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F R E N C H A N D B R I T I S H P O S T - WA R
IMPERIAL AGENDAS AND FORGING
AN ARMENIAN HOMELAND AFTER THE
GENOCIDE: THE FORMATION OF THE
L G I O N DO R I E N T I N O C T O B E R *
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Flinders University
I
On October , in the comfort of the French Embassy in London, Boghos
Nubar Pasha, the founder and rst president of the Armenian General
Benevolent Union (), and the head of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris from December , was shown the SykesPicot Agreement.
The British and French diplomats present at the meeting, Mark Sykes and
Francois Georges-Picot respectively, the co-authors of the SykesPicot Agreement, led Nubar to understand that the Armenian-populated areas of the
School of International Studies, Flinders University, GPO Box , Adelaide , South Australia
andrekos.varnava@inders.edu.au
* I would like to acknowledge the following people in the making of this article: Dr David
Close, Dr Matthew Fitzpatrick, Dr Evan Smith, and Ms Justine Tilman from Flinders University,
and the anonymous reviewers for The Historical Journal.
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Ottoman Empire would be divided into two parts after the war: one composing
the eastern vilayets of Van, Erzerum, Bitlis, Dersim, and Trabzon, under Russian
control, and the other including Cilicia and the three western vilayets of Sivas,
Kharput, and Diayarbekir, under French control. Thus, the Armenianpopulated areas of the Ottoman Empire would come under the protection of
two of the Allied powers of the Great War. Nubar recalled that Georges-Picot
had asserted that the French would be willing to grant the Armenians an
autonomous state under their control, but the Armenians should earn the
right to the liberation of their fatherland, by providing volunteers for a planned
expedition in Asia Minor. Accordingly, they agreed to form the Lgion
dOrient, with the following particulars:
. The constitution of the Lgion dOrient aimed to have Armenians contribute
to the liberation of their fatherland in exchange for granting them new
entitlements in line with their national aspirations.
. The Armenian Lgionnaires would only ght against the Ottoman Empire and
only on the soil of their fatherland.
. The Armenian Lgion would constitute the future nucleus of the Armenian army
in the future Armenian state.
Ibid.
Miscellany, box .
Despatch from General Allenby, Oct. , London Gazette, Dec. , TNA, War
Ofce (British) (WO) /; Boghos Nubar, Note, Dec. , NL, Lgion dOrient,
Armenian Volunteers, Miscellany, box .
See Simon Jackson, Diaspora politics and developmental empire: the Syro-Lebanese at the
League of Nations, Arab Studies Journal, (), pp. , at pp. .
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
Stanford Shaw, The Armenian Lgion and its destruction of the Armenian community of
Cilicia, in Turkkaya Ataov, ed., The Armenians in the late Ottoman period (Ankara, ),
pp. .
Ibid.; see also Mim Kemal Oke, The Armenian question, (Nicosia, ),
pp. .
Robert O. Krikorian, In defence of the homeland: New England Armenians and the
Lgion dOrient, in Marc A. Mamigonian, ed., Armenians of New England: celebrating a culture and
preserving a heritage (Belmont, MA, ), pp. . Not much academic material exists,
mostly memoirs. Of note is the exhibit honouring the Armenian Lgion titled Forgotten
heroes: the Armenian Lgion and the Great War, which was held in the Armenian Library and
Museum of America from Sept. to the end of Feb. .
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Yucel Guclu, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, (Salt Lake City, UT, ),
pp. ; see my review of Gucels book in Reviews in History, () (www.history.ac.uk/
reviews/review/); see also M. Serdar Palabiyik, Establishment and activities of French
Lgion dOrient (Eastern Lgion) in the light of French archival documents, Review of
Armenian Studies, (), pp. .
Halil Aytekin, Kbrsta Monarga (Bogaztepe) Ermeni Lejyonu Kamp (Monarga camp of
Armenian Lgion in Cyprus) (Ankara, ); Ulvi Keser, Kbrs, : Fransz Ermeni
kamplar I ngiliz esir kamplar ve Atatrk Kbrs Trk (Cyprus, : French Armenian
camps, British prisoner camps and Kemalist Cypriot Turks) (Istanbul, ); Ulvi Keser, KbrsAnadolu ekseninde Ermeni dogu Lejyonu (Armenian Eastern Lgion in the Cyprus-Anatolia axis)
(Ankara, ).
See David Murphy, The Arab revolt, : Lawrence sets Arabia ablaze (Oxford, );
and Martin Watts, The Jewish Legion and the First World War (New York, NY, ).
