cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies
and inscribed on them, belabouring them. That is what cruelty means. This culture is not
the movement of ideology (AO 145).
172
Similarly, see F 10, where Deleuze describes the diagonal movement as a relation between
discursive relations and non-discursive milieus.
173
See F 130-131, where Deleuze points towards the being of language in literature as a clue
to what comes after man and god. I am grateful to Christopher Penfield for many fine
conversations regarding the relation between the thought of Deleuze and Foucault.
171
156
the voice is a response to the action of the hand. The affinities with Derridas
early work here are obvious.
For Derrida, however, writing is only ever the result of lack a lack in the
subjects presence to itself that he variously refers to as supplement, trace,
diffrance, etc. In this way then, Derrida subscribes to a similar conceptual
framework as Lacan, one where meaning is based on that which is missing.174
Hence, Derridas supplement, trace, diffrance, etc. functions in the same way
as Lacans name of the father. Both take as their point of orientation a critique
of Hegels use of totality understanding a part in terms of the whole but, in
the end, the positions they develop come to the same thing understanding
the whole in terms of a missing part. Deleuze and Guattari find both positions
equally odious.
Insofar as language is itself an organizational mechanism, the conception
of language belonging to this on-the-surface layer of territorial representation
relates to an in-depth layer that concerns the organization of productive
forces. The latter is comprised of three elements, the repressed representative,
repressing representation, and displaced represented of desire. Territorial
representations in-depth layer organizes forces of material production
through the dynamics of these elements, resulting in the constitution of
full persons. Deleuze and Guattari say the intensive germinal flux plays
the role of repressed representative, relations of alliance act as the repressing
representation of desire, and (homosexual) incest is the displaced represented
of desire. Examining each of these and the relations between them sheds light
on how their interactions constitute full persons and contribute to establishing
the Oedipus complex.
Once again, in its pure form, desire is a disorganized force of material
production; cohesive social organization is untenable on the basis of desire in
its intensive state.175 Deleuze and Guattari refer to the raw productive energy
with which the territorial machine works as the intensive germinal flux,
discussing the productive nature of this energy in terms of filiation. They
characterize the forces of the germinal flux as intensive rather than extensive.
This is significant to their analyses of the ways filial relations concerning
whom one can and cannot marry determine productive forces in territorial
If there are structures, Derrida writes, they are possible only on the basis of the fundamental
structure which permits totality to open and overflow itself such that it takes on meaning by
anticipating a telos which here must be understood in its most indeterminate form (Writing
and Difference 31).
175
For this reason, in what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as pure nomadism, all production
takes place outside the camp, in a kind of proto-socius. See AO 148 for their discussion of
this point.
174
157
representation, as well as the way this process gives rise to full persons out of
the maelstrom of partial objects and flows that constitute desire.
Whereas filiation is normally understood in terms of relations of human
sexual reproduction, in Deleuze and Guattaris discussion of the territorial
machine there is nothing specifically human about this productive energy.
Rather, it refers to forces of material production in general, including those
of nature.176 For this reason, the intensive germinal flux occupies the position
of desires repressed representative in territorial representation.177 As the
repressed representative of desire, the intensive germinal flux comes to be
extended repressed, organized, or determined by relations of alliance.178
For the sake of cohesive social organization, the intensive germinal flux must
be organized or repressed. Relations of alliance give form to the frenetic
productive activity of the intensive germinal flux, and they thus act as the
repressing representation of desire.179 Relations of alliance play the role of
repressing representation in territorial representation, organizing the intensive
germinal flux relations of alliance extend or organize filial relations of
production.
In territorial representation, relations of alliance take the form of rules of
prohibition and exclusion, concerning what one does and does not receive.180
Versus structural anthropological interpretations, Deleuze and Guattari claim
neither is it possible simply to deduce alliance from filiation, the alliances
from the filiative lines, nor are filial relations based on invariant social
structures (AO 146).181 Rather, they are strategic in nature.182 Filial relations
They write the following: we know the nature of this intensive filiation, this inclusive
disjunction where everything divides, but into itself, and where the same being is everywhere,
on every side, at every level, differing only in intensity (AO 154).
177
The intensive germinal flow is the representative of desire; it is against this flow that the
repression is directed (AO 162).
178
For the flows to be codable, they write, their energy must allow itself to be quantified
and qualified Now this is possible only in the system in extension that renders persons
discernible (AO 163).
179
We call this second instance the repressing representation itself alliance, since the filiations
become extended only in terms of lateral alliances (AO 164).
180
Deleuze and Guattari write that alliance is the form in which the socius appropriates
connections of labor in the disjunctive order of its inscriptions (AO 188).
181
Concerning the invariance of social structures, Lvi-Strauss writes the following regarding
tribal organization: And yet these units, whose identity, number, and distribution are
constantly varying, remain linked by relationships whose content is equally variable but
whose formal character is maintained through the vicissitudes in their history (Structural
Anthropology 22).
182
A kinship system is not a structure but a practice, a praxis, a method, and even a strategy
(AO 147). They serve political ends, such that a kinship system only appears closed to the
extent that it is severed from the political and economic references that keep it open (AO
148).
176
158
work in the service of broader extra-familial relations, political relations of

alliance.183 Alliance relations thus organize the disorganized, haphazard filial
relations of the intensive germinal flux by making them extensive, extending
and organizing filial relations.184 At bottom, this organization concerns who
does which type of work for what (AO 144).
In terms of the first synthesis, marriage laws establish connections between
men and women, although these concern less the joining of men and women
as full persons than connecting raw materials and productive capacities,
establishing connections between land, foodstuffs, and specialized skills.185
For this reason, filial relations can be understood as being in the service of
alliance or political relations.186 The nature of persons is determined by rules
that establish licit and illicit relations between partial object and flows which
ones are brought together and kept apart in turn determining the nature
of the persons occupying roles within these relations.187 Primitive territorial
representation creates persons by establishing rules regarding whom one can
and cannot marry, which concern the organization of production, organizing
productive material forces.188 Central to this organization are procedures of
Primitive families constitute a praxis, a politics, a strategyformally, they are the driving
elements of social reproduction; they have nothing to do with an expressive microcosm
(AO 166).
184
They say that alliance imposes on the productive connections the extensive form of a pairing
of persons (AO 155)
185
Once again, this can be understood in terms of Foucault. Regarding the nature of
governmentality, he says the following: in La Perrires text, you will notice that the
definition of government in no way refers to territory: one governs things. But what does
this mean? I think this is not a matter of opposing things to men but, rather, of showing that
what government has to do with is not territory but, rather, a sort of complex composed of
men and things. The things, in this sense, with which government is to be concerned are in
fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrications with those things that
are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate,
irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation to those other things that are customs,
habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and finally men in their relation to those
still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes such as famines, epidemics, death,
and so on (Essential Foucault 235). Thus, although Foucault doubts that governmentality
concerns territory, what he goes on to describe is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari
characterize as a territory. Hence, the things with which governmentality is concerned seem
to be the same in nature as what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as desire.
186
The method of the primitive territorial machine, they write, is in this sense the collective
investment of the organs (AO 142).
187
The respective position of the mother or father as kin or affine, the patrilineal or matrilineal
character of the filiation, and the patrilineal or matrilineal character of marriage, are active
elements of the repression, and not objects at which the repression is directed (AO 159)
188
On this, Deleuze and Guattari write that alliance imposes on the productive connections the
extensive form of a pairing of personsbut inversely reacts on inscription by determining
an exclusive and restrictive use of these same disjunctions (AO 155).
183
159
exclusion and restriction, represented by the incest taboo. One moves from
intensive states to discernible persons through the process of naming relations
and thus establishing persons that do not exist prior to the prohibitions
that constitute these relations (AO 160).
Homosexual incest acts as the displaced represented in territorial
representation, that against which relations of alliance as the repressing
representation are directed. Although a universal prohibition on incest
provides the basis for marriage rules, homosexual incest is a limit case totally
superfluous and unproductive from the perspective of political relations. In
the service of alliance relations, in territorial representation filial relations
appear to be directed against this possibility protecting society from
homosexual incest. Desire supposedly tends towards incest, and filial relations
in the service of alliance relations protect society from incest. Filial relations
in the service alliance relations thus appear to be directed against incest as
an unproductive activity that would threaten the social order. According
to Deleuze and Guattari, however, this dynamic is mere show. Relations of
alliance only appear to be directed against incest. For this reason, they refer
to incest as the displaced represented of desire, a red herring that mystifies
and draws attention away from the actual dynamics of desire and social
organization.189 This mystification goes hand-in-hand with a fourth paralogism
of the unconscious, what Deleuze and Guattari call displacement.
Here one would conclude from a law of prohibition that the object
prohibited is something one desires. According to Deleuze and Guattari,
exactly the opposite is the case.190 Things only appear once desire is organized,
once desire is repressed.191 As a determination in or organization of desire,
restriction creates objects in the first place. The object does not itself exist
By placing the distorted mirror of incest before desire (thats what you wanted, isnt it?),
desire is shamed, stupefied, it is placed in a situation without exit, it is easily persuaded to
deny itself in the name of the more important interests of civilization (what if everyone did
the same, what if everyone married his mother or kept his sister for himself? There would no
longer be any differentiation, any exchanges possible) (AO 120).
190
What really takes place, they write, is that the law prohibits something that is perfectly
fictitious in the order of desire or of the instincts, so as to persuade its subjects that they
had the intention corresponding to this fiction. This is indeed the only way the law has of
getting a grip on intention, of making the unconscious guilty. In short, we are not witness
here to a system of two terms where we could conclude from the formal prohibition what is
really prohibited (AO 114-115).
191
If desire is repressed, they write, this is not because it is desire for the mother and for the
death of the father; on the contrary, desire becomes that only because it is repressed (AO
116).
189
160
before the restriction.192 With the fourth paralogism then, a strange sort of
reasoning leads one to conclude that, since it is forbidden, that very thing was
desired. In reality, global persons even the very form of persons do not
exist prior to the prohibitions that weigh on them and constitute them
desire receives its first complete objects and is forbidden them at one and
the same time (AO 70). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari say incest is
a factual impossibility.193 As opposed to incest as an unproductive activity,
filial relations in the service alliance relations are directed against desire as a
haphazard and disorganized force of productive activity.
The problem for social cohesion and stability is not a lack in production
but disorganized overproduction, and the goal of social organization is not the
instatement of incentives or aims to spur on production but one of organizing
the inherently disorganized and haphazard forces of material desire.194 For
example, regarding Aztec civilization, the historian J.M. Roberts writes that
careful and tight control kept population where it was needed; removal or
marriage outside the local community were not allowed. All produce was
state property (487). Incest is not repressed but desiring-production, that
which does not enter into social production or reproduction (AO 173). From
a social perspective, however, territorial representation has a major drawback,
which concerns the earth as the full body or surface of recording.
Once relations are recorded on the earth, one might say they are written
in stone. Relations inscribed on the body of the earth become relatively
invariant. Coding then considerably constricts the capacity of a social order
to alter relations between partial objects and flows for political ends. Take,
for instance, the case of gangs. Nothing intrinsic to gang members disposes
them to act in a certain way, to enter into specific relations. Gang designations
denote the intersection of specific constellations of connections between
various flows drugs, money, clothing, cars, music, etc. Rather than terms
determining or being internal to relations, relations determine or are external
Deleuze and Guattari write that it is through a restriction, a blockage, and a reduction that
the libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them in the narrow cells of the type
couple, family, person, objects (AO 293).
193
The possibility of incest would require both persons and names son, sister, mother, brother,
father. Now in the incestuous act we can have persons at our disposal, but they lose their
names inasmuch as these names are inseparable from the prohibition that proscribes them as
partners; or else the names subsist, and designate nothing more than prepersonal intensive
states that could just as well extend to other persons, as when one calls his legitimate wife
mama, or ones sister his wife (AO 161).
194
See Holland, Anti-Oedipus for a reading of Anti-Oedipus in terms of Batailles notion of
the generalized economy, where the problem of social order would not be one of lack but
organizing excess.
192
161
to their terms. At times the constellations of these connections are recorded

directly on the body as tattoos, brands, piercings, etc., denoting relations
of gang membership. Corporeal testaments to the relations that constitute
oneself, inscriptions of this type are relatively invariant and so too are the
relations of which these signs are the record. Only with great difficulty do
members succeed in extracting themselves from gang life after initiation.
Furthermore, recording in this manner precludes the possibility of meaning
in the Saussurian-structuralist sense.
Marks inscribed on the body of the earth refer only to the relations of
which they are the records. Coding establishes one-to-one correspondences
between relations and their records on the body of the earth. On a Saussurianstructuralist account of language, however, meaning results from differences
between various signified and signifying elements. Amalgamations that arise
at the intersection of partial objects and flows in territorial representation
then lack meaning. The one-to-one correspondences characteristic of coding
in territorial representation preclude the possibility of meaning. A second
social machine superimposed on the first the barbarian despotic machine
conditions the possibility of meaning in the above-described sense.
10. Barbarian Despotic Machine

The despotic machine is the second form of social organization Deleuze and
Guattari discuss. Whereas territorial representation records on the body of
the earth, despotic representation records on the body of the despot. The
body of the despot functions as the full body in despotic representation. As
a result, whereas territorial representation codes establishing one-to-one
correspondences between relations and their records despotic representation
consists in an operation Deleuze and Guattari call overcoding. This machine
misemploys the disjunctive synthesis, giving rise to the notion of form in
relation to the despot. Since the second synthesis directly concerns the nature
of recording, the account of language Deleuze and Guattari associate with
despotic representation lies closer to a common conception of language and
meaning formation, giving rise to a conception of language and meaning
formation central to Lacan (AO 207).
For Lacan, meaning formation depends on the difference between
signifying elements and what they signify, rather than the correspondence
between words and things. This difference is understood in terms of a lack that
results from the name of the father a dominant signifier that signifies nothing
but on which the entire process of meaning formation nonetheless depends.
162
This signifier conditions the possibility of meaning in general, disrupting

and breaking one-to-one correspondences between signifiers and signifieds,
distributing lack throughout the signifying chain (AO 208). Meaning is thus
irreducible, which is to say one never reaches a point of termination, a point
where one would not have to refer to other signifiers to understand the term
under consideration. This commitment unites Lacan and Derrida.195 Since
this dominant signifier conditions the entire process of meaning production
in general, but itself signifies nothing, it is more appropriately understood as
a function or law.196 One can begin to understand Deleuze and Guattaris
account of the despotic social machine on the basis of this scheme.
According to Lacan, these structures and functions are inherent to
language and human existence, insofar as human existence is itself inscribed in
language human beings are language-competent creatures. For Deleuze and
Guattari, these structures and functions are incidental to human existence,
and Lacanian thought is itself firmly rooted in despotic representation.197 An
understanding of language in these terms is socially conditioned, resulting
from overcoding and despotic representation. As a condition for the possibility
of meaning, recording in general and coding specifically can be understood in
terms of overcoding. As with coding in territorial representation, the nature
of overcoding in despotic representation is determined by the full body on
which recording takes place. The despotic machine records on the body of the
despot. To understand this point though, it is necessary to turn to a religious
distinction. Examining the difference between transcendent creator gods
and immanent regulatory gods within religious traditions sheds light on
Deleuze and Guattaris commitments here.
Derrida discusses the irreducibility of meaning in terms of a chain of differential references,
writing as the disappearance of natural presence (Of Grammatology 159). An understanding
of this same type is at work in his discussion of Husserl. Criticizing Levinas reading, Derrida
describes Husserls idea in the Kantian sense as a horizon that can never itself become an
object or an intuition that will remain forever empty opening the work of objectification
to infinity (Writing and Difference 150). Nevertheless, Derridas reading makes of ideas in
the Kantian sense a border or horizon a non- or missing object that structures the whole
of experience. Regarding the relationship between Lacan and Derrida in these terms, see my
previous discussion as well.
196
It is the nature of the law, Deleuze and Guattari write, to signify without designating
anything. The law does not designate anything or anybody (AO 214).
197
Lacan accompanies the signifier back to its source, they write, to its veritable origin,
the despotic age, and erects an infernal machine that welds desire to the Law, because,
everything considered so Lacan thinks this is indeed the form in which the signifier is in
agreement with the unconscious, and the form in which it produces effects of the signified
in the unconscious that famous metaphors and metonymy all of that constitutes the
overcoding and the deterritorialized despotic machine (AO 209).
195
163
Transcendent creator gods are understood as creating the world but then
leaving the scene, entrusting its care to immanent regulatory gods responsible
for various quotidian functions. The latter live in the world among people and
are more closely associated with animistic and totemic religions. Regulatory
gods are spirits within things and animals with which people identify their
lineages. Characterizing this scheme, Berger says that The entire universe is
pervaded by the same sacred forces, from mana in its original prepersonal form
to the later animistic and mythological personifications (61). In a similar
vein, Eliade writes that, following Hume, De Brosses maintained that it was
an error to believe that mankind had first possessed a pure idea of God, which
later denigrated; on the contrary, since the human mind rises by degrees from
the lower to the higher, the first form of religion could only have been crude,
that is, fetishism, a term that De Brosses used in the vague sense of the cult
of animals, plants, and inanimate objects (228). Moving from conceptions of
religion based on animism and totemism to those based on transcendent gods,
Berger describes a similar process, calling it a disenchantment of the world,
especially prominent in the transition from Catholicism to Protestantism
(111).198 Peoples relationships with creator gods are understood as being
mediated by relationships they have with lesser gods through natural
phenomena in animistic religions and ancestors conceived as animals in totemic
religions that are in turn mediated by tribal chieftains and medicine men.199
These relations are both filiative and political, providing the basis for both
lineage and political alliance.
However, the recording surface falls back on creative forces of production,
making it appear as though the full body that provides a surface of recording is
itself responsible for production.200 For this reason, in primitive religions and
territorial representation, the earth, its natural processes, and animals appear
Further, regarding kinship relations between the Lakota and buffalo, elk, and birds, see
John Neihardts Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux 27.
Regarding the role a common tendency to think of trees and rivers as inhabited or animated
by souls since they display self-movement and change as opposed to rocks that do not in
the thought of Thales, see Kirk, Schofield, and Raven 96-98.
199
Describing the role played by tribal chieftains and medicine men in territorial representation
their part in the way the territorial machine wards off the possibility of any one individual
or group of individuals becoming too powerful and thus giving rise to the possibility of
decoded flows Deleuze and Guattari write the following: The segmentary territorial
machine makes use of scission to exorcise fusion, and impedes the concentration of power
by maintaining the organs of chieftainry in a relationship of impotence with the group:
as though the savages themselves sensed the rise of the imperial Barbarian, who will come
nonetheless from without and will overcode all their codes (AO 152-153).
200
See Kirk, Schofield, and Raven 16 concerning Hesiods description of the Titans as born
from the sky and earth, Ouranos and Gaia.
198
164
as being productive of existence. Primitive myths and totemic structures are

records of these relations, the ways productive material forces are organized.
Insofar as one associates primitive religion with territorial representation,
people are mediately related to creator gods through natural processes and
animals associated with the earth. For Eliade, this concerns the establishment of
micro-macrocosmic correspondences homologies between human existence
and the universe, through which human beings relate to the cosmos.201 This
changes in despotic representation.
As opposed to a tribal chieftain or medicine man who mediates relations
between people and immanent regulatory gods which in turn mediate
relations between people and transcendent creator gods in the despotic
machine, an all-powerful ruler associated with a state installs himself at the
intersection of the mediation of these relations. For example, when Amenhotep
IV came to power in 1379 BC, he tried replacing traditional Egyptian religion
with a monotheistic cult to the sun God Aton (Roberts 84). The despot thus
establishes a relation of direct filiation and new alliance with the creator god,
establishing direct lineage with the creator god versus mediated filiation
through totemic systems, as well as a new relation of unmediated political
alliance with the more powerful creator god.202 A myth concerning the despots
direct filiation with the creator god legitimates his rule and justifies an ultimate
understanding of things in terms of their relations to the despot.203 In this
vein, Berger writes that religion has been the historically most widespread and
effective instrumentality of legitimation (32); the best way to legitimate a given
social order is to hide its constructed nature (Berger 33). Given the despots
relations of direct filiation and new alliance, everything is now understood
as relying for its existence on and serving the ends of the despot.204 Meaning
now depends on the place a thing occupies in relation to this despot, owing its
existence to while serving the ends of the despot.205
See Eliade 168-169 on this, as well as Neihardt 155 regarding micro-macroscopic relations
of these kinds, specifically, his claim that everything tries to be round/take the shape of a
circle in accordance with nature.
202
What is produced on the body of the despot, write Deleuze and Guattari, is a connective
synthesis of the old alliances with the new, and a disjunctive synthesis that entails an
overflowing of the old filiations into the direct filiation, gathering all the subjects into the
new machine (AO 198).
203
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: It is therefore inevitable that
alliance be mythically represented as supervening at a certain moment in the filiative lines
(AO 155).
204
He is the sole quasi cause, the source and fountainhead and estuary (AO 194).
205
As for the subaggregates themselves, Deleuze and Guattari write, the primitive territorial
machines, they are the concrete itself, the concrete base and beginning, but their segments
here enter into relationshipsthat ensures their integration into the higher unity (AO 199).
201
165
Describing this process in terms of the rise of monarchy, for example,

Roberts writes the following: Under the Carolingians, the practice began of
vassals of the king doing him homage; that is to say, they acknowledged with
distinctive ceremonies, often public, their special responsibilities of service
to him. He was their lord; they were his men. The old loyalties of the bloodbrotherhood of the warrior-companions of the barbarian chief began to blend
with notions of commendation in a new moral ideal of loyalty, faithfulness
and reciprocal obligations A chain of obligation and personal service might
stretch in theory from the king down through his great men and their retainers
to the lowest of the free (419). The same dynamic took place in Islam, where
social ties began being conceived in terms of umma the brotherhood of
believers rather than blood (Roberts 328).
In these cases, one moves from an emphasis on the materiality of human
existence in social and political ties to an idealized, abstract criterion,
which Deleuze and Guattari describe as a cerebral ideality that is added
to, superimposed on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or
principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts and the flows into a
whole (AO 219). No longer do people relate to each other and the earth
through relations with immanent gods that establish relations of mediated
filiation and alliance.206 Under despotism, relations established in territorial
representation continue to operate, and although they are still recorded on
the body of the earth, they are also now related to the despot recorded on
the body of the despot.207 Everything is recorded twice, once on the body
of the earth and again on the body of the despot.208 In this way, relations
The immanent unity of the earth as the immobile motor, they write, gives way to a
transcendent unity of an altogether different nature the unity of the State; the full body
is no longer that of the earth, it is the full body of the Despot, the Unengendered, which
now takes charge of the fertility of the soil as well as the rain from the sky and the general
appropriation of the productive forces (AO 146). The despot installs himself at the limit,
at the horizon, in the desert, the subject of a deterritorialized knowledge that links him
directly to God and connects him to the people (AO 194).
207
The wheels of the territorial lineage machine subsist, write Deleuze and Guattari, but are no
longer anything more than the working parts of the State machine. The objects, the organs,
the persons, and the groups retain at least a part of their intrinsic coding, but these coded
flows of the former regime find themselves overcoded by the transcendent unity (AO 196).
208
For what is at stake in the overcoding effected by incest is the following: that all the organs of
all the subjects, all the eyes, all the mouths, all the penises, all the vaginas, all the ears, and all
the anuses become attached to the full body of the despot Royal incest is inseparable from
the intense multiplication of organs and their inscription on the new full body (AO 210).
The transition Deleuze and Guattari describe from territorial to despotic representation can,
once again, be understood in terms of Foucault. Regarding what might be considered the
relationship between territorial elements and their integration into a state, Foucault writes
the following: The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks
206
166
between partial objects and flows become double coded, what Deleuze and
Guattari refer to as overcoded.209 As in the territorial machine, with despotic
representation, this relation gives rise to a corresponding conception of
language. The processes of recording in general and coding specifically can be
understood as the production of meaning in terms of overcoding.
In territorial representation, inscription is primary a proto-writing. The
hand inscribes the flesh, the voice screams out in pain, and the eye mediates
this relation, bringing together the two. Unlike the materialist conception of
language territorial representation conditions, however, the despotic machine
gives rise to an immaterial, spiritualized conception of language. This conception is also based on a relation between the hand, voice, and eye. Whereas the
hand, voice, and eye are relatively autonomous in territorial representation, in
despotic representation they all come together in the figure of the despot.210
With despotic representation, the voice of the despot commands, and these
commandments are written down. The relationship between the voice and
hand thus changes. As opposed to what Deleuze and Guattari call a system
of cruelty belonging to the territorial machine where inscription takes place
on the body directly the despot now employs a system of judgment that
consists in written laws. Writing is now aligned with and becomes subordinate
to the voice. The voice dictates, the hand writes, and the eye reads, and in
this way the voice now takes priority over writing (AO 206). The despot
thus establishes a system of bureaucratic state laws in which everything relates
to him through this form of writing through this new relation between
the hand, voice, and eye. From the perspective of the social order, despotic
representation assuages a difficulty inherent to territorial representation while
at the same time introducing a new problem.
that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth
(Essential Foucault 309). The organization of productive filial relations through alliance
relations in territorial representation can be understood as the analogue of what Foucault
calls a whole series of power networks. In both cases, the state would be superstructural,
insofar as the existence of hierarchical power relations established by the state themselves
rely on forms of network repression. Deleuze brings this same framework to bear on his
own reading of Foucault. See F 35 where Deleuze says that in primitive societies networks of
alliance cannot be reduced to hierarchical structures.
209
The despotic signifier has the effect of overcoding the territorial chain (AO 209). See
Holland, Anti-Oedipus 3 regarding meaning being defined by a supreme authority, as well as
Eliade 165 concerning the way the meaning of the world depends on its being created by God.
210
Deleuze and Guattari write that the vocal, the graphic, and the visualconverge toward
the eminent unity of the despot the flattening of the graphy into the voice has made a
transcendent object jump outside the chain a mute voice on which the whole chain now
seems to depend, and in relation to which it becomes linearized (AO 205).
167
Territorial representation records on the body of the earth, which results

in the relative invariance of filial relations hampering the formation of novel
alliance relations, stifling novel forms of social and political organization.
Although relations are still recorded on the body of the earth, in despotic
representation they are also recorded on the body of the despot. They thereby
receive new meaning in terms of their relation to the despot. Unlike territorial
representation where recording takes place through inscription on the flesh,
recording on the body of the despot consists in a spiritualized writing aligned
with the voice the promulgation of social and political codes through state
bureaucracy. Relations are thus malleable in despotic representation in a way
they are not in territorial representation.
Since the meaning of all relations ultimately depend on their relation to
the despot in despotic representation, to a large extent, the whim of the despot
determines the meaning of these relations. Their meanings change depending
on their relation to the despot, how they serve the despot. Since these relations
are recorded on the body of the despot the promulgation of social and political
codes through state bureaucracy the possibility exists of their being revised.
The spiritualized writing characteristic of despotic representation is revisable in
a way the material inscription characteristic of territorial representation is not.
The despot disrupts one-to-one correspondences between relations and their
records on the body of the earth. Inscriptions on the body of the earth refer to
not only the relations of which they are the records but also the despot.
This process introduces ambiguity into the correspondences between
relations and their records, synonymous with the slippage between the signifier
and signified that conditions meaning on a structuralist-Saussurian account of
language. Deleuze and Guattari say that with despotic representation a mute
voice speaks from up high (AO 205). Here the despot has the same function
as the name of the father in Lacan. Overcoding results in a slippage between
the signifier (codes) and the signified (relations), central to the formation of
meaning. As with territorial representation, however, from the perspective of
social order, despotic representation gives rise to a problem.
Overcoding gives rise to the possibility of decoded flows.211 The double
recording that takes place in overcoding gives rise to ambiguity in the nature
of relations. Decoded flows escape coding and, therefore, appear strange and
unfamiliar, reintroducing chaos into human experience. The job of social
machines is to code flows and, thereby, excise chaos, and the problem with
overcoding is that it results in decoded flows. Decoded flows are the fear of
211
Writing the first deterritorialized flowit flows from the despotic signifier (AO 206).
168
the socius, threatening to the existence of any and all social order. According
to Deleuze and Guattari, however, there is one social machine that actively
cultivates and depends for its very existence on decoded flows.
11. Civilized Capitalist Machine

The last form of social organization with which Deleuze and Guattari deal
in Anti-Oedipus is the capitalist machine.212 Just as schizophrenia occupies
a privileged place in Deleuze and Guattaris analyses of the syntheses of the
unconscious, so too does the capitalist machine play a special role in their
analyses of social machines. In a sense, the capitalist social formation acts as a
starting point and touchstone for Deleuze and Guattaris analyses of the other
social machines; their analyses are retrospective and could only have taken
place from the perspective of capitalism.213
Only in capitalism do the elements of social machines and mechanisms
of coding become apparent, at what might be described as their point of
breakdown.214 Insofar as each of the social machines operates on the basis
of and further conditions an illegitimate understanding and employment of
a synthesis of the unconscious, however, unlike schizophrenic experience,
capitalism does not display a legitimate understanding and employment of
the syntheses. Capitalism itself operates on the basis of and further reinforces
an understanding of reality in terms of the organic notion of teleology.
Since capitalism depends on and actively cultivates the decoding of flows,
only in capitalism does it become apparent that the basic constituents of reality
are not substances organized by forms determined by ends, but partial objects,
flows, and detachments from signifying chains organized by the syntheses of
the unconscious (AO 320 and 374). Capitalism evidences the contingent,
variable nature of the organization of desire, as well as pointing towards desire
in its pure state, as a haphazard process of erratic production. In this way,
capitalism is a limit case, a worst-case scenario where the mechanisms of
representation that condition coding break down.215
It seems as though their conception of the nomadic war machine, which Deleuze and Guattari discuss in Thousand Plateaus, would be a fourth form of non-state social organization.
213
They say that any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the ways
it has developed (N 171).
214
Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding, they write, that will destroy the socius
in order to make it a body without organs and unleash the flows of desire on this body as a
deterritorialized field (AO 33).
215
On this score, they write that in a very precise sense it is true that precapitalist social
machines are inherent in desire: they code it, they code the flows of desire. To code desire
212
169
Whereas despotic representation records on the body of the despot,

the capitalist machine records on the body of capital. The body of capital
functions as the surface of recording in the capitalist machine. While despotic
representation overcodes relating relations recorded on the body of the earth
to the despot through a spiritualized, bureaucratic writing capitalist coding
results from an operation Deleuze and Guattari call axiomatization. They
emphasize the capitalist machines misemployment of the third conjunctive
synthesis, giving rise to the notion of teleology. Since the third synthesis
concerns the nature and formation of subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari relate
the notion of teleology with a Lacanian conception of desire.216 This results
from the highly abstract nature of the capitalist machine.
Capitalism is the most ideal and least material of the social machines,
both in terms of its process of recording and the surface on which recording
takes place.217 These constitute its highly abstract nature. With the capitalist
machine, an axiomatic takes the place of representation. In broad terms, an
axiomatic can be understood as a set of fundamental assumptions or principles
regarding the nature of reality, which reciprocally determine the appearance
and meaning of reality. Depending on the set of axioms with which one
begins, however, the appearance and meaning of reality changes profoundly.
One might think, for example, of the difference that exists between pictures
of the cosmos based on Euclidean geometry and a conception of space as
flat, and those based on Riemannian geometry and a conception of space as
curved. A tendency in this direction is already apparent in the transition from
territorial to despotic representation.
On the one hand, territorial representation codes by recording on
the material body of the earth inscribing in the flesh and the despotic
machine overcodes by re-recording these relations on the body of the despot,
subsuming these relations through a spiritualized writing aligned with the
and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows is the business of the socius. As we shall
see, capitalism is the only social machine that is constructed on the basis of decoded flows,
substituting for intrinsic codes an axiomatic of abstract qualities in the form of money.
Capitalism therefore liberates the flow of desire, but under social conditions that define its
limit and the possibility of its own dissolution, so that it is constantly opposing with all its
exasperated strength the movement that drives it toward this limit (AO 139-140).
216
See AO 110 and 208 regarding the socially conditioned nature of lack.
217
Regarding its difference from axiomatization as the capitalist form of recording, Deleuze and
Guattari say, the characteristic object of codes isto establish necessarily indirect relations
among these qualified and therefore incommensurable codes a code is not, and can never
be, economic: on the contrary, it expresses the apparent objective movement according
to which the economic forces or connections are attributed to an extraeconomic instance
as though they emanated from it, an instance that serves as a support and an agent of
inscription (AO 247).
170
voice. While territorial representation wards off the possibility of decoded

flows and chaos, recording in a material fashion, it also hampers the possibility
of novel relations of social and political alliance. On the other hand, although
despotic representation facilitates the possibility of novel relations of social
and political alliance, recording in a less material fashion, it also facilitates the
possibility of decoded flows and chaos.
The nature of this development is from the concrete to the abstract, from
the concretely material to the abstractly ideal, giving rise to ambiguity in
meaning and, in turn, decoded flows relations that escape representation
and coding. The capitalist machine moves even further in this direction,
depending on decoded flows to function. As with the other social machines,
the relation between its procedure of recording and the surface on which
recording takes place determines the nature of the capitalist machine. The
highly abstract nature of axiomatization then depends on the body of capital
as the most ideal and least material of the recording surfaces. To understand
Deleuze and Guattaris commitments here, it is necessary to turn to Marxs
account of the general formula for capital, more specifically, an understanding
of the role that money plays in the formula and its relation to coding.
In pre-capitalist economies, says Marx, use-value governs relations
of production and exchange, fulfilling concrete needs with commodities
produced and obtained in exchange. Here money acts as a common measure,
an intermediary in the exchange of different commodities. Marx describes this
relation with the formula C-M-C. One begins and ends with a commodity,
and the impetus for production and exchange is use-value, the needs these
commodities fulfill. On both sides of this formula, the commodities thereby
involve and refer to concrete needs. Although the type of commodities
brought into exchange and the needs that these fulfill are variable, they always
refer to concrete conditions of human existence.
As a cobbler, for example, I need not worry about my feet becoming cold
but am certainly concerned about my food source. This concern moves me to
establish arrangements with local farmers, ones in which I repair their shoes
in exchange for grain, vegetables, etc. In this way, use-value determines the
meaning and appearance of commodities, the unique ends they serve in the
fulfillment of concrete needs. The value of money is thus parasitic on usevalue. Insofar as coding concerns the appearance and meaning of things,
concrete needs determine codes.218 The relations involved here always appear
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: Hence the code relation is
not only indirect, qualitative, and limited; because of these very characteristics, it is also
extraeconomic, and by virtue of this fact engineers the couplings between qualified flows.
Consequently it implies a system of collective appraisal and evaluation, and a set of organs
218
171
in a certain way and have a specific meaning in terms of these concrete ends,
conditioning the coding of flows.219 The meaning and value of money is
determined by the meaning and value of commodities, which is determined,
in turn, by the way these fulfill basic human needs. In capitalism this changes.
Exchange-value governs relations of production and exchange in capitalism.
The goal of both production and exchange is the production of capital
through the extraction of surplus value, the production of money through
the production and exchange of commodities.220 In capitalist exchange,
commodities act as intermediaries in monetary relations. One begins and ends
with money, and the impetus for production and exchange is the production
of money. Once capitalism determines relations of production and exchange,
commodities appear and are understood in terms of capital. No longer does
concrete use-value determine the meaning and appearance of things the
unique ends they serve in the fulfillment of basic needs.
For instance, foodstuffs, shelters, and tools are understood less as things to
be used to sustain human life to fulfill basic biological needs and more as
things to be produced and exchanged for the sake of profit. The meaning of
all things is now determined by capital, in terms of their appearance as things
to be produced and exchanged for the sake of capital. Marx expresses this
in the general formula for capital, M-C-M.221 The value of commodities is
determined abstractly, by their exchange value, the amount of money one can
obtain through their exchange. Unlike basic needs that have specific, concrete
points of termination as their goal, the goal of capital is general, abstract,
and interminable in nature (AO 248). It never ends. With this framework in
place, one is now in a position to understand the way capitalism conditions an
illegitimate employment of the third synthesis and necessitates axiomatization.
In the first place, say Deleuze and Guattari, the rise of capitalism depends
on the coalesce of work and money the conjunction of labor and capital.
of perceptionas a condition of existence and survival of the society in question thus the
collective investment of organs that causes men to be directly coded, and the appraising eye
as we have analyzed it in the primitive system (AO 248).
219
See AO 254 regarding the disappearance of enjoyment as an end in the process of
consumption.
220
See Marxs Capital vol. I. 254. For this reason, Marx says that capitalisms ultimate product
is money (Capital 247).
221
On this score, Deleuze and Guattari write that money as a general equivalent represents an
abstract quality that is indifferent to the qualified nature of flows (AO 248). This is the first
of four reasons they give for defining capitalism by a social axiomatic that stands opposed
to codes in every respect (AO 248). See Buchanan, Anti-Oedipus 113 regarding the way
money is free of all codes and thus undermines fixed meanings. See Holland, Anti-Oedipus
2 concerning the way capitalism undermines fixed meanings and Holland, Anti-Oedipus
66-67 regarding the way axiomatization depends on subverting meanings.
172
Capitalism is only possible once people have been uprooted and displaced
from their areas of origin their direct relations to the earth and concrete
needs and large amounts of material surplus become available the
appearance of money as a force or power of production. The conjunction
of abstract labor and capital thus constitutes the most basic characteristic of
capitalism. This relation itself depends on the cultivation of decoded flows,
an understanding of both labor and capital as general powers of production,
apart from the concrete circumstances in which they work. The rise of the
state in the despotic machine cultivates decoded flows. Since the records
initially inscribed on the earth are now understood in terms of the despot, no
longer does the earth appear as productive. The despot appears responsible for
these relations.
The productive power of the despot is explained in terms of his direct
filiation with a creator god, a single personal entity. Insofar as an understanding
of god in these terms provides the basis for an understanding of being human
one where human beings are simply limited gods222 the productive power
attributed to the despot through a creator god provides the model for abstract
labor. In this way, material powers of production become disconnected
from the earth.223 No longer does the earth appear productive. Rather, labor
appears as productive, as an abstract power belonging, first, to the despot
specifically and, then, human beings in general. This relation further changes
in capitalism.
As opposed to labor appearing as a force of material production, in
capitalism capital itself appears to be productive. In the pre-capitalist formula
C-M-C, money acts as a mere equivalence between commodities, which are
themselves objectified forms of labor, synonymous with what Deleuze and
Guattari mean by desire. In the capitalist formula M-C-M, however, money
now appears as productive of commodities. Money can be understood as
the cause of commodities in two senses: Capital appears as both an efficient
and final cause, an efficient cause insofar as it is a necessary condition for
the production of commodities and a final cause insofar as commodities are
themselves produced for the sake of capital. As with the other surfaces of
recording then, capital falls back on forces of material production, making
On this point, referring to the work of Foucault, Deleuze says that in the classic period
man is formed in the image of God and his finitude is merely a limitation of infinity
(N 90). See N 117 where he discusses this as well.
223
Deleuze and Guattari thus say that the question of god is born of an abstraction, it assumes
the link to be already broken between man and nature, man and the world, so that man must
be produced as man by something exterior to nature and to man, i.e., by god (AO 107).
222
173
it appear as though capital is itself productive of these relations.224 With the

capitalist machine this takes on special significance; only from the perspective
of capitalism does this really become apparent.
The apparent productivity of the body of the earth and despot in territorial
and despotic representation must be understood in terms of proto-capitalist
social formations, forms of social organization that anticipate and ward off
capitalism. Most importantly, this concerns the manner in which capitalism
actively cultivates decoded flows, as well as the danger this tendency poses to
any and all forms of social organization. Recording on the bodies of the earth
and despot are concrete operations that limit the potential for decoded flows,
warding off the introduction of chaos into the social order, which capitalism
actively cultivates.
In capitalism, no longer is desire conceived as a positive force of material
production, but capital appears as having a magical filiative character. As the
most fundamentally characteristic power of human existence the capacity to
transform oneself through the transformation of ones environment praxis,
as labor, now appears as something to be bargained away, to be traded off.
Although labor is conceived as an asset, it is only ever an asset in terms of
ones ability to trade it for capital. In capitalism, the ultimate goal of both
production and exchange is capital for the sake of capital. For this reason
then, desire as a productive force can only be conceived in negative terms, as
a second best. The whole of human existence is thereby devalued in terms of
this goal.225
Capital thus becomes concrete by appropriating production, by enticing
people into trading sensuous human activity for an immaterial idea. Insofar
as labor ceases to be tied to the earth and determined by concrete needs,
it constitutes a decoded flow, one that only becomes qualified in terms of
On this score, Deleuze and Guattari write that the capitalist machine begins when capital
ceases to be a capital of alliance to become a filiative capital. Capital becomes filiative when
money begets money, or value a surplus value It is solely under these conditions that
capital becomes the full body, the new socius or the quasi cause that appropriates all the
productive forces (AO 227).
225
It is at the level of flows, Deleuze and Guattari write, the monetary flow included, and not
at the level of ideology, that the integration of desire is achieved (AO 239). This point thus
touches on Deleuze and Guattaris second reason for differentiating between the operations
of coding and axiomatization: Secondly, the fact remains that money as an unlimited
abstract quality cannot be divorced from a becoming-concrete without which it would
not become capital and would not appropriate production it is a direct relation between
decoded flows whose respective qualities have no existence prior to the differential relation
itself. The quality of the flows results solely from their conjunction as decoded flows it
expresses the capitalist transformation of the surplus value of code into a surplus value of
flux (AO 249).
224
174
capital. Capital is thus a surplus value of code a universal equivalence

without any inherent meaning and labor is a surplus value of flux a
collection of relations without any inherent meaning. When the two coalesce,
exploitation results, turning capital into labor.226
An employment of the conjunctive synthesis the conjunction of abstract
labor with capital by the capitalist machine thus gives rise to a gaping lack at
the heart of human existence, supposing and reinforcing the organic notion of
teleology. As a genealogical principle, this operation concerns the origin and
destiny of human existence, determining a conception of human existence in
terms of lack.227 Given that people have been uprooted and displaced from
their direct relations of material production with the earth, they have no
choice but to work for money, to exchange their labor for capital. For Marx
this constitutes alienation, and Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with
the way this relation determines a conception of desire and, in turn, human
existence.
Here social and mental alienation are part of one and the same process,
conditioned by psychic repression in the service of social repression (AO 320).
Because of its abstract and interminable nature, capitalism places a gaping lack
at the center of human existence. Roberts describes this situation as follows:
Perhaps there now looms up the spectre that modernizations success may have
communicated to mankind goals which are materially and psychologically
unachievable, limitlessly expanding and unsatisfiable in principle as they are
(1187). No longer is human reality oriented in terms of terminable needs,
which in turn determine the meaning of commodities and things as the basis
for coding. Rather, the meaning of needs is now determined by capitalism.
Needs only appear and have meaning in terms of lack. With the capitalist
machine, an activity that exists for itself alone that has neither meaning
nor purpose beyond itself structures the whole of reality, giving meaning
to all other things and activities in relation to this goal.228 This is how the
The preceding is an attempt to make sense of the following rather esoteric remarks by Deleuze
and Guattari: It is from the fluxion of the decoded flows, from their conjunctions, that the
filiative form of capital, x+dx, results. The differential relation expresses the fundamental
capitalist phenomenon of the transformation of the surplus value of code into a surplus value of
flux (AO 228).
227
The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy, they write, involves
deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production;
making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having ones needs satisfied
(AO 28).
228
This welding of desire to lack, Deleuze and Guattari write, is precisely what gives desire
collective and personal ends, goals or intentions instead of desire taken in the real order
of production, which behaves as a molecular phenomenon devoid of any goal or intention
(AO 342).
226
175
capitalist form of social organization deals with the productive, inherently