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
Armenians both the British and the French had used the Armenian Genocide
to create a public humanitarian response against Ottoman savagery. In his
recent study, Davide Rodogno has argued that European humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire date back to the s, but the humanitarianism usually hid behind the real motivations (and sometimes was an ex post
facto justication), which were usually political, imperial, economic, and/or
strategic, and intervention could only be made if more than one European
power was involved. In the case presented here, the incentive to win the war
was linked to post-war imperial expansion, thus motivating both the French and
the British to form the Lgion dOrient. This explains why the determination to
form it materialized only after the SykesPicot Agreement was signed.
European humanitarianism and imperialism and their links with the
Armenian Question must be understood within the broader Eastern
Question, and specically on how the three Allied powers in the First World
War all had a traditional claim to protecting the Christians in the Ottoman
Empire and a special relationship with the Armenians. This, of course, did not
automatically result in a decision to form the Lgion, since intervention, as
Rodogno showed, needed more than humanitarianism to propel it and was
often an ex post facto justication for intervention.
During the nineteenth century, a corollary of the Eastern Question was
how the Ottoman state recognized the European Powers, particularly the
French and the Russians, as the protectors of the Catholic (Maronite and other
eastern Catholics) and Orthodox Christians respectively. For example, in
the case of the French, the Catholic presence in Syria and to a lesser extent
Palestine propelled French imperial interests in this part of the Ottoman
Empire. The role of protecting Ottoman Christian minorities was extended to
the Armenians, but with signicant differences. Armenian protection was not
guided by religious afliation, although there was a religious dimension to
Russian feeling, particularly earlier in the century, but by liberalism (particularly for the British and French) and imperialism. In the Anglo-Turkish
Ibid.
After the Crimean War, Russia focused on the Slavic Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.
See Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, Panslavism and national identity in Russia and in the Balkans,
: images of the self and others (Boulder, CO. and New York, NY, ).
See, for example, ibid.; also Benedict Humphrey Sumner, Russia and the Balkans,
(Oxford, ); and Michael Boro Petrovich, The emergence of Russian panslavism,
(New York, NY, ).
For British liberal imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, see Andrekos Varnava, British
imperialism in Cyprus, : the inconsequential possession (Manchester, ); and
Andrekos Varnava, British and Greek liberalism and imperialism in the long nineteenth
century, in Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, ed., Liberal imperialism in Europe (London, ),
pp. . For information on French liberal imperialism, see J. P. Daughton, An empire
divided. Religion, republicanism, and the making of French colonialism, (Oxford, );
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
for French missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, see Owen White and J. P. Daughton, eds., In
Gods empire: French missionaries and the modern world (Oxford and New York, NY, ), chs. .
See, for the British case, the work of the following people in Cyprus: Emma Cons,
Armenian exiles in Cyprus, Contemporary Review, (), pp. ; Patrick Geddes,
Cyprus, actual and possible: a study in the Eastern Question, Contemporary Review, (),
Ibid., pp. . For the reforms issue, see TNA, FO//; British Library
(BL), India Ofce Records (IOR) Political and Secret Annual Files, IOR/L/PS// ;
Political and Secret Annual Files, IOR/L/PS// ; and Political and Secret Annual
Files, IOR/L/PS// .
Sarkis Torossian was one fascinating case. He was in charge of the rst fort at the
Dardanelles entrance and was awarded for his bravery in stopping the British attempt to force
the Dardanelles. He later served in the Lgion dOrient after discovering that family had died
during the Genocide. Sarkis Torossian, From Dardanelles to Palestine: a true story of ve battle fronts
of Turkey and her Allies and a harem romance (Boston, MA, ).
Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, pp. and ; Bloxham, The great game of
genocide, pp. .
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
II
Boghos Nubar rst proposed using Armenians as part of an Allied landing at
Alexandretta in November in order to protect Cilician Armenians, who he
feared would be massacred by the Ottomans in revenge for Armenians near the
Russian border joining the Russian army. The landing at Alexandretta appealed to many British strategic planners, especially General Sir John Maxwell,
Andrekos Varnava, Imperialism rst, the war second: the British, an Armenian Legion,
and deliberations on where to attack the Ottoman Empire, November April ,
Historical Research, Early View () (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/././abstract).
Cairo to Paris, Apr. , Paris, French Foreign Ministry Archives (FFMA), War
, Turkey, vol. , Armenian, I, Aug. to Dec. . Hereafter, volume in
Arabic numerals and issue in Roman numerals will be provided.
Boghos Nubar to Kevork V, Paris, July , Vatche Ghazarian, ed. and trans., Boghos
Nubars papers and the Armenian question, : documents (Waltham, MA, ), doc. ,
AA (hereafter, Boghos Nubar papers).
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Cassar, The French and the Dardanelles, pp. ; Les A. Carlyon, Gallipoli (New York, NY,
), pp. .
Watts, The Jewish Lgion and the First World War, pp. and ; see also Matityahu
Mintz, Pinhas Rutenberg and the establishment of the Jewish Lgion of , Studies in
Zionism, (), pp. ; Yanky Fachler, The Zion Mule Corps and its Irish commander,
History Ireland, (), pp. .
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
In any event, Grey informed the Colonial Ofce, which was being included in
the discussion because the scheme involved training the Armenians on Cyprus,
that he rejected it because the Army Council have repeatedly expressed the
view that half organised volunteer risings of this description would have little
military value and that they should not be encouraged. There is also little doubt
that such an expedition . . . would result in the massacre of many innocent
Armenians.
Despite the Army Council rejecting the Armenian scheme to raise a
contingent, various quarters pushed for one after the Ottoman extermination
policy. In July , the Armenian Committee of National Defence addressed a
letter to General Maxwell in Egypt, calling on British military action on the
Cilician coast in order to stop the massacres against the Armenians and that
there were Armenian volunteers in Egypt willing to participate. About a week
later, the Committee of Armenian National Defence reiterated their appeal to
Maxwell, disclosing that a volunteer movement under their direction was
developing in America and elsewhere. The committee recognized that it was
useless for the Entente to now land at Cilicia as previously suggested, but it could
not remain idle as reports of massacres continued to pour in. Modifying their
earlier proposal, the committee now wanted to concentrate a force in Cyprus
and make landings at Mersina and, if strong enough, at Beilan. If successful,
these actions could paralyse Ottoman movements in Asia Minor. Once they had
disembarked a large force from Cyprus they would have no difculty in holding
the Taurus, Anti-Taurus and Amanus Mountains against the Turks, especially
now that the latter are fully occupied with the Russians on the Caucasus and the
Anglo-French in Gallipoli. The committee was certain of , men now in
Russia, Greece, Armenia, Bulgaria, and America, and all that it wanted was for
British ofcers to train them on Cyprus.
British ofcials in Egypt continued to show interest. Lieutenant-Colonel
Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the high commissioner in Egypt since January
, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Sykes, a Conservative MP and a long time
traveller to the Ottoman Empire, to consult with Armenian representatives
in Cairo. There, on August, he discussed the proposal with Vahan Malezian, a
Cairo attorney and secretary to Boghos Nubar, and Mihran Damadian, a
Hunchak and a leader of the Sassoun rebellion of . Sykes informed
Maxwell of the plan, which called for the raising of , Armenians, , of
whom had fought in the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies, and the rest workers in
the US, who would be trained on Cyprus to land on the northern Syrian coast,
landing about men to seize Suedieh and create disorder in the vicinity,
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
with the rest forming bands of about fty and landing at various points between
Ayas and Piyas, pushing north towards Zeitun and Albistan, and there operate as
comitajis (irregular ghting units) along Macedonian lines. From approval of
the scheme, the force would be operational in eight weeks, so if approved on
August, operations would commence on October, allowing the force to
enter the mountains before the snow began. The Armenians only needed from
the Allies arms, munitions, transport, and cover for their landing. Sykes opined
that the concentration of such a force on Cyprus would be protable even if
held in reserve, causing the enemy uneasiness as regards a vulnerable point,
and might be useful as a feint to conceal other operations. Sykes added that it
would be better to give the Armenians something to do rather than have them
become restless and perhaps divided. Also, the French would need to approve
and could provide their contingent at the Dardanelles as an army of occupation
of the Adana Vilayet if the scheme succeeded.
The Russians, desirous of having another front in Anatolia or Syria to relieve
pressures in Transcaucasia, pushed the British with a similar scheme put
forward by Captain A. H. Torcom, a Bulgarian Armenian serving in the Russian
army. Torcom visited George Buchanan, the British ambassador extraordinary
and plenipotentiary at Petrograd, leaving with him his scheme for the
organization of Armenian volunteers for service against the Ottoman Empire.
Torcom claimed that he could recruit , men into ten battalions, and
perhaps even , men into thirty battalions, through recruiting centres at
Alexandria, Marseilles, Liverpool, and New York. The corps would be concentrated at Egypt and under the command of either the French or the British.
Buchanan told Torcom that he sympathized with the scheme and its cause, but
believed it would be hard to gather the volunteers and provide them with
arms.
Despite Russian encouragement, the Ottoman extermination policy, and the
military benets outlined by the Armenian committee in Cairo and Torcom,
the War Ofce stood rm in rejecting the schemes, a decision the Foreign
Ofce supported. Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Ofce minuted that
the scheme proposed by the Committee is not over ambitious and might be
successful, if only in creating a diversion . . . [but] the difculty is that the Turks
would immediately take reprisals on the Armenians actually in their power, and
massacres would immediately follow in Constantinople and elsewhere.