threatening nature of desire, to introduce lack where there is always too
much, by effecting the absorption of overabundant resources that ensures
the integration of groups and individuals into the system (AO 235-236).
Here similarities with the organic model are obvious.
Capitalism structures reality in a manner analogous to the thought of the
unmoved mover in Aristotle, the unfolding of Spirit towards the end of history
in Hegel, and the name of the father in Lacan. Capitalism thus operates on
the basis of, and further reinforces, the organic notion of teleology. Whereas
strict necessity governs the structures that result from these focal points in
both Aristotle and Hegel the nature of form and historical development
respectively this is not the case for either Lacan or capitalism. The name
of the father conditions meaning formation by introducing ambiguity into
representation, disrupting one-to-one correspondences between relations and
their records. Relations between signifieds and signifiers are neither necessary
nor inherent.229
It is precisely the extrinsic and contingent nature of these relations that
gives rise to meaning. Insofar as the production of capital is an activity that
exists for itself alone referring only to itself it functions as a signifier falling
outside the signifying chain, a signifier signifying nothing.230 Capitalism
thus introduces profound ambiguity into representation, conditioning the
possibility of decoded flows as relations that escape representation. Things
only appear and have meaning in relation to this very general, highly
abstract end. They might do so in a number of ways, and, for this reason, the
appearance and meaning of things is variable, always open to revision.231 This
is the reason Deleuze says capitalism itself engenders revolutionary situations
and experiments (TRM 379).
However, Deleuze and Guattari are quick to point out that capitalisms
movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows on the one hand is followed
by the violent and artificial reterritorialization of flows that constitutes
axiomatization on the other. The more the capitalist machine deterritorializes,
decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them,
This is the fourth reason Deleuze and Guattari give for distinguishing the process of coding
from axiomatizing. Capitalism does not have to write in bodies. In fact, it is better that
people do not have memories and are stupid, so that capitalism can add, remove, or change
axioms.
230
They describe it as a transcendent object that is more and more spiritualizedthis describes
the evolution of infinite debt through Catholicism, then the Reformation (AO 268).
231
This concerns the interminable nature of decoding and axiomatizing, which is the third
reason Deleuze and Guattari give for opposing coding to axiomatizing. Capitalism can
always add, remove, or changes axioms.
229
176
the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the
forces of law and order, do their utmost to reterritorialize, absorbing in the
process a larger and larger share of surplus value (AO 34-35).232 While the
cultivation of decoded flows brings forth the threat of chaos, it also determines
relations as variable and open to revision, which ultimately serves the end
of the production of capital.233 Axiomatization should be understood as the
process by which these relations are determined in terms of this end, creating
wants for goods and services no one needs (AO 236).
No longer are the appearance and meaning of things tied to and determined
by concrete conditions of human existence If I fix x number of shoes, then
Ill be able to eat for y number of days, C-M-C but the abstract goal
of accumulation and the equivalence of all things in terms of their yield in
capital If I fix x number of shoes and harvest y pounds of crops then Ill
accumulate z amount of capital, M-C-M. For this reason, the possibility of
decoded flows increases exponentially.234
As opposed to conceiving of things and activities as having inherent
and invariable characteristics and characteristic relations determined
by something akin to an essence being expressed in a form as is the case
with both coding in territorial and overcoding in despotic representation, in
capitalism the appearance and meaning of things and activities are determined
by an axiomatic.235 In this respect then, capitalism has an unparalleled capacity
to absorb alternative cultures, strands of thought, movements, groups, etc.
but always with the goal of producing capital.236
Naomi Klein discusses this phenomenon at length in No Logo. For
example, while it may be true that real gains have emerged from this
process [of integration], she writes, it is also true that Denis Rodman
wears dresses and supports Gay Day less because of political progress than
financial expediency (115). Spurred on by financial gain, brands incorporate
See AO 378 regarding the way new axioms can always be added, and Holland, Anti-Oedipus
12 regarding the double nature of de- and re-coding.
233
The true axiomatic, they write, takes the place of the old codings and organizes all the
decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the
capitalist system and in the service of its ends (AO 233).
234
Doubtless, to begin with money and to finish with money, they write, is an operation that
cannot be expressed in terms of a code (AO 176).
235
Deleuze and Guattari say that capitalism axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with
the other The flows are decoded and axiomatized by capitalism at the same time (AO
246).
236
On this score, they write the following: You say you want an axiom for wage earners, for
the working class and the unions? Well then, lets see what we can do and thereafter profit
will flow alongside wages An axiom will be found even for the language of dolphins (AO
238).
232
177
diversity. Klein points to this tendency by Nike and Tommy Hilfiger with
regard to African American style specifically (112). In a particularly poignant
jab at the left, she says that when the free-trade debate was lost, the left
retreated even further into itself, choosing ever more minute disputes over
which to go to the wall In this new globalized context, the victories of
identity politics have amounted to a rearranging of the furniture while the
house burned down. Yes, there are more multi-ethnic sitcoms and even more
black executives but whatever cultural enlightenment has followed has not
prevented the population from the underclass from exploding or homelessness
from reaching crisis levels in many North American urban centers (123). She
links these tendencies with globalization, describing what Hardt and Negri
refer to as Empire. The conduct of the individual multinationals, Klein
writes, is simply a by-product of a broader global economic system that has
steadily been removing almost all barriers and conditions to trade, investing
and outsourcing (422).237
Conclusion
Deleuze and Guattaris engagements with psychoanalysis concern less
psychoanalysis as such and more its philosophical underpinnings the
metaphysics it implies and conception of human nature these support. Their
work should thus be understood in terms of Lawrences engagements with
psychoanalysis: Deleuze and Guattaris engagements aim less at a wholesale
rejection of psychoanalysis and more a reformulation of the metaphysical
commitments that guide the mainstream of this tradition. Taking Lawrences
criticisms of psychoanalysis and conception of classic American literature as
touchstones, these commitments concern the relationship between mind and
body, the nature of individuality, community, and relations between the two.
On the one hand, the philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel are representative
of the organic model, employing the notions of substance, form, and teleology.
When brought to bear on philosophical anthropology, this model provides
for an understanding of individuals as substances, community as a collection
of substances, and relations between them in terms of goal-directed activity.
237
See Holland, Anti-Oedipus 121 concerning the way biunivocal relations firmly established
in earlier syntheses are dissolved and become variable in capitalism. Similarly, see Karen
Armstrongs The Battle for God 63-64, 73, and 105-106 regarding the way modernization
forces societies to integrate previously marginalized groups for the sake of utilizing all its
resources. She discusses the case of Jews and America specifically.
178
On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari take their conception of the
body without organs from the Pre-Socratics and Spinoza. Here individuals are
conceived as modes or unique chances determined by chance encounters
with the environment they inhabit and other individuals with whom they
interact community is understood as further-reaching aggregates of modes
than individuals, and relations between them are conceived in terms of shared
thoughts, perceptions, and feelings sympathy. This difference results from
the specificity of the experience with which Deleuze and Guattari begin, that
of schizophrenia. Since schizophrenic experience is radically different from
commonsense experience, so too must be its conditions of possibility.
Deleuze and Guattari thus criticize what they call psychoanalysis
representative account of the unconscious. As with Lawrences critique
of psychoanalysis, their criticisms bear on a conception of the unconscious
along idealist lines, where the unconscious would be simply a mirror double
of consciousness; its defining characteristic would be psychical activity
representing the contents of consciousness in a different fashion. Deleuze and
Guattari instead conceive of the unconscious along materialist lines. They
equate the unconscious with desire, both of which they claim are productive
of reality. Deleuze and Guattaris conceptions of the unconscious and desire
should thus be understood in terms of Marx and Engels conception of
praxis. They explain this in terms of syntheses of the unconscious, showing
how an illegitimate understanding and employment of the syntheses
ultimately result in a misunderstanding of the nature of both desire and
reality.
The connective synthesis concerns the ways relations between partial
objects and flows are conceived and can be explained in terms of Freudian
drive theory. The disjunctive synthesis determines the ways relations between
partial objects and flows are recorded, in terms of the way things appear
and are understood. The conjunctive synthesis is a genealogical principle
regarding the nature of subjectivity and the constitution of groups. Although
an illegitimate understanding and employment of the syntheses depend on
the organic notions of substance, form, and teleology all of which are taken
up and promulgated by psychoanalytic thought in the Oedipus complex
Deleuze and Guattari insist that psychoanalysis discovers, rather than invents,
the Oedipus complex.
Parental figures, familial relations, and their significance to social relations
are elements comprising the Oedipus complex, although these elements do
not themselves originate with psychoanalysis. Rather, each results from a
specific social machine from one of the forms of social organization Deleuze
179
and Guattari discuss in Anti-Oedipus on the basis of one of the syntheses of

the unconscious.
On the basis of the connective synthesis, the primitive territorial machine
gives rise to an understanding of full persons in the form of familial figures
that conditions the notion of substance. The territorial machine organizes the
productive capacities of desire through filial guidelines, determining whom
one can and cannot marry, which are ultimately in the service of political
relations of alliance. On the basis of the disjunctive synthesis, the despotic
machine introduces a form of spiritualized bureaucratic writing aligned with
the voice. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this operation as overcoding. In this
way the despotic machine conditions an understanding of the notion of form,
where their ultimate relation to the despot determines the characteristics
and characteristic relations of things. Although the aim of social machines
in general is to code flows to organize the erratic and haphazard forces of
pure production according to Deleuze and Guattari, there is one socius that
operates on the basis of decoded flows.
The civilized capitalist machine purposefully and actively cultivates the
decoding of flows. Capitalism not only evidences the contingent, variable
nature of the organization of productive capacities, but also points towards
desire in its pure state, as a haphazard process of erratic production. Given
that relations are recorded on the body of capital, no longer are the meanings
of and relations between things understood as inherent, in terms of the
concrete needs they fulfill. For this reason, capitalism operates on the basis
of an axiomatic, where the natures of and relations between things are
highly variable, being determined by and for the sake of the production of
capital. This goal conditions an understanding of teleology in a specifically
Lacanian sense, an understanding of desire in psychical terms determined by
a fundamental lack lying at the heart of human existence.
180
Chapter Four
Anglo-American Literature as a Philosophical Concept

Introduction: to the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari align what they call an Oedipal form
of literature with psychoanalysis and capitalism. This form of literature not
only reinforces the processes of psychoanalysis and capitalism but also in some
sense precedes them. This Oedipal form of literature comes before, conditions,
and is itself more central to capitalism than psychoanalysis.1 Time and again,
Deleuze and Guattari reiterate the fact psychoanalysis does not invent but
discovers the Oedipus complex. It is composed of elements that arise with
the social machines through an illegitimate employment of the syntheses of
the unconscious, giving rise to the notions of substance, form, and teleology,
which condition paralogisms of the unconscious.2 At bottom then, the
defining characteristic of this Oedipal form of literature is an illegitimate
understanding and employment of the syntheses of the unconscious and these
notions.
At the same time that Deleuze and Guattari align this Oedipal form of
literature with psychoanalysis and capitalism, however, they also introduce an
alternative. For each author associated with this literature, there is a writer who
works against this tendency. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, only the works
of writers who establish themselves in contradistinction to this Oedipalizing
tendency deserve the title literature.3 Although they never develop this theme
at length in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari make remarks that point in a
definite direction, referring to Anglo-American literature.4 They connect the
It is correct to measure established literature against an Oedipal psychoanalysis, they write,
for this literature deploys a form of superego proper to it, even more noxious than the
nonwritten superego. Oedipus is in fact literary before being psychoanalytic The Oedipal
form of literature is its commodity form (AO 134).
2
See chapter three where I develop this at length.
3
There will always be a Breton against Artaud, a Goethe against Lenz, a Schiller against
Hlderlin The only literature is that which places an explosive device in its package,
fabricating a counterfeit currency, causing the superego and its form of expression to
explode, as well as the market value of its form of content (AO 134 emphasis added).
4
Regarding the tradition and authors that constitute this anti-Oedipal trajectory, they note the
following: Strange Anglo-American literature: from Thomas Hardy, from D.H. Lawrence to
Malcolm Lowry, from Henry Miller to Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac, men who know how
to leave, to scramble the codes, to cause flows to circulate, to traverse the desert of the body
without organs. They overcome a limit, they shatter a wall, the capitalist barrier (AO 132).
1
181
experience of American existence with that of schizophrenia, on which their

critique of psychoanalysis is based.5
Since the target of Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms in Anti-Oedipus is less
psychoanalysis as such and more the metaphysical underpinnings it implies
and the conception of human nature these support, it seems as though their
praise for anti-Oedipal literature what they associate with Anglo-American
literature should be understood in the same manner. Rather than a body of
work from authors of a particular tradition or geography, as a philosophical
concept, Anglo-American literature refers to metaphysical commitments and
a conception of human nature. Just as an Oedipal form of literature coincides
with psychoanalysis and an illegitimate understanding and employment of the
syntheses of the unconscious, Anglo-American literature should be understood
as coinciding with a non-Oedipal form of psychoanalysis (schizoanalysis),
based on a legitimate understanding and employment of the syntheses. Since
this Oedipal form of literature coincides with an illegitimate understanding
and employment of the syntheses, Anglo-American literature would set in
motion processes through which the syntheses would be understood and
employed in a legitimate manner. Again, although Deleuze and Guattari never
develop this line of thought at length in Anti-Oedipus, it seems as though one
can locate it elsewhere.
Included in Dialogues, one is immediately struck by a seeming discontinuity
while reading through Deleuzes On the Superiority of Anglo-American
Literature. Although he begins by expounding the merits of Anglo-American
literature and its authors in contrast to their Franco-Germanic counterparts
(D 27-38), Deleuze quickly moves on to discuss issues and themes that are
in no way straightforwardly related to literature (D 38-56). On only a few
occasions and very briefly does he actually give examples from what
might be called Anglo-American literature; he refers to Kafka as an AngloAmerican writer. One can thus venture that, for Deleuze, Anglo-American
and Franco-Germanic literature signal more than simply bodies of work
from authors of particular traditions and that differences between the two go
beyond topical, stylistic, or aesthetic considerations. Rather, as philosophical
concepts, Anglo-American and Franco-Germanic literature denote different
understandings of human nature, different accounts of philosophical
anthropology in terms of the relation between mind and body, the natures
of individuals and community, and relations between the two. In turn, these
concepts support different accounts of political activity.
5
The schizophrenic voyage is the only kind there is. (Later this will be the American meaning
of frontiers (AO 224).
182
This becomes clear when understood through Lawrences account of classic

American literature. As a philosophical concept, Deleuzes understanding
of Anglo-American literature is based on Lawrences conception of classic
American literature, in terms of its relation to the development of the identity
of a people. This connection becomes apparent by closely examining claims
Deleuze makes concerning Anglo-American literature and then tracing the
metaphysical roots of these claims in the thought of Hume, Spinoza, and
the Stoics all of whom Deleuze associates with Anglo-American literature.
These concern the exteriority of relations, mind-body parallelism, and the
priority of events, respectively. Together these constitute Deleuzes notion of
the assemblage. This is his positive alternative to a world-view based on the
organic model, which he associates with Franco-Germanic literature in On
the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature.
Further, Deleuze and Guattari themselves refer to the assemblage when
characterizing the transition from Anti-Oedipus to Thousand Plateaus, saying
their conception of the assemblage replaces that of desire.6 This notion
itself gives rise to a problem specific to the Anglo-American milieu, which
has its solution in a corresponding conception of the political. Rather than
employing exhaustive examples from Anglo-American literature, Deleuzes
account takes as its touchstone the metaphysical commitments of Lawrences
conception of classic American literature. Taken together these stand at the
heart of Deleuze and Guattaris concept of the assemblage. Insofar as their
notion of the assemblage is central to that of Anglo-American literature as a
philosophical concept which is itself based on Lawrences account of classic
American literature both Anglo-American literature and Lawrence are much
more central to the thought of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari than has
been recognized to date.7
To support these claims, the present chapter is a close reading of Deleuzes
On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature. By explaining the
elements that belong to it, I show that Anglo-American literature constitutes
a philosophical concept that implies a philosophical anthropology. In
addition, I note points of continuity between Deleuze and Guattaris analyses
in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuzes development of Anglo-American literature as a
philosophical concept in this essay, and its relation to Lawrences account
of classic American literature. Through this reading, it becomes clear the
extent to which Deleuzes concept of Anglo-American literature is indebted
See my discussion of this point in chapter three.
Or an outright dismissal of the importance of Lawrences thought to Deleuzes such as that of
Buchanan. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly refer to the roles British and American literature
play in approaching multiplicities, which comprise assemblages (TRM 306).
6
7
183
to Lawrences account of classic American literature the extent to which it

provides the theoretical foundation for Deleuzes own thought.
1. The Line of Flight: Exiting versus Leaving

Just as Deleuze and Guattaris analyses in Anti-Oedipus are based on
schizophrenic experience, so too is Deleuzes concept of Anglo-American
literature. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari continually emphasize the
extent to which schizophrenia is a universal process, on the basis of which
different psychopathologies can be understood in terms of where and how
this process stops.8 Insofar as they claim schizophrenia can be understood as
a stationary journey, it seems as though they conceive this process as one of
change in general rather than local motion specifically. Further, Deleuze and
Guattari claim that as a process schizophrenia need not necessarily result
in a breakdown but can also result in a breakthrough (AO 130-131). Their
focus shifts in Thousand Plateaus.
Deleuze and Guattari cease discussing schizophrenia. However, the
conceptual role that schizophrenia plays as a universal process in Anti-Oedipus
is not completely abandoned in Thousand Plateaus. Rather, Deleuze and
Guattaris introduction of the notion of the line of flight can be understood
as taking its conceptual place. At bottom, this consists in a Heraclitean model
of the universe, an understanding of reality as thoroughly relational and in
constant flux, where the nature of things is determined by where and how
this process ceases. Deleuze begins On the Superiority of Anglo-American
Literature with precisely this point, with his notion of the line of flight.
He mentions authors such as D.H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, Henry
Miller, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Jack Kerouac among others (D 27). According
to Deleuze, the merit of these authors and Anglo-American literature is the
way they escape or take flight without resorting to either transcendence or
escapism, both of which are said to be the downfall of French literature. This
essay thus begins by discussing two different ways to conceive of taking
flight, which concern different conceptions of change and identity through
change.9
For example, they write that there is no difference in nature between neuroses and psychoses.
For in any case desiring-production is the cause, the ultimate cause of both the psychotic
subversions that shatter Oedipus or overwhelm it, and of the neurotic reverberations that
constitute it (AO 127).
9
To flee is not exactly to travel, or even to move, Deleuze writes, because flights can happen
on the spot, in motionless travel (D 28).
8
184
The first concerns a conception of flight in terms of exiting the way the
French and French literature, claims Deleuze, conceive of flight. This French
conception depends on a notion of transcendence. Both French writers and
their characters flee but to another world, a world beyond this one via art,
mysticism, or irresponsibility.10 Implied by this conception of flight is a notion
of identity.11 This claim can be understood in terms of the organic model
criticized in Anti-Oedipus, in terms of the way Franco-Germanic literature
works with an illegitimate understanding and employment of the syntheses
of the unconscious. The French conception of flight supposes an account of
identity, which is itself pegged on the notion of substance a person or group
of persons as ego substances that travel.12 Deleuze goes on to explain FrancoGermanic in these terms.
He writes that the French are all too human, too historical, too concerned
with the future and the past. They spend their time in in-depth analysis. They
do not know how to become, they think in terms of historical past and future
(D 28). Deleuze thus relates French literature and its conception of flight
as exiting to a notion of history and in-depth analysis. Taking the second
first, Deleuze is here referring to not only the literature of France but also its
enthusiasm for structuralism both its anthropological and psychoanalytic
variants.13 Structuralisms emphasis is on interpretation, a search for meaning
based on relations between signifiers and signifieds, according to which
both individuals and communities are imbued with meaning.14 Conceiving
his criticisms of Franco-Germanic literature in terms of the organic model,
Deleuzes reference here to structuralism thus concerns the notion of
form.
The line of flight is a deterritorialization, Deleuze writes, although the French do not
understand this very well. Obviously, they flee like everyone else, but they think that fleeing
means making an exit from the world, mysticism or art, or else that it is something rather
sloppy because we avoid commitments and responsibilities. But to flee is not to renounce
action: nothing is more active than a flight. It is the opposite of the imaginary. It is also to
put to flight not necessarily others, but to put something to flight, to put a system to flight
as one bursts a tube (D 27).
11
On this point, he writes the following: there are travels in the style of the French too historical, cultural and organized where they are content to transport their own egos (D 28).
12
See A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in Descartes in chapter one
for an explanation of this point.
13
Look at structuralism: it is a system of points and positions, which operates by cuts which
are supposedly significant instead of proceeding by thrusts and crackings (D 28).
14
In terms of the connection between Franco-Germanic literature, structuralism, and
psychoanalysis in terms of meaning, see TRM 97, as well as Psychoanalytic Reading in
Freud, Bonaparte, and Lacan in chapter one and Disjunctive Synthesis in chapter three.
10
185
Particular locales, traditions, and political systems function as structures or

forms, giving meaning and stability (identity) to egos conceived as substances.
Further, these locales, traditions, and political systems also act as points of
departure in a French conception of flight as exiting, which Deleuze associates
with a notion of history.15 Structures are conceived as forms that give meaning
and stability to persons and groups of persons. Subsequent locales, traditions,
and political structures in which persons or groups of persons would be
oriented in the future are also assumed, as points of destination or ends towards
which persons or groups of persons are tending. These points of destinations
themselves act back on and give meaning to those of departure.16
French literature thus conceives of its characters as full persons with fixed
identities, which assumes an illegitimate employment of the disjunctive
synthesis in an exclusive, restrictive manner. This literature consists in
establishing a series of recurring themes and motifs, on the basis of which
not only the individuality of characters is established, but also the solidarity
of a nation state that relies on this literature to establish its identity. Insofar
as Deleuze here claims the French think in terms of trees (D 29-30) and
Deleuze and Guattari later associate this arborescent model of thought with
a state and its literature (TP 11 and 24-25) it is clear that, even in this
essay, Deleuze associates Franco-Germanic literature with the formation and
functioning of a state.17
He says that structures are linked to conditions of homogeneity (D 39). In Thousand
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari criticize Chomsky for similar reasons, for his attempts to
carve out constants in language (TP 93). Relating this linguistic perspective to a metaphysical
one, they write the following: But this [thinking of matter-flow in terms of form-matter]
cannot be done without a distortion that consists in uprooting variables from the state of
continuous variation, in order to extract from them fixed points and constant relations
(TP 408-409). This distortion is the same as that performed on language by linguists and
philosophers of language, such that, for Deleuze and Guattari, an implicit analogy exists
between metaphysical and linguistic models.
16
This is how Deleuze describes the nature and function of artistic signs in the first edition
of Proust and Signs, in terms of a Hegelian perspective, where the regaining of time consists
in an acting back on and giving meaning to time lost. See Stphane Chaudiers Proust aux
clats 86-87 regarding the way that Deleuzes reading of Proust in terms of the creation of
signs in the second, 1976 edition marks a definite if nowhere explicitly stated break from
his reading of Proust in terms of the interpretation of signs in the first, 1964 edition.
17
Further, regarding the relationship between a German state literature of this type and
Freudian psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari ask the following: For what does it mean
to say that Freud discovered Oedipus in his own self-analysis? Was it in his self-analysis, or
rather in his Goethian classical culture? (AO 55). As an undergraduate studying German in
Berlin one summer, my language teacher told me I must read Faust, that this was the only
way to truly grasp the German psyche, and that almost every German politician still quotes
Goethe in political speeches. The formation of individual and communal identity in terms
of literature such as this seems to be what Deleuze has in mind.
15
186
The national identities of these characters act as points of destination,

determined by a segregative, biunivocal employment of the conjunctive
synthesis. Hence, through individual memories and communal traditions as
well as future projects the French conception of flight itself supposes the
organic notions of substance, form, and teleology. Based on these organic
notions which result in a perversion of the syntheses a literary conception
of this type leads people to seek orientation within community along racial,
ethnic, and national lines in terms of a State and its literature.18 Deleuze
begins elucidating an alternative to this perspective in terms of a different
conception of flight.
In his initial characterization, he points out that a line of flight is not the
same as fleeing; it can also be conceived in terms of leaving. Central to this
distinction is the absence of notions belonging to the organic worldview. The
line of flight is demonic, says Deleuze, which he sets in contradistinction to
gods. Here he describes the role of gods in terms analogous to the despotic
function: Gods themselves have fixed identities that fix identity in turn.19 One
might then say their function is analogous to overcoding assigning meaning
to things and activities in terms of their relation to the despot.
Although the line of flight could be conceived as a movement between
locales, traditions, political structures, etc. la littrature francaise everything
changes without structures conceptually resembling those belonging to
the organic model on which to peg a conception of personal identity.20
That which takes flight need not be a person or group of persons; Deleuze
claims one can also put a system to flight. Insofar as he associates the line of
flight with deterritorialization, putting to flight would be similar to deterritorialization, which consists in operations of decoding.21 Hence, central to
this conceptual schema is a rejection of the organic model, which Deleuze associates with French literature.
The French beginning again is a tabula rasa, says Deleuze, the search for a primary certainty as a point of origin, always the point of anchor The French think in terms of trees
too much: the tree of knowledge, points of arborescence, the alpha and omega, the roots and
the pinnacles (D 29-30). See my discussions of these points in chapter three as well.
19
Regarding the role these play in an account of identity related to the line of flight, Deleuze
writes that there is something demonical or demonic in a line of flight. Demons are
different from gods, because gods have fixed attributes, properties and functions, territories
and codes: they have to do with rails, boundaries, and surveys (D 30).
20
Again, on this point, see A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in
Descartes in chapter one.
21
Again, see chapter three where I develop this at length.
18
187
Anglo-American literature is thus based on the model of the body

without organs. As a philosophical concept, this entails that the syntheses of
the unconscious are understood and employed in a legitimate manner, working
in terms of partial and nonspecific connections, inclusive and unrestrictive
disjunctions, and nomadic, polyvocal conjunctions. This becomes apparent in
Anglo-American literatures notion of characters. Rather than fixed identities,
according to Deleuze, these characters are based on unique, chance events
conjunctions of partial objects and flows with detachments from signifying
chains.
2. Anglo-American Literature: Individuals and Community

Deterritorialization is the process of undoing identities that occurs through
the decoding of partial objects and flows, similar in nature to what Lawrence
refers to as sloughing classic American literatures negative movement
resulting in the breakdown of the old European psyche. Regarding the
process of deterritorialization and its relation to Anglo-American literature
in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari say that everything becomes mixed
and confused, and it is here that the breakthroughoccurs (AO 132).
Stable structures that allow for distinctions between subjects and subjects,
subjects and community, thus vanish identities become undone. Everything
blends together, what they refer to as entering zones of indiscernibility.
Characters become locales, traditions, political structures, but just as much
as locales, traditions, and political structures become characters.22 Just as with
Lawrences account of sloughing, however, the undoing of identities through
deterritorialization is not the whole story.
As a possibility, first and foremost deterritorialization assumes the basic
constituents of reality are not substances determined by fixed and invariable
22
In Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to this same process in what they call
involution. There is a material proliferation, Deleuze and Guattari write, that goes hand
in hand with a dissolution of form (involution) but is at the same time accompanied by a
continuous development of [another type of ] form (TP 270). In this movement, one sees
the rejection of reference points, a dissolution of constant form in favor of differences in
dynamics (TP 104). Bogue describes this process as one where language, speech, and other
non-linguistic elements are brought to a point of varying continuously (142), losing their
fixed identities (143). Marrati describes this process in similar terms when she says that any
becoming is a movement of de-identification (211). See chapter two for a discussion of
this point in the work of Lawrence with respect to classic American literature, as well as its
connection to Deleuze and Guattaris conception of deterritorialization in chapter three. See
Marrati 213 on this point as well.
188
forms, themselves determined by final ends, but partial objects and flows
organized in terms of detachments from signifying chains by the syntheses of
the unconscious. In other words, one assumes the model of the body without
organs rather than the model of the organism.
Anglo-American literature does not then account for individuation in
substantial terms, in terms of personal subjects on the model of substance.
It fully embraces individualism, says Deleuze, but relies on a notion of
individuation without subjectivity, conceiving of characters as unique chances,
collections of variable sensations that arise through chance encounters on the
basis of experimentation. He refers to these as traitors.23 Individuals then
are never exclusively or primarily persons but result from chance encounters
in various social, historical, and geographical milieus closer in nature to
thunderstorms.24 Deleuze further notes that the respect shown for these
individuals does not hinge on a socio-political account of recognition, which
has its basis in subjectivity.25 This claim should be understood in terms of a
tacit criticism of Hegels account of recognition, one that bears on the relation
between individuals and community when conceived in non-substantial
terms.
According to Hegel, the motor of world history lies in the uniquely
human desire for recognition. This desire initiates the master-slave dialectic
and the development of history and culture. In this scheme, the development
of individuals and community would be part of one and the same process,
reciprocally conditioning and mutually reinforcing each other, where relations
between individuals and community would consist in goal-directed activity
based on mutual aims and shared interests. Hegel ultimately explains this
process in teleological terms, where the 19th century Prussian state, at the end
of history, acts as a final cause pulling this process along.
The traitor is the essential character of the novel, the hero. A traitor to the world of
dominant significations, and to the established order the experimenter is a traitor (D 31).
24
On this score, it seems as though Deleuze takes inspiration from Miller in developing a
philosophical account of individuality. For instance, Miller says that one has to be wiped out
as a human being to become an individual (Tropic of Capricorn 28).
25
Describing this conception of individuality in the work of Thomas Hardy, Deleuze writes
that his characters are not people or subjects, they are collections of intensive sensations,
each is such a collection, a packet, a bloc of variable sensations. There is a strange respect
for the individual, an extraordinary respect: not because he would seize upon himself as
a person and be recognized as a person, in the French way, but on the contrary because he
saw himself and saw others as so many unique chances the unique chance from which
one combination or another had been drawn. Individuation without a subject (D 30
emphasis added).
23
189
Deleuzes criticism here concerns not only the teleological nature of this
process but also the role Hegel gives to this process in the mediation of relations
between individuals and community. In the first place, rather than explaining
the nature and development of individuals and community in terms of a
process determined by a final cause towards which they are both tending,
Deleuze makes chance encounters and experimentation the basis for this
development and these relations.26 Rather than history being pulled forward
by and towards an ideal end, social change is something pushed forward by
random encounters and chance events.27 In the second place, for Deleuze, the
difference between individuals and community is one of degree rather than
kind. Both individuals and community are bodies conceived along broadly
Spinozistic lines unique sets of relations.28 Bodies are described as forces
defined by their chance encounters and collisions (TRM 192); Deleuze says
that Anglo-American writers conceive of individuals as haecceities rather than
subjects (TRM 351).
Deleuze and Guattaris account of the schizophrenic voyage as a universal
process in Anti-Oedipus seems already to anticipate the line of flight as
Deleuze describes it in connection with Anglo-American literature as well
as their conception of the line of flight in a Thousand Plateaus.29 As Deleuze
mentions at the beginning of this essay, a line of flight or deterritorialization
concerns not only the local motion of persons and groups but also a more
broadly conceived notion of change that concerns systems putting a system
to flight. This claim sheds light on the relations between individuals and
community implied by Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept.
As with Lawrences conception of classic American literature, AngloAmerican literature effects not only a negative process of de-identification
or deterritorialization through the decoding of partial objects and flows but
also a positive process of re-identification through the conjunction of partial
objects and flows. In the process of decoding, partial objects and flows become
On this point, Deleuze takes inspiration from the American writer F. Scott Fitzgerald, with
whom he constantly associates Anglo-American literature. Fitzgerald says, for example, that
one has never had nor will ever have a smooth identity, emphasizing the extent to which
ones identity is the result of random, chance encounters and haphazard circumstances, in
terms of the persons, places, and events with which one comes into contact (Crack-Up 210).
27
Again, see chapters one and two where I develop these two positions at length.
28
In short, if we are Spinozists, we will not define a thing by its function, nor as a substance
or a subject A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an
idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity (SPP 127)
29
I return to this point with respect to the specificity of American social and political relations
below. Deleuze and Guattaris later claim that certain authors have written the novel of
Spinozism can be understood in terms of this perspective (WP 67).
26
190
detached or de-conjuncted from the detachments from signifying chains

to which they are joined. Through chance encounters, partial objects and
flows are then joined to different detachments from signifying chains. Since
detachments from signifying chains denote the extrinsic and variable relations
into which partial objects and flows enter, this is simply to say that relations
between partial objects and flows change such that they appear in new and
different ways.30
Especially interesting here is the fact Anglo-American literature enacts a
decoding just as in capitalism, and in Anglo-American literature something
akin to a reterritorialization occurs. This seems to be what Deleuze and
Guattari mean in Anti-Oedipus when they describe Anglo-American literature
as a breakthrough at the limits of capitalism, which always risks turning into
a breakdown, seeming to imply the two are closely related in terms of the
ways they function (AO 132).31 Insofar as capitalism and Anglo-American
literature function on the basis of similar operations, capitalism cultivates
conditions of its own downfall in Anglo-American literature, just as AngloAmerican literature cultivates conditions of its own downfall in capitalism.32
The question then arises of how to distinguish the processes belonging to
Anglo-American literature from those of capitalism how Anglo-American
literature provides a counterpoint to an Oedipal literature Deleuze associates
with capitalism given the similarities of these processes.
In the first place, capitalism reterritorializes according to an axiomatic,
where meaning is determined in terms of the production of capital. This is
not the case with Anglo-American literature, where the conjunction of partial
objects and flows with detachments from signifying chains takes place in a
chance, haphazard fashion. Taken together, Deleuze refers to the processes
of deterritorialization and conjunction in Anglo-American literature as
becomings.33 Central to the difference between processes belonging to
Anglo-American literature and those of capitalism is Deleuzes claim that
Again, see chapter three where I develop this at length, especially Disjunctive Synthesis.
From this perspective, one can better understand ieks claim that Deleuze is the ideologist
of late capitalism (Organs 18). Further, with regard to the way desire constitutes social
production and relations of production such that affects and drives are parts of the
infrastructure Deleuze and Guattari write that they are part of it, they are present there
in every way while creating within the economic forms their own repression, as well as the
means for breaking this repression (AO 63).
32
At the end of this chapter, I describe the way Anglo-American literature establishes relations
between affects and drives through its cultivation of sympathy.
33
There are animal-becomings in literature, he writes, which do not consist in imitating
the animal, in playing the animal It is rather an encounter between two reigns, a shortcircuit, the picking-up of a code where each is deterritorialized (D 33).
30
31
191
becomings do not consist in imitation.34 The distinction he draws between

the writer as trickster and writer as traitor sheds further light on this claim.
3. Tricksters versus Traitors: Imitation versus Becoming

Central to the distinction between the trickster and the traitor is that between
plagiarism and creative theft, a difference Deleuze goes on to explain in
terms of imitation and becoming. This claim implies not only that authors
portray imitations and becomings in their works, but also that they enact these
in the world, causing either imitations or becomings to take place. Although
the trickster enacts something new, she does so on the basis of fixed properties
or preexisting identities. With respect to the tricksters future, Deleuze says her
conception of flight consists in leaving, a conception of change that rests on
exchanging one fixed identity for another, one ready-made form for another.35
The trickster writes by appropriating fixed forms of an existing order, simply
capitulating what has come before albeit in a different manner.36 To
understand the way Anglo-American authors enact becomings in the world,
it is necessary to understand an earlier characterization Deleuze and Guattari
make regarding the revolutionary potential of art and science.
Towards the end of Anti-Oedipus, they write that art and science have
a revolutionary potentialthis potential appears all the more as one is less
and less concerned with what art and science meanart and science cause
increasingly decoded and deterritorialized flows to circulate in the socius
to the point where the scientist and the artist may be determined to rejoin
an objective revolutionary situation (AO 379). Insofar as one associates
increasingly decoded and deterritorialized flows with becomings, in the first
place then, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize not only the extent to which
artists and scientists enact becomings in the world but also the fact that these
becomings carry a revolutionary potential. Further, they say art and science
This is not a matter of imitation (D 33).
Deleuze writes that the trickster claims to take possession of fixed properties, or to conquer
a territory, or even to introduce a new order. The trickster has plenty of future but no
becoming whatsoever (D 31).
36
The distinction between becoming and imitation lies at the basis of two conceptions of
the political in the work of Deleuze and Guattari: one based on the creative activities of
philosophy and art that consists in the production of genuinely new ways of being or modes
of existence and another based on opinion that consists in the production of agreement
or consensus concerning existing possibilities. This difference constitutes the nature of the
tricksters plagiarism, the way she enacts imitation, the French procedure. I return to this at
the end of the chapter, as well as in chapters five and six.
34
35
192
are all the more effective all the more revolutionary the less artists and
scientists take this as their goal, the less they concern themselves with the
meaning of art and science from the perspective of society in terms of their
capacity to enact becomings that carry a revolutionary potential.
Returning to On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature, Deleuze
claims writers bring about deterritorializations with the subject matter
about which they write.37 Thus, writing about an animal makes that animal
something different from an animal a cat to pet, cow to milk, horse to
ride. This constitutes decoding disconnecting partial objects and flows from
detachments from signifying chains which effects deterritorialization.38
In this process, however, the writer also changes, becoming something
other than a writer. Just as an animal becomes something different from an
animal in the process of being written about, so too does the writer become
something different from a writer in the process of writing about an animal.
Here Deleuzes thought takes inspiration from Blanchots.39 But a question
thus arises concerning what exactly the writer ceases to be or becomes in
the process of writing.
Touching on this question regarding why one would write Deleuze
asks the following: What other reason is there to write than to be traitor to
ones own reign, traitor to ones sex, to ones class, to ones majority? And to be
traitor to writing (D 33). Again, Deleuze considers not only the characters
portrayed in Anglo-American literature traitors but also Anglo-American
writers themselves. As a traitor, the writer can be understood in a fashion
analogous to Anglo-American characters, which concerns a rejection of the
organic model. In terms of authors, this would consist in an understanding
of the writer as a substance determined by a form, in turn determined by
an end.40 Again, however, a question arises concerning what end the writer
serves, which would determine her form.
On the one hand, writing might be conceived as serving a social function,
to legitimate a given social or political order. How well writers serve this
end would determine the form of both writers and writing. However, this is
precisely what Deleuze and Guattari criticize in an Oedipal-form of literature,
In terms of literature as an affective deterritorialization, see the work of William Spanos.
It is only when a flux is deterritorialized, he writes, that it succeeds in making its
conjunction with other fluxes, which deterritorialize it in their turn, and vice versa (D 37).
39
Regarding the relation between writers and writing, Blanchot says, we do not write
according to what we are; we are according to what we write (89).
40
See Benot Auclercs discussion of Deleuzes third-person singular as an alternative to
thinking about writing in terms of a personal substance in Deleuze lpreuve du tropisme
(97).
37
38
193
a writing that works on the basis of and further reinforces an illegitimate

understanding and employment of the syntheses of the unconscious.41 On
the other hand, one might conceive the task of writing as a traitor to consist
in criticizing a given social order, a criticism of capitalism. Once again,
however, Deleuze and Guattari reject precisely this understanding at the end
of Anti-Oedipus, saying writing is all the more revolutionary all the more
capable of bring about social change the less it takes this as its goal. Given
capitalisms ability to make all things appear in terms of and serve the ends of
the production of capital, writing and writers are particularly susceptible to
this subversion, where writing becomes a commodity form. Anytime writing
takes social criticism as its goal, it opens itself to this subversion.42
This is not to say, however, that the goal of writing consists in writing alone,
that this constitutes its majesty.43 The aim of writing consists in freeing life.
Anglo-American literature provides a source for conceiving persons, societies,
and reigns differently.44 Deleuze returns to this characterization of writing
and literature throughout his work, that they free life or establish a morethan-personal life.45 Once again, he takes inspiration for this claim from
In Thousand Plateaus, they associate this with a state form of literature (3-25). I return to
this below and in chapter six.
42
In this respect, Deleuze and Guattaris position is similar to that of Adorno and Horkheimer
in Dialectic of Enlightenment and Adorno in Aesthetic Theory. See the last section, Movements
and Migrations, of Edward Saids Culture and Imperialism 326 ff. for an important
discussion of this kind of subversion.
43
Deleuze and Guattari make this same point regarding philosophy in What is Philosophy? I
return to this in chapter five.
44
Writing carries out the conjunction, the transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes
from the resentment of persons, societies, and reigns Writing, the means to a more than
personal life (D 38).
45
For this reason, he claims that Masoch and Sade are pornologists rather than pornographers
(M 16-18). According to Bogue, for Deleuze, Masoch and Sade are pornologists because
their work goes from a personal realm of phantasy to a universal realm of myth (Bogue 18).
Although this characterization is not entirely incorrect, insofar as Deleuze and Guattari are
highly critical of the role myth plays in psychoanalysis, if one stops there, then one fails to
fully capture the novelty of this distinction especially Deleuzes claim that language reaches
its highest function in the work of Masoch and Sade when it acts directly on the senses.
As pornologists, Masoch and Sade establish entire worlds through the creations of affects,
which concern novel relations between subjects, percepts, and affects. The impersonality
of the sadistic enterprise in Philosophy in the Bedroom is not simply a matter of obtaining
personal enjoyment in individual acts but the creation of an impersonal sadistic universe
through the education of others. See Philosophy in the Bedroom in Justine, Philosophy in
the Bedroom, and Other Writings 191. See Geyskens for a characterization along roughly
these lines, as wells as my discussion of this in chapter two. I return to this in chapter
five.
41
194
various Anglo-American authors,46 and his position comes close to Blanchots

(28), especially when Deleuze says the impersonal third person substitutes
for the personal I in writing. In their reading of Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari
claim the impersonal nature of animal essences written about in his short
stories provides Kafka with a way out of the stories and into the novels (K 35).
Furthermore, when Deleuze describes the nature of signs in Proust, he seems
to have something similar in mind.47
Of central importance in all these cases is the extent to which Deleuze and
Deleuze and Guattari conceive of writers and writing as harnessing impersonal
material forces for the sake of transformation in other words, what they refer
to in Anti-Oedipus as desire. Insofar as conceiving desire in terms of lack
supports a conception of relations between individuals and community in
terms of goal-directed activity based on shared interests and mutual aims
the problem Deleuze addresses concerns less determining the proper end or
purpose of writers and writing than with conceiving reality in terms of ends
or purposes in the first place in terms of the organic model.
Deleuze goes on to further explain these commitments in terms of the
relationship between Anglo-American literature and the thought of Hume,
Spinoza, and the Stoics in terms of metaphysical commitments. Once
again, for this reason, as opposed to understanding Deleuzes engagements
with Anglo-American literature in terms of topical, stylistic, or aesthetic
issues concerning a body of work from authors of a particular tradition
and geography, one of a coincidental nature48 it seems more appropriate
to consider Deleuzes engagements with Anglo-American literature from
a philosophical perspective, in other words, Anglo-American literature as a
philosophical concept. The metaphysical commitments Deleuze associates
with Anglo-American literature culminate in his notion of the assemblage.
In terms of the transition from Anti-Oedipus to Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze
and Guattari say their notion of assemblage is meant to replace that of desire.
Understanding the metaphysical commitments of the philosophers with
whom Deleuze associates Anglo-American literature is thus necessary to
understand the nature of this transition and his notion of assemblage.
For instance, Miller describes a type of desire so great it becomes a reality, saying it is
impersonal and inhuman (Tropic of Capricorn 336). He characterizes this desire as one of
wanting more than life can offer (Sexus 40). Fitzgerald describes the trajectory of his own
work in terms of an increasing impersonality (Crack-Up 321), in terms of the growth of a
large personality (Crack-Up 203).
47
Deleuze writes that the series of our loves transcends our experience, links up with other
experiences, accedes to a transubjective reality (PS 71).
48
See Lecercle for his characterization of Deleuzes interest in Anglo-American literature as
coincidental in nature.
46
195
4. Hume and the Exteriority of Relations

The first philosopher with whom Deleuze associates Anglo-American literature
is Hume. He begins with the rather abrupt query, Why write, why have
written about empiricism, and about Hume in particular? Deleuze answers
that empiricism is like the English novel. It is a case of philosophizing
as a novelist, of being a novelist in philosophy (D 41). Understanding
what Deleuze means by philosophizing as a novelist is thus necessary to
understand the significance of Anglo-American literature as a philosophical
concept. If philosophizing like a novelist consists in empiricism in general
and the philosophy of Hume in particular then to make sense of this
claim, one must understand the nature of empiricism and the philosophy
of Hume from Deleuzes perspective. This concerns what Deleuze refers to
as the exteriority of relations, which he begins to discuss in terms of its
methodological implications.
Before giving his own positive account of empiricism, Deleuze criticizes
traditional characterizations in the history of philosophy: empiricism would
consist in an account of knowledge where understanding has its basis in the
sensible, where the intelligible comes from the senses (D 41). Insofar as such
accounts begin with first principles, says Deleuze, they have a stifling effect,
that things do not come alive until one reaches second, third, and fourth
principles at which point postulates cease being principles. Empiricism
is methodologically interesting for this reason.49 The empiricist discovery
consists in the way it conceives relations, conceiving relations as external to
their terms (D 41).50
Deleuze goes on to give two examples, contrasting the empiricist position
with those of rationalism-idealism and Platonism-Aristotelianism: Peter is
smaller than Paul, The glass is on the table: relation is neither internal to
one of the terms which would consequently be subject (D 41). Here Deleuze
means that neither does empiricism conceive of relations of ideas in terms
of rationalism-idealism where relations would be internal to a subject and
Inquiring into the reason for this how they made this methodological breakthrough
Deleuze asks the following: In this respect what is it that the empiricists found not in their
heads, as first principles, but in the world, which is like a vital discovery, a certainty of
life which, if one really adheres to it, changes ones way of life? (D 41). He answers that
empiricism begins in the middle, with relations: Relations are in the middle, and exist as
such. This exteriority of relations is not a principle, it is a vital protest against principles
(D 41).
50
See TRM 365 for his further discussion of the way relations are external to their terms, as
well as my previous characterization in chapter three of Deleuze and Guattaris discussions
of detachments from signifying chains in terms of the externality of relations.
49
196
then imposed on the world as an object51 nor to two together, in terms of