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
As for Torcoms proposal, the Army Council thought it more practical than
any of the others previously submitted, but the results likely to be achieved . . .
are not such . . . to justify His Majestys Government in supporting the scheme in
view of the difculties that its adoption would entail, and of the Financial
responsibilities in which it would involve this country.
The War and Foreign Ofces had a number of reasons to oppose the
formation of an Armenian Lgion. In a reverse-type of humanitarianism, their
approach to preventing massacres was not to provoke the Ottomans or to
embark upon a humanitarian intervention in response to predicted massacres
of allies in the event of a landing. This takes further the cases explored by
Rodogno across the century before the Great War started, where he shows how
humanitarian intervention required both a favourable European political
climate and one or more European powers believing that their interests, usually
imperial, were at threat before intervening. Ultimately, this was a weak
position, alongside the Armenian approach, which was to defend themselves
against the inevitable through the formation of an Armenian Lgion. In weighing up the idea, the British also determined that the investment in nance,
materials, and training did not justify the potential results. These potential
results must be understood in two ways: defeating the Ottoman Empire and in
post-war spoils (i.e. imperialism). Both British and German military personnel
wrote after the war, so with the benet of hindsight, that they were bewildered
that the British and French had not attacked Alexandretta in because the
area was an Ottoman point of weakness in so many ways, while British
intelligence in the area was certainly aware of this. What was missing from the
equation was the additional gains war spoils and therefore imperialism and
these had not been considered let alone determined, while the area was as
much a French interest as it was of British interest.
III
The British rejection of an Armenian Lgion was further reected in the British
and French rejection of General Maxwells plan to use the able-bodied Musa
Dagh survivors to launch raids on Alexandretta, and in the subsequent French
rejection of a French Armenian Lgion.
The story of the Musa Dagh refugees, made famous in Franz Werfels
epic tale, warrants a separate article, yet for the purposes of this article it is
necessary to establish how the refugees played an important part in why the
French were approached to form the Lgion in and rejected it, and the
Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Ellison, deputy quartermaster general during the Gallipoli
campaign, and Paul von Hindenburg, chief of the German General Staff.
See Varnava, Imperialism rst, the war second; and Andrekos Varnava, British military
intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War, War in History, (), pp. .
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
For the dramatization, see the famous novel by Franz Werfel, The forty days of Musa Dagh,
intro. Peter Sourian (New York, NY, , rst published in German, ).
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
racial factors. Clausons other claim that the Armenians ghting at Musa
Dagh were part of an insurrection, that is, part of one of the Armenian
revolutionary groups that had now revolted, was also wrong. The Musa Dagh
Armenians were resisting deportation, and doing a good job of ghting the
mutual Ottoman enemy.
General Maxwell believed this, writing to Kitchener that
everything should be done, I think, to help the movement, and, with either Cyprus
or Rhodes taking their women and children, it will make an important diversion
from the Dardanelles if we can promote the Armenian movement. I think it is
advisable to exercise a little pressure in Cyprus.
Maxwell was bored with his role of providing training and supplies to troops
destined for Gallipoli and Salonika (his transfer request was honoured in March
, whereupon he was posted to Ireland and notoriously put down the Easter
Rebellion), so action closer to Egypt excited him. The War Ofce, not understanding the urgency of the situation, wanted more information because it
disbelieved the number of Armenians holding off the Ottoman forces.
With no answer on September, Paul Cambon, the French ambassador
to London, informed the Foreign Ofce that the admiral wanted to transport
the refugees to Cyprus or Egypt, while on the same day Maxwell informed
the War Ofce that the French admiral had already loaded the ,
refugees onto cruisers and that they should be taken to Cyprus or Rhodes.
See Varnava, British imperialism in Cyprus, pp. ; for an exploration of the Cypriot
political-religious elite and their gradual move away from co-operation with the Ottomans and
British to hostility, see Michalis N. Michael, Panaretos, : his struggle for absolute
power during the era of Ottoman administrative reforms, in Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N.
Michael, eds., The archbishops of Cyprus in the modern age: the changing role of the ArchbishopEthnarch, their identities and politics (Newcastle upon Tyne, ), pp. ; Kyprianos D. Louis,
Makarios I, : the Tanzimat and the role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, in ibid.,
pp. ; Andrekos Varnava, Sophronios III, : the last of the old and the rst of
the new Archbishop-Ethnarchs?, in ibid., pp. ; Andrekos Varnava and Irene
Pophaides, Kyrillos II, : the rst Greek nationalist and Enosist ArchbishopEthnarch, in ibid., pp. ; for an understanding of how Europeans and educated Cypriots
established a provincial high society and exploited the peasantry and working classes, see
Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, society and politics in Cyprus (Nicosia, ); and Marc Aymes,
The port-city in the elds: investigating an improper urbanity in mid-nineteenth-century
Cyprus, Mediterranean Historical Review, (), pp. ; for an introduction into Cypriot
society at the time of the Great War, the importance of the Cypriot Mule Corps and the impact
of the Armenian Lgion, see Andrekos Varnava, Famagusta during the Great War: from
backwater to bustling, Michael Walsh and Tamas Kiss, eds., Famagusta: city of empires (
) (Newcastle upon Tyne, forthcoming ).
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
For an example of how this happened in Cyprus, between John Clauson, the high
commissioner, and the authorities in London, see Varnava, British imperialism in Cyprus,
pp. , and Varnava, British military intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War.
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
to work. The Armenians told Defrance that they had resisted the Ottomans
for over forty days and wanted to continue ghting the Turks. Defrance
informed Paris that Maxwell had spoken to Dimlekian about the British using
the Armenians to raid Alexandretta and that Defrance had told Dimlekian that
the French and British were co-operating on this because the French were not
competing with the British.
Although Maxwell was interested in using the Musa Dagh Armenians to form
a Lgion, he was not interested in those that could not ght. Defrance and
Maxwell proposed to their respective governments that the French would cover
the expenses of the Armenian refugees and an Armenian Lgion should be
formed to launch raids on the Syrian and Cilician coasts. Soon, the various
opinions on the formation of an Armenian Lgion manifested. Lieutenant de
Saint Quentin in Cairo opined that a raid by Armenians in the Alexandretta
region would attract the Ottomans to the region and should therefore not be
attempted so long as the French and British still had designs on the region.
A member of the Foreign Ministry suggested forming a committee of
Armenians to appeal for support from the Armenian diaspora, notably in the
US, but the bottom line was that, like the British government, the French did
not want to encourage a rebellion which did not have good prospects of success.
Ultimately, however, both governments would decide together. Maxwell
pushed for a decision because he wanted the refugees to leave as he worried
they would become frustrated if they remained idle. Grey informed his
French counterpart that the French were responsible for nding work for the
refugees, and suggested work on the Gallipoli beaches. Thophile Delcass,
in one of his last acts as foreign minister, informed Cairo that he had agreed
with Grey that the Armenian refugees should be sent as labourers to Mudros.
Indeed a French military agent in Egypt attempted to recruit from the Musa
Dagh refugees for service at Gallipoli and Mudros.
Yet the voices supporting the formation of the Musa Dagh refugees into a
combat unit were numerous. Arshag Hovhannes Tsobanian (or Chobanian), an
Ottoman Armenian in Paris, and a famous writer, journalist, and editor,
suggested to the Foreign Ministry that the refugees be formed into combat
units, especially since, in his view, the Armenian struggle in Cilicia and the
surrounding mountains was not lost. Indeed, Defrance informed Paris that
Perhaps this is where Werfel got the idea of the forty days, since it was actually fty-three.
Three letters, Defrance to FM, Sept. , pp. , FFMA, , I.
Ibid., Defrance to FM, Sept. , p. .
Ibid., Defrance to FM, Sept. , p. .
Ibid., Defrance to FM, Sept. , p. .
Ibid., French military, Defrance, to FM, Oct. , p. .
Ibid., Bertie, undated, pp. .
Ibid., Paris to FM, Oct. .
Lord Bertie to FO, Oct. , TNA, FO//, pp. .
Tsobanian to Paris, Sept. , p. , FFMA, , I.
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
the Musa Dagh leaders did not want to work as labourers and they should not be
treated like Ottoman prisoners or like Somalis employed at Mudros. Then,
Vice-Admiral Gabriel Darrieus, the new commander of the rd Squadron on
the Syrian coast, weighed in, informing Paris that the Armenian refugees
wanted revenge on the Turks, not to work as labourers. He favoured using them
as combatants in their native region, particularly in a raid to cut Ottoman rail
communications.
But the voices of opposition weighed more heavily. The French Foreign
Ministry and Defrance in Cairo thought establishing an Armenian Lgion and
using it to raid the Alexandretta area would be a bad idea and it was best to
employ them at Mudros. Captain E. De Jonquires of the French navy, agreed,
rejecting an Armenian corps of irregular troops because this might provoke the
Turks, and although the Armenians may not like it, they should be pushed to
work as labourers at Mudros. Cambon reported that the British and he were
sceptical about encouraging an Armenian uprising in Cilicia because of
Ottoman reprisals and were coming around to the idea of employing them at
Mudros, well away from Egypt where they might cause mischief. The French
War Ministry agreed, although worried about using the Armenians as labourers
because of their lack of aptitude, the naval authorities were opposed to
forming them into a ghting unit. The new French foreign minister and
prime minister, Aristide Briand, agreed with the reservations over forming an
Armenian Lgion, which were also shared by Defrance, because it would merely
provoke further Turkish massacres.