Platonism-Aristotelianism, where relations would be internal to both terms as
particular embodiments or instances of universal forms (D 41). The significance
of empiricism thus consists in not only its philosophical methodology but also
its metaphysical commitments. Even more precisely, the point Deleuze makes
here is that philosophical methodology informs metaphysical commitments,
just as metaphysical commitments inform philosophical methodology.
Characterizing the significance of empiricism in his own thought in terms
almost diametrically opposed to those of the structuralist tradition Deleuze
says that the nature of empiricism is to start with states of things and then
derive concepts from them (TRM 304).52 His criticisms of psychoanalytic
readings of literature are based on a similar methodological point, where
psychoanalysis is criticized because it turns to literature simply to justify or
legitimate its own positions.53 Deleuzes earlier work on Hume provides for a
better understanding of the significance of this point.
Published in 1953, Empiricism and Subjectivity is Deleuzes first booklength monograph, in which he investigates the philosophy of Hume. At a
time when Hegel, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis dominated the French
academic landscape, where the central philosophical questions concerned the
ways a subject causes a world to come into existence in other words, how a
subject forms the given Deleuze asked another question: How is a subject
formed by the given? This question orients his reading of Hume, and the
answer Deleuze gives to this question is the association of ideas. As relations,
the association of ideas constitutes a subject on the basis of experience. As
opposed to beginning with a conception of subjectivity based on substance
and then explaining how it constitutes the given, Deleuze begins with the
See TRM 384, where he says that transcendental empiricism does away with distinguishing
anything belonging to a subject and object, as well as my explanation of the subjectobject nature of experience in Kantian idealism in Experiential Unity and Transcendental
Subjectivity in Kant in chapter one.
52
Characterizing structuralism and its methodology, Lvi-Strauss says, for example, that the
term social structure has nothing to do with empirical reality but with models which are
built up after it (Structural Anthropology 279). One can better understand Deleuzes position
here with reference to Lawrences claim that literature is closer to life than philosophy and
that Lawrences philosophy (pollyanalytics) is a result of literature rather than the reverse
(FU 57).
53
Freuds characterization of the close relation between the psychiatrist and poet is of this type
(Gradiva 44), such that in Deleuzes reflections on the work of Masoch, he says that all
too often the writer is still considered as one more case added to clinical psychology (DI
133). Miller uses these psychoanalytic engagements with literature to ridicule psychoanalysis
(Sexus 324-339). See my discussion of these issues in chapters one and three.
51
197
given and then explains how the given constitutes the subject.54 He returns
to this in On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature, discussing it in
terms of a distinction between the verbal form is and the conjunctive and.
Describing the significance of the verbal form is, Deleuze writes that the
history of philosophy, is encumbered with the problem of being, IS. They
discuss the judgment of attribution (the sky is blue) and the judgment of
existence (God is), which presupposes the other. But it is always the verb to be
and the question of the principle (D 42). Philosophy always begins with an
existing being, turning to the question of the nature of relations on this basis.
Insofar as the mainstream of the tradition has always conceived of substance as
the most basic constituent of reality, one can here equate Deleuzes reference
to the verbal form is with the philosophical notion of substance. He then
describes a different perspective, one based on empiricist insights: if relations
are external and irreducible to their terms, then the difference cannot be
between the sensible and the intelligible, between experience and thought,
between sensations and ideas, but only between two sorts of ideas, or two
sorts of experiences, that of terms and that of relations (D 41-42). Because
of empiricisms recognition that relations are external and irreducible to their
terms, the most important philosophical distinction becomes that between
terms and relations.
Deleuze attributes precisely this feature of empiricism to Anglo-American
literature.55 In this respect then, Anglo-American literature begins with
relations rather than terms. The category of relation takes primacy over that
of terms or substance. On this basis, Anglo-American literature considers
the nature of these relations, the way they constitute terms, rather than the
way terms constitute relations.56 This is empiricisms contribution to AngloAmerican literature as a philosophical concept.57
Subjectivity is determined as an effect; it is in fact an impression of reflection. The mind,
having been affected by the principles [the association of ideas], turns now into a subject
(ES 26). Fitzgerald conceives the identity of his characters in similar terms. For instance, see
The Love of the Last Tycoon: A Western 11, where he describes Monroe Stahr not having an
identity until getting back to the hotel room and being given a letter with his name on it.
55
It is only the English and the Americans, he writes, who have freed conjunctions and
reflected upon relations (D 42).
56
The conjunctive AND is the basis for all such relations, versus the substantial IS. The AND
is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path
of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their
terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole (D 43).
57
Thinking with AND, instead of thinking for IS, Deleuze writes, empiricism has never
had another secret (D 43). He describes the filmmaker Godards work in similar terms in
terms of its use of the conjunctive and instead of the verbal form is (N 44).
54
198
In terms of the transition from Anti-Oedipus to Thousand Plateaus, this

is a first characteristic of Deleuze and Guattaris notion of assemblages, their
thoroughly relational nature. Assemblages are composed of multiplicities,
which are themselves relational, taking the place of substance in traditional
metaphysics (Smith and Protevi). Whereas their emphasis in Anti-Oedipus is
on the relational nature of desire, in Thousand Plateaus it is on the relational
nature of assemblages. However, this perspective is itself multifaceted,
concerning not only metaphysical commitments but also philosophical
methodology, as well as relations between the two.
Anglo-American literature implies a methodology based on experimen
tation rather than interpretation, one that begins with relations rather
than principles.58 This is what it means to philosophize like a novelist,
experimenting with relations rather than interpreting with principles. Insofar
as experimentation constitutes a methodological component of AngloAmerican literature as a philosophical concept, to develop it Deleuze clearly
pulls from his criticisms of psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus.59 This highlights
the extent to which Deleuzes critique of psychoanalysis and praise for AngloAmerican literature go hand-in-hand.
In the first place, experimentation can be understood as a difference
in perspective, looking at things differently. This is precisely Deleuze and
Guattaris approach in Anti-Oedipus, where they take schizophrenia as their
starting point and touchstone in a critique of psychoanalysis. Insofar as they
base their analyses on schizophrenic experience, Deleuze and Guattari arrive at
different conclusions than the mainstream of the psychoanalytic tradition. In
the second place, insofar as the importance of interpretation is itself based on
a primacy given to psychical over physical processes, experimentation can be
understood as a semi-materialist methodology. In this regard, experimentation
takes into account the central importance of material conditions to human
existence, as well as the role these play in addressing the problem of critique
and social change raised in chapter one. Precisely this issue lies at the heart of
Deleuzes discussion of the relation between Anglo-American literature and
Spinoza, as well as a second major characteristic of assemblages.
Deleuze writes that empiricists are not theoreticians, they are experimenters: they never
interpret, they have no principles (D 41).
59
See TRM 80 where Deleuze describes psychoanalysis as an art of interpretation.
58
199
5. Spinoza, Parallelism, and Affects

The second philosopher with whom Deleuze associates Anglo-American
literature is Spinoza. Regarding the manner in which he links the thought of
Spinoza to Anglo-American literature, Deleuze writes, let us take him by the
middle and not by the first principle (a single substance for all the attributes)
(D 45). As with his reading of Hume, Deleuze thus begins by contesting a
widely received understanding of Spinozas thought, one that begins with the
notion of a single all-encompassing substance.60 Deleuzes primary concern
here is with the Spinozistic doctrine of parallelism, a conception of the relation
between mind and body.61 However, a methodological question immediately
presents itself.
Deleuze wonders how and why Spinoza has such an original feeling for
the conjunction and. Whereas others overlook this novel perspective, it is
central for Spinoza. Invoking the empiricist method he locates in the thought
of Hume, the answer Deleuze gives is experimentation. Experimentation
allows Spinoza to discover this novel relation between mind and body. As
in his discussion of Hume, here Deleuzes conception of experimentation
should be understood in two related ways, one metaphysical and the other
methodological.
In the first place and fairly straightforwardly, this concerns thinking
about things differently. Rather than beginning with substance (the verbal
form is) conceiving mind and body as substances and then considering
relations between the two on this basis Deleuze recommends conceiving
Spinozas thought differently, beginning with relations (the conjunctive and).
Starting with parallelism, Deleuze thus elucidates a different perspective in
the thought of Spinoza. Once again, his analysis here can be understood in
terms of a criticism and rejection of the organic model, while at the same time
praising and elucidating a model of the body without organs in the thought
of Spinoza.
From the perspective of parallelism, neither the mind nor body is
privileged. Neither is the mind more real than the body, nor is the body
more real than the mind; neither does the mind control the body, nor does
the body control the mind. Rather, each and every affect in the body has a
corresponding affect in the mind, and vice versa. At the same time, beginning
However, this is not to say that Spinozas notion of a single all-encompassing substance is
unimportant to Deleuze. See chapter three where I describe the model of the body without
organs in terms of Spinozistic substance.
61
The soul AND the body; no one has ever had such an original feeling for the conjunction
and (D 45).
60
200
with relations and parallelism results in conceiving mind and body in terms
different from those of substance and the verbal form is. Neither do they exist
in and through themselves alone, nor can they be distinguished on the basis of
forms, determined by ends. According to Deleuze, they should be understood
as unique sets of relations.
Mind and body are conceived as modes or affects of a single all-encompassing substance considered under different attributes, thought and extension respectively. Insofar as every mode is composed of and composes lesser and greater modes, the nature of reality is relational all the way down.62
These inter-determining, unique sets of relations are what Spinoza refers to
as bodies.63 This commitment thus constitutes a fundamental rejection of
substance as the most basic constituent of reality.
Further, relations between affects are conceived as ones of chance
encounters. One cannot conceive these relations in terms of either formal
or final causality. These encounters constitute affects that either increase or
decrease the ability of a mode to act, determining different modes of existence.64
Since these relations are never final but always variable one always becomes
more or less powerful depending on ones encounters affects constitute what
Deleuze refers to as becomings.65 These commitments thus constitute the
metaphysical components of Deleuzes conception of experimentation in the
thought of Spinoza. One is now in a position to approach its methodological
component how and why Spinoza discovers this novel perspective where
others overlook it.
As has often been pointed out, the Ethics is itself written from the
perspective of knowledge of the second kind.66 The metaphysics it elucidates
including the notions of parallelism and an all-encompassing substance,
Describing Spinozas thought, Deleuze says that each individual, body and soul, possesses an
infinity of parts which belong to him in a more or less complex relationship. Each individual
is also himself composed of individuals of a lower order and enters into the composition of
individuals of a higher order. All individuals are in Nature as though on a plane of consistence
whose whole figure they form, a plane which is variable at each moment (D 45).
63
Bodies are not defined by their genus or species, Deleuze writes, by their organs and
functions, but by what they can do, by the affects of which they are capable in passion as
well as in action. You have not defined an animal until you have listed its affects (D 45).
64
Deleuze goes on to say that modes affect each other in so far as the relationship which
constitutes each one forms a degree of power, a capacity to be affected. Everything is simply
an encounter in the universe, a good or a bad encounter (D 45).
65
Affects are becomings, Deleuze writes, sometimes they weaken us in so far as they
diminish our power to act and decompose our relationships (sadness), sometimes they make
us stronger in so far as they increase our power and make us enter into a more vast or
superior individual (joy) (D 45).
66
See EPS 296 for a characterization of the Ethics in these terms.
62
201
its critique of teleology, etc. is only possible on the basis of knowledge of

the common notions. To reach knowledge of the second kind, one must first
become powerful enough and experience enough joy to unite the idea of
oneself to that of something else, thereby discovering the common notions and
organizing ones thoughts, actions, and encounters in such a way as to escape
the passions.67 As Deleuze notes, however, this is difficult and appears almost
impossible.68 Here one is confronted with the methodological component of
Deleuzes conception of experimentation, not only how one discovers this
metaphysics but also the role it plays in addressing the paradoxical problem of
critique and social change raised previously.
As in Deleuzes reading of Hume, the metaphysical component of
experimentation informs the methodological one. Especially important
here is the notion of parallelism, as it emphasizes the role of the body in
experimentation. According to a doctrine of parallelism, each and every
affect in the body has a corresponding affect in the mind conceived as
unique sets of relations based on chance encounters. These encounters either
increase or decrease the ability of a mode to act, determining different modes
of existence. Deleuzes emphasis here is on the role the body plays in this
process, discovering that of which the body is capable so as to simultaneously
discover that of which the mind is also capable, which he says goes beyond an
understanding of the mind in terms of consciousness.69
Although the goal of this process is ultimately a difference in psychical
perspective the ability to consider things differently this is only itself possible on the basis of physical processes, that which happens to the body. Experimentation consists in considering things differently on the basis of experimentation with ones body, discovering that of which ones body is capable.70
See my description of this process in chapter two.
He writes that we live in a world which is generally disagreeable, where not only people
but the established powers have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us. Sadness, sad affects,
are all those which reduce our power to act It is not easy to be a free manorganize
encounters, increase the power to act, to be moved by joy, to multiply the affects which
express or encompass a maximum of affirmation (D 46).
69
Just as you do not know what a body is capable of, Deleuze writes, just as there are many
things in the body that you do not know, so there are in the soul many things which go
beyond your consciousness. This is the question: what is a body capable of? What affects are
you capable of? Experiment (D 46).
70
Again, Deleuze takes inspiration for this position from not only Spinoza but also AngloAmerican writers: Miller describes the way the body cannot be separated from the soul,
this being especially so in sex (Sexus 221). Insofar as Deleuze and Guattari directly associate
their conception of desire in Anti-Oedipus with libido, which they say is thoroughly sexual
versus Jungs characterization of libido as a general mental energy this constitutes
another point of continuity between Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of psychoanalysis and
conception of desire in Anti-Oedipus Deleuzes development of Anglo-American literature
67
68
202
Through this method, one discovers a metaphysics based on the model of the
body without organs rather than that of the organism, as well as resolving the
paradoxical problem of critique and social change raised in chapter one. Only
on the basis of this semi-materialist methodology is a difference in both metaphysical and political perspective possible, where one simultaneously arrives at
different psychical conclusions because of different physical processes.71
Deleuze refers to none other than Lawrence and his reading of Whitman to
summarize this perspective. Instead of the organic models conception of the
relationship between mind and body in substantial, dualistic terms, through
Anglo-American literature and its constitutive conception of experimentation
one discovers these as affects conceived in terms of parallelism.72 Furthermore,
relations between individuals and community are here described in terms of
vibrations, in the same manner as in Anti-Oedipus.
Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept thus implies
metaphysical and methodological commitments, as well as an account of the
way these are related. In constructing this concept, Deleuze borrows from
Hume a commitment to the externality of relations, as well as the related
methodological conception of experimentation. From Spinoza, he begins
with parallelism and arrives at a conception of individuals and community
as modes or affects determined by chance encounters. This supplements the
conception of experimentation with which he begins in Humes thought,
emphasizing the importance of material conditions to an understanding of
human existence.
Hence, in the transition from Anti-Oedipus to Thousand Plateaus, the second
major characteristic Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept
contributes to Deleuze and Guattaris concept of the assemblage is its material
nature, as well as the importance of material conditions to philosophical and
political methodology. Whereas their emphasis in Anti-Oedipus is on the
material nature of desire, in Thousand Plateaus it is on the material nature of
assemblages. The third major characteristic concerns a distinction between
substances and events, which Deleuze here locates in Stoic thought.
as a philosophical concept and Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the assemblage in
Thousand Plateaus.
71
To make the body a power which is not reducible to the organism, Deleuze writes, to
make thought a power which is not reducible to consciousness (D 46).
72
What Lawrence says about Whitmans continuous life is well suited to Spinoza: the Soul
and the Body, the soul is neither above nor inside, it is with, it is on the road, exposed to
all contacts, encounters, in the company of those who follow the same way, feel with them,
seize the vibration of their soul and their body as they pass, the opposite of a morality of
salvation, teaching the soul to live its life, not to save it (D 46-47).
203
6. Bodies, Events, and the Stoics

The last set of philosophers with whom Deleuze associates Anglo-American
literature in this essay is the Stoics. In this reading, Deleuze adds further
nuance to his conception of Anglo-American literature, focusing on the
material nature of reality in Stoic thought, as well as their conception of
the event in contradistinction to that of substance. As with Hume, Deleuze
begins with the abrupt query, Why write about them? His answer concerns
bodies and their relations: A darker and more agitated world has never been
set out, Deleuze writes, bodiesbut qualities are also bodies, breaths and
souls are bodies, actions and passions themselves are bodies. Everything is a
compound of bodies bodies interpenetrate, force each other, poison each
other, insinuate themselves into each other, withdraw, reinforce or destroy
each other, as fire penetrates iron and makes it red, as the carnivore devours its
prey, as the lover enters the beloved (D 47).
Deleuzes emphasis here is on a Stoic conception of reality in terms of
the way bodies interpenetrate and determine each other. Insofar as Stoic
metaphysics closely tallies with that of the Pre-Socratics, it is unsurprising the
description Deleuze gives of their worldview is one where the emphasis is on
bodies and material conditions.73 However, as in his readings of Hume and
Spinoza, Deleuzes position here regarding the Stoics is one developed earlier,
in relation to the notions of freedom and sense.
Published in 1969, The Logic of Sense is a transitional work for Deleuze,
written around the time of Difference and Repetition but before the beginning
of his collaborations with Guattari. Deleuze still praises psychoanalysis and the
likes of Freud, Klein, and Lacan in this work. However, insofar as he develops
Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept in contradistinction
to psychoanalytic thought and the organic model and associates Stoic
thought with Anglo-American literature as early as The Logic of Sense he can
thus be understood as developing a conceptual framework in tension with
psychoanalysis.
The focus of this book is on a number of paradoxes and seemingly
irresolvable difficulties that arise in logic and linguistics if one fails to take
into account what Deleuze refers to as the important Stoic category of sense
73
Deleuzes characterization of the Stoic worldview here implies Democritus claim that what
exists differs only by contact, rhythm, and turning (Barnes 207). Regarding the claim
that Stoic thought is based on an atomistic, Pre-Socratic metaphysics, see David Coopers
description in Ethics: The Classic Readings 47. See my discussion in chapter three of the
relation between Pre-Socratic metaphysical commitments and those of Deleuze and Guattari
in Anti-Oedipus.
204
(LS 16-26). Starting from insights in the work of Lewis Carroll, Deleuze
puts forward an account of sense inspired by Stoic metaphysics. He shows
that linguists and logicians are unable to either resolve or account for these
paradoxes because they have overlooked Stoic insights. In the first place,
these concern the nature of and relations between corporeal and incorporeal
stuff. The starting point for this discovery in Stoic thought, says Deleuze, is
an attempt to account for both causality and freedom (LS 7-13). The Stoics
do so in terms of sense, which Deleuze refers to as the event in On the
Superiority of Anglo-American Literature.
Describing the event in terms of bodies and their relations, Deleuze writes
the following: from all these bodily struggles, there arises a sort of incorporeal
vapor, which no longer consists in qualities, in actions or in passions, in causes
acting upon one another, but in results of these actions and passions, in effects
which result from all these causes together. They are pure, impassive, incorporeal
events, on the surface of things, pure infinitives of which it cannot even be
said that they ARE, participating rather in an extra-being which surrounds
that which is: to redden, to turn green, to cut, to die, to love (D 47).
Insofar as Stoic thought is itself based on Pre-Socratic metaphysics, again,
it is unsurprising that the description Deleuze gives of the Stoic worldview
resembles that of the Pre-Socratics. The major difference between the two
and the difficulty with this analogy is the fact that Deleuze describes the
Stoic event in immaterial terms. Events arise from material bodies as a sort of
incorporeal vapor and then act back on the bodies from which they arise.74
Although Deleuze here describes events in immaterial terms, these should not
be understood as spiritual entities conceived in dualistic terms.75
Deleuzes concern is with the way the Stoics reconceive the nature and
relation between things and events, similar to the way Hume reconceives the
nature of terms and relations. Here one could say the Stoics give priority to
relations rather than terms. Deleuze says they discover how things can be
conceived on the basis of events rather than events on the basis of things. For
this reason, events might also be understood as unique sets of relations, bodies
in the Spinozistic sense; it seems as though Deleuzes understanding of the
Stoics is influenced by Spinozas conception of the common notions and their
He says that the event is always produced by bodies which collide, lacerate each other or
interpenetrate, the flesh and the sword. But this effect itself is not of the order of bodies,
an impassive, incorporeal, impenetrable battle, which towers over its accomplishment and
dominates its effectuation (D 48).
75
The Stoics strength lay in making a line of separation pass no longer between the sensible
and the intelligible, or between the soul and the body in other words, a dualist distinction
but where no one had seen it before between physical depths and metaphysical surface.
Between things and events (D 47).
74
205
relation to knowledge of the third kind.76 Thus, the significance of the Stoic
event to Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept concerns less its
immaterial than relational nature.77
Here relations are conceived as external to their terms and things as
consequent on events.78 Insofar as becomings are always open to and
determined in relation to other becomings, relations and events provide
counterpoints to the simplistic formal determinism of the organic model. It
is impossible to determine beforehand the nature of either relations or events,
the things to which they give rise.79 One must experiment.
Hence, in the transition from Anti-Oedipus to Thousand Plateaus, the third
major characteristic Anglo-American literature contributes to Deleuze and
Guattaris concept of the assemblage is the event, understanding things on the
basis of events rather than events on the basis of things. Just as their project
in Anti-Oedipus consists in not only a critique of psychoanalysis and the
organic model but also a positive alternative in schizoanalysis and the body
without organs, so too is Deleuzes task here positive in nature. His readings
of Hume on the exteriority of relations, Spinoza on parallelism, and the
Stoics on the event culminate in his notion of assemblages. This notion itself
gives rise to a problem specific to the Anglo-American milieu, one regarding
relations between individuals and community, a political problem specific to
He writes that Thyestes terrible feast, incest and devouring, sicknesses which are nurtured
in our thighs, so many bodies which grow in our own. Who is to say which compound is
good or bad, since all is good from the viewpoint of the two parties which encounter one
another and interpenetrate (D 47). A cool, disinterested perspective on incest and devouring
ones children is thus possible if only one considers these as relations of composition and
decomposition.
77
Regarding a characterization of the broader trajectory of his own thought, Deleuze says, Ive
tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; its a philosophical concept, the only
one capable of ousting the verb to be and attributes (N 141). Hence, Deleuzes concern
with events bears less on their immaterial than relational nature starting with relations
rather than terms, events rather than things. Reflecting on his engagements with Leibniz,
Deleuze emphasizes this point: I have, its true, spent a lot of time writing about this notion
of event: you see, I dont believe in things (N 160).
78
Summarizing the Stoic contribution to Anglo-American literature as a philosophical
concept, Deleuze thus describes the event as a new way of getting rid of the IS: the attribute
is no longer a quality related to the subject by the indicative is, Verbs in the infinitive
are limitless becomings. The verb to be has the characteristic like an original taint of
referring to an Iwhich overcodes it and puts it in the first person of the indicative. But
infinitive-becomings have no subject: they refer only to an it or the event (it is raining)
states of things which are compounds or collectives, assemblages, even at the peak of their
singularity (D 47-48).
79
Later Deleuze says that the event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity
(TRM 234).
76
206
Anglo-American literature that has its solution in a corresponding conception

of the political.
7. Assemblages and the Political

Deleuze and Guattari note that their concept of assemblages in Thousand
Plateaus is meant to replace that of desire in Anti-Oedipus, and Deleuzes
description of Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept culminates
in precisely this notion. In On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature,
as elsewhere, Deleuze describes the assemblage in terms of its difference from
notions belonging to the organic worldview. He begins to explain this concept
by making reference to a structuralist understanding as representative of the
organic worldview.
Words or signifiers condition ideas and concepts, which in turn condition
the experience of a uniquely human existence.80 On a structuralist model, words,
ideas, concepts, and signifiers are considered the basic constituents of human
existence. Deleuze disputes this, saying instead that assemblages are the basic
constituents of reality.81 Words, ideas, concepts, and signifiers result from assemblages. Insofar as the former are conceived as relatively self-subsistent, immaterial entities modeled on the notion of substance, assemblages should be understood as reciprocally determining and interpenetrating material entities. Thus,
there is nothing specifically personal about these entities, such that Deleuzes
account of assemblages does not rely on the notion of a personal subject.
Even if a structuralist paradigm is committed to the view that language is
impersonal coming before and conditioning individual human existences82
it nonetheless relies on a notion of personal subjectivity to embody specific
material instantiations of language, the subject of enunciation. However,
not even specific material instantiations of language, says Deleuze, should be
understood on the basis of a subject as substance. The voice, writing, gestures,
etc. material vehicles in and through which language enters and reinforces
itself in the world are themselves conditioned by wider sets of material
relations, assemblages and what Deleuze here refers to as populations,
See chapters one and three where I explain this claim at length.
The minimum real unit is not the word, he writes, the idea, the concept or the signifier,
but the assemblage (D 38).
82
Deleuzes earlier, positive comments regarding the role structuralism plays in producing
a conception of the nomad subject should probably be understood in terms of the
impersonality of these structures. On this see DI 190.
80
81
207
multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events.83 These assemblages

themselves give rise to individuals. Conceived in terms of populations,
multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events all of which constitute
components of assemblages individuals are understood as proper names that
denote unique sets of relations, bodies in the Spinozistic sense.84
Deleuze then immediately raises a problem in connection with this
account, one that is political in nature. This problem concerns how individuals
and community manage to function when conceived along these lines the
question of relations between individuals and community in non-organic
terms. Deleuze writes that structures are linked to conditions of homogeneity,
but assemblages are not (D 39). His reference to the homogeneity of
structures should, again, be understood in terms of structuralism, its relation
to the organic model, and a corresponding conception of the political.
In this scheme, structures serve the same roles as forms, giving stability and
meaning to individual egos conceived as substances. Traditions and political
systems act as points of departure and destination, in terms of which individuals
are oriented and integrated into community. This understanding assumes an
illegitimate employment of the syntheses based on notions belonging to the
organic model. Conceived in terms of the model of the organism, individuals,
community, and relations between the two are understood in a top-down
fashion.
The organic models conception of the political consists in the production of
agreement or consensus, where relations between individuals and community
are based on goal-directed activity, determined by mutual interests and shared
aspirations. Here the integration of individuals into community is simply the
natural consequence of the expression of form. Orientation and integration
within a community is thus conceived as a natural process, one that occurs
because of the types of creatures human beings are.
If one jettisons these notions, however, then the question of how individuals
relate to community comes to the forefront. If relations between individuals
and community are no longer the result of a natural process, then it is
He says that it is always an assemblage which produces utterances. Utterances do not have
as their cause a subject which would act as a subject of enunciation The utterance is the
product of an assemblage which is always collective, which brings into play within us
and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events (D 38). In
connection to this, see chapter three for my discussion of Deleuze and Guattaris account in
Anti-Oedipus regarding the way the social machines organize the productive powers of desire
on the basis of an illegitimate employment of the syntheses of the unconscious.
84
The proper name does not designate a subject, Deleuze write, but something which
happens, at least between two terms which are not subjects, but agents, elements makes
one multiplicity pass into another (D 38-39).
83
208
unclear how they can be brought together.85 For Jacques Rancire, this is the
problematic unique to politics, precisely that agreement cannot be conceived
as a natural process.86 Anglo-American literature touches on this problem.
Although Deleuzes interest in Anglo-American literature goes beyond that
of a simple fascination with works from authors of a particular tradition and
geography, one finds considerations in this body of work that justify Deleuzes
construction of a philosophical concept on its basis. In the first place, this
concerns Anglo-American works themselves. Anglo-American writers neither
conceive of nor write about their characters in terms of a primary identity,
in terms of the notion of substance. Rather, they portray these characters
as chance encounters, individuals as unique sets of relations, as Spinozistic
bodies. In the second place, Deleuzes construction of a philosophical concept
on the basis of Anglo-American literature concerns the broader social and
historical context in which this literature is written. This is particularly true of
American literature.87
The United States of America is a country of immigrants, populated with
people from all over the world. These people come from different, diverging,
and often conflicting backgrounds and traditions, with different conceptions of
how to live and what constitutes the good life. Fitzgerald describes Americans,
for example, as a people without roots, without history (Crack-Up 109).
Relations between individuals and community are thus potentially fraught
with strife. The integration of individuals into community is by no means
a process that appears as either easy or natural. Deleuzes claim that society
is defined by its lines of flight implies this problematic (N 160), and AngloAmerican literature addresses this process with its notion of assemblages.88
Deleuze writes that the difficult part is making all the elements of non-homogeneous sets
converge, making them function together (D 39).
86
Rancire writes that the foundation of politics is not in fact more a matter of convention
than of nature: it is the lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order. Politics
exists simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human
society (Rancire 16). This means that politics doesnt always happen it actually happens
very little or rarely (Rancire 17). I return to this in chapters five and six.
87
Hence, although Deleuze conflates English and American literature in this essay in his
construction of Anglo-American literature as a philosophical concept at the end of his life,
he returns to this issue, distinguishing between English and American literature and their
precise social functions. See ECC 77 regarding his distinction between Dickens and Melville.
88
Addressing this same issue, Miller says America is a sick, cancerous growth (Tropic of Capricorn
213). Although this claim is easily misconstrued, he does not mean it in a pejorative sense.
Rather, Millers characterization is a matter of fact, pointing towards the political problem of
conceiving relations between individuals and community in non-organic terms. Time and
again, Fitzgerald touches on precisely this issue, describing individuals and their relations to
community in terms of this problematic. In The Love of the Last Tycoon a work to which
Deleuze frequently refers Fitzgerald says that writers are not people but a whole bunch of
85
209
Deleuze says he conceives of assemblages in terms of sympathy, symbiosis,

or co-functioning rather than identity.89 Sympathy consists in shared thoughts,
perceptions, and feelings. Both individuals and community are modes that
interpenetrate and reciprocally determine one another. Here individuals,
community, and relations between the two are conceived in a bottom-up
fashion, in terms of relations, affects, and events. There is no way to tell
beforehand the nature of the relations to which assemblages will give rise.90
Deleuze thus proposes a conception of the political based on ethics in the
Spinozistic sense, which consists in experimentation as discussed above.91 He
describes this in terms of a way of writing, beginning to elucidate a conception
of Anglo-American writing in contradistinction to Franco-Germanic writing.
According to Deleuze, French and German literature consist in national
istic projects, those of establishing the identity of a people through a specific
type of literature, which arises from and can be identified with that people.92
Not only do Franco-Germanic authors give voice to the spirit of a people
in their writing, but they also establish the identity of a people through this
process. Authors thus speak for and in the place of others, and criteria of
identification are central to this process such that the author is close to a
people and its identity.93 All of this assumes notions belonging to the organic
people trying to be one (12) and that, as a movie producer, the character Monroe Stahr acts
as a point of unity for the individual writers (58). Further, Fitzgerald characterizes Americans
as three or four different people in one, although they change very quickly (116). In Tender is
the Night, Nicole is described as a whole lot of simple people in one (293-294).
89
Structures are linked to conditions of homogeneity, but, as Deleuze goes on to say,
assemblages are not. The assemblage is co-functioning, it is sympathy, symbiosis (D 39).
90
Describing this with reference to the exteriority of relations, Marrati says, what happens
does not depend on fixed essences or properties (212).
91
In Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe a similar material process in different
terms, as a generalized chromaticism. This is what we are getting at, they write, a
generalized chromaticism. Placing elements of any nature in continuous variation is an
operation that will perhaps give rise to new distinctions, but takes none as final and has
none in advance (97).
92
In Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write that it is odd how Goethe and Hegel
hated this new kind of writing, one they associate with Kleist and is similar in nature to
Anglo-American literature. Because for them the plan(e) must indissolubly be a harmonious
development of Form and a regulated formation of the Subject, personage, or character (the
sentimental education, the interior and substantial solidity of the character, the harmony or
analogy of forms and continuity of development, the cult of the State, etc.) (268).
93
Neither identification nor distance, he writes, describing Anglo-American literature in
contradistinction to Franco-Germanic literature, neither proximity nor remoteness, for,
in all these cases, one is led to speak for, in the place of (D 39). See Mengue, Birth
of Philosophy regarding the difference between Deleuzes conception of fabulation as
constituting a people to come and that of, for example, political aestheticism in the work of
Heidegger. I return to the notion of fabulation in chapter five.
210
model, where the spirit of a people resembles something like a form. The job
of the author is to articulate this form, such that the author is understood in a
teleological fashion, in terms of the role he or she plays in a given social milieu.
Having abandoned these notions, Deleuze proposes something different.
One must speak with, write with. With the world, with a part of the
world, with people. Not a talk at all, but a conspiracy, a collision of love or
hatred. There is no judgment in sympathy, but agreements of convenience
between bodies of all kinds (D 39). Instead of conceiving writing in
terms of criteria of identification speaking for or in the place of others
Anglo-American authors speak with others, write with the world. Insofar as
speech has always been given a certain priority over writing as a vehicle for
communicating thoughts, the fact that Deleuze here refuses to equate speech
with Anglo-American writing Not a talk at all is significant. Writing
consists in more than the material process of conveying ideas, not merely an
intermediary process through which immaterial ideas are transmitted from
mind to mind, a third-best to the activities of speech and pure thought.94
Writing is understood as a material force, where its political value
consists in establishing relations of sympathy, what Deleuze here refers
to as agreements of convenience between bodies of all kinds.95 Writing
with someone, writing with the world, consists in establishing sympathy,
cultivating shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. This is not simply
because reading a book written about puppies, for instance, makes one
think about puppies at the moment someone else is reading the same
book.96 Rather, both writing and reading are material processes that affect
the body and other bodies, physical processes that act directly on the senses,
Again, one can locate at least a nascent form of this position in Anti-Oedipus. There Deleuze
and Guattari write that it has been a long time since Engels demonstratedhow an author
is great because he cannot prevent himself from tracing flows and causing them to circulate,
flows that split asunder the catholic and despotic signifier of his work That is what style
isthe moment when language is no longer defined by what it says, even less by what makes
it a signifying thing, but by what it causes to move, to flow, and to explode desire. For
literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production and not an expression
(133 emphasis added).
95
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes a similar process, one he refers to as
individuation. The act of individuation consistsin integrating the elements of the
disparateness into a state of coupling which insures its internal resonance (246).
96
Central to this distinction is Lawrences between allegory and myth and the difference between
the ways they employ symbols (A 48-49). In Lawrences scheme, allegories are the equivalent
of reading a book or looking at a picture about which one then thinks something, a thoroughly
psychical process. He says that allegories can be explained and explained away, whereas myths
utilize symbols in a manner that affects us deeply, as physical processes (A 142).
94
211
unmediated by either mental ideas or psychical processes.97 This account of

reading and writing points towards the metaphysical positions Deleuze and
Guattari develop in Thousand Plateaus98 and is evident in What is Philosophy?
when they claim the writers materials are words and syntax, which pass into
sensations (167).99
In the diverse American social milieu of immigrants, where neither the
orientation nor integration of individuals into a wider community appears as
a process that is either easy or natural, the political import of Anglo-American
literature consists in establishing relations of sympathy, acting directly on
the senses through a writing that cultivates shared thoughts, perceptions,
and feelings.100 Insofar as this position consists in a material ontology, it is
not surprising that Deleuzes conception of writing in its political function
comes close to that of the Pre-Socratics, similar in nature to the conception of
Deleuze takes this same position in his reading of Proust. There he says that, as material
impressions, signs initially reach us through the senses (PS 96). Material signs are described
as forcing one to think, but the nature of these encounters is contingent (PS 97). Deleuze
reiterates this same position in Difference and Repetition, saying that an encounter forces one
to think, but that this encounter can only be sensed as a sign (139-140). Foucault also
conceives of literature as acting directly on the senses and the body. Literature consists in
the action, in disorder, noise, and pain, of power on lives, and the discourse that comes of
it (Essential Foucault 293). See Bogue 21 regarding his discussion of a language capable of
acting directly on the senses, which he goes on to characterize as a minor use of language,
one where sound is deterritorialized by which he seems to mean something like detached
from designated objects, such that they become simply sonic vibrations where words
and things can no longer be differentiated (104). Although this is certainly a minor use of
language and the one in which I am interested it is only one minor use of language, that
of the schizophrenic.
98
In Deleuze and Guattaris metaphysics, movement takes the place of form. A things shape,
characteristics, characteristic relations, etc. all of which are explained by the notion of
form in classic metaphysics are explained with reference to movement. In this respect, the
metaphysical commitments on which their thought is based can be understood as thoroughly
ancient (Pre-Socratic) or modern. In Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari characterize
assemblages and multiplicities as matters in motion, as matter-movement, this matterenergy, this matter-flow, that matter in variation It is a destratified, deterritorialized matter
(407). I greatly appreciate Trevor Perri bringing this to my attention in his explanation of
the relation between the notions of multiplicity in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari and
Bergson. See my previous characterization of this position with respect to the thought of
Spinoza in chapter two. I return to this in chapters five and six.
99
Deleuze and Guattari further write that artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and
creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make
us become with them, they draw us into the compound, into an assemblage (WP 175).
On this same point, Deleuze claims that writers generate real bodies (N 134). I return to
this claim in chapter five, explaining its relation to Deleuze and Guattaris account of the
relations between philosophy, art, and the brain in What is Philosophy?
100
Fitzgerald refers to this process as a shifting about of atoms to form the essential molecule
of a new people (Tender is the Night 83).
97
212
apprenticeship Deleuze develops in his engagements with Proust.101

Criteria of great writing are not based on identification how well a writer
captures the spirit of a people or succeeds in establishing an identity with
which a people can relate, based on the assumption that writing consists in
speaking for and in the place of others. Rather, Deleuze uses the criterion of
whether writing works. The political significance of writing, reading, and
art consists in the creative process of experimentation, determining what does
and does not work between people, for the sake of establishing new ways of
being or novel modes of existence.102
Conclusion
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not develop their claims in Anti-Oedipus
that a commodity form of Oedipal literature conditions psychoanalysis and
that a non-Oedipal form of literature exists that works against this tendency,
these can be understood in terms of the distinction Deleuze makes between
Franco-Germanic and Anglo-American literature in On the Superiority
of Anglo-American Literature. His praise for Anglo-American literature
concerns the metaphysical commitments it implies and conception of human
nature it supports, developing Anglo-American literature as a philosophical
concept.
On the one hand, Deleuzes criticisms of structuralism and interpretation
in connection with Franco-Germanic literature aim at not only psychoanalysis
but also notions belonging to the organic worldview and the way they condition
and are conditioned by an illegitimate employment of the syntheses. On the
other hand, Deleuze associates Anglo-American literature with the model of
the body without organs and a legitimate understanding of the syntheses of
the unconscious, which gives rise to a different understanding of individuals,
community, and relations between them. He discusses this concept with
reference to the philosophies of Hume, Spinoza, and the Stoics.
Regarding the way an atomist conception of teaching consist in rearranging material stuff,
Democritus says, nature and teaching are similar, for teaching changes a mans shape and
nature acts by changing shape (Barnes 232). For these same reasons, according to Bogue,
the creation of a people in Deleuzes conception of theater begins with language, including
speech, gesture, etc. (144).
102
Blanchot describes this as inspirationthe gift of existence to someone who does not yet
exist, where the poet is equally formed in the process of writing (227). Miller describes it in
terms of writing and sex, both of which establish new types of relations with life (Sexus 243).
Fitzgerald relates a similar understanding of relations between individuals in Tender is the
Night. Regarding the relation between Nicole and Abe, he says, unlike lovers, they possessed
no past, and, unlike man and wife, they possessed no future (81).
101
213
In terms of both its methodological and metaphysical implications, Humes

account of the exteriority of relations informs the philosophical methodology
and metaphysical commitments belonging to Anglo-American literature
as a philosophical concept. The empiricist discovery consists in conceiving
relations as external to their terms: Anglo-American literature begins with
relations rather than terms, considering the nature of these relations and the
way they constitute terms rather than the way terms constitute relations. As
opposed to a methodological approach based on interpretation that begins
with principles, Anglo-American literature thus implies a methodology based
on experimentation. Insofar as interpretation itself supposes the primacy given
to psychical over physical processes, in contradistinction to interpretation,
experimentation can be understood as a materialist methodology. Deleuze
takes up this issue in his discussion of the relation between Anglo-American
literature and the thought of Spinoza.
Deleuzes primary concern is with Spinozas metaphysical doctrine of
parallelism an understanding of the relation between mind and body.
However, this opens onto an equally important methodological question
regarding how Spinoza discovered this novel perspective. The answer Deleuze
gives is experimentation and the role of the body in this process discovering
what the body can do so as to simultaneously discover what the mind can
do.
Insofar as Stoic metaphysics closely tallies with that of the Pre-Socratics,
it is unsurprising that bodies and relations take precedence in Deleuzes
description of the Stoic worldview. Deleuze discusses this priority in terms
of his conception of the event or becomings becomings are always open to
and determined in relation to other becomings. Deleuzes engagement with
the Stoics ultimately concerns how things can be understood on the basis
of events rather than events being understood on the basis of things. Taken
together, Deleuzes reading of these philosophers in association with AngloAmerican literature culminates in his concept of the assemblage.
This notion itself gives rise to a problem specific to the Anglo-American
milieu, one regarding relations between individuals and community: In the
United States, the integration of individuals into community is by no means
a process that appears as either easy or natural, and Anglo-American literature
addresses this problem with its conception of writing. Its political value
consists in establishing relations of sympathy. Writing with someone, writing
with the world, results in establishing sympathy, cultivating shared thoughts,
perceptions, and feelings. Here Deleuze thus champions a conception of
the political based on experimentation. The political significance of writing,
214
reading, and art concerns a creative process of determining what does and
does work between people, to establish new ways of being or novel modes of
existence.
215
Chapter Five
The Political Significance of Opinion,

Philosophy, and Art
Introduction: Opinion as a Problem
Increasing attention has been paid to Deleuze and Guattaris account of the
creative nature of philosophy, art, and science, as well as the political import
of this creativity. However, in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari
oppose these disciplines to what they call opinion. Opinion is the object
against which the creative forces of philosophy and art struggle (WP 204).
For this reason, understanding what they mean by opinion and its negative
significance is paramount for understanding the creative nature and positive
significance of philosophy and art, as well as the political implications of this
significance. For Deleuze and Guattari, this difference is by no means minor
but has practical consequences evident, for example, in their claim that the
misfortune of people comes from opinion (WP 206). Hence, any and all
attempts to live better must confront opinions reign. However, their notion
of opinion has gone largely unexplored in the secondary literature, and the
first task in the present chapter is to rectify this deficiency.1
What Deleuze and Guattari mean by opinion is far from a commonsense
understanding of the term, and, for this reason, neither what they mean
by opinion nor its political implications are entirely clear. This gives rise to
misunderstandings and misrepresentations of not only opinion and its political
significance but also Deleuze and Guattaris account of the creative natures of
philosophy and art and the political import of this creativity. In the second
place then, this explication is an attempt to address and correct these readings.
Although no other work deals with Deleuze and Guattaris account of opinion singularly
or exhaustively, Claire Colebrook, Paolo Marrati, Philippe Mengue, and Paul Patton all
touch on this notion in their own work. However, the ways they handle this account seem
misguided, ranging from recapitulations only loosely based on anything either Deleuze
or Deleuze and Guattari write, such as those of Colebrook, to explications regarding the
political implications and consequences of this notion open to contention, such as those
of Marrati, Mengue, and Patton. See Colebrooks Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed as well
as her Gilles Deleuze, Lefebvres The Image of the Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza, Marratis
Against the Doxa: Politics of Immanence and Becoming Minoritarian, Mengues The
Problem of the Birth of Philosophy in Greece in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze, as well as
his Deleuze et la question de la dmocratie and Paul Pattons Deleuze and Democracy and
Order, Exteriority, and Flat Multiplicities in the Social. I return to these throughout the
course of my own exegesis.
217
The following examines Deleuze and Guattaris account of opinion

in terms of three points. First, the elements that comprise it opinion is
committed to metaphysical suppositions (regarding the nature of reality) that
support conceptions of subjectivity, objectivity, inter-subjective community,
and relations between individuals and community an entire philosophical
anthropology or conception of human nature. According to Deleuze
and Guattari, philosophy and art are based on fundamentally different
suppositions that, therefore, support different accounts of these notions and
a different philosophical anthropology. Second, opinions development as
a response to chaos opinions relation to chaos is one of denial, denying
variances in correspondences between particular perceptions and affections
that constitute opinions. The nature of this relation marks one of the main
differences between opinion and philosophy and art: Philosophy and arts
relation to chaos is one of (uneasy) alliance. Third, the way this development
leads to a conception of politics as consensus assuming all are capable
of recognizing the same universal opinions and naturally tend towards
agreement regarding these opinions through discussion, opinions conception
of politics as one of consensus is based on fixed correspondences between
perceptions and affections all are capable of recognizing. This recognition
constitutes membership in a global community, what Deleuze and Guattari
refer to as universal liberal opinion as consensus (WP 146). On the other
hand, conceived in terms of the creative activities of philosophy and art, their
conception of the political consists in inventing a people who are missing,
conditioning genuinely new ways of thinking, perceiving, and feeling (ECC
4). Through an examination of the elements that constitute philosophy and
art, the relation Deleuze and Guattari claim exists between these elements and
the brain, and their relation to chaos, I argue the invention of a people who
are missing consists in establishing novel modes of existence, different ways of
thinking, perceiving, and feeling.
1. Elements of Opinion
Given the wide-ranging nature of the objects of Deleuzes criticisms throughout
his work from phenomenology, the dialectic, and the image of thought, to
psychoanalysis and capitalism the fact that in his last collaborative endeavor
with Guattari their criticism falls on the somewhat banal notion of opinion
is at first surprising.2 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines opinion as,
2
See chapter three regarding Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of Hegel via psychoanalysis,
as well as chapter four concerning their relation to Franco-Germanic literature. As I
218
The Political Significance of Opinion, Philosophy, and Art
first, a view, judgment, or appraisal formed in the mind about a particular

matter, next, belief stronger than impression and less strong than positive
knowledge, and lastly, a generally held view. What in this definition makes
opinion a worthy adversary of philosophy and art, or warrants Deleuze and
Guattaris claim that opinion is the cause of peoples misfortune is unclear.
Deleuzes discussion of opinion in Difference and Repetition bears some
resemblance to the above definition. There he describes the thinker as someone
who manages not to know what everybody else does, who has neither common
sense nor good sense, which together constitute what Deleuze refers to as
opinion (DR 130). At least on this point then his understanding of opinion
comes close to the above definition of opinion as a generally held view.
When one looks closer though, paying attention to what Deleuze means by
common sense and good sense, the picture is more complicated.
He says that common sense is a norm of identity with respect to a pure self
and unspecified object here Deleuze means something like transcendental
subjectivity and the object x as pre-categorical conditions of experience and
that good sense concerns the distribution of this form with respect to empirical
selves and objects in other words, everybody has it.3 For this reason then,
Deleuzes account of opinion is obviously different from and more precise
than a commonsense understanding of the term. One might nevertheless
argue that such an understanding has a philosophical basis, one that results
from broader commitments regarding the nature of reality. Opinion as belief
stronger than impression and less strong than positive knowledge seems
to correspond to a Platonic account of opinion, where opinion would be
a deficiency in knowledge, an inadequate or untrue apprehension of form.
Insofar as a commonsense understanding of opinion is based on this view, a
line of continuity connects Deleuze and Guattaris understanding of opinion
through Plato to a commonsense understanding of the term.4
noted before, a line of continuity runs throughout these criticisms, which concerns the
metaphysical commitments on which they are based and conception of human nature they
support.
3
Regarding good sense as the best distributed thing in the world, see Descartess Discourse
on Method 111. For an excellent account of the co-determining roles that transcendental
subjectivity and the object x play as pre-categorical conditions of possible experience, see
Gardner 145-160. See my discussion of this point in Experiential Unity and Transcendental
Subjectivity in Kant in chapter one. Regarding good sense as the distribution of the form
of common sense, Deleuzes account of opinion in Difference and Repetition comes close to
Deleuze and Guattaris in What is Philosophy? In both cases the form of opinion is universal.
I return to this below.
4
See Platos discussion of the relationship between philosophy and art in, for example, the
Philebus 59a. Paolo Marrati bases her explication of Deleuzes thought on this understanding.
She argues that even before the beginning of his collaborations with Guattari Deleuzes
219
As is already clear, however, Deleuzes notion of opinion is different from a