Ofcially, however, it seems that the French authorities in Cairo were not
informed of this decision. In December , Defrance messaged Paris that the
male Armenian refugees wanted to return to their mountains after being
trained and armed and that if the government approved the French authorities
in Egypt would arrange this.
IV
One of the reasons given for rejecting an Armenian Lgion in was that it
would incite the Ottomans to implement more massacres, but this reason was
overcome in January . In a letter to the French military authorities in
Egypt, the War Ministry instructed it to proceed with forming an Armenian
Lgion. Then, in a letter to members of the Armenian Defence Committee in
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
Cairo, the British and French military representatives in Egypt agreed to form a
Lgion only if they would not be held responsible for more Ottoman massacres.
The number of Armenians likely to serve is so small as to be at the present time of no
interest to the Allied Powers; the only object of their employment is to give to the
Armenians some material claim to their reinstatement in their original country; it is
therefore a matter of purely Armenian interest . . . [Therefore], the Allied
Governments are free of any moral responsibility for reprisals or acts of violence
on the part of the Turks that may be regarded as reprisals for the employment of
these volunteers.
Based on this extraordinary condition, the Armenian committee was told that
the Allied Governments are prepared to form a Volunteer force from the
Armenian refugees of Djebal Moussa and from such other Armenian
Volunteers as may be sent in by the Committee.
The deal the Armenian National Committee was being asked to accept was
unbalanced. The Allied governments would administer military training; provide arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and boots; and employ the volunteers
only in the districts of Cilicia and Lesser Armenia with which the Armenians
are as natives familiar. On the other hand, the Armenian committee was
responsible for proving each volunteer with a ration allowance and pay totalling
PT (Egyptian Piastres) per diem; six trained men as sous-ofcers, funded by
the committee; extra pay of PT a day for volunteers given responsible positions; and material for clothing since not all the volunteers would wear
uniforms. It is obvious from both the tone and the content of the letter that the
French government had approved the detailed and specic proposals.
Despite this change of heart, this time it was the Armenians who rejected the
formation of a Lgion. Defrance informed Paris that the matter of forming an
Armenian force was in doubt because the Armenian National Defence
Committee believed that activities by such a force would provoke dangerous
Turkish reprisals. The Hunchak party, however, was pressing the French naval
commander to hasten the arming of Armenians, but Vice-Admiral Moreau,
commander of the rd Squadron, opposed using the Musa Dagh refugees in
this way. Defrance, however, believed that the option should be open. The
strongest opposition came from the most inuential Armenian, Boghos Nubar.
In a letter to Moreau on March, he conrmed his position rst taken on
March that he opposed any Armenian action that could lead to retaliations
on Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, including the formation of a volunteer
Lgion. He argued that if Armenians wanted to ght, they should enlist with
one of the Allies. In Nubars letter, which Defrance sent to Briand, he
Ibid.
Ibid.
Boghos Nubar to Admiral Moreau, Port Said, Mar. , p. , FFMA, , II, Turkey,
Jan. to Mar. .
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
expressed concern over the British training about Musa Dagh Armenians in
order to blow up railway bridges in Alexandretta and was relieved that the idea
was abandoned after the Armenian bishop in Cairo and the Eastern Orthodox
patriarch of Alexandria objected for fear of Ottoman reprisals. The concerns
over retaliations must be understood within the context of the Genocide and its
progress, since it implies that there were still some Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire that had escaped it, but unlike six months earlier these Armenians were
isolated and not in a position to be protected by an Entente landing with an
Armenian contribution.
Nubars rejection carried much weight, despite the obvious power imbalance
alongside the French and British. Indeed, Defrance believed that the question
of raising an Armenian Lgion was nally closed. Then, seemingly, the nal
nail in the cofn came from the French War Ministry, which announced that
French law forbade the enlistment of enemy nationals into the French army.
V
It was not, however, the nal nail in the cofn. The proposal was resurrected
and agreed to in August by the commander-in-chief of the French army
and the French government and ofcially agreed to by all parties concerned in
October.