Platonic account. Likening Deleuze to Plato even for explanatory ends seems
misguided as Deleuzes philosophy from beginning to end is thoroughly
anti-Platonic in nature. In Plato, the Greeks, for example, Deleuze
associates opinion with Platonic philosophy specifically and philosophies of
transcendence in general (ECC 136-137).5 Attention to Deleuze and Guattaris
account of opinion in What is Philosophy? in conjunction with Plato, the
Greeks makes it clear that portraying Deleuzes thought as a Platonism
insofar as both Deleuze and Plato are opposed to opinion is thoroughly
misguided. This results from their fundamentally different metaphysical
suppositions and commitments. To understand these, it is necessary to turn to
Deleuze and Guattaris account of opinion in What is Philosophy?, examining
the elements that comprise opinion and the relations that exist between them.
Deleuze and Guattaris clearest articulation of opinion comes in the form
of a functional definition; they define opinion by explaining how it works:
what opinion proposes is a particular relationship between an external
perception as state of a subject and an internal affection as passage from one
state to another (exo- and endoreference) (WP 144). This definitions brevity
belies its complexity. For this reason, it should be worked through slowly,
examined piece-by-piece.
The above quotation highlights two important features of opinion. First,
opinion is a type of relationship. Second, this relationship is between three
elements: an external perception as a state (exoreference), an internal affection
as a passage (endoreference), and a subject for whom the perception is an
external state and the affection an internal passage. Since opinion is a type
of relation, it assumes the existence of these elements, such that they can
enter into a relation with each other. Hence, versus philosophy and art both
of which might be said to begin with relations, which explains, in part, the
creative nature of these endeavors opinion begins with terms rather than
thought is political, and the political import of his philosophy at this stage should be
understood in terms of his criticisms of opinion (206). Marrati establishes this connection
via Plato. Just as Platos criticisms of opinion are political in nature implying and resulting
in a criticism of the status quo so too are Deleuzes criticisms of opinion political in nature
(Marrati 215). Both Alexandre Lefebvre and Philippe Mengue follow a similar approach in
their readings of Deleuze on opinion, likening Deleuze to Plato via their mutual criticisms of
opinion. See Lefebvre 60 and 267, as well as Mengue, Birth of Philosophy 178.
5
Neither Marrati, Lefebvre, nor Mengue refer to this text in their respective readings of
Deleuze on opinion. Marrati refers almost exclusively to Deleuzes account in Difference
and Repetition, which is different from Deleuze and Guattaris in What is Philosophy? Since
her aim is to elucidate pre-Guattarian stands of political thought in Deleuzes work, this is
understandable, although her account is necessarily incomplete for this reason.
220
relations.6 In this way, opinion is implicitly committed to a certain conception

of reality, and the first aspects of its implied philosophical anthropology
become apparent.
This conception of reality includes an account of subjectivity and its
characteristics, a subject that perceives an external world and feels its own
internal changes. Perceptions and affections act as points of reference by
which the subject orients itself in an external world and an inter-subjective
community. This orientation takes place in the following manner: We pick
out a quality supposedly common to several objects that we perceive, and an
affection supposedly common to several subjects who experience it and who,
along with us grasp that quality (WP 144).
Hence, Deleuze and Guattari add two more elements to their account of
opinion: not only a subject, its perceptions, and affections, but also objects
of perceptions from which qualities are extracted that give rise to specific
feelings, and other subjects for whom correspondences between qualities
belonging to objects and feelings within a subject are also the case. In this way
then, perceptions refer to external states of affairs (those of an objective world)
and affections refer to internal states of affection (those of an inter-subjective
community). Opinion consists in establishing a correspondence between the
two.7
Taken together, the above elements comprise what might be called a
metaphysics of opinion, a view concerning the nature of reality, the kinds
of things that exist, and the relations that exist between these things. On
this basis, one supposes that specific qualities within perceptions precede
and precipitate specific affections within subjects. The correspondence
between these perceptions and feelings is determined with reference to an
inter-subjective community that, in turn, takes as its reference an objective
See chapters three and four for a fuller explanation of the way that philosophy begins with
relations rather than terms and events rather than things. I return to this point below, as it
bears on elements that comprise philosophy and art.
7
Opinion is the rule of the correspondence of one to the other; it is a function or a
proposition whose arguments are perceptions and affections (WP 144). Hence, although
Claire Colebrook is correct to say that opinion supposes a common world, it seems incorrect
to say that in opinion one passes directly from affects to concepts (Deleuze 24). And it is
clear that Deleuze and Guattaris notion of opinion is different from and more precise than
her other characterizations of opinion as 1. a state in which one passes from sensations to
generalities (Guide for the Perplexed 106), 2. the re-presentation of a word that is recognized
and results in a general laziness in thought (Deleuze 16), or 3. simply that opinion takes
the form I dont like this; therefore this is bad (Deleuze 115). Pattons description is more
precise and closer to my own. See Pattons Order, Exteriority, and Flat Multiplicities in the
Social 22 on this.
6
221
world. Although these suppositions are general enough to be ascribed to a

number of philosophers and philosophies, as was mentioned above, Deleuze
associates these with Plato specifically and philosophies of transcendence in
general. For this reason, one can say that, according to Deleuze and Guattari,
opinion supposes an unchanging standard against which individual opinions
are judged for the sake of orthodoxy, which functions analogously to but in
the absence of a Platonic form.8
2. Development of Opinion in Relation to Chaos: Denial

According to Deleuze and Guattari, opinion arises in response to chaos. It
appears as a type of protection against chaos.9 We constantly lose our ideas.
That is why we want to hang onto our fixed opinions so much (WP 201).
Chaos is the reason we lose our ideas; alone chaos is a terrible thing.10 However,
as with their use of the term opinion, Deleuze and Guattaris use of the
term chaos is specific, and to understand opinions development and why
thought is conceived in terms of opinion it is essential to understand what
they mean by chaos.
With respect to this notion, Deleuze and Guattari write the following:
Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with
which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void which is not a
nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out
all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without
consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of
birth and disappearance (WP 118). Given this vertiginous definition, one
can certainly appreciate Deleuze and Guattaris claim that chaos is something
from which to be protected. As with their account of opinion, their conception
of chaos should be worked through slowly, piece-by-piece.
Contrary to the way the term is commonly understood, Deleuze and
Guattari say chaos should not be understood in terms of disorder or
disorganization. It is not an arrangement lacking order or organization.
Here one must be cognizant of the terms in which order and organization
I return to this point more fully in terms of what Deleuze and Guattari call the generic
subject below.
9
However, opinion only appears as a protection against chaos, only claims to protect us from
chaos (WP 203). Philosophy and art provide a true protection against chaos. I return to the
reason for this in chapter six.
10
See my discussion of this point in chapter three, with respect to the way that in its pure,
schizophrenic state desire is a disorganized and haphazard force of production threatening
cohesive social organization.
8
222
have traditionally been understood. Both invoke a conception of form

associated with the organic model.11 Understood in terms of this concepts
earliest appearance in the history of philosophical thought, Plato (and maybe
Socrates) makes form the cornerstone of his intellectual edifice: a things form
is the answer to the question what is it? Plato is responsible for the creation of
the Idea as a philosophical concept (ECC 136). The Aristotelian innovation
consists in placing form in matter. In both cases, however, a things form
versus various Pre-Socratic accounts, most of which involve the relationship
between basic elements of matter and sundry forces12 explains the regular
characteristics and activities a thing evidences. These characteristics and
activities account, in turn, for expectations regarding the kinds of relations
into which things do and do not enter.
In this way, order and organization are parasitic on a conception of form,
and, insofar as this concept lies at the heart of ones worldview and functions
as a way of conceiving ones experience, disorder and disorganization are
nonexistent. Everything is what it is by virtue of the fact that it shares in
(Plato) or embodies (Aristotle) a particular form. Not only the order and
organization of individual things but also the whole of experience would be
a result of form. The merit of form metaphysics is its intense practicality, the
fact one can anticipate organization and order in experience in the first place,
providing a ground for expectations in terms of which to adjust behavior.
Given the difficulties involved in obtaining and coordinating information, a
certain practical interest informs the tendency to understand this information
as invariant. Expecting this organization to be forthcoming and unchanging
is profoundly comforting, allowing one to do more and think less. Hence,
immutability is forms most important characteristic, which leads to an
understanding of disorder as merely an epistemological state that results from
being ignorant of or misunderstanding (mistaking, misapplying) the form at
work. However, such an account is clearly indicative of an understanding of
thought in terms of what Deleuze refers to as recognition, a conception of
thought in which error is conceived as a misapplication of this type and as
thoughts primary enemy.13
For this reason, rather than defining chaos by disorder or disorganization
mistaking, misapplying, or being ignorant of the particular form at work
Deleuze and Guattari understand chaos in terms of its an-order or an See earlier chapters regarding the organic model.
See my further discussion of this point in chapter three.
13
See DR 148-149 on this point, as well as Patton Order, Exteriority 23. I return to the
significance of recognition to opinion below.
11
12
223
organization, insofar as the forms on which order or organization depend are

not immutable but changing. The regular characteristics things evidence as
well as the characteristic relations into which they enter are not the result of
immutable forms expressing themselves in matter. The significance of speed
to their definition of chaos can be understood in terms of this explanation.
Chaos is the speed by which the percepts and affects on the basis of which
one reasons to the existence of form appear and vanish. But vanish should
not here be understood in terms of disappear but change. Chaos is anordered or an-organized insofar as the persistent invariance of characteristics
and relations one expects to find in experience are not always forthcoming.14
Since the immutability of forms cannot provide a basis for establishing
once and for all objective constants in the characteristics of and relations
between things, at least subjective rules can be established for the sake of
methodologically joining percepts to affects, associating ideas as a shield from
chaos.15
Opinion is a way of thinking that attempts to establish more or less fixed
coordinates within chaos, establishing correspondences between perceptions
and affections. Ideas are the subjective side of this process, as they relate to
qualities belonging to subjective perceptions. There is also an objective side
to this process, which concerns the relationship between subjective principles
and objective states of affairs, since there would not be a little order in ideas
if there was not also a little order in things or states of affairs, like an objective
antichaos (WP 202). In addition to subjective principles, thought must also
pose objective standards, such that the employment of subjective rules has an
objective basis.
Understood in terms of the earlier analysis, this is the objective world for
which perceptions act as exoreferences. In opinion, qualities of particular
objects cause particular sensations, and the recurrence of these sensations is
proof that the subjective principles posited to organize experience are ones
that do in fact mirror or get a grip on the world.16 These three elements
Regarding Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of substance metaphysics and the way things are
conceived as en-formed matter as well as their alternative in which things are simply matter
in motion see, for instance, their discussion of the machinic phylum in TP 409-410, as
well as my discussions of these points in earlier chapters.
15
They write the following: We ask only that our ideas are linked together according to a
minimum of constant rules. All that the association of ideas has ever meant is providing
us with these protective rules resemblance, contiguity, causality which enables us to
put some order into ideas (WP 201). Their mention here of association of ideas as
resemblance, contiguity, causality is of course a tacit reference to Hume. I return to
this in chapter six.
16
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: at the meeting point of things and
14
224
are all that we ask for in order to make an opinion for ourselves, like a sort
of umbrella, which protects us from chaos (WP 202). However, if opinions
work as an umbrella that protects against chaos, then they must do so in a
particular way, one that differs from the way philosophy and art do. Whereas
the latter actively align themselves with chaos in order to create, opinions
relation to chaos is one of denial, and it is in terms of this relation that
opinions political significance can be understood.
3. Political Significance of Opinion: Creating Consensus

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari associate opinion with a
conception of the political as consensus universal agreement regarding
correspondences between qualities in perceptions and affections. Under the
sway of opinion, the goal of politics is to produce consensus.17 For this reason,
the relationship opinion has to chaos is one of denial denying variance
in the correspondence between particular perceptions and affections. Here
community and communication play a large role in the development of
opinion and the production of consensus.
Opinion never concerns only individual subjects but also community and
relations between individuals and community. This constitutes the second
major aspect of its implicit philosophical anthropology. In opinion, an
individual identifies himself with a generic subject experiencing a common
affection (the society of those who detest cheese competing as such with
those who love it, usually on the basis of another quality) (WP 145). The
generic subject is a paragon for the inter-subjective community of which it
is the representative, determined by the ways it is affected by perceptions.
Different types of generic subjects and inter-subjective communities are here
defined in contradistinction to other types of generic subjects and intersubjective communities, based on the types of correspondences they recognize
between qualities in perceptions and affections.
In this way, the generic subject is an unchanging standard against which
individual opinions are judged, functioning analogously to but in the
absence of a form. Opinion then operates as follows: Depending on the
thought, the sensation must recuras proof or evidence of their agreement with our bodily
organs that do not perceive the present without imposing on it a conformity with the past
(WP 202).
17
On this they write the following: Nor does philosophy find any final refuge in communication, which only works under the sway of opinions in order to create consensus and not
concepts (WP 6).
225
ways an individual is affected by particular perceptions, it identifies with a

generic subject, which determines, in turn, the inter-subjective community
to which it belongs, defined in contradistinction to another generic subject
and inter-subjective community for example, homelessness compassion
for the welfare state democrat versus republican. According to Deleuze
and Guattari, however, this is only the first step in a two-part process through
which opinion triumphs.
The second step takes place when the quality chosen ceases to be the
condition of a groups constitution but is now only the image or badge of a
constituted group that itself determines the perceptive and affective model,
the quality and affection, that each must acquire (WP 146). The same process
is at work in this second step as the first but in the reverse order. The generic
subject and inter-subjective community with which an individual identifies
now act as a rule for determining a correspondence between particular
perceptions and affections, how an individual feels in response to particular
perceptions. Here opinion operates as follows: Defined in contradistinction
to another generic subject and inter-subjective community that establish
different correspondences between perceptions and affections, the subject
identifies with a particular generic subject, which determines the ways the
subject is affected by a particular perception for example, republican versus
democrat against the welfare state callous homelessness. Consensus
then is the process of coordinating persons through the production of opinion
in this second way.
Deleuze and Guattari say this process takes place through discussion, a
particular type of communication.18 Discussion bears on the ways particular
qualities belonging to perceptions correspond to affections belonging to generic
subjects. Opinions are never discrete but parts of continuous, interpenetrating
webs that define different generic subjects and the communities of which they
are the representatives.19
An opinion characteristic of a generic democrat subject concerns not
only a certain correspondence between, for example, the isolation of a quality
belonging to perception (homelessness) and the corresponding affection it
evokes (compassion), but also other opinions that bear on perceptions and
affections regarding things like, for example, taxes, education, and foreign
policy. The role that insult plays in discussion bears on opinions continuous,
See Mengue, Deleuze et dmocratie 102-103 for an excellent discussion of the way
contemporary public opinion is produced.
19
Thus, as Colebrook and Patton rightly point out, neither philosophical concepts nor the
planes on which they are created ever exist in isolation from each other, nor should they be
considered as such. See Colebrook, Deleuze 17 and Patton, Order, Exteriority 23 on this.
18
226
interpenetrating characteristic. A certain opinion is isolated and attacked for

the sake of condemning the generic subject to which it belongs, as well as
the community of which this generic subject is the representative.20 This is
the role insult plays and why all opinion is already political why so many
discussions can be expressed in this way; as a man, I consider all women to be
unfaithful; as a woman, I think men are liars (WP 145).21
If there is one philosopher whose understanding of philosophy consists
primarily in discussion then it is certainly Plato. However, Deleuze and
Guattari do not single out Plato in What is Philosophy? as an opinion monger
for lack of a better term as they do Habermas and Rorty.22 Contra their
characterizations throughout, however, neither Habermas nor Rorty conceive
of philosophy in terms of discussion but primarily characterize political
activity as consisting in discussion.
Rather than thinking simply that Deleuze and Guattari mistake the
nature of Habermas and Rortys respective projects, these claims highlight
Deleuze and Guattaris understanding of the deeply interrelated nature of
philosophy and political activity. What they find objectionable in consensus
as universal liberal opinion are the ends debate and discussion serve, the role
communication plays in the attenuation of opinions as described above.
As insult, both debate and discussion contribute to the universalization of
opinions, the solidification of correspondences between qualities in perceptions
and affections.23 The resulting opinions, claim Deleuze and Guattari, belong
to a particular generic subject, that of the capitalist. The building of consensus
through the attenuation of opinions is part of a process that facilitates the
Discussion, therefore, bears on the choice of the abstract perceptual quality and on the
power of the generic subject affected opinion is an abstract thought, and insult plays an
effective role in this abstraction because opinion expresses the general functions of particular
states (WP 145). For example, If seeing homelessness (perception) makes you feel okay
(affection), then I disagree with you (opinion). I am a democrat (generic subject) and believe
something different from you (different community) and cannot, therefore, subscribe to any
of the other beliefs you hold (web of opinions).
21
According to Deleuze and Guattari then, neither debate nor discussion is a violence that
forces thought to think, as Mengue claims (Deleuze et dmocratie 53-54), but kinds of
communication by which opinions are attenuated and, in turn, ways of perceiving and
feeling become impoverished.
22
They write that opinions are essentially the object of a struggle or an exchange. This is
the Western democratic, popular conception of philosophy as providing pleasant or
aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rortys (WP 144). Although Deleuze and Guattari
never mention Habermas by name in What is Philosophy?, when asked if their criticisms of
opinion, discussion, and consensus were directed against Habermas, Deleuze and Guattari
respond by saying their criticisms are directed against not only Habermas (TRM 378).
23
See WP 12 for their discussion of the role Hegel and the post-Kantians play in the
establishment of universals.
20
227
spread of global capitalism.24 Here opinions relation to recognition plays

a central role, in terms of the way communication results in a conception of
politics as consensus, as well as the relation of consensus to capitalism.
For the sake of the present analysis, this notions most important
characteristic is its affinity with truth, supposing that thought naturally
tends towards truth.25 Truth would be the result of the natural, harmonious
exercise of thoughts various faculties. Insofar as opinion is modeled on
recognition, opinions elements perceptions, affections, and inter-subjective
communities function in an analogous fashion. Contemplation, reflection,
and communication are conceived as faculties that function together to
produce opinion. Contemplation isolates qualities within perceptions while
reflection identifies affections corresponding to these qualities in a generic
subject. Through communication a generic subject and the inter-subjective
community of which it is the representative are determined in contradistinction
to another generic subject and inter-subjective group.26 Communication here
attenuates opinions. This process acts as the criterion by which the truthvalues of opinions are established.
Considered as faculties, the harmonious exercise of contemplation,
reflection, and communication results in truth.27 In opinion, a propositions
truth-value is decided with reference to a group. Individual opinions are true
if they conform to those of a community, if the opinions of an individual
are the same as those of the generic subject with which one identifies and
See N 152 regarding consensus as an idea that guides opinion, its relation to the state and a
single world market.
25
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that recognition may be defined by the
harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object, which he associates
with the image of thought a conception of the way thought works (DR 133). See
DR 139 on this as well.
26
Opinion is a thought that is closely molded on the form of recognition, they write,
recognition of a quality in perception (contemplation), recognition of a group in affection
(reflection), and recognition of a rival in the possibility of other groups and other qualities
(communication) (WP 145-146). For a further discussion of the way both individuals and
groups determine themselves in contradistinction to other individuals and groups, see my
discussion in chapter three with respect to an illegitimate understanding and employment of
the third synthesis of the unconscious in Anti-Oedipus. I return to this in chapter six.
27
For the sake of this analogy, the following passage in Difference and Repetition is relevant:
An object is recognized, however, when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another,
or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of
identity in the object. Recognition thus relies upon a subjective principle of collaboration
of the faculties for everybody in other words, a common sense as a concordia facultatum;
while simultaneously, for the philosopher, the form of identity in objects relies upon a
ground in the unity of a thinking subject, of which all the other faculties must be modalities
(DR 133).
24
228
the community to which one belongs.28 As was mentioned above, opinion

supposes an unchanging standard against which individual opinions are judged
for the sake of orthodoxy. In this manner then, the generic subject functions
analogously to but in the absence of a form, for the sake of establishing
orthodoxy.29 According to Deleuze and Guattari, discussion signals a step
away from and beyond a conception of thought they characterize in terms of
the sage and sagely wisdom towards philosophy (WP 3).
No longer is thought conceived as the possession of an esoteric wisdom
by the sage but as a struggle or dispute between multiple claimants through
discussion for a wisdom nobody ever fully possesses. In this respect then,
Mengue correctly points out that Deleuze and Guattari consider discussion a
necessary condition of the birth of philosophy (Birth of Philosophy 178).
However, his failure to consider the nuance and qualification Deleuze gives
to this characterization in Plato, the Greeks results in the misrepresentation
of Deleuzes thought as a quasi-Platonism. There Deleuze says philosophy
employs the concept of form to mediate between and resolve conflicting views
and opinions that arise in discussion, thereby establishing a right opinion
truth as orthodoxy (ECC 136). Form then functions in a similar manner to
the generic subject in opinion, and the Greek emphasis on discussion brings
with it a corresponding emphasis on transcendence.30 Deleuze says the goal
of philosophy is always to battle against transcendence and, for this reason,
philosophy seems to go wrong from the very beginning.31
Opinion gives to the recognition of truth an extension and criteria that are naturally those
of an orthodoxy: a true opinion will be the one that coincides with that of the group to
which one belongs by expressing it (WP 146).
29
This is clear in certain competitions: you must express your opinion, but you win (you
have spoken the truth) if you say the same as the majority of those participating in the
competition (WP 146).
30
The poisoned gift of Platonism, Deleuze writes, is to have introduced transcendence
into philosophy (ECC 137). Further, in Proust and Signs, Deleuze systematically opposes
themes in ancient Greek philosophy to those in Proust, impugning the relationship
between conversation and friendship in philosophy (29 and 108). See my discussions of the
importance of Proust to Deleuze in preceding chapters. I return to the significance of Proust
in What is Philosophy? below.
31
Every reaction against Platonism is a restoration of immanence in its full extension and
in its purity, which forbids the return of any transcendence (ECC 137). Deleuze and
Guattari make a similar claim regarding psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus, where they write
there is no contradiction in the fact that it started on the right track, and that it went
wrong from the start (173). I am grateful to Daniel Smith for bringing this continuity
to my attention. Although Deleuze and Guattari claim psychoanalysis goes wrong from
the start, if one closely examines their own engagements, criticisms, and reformulations of
psychoanalytic theory where Deleuze and Guattari stake their own claims with respect to
the psychoanalytic tradition then this is less than obviously true. See my discussions of
these points in chapter three.
28
229
Opinion denies the singular and unique nature of the relation between
qualities in perceptions and their affective correspondences within subjects,
universalizing the opinions of a particular individual or group.32 In this way,
the particular opinions of an individual or group are understood as universal
and necessary rather than as unique and contingent. True opinions are those
that match this standard, and opinion becomes the standard by way of
majority.33 The majority opinion is ascribed to a generic subject representative
of a group, and since individuals relate to communities by identifying with
a generic subject, the group to which an individual belongs determines the
opinions of individuals.34
Individuals belonging to the same community experience the same affects
in response to the same qualities in perceptions, not because like-minded
individuals come together to form communities but because communities
form like-minded individuals.35 But the community with which Deleuze and
Guattari are interested is specific: The philosophy of communication, they
write, is exhausted in the search for a universal liberal opinion as consensus,
in which we find again the cynical perceptions and affections of the capitalist
himself (WP 146).36 The point they seem to be making here is that as a
community capitalism overwhelmingly determines contemporary opinion,
more specifically, liberal ideals regarding the value of, for example, consensus,
Contemplation, reflection and communication are not disciplines but machines for
constituting Universals in every discipline (WP 6).
33
The essence of opinion, they write, is will to majority and already speaks in the name of
a majority (WP 146).
34
Marratis reading in which the majority functions as the standard measure of orthodoxy
(207-209) is the same as my own. For a different understanding of the role of the majority
in Deleuze and Guattaris thought see, for example, Pattons Deleuze and Democracy,
where the majority is described as the analytic fact of nobody (407) and is based on
Pattons reading of Thousand Plateaus (106).
35
See DR 158, where opinion is characterized as having the same perceptions and affections
of the group to which one belongs, as well as PS 83, where belonging to a society consists in
having the ideas and values that society emits.
36
In his defense of the compatibility of Deleuze and Guattaris thought and Western liberalism,
Patton thoroughly misrepresents the sense of these lines. He introduces them by writing all
to often reflect the cynical perceptions and affections making the relation between a
philosophy of communication, the search for a universal liberal opinion as consensus,
and the cynical perceptions and affections of the capitalist himself appear much weaker
than Deleuze and Guattari themselves seem to think, thereby obscuring the trajectory of
their thought (Deleuze and Democracy 411 emphasis added). Patton does the same
when calling their critical remarks regarding a conception of philosophy as providing
pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rortys (WP 144) ironic (Deleuze
and Democracy 412). There does not seem to be any sense in which Deleuze and Guattaris
comments on this point could be called ironic.
32
230
universal human rights, and free markets.37 Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms
of these liberal ideals bear on the role they play in the spread and legitimation
of global capitalism. This tendency is captured perfectly in Francis Fukuyamas
The End of History and the Last Man.38 The capitalist is the generic subject
with which individuals identify and through which they belong to the global
capitalist community.39 Deleuze and Guattari claim that an understanding
of politics as the search for universal liberal opinion as consensus is guided
by capitalism, ultimately determined by and in the service of capitalism
(WP 146).40
Rather than becoming embarrassed by an interpretation in which Deleuze
and Guattari seem to be critical of these ideals and arguing against such an
interpretation, as does Patton, it seems more interesting to consider what
Deleuze and Guattari find wrong with the philosophical suppositions on
which liberal ideals are based. At bottom, their criticisms bear on philosophical
anthropology.41 In this way then, the issue is not so much that democracy
has been completely skirted, as Mengue claims (Birth of Philosophy 180).
Rather, the aim of Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of liberal ideals are the
metaphysical suppositions on which these are based, as well as the role they
play in the justification of global capitalism.
This liberal tradition has its roots in the thought of Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and the American founding fathers, and emphasizes universal,
In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari write the following: Human rights are axioms. They
can coexist on the market with many other axioms, notably those concerning the security of
property What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come out of
their territories or ghetto? Rights save neither men nor a philosophy that is reterritorialized
on the democratic State. Human rights will not make us bless capitalism. A great deal of
innocence or cunning is needed by a philosophy of communication that claims to restore
the society of friends, or even of wise men, by forming a universal opinion as consensus able
to moralize nations, States, and the market. Human rights say nothing about the immanent
modes of existence of the people provided with rights (WP 107). Here they are clearly
referring to the position Habermas develops in his The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere: Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.
38
On the relationship between democracy and political liberalism, see Francis Fukuyamas The
End of History and the Last Man 42-43.
39
Hence, Colebrooks claim that opinion results in a reduction of diversity, supposes all are the
same and capable of acting in one global market (Deleuze 16), and insofar as liberal ideals are
themselves based on capitalism, they are in the service of powers that be (Mengue, Deleuze
et dmocratie 103-104).
40
For this reason, Mengues claim that their criticisms of opinion are indicative of their
misgivings regarding liberal ideals seems correct (Deleuze et dmocratie 43).
41
I return to this point further in chapter six.
37
231
largely negative rights that secure competition in a market for example, the
right to own property.42 Hardt and Negri also credit the American founding
fathers, saying that American constitutionalism introduces a unique form of
sovereignty that lies at the basis of Empire, the term they use to denote to a
non-state, network form of power characteristic of global capitalism.43
Previous and more traditional forms of sovereignty, which arise with the
development of nation states in Europe, have their basis in transcendent
forms of power for example, God, church, king, and feudal lords in
which citizens eventually come to share. Hegels project, both metaphysically
and politically, can be understood as explaining how this sovereignty comes
into and can be legitimized within world history (Hardt and Negri 8188). An American form of sovereignty, on the other hand, begins with the
people and then constitutes transcendent powers on this basis for example,
local, state, and federal governments, and corporations.44 The import of this
innovation consists in making people responsible for the oppression to which
they are subjected, explaining how, why, and in which ways people concretely
contribute to their own repression, in terms of sensuous human activity
desire desiring its own repression when understood as praxis. Here one can
thus establish a link between Deleuze and Guattaris account in Anti-Oedipus
of how and why desire desires its own repression and the political significance
of their criticisms of consensus and opinion in What is Philosophy?45
Deleuzes critique of human rights should be understood in these terms;
his criticisms of the collusion of the democratic state with capitalism can be
understood from this perspective.46 Insofar as these rights are conceived as
In its economic manifestation, writes Fukuyama, liberalism is the recognition of the right
of free economic activity and economic activity based on private property and markets the
legitimacy of private property and enterprise (44). See Fukuyama 153-161 for a discussion
of the roots of this tradition.
43
Later we will critique this notion of network power contained in the U.S. Constitution,
they write, but here we want simply to highlight its originality. Against the modern
European conceptions of sovereignty, which consigned political power to a transcendent
realm and thus estranged and alienated the sources of power from society, here the concept of
sovereignty refers to a power entirely within society. Politics is not opposed to but integrates
and completes society (164).
44
See my discussion in chapter four regarding the differences between a top-down versus
bottom-up conception of the relation between individuals and community implied by
Franco-Germanic versus Anglo-American literature, in terms of goal-directed activity versus
sympathy.
45
I return to this in chapter six.
46
A concern for human rights, Deleuze says, shouldnt lead us to extol the joys of the
liberal capitalism of which theyre an integral part. Theres no democratic state thats not
compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery (N 172-173).
42
232
universal, basic goods whose protection results in further goods, programs

of democratization, state building, and the opening of new markets seem
justified.47 Deleuze addresses these same tendencies in remarks concerning
the value of consensus and its relation to philosophical thought in the context
of global capitalism.48 For these reasons, Mengues claim that since it lacks
transcendent values and is without foundations Deleuze and Guattari
should embrace democracy as a truly immanent politics seems to miss their
point (Deleuze et dmocratie 47).49
An understanding of opinion makes clear that Deleuze and Guattari think
contemporary forms of liberal democracy not only suppose transcendent
values but are also thoroughly foundational. They involve discussion and in
terms of the role it plays discussion involves reference to transcendence,
reference to a generic subject that functions in an analogous manner to a
transcendent form, mediating and resolving conflicts in opinions, thereby
causing their attenuation. Here the political sphere is understood as a market
where citizens possess beliefs, ideas, points of views, etc. that are then traded
and traded away. The political consists in a surreptitious activity, attempting
to obtain a maximum while imparting a minimum: The liberal democratic
ideal of consensus consists in people obtaining as much possible while giving
as little as possible. In this way, the foundations of liberal ideals are those
of a generic capitalist subject, and an understanding of politics as consensus
consists in a relation to chaos as one of fundamental, foundational denial.
Naomi Kleins analyses are instructive on these points. Regarding democratization in the
context of globalization, she says it is usually couched in terms of the euphoric marketing
rhetoric of the global village (xvii). Describing the relation between globalization and
corporations in terms similar to those of Hardt and Negri, she writes that the conduct of
the individual multinationals is simply a by-product of a broader global economic system
that has steadily been removing almost all barriers and conditions to trade, investing and
outsourcing (422).
48
He writes that consensus is an idea that guides opinionoften directed against the
USSR One cant think about the state except in relation to the higher level of the single
world market People talk about the future of Europe, and the need to harmonize banking,
insurance, internal markets, companies, police forces: consensus, consensus, consensus (N
152-153).
49
Patton is in agreement with Mengue when he writes that As it is a politics without foundation
in which even the most fundamental convictions expressed in its laws and institutions are
open to change, democracy is a politics of pure immanence (Deleuze and Democracy
401).
47
233
4. Elements of Philosophy and Art

Just as opinion is committed to metaphysical suppositions that support
a philosophical anthropology, so too are philosophy and art comprised by
elements that imply a conception of human nature. However, overlap exists
between the two. Opinion employs elements belonging to philosophy and
art. For example, the coordination between subjective rules (thought) and an
objective order (things) takes place by means of sensations, where art consists
in the creation of sensations (WP 211). Opinion thus operates by means of
elements constitutive of philosophy and art. The difference between the two
can, in the first place, be understood in terms of the priority opinion gives to
terms over relations.
Although opinion consists in a type of relation, this relation supposes
the preexistence of terms that enter into relations. Whereas opinion begins
with terms, philosophy and art begin with relations. In part, this explains
the creative nature of these endeavors and the fact that, although philosophy
and art are capable of explaining the elements and relations on the basis of
which opinion functions, opinion is incapable of explaining the elements and
relations on the basis of which philosophy and art function. Opinion consists
in intrinsic and invariable relations between fixed terms, while extrinsic and
variable relations that condition fluid elements comprise philosophy and art.50
Although Deleuze and Guattari go to great lengths to distinguish philosophy
from art, this distinction primarily concerns the elements with which these
disciplines work (WP 65-66).51 Deleuze is much looser with this difference
in works written before and after What is Philosophy? At times concepts are
described as inseparable from percepts and affects; they reciprocally condition
and mutually reinforce each other (TRM 238 and 325). At other points,
relations described between philosophy, art, and science verge on equivalence
rather than interaction (N 67 and 123). Both philosophy and art are described
as creative endeavors that work with elements resembling each other.52
See chapters three and four on this point. I return to a fuller explication below.
Further, the object of philosophy, they write, is to create concepts that are always new
arts, and philosophies are all equally creative, although only philosophy creates concepts in
the strict sense (WP 5).
52
Regarding the interactions between elements belonging to philosophy and art, Deleuze
and Guattari discuss philosophy more than art. For this reason, in my discussion of the
interaction between elements belonging to philosophy and art, I focus largely on philosophy
it being understood that the same holds for the interaction between elements belonging to
art.
50
51
234
Whereas philosophy creates concepts, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and

Guattari describe art as creating sensations percepts and affects (TRM 296).
This claim can be understood on the basis of remarks Deleuze makes regarding
concepts, percepts, and affects in his 1989 Letter to Reda Bensmaa, on
Spinoza. Philosophy creates concepts, percepts, and affects that condition
new ways of thinking, seeing, and feeling.53 Although Deleuze and Guattari
associate the creation of percepts and affects with art specifically, they describe
the activity of philosophy in similar terms.54 Both the artist and philosopher
add new varieties to the world through the creations of concepts, percepts,
and affects. Time and again, Deleuze and Guattari stress the impersonality of
these endeavors.
Neither does the creation of concepts consist in merely causing a subject to
think differently, nor does the creation of percepts and affects consist in merely
displaying an object differently. Philosophy and art do not involve reference,
such that the creative activities of philosophy and do not refer to subjects and
objects.55 Unlike in opinion, in philosophy and art concepts, percepts, and
affects are neither indexed on nor act as points of correspondence between a
preexisting objective world and an intersubjective community. Rather, they
bring about both worlds and inter-subjective communities, as novel modes of
existence, in their relations through problems. In philosophy and art, concepts,
percepts, and affects relate to each other through problems.56 The nature of these
problems and relations depend on and reciprocally determine other elements
belonging to philosophy and art, what Deleuze and Guattari call conceptual
personae and aesthetic figures, respectively, as well as the planes on which
the creation of concepts, percepts, and affects occur. Philosophy creates on a
plane of immanence, whereas art does so on a plane of composition (WP
65-66).
There he writes that style in philosophy strains toward three different poles: concepts, or
new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and hearing; and affects, or new ways
of feeling (N 164-165). See Deleuzes further discussion of this point in TRM 238 and
325-326.
54
The artist is always adding new varieties to the world. Beings of sensation are varieties, just
as the concepts beings are variations, and the functions beings are variable (WP 175).
55
As percepts, sensations are not perceptions referring to an object (reference) (WP 166). See
WP 22 where they discuss the concept being without reference.
56
A concept requires not only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts
but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts (WP 18).
Deleuze and Guattari write that what is distinctive about the concept is that it renders
components inseparable within itself. Components, or what defines the consistency of the
concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet not separable (WP 19).
53
235
Regarding the significance of the friend as a conceptual personae to

Greek thought, for example, Deleuze and Guattari write that the friend
who appears in philosophy no longer stands for an extrinsic persona, an
example or empirical circumstance, but rather for a presence that is intrinsic
to thought, a condition of possibility of thought itself, a living category, a
transcendental lived reality (WP 3). The notion of form is central to ancient
Greek philosophy. Beginning with Socrates, the task of thought consists in
discovering forms. However, doing so requires a particular method. This
consists in dialogue, where questions are posed and answers are given, slowly
but surely whittling away false opinions to arrive at the form as truth. Here
the friend plays an essential role.
No longer is the friend conceived as accidental and extrinsic to thought but
as essential and intrinsic. Conceived as dialogue, thought can only take place
in the presence of an interlocutor. For this reason, the friend is a transcendental
condition of thought, a condition for the possibility of philosophy when
conceived in these terms. Depending on the conception of philosophy with
which one works and the concepts to which one is committed different
conceptual personae take on greater and lesser importance.57
Hence, the Socratic commitment to the concept of form as an index of
truth determines the significance of the friend as a conceptual personae in
ancient Greek philosophy. If the object of knowledge is a form and one
can only reach this form through dialogue then the friend, as interlocutor,
becomes a necessary condition of thought as such. In a sense then, the
questions one asks determine the answers one receives.58 Although concepts
do not take as their references either an objective world or inter-subjective
community, they nonetheless refer to a wider milieu. Here the significance of
the plane of immanence comes to the forefront.
Although the plane of immanence acts as a ground for concepts and
conceptual personae, it is distinct from and should not be confused with
them.59 Deleuze and Guattari equate conceptual personae with unique sets of
Friend, lover, claimant and rival are transcendental determinations that do not for that
reason lose their intense and animated existence, in one persona or in several The list
of conceptual personae is never closed and for that reason plays an important role in the
evolution or transformations of philosophy (WP 4-5).
58
On this score, Deleuze and Guattari write that philosophy is the art of forming, inventing,
and fabricating concepts. But the answer not only had to take note of the question, it had
to determine its moments, its occasion and circumstances, its landscapes and personae, its
conditions and unknowns (WP 2).
59
Introducing this notion in contradistinction to that of the concept, Deleuze and Guattari
write that a plane, and a groundmust not be confused with them but that shelters their
seeds and the personae who cultivate them (WP 7).
57
236
relations proper names intrinsic to thought, which occupy a particular

plane of immanence.60 Reciprocally determining concepts and conceptual
personae are thus unique to the planes of immanence on which they occur.
Deleuze and Guattari characterize this notion in terms of the relation between
philosophy and non-philosophy, philosophy and pre-philosophy: the plane
of immanence must be regarded as pre-philosophical. It is presupposed not
in the way that one concept may refer to others but in the way that concepts
themselves refer to a non-conceptual understanding (WP 40). The plane
of immanence is thus pre-philosophical insofar as concepts refer to nonconceptual understanding. It is easy to misunderstand this point.
Here Deleuze and Guattaris use of pre-philosophical and nonconceptual should not be understood in terms of commonsensical. The
plane of immanence is not a storehouse of commonsense intuitions against
which philosophical positions would be measured, providing fodder for
conceptual analysis as in analytic philosophy. Rather, the plane of immanence
is pre-philosophical and non-conceptual to the extent that it intersects with
the plane of composition on which the creations of percepts and affects take
place in art. Insofar as the activities of both philosophy and art are themselves
determined by the planes of immanence and composition on which the
creations of concepts, percepts, and affects occur, the point at which these
planes intersect is extremely important.
Deleuze and Guattari say the brain lies at the intersection of these planes,
those of philosophy, art, and science.61 The significance of this claim bears on
not only the importance of philosophy and art to an account of human nature
but also the creative, material nature of these activities. The supposedly mental
objects and vital ideas belonging to philosophy and art concepts, percepts,
and affects are themselves constitutive of brain tissue. Deleuze and Guattari
emphasize that the brain should not be conceived in organic terms, where its
parts would be organized and integrated in terms of an ultimate goal or end.62
This would be to understand the brain in terms of opinion, as an instrument
Further describing the relation between concepts, conceptual personae, and the plane of
immanence, Deleuze and Guattari write that proper names are intrinsic conceptual personae
who haunt a particular plane of consistency (WP 24). See previous chapters regarding the
nature of proper names as unique sets of relations.
61
The brain is the junction not the unity of the three planes (WP 208).
62
If the mental objects of philosophy, art, and science (that is to say, vital ideas) have a place,
it will be in the deepest of the synaptic fissures, in the hiatuses, intervals, and meantimes of a
nonobjectifiable brain, in a place where to go in search of them will be to create That is to
say, thought, even in the form it actively assumes in science, does not depend upon a brain
made up of organic connections and integrations (WP 209).
60
237
of opinion on the model of recognition.63 As an object of science, the brain

appears in this way, as merely an instrument for communicating opinion,
establishing correspondences in recognition between external perceptions and
internal affections, thereby integrating individuals into wider communities
through discussion.
As with their criticisms of psychoanalysis and the Oedipus complex,
however, Deleuze and Guattari do not doubt this is how the brain appears. It
appears as a series of relations organized and integrated in terms of an ultimate
function.64 Thus, their charge is not that science invents or fabricates a
conception of the brain along these lines. Scientists discover rather than invent
the brain understood in terms of the organic model and opinion. Given
that the starting point and touchstone of Deleuze and Guattaris analyses are
neither the organic worldview nor a commonsense experience on which it
is based, they raise a question regarding this conception of the brain.65 Are
cerebral pathways pre-established or incidental and variable? In other words,
is the brain necessarily and inevitably an instrument for communicating
opinion or could it work differently?66
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not address this issue straightforwardly
in What is Philosophy?, as is the case with Anti-Oedipus and the possibility of
a non-Oedipal form of literature, one can find Deleuze addressing the nature
of the brain elsewhere. He does so in Three Questions on Six Times Two,
included in Negotiations.
There Deleuze makes a rather unexpected equation between images, things,
and motion; he proclaims a relation of equivalence between these three.67 This
claim is not only rather strange but also less than obviously true. One can begin
to make sense of this by remembering that the metaphysical underpinnings
of Deleuzes thought are thoroughly modern, where fundamental distinctions
It is not surprising, they write, that the brain, treated as a constituted object of science,
can be an organ only of the formation and communication of opinion: this is because
step-by-step connections and centered integrations are still based on the limited model of
recognition (gnosis and praxis; this is a cube; this is a pencil) (WP 209).
64
Certainly, when the brain is considered as a determinate function it appears as a complex set
of horizontal connections and of vertical integrations reacting on one another, as is shown by
the cerebral maps (WP 208).
65
Thus, a methodological constant throughout Deleuzes work is the specificity of the experience
on which his various transcendental analyses are based, from Difference and Repetition and
Anti-Oedipus through What is Philosophy? See chapter three for a fuller explication of this
point. I return to this in chapter six in terms of the specificity of American experience and
its relation to American literature.
66
The question, then, is a double one: are the connections preestablished, as if guided by rails,
or are they produced and broken up in fields of forces? (WP 208).
67
He says there is no difference at all between images, things, and motion (N 42).
63
238
between things are explained in terms of motion and rest relations of

slowness and speed rather than with reference to form.68 One can thereby
understand why Deleuze would equate things and motion. However, it is still
unclear why he would associate these two with images. The fact Deleuze does
so while discussing film points in a definite direction.
According to Deleuze, film creates and works with images. Images are its
distinctive medium. However, his conception of the image is idiosyncratic.
An image is not simply a picture or mental representation. Rather, the image
has a material content. It functions as a force in the world interacting with
other material forces.69 In these terms, one can understand why Deleuze
would equate images with things and motion.
As with Deleuze and Guattaris conception of art in general, filmmakers
not only establish images in their films but also in the world. More specifically,
according to Deleuze, images establish circuits in the brain.70 Cerebral
pathways are not pre-established but determined by stimuli. For this reason,
neither is the brain necessarily nor inevitably an instrument for communicating
opinion. It can work differently.71
This is precisely the task of philosophy: Theres a special relation between
philosophy and neurology Our current inspiration doesnt come from
computers but from the microbiology of the brain: the brains organized
like a rhizome New connection, new pathways, new synapses, thats
what philosophy calls into play as it creates concepts (N 149). Here the
importance Deleuze attributes to neurology consists in not only the insights
it offers regarding the brain but also the possibilities these offer to philosophy.
Specifically, he notes that the brain is organized like a rhizome, that it should
be conceived in terms of the model of the body without organs rather than
the organism.
See my discussion of this in Individuals, Communities, and Sympathy: Lawrence and
Spinoza in chapter two, as well as The Specificity of Schizophrenic Experience in chapter
three.
69
Again, Deleuzes earlier engagements with Proust shed further light on this point. See
PS 96-97 regarding the way that material impressions reach us through our senses, his
characterization of the way the sign forces us to think, and the contingent nature of this
encounter.
70
Creating new circuits in art means creating them in the brain too (N 60). Cerebral
circuits and connections do not preexist the stimuli; the corpuscles, or particles that trace
them (TRM 283).
71
See Eric Alliezs Signature of the World for a discussion of the brain in the thought of Deleuze
and Guattari, especially where he refers to Francisco J. Varelas conception of the brain as one
that functions independently of a central processing unit, one in which all its components
resonate (29).
68
239
Deleuze goes on to say that philosophy establishes new synapses, new

circuits in the brain, that the creation of new cerebral pathways conditions
new ways of thinking (N 176). Just as relations of ideas give rise to a subject
in Deleuzes reading of Hume, so too do relations of the brain give rise to
a subject here.72 The brain is not merely or primarily an instrument in the
service of opinion, in the service of human beings. The creative activities of
philosophy, art, and science themselves determine the nature of the brain and
its functions. But if the creation of concepts, percepts, and affects condition
new ways of thinking through the creation of brains, then it is necessary to
examine the way concepts, percepts, and affects are created.
A widespread and by no means fully articulate consensus seems to dominate
when Deleuze and Guattaris conception of philosophy and art as the creation
of concepts, percepts, and affects comes up for discussion. This consists in the
vague hunch that the creation of concepts, percepts, and affects takes place by
means of imagination, where one simply thinks about various things, the way
that all too often for undergraduates philosophy consists in the sloppy
activity of letting their thoughts run wild Look at me mom! Im creating
concepts! This is certainly not what Deleuze and Guattari mean by creating
concepts, percepts, and affects.
They mention a hypothesis that touches on these processes. At present we
are relying only on a very general hypothesis, Deleuze and Guattari write,
from sentences or their equivalent, philosophy extracts concepts (which must
not be confused with general or abstract ideas)and art extracts percepts and
affects (which must not be confused with perceptions or feelings) (WP 24).
Philosophy and art thus begin with sentences or their equivalents. Insofar
as sentences are composed of at the very least a subject and verb, the
equivalents of sentences would be something composed of similar elements,
a subject doing or undergoing something. From these philosophy extracts
concepts, while art extract percepts and affects.
Here Deleuze and Guattari make clear that percepts and affects should
not be confused with perceptions or feelings and that concepts should not
be confused with general or abstract ideas. The difference between percepts
and affects and perceptions and affections consists in their relations to a
subject. For Deleuze and Guattari, the basic nature of reality is a maelstrom
72
It is the brain that thinks and not man the latter being only a cerebral crystallization
Philosophy, art, and science are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three
aspects under which the brain becomes subject (WP 211). Regarding the way relations
of ideas give rise to a subject in Deleuzes reading of Hume, see my discussion in chapter
four.
240
of percepts and affects from which artists form a chaosmos.73 This is similar in
nature to what Deleuze later refers to as a transcendental field, a stream of
pre-reflexive, impersonal consciousness (TRM 384).74
Perceptions and affections are always related to a subject in a particular
manner, implying a relation between perceptions and affections, as well
as a subject, the objective world, and an inter-subjective community. For
Deleuze and Guattari, both subjects and objects are conceived as habitually
joined amalgamations of percepts and affects (DR 96-97 and WP 213). The
difference between concepts and general or abstract ideas consists in their
specificity. General or abstract ideas as their names make clear have been
generalized or abstracted from concrete circumstances. On the other hand,
concepts are always specific to the relation between the conceptual personae
and plane of immanence in which they occur.
Deleuze and Guattaris claim that concepts, percepts, and affects can be
extracted from sentences or their equivalents can be understood on this basis.
Language is useful precisely because its elements are general and abstract
enough to refer to similar but not specific states of affairs. Although sentences
suppose subjects, percepts and affects can be extracted from sentences or their
equivalents. This conceptual difference concerns the relation philosophy and
art have to chaos.
5. Relation of Philosophy and Art to Chaos: Uneasy Alliance

Just as opinion can be understood in terms of its relation to chaos, so too can
philosophy and art. The relation opinion has to chaos is one of denial, denying
variances in correspondences between particular perceptions and affections.
In this manner, opinion claims to act as a protection against chaos.75 The
relation of philosophy and art to chaos is one of alliance. Although philosophy
and art act as protections against chaos, according to Deleuze and Guattari,
philosophy and art are also engaged in an even greater struggle against opinion.
For this reason, philosophy and art enlist the help of chaos, establishing a pact
Again, for an excellent discussion of the chaosmos and its relation to the cracked-self as
immanent ideas, see Smith 106-121. I return to this below.
74
In addition, on this point Deleuze writes that percepts arent perceptions, theyre packets
of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them. Affects
arent feelings, theyre becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby
becoming someone else) (N 137).
75
The problem is that opinion claims to act as a protection against chaos but does not actually
do so. I return to this point in chapter six.
73
241
or relation of alliance with chaos.76 In this account, Deleuze and Guattari turn
again to Lawrence for inspiration.
Introducing the nature of Lawrences contribution, they write the following:
In a violently poetic text, Lawrence describes what produces poetry: people
are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside
of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions
(WP 203). Here they are referring to a short introduction Lawrence wrote
for Harry Crosbys Chariot of the Sun, entitled Chaos in Poetry. In that
piece, Lawrence says that opinions are like an umbrella that protect against
chaos, fixing correspondences between perceptions and affections for the sake
of regularity.77 Every now and then, however, poets find it necessary to tear
open the umbrella and let in chaos.78 Deleuze and Guattari ascribe this same
function to philosophers and artists.79 Insofar as chaos is the infinite speed by
which forms arise and vanish, only through a pact with chaos are philosophy
and art capable of disrupting the correspondences established between
perceptions and affections that constitute opinions.80
In the first place, the nature of this alliance consists in tearing open the
firmament that protects against chaos, disrupting the correspondences
between perceptions and affections that constitute opinion, which Deleuze and
Guattari also refer to as clichs. 81 In this respect, philosophy and art battle
against clichs or opinions.82 The creation of concepts, percepts, and affects by
It is as if the struggle against chaos [in philosophy and art] does not take place without an
affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops and takes on more importance
the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself (WP 203). Henry
Miller describes a similar relation, one that establishes a link between Deleuze and Guattaris
earlier schizophrenic perspective and an alliance with chaos as described here. Miller says
anyone who has ever caught the truth of certitude was a little cracked and it is only these
men who have accomplished anything for the world (Sexus 170).
77
But poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a
bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through the
rent (WP 203).
78
Regarding its impetus, Lawrence says, nothing will ever quench humanity and the human
potentiality to evolve something magnificent out of a renewed chaos (FU 56).
79
Philosophyand art want us to tear open the firmament and plunge into the chaos. We
defeat it [opinion] only at this price (WP 202).
80
On this point, they write the following: if art battles against chaos it is to borrow weapons
from it that it turns against opinion, the better to defeat it with tried and tested arms (WP
204).
81
Because the picture starts out covered with clichs, the painter must confront the chaos and
hasten the destructions so as to produce a sensation that defies every opinion and clich
(WP 204).
82
This is to say that artists struggle less against chaos (that, in a certain manner, all their
wishes summon forth) than against the clichs of opinion (WP 204).
76
242
philosophy and art thus supposes the destruction of clichs and opinions.83
This activity corresponds to one of the elements belonging to philosophy
and art, that of establishing the planes on which philosophy and art work,
planes of immanence and composition.84 Hence, in the creation of concepts,
percepts, and affects, the first task of philosophy and art consists in tearing
open the umbrella, casting planes over the chaos (WP 202).
However, chaos introduces unfamiliarity, such that practical interest necessitates the establishment of new opinions, the solidification of new correspondences between perceptions and affections.85 The planes of immanence
and composition thus need to be constantly renewed.86 Deleuze and Guattari
note, however, that this tendency is religious in nature, such that the processes
by which philosophy and art operate might be mistaken for those of religion.87
Religion has been and continues to be one of the most widespread and
effective means by which people make sense of existence, a protection against
chaos that gives meaning to life and the world.88 Further, in terms of Deleuze
and Guattaris conception, religion makes reference to transcendence,
otherworldliness. This emphasis results in the denigration of the everyday.
To an extent then, religion also appears as a struggle against opinion, against
an order of quotidian existence. Ultimately, however, they are not the same.
Although religion also struggles against opinion, it makes reference to an
The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank
page; but the page is already covered with preexisting, preestablished clichs that it is first
necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the
chaos that brings us the vision (WP 204). Deleuze says the same in FBLS 71.
84
The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve (WP 42).
85
Then comes the crowd of imitators, they say, who repair the umbrella with something
vaguely resembling the vision, and the crowd of commentators who patch over the rent with
opinions: communications. Other artists are always needed to make other slits, to carry out
necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions, thereby restoring to their predecessors the
incommunicable novelty that we could no longer see (WP 204).
86
See FBLS 79 as well, where Deleuze says the fight against clichs must be constantly renewed.
Again, on this point, Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the relation between philosophy,
art, and opinion seems to gain inspiration from Anglo-American writers, specifically, the
way the latter deal with the problem of making a clean break, getting away and staying
away. See Crack-Up 81 concerning the way that survival consists in making a clean break,
making the past cease to exist, which is different from what Fitzgerald refers to as a jail
break, fleeing from one prison to another. See Miller, Sexus 189 regarding his reflections on
needing to make a clean break.
87
We thus come back to a conclusion to which art led us: the struggle with chaos is only the
instrument of a more profound struggle against opinion, which lends to it a religious taste
for unity or unification (WP 206).
88
See my fuller discussion of these points in chapter three.
83
243
otherworldliness to organize experience and make sense of this world. This

provides the basis for opinion in general.89
Insofar as gods or a God would be responsible for either the organization
or creation of both the world and humankind, the relation between the
world and human beings is based on a common reference to God.90 This
common reference provides a measure between external perceptions, referring
to an objective world, and internal affections, referring to an inter-subjective
community. Hence, invoking dynasties of gods, or the epiphany of a
single god provides the basis for correspondences between perceptions and
affections in which opinions consist. Like opinion, the relation religion has to
chaos is ultimately one of denial.91
Both philosophy and art not only recognize chaos but also form an
alliance with it. This alliance consists in establishing planes of immanence and
composition by wiping away clichs, making slits in the umbrella of opinion
to let in chaos. The creation of concepts, percepts, and affects is based on this
same process, from materials that result when one establishes a plane. Deleuze
and Guattari refer to the materials with which philosophers and artists work
as daughters of chaos or chaoids. Different daughters of chaos or chaoids
result, depending on the type of plane one establishes, depending on the way
one makes slits in the umbrella of opinion.92 Insofar as Deleuze and Guattari
claim philosophy and art begin with sentences or their equivalents, this claim
should be understood in terms of a broader conception of language and the
metaphysics it implies.
Sentences and their equivalents are composed of at least a subject and
verb, a subject doing or undergoing something. In this scheme, categormatic
terms take the subject position and syncategorematic terms the verb position.
Implied by this account of language is a broader conception of reality, one
where categormatic terms refer to things and syncategorematic terms to their
relations. The basic constituents of reality then are terms and their relations,
These three disciplines are not like religions that invoke dynasties of gods, they write, or
the epiphany of a single god, in order to paint a firmament on the umbrella, like the figures
of an Urdoxa from which opinions stem (WP 202).
90
See my discussion of this in terms of Descartes in chapter one.
91
More specifically, religion recognizes that chaos once existed or continues to exist, but tells
a story regarding its being vanquished, or provides guidelines concerning how it can be kept
at bay. See my discussion of this point in chapter three.
92
In short, they write, chaos has three daughters, depending on the plane that cuts through
it: these are the Chaoids art, science, and philosophy as forms of thought or creation.
We call Chaoids the realities produced on the planes that cut through the chaos in different
ways (WP 208).
89
244
where relations only make sense with reference to preexisting terms.93 Deleuze
and Guattaris worldview is diametrically opposed to this scheme as is their
corresponding conception of language.
The basic constituents of reality are relations, where terms do not preexist
relations. Language is itself conceived as a relation, a material force that interacts
with other forces, rather than as a quasi-spiritual entity, simply an intermediary
between ideas whose task consists in reference. This understanding establishes
a link between Deleuze and Guattaris earlier schizophrenic perspective and
the alliance with chaos as described here.
In schizophrenia, language is powerless to create a distance from reality,
such that words fall into things and things fall into words.94 Hence, Deleuze
and Guattaris interest in sentences their hypothesis that philosophy and art
begin with sentences to extract concepts, percepts, and affects concerns the
value of language as a relation, a material entity with the capacity to establish
new relations, to transform the terms and relations with which it comes into
contact.
Although concepts suppose knowledge, the creation of concepts neither
consists in abstract knowledge nor does it refer to states of affairs. Rather, this
knowledge concerns events the ways events constitute states of affairs and
relations give rise to terms.95 Creating concepts consists in utilizing language
as a material force to establish new relations in thought.96 As constituents of
the creative activities of philosophy and art, chaoids or daughters of chaos are
synonymous with the different types of relations that result from language as
a material force.97 Whereas philosophy discovers and cultivates these relations
to condition new ways of thinking, art discovers and cultivates these relations
to condition new ways of perceiving and feeling.
Although philosophy and art form an alliance with chaos to struggle
against opinion, insofar as they also provide protection against chaos, neither
See Gyula Klimas Syncategoremata on this.
See Van Haute 230, my discussions of the material nature of language in chapters two and
four, as well as its relation to schizophrenia in chapter three.
95
The concept is obviously knowledge butwhat it knows is the pure event, which must
not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied (WP 33)
96
The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, they write, is always to extract
an event from things and being, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to
give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible as events (WP 33).
97
Regarding the relation between chaos and the event in Leibnizs thought, Deleuze asks the
following: What are the conditions that make an event possible? Events are produced in a
chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screen intervenes
(FLB 76). The screen to which Deleuze here refers would be the equivalent of a plane on
which concepts, percepts, and affects are created.
93
94
245
are they chaotic nor do they produce chaos. Once again, the creative activities
of philosophy and art do not consist in the sloppy activity of letting ones
thoughts run wild but are specific operations of composing chaos, making
slits in the umbrella of opinion and establishing planes so as to think, perceive,
and feel differently, without at the same time being overwhelmed by chaos.98
The relation of philosophy and art to chaos is thus ambivalent, courting chaos
to battle against opinion while at the same time avoiding total immersion.99
Insofar as this uneasy alliance serves the battle against opinion, and opinion
always concerns relations between individuals and community, so too does the
pact of philosophy and art with chaos bear on relations between individuals
and community.
When opinion triumphs, the perceptive-affective correspondences of
which opinions consist are determined in individuals by the community to
which they belong. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, the resulting opinions
belong to a particular generic subject, that of the capitalist, such that the
building of consensus through the attenuation of opinion is part of a process
that facilitates the spread of global capitalism. A conception of politics as
consensus is thus based on fixed opinions all are capable of recognizing,
and discussion precipitates this recognition through which all are capable of
membership in a global capitalist community. In their battle against opinion
then, philosophy and art are also engaged in a struggle against global capitalism
and a conception of politics as consensus.100
Not only do philosophy and art condition new ways of thinking, perceiving,
and feeling in the individual, but also struggle against the entire framework in
terms of which opinion takes place, altering the relations between thoughts,
perceptions, and feelings, and relations between individuals and community
to which these give rise.101
Art is not chaos, Deleuze and Guattari write, but a composition of chaos that yields the
vision or sensation, so that it constitutesa chaosmos, a composed chaos neither foreseen
nor preconceived (WP 204).
99
Deleuze says painters embrace the chaos, and attempt to emerge from it (FBLS 84). For
this same reason, he criticizes catastrophe painting, where sensation remains in a confused
state. Rather, it should be confined; the violent method cannot be given free reign, submerging the whole. See FBLS 89 on this. See Jean-Claude Pinsons Pothique de Deleuze 198
for a further discussion of this point.
100
However, this is not to say there is an other of capitalism for which philosophy and art
are fighting. Rather, they struggle against an understanding and the establishment of
relations between individuals and community in terms of inclusive universalism, central to
both global capitalism and a conception of politics as consensus. I return to this in chapter
six.
101
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write that we do not fight against perceptual and
affective clichs if we do not also fight against the machine that produces them (WP 150).
98
246
6.Political Significance of Philosophy and Art: Inventing a People,

Making Brains
Just as the relation of opinion to chaos conditions a conception of the political,
so too does that of philosophy and art. Conceived in terms of the creative
activities of philosophy and art, this consists in inventing a people who are
missing (ECC 4). Creativity is the central feature of a conception of the
political modeled on the activities of philosophy and art, which Deleuze and
Guattari oppose to discussion. However, what it means to invent a people
who are missing is by no means clear. In the first place, this can be understood
in terms of fabulation, a faculty of storytelling.
Deleuze links the invention of a people to the creative activities of
philosophy and art through Bergsons conception of fabulation, thus giving
this notion a political sense (N 174). Fabulation constitutes the invention of a
people as a faculty that consists in storytelling (N 125-126). The link between
the invention of a people and the activities of philosophy and art consists in
the creation of novel modes of existence, genuinely new ways of thinking,
perceiving, and feeling not only individually but also communally.102
However, fabulation should not be understood in nationalistic terms, as an
activity that consists in establishing the identity of a people through a type
of literature that arises from and can be identified with a people. This
would be to speak for and in the place of others.103 Fabulation consists in an
alliance with chaos where philosophy and art discover in sentences and their
equivalents a material reality with the capacity to establish new relations, to
transform the terms and relations into which it comes into contact through
different motions, different proportions of speed and slowness.104 Here
the priority Deleuze and Guattari give to relations, its significance to their
conception of the brain, and the creation of a people comes to the forefront.
The brain lies at the intersection of the planes on which the creative
activities of philosophy and art take place. The relations between the creation
We are dealing here with a problem concerning the plurality of subjects, their relationship,
and their reciprocal presentation (WP 16).
103
See my fuller discussions of these points in chapter four.
104
On this point, Deleuze and Guattari write that the concept is an act of thought, it is
thought operating at infinite (although greater or lesser) speed (WP 21). Describing this
process in terms of sensation in the work of Francis Bacon, Deleuze writes the following:
at one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the
sensation, one through the other, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the same body that,
being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I experience
the sensation only by entering the paining, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the
sensed (FBLS 31).
102
247
of concepts, percepts, and affects and the establishment of planes of

immanence and composition determine the nature of the brain. Cerebral
pathways are not pre-established, says Deleuze, but determined by stimuli.
Thus, the brain is not necessarily an instrument for communicating opinion.
The political significance of philosophy and art consists in discovering this and
changing the brain. As a conception of the political modeled on the creative
activities of philosophy and art, inventing a people who are missing consists
in making brains. The creative activities of philosophy and art establish
new synapses and circuits in the brain, conditioning new ways of thinking,
perceiving, and feeling, not only individually but also communally, thereby
establishing different relations between individuals and community, novel
modes of existence. For this reason, it seems mistaken to separate the creative
nature of philosophy and art from an understanding of political activity.105
Attempts to do so are the result of misunderstanding misunderstanding
the inherently social and political nature of Deleuze and Guattaris accounts
of philosophy and art. There is no need to give either the social or the political
privileged positions, because philosophy and art are always already thoroughly
political and social in nature. They have the same status and function in the
same manner as theory.106 Philosophy and art are both political and social in
terms of their creative actions, in terms of their capacities to invent a people
who are missing by creating brains.107
However, Patton does precisely this in his defense of the compatibility of Deleuze and
Guattaris thought with that of political liberalism (Deleuze and Democracy 409). This
move is related to Pattons claim that What is Philosophy? lacks an account of the social
(Order, Exteriority 26) and Patton and Mengues claim that it lacks a specific account of
the political, that Deleuze and Guattari fail to give this notion an appropriately privileged
place (Deleuze et dmocratie 52 and Deleuze and Democracy 402).
106
There is only action, Deleuze writes, the action of theory, the action of praxis, in the
relations of relays and networks theory does not express, translate, or apply a praxis; it is
a praxis (DI 207).
107
Although Patton mentions Deleuze and Guattaris claim regarding this point on multiple
occasions (Order, Exteriority 22 and Deleuze and Democracy 210), he never attempts
to explain its precise meaning neither what it would mean to invent a people who are
missing nor how philosophy and art would accomplish this task such that Pattons
account of the broader political significance of Deleuzes work is not only incomplete but
also misses their point. He lays out his reading of the relationship between Deleuzes thought
and the political in the aptly named Deleuze and the Political. This book represents the major
engagement of Deleuzes thought with the question of the political in secondary scholarship.
His central claim is that deterritorialization should be considered a norm of political action,
where actions would be right or wrong good or bad depending on the extent to which
they effect a process of deterritorialization. See chapter three where I argue that, insofar as
deterritorialization is related to a process of courting or confronting chaos and the problem
of social and political orders is precisely to keep chaos at bay it seems untenable to ascribe
such a position to Deleuze and Guattari. Rather than considering deterritorialization a norm
105
248
As in Deleuzes engagements with Anglo-American literature and the

specificity of the American social milieu, the political problem Deleuze and
Guattari address here consists in the fact that relations between individuals
and community are potentially fraught with strife. The political import of
philosophy and literature thus consists in establishing relations of sympathy,
cultivating shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings, determining what does
and does not work between people to establish novel modes of existence.108 A
certain affinity exists here between these themes and Lawrences conception of
classic American literature, and its relation to the formation of an American
identity. One can support this claim by closely examining a concrete instance
where Deleuze and Guattari think this occurs, with Prousts conception of
jealousy: They say Proust creates jealously as an affect.109
As the creation of an affect, jealously concerns not only a new way of
feeling but also a reconceptualization of the relation between perceptions and
affections belonging to opinion. Insofar as relations between perceptions and
affections determine those between individuals and community, this leads to
the reconceptualization of relations between individuals and community. No
longer are these considered in terms of the organic model but what Deleuze
describes in his work on Proust as the vegetal realm of pathos (PS 174-175).
In this scheme, criteria of organic totalityare precisely the ones [Proust]
rejects, such that to read Proust as having anticipated a unity in the first
place is to read him badly, missing the new conception of unity he was in the
process of creating (PS 116).
of political action, it seems as though their conception of the political is based on the creative
activities of philosophy and art such that the invention of a people who are missing consists
in creating novel modes of existence, by making brains.
108
Once again, insofar as the work of Fitzgerald addresses this issue in terms of the American
social milieu, one can make sense of Dos Passos comments that a firmly anchored ethical
standard exists in Fitzgeralds work, one towards which America had been striving (CrackUp 339).
109
The tremendous influence of Proust on Deleuze helps explain why he took such an interest in
Proust and Signs. Although Deleuze rarely returned to and revised his books for new editions,
he reworked this book twice. These editions differ, but they share a common critique and
reconceptualization of traditional philosophical commitments in terms of the thought of
Proust. Examining this development sheds light on the significance of literature to Deleuzes
conception of philosophy, especially the development of his conception of philosophy as a
creative endeavor, political in nature.
249
Deleuze goes on to describe this unity as a problem specific to art

discovering a type of unity not based on the organic model (PS 164).
However, insofar as the unity belonging to the organic model is an assumed
unity one thought to exist naturally discovering a type of unity not based
on this model consists in creation. Prousts work is important to Deleuze
because Proust takes seriously the problem of chaos, the threat chaos poses
to both thought and social life. Deleuze praises Proust for impugning a
simplistic philosophical understanding of thought that would naturally tend
towards truth, as well as a corresponding conception of part-whole relations,
where the integration of individuals into community would be the result of
a natural process.110 Rather, the Proustian universe is one in fragments (PS
184). According to Deleuze, this results from a thematic preoccupation, the
fact Proust is so specifically concerned with time.
As opposed to conceiving time as a whole a vast container in which
everything happens on Deleuzes reading, time cannot possibly be conceived
as a whole. Time is the form of all that changes and thus prevents the emergence
of a whole.111 The problem of time is thus intimately related to that of chaos,
where both time and chaos threaten the emergence of thought, precipitating
discord between individuals and community.
In his reading of Proust, Deleuze claims only the work of art can give order
to a world of multiplicity and chaos, without unifying or totalizing objects or
subjects (PS 168). Later, Deleuze and Guattari ascribe precisely this task to
philosophy in its creation of concepts.112 Unifying and totalizing both subjects
and objects would consist in understanding these from the perspective of the
organic model. As with opinion, the relation the organic model has to chaos
See PS 94 where he discusses the establishment of an image of thought by Proust against that
of philosophy, where truth would be the natural telos of thought, thus assuring agreement
between minds, PS 105 and 112 regarding the logos as a universal dialectic, a conversation
among friends where the faculties voluntarily collaborate linking wholes to parts and parts
to wholes and PS 112-113 concerning micro-macrocosmic relations of parts to wholes in
terms of a great Organism.
111
See PS 161, as well as B 131-132 where the problem of time and the whole the prevention
of the emergence of a whole because of time is addressed in the work of Bergson. It is
precisely this problem to which Hegels philosophy is a response, especially the importance
Kojve gives to the end-of-history thesis in his reading of Hegel. See my explication of this
point in Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method in Hegel in chapter one. I return to
this in Deleuzes reading of Whitman in chapter six.
112
They say that the concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary
whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it,
stalking it, trying to reabsorb it (WP 16). I return to this below. Smith addresses this
point in his excellent On the Becoming of Concepts, which concerns Deleuzes account
of concepts in relation to time what Deleuze means by concepts if they are not simply
discovered as eternal and unchanging but created as varying continuously (122-145).
110
250
is one of denial. Although art brings order to chaos, it does so differently from
the organic model, unified only by a creative viewpoint that itself takes the role
of an incongruous part within the whole (PS 114). This creative viewpoint is
but one perspective among others. The difference between the organic models
confrontation with chaos in a relation of denial and arts as one of uneasy
alliance consists in the variability of the perspective from which art brings
order to chaos.113 Deleuze and Guattaris account of jealousy as the creation of
an affect by Proust highlights this variability.
They start by addressing a widely held understanding of Prousts conception
of jealousy, that Proust describes jealousy inminute detail (WP 175).
According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, this understanding is mistaken.
Rather, they claim he is inventing an affect (WP 175).114 Going on to
describe the nature of this invention how and why Proust can be understood
as creating an affect they write that he constantly reverses the order in
affections presupposed by opinion, according to which jealousy would be
an unhappy consequence of love (WP 175). Creating jealousy as an affect
consists in reconceiving the relation between affections supposed by opinion,
where jealousy would be a consequence of love. To understand this claim, it
is necessary to explore how jealousy could be conceived as a consequence of
love in opinion, such that reversing this relation would consist in the creation
of jealousy as an affect.
Opinion supposes that specific qualities within perceptions precede and
precipitate specific affections within a subject. The correspondence between
these perceptions and feelings is determined with reference to an inter-subjective
community that, in turn, takes an objective world as its reference. Depending
on the community, love would be an inter-subjective relation occasioned by
qualities within perceptions, for example, a letter, diamond ring, particular
look, etc.115 Here jealousy would be secondary, only ever parasitic on love. As
an ambiguity or mistake regarding correspondences between perceptions and
affections, jealousy occasions questions such as: Why was she talking with
him? What does it mean? How should I take that? As an ambiguity or failure
of recognition, jealousy can be clarified and dispelled. Conceived in terms of
opinion, jealousy thus supposes love as an ideal.
I return to the importance of the variability of this perspective with regard to the tension
between inclusive universalism and exclusive particularism discussed in chapter six.
114
Deleuze makes a similar claim in Proust and Signs, saying jealousy goes further than love as
the creation of an affect (8-9).
115
See Marcel Prousts In Search of Lost Time vol. 1 Swanns Way 394-397 and 512-514 for
examples in the case of Swann.
113
251
Love would consist in a translucent correspondence between perceptions

and affections determined by an inter-subjective community which act
as points of reference, according to which the subject orients itself in relation
to this community and the objective world. The clarification of jealousy thus
bears on ones relation to a community, ones orientation within a community
that determines which feelings do or do not correspond to certain qualities
extracted from perceptions.116 Jealously can thus be resolved into either love or
hate on the basis of the community to which one belongs or seeks membership.
Different communities determine correspondences between perceptions and
affections that constitute love differently. Escaping opinion, Proust reverses
the relation between love and jealousy.
Deleuze and Guattari say that, for Proust, jealousy is finality, destination;
and if we must love, it is so that we can be jealous, jealousy being the meaning
of signs affect as semiology (WP 175). Negatively, the invention of jealousy
as an affect consists in disengaging jealousy from love, such that jealousy can
no longer be understood as an ambiguity or failure to distinguish between
love and hate. Positively, the invention of jealousy as an affect signals a
reconceptualization of the model of thought on which this conception of
jealousy would be based. Love does not here take priority, acting as a standard
by which jealousy is assessed. Neither, however, should a characterization of
jealousy in terms of finality or destination be understood as implying that
either Proust or Deleuze and Guattari understand jealousy as taking priority,
such that it would act as an ideal or standard against which love would be
assessed. Rather, they say that jealousy consists in the meaning of signs
affect as semiology.
Published in 1964, the first edition of Proust and Signs addresses the need to
transform philosophical methodology in terms of a Proustian universe of signs,
resulting in a reconceptualization of philosophy as semiology-interpretation.
With the exception of a brief discussion in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze
first addresses the image of thought and its related problematics in his book
on Proust.117 The image of thought and its critique, says Deleuze, are the most
important parts of Difference and Repetition. Additions to the second and third
editions of Proust and Signs concern the conditions of the production of signs
in the work of Proust, leading to an understanding of philosophy as creation.
Here a point of continuity between opinion and the organic model comes to the foreground:
On Deleuzes reading, Proust opposes the establishment of an anti-logos to that of the logos,
organ, and organon, where meaning must be discovered in the whole to which it belongs
(PS 146). See my discussions of this point in Spirit as Ground and the Dialectical Method
in Hegel in chapter one, as well as chapter three.
117
See NP 96-99 for his discussion of the image of thought in relation to Nietzsche.
116
252
This move from a conception of philosophy as interpretation to one of

creation can be explained, in part, biographically: During the early to mid
1960s, structuralism was a major intellectual force in France, such that
this paradigm and the centrality of semiology influenced Deleuze and his
reading of Proust, whereas structuralisms influence had waned considerably
by the 1970s. Between these two editions, Deleuze met and collaborated
with Guattari. Guattari brought to Deleuzes thought an awareness of the
shortcomings of interpretive paradigms especially structural interpretations
of psychoanalysis in exchange for a conception of thought that stressed its
creative nature, as well as a turn towards the political.118
Taken together, the equation of jealousy with the meaning of signs
thus concerns not only a critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of
thought what Deleuze identifies with the image of thought in his early
work, and Deleuze and Guattari equate with opinion in What is Philosophy?
but also the reconceptualization of thought as a creative endeavor based, in
part, on interpretation. These related commitments concern a reassessment of
thought in general, in terms of the relation between percepts, affects, subjects,
and inter-subjective communities, and in all cases the political significance
of these relations.
No longer are affects conceived as feelings or changes of feelings in a
subject that arise from qualities in perceptions. Rather, affects are experienced
and then perceptions are discovered adequate to these affects. A tendency
exists to search out and decipher a percept in experience as one would a
sign. In this way, Prousts invention of jealousy as an affect consists in an
understanding of affects as signs, semiology as a science of signs. Affects are
determinative of percepts rather than perceptions being determinative of
affections. If perceptions are conceived as occasions for the actualization of
jealousy, then qualities can no longer be the result of a perception from which
they are extracted. Further, rather than perceptions and affections being tied
to a subject where their correspondences refer to an objective world and
inter-subjective community in terms of which the subject is oriented the
tendency to search out and decipher percepts in experience is constitutive of
subjectivity and inter-subjective communities.
Deleuze says jealousy discovers the lover as a collection of partial objects
the transexuality of the lover rather than as a full person conceived on
the model of substance (PS 139-140). This process is itself one of creating
See TRM 66 concerning the way politics comes into play with Anti-Oedipus, as well as my
discussion of this in chapter three.
118
253
sympathy, which Deleuze associates with art and love rather than philosophy
and friendship (PS 30).
Animated by an affect, one seeks out a percept. Thought is not here
conceived in terms of the expression of a universal mind but as the result
of haphazard impressions that force one to think (PS 95). Unlike opinion,
this relation is understood as extrinsic and variable, determined by chance
encounters open to change and revision. The correspondences established
determine the nature of subjectivity and the kinds of relations into which
subjects enter, which in turn determine the inter-subjective community
formed as a result. Just as Masoch and Sade establish novel modes of existence
with corresponding political commitments, so too does Proust. Deleuze and
Deleuze and Guattaris constant interest is in the way that the novel modes of
existence that writers establish are no longer tied to the model of the organism.
The activity of these writers consists, rather, in constructing a body without
organs (TP 150-151).
Conclusion
Deleuze and Guattaris criticisms of opinion and liberal ideals by extension
bear on philosophical anthropology, a conception of what it means to
be a subject and the kinds of relations that exist between individuals and
community. In opinion, subjectivity is characterized by two capacities a
faculty of perception and a faculty of affection. When opinion triumphs, the
perceptive-affective correspondences of which opinions consist are determined
in individuals by the community to which they belong. According to Deleuze
and Guattari, widespread contemporary opinion belongs to a particular
generic subject, that of the capitalist. Thus, the building of consensus through
the attenuation of opinion is part of a process that facilitates the spread of
global capitalism. Just as opinion implies a philosophical anthropology, so too
does philosophy and art.
Whereas opinion begins with terms, philosophy and art begin with
relations, extrinsic and variable relations that condition fluid terms. They bring
about both worlds and inter-subjective communities, where relations between
philosophy and non-philosophy concern the plane of immanence on which the
creation of concepts takes place. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the brain
lies at the intersection of the planes of philosophy, art, and science. Insofar as
Deleuze claims cerebral pathways are not pre-established but determined by
stimuli, the creative activities of philosophy and art establish new circuits and
synapses in the brain through their relations to chaos. Although philosophy
254
and art act as protections against chaos, according to Deleuze and Guattari,
they are engaged in an even greater struggle against opinion.
Opinions are like an umbrella that protect against chaos. Philosophers and
artists tear holes in the umbrella and let in chaos. Only through a pact with
chaos are philosophy and art capable of disrupting correspondences established
between perceptions and affections by opinion. However, chaos introduces
unfamiliarity, such that practical interest necessitates the establishment of
new opinions. Thus, the planes of immanence and composition need to be
constantly renewed. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the materials with which
philosophers and artists work as daughters of chaos or chaoids. They claim
that philosophy and art begin with sentences or their equivalents, which
should be understood in terms of a broader conception of language and the
metaphysics it implies.
Language is conceived as a relation, a force that interacts with other
forces to establish new relations. Creating concepts, percepts, and affects thus
consists in utilizing language as a material force to establish new relations in
thought. Insofar as this uneasy alliance serves the battle against opinion and
opinion always concerns relations between individuals and community so
too does the pact of philosophy and art with chaos bear on relations between
individuals and community: Not only do philosophy and art condition new
ways of thinking, perceiving, and feeling, but also relations between them,
and relations between individuals and community.
The relation of opinion to chaos conditions a conception of politics as
consensus under the sway of global capitalism; the relation of philosophy and
art to chaos results in a critique of consensus and capitalism, a conception of
the political. This consists in inventing a people who are missing. Creativity
is thus the central feature of a conception of the political modeled on the
activities of philosophy and art. The political import of philosophy and
literature consists in establishing relations of sympathy, cultivating shared
thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Insofar as relations between perceptions
and affections determine those between individuals and community, this leads
to a reconceptualization of part-whole relations.
Art brings order to a world of multiplicity and chaos in a manner different
from that of opinion and the organic model, where the creative viewpoint
responsible for this order is but one among others. The difference between
the organic models confrontation with chaos in a relation of denial and
philosophy and arts as one of uneasy alliance thus consists in the variability
of the perspective from which the latter bring order to chaos. Unlike opinion,
the relation by which philosophy and art bring order to chaos is conceived as
255
extrinsic and variable, determined by chance encounters. The correspondences

established determine the nature of subjectivity and the kinds of relations into
which subjects enter, which in turn determine the inter-subjective community
formed as a result. The creation of percepts and affects in writing establishes
novel forms of individuality, community, and relations between the two
novel modes of existence.
256
Chapter Six
Creating a People to Come

Introduction: Liberalism and its Failures
In his first speech as Prime Minister, David Cameron announced the failure
of multiculturalism in the UK. Although he singled out Muslim groups
specifically, to combat extremist tendencies of all types, Cameron argued for
the need to build a strong sense of national identity (State multiculturalism).
Even before events such as September 11th and the killing of Theo Van
Gogh brought the problem of Islamism to popular consciousness, Samuel
Huntington proposed a similar course of action in his 1996 The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. As the last remaining
superpower and guardian of Western values, he argued the United States must
develop a strong national character to lead the world. Despite criticisms and
a show of support for inclusive liberal ideals by the left, these positions are
indicative of a growing sentiment.
The recognition of and appreciation for cultural, ethnic, and religious
diversity associated with inclusive liberal values evident in multiculturalism
and cosmopolitanism have not materialized to the extent expected. In some
sense, these integrative projects have also fueled an intense backlash. In the
wake of September 11th a program such as that proposed by Huntington came
to dominate the domestic and foreign policy of the Bush administration,
generally associated with neoconservatism. As is relatively clear with
hindsight, however, this program failed. It not only failed to achieve its
intended ends but also fueled an intense backlash. In terms of image and
potential for world leadership, eight years of Bush administration policies
caused the United States to lose prestige in the eyes of the world. In terms
of security and stability, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq lasted longer than
anticipated. Although the situation has improved, both conflicts confirm
the role of the United States as an imperial hegemon, further enforcing and
strengthening distain towards the Western world.
Not only are extremist tendencies increasingly pronounced in minority
and immigrant populations such as those associated with Islam, but one also
sees increasingly conservative tendencies in the social and political spheres,
in traditionally open societies such as the United States, the Netherlands,
257
and Denmark.1 A strong national identity or exclusive particularism seems to

provide an antidote to the perceived shortcomings of the openness associated
with inclusive liberal values. Ironically, liberal ideals are themselves invoked
to justify conservative tendencies, stressing the extent to which these ideals
provide the basis for Western society and must be protected against threatening
foreign elements.2
In this way, inclusive liberalism appears threatening to Western society.
If society is itself under threat, then neither these projects nor the ideals on
which they are based seem to serve the ends of social order. Rather, they appear
as disembodied liberal dogma, disconnected from and incapable of addressing
concrete social concerns. In both its political and academic manifestations,
the left has been largely incapable of mounting an effective response. Parties
towards the left of the political spectrum acquiesce to the demands of global
capitalism, while theorists grasp desperately at the reeds of a bygone era on
which to hang their hopes.
Perhaps the irony is that Western liberalism is open to and welcoming of
cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity assuming, of course, that, at bottom,
these share the same ideals. Indeed, these ideals themselves seem to result
from a certain conception of human nature, a philosophical anthropology
in which human beings are inherently rational and rational with respect to
their self-interests, such that people naturally tend towards consensus through
discussion. For this reason not only is a liberal perspective incapable of
resolving such disputes but cannot even adequately explain their persistence.
The failures and backlash against the inclusive universalism characteristic of
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism seem to thus call this account into
question. As these ideals are themselves neither accidental nor incidental but
rooted in a universal philosophical anthropology their failures should be
considered from the perspective of philosophical anthropology.3
For example, in Europe with the rise of rightwing parties and their distain for immigrants
and Islam, and in the United States with increasingly right-leaning tendencies fueled by
Christianity in the Republican party. For a discussion of these issues in a philosophical
context, see Rudi Viskers In Praise of Visibility. Much of the work of Visker and Paul
Moyaert explores precisely these issues in the context of Levinas philosophy and Lacanian
theory.
2
See Robert Fisks Nine years, two wars, hundreds of thousands dead and nothing learnt
for an assessment along these lines.
3
See ieks discussions of multiculturalism in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of
Political Ontology, as well as the New Americanists on their critique of liberal humanism and
its complicity with a conservative ontology.
1
258
In liberalism, the integration of individuals into community is based on

mutual aims and shared interests, where people naturally tend toward agreement
through discussion. Ultimately this results from the types of creatures human
beings are. The account of philosophical anthropology implied thus gives
priority to immaterial over material conditions in an understanding of human
existence.4 An inclusive liberal framework neglects the central importance of
material conditions to human existence, as well as the importance of differences
between these conditions to people, the importance of particularism in an
understanding of human existence. The problem presented in the failures of
multiculturalism and its backlash thus concern a tension between an inclusive
universalism and exclusive particularism as they bear on an understanding of
human nature. The importance of Deleuzes work here comes to the forefront.
Central to Deleuzes critique of psychoanalysis and the superiority of
Anglo-American literature are issues of philosophical anthropology. These are
themselves political in nature. They support a critique of an understanding of
political activity as a natural process, one where the integration of individuals
into community occurs through natural processes, based on an understanding
of desire as lack and discussion as tending towards consensus.5 At the same
time, Deleuze establishes an alternative based on the creative activities of
philosophy and art. Insofar as these two are intertwined, the merit of this
account consists in not only establishing a novel perspective but also explaining
why those criticized are convincing, why they are in fact the mainstream. The
work of Deleuze is thus capable of not only explaining the persistence of these
disputes rooted as they are in human nature but also pointing towards
their resolution. Here one finds a framework in which to fruitfully address the
contemporary failures of and intense backlash against liberal ideals, although
not in the manner one might expect.
In one of the few texts Deleuze addresses an issue generally associated
with multiculturalism, he does so in a woefully simplistic fashion. Deleuze
discusses the headscarf in France in A Slippery Slope. Although he shies
away from either endorsing or condemning the practice, the criterion Deleuze
proposes to decide the issue seems to miss the point: He asks if the headscarf
is indicative of a movement to introduce Islam into Frances secular social
milieu, whether the next step would be the introduction of religious texts in
See my discussions of these points in previous chapters.
Once again, Deleuzes critique of human rights should be understood in these terms. See
N 122, where he says the rights of man provide eternal values. Deleuze criticizes Kant
for similar reasons, saying that in Kant critique amounts to giving civil right to thought
considered from the point of view of its natural law (DR 136).
4
5
259
French schools (TRM 359-360). If this is the case, then Deleuze says it is
wrong. The criterion he proposes is relatively straightforward and based
on the separation of church and state. Deleuze thus assumes secularism as
a universal norm. Insofar as this is a largely Western ideal and central to
multiculturalism is a confrontation between the East and West, South and
North in terms of multiculturalism, his assessment seems to miss the point.
In works written towards the end of his life, however, Deleuze addresses
themes related to the failures and backlash against multiculturalism and
cosmopolitanism, themes related to the tension between an inclusive
universalism and exclusive particularism. He does not do so in popular
newspaper or television interviews but in his engagements with the work of
D.H. Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence, and Walt Whitman. Here his focus is on
fundamentalism, exclusivism, and nationalism. These three issues form the
hardcore of a contemporary exclusive particularism directed against inclusive
liberal values. Based on a conception of the political modeled on the creative
activities of philosophy and art, one can here discern Deleuze developing an
account of relations between individuals and community characterized by
inclusive anti-universalism, by inclusive particularism.
In his engagement with D.H. Lawrence, Deleuze explains the rise of a
hate-filled form of Christianity, similar to fundamentalist strands, in terms of
a reaction against modern Enlightenment ideals.6 Precisely this dichotomy lies
at the heart of the contemporary impasse one finds between a liberal inclusivist
view that affirms the value of religion as a basic human good and a virile form
of religion associated with fundamentalist strands.7 Their redemptive value
the reason people embrace these forms of fundamentalism consists in their
emphasis on exclusive particularism, their emphasis on concrete conditions
of human existence. In Lawrence, this account is linked to a somatically
grounded theory of the drives that supports a corresponding conception of the
self. Here one can thus discern a connection between the political significance
of religious fundamentalism and a theory of drives, connecting Deleuze and
Guattaris earlier criticisms of psychoanalysis with those of liberal ideals in
opinion. What is redeeming in fascism why the masses were not fooled
Forms of religious fundamentalism are by no means archaic throwbacks but thoroughly

modern or even postmodern insofar as they are reactions against modernity. Regarding
this point, see Armstrong 368-369.
7
Regarding religion as a fundamental human good, John Courtney Murray writes the
following: The fact may be embarrassing to the highminded believer, but it is nevertheless a
fact that the development of religious freedom in society bears a distinct relationship to the
growth of unbelief and indifference (58).
6
260
but clamored for fascism consists in its emphasis on the importance of the
body, community, and concrete conditions in an understanding of human
existence, an understanding of relations between individuals and community
in terms of exclusive particularism.
In his reading of T.E. Lawrence, Deleuze addresses the question of
how people from different backgrounds and traditions work together
in times of tumultuous change or revolution. According to Deleuze, a
necessary condition of cooperation is the maintenance of difference that
people are neither equal nor the same. Failure to maintain this difference
results in the breakdown of social cooperation altogether. Here Deleuze
emphasizes Lawrences reconsideration of the development of the relation
between mind and body, as well as its significance to the political import
of literature. From this perspective, the political significance of literature
consists in a galvanization of the mind by the body, bringing people together
by establishing relations of sympathy, which at the same time supposes and
enforces difference by establishing relations of antipathy. Once again, the
contemporary relevance of this account consists in its emphasis on the value
of exclusive particularism, the redemptive value of reactions against inclusive
universalism.
Finally, in his engagement with Walt Whitman, Deleuze explores the nature
of relations between individuals and community in terms of a nationalism
unique to the United States. Again, his focus is in on a tension between
inclusive universalism and exclusive particularism. In terms of the specificity
of the social and political milieu of America, Deleuze develops an account of
relations between individuals and community characterized by inclusive antiuniversalism, by inclusive particularism. Following Whitman, Deleuze refers
to these as relations of camaraderie. These relations are not natural. They do
not result from expressions of innate dispositions within human nature but
from the creative activities of philosophy and art. Understood in these terms,
the political significance of philosophy and art consists in not only establishing
relations of sympathy but also antipathy, bringing people together while at the
same time maintaining differences between them. Whitman refers to this as
Unionism, a form of nationalism unique to America, which supports social
cooperation by establishing relations between individuals and community
different from those of inclusive universalism. Central to all three of Deleuzes
engagements is the importance of the creative activities of philosophy and art
as a model for the political.
261
1.Inclusive Particularism: THe Political Significance of Philosophy

and Art
Insofar as the problem of the political concerns the integration of individuals
into community in terms of neither inclusive universalism nor exclusive
particularism, but the development of inclusive particularism the political
significance of philosophy and art consists in striking a balance. This
balance concerns the relation philosophy and literature have to chaos in
contradistinction to opinion, maintaining a balance within rather than
denying chaos. In this way, philosophy and art provide a true protection
against chaos.
The correspondences opinion establishes between perceptions and
affections are fixed and inflexible, although the nature of reality is a chaotic
maelstrom where relations between percepts and affects are singular and
unique. In this way, neither does opinion correspond to reality nor is it
capable of accommodating reality. Given time, opinions crack. They break
down in a radical fashion, and social reality is engulfed by chaos. The failures
of and strong backlash against multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and
liberal values can be understood in these terms, in terms of a radical rejection
of a conception of politics as consensus based on opinion and characterized by
inclusive universalism. Since philosophy and art enter into a pact with chaos
to struggle against opinion, they provide a true protection against chaos.
Philosophy and art establish relations for the sake of warding off chaos,
while at the same time courting chaos in their battle against opinion. As
opposed to fixed relations, this maintenance of balance within chaos allows
for the establishment of variable relations. In this way, philosophy and art
correspond to reality. This balance within chaos contributes, in turn, to a
balance between individuals and community, between individuality and
collectivity, thereby addressing the backlash against inclusive universalism.
Hence, although the alliance of philosophy and art with chaos is an uneasy
one, insofar as this relation serves philosophy and art in their struggle against
opinion, they stave off worst-case scenarios involving the inundation of social
life with chaos, as well as the strong backlash against inclusive universalism in
the form of exclusive particularism.
262
2. D.H. Lawrence, Christianity, and Fundamentalism

The influence of D.H. Lawrence on Deleuze is by no means marginal but
plays a central role. In part this can be explained biographically, by the fact
that Fanny Deleuze translated works by Lawrence into French. Together
the couple wrote a preface for the French edition of Apocalypse, Lawrences
last book. This was later revised and included in Essays Critical and Clinical
under the title Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos. In
this essay, Deleuze explores similarities and differences between Nietzsches
criticisms of Paul and Lawrences of John of Patmos. The import of this essay,
however, far surpasses that of this simple comparison. Rather, one finds here
an engagement by Deleuze with an issue only raised in a circumspect fashion
in his earlier work with Guattari. The importance of this account concerns the
claim, in Anti-Oedipus, that desire desires its own repression, that the masses
were not fooled but clamored for fascism. Central to this problem is a concern
with the nature of power.
Under the sway of Lawrence, Deleuze develops a conception of power
similar in nature to that of Foucault. As with Foucault, the problem of power
concerns its positive nature not a negative but a positive and productive
conception of power, one that produces reality (Discipline and Punish 194).8
The conception of power Deleuze develops in his reading of Lawrence thus
comes close to what Deleuze and Guattari mean by desire in Anti-Oedipus.
Power increases rather than decreases ones abilities.9 As with desire in
Anti-Oedipus, in Deleuzes engagements with Lawrence his concern is with the
nature of power as it bears on relations between individuals and community.
Belonging to a community increases ones ability to act, increases power. Like
Foucault, the problematic involved here concerns how individuals relate to
community, benefiting by becoming parts of powerful collective organizations
without at the same time begin swallowed up by these collectives.10 On the
In an early text entitled Instincts and Institutions, Deleuze frames this problem in terms of the
difference between law and institutions. He says that whereas law limits ones actions, institutions provide a positive model for action (DI 19). Both instincts and institutions are procedures of satisfaction, positive processes through which ones abilities are increased (DI 19).
9
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault says that an increase in aptitude is tied to an increase in
domination, adapted to respond to particular needs: If economic exploitation separates the
force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body
the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination (138).
10
In What is Enlightenment? Foucault asks the following: How can the growth of
capabilities be disconnected from intensification of power relations? (Essential Foucault 55).
Negri touches on similar themes in his reading of Spinoza, when he describes obedience as
a prior condition of sociability, collectivity, or human reproduction (Savage Anomaly 105).
The issue of power in the work of Foucault is, however, more complex than this alone.
8
263
basis of a superficial reading, however, this perspective is by no mean obvious

in Deleuze. It only becomes apparent by turning to Lawrences Apocalypse in
conjunction with Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos.
3. The Meaning(s) of Revelation