On June , the British Foreign Ofce informed its French counterpart
that it had received a request to free Armenian prisoners of war held in India
and wanted to know whether the French had any plans to use the Armenians in
any way related to the war. Then, on July, Cambon informed the Foreign
Ministry that an idea was being examined to form an Armenian corps on
Cyprus, at French expense, since a recent agreement ceded large parts of
Armenia to France. Here lies the reason for the resurrection of the proposal
to form an Armenian Lgion, but before exploring this further it is important to
complete the story. Over two weeks followed before Cambon updated the
Foreign Ministry that Brigadier-General Gilbert Clayton, of the Arab Bureau in
Cairo, in discussions with Georges-Picot, suggested that the Armenian refugees
in Egypt and those imprisoned in India could be made into soldiers and
grouped on Cyprus to dissuade the Ottomans from moving all their troops
southwards against the sherif of Mecca. The British suggested that the
Armenians be trained and armed by French ofcers, which Cambon thought
would show French strength without enlarging their eld of operations and
control the Armenian partisans who might seek to create principalities in
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
northern Syria. Also, it offered a solution as to what to do with the Musa Dagh
refugees, who refused to take jobs or act as auxiliaries.
The resurrection of the idea to form an Armenian Lgion was largely due to
the SykesPicot Agreement. This was what Cambon meant when he mentioned
the cession of Armenian populated territories to France in a recent agreement.
When the Gallipoli expedition failed, resulting in Bulgaria joining the Central
Powers, and when the British offer of Cyprus to Greece, in order for that
country to aid Serbia immediately, also failed, the British and the French (and
indeed the Russians) needed to work together more closely. Consequently, they
decided that they needed to focus on what their aims were in defeating the
Ottoman Empire, and given Russian ambitions on Constantinople and
Transcaucasia (reected in a separate agreement with the Russian foreign
minister, Sergei Sazonov), French interests in Syria and Cilicia, and British
interests in Egypt and Mesopotamia, it became obvious that the military effort
needed to concentrate on where the British and French interests were. These
interests were captured in the SykesPicot Agreement, negotiated and signed by
Franois Georges-Picot for the French and Mark Sykes for the British on May
. Sazonov played an important role in the agreement, since it was he who
proposed to Picot that France obtain a share of Ottoman Armenia (i.e. Cilicia),
which pleased Picot, who was in the highest spirits over his new Castle in
Armenia. The SykesPicot Agreement divided the Ottoman vilayets from
Adana to Basra into either direct or indirect (where an Arab state would be
created) spheres of French or British control. Cilicia (mostly in the Adana
vilayet) and neighbouring Ottoman vilayets with a substantial Armenian population would come under direct French control; with the other vilayets populated by Armenians coming under Russian protection. British and French
imperial rivalry was suddenly reinvented and a new collaborative relationship
was formed, linking the successful prosecution of the war with post-war imperial
expansion.
Once French and British post-war imperial expansion was settled upon, it
did not take long for them to embark upon a determined effort to form an
Armenian Lgion. On August the commander-in-chief of the French army,
General Joseph Joffre, accepted the proposal to form an Armenian Lgion.
Joffre agreed with General Pierre Roques, the minister of war, a close friend
from their days at the cole Polytechnique in the s, that forming an
Armenian Lgion on Cyprus was an opportunity to threaten the Ottomans and
allow the Allies to support a revolt against the Ottomans if desirable. If the
Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France overseas: the Great War and the
climax of French Imperial expansion (London, ), p. .
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Ibid.
Ibid., FM to WM, Aug. , pp. .
Ibid., Roques to Briand, Aug. , pp. .
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
corollary of the SykesPicot agreement and because it would propel AngloFrench military co-operation in the Levant. Cambon did not ask if the British
agreed to the Lgion; instead, he asked how many militarily t Armenians the
British held. The War Ofce informed Grey that there were in Egypt
(Musa Dagh refugees) and another prisoners of war in India, but how many
were t for combat and would consent to ght was unknown. The prisoners at
Sumerpur, India, the India Ofce opined, would do well, having been taken
from the Ottoman army in Mesopotamia. As for the Musa Dagh refugees in
Egypt, the director of military intelligence, Major-General Macdonogh, believed
that few had martial qualities, while he claimed that Brigadier-General Clayton
was against the idea because they were not of good ghting material,
contradicting French views of Claytons position. A labour company was formed
in Egypt from amongst the refugees for work on the defences of the canal, while
Maxwell was considering using them as muleteers in Salonika to augment the
Macedonian (Cypriot) Mule Corps. In any event, Sir Ronald Graham, of the
Ministry of the Interior in Cairo, revealed that there were about capable
men at the Armenian refugee camp, but that he had failed to induce any to
volunteer for the Macedonian Mule Corp or for a labour camp, and felt that
compulsion might be needed.
The Foreign Ofce replied to Cambon without stating that the British
government had accepted or rejected the proposed scheme, although it
implied that it had accepted it because it only encouraged it. The letter
disclosed how many Armenians were under British authority and that Clauson
had been requested to provide information on a camp.