Apocalypse is an analysis by Lawrence of Revelation, the final book of the New
Testament that consists in a prophetic vision foretelling the end of the world
and Christs return at the final judgment. He originally undertook this project
as a preface for a work by Fredrick Carter on the book of Revelation and its
symbols. After extensive research, Lawrence decided to write his own book
on Revelation (A 12). Following Carter, for Lawrence Revelation is a multilayered work.11
Lawrence associates each of these levels and layers of meaning with
different traditions, written by different authors for various peoples at different
times.12 He identifies three main traditions or central layers that contribute
to Revelation. The first comes from an ancient pagan ethos. Lawrence says
it incorporates themes such as reverence for the cosmos, mystery rites, etc.13
Whereas this first layer is pagan and orgiastic in nature, according to Lawrence,
the second is Jewish in origin and hostile to the first.
Frustrated by defeat after defeat, at this point in their history the Jews
started looking forward to the end of the world.14 Rather than a people with
imperial aspirations, after the destruction of the Temple, the Jews became a
people of postponed destiny, looking forward to the end of the world and
writing apocalypses. Lawrence says that early forms of this are already apparent
in prophetic books of the Old Testament.15 The third layer is Christian in
He says it has various levels or layers of meaning. The fall of the World Rule and the World
Empire before the Word of God is certainly one stratum (A 41). In a fragment not included
in the original work, Lawrence writes, But from the start, it is obvious it cannot be taken at
its face meaning. The words are not intended to mean just what they say. They are intended
to have a wrapped-up meaning, or perhaps a whole series of wrapped-up meanings: three or
four separate meanings all wrapped up in the same sentence (A 176).
12
Gradually we realize the book has no one meaning. It has meanings. Not meanings within
meanings: but rather, meaning against meaning the Apocalypse is a compound work. It
is no doubt the work of different men, of different generations and even different centuries
(A 48).
13
The oldest part, surely, was a pagan work, probably the description of secret ritual initiation
into one of the pagan Mysteries, Artemis, Cybele, even Orphic (A 85).
14
After the destruction of the temple by Antiochus Epiphanes, Lawrence writes, the national
imagination ceased to imagine a great natural Jewish Empire The Jews became a people of
postponed destiny. And then the seers began to write Apocalypses (A 79-80).
15
An early Apocalypse is the book of Danielanother is the Apocalypse of Enoch (A 79).
11
264
nature. Taking inspiration from Nietzsche, however, here Lawrence makes an

important qualification. He distinguishes between two types of Christianity.
In his own reading of Apocalypse, Deleuze takes precisely this difference as his
point of departure.
4. Christianity: Aristocratic and Popular

The point of orientation in Deleuzes reading of Apocalypse is the rise of a
vengeful, hate-filled form of Christianity similar in nature to contemporary
strains of religious fundamentalism. He begins Nietzsche and Saint Paul,
Lawrence and John of Patmos by discussing the difference between John the
Apostle and John of Patmos. Following Lawrence, Deleuze says John of the
Gospel cannot have been the same John who wrote Revelation.16 According
to Deleuze, this distinction by Lawrence is based on a particular method of
evaluation, typology.
Lawrence and Deleuze treat Revelation as a symptom or phenomenon,
and then they characterize the mode of existence it implies, the combination
of forces harnessed by a particular will that animates this phenomenon.17
Concerning the results of this typology, Deleuze writes that the gospel is
aristocratic, individual, soft, amorous, delicate, always rather cultivated. The
Apocalypse is collective, popular, uncultivated, hateful, and savage John
of Patmos deals with cosmic terror and death, whereas the gospel and Christ
dealt with human and spiritual love. Christ invented a religion of love (a
practice, a way of living and not belief ), whereas the Apocalypse brings a
religion of Power [Pouvoir] a belief, a terrible manner of judging. Instead of
the gift of Christ, an infinite debt (ECC 36). Deleuzes characterization of
Lawrences distinction between these two types of Christianity is similar in
nature to Nietzsches.
Nietzsche distinguishes between the doctrine taught by Jesus and that
popularized by Paul. Whereas the first consists in what he refers to as passive
nihilism which Nietzsche says comes close to Buddhism the second
consists in an internalization of ressentiment. The hatred originally directed
towards the world in Judaism turns inward. The difference Lawrence identifies
is between Jesus and John of Patmos, the Christianity one finds in the Gospel
Lawrence intervenes with very passionate arguments, which have all the more force in that
they imply a method of evaluation, a typology: the same man could not have written the
Gospel and the Apocalypse (ECC 36).
17
See my discussion of this method at length in chapter two.
16
265
and that belonging to Revelation. This is the third layer Lawrence identifies
in Revelation.
He says it is not based on Christs message of love but comes from John
of Patmos and other early Christians persecuted by Rome.18 Whereas Christs
message of love in the Gospel consists in what Lawrence refers to as thoughtful
religion, Johns hatred in Revelation constitutes popular religion. Hence,
like the second Jewish layer, this form of Christianity is hostile towards life,
looking forward to a beyond. It results from a frustrated desire to have power in
this life.19 As with Nietzsche, however, Lawrence thinks the hatred one finds in
Revelation goes beyond that of the Jews is worse than and more destructive
of life. Lawrence points towards this in their different understandings of hell.
Hell takes on a meaning in Christianity it never had in Judaism.20 Not only
must the downtrodden triumph, but their enemies must also suffer to make
victory worthwhile. With the advent of Revelations Christianity, triumph
becomes synonymous with achieving the power to make suffer. Victory is
hollow without also achieving the power to punish the defeated.21 As with
Nietzsches characterization of slave morality, the conception of power one
finds in Revelation is reactive. It can only become strong by making others
weak.
However, neither Nietzsche nor Lawrence think that Judaism and
Christianity have to be this way, that there is anything inherent to these
religions or religion in general that necessitates their developing in this fashion.
If this were the case, then neither Nietzsche nor Lawrence could distinguish
between two types of Christianity and their respective characteristics. Having
something akin to an essence, Christianity would develop in one and only
one form. In the cases of both Nietzsche and Lawrence, this possibility results
from more basic commitments that shape Deleuzes thought.
According to a method of Nietzschean typology which Deleuze also
attributes to Lawrence Christianity should be treated as a symptom, as a
phenomenon. Christianity appears as it does because of the mode of existence
to which it is tied, the combination of forces harnessed by a particular will
If it is not Jesus, it is John. If it is not Gospel, it is Revelation. It is popular religion, as
distinct from thoughtful religion (A 63).
19
This business of reigning in glory hereafter went to the root of Christianity: and is, of
course, only an expression of frustrated desire to reign here and now (A 67).
20
Whereas the old Jewish hells of Sheol and Gehenna were fairly mild, uncomfortable
abysmal places like Hades This was not good enough for the brimstone apocalyptist and
John of Patmos. They must have a marvelous, terrific lake of sulphureous fire that could
burn forever and ever, so that the souls of the enemy could be kept writhing (A 112).
21
This is the vision of eternity of all Patmossers. They could not be happy in heaven unless
they knew their enemies were unhappy in hell (A 112).
18
266
that animates this phenomenon. Religion becomes reactive when active forces
cease to act, when they are separated from what they can do. Unlike Nietzsche,
however, in Apocalypse Lawrence does not make reference to forces and wills to
explain the difference between the Christianity of the Gospel and Revelation.
Rather, Lawrence speaks in terms of selves. He distinguishes two types of
selves and uses this distinction to explain the differences between these types
of Christianity.
5. Selves: Individual and Collective

Lawrence distinguishes between two types of selves to explain the difference
between the thoughtful Christianity taught by Jesus and the popular one
he associates with John of Patmos. Lawrence uses this distinction to explain
the difference between the loving acts practiced by Christ and the hate-filled
tirades of John of Patmos. Those who feel weak follow Revelation, whereas
those who feel strong follow the Gospel.22 Lawrence explains this in terms of
the Gospels emphasis on giving and charity.23
Given that the strong are strong enough to obtain what they need, they
can give away what they have. They do not need the support of a collective,
tending away from collective bodies, being more independent, more
individual. Given that the weak are too weak to obtain what they need, not
only are they incapable of charity but also demand what the strong have. They
need the support of a collective, tending towards collective bodies, being less
independent and more collective.24 Weak, collective persons need what the
strong acquire, attempting to bring down and take from the strong what they
cannot obtain themselves.
On the one hand, Lawrence says some persons are, by nature, strong
individuals. Their natures are powerful and aristocratic, and they are masters.
They can only act humbly or renounce power when they are alone, by
themselves. Once among others, writes Lawrence, their superiority is clear.
On the other hand, Lawrence says other persons are not naturally powerful
We are speaking now, he writes, of two sorts of human nature: those that feel themselves
strong in their souls, and those that feel themselves weak. Jesusand the greater John [the
Apostle] felt themselves strong. John of Patmos felt himself weak (A 65).
23
He writes that the religion of the strong taught renunciation and love. And the religion of
the weak taught down with the strong and the powerful, and let the poor be glorified (A 65).
24
The vast mass are, writes Lawrence, these middling souls. They have no aristocratic
individuality So they skulk in a mass and secretly are bent on their own ultimate selfglorification. The Patmossers (A 68).
22
267
but weak and collective, although they refuse to accept this.25 As opposed
to accepting their collective natures their natures as collective selves and
giving homage to powerful individuals, they seek to destroy both powerful
individuals and power in general, catering to those who are weak and collective.
According to Lawrence, this is John of Patmos technique in Revelation. The
cosmos manifests an awesome power. Since John cannot attain this power,
he promotes its destruction the destruction of the entire universe rather
than doing without power. Following Lawrence, however, Deleuze says this
procedure results in the transformation of power rather than its renunciation.26
Being upset they cannot obtain power, the weak decide if they cannot
have power then nobody should. The good things they think they deserve
the things they could obtain if they were strong and had power are put
off for another life. Instead of renouncing power in this fashion though, says
Deleuze, power is transformed. Power becomes authority. As authority, power
supposes the lives of the weak those without power become archetypes.
The lives of the weak become a standard against which actions and behaviors
are judged, for the sake of determining who will and will not obtain what in
an afterlife.
Forms are thus established rules of action and conduct in terms of
which to obtain an end. Authority takes the place of power as a submission
to these forms. This authority is related to a transcendent being who carries
out judgment and imposes punishment, procedures the weak are incapable
of performing themselves.27 Here God is responsible for the destruction of
Describing specific examples of these character types, Lawrence says it is only when he is
alone, can man be a Christian, a Buddhist, or a Platonist. The Christ statues and Buddha
statues bear witness to this. When he is with other men, instantly distinctions occur, and
levels are formed. As soon as he is with other men, Jesus is an aristocrat, a master. Buddha
is always the lord Buddha, Francis of Assisi, trying to be so humble, as a matter of fact finds
a subtle means to absolute power over his followers. Shelley could not bear not to be the
aristocrat of his company. Lenin was a Tyrannus in shabby clothes (A 68).
26
He discusses this point in To Have Done with Judgment, also included in Essays Critical
and Clinical. Referring to Lawrence, Deleuze writes that Christianity did not renounce
power, but rather invented a new form of power as the Power to judge: the destiny of man
is postponed at the same time that judgment becomes a final authority. The doctrine of
judgment appears in the Apocalypse or the Last Judgment (ECC 127).
27
Deleuze describes this in terms of war: War is only a combat-against, a will to destruction,
a judgment of God that turns destruction into something just. The judgment of God is
on the side of war In war, the will to power merely means that the will wants strength
[puissance] as a maximum of power [pouvoir] or domination. For Nietzsche and Lawrence,
war is the lowest degree of the will to power, its sickness (ECC 133). Following Lawrence,
Deleuze says war is symptomatic of a weak, diseased nature. At other points in Essays Critical
and Clinical, Deleuze associates war with a situation where relations breakdown altogether.
I return to this shortly.
25
268
power. God makes just or justifies this destruction. Authority is a new form
of power Deleuze associates with Christianity, the power to judge on the
basis of forms.28 However, this transformation is by no means an exclusively
religious issue. As a religious issue, its import goes beyond religion alone.
For Lawrence, the transformation from power into authority concerns
secular governmental institutions and their relation to society at large.
Lawrence says that power wanes when denied, but that power relations form
the basis of social relations, such that society is ungovernable without relations
of power.29 His position here is strikingly close to that of Deleuze and Guattari
in Anti-Oedipus. There desire is conceived as an impersonal, material force of
production, similar in nature to what Spinoza refers to as conatus. It is a life
force that traverses all things, always present in human affairs.30 It is especially
evident when people come together for constructive, creative endeavors.
Engaging in such projects power circulates. All share in the flow of power by
participating.
However, in its schizophrenic state, power or desire produces in a
disorganized and haphazard fashion, introducing chaos into the social world.
The problem of society consists in the organization of these productive but
haphazard forces. Although mutual aims and interests seem to animate social
relations between individuals and community, these ultimately have their basis
in power, in material forces of production.31 Mutual aims and interests only
come afterwards, on the basis of power relations.32 However, even addressing
Lawrence describes this as follows: But by the time of Christ all religion and all thought
seemed to turn from the old worship and study of vitality, potency, power, to the study of
death and death-rewards, death-penalties, and morals. All religion, instead of being religion
of life, here and now, became religion of postponed destiny, death, and reward afterwards, if
you are good (A 83-84).
29
He writes the following: Deny power, and power wanes. Deny power in a greater man, and
you have no power yourself. But society, now and forever, must be ruled and governed (A
68).
30
Describing power as a vital life force in relation to the body without organs in the work
of Lawrence, Deleuze writes that the body without organs is traversed by a powerful,
nonorganic vitality and that Lawrence paints the picture of such a body a powerful,
inorganic affect that comes to pass on this vital body Lawrence ceaselessly describes bodies
that are organically defective or unattractivebut are nonetheless traversed by this intense
vitality that defies organs and undoes their organization (ECC 131).
31
Deleuze and Guattari say that although aims and interests provide the cover by which people
participate in society, more fundamentally there is a disinterested love of the social machine,
of the form of power, and of the degree of development in and for themselves (AO 346).
32
From this perspective, everyone thus receives something from capitalism, from the power
or what Deleuze and Guattari call the mutant flows of capitalism. Since mutual
aims and interests only come afterwards, one can understand how and why even the most
disadvantaged and excluded from society also invest in it (AO 346).
28
269
this problem is impossible if one misunderstands the nature of desire. If one

conceives of desire as lack, then it appears as though mutual aims and interests
form the basis of social relations. From this perspective, the aim of society
appears as organizing individuals for the sake of fulfilling lack, rather than
producing relations of sympathy. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari go to
great lengths in Anti-Oedipus to clarify the nature of desire.33 Here Lawrence
does the same.
If one denies power relations, then power wanes. The nature of power
relations as the basis for social relations becomes opaque. Lawrence raises the
question of the nature of social relations in the absence of power relations.
Like Deleuze, Lawrences response concerns authority. In terms of Deleuze
and Guattaris conception of desire as the basis of social relations power
supports a conception of political activity as one of creating sympathy.
Authority, on the other hand, consists in an admission born of a resentment
of the weak against the strong. Authority is the weak admission that society
must be governed, establishing rules and regulations to serve this end.34 When
authority takes the place of power as the basis of social relations, the task of
political activity consists in producing agreement or consensus rather than
establishing relations of sympathy. According to Lawrence, however, this
satisfies no one.
Quibbling politicians act as the arbiters of social rule, vying against
each other to achieve the interests of their constituents, achieving universal
consensus only as the lowest common denominator of agreement between
people.35 Although authority appears to serve the interests of the weak,
according to Lawrence, this is not the case. He says that when authority takes
the place of power as the basis of social relations everyone suffers. Lawrence
grounds this claim in his philosophical anthropology.
Lawrence says the majority of people are weak and collective, which explains
the triumph of a vengeful, hate-filled Christianity.36 Although Lawrence has
specific people in mind when he refers to the weak as opposed to the
strong stopping there fails to capture the broader trajectory of Lawrences
thought, as well as its influence on Deleuze. On this point, the commitments
of Lawrence should be understood in terms of Nietzsche.
See my discussion of these points in chapter three.
He says, the mass must grant authority where they deny power. Authority now takes the
place of power, and we have ministers and public officials and policemen (A 68).
35
Then comes the grand scramble of ambition, Lawrence writes, competition, and the mass
treading one another in the face, so afraid they are of power (A 68-69).
36
He writes that since there are always more weak people than strong, in the world, the
second sort of Christianity has triumphed and will triumph (A 65).
33
34
270
According to Deleuze, reading the master-slave distinction in Nietzsche

as one referring to actual persons where the master would be a person who
represses the slave results in a fundamental misunderstanding of Nietzsches
work. Deleuze says this distinction should be understood as referring to
qualities of the will, the differential relation between types of forces seizing
the will. An analysis of forces such as one finds in Nietzsche is by no means
foreign to the thought of Lawrence. Insofar as Trieben are understood as drives
rather than instincts in terms of general forces rather than the goal-directed
activities of organisms an analysis in terms of forces and wills stands at the
heart of Lawrences criticisms of psychoanalysis. The theory of the drives he
develops in Fantasia of the Unconscious is an analysis of drives or forces similar
in nature to Nietzsches.
There he explains the behaviors of individuals and their relations to
community in terms of two basic tendencies, a drive to be by oneself and
a drive to be with others, the voluntary drive and sympathetic drive. The
two selves result from and correspond to these two basic tendencies. As with
Deleuzes reading of the master-slave relation, Lawrences distinction between
the weak and the strong should be understood in terms of forces, in terms of
relations between the voluntary and sympathetic drives.37
Each and every person is both individual and collective, composed of
an individual and a collective self. Relations between the voluntary and
sympathetic drives thus determine relations between the individual and
collective self, such that in some sense everyone is both weak and strong.
A person composed of a higher degree of individual self feels stronger than
a person composed of a higher degree of collective self, and vice versa. The
distinction between these two types of selves itself based on the more basic
distinction within the drives corresponds to the two types of Christianity. On
To a large extent, one can discern a similar understanding in Deleuze and Guattaris analyses
in Anti-Oedipus. There they characterize the socius in terms of two basic poles, the paranoiac
and schizophrenic. These correspond to two basic movements of flows in relation to the
socius, the tendency of flows to be coded-captured and the tendency of flows to be decodedescape. For example, they say that because capitalism gives rise to and thrives on decoded
flows (a schizophrenic movement of flows away from the socius), it has to resurrect and align
itself with the Urstaat (a paranoiac movement of flows towards the socius) (374). Insofar
as Deleuze and Guattari declare that delirium is the general matrix of every unconscious
social investment, where they understand delirium as the general movement of desire-the
unconscious, it seems as though their conception of desire-the unconscious should also
be understood in terms of these two basic poles, in terms of these two basic movements
(AO 277). The drive theory implied in Anti-Oedipus is thus dualistic in nature, a conception
of desire with two basic movements that correspond to Lawrences account in the following
manner: paranoiac : sympathetic :: schizophrenic : voluntary.
37
271
this basis, Lawrence explains the triumph of the Patmossers, the widespread
popularity of a vengeful, hate-filled Christianity.38
Principles corresponding to the individual self do not hold for the collective
self, and vice versa. If persons were composed predominantly of individual self
in other words, if only the voluntary drive ruled the actions and behaviors of
persons then thoughtful religion would be a universal success, but this is not
the case. Even the most independent persons are to some extent dependent,
composed of collective self, animated by the sympathetic drive.
However, just as Lawrence claims the Oedipus complex is socially
and historically conditioned that it results from broader circumstances
concerning relations between men and women, education, etc. so too does
he think the splintering of Christianity is socially and historically conditioned.
Particularly interesting here is the fact that Lawrence identifies similar social
and historical circumstances in both cases. Changing relations between men
and women, modern education, etc. are responsible for the rise of both the
Oedipus complex and a fundamentalist form of Christianity.39
6. People and Power

In the lives of individual persons and their relations to community, the two
selves should be balanced a balance between the drive to be with others and
the drive to be by oneself. Here the contemporary problem of navigating the
tension between inclusive universalism and exclusive particularism comes to
the forefront. Just as with the Oedipus complex, according to Lawrence, the
rise of a vengeful, hate-filled form of Christianity results from a mis-relation
between these two selves, from social ideals that privilege the voluntary drive
at the expense of the sympathetic drive.
Under the pressure of modern social ideals and education, says Lawrence,
people have neglected their collective selves and the sympathetic drive. No
longer is homage paid to the strong, natural human tendency to join with
others to form collective bodies for the sake of creative undertakings. Modern
social ideals put a premium on autonomy, the individual self, and voluntary
Describing the failures of thoughtful religions such as those he associates with the Gospel,
Lawrence says that religions of renunciation, meditation, and self-knowledge are for
individuals alone. But man is individual only in part of his nature. In another great part of
him he is collective (A 67).
39
See Armstrong 368-369 regarding the way religious fundamentalism is linked to and
constitutes a kind of psychopathology, a kind of neurosis.
38
272
drive, at the expense of dependence, the collective self, and sympathetic drive.
Emphasizing the individual nature of human existence, people are taught
to be independent, neglecting the collective nature of human existence, the
natural drive to be dependent and with others. This first tendency works
against the second.
The problem consists not only in failing to achieve these objectives of
autonomy and independence but also becoming frustrated and swinging too
far back in the opposite direction. People are unable to achieve the unnatural
goal of absolute independence. They thus become frustrated and give total
sway to their collective selves and the sympathetic drive, resulting in an
immersion in the collective, becoming swallowed up by the crowd.40 From
this perspective, one can understand the value Lawrence and Deleuze find in
fundamentalism and fascism.
Lawrence identifies precisely this tendency in Revelation, referring to it as
the power-spirit. Although Lawrence finds the pathos of Revelation odious,
he says it reveals something important, the danger involved in denying the
collective self, the sympathetic drive.41 This is to privilege the upper at the
expense of the lower self, giving priority to the ideal over the material in an
understanding of human existence. Insofar as sympathetic relations are rooted
in the lower self, denying the lower self at the same time denies these relations.
Privileging the psychical at the expense of the physical the mind at the
expense of the body is also to deny power as the basis of social relations.
This results in the abovementioned understanding of social relations in terms
of authority, an unhappy conception of politics as consensus.
As an alternative, Lawrence recommends the recognition of power as the
basis of social relations. As opposed to an inclusive universalism, Lawrence
recommends the frank admission of differences between people in terms
Miller describes this as wanting to be purely terrestrial and absolutely divested of idea
(Tropic of Capricorn 70). See Berger 60, regarding the way this constitutes a certain form of
religious orientation, where the individual is not sharply distinguished from the collective.
Deleuze and Guattari point towards precisely this problem in Anti-Oedipus, when they write
that the worldlays the two traps of distance and identification for us, either giving total
sway to the individual self and voluntary drive, such that individuals are disconnected from
community, or giving total sway to the collective self and sympathetic drive, such that the
collective immerses the individual (39).
41
And the Apocalypse, Lawrence writes, repellent though its chief spirit be, does also
contain another inspiration. It is repellent only because it resounds with the dangerous snarl
of the frustrated, suppressed collective self, the frustrated power-spirit in man, vengeful. But
it contains also some revelation of the true and positive Power-Spirit (A 73).
40
273
of particularism.42 Just as emphasizing the psychical at the expense of the

physical results in the mis-development of the physical as well as the psychical,
so too does emphasizing similarity at the expense of difference result in the
mis-development of difference as well as similarity. At the basis of human
nature is a drive towards sympathy, being a member of a group. Membership
in one group itself supposes particularity.
Belonging to a community consists in relations of sympathy as shared
thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. However, belonging to one group
rather than another supposes that the sympathetic relations of the group
to which one belongs are different from those of another. Both individuals
and community need to distinguish themselves on the basis of difference.
According to Lawrence, people should recognize and pay homage to their
collective selves, joining collective bodies in creative endeavors. When they
do so, then power flows from one to the other and back again.43 However,
denying the particularity of power relations in this form results in a backlash
against power altogether, evident in Revelation. Denying power in terms of
difference makes identification with a particular group in contradistinction to
another impossible; denying power in this form results in the denial of power
or difference altogether. The price one thus pays for universal inclusivism is
exclusive particularism, the destruction of all power whatsoever and difference
in its entirety.
Hence, if a conception of the political modeled on the creative activities
of philosophy and art exists in the work of Deleuze, then this account cannot
be understood in terms of the production of sympathy alone. There must
be an awareness that the philosophical anthropology this conception implies
consists not only in universalism but also particularism. From the perspective
of human affairs, relations of sympathy themselves imply ones of antipathy.44
Power is there, and always will be. As soon as two or three men come together, especially
to do something, then power comes into being, and one man is a leader, a master. It is
inevitable. Accept it, recognize the natural power in the man, as men did in the past, and
give it homage (A 68).
43
Referring to this in terms of power, Lawrence writes that there is a stream of power. And in
this, men have their best collective being, now and forever. Recognize the flame of power,
or glory, and a corresponding flame springs up in yourself. Give homage and allegiance to a
hero, and you become yourself heroic (A 68).
44
Foucault relates sympathy and antipathy to principles of identity and difference (Order of
Things 24). See my previous discussions of these points in chapter two.
42
274
7. T.E. Lawrence, Arabs, and Exclusivism

Also included in Essays Critical and Clinical, in The Shame and the Glory:
T.E. Lawrence Deleuze explores the relation between T.E. Lawrences Seven
Pillars of Wisdom and his struggles with the Arabs. One can here discern an
engagement with the question of how people from different backgrounds
and traditions can live and work together. Following the problem Deleuze
raises in his engagements with Apocalypse, however, a necessary condition of
this cooperation is the maintenance of difference. Failure to maintain this
difference results in the breakdown of social cooperation altogether: People
swing from an inclusive universalism to an exclusive particularism. According
to Deleuze, the relation of Lawrence to the Arabs is based on not only
sympathy but also antipathy.
Deleuze emphasizes the fact that, although Lawrence lived and worked
with the Arabs, he did not become like them. To explain how he did so,
Deleuze discusses two related issues: The development of the relation between
mind and body and the political significance of literature. Lawrence succeeds
in his endeavors with the Arabs through the creation of shame as an affect.
Just as the creation of jealously as an affect by Proust consists in a reversal of
the traditional relation between jealousy and love, so too does the creation of
shame by Lawrence. It consists in a reversal of the traditional relation between
mind and body. The creation of shame results in novel relations between
Lawrence and the Arabs, ones that balance the individual with the collective
self, fostering an inclusive particularism.
8. The Creation of Shame as an Affect

Lawrence succeeds in his endeavors with the Arabs through the creation of
shame as an affect. A novel mode of existence is established between himself
and the Arabs through shame. Just as the creation of jealousy by Proust
consists in a reversal, so too does the creation of shame by Lawrence. In the
case of Lawrence, this concerns the development of the relation between mind
and body. The mind takes a perspective of shame towards the body. However,
this perspective does not imply a denigration of the body.45 In the mainstream
of the philosophical tradition, the mind has taken priority over the body. Here
precisely the opposite is the case. From the perspective of shame, the body has
On this point, Deleuze writes the following: Never before has shame been sung like this, in
so proud and haughty a manner (ECC 120).
45
275
a certain priority. But for this reason shame can no longer be understood in
its colloquial sense.
Shame consists in the mind becoming aware of the bodys autonomy,
that the body is not subordinate to the mind.46 Just as with Spinoza, this
is not to say the mind and body are independent from each other.47 Rather
than a dualistic account, the mind and body are related in a parallel fashion.
Insofar as one does not know what a body can do, undiscovered ways of
acting or affects of the body exist, which correspond in a parallel fashion to
undiscovered affects in the mind, ways of thinking. Taking this perspective
towards the body thus implies a method.48
The creation of shame as an affect consists in a perspective regarding the
relation between mind and body. The body is not merely a vehicle for the
mind. The body is implied by and inextricably linked to each and every action
of the mind. Only from this perspective, says Deleuze, does the body actually
appear. Otherwise one forgets about the body as a mere tool of the mind.49
Explaining the aim of the body from this perspective, Deleuze makes a break
with Spinoza in his reading of the relation between the mind and body in
Lawrence.
According to Spinoza, human beings are initially and naturally dominated
by passions. Escaping these passions requires the development of the intellect
through the discovery of common notions rising from knowledge of the
first to knowledge of the second kind. This facilitates the development of a
perspective, such that people can begin to view themselves and their relations
to the world in a disinterested, intellectual fashion, as they would any other
natural phenomena. Spinoza associates this perspective with an intellectual
love of god (VP32C). Deleuze locates a similar development in the thought of
Lawrence, although he describes this development as moving in the opposite
direction.
Describing this awareness in Lawrence, Deleuze refers to Spinoza: Being ashamed for the
body implies a very particular conception of the body. According to this conception, the
body has external autonomous reactions. The body is an animal. What the body does it does
alone. Lawrence makes Spinozas formula his own: we do not know what a body can do
For all the more reason, in its normal state, the body never ceases to act and react before the
mind moves it (ECC 123).
47
Lawrence has shame because he thinks the mind, though distinct, is inseparable from the
body; the two are irremediably linked (ECC 123).
48
See my discussion of this point in chapter four.
49
In this sense, writes Deleuze, the body is not even a means or a vehicle for the mind, but
rather a molecular sludge that adheres to all the minds actions. When we act, the body lets
itself be forgotten. But when it is reduced to a state of sludge, on the contrary, one has the
strange feeling that it finally makes itself visible and attains its ultimate aim (ECC 123).
46
276
Whereas for Spinoza one only arrives at a disinterested perspective after

a long and burdensome period of intellectual development, according to
Deleuze, this is the starting point for Lawrence.50 Only after this initially
disinterested perspective is the mind affected, it becomes an impassioned
witness, that is, it experiences for itself affects that are not simply effects of
the body, but veritable critical entities that hover over the body and judge it
(ECC 124). The second step in this account concerns the passions, the mind
becoming impassioned in relation to the body. However, Deleuze quickly
notes that this galvanization of the mind by the body consists not merely in
the mind being affected by the body but also concerns what he calls critical
entities and at other points refers to as abstract ideas.
Neither critical entities nor abstract ideas should be conceived as inert
mental representations. Rather, they possess a certain power. This power
consists in bringing about movement in things and bodies.51 Although
Deleuze equates these with emotions and affects, if they do not belong to
the body in relation to the mind, then the significance of this equation is far
from clear.52 Deleuze equates critical entities and abstract ideas with powers
and words that shock the body, as visual and sonorous images, powers and
words that hollow out the body. Here abstract ideas and critical entities are
described in terms similar to those of concepts, percepts, and affects in What
is Philosophy?53
Universal ideas and critical entities are themselves constituted in relation
to what Deleuze refers to as the Open. Insofar as he can here be understood
as making a tacit reference to Heidegger where the Open is that part of the
two-fold Heidegger associates with Being, whereas he associates the other part
with beings that come to appear in the Open the Open would refer to the
intersection of the planes philosophers and artists establish in the creation
The mind begins by coldly and curiously regarding what the body does, it is first of all a
witness (ECC 124).
51
Describing the role these play in the development of the mind in relation to the body, he
writes that they rise up and act on the mind when it contemplates the body its Powers
and its Words. What we hear in Lawrences style is the shock of entities. But because their
only object is the body, they provoke, at the limit of language, the apparition of great visual
and sonorous images images that hollow out these bodies (ECC 124).
52
Deleuze writes that they are not dead things, they are entities that inspire powerful special
dynamisms things, bodies, or beings (ECC 119), that critical entities or abstract ideas
are not what we think they are: they are emotions or affects (ECC 124).
53
They are like a haze, solar haze similar in nature to Stoical events as constitutive of things
(ECC 115).
50
277
of concepts, percepts, and affects.54 Philosophy and art begin with sentences
and their equivalences, utilizing material relations within language. Insofar
as these relations are equivalent to motion and images, visual and sonorous
images can be understood as material relations within language, ones that
act directly on the body and constitute brains. This process establishes novel
relations between concepts, percepts, and affects, novel modes of existence
that imply different relations between individuals and community.55
Insofar as these relations are different from those of opinion which are
based on an understanding of the body as an organism here hollowing out
bodies consists in establishing novel relations between concepts, percepts, and
affects.56 The very activity of writing consists in this process.57 Whereas for
Spinoza the goal of the development of the mind in relation to the body
consists in establishing a disinterested perspective, for Lawrence and Deleuze
it consists in establishing impassioned, particular dispositions, novel forms of
subjectivity, community, and relations between the two as ones of sympathy.
The political does not consist in the disinterested pursuit of universal
consensus through discussion based on intellection, but the production of
particular relations of sympathy and antipathy through bodily affects created
by philosophy and art.
From the perspective of shame, the account Lawrence gives of the
development of the mind in relation to the body supports a conception of
the political based on the creative activities of philosophy and art. As with
jealously in Proust, shame in Lawrence implies establishing novel modes
of existence, the creation of sympathy between Lawrence and the Arabs.
The Idea, or the abstract, has no transcendence. The Idea is extended throughout space, it
is like the Open Ideas are forces that are exerted on space following certain directions of
movement: entities or hypostases, not transcendences (ECC 115). See my discussion of the
relation between the creation of concepts, percepts, and affects, and the establishments of
the planes on which they are created in chapter five.
55
Hence, in his reading of Lawrence, Deleuze asks about the nature of these subjective
entities, and how are they combined (ECC 120).
56
See my further discussion of this account in chapter five. Deleuze and Guattari discuss this
same process in Thousand Plateaus. Describing the suppositions on which this position is
based, they write the following: We witness a transformation of substances and a dissolution
of forms, a passage to the limit or flight from contours in favor of fluid forces, flows, air,
light, and matter, such that a body or word does not end at a precise point. We witness
thepower of that intense matter, that material power of that language. A matter more
immediate, more fluid, and more ardent than bodies or words between two inseparable
planes in reciprocal presupposition (TP 109).
57
In Literature and Life, Deleuze says writing liberates life wherever it is imprisoned by and
within man, by and within organisms and genera (ECC 3).
54
278
However, of the utmost importance to Deleuze is the fact that Lawrence

succeeds in maintaining his difference from the Arabs. A necessary condition
of their cooperation is the maintenance of difference. Thus, in his reading of
T.E.Lawrence, Deleuze raises an issue central to his engagements with D.H.
Lawrence.
9. The Political Significance of Literature

Through literature, Lawrence succeeds in establishing relations of sympathy
between himself and the Arabs, while at the same time maintaining his
difference. This difference is itself a condition of their working together. The
question then becomes what it is about the work of Lawrence that allows for
this possibility. The political significance of philosophy and art here comes to
the forefront, in terms of their relation to chaos.
As opposed to denying chaos as does opinion, philosophy and art maintain
a balance within chaos. Struggling against opinion, they thereby provide a
true protection against chaos. Philosophy and art disrupt fixed and inflexible
correspondences between perceptions and affections, thus navigating the
tension between inclusive universalism and exclusive particularism, fostering
an inclusive particularism. This perspective is based on Lawrences conception
of reality.
For Lawrence, reality is a chaotic maelstrom, one where relations between
percepts and affects are singular and unique. Deleuze points towards this in
Lawrences conception of color.58 Insofar as perceptions are composed of
color, and color is in constant movement, so too are perceptions. Percepts
are in constant movement and are thus constantly changing, as are affects.
These are not discrete but continuous entities.59 Percepts and affects change
constantly, depending on the percepts and affects to which they are related.
These relations are absolutely unique, and the power of the writer consists in
recognizing this.
The dispositions of writers allow them to recognize the unique nature of
these relations.60 Deleuze goes on to equate these dispositions with character,
He writes that color is movement, no less than the line; it is deviation, displacement,
sliding, obliquity. Color and line are born together and meld into each otherthey are
always in movement (ECC 116).
59
Every entity is multiple, writes Deleuze, and at the same time is linked with various other
entities (ECC 120).
60
Deleuze says that the finest writers have singular conditions of perception that allow them
to draw on or shape aesthetic percepts like veritable visions, even if they return from them
with red eyes (ECC 116).
58
279
which are unique sets of relations; writers are themselves unique sets of
relations.61 These relations condition a certain relation with chaos, a relation
of alliance whereby the writer disrupts correspondences between perceptions
and affections. Describing this process, Deleuze links his account from AntiOedipus to that of What is Philosophy? The disposition of the writer the
unique set of relations composing the writer consists in desire or power.62
This conception of desire is a positive one, desire understood in terms of
projection and creation rather than need and lack, the production of physical
reality as sensuous human activity rather than the production of psychical
reality as imagination or representation.63
Hence, when Deleuze refers to the tendency of the writer to project his
image into things, he is not referring to a mental entity, an idea the writer
has of himself. Since the term image has an idiosyncratic sense in the
work of Deleuze which he equates with motion and things the image
of the writer should be understood as a unique set of relations, relations of
slowness and speed between forces that affect and are affected by the forces
into which they comes into contact.64 The images Lawrence projects are ones
of intensity, relations of force that act on and are reacted on by other forces,
thus establishing novel modes of existence. The disposition and image of the
writer is thus conceived as a multiplicity or becoming.65
Here fundamental distinctions between things are explained in terms of
motion and rest relations of slowness and speed rather than with reference
to form as in ancient and pre-modern accounts.66 Things are conceived as
Character must not be confused with an ego there is not an ego but rather the singular
composition, an idiosyncrasy It is this combination that is named Lawrence (ECC 120).
62
He says it is a question of a profound desire, a tendency to project into things, into
realityan image of himselfso intense that it has a life of its owncontinually growing
along the way (ECC 117-118).
63
Regarding a conception of desire in these terms, see my discussions in chapters one and
three.
64
See my discussion of Deleuzes conception of the image in chapter five.
65
The terms multiplicity and becoming are synonymous: becoming and multiplicity are
the same thing (TP 249).
66
With respect to becoming-animal, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari write the following:
I must succeed in endowing the parts of my body with relations of speed and slowness that
will make it become dog, in an original assemblage proceeding neither by resemblance nor
by analogy (TP 258). Becoming-dog thus consists in taking on relations of motion and rest
characteristic of a dog. Deleuze says that in the work of Francis Bacon the animal functions
as a trait rather than a form, which establishes a zone of indiscernibility: It is never a
combination of forms, but rather the common fact: the common fact of man and animal
as movements (FBLS 20). See FBLS 21 where Deleuze says their common zone is meat.
Again, I am grateful to Trevor Perri for having pointed this out to me. See my discussion of
this point with respect to Spinoza in chapter two.
61
280
matter in motion, where movement takes the place of form.67 This process
implies what Deleuze and Guattari call zones of indiscernibility, entering a
zone of indiscernibility where the relations of motion and rest that constitute
things become blurred. Writing plays a role in this process.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, writing initiates processes of becoming
that imply zones of indiscernibility.68 It taps into chaos and uses the material
relations of language to create novel modes of existence, such that language
reaches its highest function by acting directly on the senses.69 Writing opens
zones of indiscernibility and initiates becomings. Things brought together
in writing and literary creation thus change.70 However, this does not mean
they go from being one thing to another, from one thing to something else.
Entering zones of indiscernibility, things become different from what they
were before, different from any preexistent thing.71
Like chaos, as a unique set of relations of slowness and speed, Lawrences
disposition disrupts correspondences between perceptions and affections
established by opinion.72 The projection of Lawrences image in writing thus
gives rise to critical entities as percepts and affects, relations of movement
belonging to language that bring about becomings in the world.73 Although
these entities are specific to and result from the projection of Lawrences
On this basis, Deleuze and Guattari say that becoming is to emit particles that take on
certain relations of movement and rest because they enter a particular zone of proximity. Or,
it is to emit particles that enter that zone because they take on that relation (TP 273).
68
For example, they say writing should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood
capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating men, of
sweeping them up in that becoming (TP 276).
69
In Literature and Life, Deleuze makes this same connection between writing and becoming.
He says that writing is a process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and
the lived. Writing is inseparable from becoming (ECC 1). In relation to this point, see
Bogue 106 regarding language as continuous variation and its relation to function-matter.
70
To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of
proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished
One can institute a zone of proximity with anything, on the condition that one creates the
literary means for so doing (ECC 1-2).
71
Becoming is always between or among: a woman between woman, or an animal among
others (ECC 2). See my discussion of this point with respect to the relationship between
the writer and animal in chapter four.
72
Lawrences special disposition is a gift for making entities live passionately in the desert,
alongside people and things this gift confers something unique on Lawrences language
endowing the English language with new powers (ECC 119).
73
When Deleuze says, alongside people and things, he means that language is a force that
affects other forces in the world, and when Deleuze says, endowing the English language
with new powers, he means these forces in the world affect language in turn.
67
281
image, according to Deleuze, this process is impersonal.74 The significance of

this claim is two-fold.
In the first place, Lawrence does not go about this intentionally. As Deleuze
and Guattari note in Anti-Oedipus, art is all the more revolutionary the less
concerned it is about its meanings from a social perspective.75 Lawrence is
interested in Ideas rather than ends and their means, is interested in ideas
rather than the role they play in producing predetermined outcomes (ECC
118).76 The revolutionary potential of Lawrences literature does not then
consist in a socialist realist agenda where the meaning of his work would be
determined by the end or goal of social change. In some sense, this would
be a conception of art as propaganda.77 The literature of Lawrence is not an
attempt to make the project in which he is engaged with the Arabs conform
to his plans, thoughts, or ideas.
In the second place, this claim concerns the maintenance of difference
between Lawrence and the Arabs. Lawrence does not project his ego,
imposing himself on the Arabs and making them conform to him.78 But this
is not to say that Lawrence becomes like the Arabs. Difference is maintained
between them. Writing and literature mediate relations between Lawrence
and the Arabs, establishing relations of inclusive particularism, such that
neither do the Arabs become like Lawrence nor does Lawrence become like
the Arabs. Regarding this process, Deleuze says the projection machine is
inseparable from the movement of the Revolt itself, such that the projection
of Lawrences image in and through writing is itself inextricably linked to
the revolution (ECC 118). The Arabs and the desert affect Lawrence and
the English language, just as Lawrence and the English language affect the
Literature does not consist in imagining or projecting an ego (ECC 3).
See my fuller elucidation of this point in chapter three.
76
Further elaborating on this point, Deleuze says Lawrence defines himself solely in relation
to the force through which he projects images into the real, images he was able to draw from
himself and his Arab friends (ECC 118).
77
See Leonard Harris The Great Debate: W.E.B. Du Bois vs. Alain Locke on the Aesthetic
20-24 for an account of the difference between Alain Locke and W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus
Garveys understanding of art in these terms. Harris discusses this distinction in terms of
their respective appraisals of Claude McKays Home to Harlem and other works included in
The New Negro. Although Locke subscribes to an instrumentalist understanding of art, it is
far from the socialist realism advocated by Du Bois and Garvey. Although the themes and
content of works of art may be distinctly racial according to Locke, their value as artistic
works hangs on their ability to introduce uniquely African American forms and idioms,
which can then act as novel criteria for assessing broader social concerns. This is what allows
them to escape the narrow confines of forms and criteria that characterize a propagandist
conception of art. See Harris 24-26 on this.
78
The projection of his character does not consist in some sort of contemptible individual
mythomania that compels Lawrence to project grandiose images on his path (ECC 118).
74
75
282
Arabs and the desert. The two are inextricably linked, determining each other
and being determined in turn. Writing thus initiates becomings between
Lawrence and the Arabs, implying zones of indiscernibility where Lawrence
takes on relations of movement characteristic of the Arabs, just as the Arabs
take on relations of movement characteristic of Lawrence. As a result, neither
Lawrence nor the Arabs are the same anymore.
As forces that act on and are reacted on by other forces, critical entities
mediate relations between Lawrence and the Arabs.79 Like particles that take
on certain relations of movement and rest, they initiate becomings in which
neither do the Arabs become like Lawrence through the projection of his
ego nor does Lawrence become like the Arabs by being immersed in their
collectivity (TP 273). Both enter into processes of becoming and change at
the same time, such that neither could the Arabs become like Lawrence nor
could Lawrence become like the Arabs. These processes themselves refer to
the subjectivity of the revolutionary group, where Lawrences writingacts
as its relay: the subjective disposition, that is to say, the force through which
the images are projected, which is inseparably political, erotic, and artistic
(ECC 118).
Explaining the role Lawrences disposition plays in this process, Deleuze
says a world of entities thus passes through the desert, that doubles the images,
intermingling with them and giving them a visionary dimension (ECC
120). The doubling to which Deleuze refers consists in the intensification
and magnification of images, the intensification and magnification of the
unique sets of relations that reciprocally determine Lawrence in relation to the
Arabs. The character and writing of Lawrence act as feedback mechanisms.
In the process though, all these relations change, constituting novel modes
of existence as a result.80 This process of magnification and intensification is
synonymous with the production of relations of sympathy between Lawrence
and the Arabs.81 It consists in establishing particular, impassioned dispositions,
novel forms of subjectivity, community, and relations between the two.82
The critical entities that arise in this process do not cancel each other out, but can coexist
and intermingle, composing the character of the mind, constituting not an ego but a center
of gravity that is displaced from one entity to the next (ECC 124).
80
As the Arabs join the Revolt, they are molded more and more on the projected images that
individualize them (ECC 120-121).
81
Lawrence himself helps them transform their paltry undertakings into a war of resistance
and liberation it is as if the Arabscapture the reflection of Vision and Beauty (ECC
125).
82
In To Have Done with Judgment, Deleuze describes a similar account, where language
is conceived as a material power that directly acts on and transforms bodies. He writes that
power is an idiosyncrasy of forces, such that the dominant force is transformed by passing
79
283
10. Becoming (with but not like) Arab

Time and again, Deleuze stresses the fact that although Lawrence possesses
a disposition that compels him to live and struggle with the Arabs, he never
becomes like them.83 Although Lawrence and the Arabs are related through
sympathy points of continuity in perceptions and conceptions a difference
exists between them: Lawrence insists on his difference from the Arabs (ECC
123). According to Deleuze, the difference of Lawrence from the Arabs is itself
a condition of his writing, a condition of the intensification and magnification
of relations reciprocally determining Lawrence and the Arabs. Although the
desert presents novel perceptions, this milieu is not itself a sufficient condition
of Lawrences literature.84
If relations constitutive of Lawrence were exactly the same as those of the
Arabs relations of movement constitutive of percepts and affects if they
fully coincided and were related through sympathy alone, then Lawrence
would simply be an Arab. Lawrences own disposition would not be special,
could not act as a mechanism for the intensification and magnification of
these reciprocally determining relations through literature. Deleuze goes on to
caution against misunderstanding the nature of this difference.
The difference of Lawrence from the Arabs is of neither a national nor
personal type. It stems from neither the projects in which he is engaged for
the English (a point of destination towards which he is tending) nor the
personal history of Lawrence (a point of origin from which his actions arise).85
into the dominated forces, and the dominated passes into the dominant a center of metamorphosis. This is what [D.H.] Lawrence calls a symbol: an intensive compound that vibrates
and expands, that has no meaning but makes us whirl about until we harness the maximum
of possible forces in every direction, each of which receives a new meaning by entering into
relation with the others (ECC 136). Here power should be understood in terms of Deleuze
and Guattaris account of desire in Anti-Oedipus, where desire is a general force of material
production on the basis of which language originates as a writing on bodies directly. See my
discussions of these points in chapter three, especially Primitive Territorial Machine.
83
In Lawrence, there is a private desert that drives him to the Arabian deserts, among the
Arabs, and that coincides on many points with their own perceptions and conceptions, but
that retains an unmasterable difference Lawrence speaks Arabic, he dresses and lives like
an Arab, even under torture he cries out in Arabic, but he does not imitate the Arabs, he
never renounces his difference (ECC 117).
84
Are there not rather subjective conditions, Deleuze asks, that certainly require a favorable
and objective milieu, are deployed in it, can coincide with it, but nonetheless retain an
irresistible and irreducible difference from it? (ECC 117).
85
Lawrences difference does not simply stem from the fact that he is English, in the service
of England But neither is it his personal difference, since Lawrences undertaking is an
infinitely secret subjective disposition, which must not be confused with a national or personal
character (ECC 117).
284
His difference from the Arabs consists in a struggle against an understanding

of individuality in these terms, a cold and concerted destruction of the ego
in terms of nationalism, personalism, and egoism (ECC 117).86
Returning to the conceptual framework Deleuze develops in his reading
of D.H. Lawrence and Apocalypse, one could say this difference results from a
basic human drive, the voluntary drive to be away from others and by oneself.
Implied by this commitment is an understanding of the self in broadly
Spinozistic-Nietzschean terms, the self as a unique set of relations between
competing drives. Referring to this as character, Deleuze says Lawrence
discovered the secret of character by living in the desert with the Arabs
(ECC 120). The secret of character consists in the recognition that sympathy
is inextricably linked to and determined by antipathy, that the voluntary and
sympathetic drives must be equally recognized and balanced to avoid pitfalls
at either end of the spectrum. Rather than either inclusive universalism or
exclusive particularism, relations between individuals and community should
be based on inclusive particularism. Lawrence balances his individuality with
the Arabs collectivity.
The fact that he does so in a situation of revolution is especially important.
Lawrence succeeds in avoiding being swallowed up by a revolutionary
collective or breaking with it altogether. Deleuze points towards this fact
in the distinction he makes between guerrilla warfare versus wars and
armies. Whereas human beings are simply considered types in the case of
wars and armies, the problem of guerrilla warfare consists in maintaining
individuality.87
In the case of wars and armies, the basis of relations between individuals
and community is universal inclusivism, where individuals are conceived as
simply parts of a whole. Although everyone is here welcome, this inclusion is
based on a universal typology. The inclusion or integration of individuals into
community as parts is based on and determined by the function or end
they fulfill in terms of and with reference to the community as a whole. In
this way, the individual is simply a part of the whole, a cog in the collective.
The group swallows up the individual. But this immersion gives rise to a twopart backlash.
See my discussions of these points in chapters three and four.

The problem of guerrilla warfare merges with that of the desert: it is the problem of
individuality or subjectivity, even if it is a group subjectivity, in which the fate of freedom is
at stake, whereas the problem of wars and armies is the organization of an anonymous mass
subjected to objective rules, which set out to turn the men into types (ECC 121).
86
87
285
In the first instance, insofar as human behavior is governed by not only

a sympathetic drive to be with others but also a voluntary drive to be by
oneself, complete immersion in a collective is instinctually unsatisfying. If the
only possible relation between individuals and community is total immersion,
then individuals break with community altogether, such that war entails the
total breakdown of relations between people.88 In the second instance, insofar
as differences between individuals and community are themselves conditions
of individuality and group membership insofar as individuals, groups, and
group membership are themselves determined by differences from other
individuals and groups universal inclusivism frustrates the expression of
not only the voluntary but also the sympathetic drive. Membership in one
universal community is, in some sense, a false one since this group has no
counterpart against which to differentiate itself and thus solidify its own
identity. Lacking membership in a community, the individual is left by herself.
The emphasis on the voluntary drive and upper self in what D.H. Lawrence
refers to as modern education concerns this lonely individual, a Western
ideal emphasizing the inherently rational nature of human existence, where
the individual is left to rely on herself alone.89
In the modern era, the mainstream of Western civilization has failed
to take cognizance of and give proper credence to both the body and
community, the importance of the lower self and the sympathetic drives in an
understanding of human nature. Failing to properly balance the body with the
mind, and community with individuality, people swing too far in the other
direction. In strains of religious fundamentalism and rightwing nationalism,
the emphasis is on concrete, material conditions of human existence. Central
to this emphasis is a sense of belonging through membership in a community.
This situation activates the sympathetic drives in a radical fashion, resulting
in either the acceptance of immersion in the collective by the individual
or an attempt by the individual to join or form her own group, where
relations between individuals and community would be based on exclusive
particularism. As the counterpoint to wars and armies, the problem of guerrilla
warfare consists in navigating the tension between inclusive universalism
and exclusive particularism, establishing relations between individuals and
community on the basis of inclusive particularism. Philosophy and art here
play an essential role.
88
89
Deleuze refers to this situation as one of war. I return to this shortly.

See Klein 267-268 regarding the relation between global capitalism and the way people are
encouraged to be totally self-reliant.
286
Their relation to chaos is one of balance, courting chaos while at the

same time warding it off. Based on this relation to chaos, a conception of the
political modeled on philosophy and art does not support an understanding
of relations between individuals and community in terms of inclusive
universalism. Reality is conceived as a chaotic maelstrom where relations
between percepts and affects are singular and unique. Hence, a conception of
the political modeled on philosophy and art corresponds to reality, allowing
for the possibility of variable, singular correspondences between percepts and
affects.
This relation to chaos as one of balance also supports the maintenance
of balance between the individual and collective self, the voluntary and
sympathetic drives. Insofar as relations between perceptions and affections
determine membership in a community, and relations between percepts
and affects are conceived as variable and singular by philosophy and art, a
conception of the political modeled on philosophy and art supports an
understanding of relations between individuals and community as variable
and singular. These relations are inclusive without being universal, particular
without being exclusive. They are inclusively particular.
Although this relation to chaos is an uneasy one, it is far better than the
alternative, where chaos is denied altogether. A conception of the political in
these terms supposes an uneasy balance between the individual and collective
self, maintaining individuality while at the same time paying homage to the
collective self and power spirit. As D.H. Lawrence shows with respect to
Revelation, although paying homage to the collective self and power spirit
are potentially threatening resulting in and justifying inequality and massmindedness denying power and the collective self altogether has far worse
consequences.
In Deleuzes engagements with T.E. Lawrence, the concern with relations
between individuals and community arises directly out of an initial focus
of the relation between mind and body. Following the problem of inclusive
universalism versus exclusive particularism raised in relation to a somatically
grounded theory of the drives in D.H. Lawrence, Deleuzes concern in T.E.
Lawrence is with the balance of the individual self of Lawrence with the
collective self of the Arabs, how Lawrence becomes with but not like the
Arabs. In his engagements with Walt Whitman, Deleuze uses the framework
established in his readings of D.H. and T.E. Lawrence to explore the nature of
relations between individuals and community in the context of an American
social and political milieu.
287
11. Walt Whitman, America, and Nationalism

Deleuzes Whitman explores the relation between Walt Whitmans Specimen
Days and the social and political milieu of the United States, articulating a
form of nationalism unique to the United States. Once again, his focus is
on the navigation of a tension between inclusive universalism and exclusive
particularism. In terms of the specificity of the social and political milieu of
America, Deleuze develops an account of relations between individuals and
community characterized by inclusive particularism. Following Whitman,
he refers to these relations as ones of camaraderie. Deleuze arrives at these
conclusions by addressing three related themes in the work of Whitman.
The first concerns the specificity of the American experience. This experience
acts as a touchstone and point of reference in a quasi-transcendental analysis
by Deleuze. He begins with the tragic nature of the American experience the
constant threat of war connected with American writing working backwards
to the conditions of its possibility. This leads to a conception of nature with
which the United States is linked, a second theme in the work of Whitman.
The American experience is itself determined by and in relation to nature.
Rather than an understanding of nature as a well-ordered and unified whole,
however, this is a conception of nature as chaotic and fragmented. Just as
with philosophy and art, the American experience is thus determined by and
in relation to a confrontation with chaos, in terms of its fragmented nature.
Insofar as this relation with nature bears on relations between individuals and
community, this confrontation with chaos thus supports an understanding of
the political in terms of philosophy and art.
In the third place, a conception of the political along these lines supports
a uniquely American form of nationalism. If nature is neither well ordered
nor unified, then the integration of individuals into community appears as
neither an easy nor a natural process. Thus, rather than conceiving relations
between individuals and community in terms of part-whole relations where
individuals are simply parts of the whole in an organic fashion these are
conceived as organized fragments in terms of the model of the body without
organs.
12. The Specificity of American Experience

Deleuzes interest in America can be understood as that of a special
case. The United States is a limit case, an outlier that nonetheless reveals
something fundamental. In his engagements with Whitman, this concerns
288
the nature of part-whole relations. As opposed to a totality or organized

whole, Deleuze characterizes the United States as an open or fragmented
whole.90 This distinction concerns the nature of the parts involved, as well as
the process by which they are brought together.
In the case of a totality, parts are conceived as relatively similar to one
another, and the processes that bring them together are finite, definite, and
limited. In the case of an open whole, parts are conceived as different from one
another, and the processes that bring them together are infinite, indefinite,
and unlimited. Deleuzes commitments here are grounded in the specificity of
American experience.
The fragmented nature of the United States results from its makeup, not
only the nature of its parts but also the way they are put together. America
is a country of immigrants from all over the world.91 The parts of which
the United States is composed are thus heterogeneous, and the process that
brings these together never stops: People from all over the world continue
coming to America. The Unites States is thus an open or fragmented whole.
For these same reasons, however, the situation of America is a tragic one.
Conflict is a constant threat. The threat of war lies at the heart of the
United States experience, which is inseparable from American writing.92
The specificity of this experience results from the nature of relations between
individuals and community. Deleuze puts this descriptive observation in the
service of an ethical prescription.
He says Europeans should learn from Americans: Europeans have an
innate sense of organic totality, or composition, but they have to acquire
the sense of the fragment, and can do so only through a tragic reflection or
experience of disaster (ECC 56). Since its organization as a fragmented whole
constitutes the tragic nature of American experience, Deleuzes prescription
concerns an understanding of relations between individuals and community.
Deleuze describes America as a collection of heterogeneous parts: an infinite patchwork,
or an endless wall of dry stones The world as a sampling: the samples (specimens) are
singularities, remarkable and nontotalizable parts extracted from a series of ordinary parts
(ECC 57). In developing the difference between the organic model and the model of the
body without organs in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari make reference to the notion of
an open whole in the work of Bergson. See my discussion on this in chapter three.
91
America brings together extracts, Deleuze writes, it presents samples from all ages, all
lands, and all nations (ECC 57).
92
Deleuze writes that if the fragment is innately American, it is because America itself is
made up of federated states and various immigrant peoples (minorities) everywhere a
collection of fragments, haunted by the menace of secession, that is to say, by war (ECC 56-57
emphasis added). The experience of the American writer is inseparable from the American
experience, Deleuze writes, even when the writer does not speak of America (ECC 57).
90
289
Understood in a European fashion in terms of a totality or the organic

model the integration of individuals into community appears as a natural
process.93 Conceiving these relations as always potentially fraught with strife
as haunted by war the integration of individuals into community does
not appear this way. Hence, considering the tragic nature of the American
situation consists in taking seriously the integration of individuals into
community as a political problem.
Whereas Europeans have an innate feeling for totality and need to acquire
a sense of the fragment, Americans have a natural feeling for the fragment
and should acquire a sense of totality.94 Unlike his prescription to Europeans,
however, Deleuze does not recommend that Americans look to Europeans.95
Although he mentions the need for Americans to acquire a feel for totality,
recommending they acquire this in organic terms would seem strange. In the
first place, this would run against the broader trajectory of Deleuzes thought.
In the second place, if a European perspective is assumed to be natural and,
therefore, innate then recommending that one adopt this perspective does
not itself make any sense. Rather, Deleuze equates a feeling for totality with
that of beautiful composition, such that the sense of totality he recommends
to Americans is different from that of Europeans: not a feeling for totality
understood in organic terms but one that consists in creation (ECC 56). This
distinction itself rests on a more basic one, two different ways of conceiving
nature.
13. An Alliance with Nature as Fragmented Reality

The distinction Deleuze makes between these two understandings of totality
is based on two different ways of conceiving nature. A conception of nature
on which beautiful composition is based follows what he calls the law of
fragment. Deleuze associates the American feeling for the fragmentary with
a more basic conception of nature, one shared with history, the earth, and
war. All of these have this fragmentary character as their cause. Understood
in terms of beautiful composition, totality is, therefore, something that has
to be created. The feeling for totality in which Americans are in need consists
See my discussions of these points in chapters one, three, and four.

Whereas Europeans should acquire a feeling for the fragmentary, Deleuze writes that
America must conquer the feel for the totality, for beautiful composition (ECC 56).
95
Melville notes that no American writer should write like an Englishman. They have to
dismantle the English language (ECC 58).
93
94
290
in a creative endeavor.96 However, Deleuze points out a confusion made by

Whitman regarding the nature of this whole.
At times Whitman speaks as though the whole is given, comes beforehand,
or is preexistent. Based on this supposition, the whole appears as something
in which to be installed, in which to seek rightful orientation, such that
the task of both individuals and community is one of fusion.97 Given this
perspective, Whitman refers to himself as a Hegelian.98 According to Deleuze,
Whitman is wrong to adopt this perspective, describing it as European
rather than American. This European perspective consists in an inflation of
the ego or a personalization of nature.99 It is based on the view that nature,
in general, is modeled on human nature. This is a narcissistic enterprise in
which explorations of nature reveal to human beings what was there from the
beginning, revealing human beings to themselves. However, when Whitman
speaks in his own voice, says Deleuze, something much different appears.
The alternative is a depersonalization of personhood through pantheism,
the view that human nature is coextensive with nature in general.100 This
consists in the creation of a whole, a process that is itself paradoxical. Although
the creation of a whole of this type works with and organizes fragments, it
leaves them as fragments. This process does not turn the fragments with which
it works into parts of a whole.101 Deleuze explains this apparent paradox with
reference to nature. This paradox arises from conceiving nature in terms of a
metaphysics based on the notions of substance, form, and teleology.
The law of the fragment is as valid for Nature as it is for History, for the Earth as for War
For War and Nature indeed share a common cause: nature moves forward in procession
But if it is true that the fragment is given everywhere, in the most spontaneous manner, we
have seen that the whole, or an analogue of the whole, nonetheless has to be conquered and
even invented (ECC 58).
97
Yet Whitman sometimes places the idea of the Whole beforehand, invoking a cosmos that
beckons us to a kind of fusion (ECC 58).
98
Whitman asserts that only America realizes Hegel, and posits the primary rights of an
organic totality (ECC 58).
99
Whitman is expressing himself like a European, who finds in pantheism a reason to inflate
his own ego (ECC 58).
100
From the point of view of this depersonalization, Deleuze says the Self [Moi] of AngloSaxons, always splintered, fragmentary, and relative, is opposed to the substantial, total, and
solipsistic I [Je] of the Europeans (ECC 57). See my discussions in chapter three concerning
the relation between schizophrenia and the nature of desire as an inorganic process of
material production.
101
On this score, Deleuze writes the following: it turns out that a kind of whole must be
constructed, a whole that is all the more paradoxical in that it only comes after the fragments
and leaves them intact, making no attempt to totalize them (ECC 58).
96
291
The nature of things and their characteristic relations are not determined
by a preexisting whole, a top-down organic model. Instead, Deleuze says
nature is a process of establishing relations. Nature is itself inextricably
linked to sociability, entering into relations. This process involves not only
sociability and conviviality but also difference, different types of beings. The
characteristics and characteristic relations of things are themselves determined
by the types of relations into which they enter. This process not only changes
the nature of the things involved but also the process itself, the ways things
enter into relations.102 The nature of this constructed whole is determined by
variable fragments, a bottom-up model of the body without organs based on
a Pre-Socratic-Spinozistic metaphysics.103 Deleuze goes on to associate this
model with empiricism.104
Both Hume and Whitman conceive of relations as external to their terms.
Relations do not result from terms but terms result from relations. Relations
are not given as fixed and immutable but variable and changing.105 However,
this gives rise to a problem similar in nature to that of chaos, one facing both
Hume and Whitman. Deleuze points towards this problem when he claims the
Americans give new meaning and development to the externality of relations.
Since relations are not given as fixed and immutable, they must be created.106
However, creating relations takes time and proves difficult. In this respect, the
problem of the externality of relations is similar in nature to that of chaos.
Insofar as chaos is the infinite speed by which forms take shape and disappear
making not only thought but also social relations impossible both chaos
and the externality of relations thus pose a threat to human existence. Human
beings cannot live without relations. Deleuze describes the situation where all
relations breakdown as one of war, the generalized hospital where human
beings coexist absolutely solitary and without relation (ECC 59).
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari refer to the association of
ideas in Hume in terms of opinion, as rules for connecting ideas that act
Nature is not a form, but rather the process of establishing relations Nature is inseparable
from processes of companionship and conviviality, which are not preexistent givens but are
elaborated between heterogeneous living beings in such a way that they create a tissue of
shifting relations, in which the melody of one part intervenes as a motif in the melody of
another (the bee and the flower). Relations are not internal to a Whole; rather, the Whole is
derived from the external relations of a given moment, and varies with them (ECC 59).
103
See previous chapters for fuller characterizations of these two positions.
104
This complex idea depends on a principle dear to English philosophy, to which the
Americans would give a new meaning and new developments: relations are external to their
terms (ECC 58).
105
Hence, they can and must be instituted or invented (ECC 58).
106
Parts are fragments that cannot be totalized, but we can at least invent non-preexisting
relations between them (ECC 58).
102
292
as protection against chaos. There they associate these rules with the
subjective side of opinion, the way perceptions are linked to affections
through invariable relations. The thought of Hume provides the basis for
opinion.107 Although Hume discovers the externality of relations, this
discovery opens onto a problem to which he gives an inadequate response.
According to Deleuze, the externality of relations stands at the center of
Whitmans work, such that Whitman faces this same problem. However, at no
point does Deleuze associate Whitman with opinion. Rather, it seems as
though Whitman succeeds where Hume fails. Whitman succeeds because of
the way he creates relations, as singular and variable rather than universal and
fixed. Once again, insofar as relations between percepts and affects determine
membership in a community, this distinction lies at the heart of the political
significance of philosophy and art.
14. The Creation of Relations as Camaraderie

Human beings cannot live unrelated but must establish relations as protection
against chaos. The solution Hume gives to this problem is the association of
ideas. Insofar as relations between percepts and affects determine membership
in a community, the establishment of relations within thought bears on
the establishment of relations between individuals. In terms of the former,
the association of ideas fixes relations between affections and perceptions,
providing the subjective side of opinion.
Whitman succeeds where Hume fails, says Deleuze, because his poetry
has as many meanings as it has interlocutors, as many meanings as there
are relations with its various interlocutors: the masses, the reader, States, the
Ocean (ECC 58). Whitman succeeds in relating different things without
making them the same, relating various fragments or heterogeneous elements
without turning them into homogeneous parts of a whole. Rather than
conveying one meaning establishing fixed and invariable relations as does
Hume the poetry of Whitman succeeds in establishing as many types of
relations as there are terms involved. According to Deleuze, these interlocutors
are neither individual persons nor groups alone. He considers the states and
the ocean interlocutors as well. The relations Whitman establishes between his
poetry and its interlocutors concern geography as well as persons and groups.
According to Deleuze, the way Whitman establishes relations represents a
counterpoint to the narcissistic endeavor of projecting ones ego onto the cosmos
See my discussions in chapter five for a fuller account of these points.
107
293
and nature. This is the goal of American literature. The poetry of Whitman
is different from the narcissistic Hegelian enterprise of discovering human
beings in the cosmos and nature, projecting ones ego. A depersonalization
of personhood occurs through the establishment of relations between people
and geography.108 At the same time, however, this process does not consist in
the merging of personhood with nature, human nature being swallowed up by
nature in general. Rather, it requires balance.
This is not an easy task. In the work of Whitman, Deleuze refers to it as a
gymnastic.109 Here neither is nature understood in terms of personhood nor
is personhood understood in terms of nature. Whitman succeeds in relating
human beings to nature and nature to human beings different things or
various fragments without, at the same time, undermining their difference.
Something passes between them, relations of speed and slowness.110 Human
beings enter into a becoming-nature.111 Just as Deleuze contrasts Whitmans
understanding of the relation between human beings and nature with that of
Hegels, so too can this contrast be brought to bear on an understanding of the
relation between the political and literature.
The goal of American literature consists in establishing ever greater,
increasingly subtle relations between diverse elements. Rather than making
these elements homogenous establishing relations between them in terms
a single goal or end the goal of American literature consists in maintaining
heterogeneity between these fragments.112 This is determined, in part, by the
specificity of the American milieu.
The object of American literature is to establish relations between the most diverse aspects
of the United States geography the Mississippi, the Rockies, the Prairies as well as its
history, struggles, loves, and evolution. Relations in ever greater numbers and of increasingly
subtle quality (ECC 59).
109
On this same score, in Life and Literature, Deleuze says that all writing involves this
athleticismthis athleticism is exercised in flight and in the breakdown of the organic
body (ECC 2).
110
Whitman enters into a gymnastic relationship with young oak trees, Deleuze writes, a
kind of hand-to-hand combat. He neither grounds himself in them nor merges with them;
rather, he makes something pass between the human body and the tree, in both directions,
the body receiving some of its elastic fibre and clear sap, but the tree for its part receiving a
little consciousness (may-be we interchange) (ECC 59).
111
This is not to say, however, that nature enters into a becoming-man. Deleuze says becoming
does not move in the other direction, and one does not become Man, insofar as man
presents himself as a dominant form of expression that claims to impose itself on all mater
(ECC 1).
112
For this reason, the simplest love story in American literature brings into play states,
peoples, and tribes; the most personal autobiography is necessarily collective, as can still be
seen in Wolfe or Miller. It is a popular literature created by the people, by the average bulk,
like the creation of America, and not by great individuals (ECC 57).
108
294
Socially, politically, and geographically, the United States is varied and

diverse. For this reason, relations need to be constantly invented and further
nuanced, such that ever-greater numbers of people and things become related,
which at the same time prevents fragments from becoming related simply as
parts of a whole.113 In terms of its political significance, Whitman refers to
the relations established in this process as ones of camaraderie. Relations
between people are not given but have to be invented.114 Rather than denying
chaos and conceiving relations in terms of the organic model or opinion,
a conception of the political based on philosophy and art is related to an
alliance with chaos or a fragmented nature, where relations are malleable and
changing. Once again, for this reason, a conception of the political modeled
on philosophy and art provides a true protection against chaos.
Concepts, percepts, and affects are themselves formed chaos. They are not
pure chaos but bits of composed chaos determined by the types of planes
philosophy and art establish.115 Philosophy and art act as protections from
chaos by struggling against opinion, navigating the tension between inclusive
universalism and exclusive particularism, conditioning a balance between the
individual and collective self.
As opposed to fixed relations, this maintenance of balance within chaos
allows a web of variable relations to be woven, which are not merged into
a whole (ECC 60). Deleuze refers to the situation where social relations
breakdown altogether and social reality is inundated by chaos as war.116 This
can be understood as a worst-case scenario where opinions break down in a
radical fashion, as a strong backlash against inclusive universalism. Establishing
relations of inclusive particularism in camaraderie, philosophy and art can
ward off exclusive particularism as a reaction against inclusive universalism.
According to Deleuze, this is what gives the fragmentary work the immediate value of a
collective statement there is no private history that is not immediately public, political, and
popular: all literature becomes an affair of the people, and not of exceptional individuals.
Is not American literature the minor literature par excellence, insofar as America claims to
federate the most diverse minorities (ECC 57).
114
It is the same, finally, in the relationship between man and man. Here again, man must
invent this relation with the other. Camaraderie is the great word Whitman uses to designate
the highest human relation, not by virtue of the totality of the situation but as a function
of particular traits, emotional circumstance, and the interiority of the relevant fragments
(ECC 59).
115
Again, see my fuller discussions of these points in chapter five.
116
Deleuze writes that its acts of destruction affect every relation, and have as their consequence
the Hospitalthe place where brothers are strangers to each other, and where the dying
parts, fragments of mutilated men, coexist absolutely solitary and without relations (ECC
59).
113
295
Deleuze associates this process with a uniquely American form of nationalism

modeled on philosophy and literature.
This form of nationalism is based on an understanding of relations
between individuals and community in terms of camaraderie, what Whitman
refers to as Unionism. As in his engagements with T.E. Lawrence, here
Deleuze describes the establishment of sympathetic relations in terms of the
galvanization of the mind by the body, the establishment of virile and popular
loves (ECC 60). Through the establishment of relations in thought that bear
on the establishment of relations between individuals and community and
vice versa, it organizes heterogeneous fragments without reducing these to
homogeneous elements, without establishing a totalism or a totalitarianism
(ECC 60).117
As opposed to universal inclusivism, particularism characterizes Unionism.
It is thoroughly situational.118 The nature of the organized fragments changes
depending on the parts of which it is composed. Deleuze says that even these
fragments the remarkable parts, cases, or views must still be extracted by
means of a special act, an act that consists, precisely, in writing (ECC 57).
Here he means that writing battles against the correspondences established
by opinion to create novel relations between percepts and affects.119 Insofar as
relations between percepts and affects determine membership in a community,
and writing establishes new relations between percepts and affects, here writing
In full, it is in America, Deleuze writes, that the relation of camaraderie is supposed
to achieve its maximum extension and density, leading to virile and popular loves, all the
while acquiring a political and national character not a totalism or a totalitarianism, but
as Whitman says, a Unionism. Democracy and Art themselves form a whole only in their
relationship with Nature (ECC 60).
118
Selecting singular cases and minor scenes is more important than any consideration of the
whole (ECC 57).
119
Describing in similar terms the process by which writing struggles against opinion the
process by which one forms a foreign language within language Deleuze says a foreign
language cannot be hallowed out in one language without language as a whole in turn
being toppled or pushed to a limit (ECC 5). He describes the way this process leads to the
creation of novel relations between percepts and affects as follows: Language is pushed to
an outside or reverse side that consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any
language. These visions are not fantasies but veritable Ideas that the writer sees and hears in
the interstices of language, in its intervals (ECC 5). Deleuze describes this process in terms
of the framework of Anti-Oedipus: They are not interruptions of the process, but breaks that
form part of it, like an eternity that can only be revealed in a becoming, or a landscape that
only appears within movement. They are not outside language, but the outside of language.
The writer as seer and hearer, the aim of literature: it is the passage of life within language
that constitutes Ideas (ECC 5). The appearance of veritable ideas does not result from
pathological processes belonging to schizophrenia where processes of life are interrupted
but breaks that constitute the process itself; percepts, affects, and writing are all intimately
related as material forces that interact with each other.
117
296
consists in the establishment of novel modes of existence. Deleuze refers to

these relations as ones of camaraderie.120 On the basis of its situational
nature, Unionism thus navigates the tension between inclusive universalism
and exclusive particularism in the form of inclusive particularism.
Conclusion
The failures of and backlash against both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism
point towards a broader backlash against inclusive universalism, where an
exclusive particularism seems to provide the antidote. Insofar as liberal ideals
are not themselves incidental but based on a philosophical anthropology, this
backlash should be considered from the perspective of human nature. Deleuze
does precisely this in his engagements with D.H. Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence,
and Walt Whitman, where his focus is on fundamentalism, exclusivism, and
nationalism. These three issues form the hardcore of a contemporary exclusive
particularism directed against liberal values.
In the modern era, the mainstream of Western civilization has failed to take
cognizance of and give proper credence to both the body and community
in an understanding of human existence. Failing to properly balance the body
with the mind, and community with individuality, people swing too far in
the other direction. This results in the individual either seeking immersion
in a collective or attempting to join or form a group where relations between
individuals and community would be based on exclusive particularism. The
emphasis in strains of fundamentalism, exclusivism, and nationalism is on
concrete, material conditions of human existence. Central to this is a sense of
belonging through membership in a community.
In his engagements with D.H. Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence, and Walt
Whitman, the value Deleuze finds in fundamentalism, exclusivism, and
nationalism consists in their reactions against inclusive universalism. Here
Deleuze emphasizes the importance of the body for an understanding and
establishment of relations between individuals and community, which
supports a conception of the political modeled on philosophy and art. Unlike
the exclusive particularism characteristic of contemporary religious, social,
and political movements, Deleuze uses his engagements with D.H. Lawrence,
T.E. Lawrence, and Walt Whitman to develop a conception of the political
that cultivates relations of inclusive particularism. The political significance of
Camaraderie is the variability that implies a march of souls in the open air, on the Open
road (ECC 60).
120
297
philosophy and art consists in striking a balance based on the relation they
have to chaos.
As opposed to fixed relations, this maintenance allows for the establishment
of variable relations. This balance within chaos in turn contributes to a
balance between individuals and community. A conception of the political
modeled on philosophy and art thus supports an understanding of relations
between individuals and community as variable and singular. These relations
are inclusive without being universal, particular without being exclusive, but
inclusively particular. The alliance of philosophy and art with chaos serves in
the struggle against opinion, staving off a worst-case scenario involving the
inundation of social life with chaos.
In his engagement with D.H. Lawrence, Deleuze explains the rise of
a hate-filled form of Christianity in terms of a reaction against modern
Enlightenment ideals. Although the pathos of Revelation is odious, says
Lawrence, it reveals the danger involved in denying the collective self and
the sympathetic drive. Denying power relations and their particularity results
in the backlash against power evident in Revelation, making identification
with a particular group in contradistinction to another impossible, such that
the price one pays for universal inclusivism is exclusive particularism, the
destruction of all difference whatsoever.
Following up this problem, Deleuzes concern with T.E. Lawrence is the
balance of Lawrences individual self with the Arabs collective self. Deleuze
says Lawrence discovered the secret of character: the recognition that the
voluntary and sympathetic drives must be equally recognized and balanced to
avoid pitfalls at either end of the spectrum. Deleuze explains this in terms of
two related issues, the development of the relation between mind and body
and the political significance of literature. Whereas for Spinoza the goal of
the development of the mind in relation to the body consists in establishing a
disinterested, universal perspective, in his reading of Whitman, Deleuze says it
consists in establishing impassioned, particular dispositions. Writing initiates
becomings between Lawrence and the Arabs, zones of indiscernibility, novel
forms of subjectivity, community, and relations between the two.
In his engagements with Walt Whitman, Deleuze uses the framework
established in his readings of D.H. and T.E. Lawrence to explore the nature of
relations between individuals and community in the context of an American
social and political milieu, a form of nationalism unique to the United States,
Unionism. Considering the tragic nature of the American situation consists
in taking seriously the integration of individuals into community as a political
problem. The American experience is itself determined by and in relation to
298
nature as chaotic and fragmented rather than as well-ordered and unified. As

opposed to universal inclusivism, particularism characterizes Unionism its
thoroughly situational nature where the nature of the organized fragments
changes depending on the parts involved.
299
Conclusion
Political Anthropology, Liberalism, and Deleuze

Although classical and modern thought has traditionally grounded its analyses
of concepts belonging to the political sphere with reference to human nature,
the mainstream of contemporary political thought has for good reasons
largely abandoned such an approach. Abandoning this strategy has itself
been understood as a precondition for justice, a line of thought associated
with liberalism. However, this shift is problematic for at least two reasons:
Not only is it impossible to divorce political thought from philosophical
anthropology but even attempting to do so is also perilous.
Refraining from making strong claims regarding the nature of the good
life, morality, etc. based on robust conceptions of personhood or accounts
of human nature is indicative of an attempted neutrality in political
thought. Insofar as increasing social and political polarity characterizes the
contemporary situation, the account of human nature on which this ideal is
based seems misguided. The major significance of Deleuzes thought today,
I argue, consists in providing a theoretical framework in terms of which this
can be understood: A political anthropology exists in the thought of Deleuze,
where an understanding of the political makes reference to accounts of human
nature. Hence, versus the mainstream of contemporary political thought, the
importance of Deleuzes work can be understood in terms a contribution to
political anthropology, the way Deleuze grounds his understanding of the
political with reference to human nature.
However, this perspective is by no means an obvious one. Rather, it only
becomes apparent when one turns to two related themes in Deleuzes thought:
his critique of psychoanalysis and claims Anglo-American literature is superior
to its Franco-Germanic counterparts. In both cases, Deleuzes thought is
informed by the theoretical work of English writer D.H. Lawrence, such that
Deleuze can only be fully understood in terms of Lawrence. The fact that this
contribution takes shape in terms of Lawrences thought on psychoanalysis
and classic American literature is significant.
With respect to both psychoanalysis and classic American literature,
Lawrences emphasis on the body and the importance of strong communal
relations seems indicative of proto-national socialist sympathies as well as
sexism and political conservatism. One must thus be sensitive to the influences
of Lawrence on Deleuze, showing how Lawrences critique of psychoanalysis
301
and praise for classic American literature ultimately bear on the relation
between politics and human nature in Deleuzes thought, giving rise to a
political anthropology.
Examining Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious
against the backdrop of the history of psychoanalysis and philosophy, in
chapter one I showed how Lawrences critique of psychoanalysis ultimately
bears on the conception of human nature it implies: Psychoanalysis begins as a
mind-body dualism in Freud and ends in a linguistic idealism in Lacan. These
commitments influence Lawrences claim that literature and poetry should be
given priority over philosophy. This view breaks with the mainstream of the
philosophical tradition. Deleuze and Guattari hold a view similar to Lawrence
concerning the relationship between life and theory. This relationship opens
onto a broader issue concerning the possibility and means by which existing
social orders can be criticized and changed.
Marx addresses this possibility while at the same time offering a novel
perspective on philosophical anthropology. Versus Descartes, Kant, and Hegel,
who give ontological and explanatory priority to the mind and psychical
processes in their accounts of human existence, for Marx and Engels praxis
determines a specifically human mode of existence. This perspective provides
a basis to understand the philosophical implications of Lawrences critique of
psychoanalysis.
According to Lawrence, there is nothing specifically psychical about the
unconscious, but consciousness results from the proper development and
coordination of bodily drives. Lawrences conception of the unconscious is
thus a dualistic, somatically grounded theory of the drives. The development
and coordination of these drives alway depend on others. Unlike Freud,
however, if the development and coordination of these drives take place in
a proper manner, then relations in later life should neither resemble nor be
modeled on those of the family. However, this is rarely the case.
According to Lawrence, contemporary society is plagued by neurosis,
resulting from the Oedipus complex. Lawrence is thus in agreement
with Freud in identifying the Oedipus complex as the nuclear complex of
psychopathology, although, for Lawrence, the Oedipus complex results from
social and historical conditions rather than being constitutive of human
nature. To begin to understand how these problems should be addressed, it
was necessary to turn to a different understanding of human nature than that
evident in the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought.
302
For this reason, chapter two was a close reading of Lawrences Studies in
Classic American Literature, from which one can divine his alternative account
of philosophical anthropology. This, in turn, provides a framework for
understanding Deleuzes praise for Anglo-American literature and its political
anthropological implications. The primary importance of classic American
literature, says Lawrence, consists in the way it establishes the identity
of an American people, destroying the old European consciousness and
establishing a new one. He claims classic American literature accomplishes
this positive movement by changing the blood of the American people,
signaling a commitment to the importance of material over ideal conditions
in an understanding of human life. This shapes both Lawrence and Deleuzes
criticisms and re-conceptualization of literary criticism.
The mainstream of criticism has conceived literary works in an a-political
manner, supporting an understanding of works as self-subsistent entities
existing for themselves alone, where critics interpret meaning. Throughout
history, however, this perspective represents the minority view. Rather, works
have been conceived as units of force, where critics categorize relations
between words and things.
Hence, whereas Lawrence criticizes psychoanalysis for its dualistic
commitments, he lauds classic American literature because it does not
give priority to the mind, a perspective that can be understood in terms of
materialism and parallelism. This position results in a reconceptualization
of the nature of and relations between individuals and community: an
understanding of individuals as modes of substance aggregates of thoughts,
perceptions, and feelings community as a larger, further-reaching mode
of substance, and relations between the two in terms of sympathy, shared
thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Hardt and Negri designate a community
of this type in the work of Spinoza with the term multitude.
Whereas their use of this term is positive, Spinozas is not, highlighting
the anti-democratic tendencies that run throughout his thought. Even more
pronounced in Lawrences work, there these tendencies could be described as
proto-fascist, sexist, and racist. Given the influences of Spinoza and Lawrence
on Deleuze, I claimed these tendencies are important to Deleuzes political
commitments.
Having established a framework based on Lawrences thought in terms of
which to understand the political anthropological significance of Deleuzes
critique of psychoanalysis and praise for classic American literature in
chapters one and two, in chapter three I brought this framework to bear on
Deleuze and Guattaris critique of psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus. As with
303
Lawrence, Deleuze and Guattaris engagements with psychoanalysis concern

the metaphysics it implies and conception of human nature it supports: a
reformulation of the metaphysical commitments guiding the mainstream of
this tradition.
On the one hand, the philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel represent an
organic model. This results in an understanding of individuals as substances,
community as a collection of substances, and relations between these in terms
of goal-directed activity. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattaris conception
of the body without organs comes from the Pre-Socratics and Spinoza.
Here individuals are conceived as modes or unique chances, community is
understood as further-reaching aggregates of modes, and relations between the
two are conceived in terms of sympathy shared thoughts, perceptions, and
feelings. This difference results from a particular transcendental orientation,
the specificity of the experience with which Deleuze and Guattari begin, that
of schizophrenia.
Since schizophrenic experience is different from commonsense experience,
so too must be its conditions of possibility. This leads Deleuze and Guattari
to criticize psychoanalysis representative account of the unconscious,
a conception of the unconscious along idealist lines, opting instead for
a materialist conception of the unconscious based on Marx and Engels
conception of praxis, which is productive of reality. The idealist perspective
results from a misunderstanding of reality and supports a flawed conception
of desire. Deleuze and Guattari explain this misunderstanding in terms
of an illegitimate understanding and employment of the syntheses of the
unconscious, which ultimately result from different social machines.
In chapter four, I brought this framework to bear on Deleuzes praise
for Anglo-American literature in On the Superiority of Anglo-American
Literature. Deleuzes praise for Anglo-American literature concerns the
metaphysical commitments it implies and conception of human nature it
supports, pointing towards an understanding of Anglo-American literature
as a philosophical concept. His criticisms of structuralism and FrancoGermanic literature aim at notions belonging to the organic worldview.
Deleuze associates Anglo-American literature with the model of the body
without organs, supporting a different understanding of individuals,
community, and relations between them, which he explains with reference to
the philosophies of Hume, Spinoza, and the Stoics.
In terms of Humes account of the exteriority of relations, the empiricist
discovery consists in beginning with relations rather than terms, considering the
nature of these relations and the way they constitute terms; methodologically,
304
Anglo-American literature implies experimentation. In contradistinction

to interpretation, experimentation can be understood in terms of a quasimaterialist methodology, related to Deleuzes concern with the Spinozistic
doctrine of parallelism. Based on an understanding of parallelism, through an
experimental methodology, one discovers a metaphysics based on the model
of the body without organs, as well as resolving the paradoxical problem of
critique and social change mentioned in chapter one. For these reasons, bodies
and relations take precedence in Deleuzes description of the Stoic worldview.
His engagements with the Stoics result in an understanding of things on
the basis of events (becomings) rather than an understanding of events on
the basis of things. Taken together, Deleuzes reading of these philosophers
culminates in his concept of the assemblage.
This notion itself gives rise to a problem specific to the Anglo-American
milieu, where the integration of individuals into community is by no means a
process that appears as either easy or natural. On this basis, the political value
of Anglo-American literature consists in establishing relations of sympathy,
cultivating shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Deleuze thus develops
a conception of the political based on ethics in a Spinozistic sense, based
on experimentation. The political significance of writing, reading, and art
concerns a creative process of determining what does and does work between
people, establishing novel modes of existence.
With this framework in place, in chapter five I explained Deleuze and
Guattaris criticisms of opinion and liberal ideals in What is Philosophy? in terms
of philosophical anthropology. On the one hand, widespread contemporary
opinion, claim Deleuze and Guattari, is determined by capitalism, where the
attenuation of opinion results in consensus and facilitates the spread of global
capitalism. On the other hand, philosophy and art bring about both worlds
and inter-subjective communities, where relations between philosophy and
non-philosophy are based on the relation between the planes of immanence
and composition. The brain lies at the intersection of these planes, say Deleuze
and Guattari, such that the creative activities of philosophy and art establish
new circuits and synapses in the brain through their relations to chaos.
Although philosophy and art act as protections against chaos, they also
fight opinion. Opinions are like an umbrella that protect against chaos, and
philosophers and artists tear holes in the umbrella to let in chaos. Only in this
way are philosophy and art capable of disrupting opinion. Insofar as chaos
introduces unfamiliarity into the world, however, practical interest necessitates
the establishment of new opinions, such that the planes of immanence and
composition need to be constantly renewed. This perspective is based on a
305
broader conception of language and implies a metaphysics, where language

is conceived as a relation, a force that interacts with other forces to establish
new relations.
Just as the relation of opinion to chaos conditions a conception of politics
as consensus, so too does the relation of philosophy and art to chaos result in
a conception of the political. The difference between opinions confrontation
with chaos in a relation of denial and philosophy and arts as one of uneasy
alliance consists in the variability of the perspective from which philosophy
and art bring order to chaos. The creation of concepts, percepts, and affects
in philosophy and art establish novel forms of individuality, community, and
relations between the two, novel modes of existence.
Finally, in chapter six, I brought this perspective to bear on contemporary
failures of and backlashes against both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism,
where an exclusive particularism seems to provide the antidote. Insofar as
liberal ideals are not themselves incidental but based on a philosophical
anthropology, this backlash should be considered from the perspective of
human nature. One can understand Deleuze as doing precisely this in Essays
Critical and Clinical.
In his engagement with D.H. Lawrence, Deleuze explains the rise of
a hate-filled form of Christianity in terms of a reaction against modern
Enlightenment ideals. His concern with T.E. Lawrence is the balance of
Lawrences individual self with the Arabs collective self. In his engagements
with Walt Whitman, Deleuze uses the framework established in his readings
of the first two writers to explore the nature of relations between individuals
and community in the context of an American social and political milieu, a
form of nationalism unique to the United States, Unionism. In all three cases,
Deleuze emphasizes the importance of the body for an understanding and
establishment of relations between individuals and community.
The mainstream of modern Western civilization has failed to take
cognizance of and give proper credence to both the body and community in
an understanding of human existence. Failing to properly balance the body
with the mind and community with individuality, people swing too far in the
other direction. The emphasis in strains of fundamentalism, exclusivism, and
nationalism is on concrete, material conditions of human existence. Central to
this perspective is a sense of belonging through membership in a community,
which one finds in fundamentalism, exclusivism, and nationalism, which
form the hardcore of a contemporary exclusive particularism directed against
liberal values.
306
Unlike the exclusive particularism characteristic of contemporary religious,

social, and political movements, Deleuze uses his engagements with D.H.
Lawrence, T.E. Lawrence, and Walt Whitman to develop a conception of
the political that cultivates relations of inclusive particularism. The political
significance of philosophy and art consists in striking a balance based on
their relation to chaos; the alliance of philosophy and art with chaos serve in
their struggle against opinion, staving off a worst-case scenario involving the
inundation of social life with chaos.
Understood through the lens of D.H. Lawrence, Deleuzes critique of
psychoanalysis and praise for Anglo-American literature thus concern political
anthropology. The conception of human nature criticized by Deleuze in
psychoanalysis and Franco-Germanic literature is similar to that on which
liberal thought is based. When taken up by Deleuze, the merit of Lawrences
thought consists in making sense of the strong contemporary backlash against
neutrality with respect to claims regarding the nature of human existence.
Rather than an endorsement of Lawrences conservatism, only by engaging in
these lines of thought can one hope to combat them, understanding the allure
of sexism, nationalism, and fundamentalism forms of conservatism in terms
of which the backlash against liberalism develops.
This backlash should be understood from the perspective of philosophical
anthropology: In terms of their emphasis on the body and reconceptualization
of individuality, community, and relations between the two, the thought of
Lawrence and Deleuze makes sense of this tendency and these movements,
pointing towards a political anthropology in terms of which they can be better
understood and addressed.
307
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319
Index
A
absolute idea 55
absolute knowledge 46, 51
abstract ideas: as critical entities 277;
versus concepts 240-241
actuality-potentiality 55
Adler, Alfred 63
Adorno, Theodor 194
aesthetic figures 235
aesthetics 36, 92
affections 218, 221, 224-228, 238, 242244, 249, 251-253, 255, 262, 279281, 287, 293; of the capitalist 230;
versus affects 240-241
affects 191, 208, 210, 221, 224, 230,
234-235, 237, 242-244, 248, 253,
262, 277-279, 284, 287, 293, 295,
306; in language and literature 87,
212, 241, 245, 255-256, 281, 296;
in Masoch and Sade 194; and the
mind-body relation 92, 94, 276; as
modes 201-203
Afghanistan 257
aggressiveness 69
alienation 56-57, 175
allegory 211 (see myth too)
alliance (relations) 157-161, 164168, 171, 180; as repressing
representation 157-158, 160
Alliez, Eric 65, 239
Althusser, Louis 42
American experience 182, 184, 238,
288-290, 298
American identity 78-81, 83-85, 88-89,
93-94, 102, 183-185, 190, 198,
209-210, 249, 303
American writers 79, 83, 92-94
anthropology 131
analogy: doctrine of 45; Kants third 52

analytic philosophy 21, 237
and (the conjunctive versus the verbal
form is) 198, 200-201
antipathy: in Foucault 274; in T.E.
Lawrence 261, 274-275, 278, 285;
in Spinoza 99, 101
Anglo-American literature 15-16, 25,
27-29, 37, 78, 88, 91-92, 105, 140,
181-215, 232, 249, 259, 301, 303305, 307; versus English 209, 290
Anglo-American writers 190, 193, 202,
209, 243
animism 164
anomy 152
apperception 48, 114 (see subjectivity
too)
apprenticeship 213
Aquinas, Thomas 45-46
Arabs 275, 278, 282-285, 287, 298,
306
arche 51, 53, 128; in familial relations
142
archetypes 66
Aristotle 18, 51, 133, 136, 223, 304;
and Hegel 51, 55, 96, 106, 143,
145, 176, 178, 304; human nature
17, 37, 107; account of knowledge
50, 54; and the Pre-Socratics 111
Arkes, Hadley 17-18
art 185, 217, 234, 254-255, 305-307;
and the brain 212, 217, 237-241;
and chaos 241-251, 288; and ethics
81-83, 213, 215; and philosophy
36-37, 40-41, 74, 79, 96, 235, 259;
and philosophical anthropology
218; political import of 44, 8687, 213, 215, 218, 260-262, 274,
321
Index
278-279, 286-287, 293, 296, 298;

propagandistic conception of 282;
revolutionary potential of 192-193,
282
Artaud, Antonin 27, 88-91, 101, 109,
156, 181
assemblage(s) 120, 183, 195, 199,
203, 206-212, 214, 280, 305; as
hodgepodges 120
association of ideas 27, 197-198, 224,
292-293
atheism 21
athleticism 294
attributes: in Deleuze and Guattari 124,
137; in Descartes 45-46; in Spinoza
92-93, 99, 124, 200-201
Augustine 46
auto-eroticism 125-126, 135
author, the role of the 38, 78-80, 83,
92-94, 181, 190, 192-193, 210-211
authority 70, 143, 167, 269-270, 273;
European 80; familial/parental 142;
male 68
autonomy 272-273; of the body in
shame 276
axiomatization 170-172, 174, 176-177
Aztec civilization 161
Benveniste, Emile 39
Bergen, Vronique 27
Berger, Peter 152, 164-165, 273
Bergson, Henri 24, 108, 110, 120, 212;
fabulation 247; open whole 107, 289;
time 250; continuity between
human and animal life 119
Berlin, Isaiah 18
btise 119
beautiful composition 290
Binswanger, Ludwig 112
biology 131, 153
Black Elk 164
Blanchot, Maurice 140, 193, 195, 213
blood: association with fascism 20, 101;
changing the 77, 81-85, 88-89, 93,
101-102, 303
bodily resurrection 46
body 31, 154-155, 162, 167, 211-212,
263, 280, 294, 296-298; of capital
152, 170-171, 180; of the despot
152, 162-163, 165-166, 168, 170;
of the earth 152, 154-155, 161-162,
166, 168, 170, 174; in Freud 125,
135, 302; the full 152, 154-155,
161-164, 166, 174; in Lacan 40,
130-131; in D.H. Lawrence 30,
61-63, 66-68, 70, 73, 75, 77-78,
81-83, 97, 301; and mind 29, 3435, 37, 42, 45-47, 59, 90, 103,
116, 118, 136, 178, 182-183, 200203, 205, 214, 261, 273, 286-288,
306-307; and shame 175-178; in
Spinoza 91-95, 98-101, 190
body without organs 106, 109, 119,
124, 145-146, 148, 152, 169, 179,
181, 188-189, 200, 203, 206, 213,
239, 254, 269, 288-289, 292, 304305
Bonaparte, Marie 38, 40, 74
Borde, la 28
Bogue, Ronald 77, 88, 91, 188, 194,
212-213, 281
B
backlash 20-21, 30, 257-260, 262, 274,
285, 295, 297-298, 306-307
Bacon, Francis 89, 247, 280
Badiou, Alain 21, 28
barbarian despotic machine 153, 162169, 170, 173, 180
Baur, Michael 33, 128
beatific vision 45
becomings (multiplicities) 15, 27, 183,
191-193, 199, 201, 206, 208, 212,
214, 241, 281, 283, 298, 305
Beekman, Issaac 46
being (versus having) 39
Bennett, Tony 87
322
Index
bourgeois class 58
brain 89, 212, 218, 237-240, 247-249,
254, 278, 305
breakdown (versus breakthrough) 184,
191
breast 67, 70, 125-126, 134-135
bricolage 151
Buchanan, Ian 34, 119, 129, 143, 146147, 151, 172, 183
Buddhism 265
Bush administration 257
Butler, Judith 115, 152
Butler, Samuel 108, 120
198, 209; French 185-187

charity 267
child 39, 64, 66-68, 70-74, 125-126,
130, 133-139, 142, 145, 148
childhood 38, 123, 125, 137, 142, 144;
in D.H. Lawrence 72-73; sexuality
37
Chomsky, Noam 186
Christendom 54
Christianity 20, 258, 260, 263, 265272, 298, 306
church fathers 46
citizens 18, 52-53, 232-233
citizenship (in Aristotle) 17
civilized capitalist machine 153, 169178, 180
classic American literature 29-30, 73,
77-103, 178, 183-184, 188, 190,
249, 301-303
clichs 242-244, 246
close reading 23, 91, 183, 303
coding 79, 111, 140, 146, 149-152,
154-155, 161-163, 164, 166-172,
174-177, 180-181, 187, 191
code(s), true 139; surplus value of 174175
cognitivism 105
Colebrook, Claire 112, 155, 217, 221,
226, 231
collective self 271-273, 275, 287, 295,
298, 306
commodities 56-57, 171-173, 175
common goals 29
common notions 97, 202, 205, 276
common sense 138, 219, 228
commonsense experience 110, 113-114,
120, 122, 179, 238, 304
commonsense intuitions 21, 237
communism 58
comprehensive doctrines 19
conatus 117, 269
concept(s) 197, 207, 221, 225-226,
277-278; Anglo-American literature
C
Cameron, David 257
camaraderie 261, 288, 293, 295-297
capitalism 169-170, 174, 180,
194, 258, 269, 271, 286; and
axiomatization 175-178; conditions
of 169-173; and literature 181, 191;
and opinion 218, 228, 230-233,
246, 254-255, 305
capitalist: as a generic subject 227, 230231, 233, 246, 254, 322; mode of
production 56
Carroll, Lewis 27, 91, 205
castration 33, 55, 134, 137
categories: in Kant (see concepts too)
113
categorematic versus syncategorematic
terms 246
cathartic method 90, 135
cerebral pathways 238-240, 248, 254
chaoids (daughters of chaos) 244-245,
255
chaos 111, 151-152, 168, 171, 174,
177, 218, 222-225, 233, 241-248,
250-251, 254-255, 262, 269, 279281, 287-288, 292-293, 295, 298,
305-307
character, secret of 284-285, 298
characters: American 188-189, 193,
323
Index
as a 182; creation of 234-237, 239245, 248, 250, 254-255, 295, 306;

Deleuzian 23-24; in Kant 48, 114,
121 (see categories too)
conceptual analysis 21, 237
conceptual personae 235-237, 241
conjunctive synthesis 123, 140-148,
153, 170, 175, 179, 187
connective synthesis 121, 123-128, 134,
137, 141, 153-155, 165, 179-180
contradiction: in Hegel 50; in Marx
58-59
consciousness 43, 58, 88, 119-120, 179,
202-203, 241; in Hegel 51-54; in
D.H. Lawrence 60-61, 64-65, 68,
73-75, 79-84, 93, 102, 302-303;
unity of 35, 44-45, 47-49, 56-57
consensus 29, 96, 192, 208, 218, 225233, 246, 254-255, 258-259, 262,
270, 273, 278, 305-306; in Badiou
21
conservatism 30, 106, 257-258
contemplation 19-20, 228, 230
Cooper, James Fenimore 97
corporations 232-233
cosmopolitanism 20, 22, 257-258, 260,
262, 297
critique, problem of the possibility of
35, 40-42, 75, 83, 85, 199, 203203, 305
cruelty 156, 167
cultural phenomena 137
Curd, Patricia 110-111
decoded flows 146; and capitalism

169-177, 180; and despotism 152,
164, 168; and revolution 192; and
society 152, 168, 271
Deleuze: Anti-Oedipus 27-28, 33-34,48,
57-58, 74, 79, 88, 105-185, 188,
190-195, 199, 202-208, 211, 213,
228-229, 232, 238, 253, 263, 269271, 273, 280, 282, 284, 289, 296,
303; Dialogues 182; Difference and
Repetition 23-28, 50, 108, 111, 204,
211-212, 219-220, 228, 238, 252;
Empiricism and Subjectivity 26, 197;
English-language scholarship 15, 23,
25; Essays Critical and Clinical 91,
94, 139, 257-299, 306; To Have
Done with Judgment 101, 268,
283; French-language scholarship
23; Instincts and Institutions
263; Letter to Reda Bensmaa,
on Spinoza 235; Literature and
Life 278, 281; Logic of Sense 27-28,
91, 204; Masochism: Coldness and
Cruelty 77, 85, 194; Negotiations
238; Nietzsche and Philosophy 79,
108, 252; Nietzsche and St. Paul,
Lawrence and John of Patmos
263-265; Plato, the Greeks 220,
229; Proust and Signs 77, 108, 186,
229, 249-252; his sources 29, 34;
A Slippery Slope 259; Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy 82, 117; On
the Superiority of Anglo-American
Literature 80, 91, 181-215, 304;
The Shame and the Glory: T.E.
Lawrence 275-288; Thousand
Plateaus 109, 111, 120, 169, 183184, 186, 188, 190, 194-195, 199,
203, 206, 207, 210, 212, 230, 278;
Three Questions on Six Times Two
238; What is Philosophy? 79-80, 98,
108, 111, 194, 212, 217-256, 277,
280, 292, 305; Whitman 139,
D
Darwin, Charles 21, 64
David-Mnard, Monique 34
Daseinanalysis (see Binswanger)
Dawkins, Richard 21
death drive (Nirvana principle, thanatos)
52, 63-65, 69
decoding 79, 152, 169, 176, 180, 187188, 190-191, 193
324
Index
288-297
Democritus 111, 204, 213
democracy 95, 97, 107; Deleuzes
critique 211, 233; hostility towards
100-101
demonic 187
Dennett, Daniel 21
Derrida, Jacques 20, 157, 163
Descartes, Ren 44-47, 56-59, 66, 75,
91-92, 98-99, 110, 116, 131, 219,
244, 302; Discourse on Method 219;
and language 88; Meditations 45-46,
110; Principles of Philosophy 46
desire 47, 98, 128-129, 139, 141-142,
145-151, 153, 158-161, 175-176,
183, 191, 199, 202-203, 207, 259,
266; desiring its own repression 42,
114-115, 232, 263; in Hegel and
Lacan as a-/non-biological 51-52,
189; in Freud 57, 135, 137-138;
and idealism 33, 304; in Lacan 3940, 96, 133-134, 163, 170; in D.H.
Lawrence 64; as power 115, 117118, 280; as praxis/labor 117-122,
124, 173-174, 179-180, 191, 195,
232; as pure/disorganized/material
production 150-151, 154, 157, 169,
208, 211, 222, 269-271, 281, 291
desiring machines 115, 120, 141, 146,
148, 151
despot 150, 153, 162, 165-168, 170,
173-174, 180, 187; the body of (see
body)
despotic representation 162-163, 165171, 174, 177
detachments from signifying chains
111, 124, 129, 139, 145, 147, 152,
169, 188-189, 191, 193, 196; as
true codes 139
deterritorialization 79, 185, 187-188,
190-191, 193; as a political norm
15, 152, 248
developmental stages 125, 127, 130,
136, 138, 148

diagonal movement 156
dialectic 53-55, 58, 84, 107, 127, 218,
250
dialectical method 49-50, 53
dialogue 96, 236
Dicker, George 45-46
difference 157
Ding, Das 40, 51
discussion 226-227, 229, 233, 238,
246-247, 258-259, 278
disjunctive synthesis 112, 123, 128141, 152-153, 162, 165, 179-180
displaced represented (homosexual
incest as) 153, 157
divine concurrence 46
double bind 138
doctrine of the faculties 24-25, 27
dreams 37-38
drives (Trieben, instincts) 62-66, 68-69,
71, 73, 75-76, 82, 84-85, 125, 127128, 134-135, 191, 260, 271, 284287, 298, 302; in Lacan 55
dualism 131; in the drives 63-65, 75,
273, 302; mind-body 35, 44, 59,
83, 90-93, 136, 302
Du Bois, W.E.B. 282
E
earth 98, 154-155, 162, 173-175, 290291; the body of (see body); as a
symbol 164-166
economic markets 22, 232-233
Eder, David 65
education 69, 272, 286
ego 134, 145, 185; in Lacan 130;
in D.H. Lawrence 60; in T.E.
Lawrence 280, 282-283, 285, 291,
293-294
ego identification 39, 64, 130
ego psychologists 39, 134
lan vital 119
Eliade, Mircea 151, 155, 164-165, 167
325
Index
end of history 55, 58, 128, 176, 189

Emerson, Ralph Waldo 83
emotions 61, 68, 79, 277; ambivalence
of 37
Empedocles 111
empiricism 196-198, 292;
transcendental 110, 197
Engels, Friedrich 42-44, 56, 58-59, 75,
118-119, 179, 211, 302, 304
enlightenment ideals 260, 298, 306
episteme 50, 54
erogenous zones 125
eros 63, 65, 69 (see love too)
essence(s) 15, 17, 57, 123, 177, 210,
266 (see form(s) and natures
too); in Aristotle 54-55; in Hegel
53; in Sartre 26; in Spinoza 99, 139
ethics 17, 28, 120, 210, 305; versus
morality 82-83
ethnology 97
Euripides 36
European identity 80-81, 83, 85, 94
Europeans 80, 289-291
event(s) 27, 183, 203, 204-206, 208,
210, 214, 221, 245, 277, 305
exchange value 172
exclusive particularism 251, 258-262,
272, 274-275, 279, 285-288, 295298, 306-307
experience: imagistic versus propositional accounts of 47; pre-categorical
conditions of 48, 56-57, 110, 146,
219 (see apperception, neurosis,
and schizophrenia as well)
experimentation 78, 97, 189-190, 200203, 210, 213; versus interpretation
77, 199, 214, 305
exploitation 114, 175, 263
exteriority/externality of relations 183,
196-203, 206, 210, 214, 292-293,
304
extra-familial groups 141, 143-144
F
fabulation 210, 247
family 123, 140-141, 144-145, 148,
150, 154, 161, 167, 302; in
Aristotle 17; in Freud 70, 126, 137,
142; in Hegel 55; in D.H. Lawrence
64, 66-68, 75, 98
fascism (proto-fascism) 100-101, 114,
260-261, 263, 273
father 126, 142, 145, 153-154, 159161; in Freud 39, 137-138; in Lacan
(see name of the father); in D.H.
Lawrence 64, 66-68, 70, 74
fatherhood 97
Felman, Shoshana 38
Feuerbach, Ludwig 43
Fichte, J.G. 49
filiation (relations) 142, 157-159, 165166, 173
film 239
final causality (finalism) 96, 107-108,
201
Findlay, John 23, 50, 52, 55
Fitzgerald, F. Scott 184; The Crack-Up
190, 195, 209, 243, 249; Love of the
Last Tycoon 198, 209; Tender is the
Night 210, 212-213
flows (flux) 111, 121, 126, 128-129,
135-140, 145, 147, 150-151, 153163, 165-167, 172, 178-179, 181,
184, 188-193, 221, 269, 274, 278
Flynn, Elizabeth 86
fore-pleasure 135
foreclosure 113, 134
form(s) 15, 128-129, 169, 186, 189,
192, 201, 208 (see essence(s)
and natures too); Aristotelian 50,
197; and authority 268; and chaos
152, 222, 224, 242, 292; Platonic/
Socratic 36, 197, 236
Foucault, Michel 83, 146, 159, 166167, 173, 212; Discipline and
Punish 115, 263; relation between
326
Index
discursive and non-discursive

formations 156; Order of Things 88,
156, 274; Madness and Civilization
24; What is Enlightenment? 263
fragment, a sense of the 289-291
France 253, 259
Franco-Germanic literature 29-30, 78,
182-187, 189, 210, 213, 218, 304,
307
Frede, Michael 55
freedom 18-19, 204-205; in Hegel 52,
84, 128; religious 80, 102, 260; in
Spinoza 84
Freud, Anna 39
Freud, Sigmund 28, 33-40, 57, 59-60,
62-66, 69-70, 72, 74-75, 85, 105,
113, 116-117, 119, 122,125-127,
130-131, 134-137, 142-143, 147,
149, 179, 186, 197, 204, 302; The
Aetiology of Hysteria 72, 116;
An Autobiographical Study 38,
60, 125, 136; Beyond the Pleasure
Principle 63-65; Civilization and
Its Discontents 69; Delusions and
Dreams in Jensens Gradiva 37-38,
197; earlier versus later thought 63,
90, 135; The Ego and the Id 39, 59;
Group Psychology and the Analysis
of the Ego 39, 143; Interpretation
of Dreams 60; and Klein 126-127,
134; versus Lacan 28, 39, 131, 134;
An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 63, 65,
70; Psychopathic Stage Characters
38; Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality 72, 125-126, 135-136,
142-143; The Unconscious 63
friendship 229, 254
Fukuyama, Francis 231-232
fundamentalism 30, 260, 263, 265,
272-273, 286, 297, 306-307
G
Galston, William 19
Gardner, Sebastian 48, 219
Garvey, Marcus 282
gender roles 30
genealogist 79, 82
generalized chromaticism 210
generic subject 222, 225-231, 233, 246,
254
geometry (Euclidean versus
Riemannian) 170
George, Robert 19,
god(s) 114, 156, 173, 187, 198, 232,
244, 269; in Descartes 45-46; in
Hegel 50-51, 54-55, 128; immanent
regulatory versus transcendent
creator 163-167; in D.H. Lawrence
264, 268; projections of 43; in
Spinoza 27, 92, 99, 276
Goethe, J.W. 181, 186, 210
good sense 219
Gospel 54, 265-267, 272
Grayling, A.C. 21
Greek philosophy/thought 87, 229, 236
guerrilla warfare 285-286
H
Habermas, Jrgen 96, 227, 231
Hadot, Pierre 83
hand (its relation to eye and voice) 155,
157, 167
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri 100101, 103, 178, 232-233, 303
Hardy, Thomas 181, 189
Harris, H.S. 23
Harris, Leonard 282
Hawthorne, Nathaniel 78, 83
headscarf 259
Hegel, G.F.W. 23, 35, 39, 43-44, 46,
50-51, 59, 66, 75, 107, 116, 127,
189-190, 197, 210, 227, 302; and
Aristotle 51, 55, 96, 106, 143,
145, 176, 178, 250, 304; and Kant
327
Index
49, 128; and Lacan 47, 52, 96,

106, 113, 129, 157, 176; Logic
52; Phenomenology of Spirit 52-53;
Philosophy of History 52; Philosophy
of Right 51, 55; social and political
commitments 53, 56-58, 84, 96,
98, 232; and time 50, 54, 186 (see
end of history too); theological
commitments 54; and Whitman
291, 294
Heidegger, Martin 20, 23, 110, 210,
277
hell 266
history 66, 131, 185-186, 209; in Hegel
50-55, 58, 95-96, 107-108, 128,
189-190, 232, 250 (see end of
history too); of a people 20
Heraclitus 111, 184
Hermann, Imre 64, 75
Hitchens, Christopher 21
Hobbes, Thomas 17-18, 45, 88, 96,
117, 151, 231
Hlderlin, Friedrich 156
Holland, Eugene 34, 57, 110, 119-120,
142, 144, 150, 161, 167, 172, 177178
Holland, Noman 78
homosexual incest (as displaced
represented) 157, 160-161
Horkheimer, Max 194
Hughes, Joe 27
human condition (versus human
nature) 27
human nature (philosophical anthropology) 15-20, 22-23, 25-30, 35,
37-43, 56, 59, 66, 69, 75-76, 78,
85, 88, 94, 99, 101, 105-106, 118120, 123, 132, 178, 182-183, 213,
218-219, 221, 225, 234, 237, 254,
258-259, 261, 270, 274, 286, 291,
295, 297, 301-307
Hume, David 24, 27, 183, 195-200,
202-206, 213-214, 224, 240, 304;
and apperception 47; and religion

164; and Whitman 292-293
Huntington, Samuel 257
Husserl, Edmund 47, 110, 163
hysteria 90, 122, 134
I
Id 65, 85
idealism 27, 44, 59, 73, 91-92, 196197;
in Europe 83; psychoanalysis as 33-35,
77, 106, 116, 118, 129-131, 302
ideas (in the Kantian sense) 123, 163
ideology 58, 143, 156, 174
image: in Aquinas 45; in Deleuze 239,
280-282
image of thought 24, 108-109, 218,
228, 250, 252-253
imaginary register/function 39-40, 117,
129-133, 138, 143, 185
imitation 192, 281
immanent criteria 49-50
immanent critique 113
immortality (of the soul) 45-46
inclusive particularism 260-262, 275,
279, 282, 285-286, 288, 295, 297,
307
inclusive universalism 20, 22, 252, 258,
259, 262, 272-273, 275, 279, 285288, 295, 297
incest 134, 138, 153, 166, 206 (see
homosexual incest too); in
Freud 142; in Lacan 133; in D.H.
Lawrence 74
individuality 31, 35, 94, 123, 178, 256,
262, 267, 285-287, 297, 306-307;
in Aquinas 45; in Hegel 84, 95-96;
in D.H. Lawrence 65, 67-68, 95-96;
in literature 186, 189; in Spinoza
99, 145
individual self 271-273, 287, 298, 306
individuation 63-66, 68, 70, 146, 189,
211
328
Index
insult 226-227
intellectual love of God 276
intensities 119, 146
intensive germinal flux (as repressed
representative) 157-159
interpretation 78, 89, 92, 185, 213
252-253; versus experimentation
(see experimentation)
intuitions 21, 48, 113-114, 121, 163,
237
involution 188
Iraq 257
Iser, Wolfgang 86
Islam 20, 166, 257-259
Kant 114; in Lacan 133; in D.H.

Lawrence 61, 67-69; in opinion
219; in Plato 236; self- 272; in
Spinoza 97, 201-202, 206, 276
Kojve, Alexandre 50-52, 54-55, 95,
107, 131, 250
Kbler-Ross, Elisabeth 28
L
labor 131, 152, 158, 172-175; as desire
118-119; in Hegel 43, 52; in D.H.
Lawrence 71; as praxis 44, 56-57,
58-59
laborer 57
Lacan, Jacques 28, 33-35, 49, 52, 55,
66, 130-131, 162, 168, 170, 176,
204, 302; and Derrida 157, 163;
and lack 47, 51, 132-133, 180;
and Levinas 258; and literature 3740, 74, 96, 106, 185; lost object/
encounter 133; and pathoanalysis
127; and the real 117; and
schizophrenia 112-113, 134
lack 33, 117-118, 128, 132, 138, 141,
148, 151, 161, 170, 175-176, 180,
195, 259, 270, 280; in Augustine
46; in Derrida 157; and language/
meaning 39, 47, 51, 133, 112-113,
129, 134, 163
Lakota 164
language 167-168, 186, 207, 241, 278;
in Artaud 88-91, 156; in Lewis
Carroll 91; in Deleuze 77-78, 8586, 88-91, 153-157, 188, 194,
212-213, 244-245, 255, 277-278,
281-284, 296, 306; in Descartes 88;
and desire 39-40, 133, 211, 284; in
Foucault 88, 156, 212; in Hobbes
88; in Lacan 40, 47, 112-113, 130133, 162-163; in D.H. Lawrence
77, 88-90; in T.E. Lawrence 277,
281-283, 296; in Nietzsche 91,
155-156; in the Pre-Socratics 91;
J
jealousy 249-253, 275
Jesus 265-268
John the Apostle 265, 267
John of Patmos 263-268
justice 17-19, 301
judgment(s) 198, 211, 219, 268;
critique of 101; final 264; in Kant
48, 58, 113; system of 167
Jung, Carl 63, 65-66, 70-71, 75
K
Kafka, Franz 101, 182, 195; and desire
118
Kant, Immanuel 24, 35, 44, 47-50, 52,
56-59, 75, 110, 113-118, 121-123,
128, 146, 163, 197, 219, 259, 302
Kearney, Richard 47
Kerouac, Jack 181, 184
Kerslake, Christian 34
kinship 154, 158, 167; with animals
164; relations (see filiation)
Klein, Melanie 126-127, 134, 204
Klein, Naomi 177, 47
knowledge 166, 187, 245; in
empiricism 196; as episteme 50; in
Foucault 24, 156, 167; in Hegel
46, 51, 55; and idealism 33; in
329
Index
in schizophrenia 91, 112-113, 156,

212, 245; in the Stoics 91
Laing, R.D. 34, 145
Lamark, Jean-Baptiste 105
Laplanche, Jean 62, 64, 75
latency 125
latent states 60
Lawrence, D.H.: Apocalypse 66, 263275, 285; Chaos in Poetry 242;
Fantasia of the Unconscious 29,
35, 79, 84-85, 271, 302; open
road 95-96; poetry 74, 242, 302;
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious
29, 35, 84, 302; Studies in Classic
American Literature 29, 78-85, 8898, 303
Lawrence, T.E. 260-261, 275-287, 296298, 306-307
Lear, Jonathan 51, 136
Lecercle, Jean-Jacques 25, 195,
Lefebvre, Alexandre 108, 217, 220
Leninism 21
Leucippus 111
Lvi-Strauss, Jean Claude 34, 116, 131132, 151, 154, 158, 197
Levinas, Emmanuel 47, 163, 258
liberalism 18-19, 22, 30, 230-233, 248,
254, 257-260, 297, 301, 305-307
libido 60, 63, 72, 118, 121, 147-148,
161, 202
line of flight 184-188, 190, 209
literary critic 79, 82, 86-87, 92, 102
literary criticism 36, 38, 77, 86-87, 92,
102, 303
little Hans 66
Locke, Alain 282
Locke, John 231
love: Christianly 69; in Deleuze 146,
195, 211, 254, 269, 294, 296; as a
final cause 55; in Freud 38, 70 (see
eros too); versus jealousy 251-252,
275; in Lacan 39; in D.H. Lawrence
70-73, 85, 97, 98, 265-267; in the
Pre-Socratics 111
Lyotard, Jean-Franois 15
M
Mallarm, Stphane 156
Marrati, Paola 23, 108, 128, 188, 210,
217, 219-220, 230
Marx, Karl 28, 34-35, 59, 66, 71, 75,
84-85, 118-119, 152, 171-172,
175, 179, 302, 304; The Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844 43, 56-58; German Ideology
42-44
marriage 97, 153, 159-161
Masschelein, Anneleen 34
master-slave dialectic 39, 52, 189
master-slave distinction 271
masterwork 24
materialism 28, 34-35, 42-44, 56, 66,
73, 77-78, 89, 90-92, 103, 116,
119, 167, 179, 199, 203, 214, 303305
May, Todd 82
Mauss, Marcel 152
McBride, William 42-44, 58
Melville, Herman 78, 83, 209, 290
Mengue, Philippe 33, 108, 210, 217,
220, 226-227, 229, 231, 233, 248
men and women, relations between 7071, 159, 272
meta-narratives 15
metaphor and metonymy 132-133, 163
metaphysics 55, 122-123, 178, 212,
244, 255, 258, 304, 306; in Hegel
54; in Lacan 116; and literature
41; and opinion 221; in the PreSocratics/Stoics 204-205, 214, 292;
in Spinoza 201-203, 292, 305;
substance 108, 111, 199, 223-224,
291
methodology 197, 214; in Deleuze 63,
109-110, 199, 203, 252, 305; in
Kant 113
330
Index
Michaux, Henri 151

micro-/macro-scopic correspondences
107, 136, 145, 159, 165, 250
Miller, Henry 145, 181, 184, 294; Sexus
195, 197, 202, 213, 242-243; Tropic
of Capricorn 180, 195, 209, 273
Miller, Kenneth 21
mind (see body)
minor literature 77, 295
mnemotechnics 88, 155
modern life 62, 68, 85
modes: of existence 41, 79-80, 82, 94,
97, 120, 192, 202, 218, 231, 235,
247-249, 254, 256, 278, 280-281,
283, 297, 305-306; individuals as
78, 99, 103, 108-109, 179, 201,
203, 210, 303-304
monarchy 53, 166
money 161, 171-175, 177
morality (see ethics)
mother 134-135, 140, 153, 159-161;
as an archetypical object 137138; identification with 39, 130134, 142; in Klein 126; in D.H.
Lawrence 64, 66-68, 70, 72-74
motion 111, 184, 190; relation to
images and things 278, 280; as
relations of slowness and speed 99,
212, 224, 238-239, 281
Moyaert, Paul 52, 258
multiculturalism 20, 22, 257-260, 262,
297, 306
multitude 100-101, 103
mutual aspirations/interests 29, 96,
189, 195, 208, 259, 269-270
mysticism 185
myth 66, 133, 151, 154, 165, 194;
versus allegory 211
nation 53, 143, 186, 232

national identity 143, 187, 210, 247,
257-258
National Socialism 20
nationalism 22, 30, 260, 285-286, 297,
307; American form of 261, 288,
296, 298, 306
Native Americans 94
natural law 18, 259
nature 119-120, 154, 158, 165, 173,
291-293
natures (see essence(s) and form(s)
too) 15, 26, 154, 180,
navel 67
Negri, Antonio 58, 100-101, 119, 263
(see Hardt and Negri too)
neoconservatism 257
neo-Platonism 54
neurosis 33, 37, 75, 117, 122, 134,
136, 138, 302; as a model of
psychopathology 65, 113, 116, 123;
and religion 272
neurotic experience 113, 122-123, 138,
148
neurology 239
neutrality 18-19, 30, 301, 307
new Americanists 258
new criticism 85-86
New Testament 264
Nietzsche, Friedrich 24, 34, 36, 91,
101, 108-109, 114, 117-119, 155156, 252, 263, 265-268, 270-271,
285
nomadic war machine 169
nomadism, pure 157
O
object x 48-49, 57, 113, 219
object relations 39, 127
Oedipus complex 33, 123, 133, 141142, 150, 154, 157, 179, 238, 272,
302; in Freud 136-137; in D.H.
Lawrence 74-76; and literature 181
N
name of the father 113, 132-134, 157,
162, 168, 176
narcissism 38, 291, 293-294
331
Index
Old Testament 264

ontogenesis 125
ontological hierarchy 45
ontology (see metaphysics)
Open, the 277-278
opinion 108, 144, 192, 217-256, 260,
262, 278-279, 281, 295-296, 298,
305-307; and Hume 224, 240, 292293
organs 106-108, 147, 159, 164, 166,
171-172, 201, 225; in D.H.
Lawrence 61; reproductive 120
orthodoxy 222, 229-230
Oury, Jean 28
overcoding 152, 162-164, 166-168,
170, 177, 180, 187, 206
percepts 194, 224, 234-235, 237, 240,

242-244, 248, 253, 262, 277279, 284, 287, 293, 295, 306; in
language and literature 241, 245,
255-256, 281, 296; in Masoch and
Sade 194
Perri, Trevor 212, 280
persona 65
personal identity 35, 44, 78, 130, 132,
145-146, 187
persons, full 123, 126-128, 134-137,
140, 153-154, 157-159, 180, 253
perversion 117, 125
phallus 40, 51, 133-134
phenomenology 46-47, 197, 218
philosophy: and art (see art); and
the brain 212, 218, 237-240, 247248, 254, 305; and chaos 218,
222, 225, 241-248, 254-255, 262,
279, 288, 295, 298, 305-307;
elements of 218, 220-221, 234241, 243; history of 23-24, 35, 74,
116, 196, 198; and philosophical
anthropology 218; political 28, 114115, 169; non-/pre- 237, 254, 305;
of religion 21
philosophical anthropology (see
human nature)
phylogenesis 125
physics 119
pleasure principle 65 (see death drive
too)
planes of consistence/composition/
immanence 201, 226, 235-237,
241, 243-248, 254-255, 277-278,
295, 305
Plantinga, Alvin 21
Plato 17, 37, 91, 107-108, 151, 196197, 219-220, 222-223, 227, 229;
and desire 117
Poe, Edgar Allen: in Bonaparte 38;
in Lacan 38-40, 132; in D.H.
Lawrence 78, 81, 83, 93, 102
P
pagan 264
parallelism, mind-body 63, 73, 77, 9193, 103, 200-203, 206, 214, 303
305
paralogisms of reason 48, 114-115
paralogisms of the unconscious 47, 115,
122, 147, 150, 160, 181
partial objects 111, 121, 124-129,
133-140, 145-147, 152, 154-155,
158-159, 161-162, 167, 169, 179,
188-191, 193, 253
passions 118, 201; in D.H. Lawrence
61, 69, 71; in Spinoza 82, 100, 276277; in the Stoics 204-205
pathoanalysis 122
Patton, Paul 15, 24, 115, 152, 217,
221, 223, 226, 230-231, 233, 248
Patzig, Gnter 55
perceptions 29, 78, 80, 82, 94, 96, 99,
103, 113, 120, 179, 210-212, 214,
221, 224-228, 230, 235, 238, 240244, 246, 249, 251-253, 255, 262,
274, 279-281, 284, 287, 293, 303305; of the capitalist 230; versus
percepts 240-241
332
Index
poets 36, 87, 242

political 16, 18-20, 25, 28, 293, 301;
and Anglo-American literature 183,
207-215, 294-295, 305; and art and
philosophy versus opinion 217-256,
306; in Deleuze 15, 27, 41, 108,
139, 144, 152, 183, 192, 260-262,
274-275, 278-279, 287-288, 297298, 307; in Hegel 95
political activism 28
political aestheticism 210
pollyanalytics 36, 40-41, 74, 197
pornology versus pornography 194
postmodernism 15, 260
power 117-121, 148, 151, 173-174,
201-203, 232, 265-270, 277-279,
284; in Foucault 115, 166-167,
263; in D.H. Lawrence 263, 272274, 287, 298; in Nietzsche 63; as
pouvoir (potestats) versus puissance
(potentia) 119; in Spinoza 27; of
words/literature 87-88, 212, 283
power spirit 273, 287, 278
pragmatics 88
praxis 42-44, 56-57, 59, 71, 75, 118119, 158-159, 174, 179, 232, 248,
302-304
Pre-Socratics 111, 124, 179, 204-205,
214, 304; account of language 91,
212
primitive territorial machine 153-162,
164-168, 170-171, 174, 180, 284
private property 58, 232
proper names 147, 208, 237
Proust, Marcel 107, 229, 250; and
jealousy (see jealousy); pathos 109,
249; signs 90-91, 186, 195, 212213, 239, 252-254
Prussian state 53, 95, 128, 189
psychic (primary/organic) repression
(see repression)
psychoanalytic biography 38
psychopathology 22; in Freud 76,
105, 127, 136, 302; in Lacan 112,

134; in Jung 65; religion as 272; in
Schotte 122
psychosis 110, 112, 117
Q
questions: in Deleuze 26, 197; in
jealousy 251; in Lacan 113, 134;
in Plato 236
R
Rancire, Jacques 18, 209
Ransom, John Crowe 86
reader-response criticism 85-87, 102
recognition: in Hegel 39, 52, 95, 189;
in opinion 218, 223, 228-229, 238,
246; in the syntheses 121, 124, 147
relativism 50, 53
religion 20-22, 50, 80, 143, 155, 163165; and chaos 151, 243-244; as a
human good 260; in D.H. Lawrence
80, 84, 98, 102, 260, 263-274; and
liberalism 18, 257-259, 286, 297,
307; in Marx 43; philosophy of (see
philosophy); in psychoanalysis 137
religious impulse 98
Reich, Wilhelm 34, 114, 117
representation 118-119; despotic
162-168, 170-171, 174, 177; and
psychoanalysis 118-119, 121; and
social machines 150, 153; territorial
154-162, 164-168, 170-171
repressed representative 153, 157-158
repressing representation 153, 157-158,
160
repression 38, 42, 59, 115, 125, 137,
142, 158-159, 191, 232, 263;
network forms of 167; versus
oppression 114; psychic (primary/
organic) 116-117, 119, 127, 149150, 153, 175; social (secondary)
116-117, 119-120, 149-150, 153154, 175
333
Index
retention 144
reterritorialization 79-80, 176, 191
Revelation 264-268, 273-274, 287, 298
rhizome 24, 109, 239
Richardson, William 23
rights 17; Badious critique of 21;
Deleuzes critique of 231-232;
in Foucault 115; negative versus
positive 18
Rome 266
Rorty, Richard 20, 227, 230
September 11th 257

sensations 70, 189, 198, 212, 221, 224,
234-235, 241
senses 77-78, 86, 89-90, 194, 211212, 239, 281; in Aquinas 45; in
empiricism 196; in D.H. Lawrence
61
sexism 30, 34, 301, 307
sexuality 17, 62, 106, 125-128, 135136, 143, 147, 167
shadow (in Jung) 65
shame (as an affect) 275-279
signifier 33, 39-40, 51-52, 112, 131133, 162-163, 167-168, 176, 185,
207, 211
sloughing 79, 81, 94, 102, 188
Smith, Daniel 23-24, 33, 199, 229,
241, 250
social change: possibility of 35, 42, 44,
75, 199, 202-203, 305; reason for
56, 190, 194, 282
socialism 58
social machines 27, 120, 141, 148-178,
180-181, 208, 304
social organization 119-120, 137, 151,
157-158, 161-162, 169, 174, 176,
179, 222
socialist realism 36, 282
social (secondary) repression (see
repression)
socius 151-152, 154-158, 174, 180,
192, 271 (see body too); the fear
of the 169-170
Socrates 36, 223, 236
solar plexus 61, 67
soul(s) 88, 100, 164, 200-202, 204205; in Aristotle 17; in Kant 48,
114; in D.H. Lawrence 71, 81, 8384, 96-97, 203, 266-267, 297; in
Plato 17
sovereignty 17, 115, 232
Spanos, William 193
Spinoza, Baruch 84, 108-109, 114, 117,
S
Sacher-Masoch, Leopold von 77, 194,
197, 254
Sade, Marquis de 77, 194, 254
Said, Edward 194
Sandel, Michael 18
Sartre, Jean Paul 26, 110, 130-131
Saussure, Ferdinand 132
Sauvagnargues, Anne 23
Saville, Anthony 48, 114
Schelling, F.W.J. 49
schizoanalysis 29, 145-146, 149, 182,
206; as a materialism 34
schizophrenia 58, 152, 296; and desire
150-151, 291; in Jung 65; and
language 112-113, 134, 245; and
literature 182, 211; as a model 110,
117, 122, 138, 169, 179, 199, 304;
as a process 184; versus neurosis 123
schizophrenic experience 49, 58, 109115, 117, 120, 122, 138-139, 149,
152, 169, 179, 182, 184, 199, 304;
and religious experience 152
Schopenhauer, Arthur 117
Schotte, Jacques 122, 127
Schreber, Daniel Paul 113
Schweickart, Patrocinio 86
science 20-21, 217, 234, 237-238,
240, 244, 254; the revolutionary
potential of 192-193
self-reliance 286
334
Index
119, 124, 139, 183, 195, 212-213,

263, 269; anti-democratic 101-103,
303; Ethics 84, 97, 100-101, 201;
human nature 17, 27, 30, 145, 179,
304; parallelism 30, 63, 77, 82-83,
91-100, 199-206, 214, 276-278,
298; Political Treatise 27, 30, 100101
state 17, 108, 115, 165-169, 173, 228;
and democracy 231-233; in Hegel
52-53, 55, 58, 95, 128, 189; and
literature 186-187, 194, 210; non169, 232
Stoics, the 183, 195, 204-207, 213-214,
304-305; and language 91
stomach 66, 75
structural anthropology 158, 185
structuralism 39, 129, 132, 185, 197,
207-208, 213, 253, 304
stupidity 110, 119
style 78, 94, 211, 235,
subject(ivity) 15, 27, 50, 145-147, 149,
170, 189-190, 197-198, 206-207,
218-219, 221, 278, 283, 285, 298;
and group identification 140-141,
144, 179, 253-254, 256; in Kant
47-49, 57; in Lacan 40, 130, 132;
in D.H. Lawrence 72 (see soul
too); in Marx 56-57; and Oedipal
relations 137; in Spinoza 92;
substance theory of 112, 114, 145,
189, 208; transcendental 47-49,
146, 219
sublimation 118, 148
substance 57, 106-108, 111-112, 114,
122-123, 128, 137, 139-141, 149,
152-153, 169, 178-181, 187-188,
198-199, 203-204, 224, 253,
278, 291, 304; in Aristotle 55; in
Descartes 44-49, 56, 98-99; in
Hegel 53; individuals/subjects as 29,
79, 103, 105, 185-186, 189, 197,
207-208; in Spinoza 91-92, 99,
124, 145-146, 190, 200-201, 303;

and writing 193, 209
suicide 52
super ego 70, 181
supplement 157
surface of recording (see body)
surplus value 56, 172, 174-177,
symbolic register 39-40, 112-113, 117,
130-134, 138
sympathy 29, 67, 73, 78, 94-103, 109,
145, 179, 191, 210-212, 214, 249,
254-255, 261, 270, 274-275, 278279, 283-285, 303-305
Spirit 49-50, 52-55, 58, 95-96, 107,
128, 176
symbols 90, 121, 132; in D.H.
Lawrence 66, 211, 264
symptomatology 112, 120
synapses 239-240, 248, 254, 305
synthesis (in Kant) 48, 120-121, 146
synthetic judgment 48
T
Taylor, Charles 19
Teellinck, Willem 46
teleological thought 58, 141, 189-190,
211 (see final causality (finalism)
too)
territory 98, 159, 192
Thales 164
thanatos 63
theodicy 51
theological thought 43-47, 49, 54, 80,
95-96, 129
therapy 28, 39, 105
thoracic ganglion 61, 68
thumb 135
time: in Deleuze 15; in Proust 186,
250; relation to knowledge 46, 5051, 54
Tomiche, Anne 91
Tompkins, Jane 86-89, 93
totemism 164
335
Index
trace 157
traitor 8, 189, 192-194
transcendence 108, 139, 184-185, 220,
222, 229, 233, 243, 278
transcendent values 137, 233
transcendental empiricism (see
empiricism)
transcendental field 120, 241
transcendental illusions 48, 114
transcendental methodology 47-49, 57,
109-112, 120, 138, 197, 219, 238,
288, 304
transversality 28
trauma 127, 137
trickster 192
truth 15, 96, 109, 228-229, 236, 250;
in Hegel 51, 53-54
two-fold, the 277
typology 82, 265-266, 285
veil of ignorance 19
vibrations 98, 145-147, 208
vitalism 107-108
voluntary drives 64, 67-68, 271-273,
285-287, 298
W
war 268, 286, 288-292, 295
Westerink, Herman 39, 46, 136
Western civilization 257, 286, 297, 306
Westphal, Kenneth 54
white-collar work 71
Whitman, Walt 78, 83-85, 88-89, 94,
96-97, 102, 139, 203, 250, 260261, 306-307, 287-298; as Hegelian
291; his poetry 81, 93, 293-294;
Specimen Days 288
whirl 111
Will to Power 63, 118
Wippel, John 46
writing 193-195, 207, 210-214, 256,
278, 288-289, 305; bureaucratic
167, 170, 180; in Derrida 157, 163;
in D.H. Lawrence 40, 79-80, 93-94;
in T.E. Lawrence 281-284, 298; in
territorial representation 156, 167168; in Whitman 294, 296
Woolf, Virginia 184
U
umbrella 225, 242-244, 246, 255, 305
unconscious: in Deleuze and Guattari
33, 57, 106, 115-122, 124, 128,
140, 150, 160; in Freud 59-60, 63;
in Jung 65; in Lacan 130, 163; in
D.H. Lawrence 35, 59-62, 64, 66,
68, 72, 75, 84; as representative 60,
116, 118-119, 179, 304
Unionism 261, 296-299, 306
universal mind 109, 254
Y
Yeomans, Christopher 54
young Hegelians 43
V
Van Haute, Philippe 33, 37, 40, 57, 62,
64, 112-113, 116, 122, 125-127,
130-133, 135, 245
Van Gogh, Theo 257
Visker, Rudi 258
Z
iek, Slavoj 18, 21, 27-28, 191, 258
zones of indiscernibility 188, 281, 283,
298
Zourabichvili, Franois 23, 25
336

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TOWARDS A POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

IN THE WORK OF GILLES DELEUZE

FIGURES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 13

In loving memory of John Mr. John Makin,

The metaphysicians of Tln do not seek

1. Politics and the Problem of Human Nature: Political Anthropology

Introduction: Psychoanalysis as Idealism and D.H. Lawrence

Introduction: Language, Literature, and Lawrence

Introduction: From a Critique of Psychoanalysis

Introduction: to the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature

Introduction: Opinion as a Problem

Introduction: Liberalism and its Failures

My interest in philosophy began as an undergraduate at Fordham

From Psychoanalysis and Literature

lines of inquiry led to a political anthropology in the thought of Deleuze

Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States.

Deleuze, Politics, and the Problem of Human Nature

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

the increasingly globalized and pluralistic nature of the world, abandoning

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

reflection on human nature is itself intimately linked to a uniquely human

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

2.Deleuze and the Problem of Human Nature: Philosophical

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

and obtaining a better university position.20 Even if one treats this as a

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

the elucidation of a human condition, coordinates that form a framework

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

(metaphysical) psychoanalytic commitments, Deleuze and Guattaris political

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

of Lawrences thought on psychoanalysis and classic American literature is

terms of their emphasis on the body and reconceptualization of individuality,

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

knowledge, no author has taken up this issue specifically, their characterization

See, for example, Monique David-Mnards Deleuze et la psychanalyse: Laltercation, Tomas

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

in these terms, a trajectory within the history of philosophical thought that

1. Philosophy and Literature in Lawrence

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

For Lawrence, the role of literature is primary to that of philosophy; literature

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

The fact that Lawrence begins a book on psychoanalysis by describing

2. Psychoanalytic Reading in Freud, Bonaparte, and Lacan

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

repression all forms of perceived unsavoriness belonging to psychoanalysis.

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

Purloined Letter as a metaphor for psychoanalytic practice, a story that

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

3. A Note on Pollyanalytics and Problem of Critique

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

i.e., philosophy. Consequently, the theoretical work will succeed or fail to

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

4.Praxis and Philosophical Anthropology in Marx and Engels

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

5.A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

Descartes accounts for the unity of consciousness with a substance theory

Towards a Political Anthropology in the Work of Gilles Deleuze

One of substances defining characteristics is its independence, that that it

The Metaphysics of Psychoanalysis

2.Deleuze and the Problem of Human Nature: Philosophical

4.Praxis and Philosophical Anthropology in Marx and Engels

5.A Substance Theory of Mind and Theological Motivations in

10.Lawrence and the Psychoanalytic Tradition: Drive Theories and