The initial Colonial Ofce view was neither negative nor positive. There was,
a minute stated, no reason why such a body should not be sent to Cyprus were it
not that it might have very bad political results on the Moslem population of the
Island who do not like Armenians. This was a gross generalization. The
Colonial Ofce decided to wait for Clausons views before ofcially giving its
own. Clauson was a notoriously stubborn high commissioner: in October
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
, he had refused to inform the Greek and Turkish Cypriot political elites
that the British government had formally offered to cede the island to Greece
because he did not want to upset the loyal Muslim elites; he had a difcult
relationship with the military intelligence ofcers working on Cyprus and Egypt
because they considered him too negligent on security and he considered the
military intelligence ofcers too intrusive; and nally his rejection of the
Musa Dagh refugees. This time, Clauson was obliging, informing Bonar Law
that there were difculties of sea and land transport and the necessity of
importing many necessities at much expense and delay, and it was advisable to
minimise contact with the Cypriot Turks who are uneasy . . . For these reasons
I would recommend that a secluded site in the north or east of the island be
sought. Bonar Law informed Cambon that he agreed with Clauson on
minimizing contact with the Cypriot Turks.
The military and government authorities in Egypt had mixed views about the
scheme. McMahon, Graham, and General Archibald Murray, commander-inchief of the troops in Egypt, were pleased to be rid of the Musa Dagh refugees
and that the force was not going to be trained in Egypt, but Murray stated
that the British authorities were unable to provide equipment or training, so the
French had to take all responsibility. He was also unhappy with Cypruss
selection as the training base: I do not consider that Cyprus would be a
desirable place in which to train these men but no doubt it will be possible to
nd some other locality which is in French occupation. Graham agreed,
stating that there seems no reason that we should undertake their training
in Cyprus and I imagine that the authorities in Cyprus would not encourage
any idea of the kind. The French now hold several islands in the eastern
Mediterranean, which are equally, or almost equally, suitable for the purpose.
Both Graham and Murray were wrong, as the French wanted Cyprus and
Clauson had agreed, although he had never been asked to agree or disagree
as one Foreign Ofce minute put it, Clauson implied a grudging acceptance.
During September, the French remained apprehensive about the British
position on an Armenian Lgion on Cyprus. On September, Defrance
Cambon, Sept. , TNA, CO//, w./; CO, to FO, Aug. ,
TNA, FO////.
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
informed the Foreign Ministry that the French were training about
Armenian refugees in Port Said, but the British preferred to send them to
Salonika as muleteers, although the British merely wanted to be rid of them. He
wanted advice on whether the French government wanted them or not, and if
the French wanted them whether they would pay the cost of keeping them and
their families. Colonel T. G. Hamelin, of the French General Staff second
section Africa, learned that the British were opposed to using Cyprus and so the
French should drop the idea, adding that the Armenians were not worth the
money to compensate the British. But then Defrance sent to Briand two
documents detailing discussions on the ground between French and British
ofcers over what to do with the Musa Dagh refugees that showed that a Lgion
under French command in Cyprus was feasible. In Bremonds letter to
Defrance he detailed the number of Musa Dagh refugees at Port Said, those t
for service, the training already undertaken, and the constructive discussions
with two British ofcers, General Althem and Colonel Elgood, over using the
Armenians. Discussions between Defrance and McMahon showed that the
British had found the Armenians difcult, and would be pleased to be rid of
them.
It was not until September that Cambon informed Briand that the British
did not oppose the creation of an Armenian Lgion, but wanted it camped in
northern or eastern Cyprus where there were fewer Muslims. He also informed
Briand on the number of Armenians under British control (in Egypt and India)
who could form the nucleus of the corps. Although the proposal for a Lgion
was moving towards acceptance, a nal decision had not yet been taken.
Meanwhile, the Musa Dagh refugees were growing restless. The French navy
in the Mediterranean reported to the Naval Ministry that some Musa Dagh
Armenians had protested to the minister of state, Denys Cochin, about being
enrolled in the British army and asking to be employed as paid guides for the
French in their country. The letter, dated September (but not sent to
Briand until October), thanked France for saving them from certain
extermination and declared that they considered themselves under French
protection. They had started military training, but it was stopped without
explanation, and the British offered them work (i.e. as muleteers in Salonika),
which did not match the assurances they were previously given (i.e. that they
would ght the Ottomans on their home soil). They were now told that the
planned operations (i.e. at Alexandretta) could have devastating consequences
for Armenians still in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, they wanted to continue
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
Ibid., Defrance to FM, Sept. , p. , and military attach, Cairo, to FM, Sept.
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
refugees (, francs a month) over the last year and take on the expense of
caring for the women, children, and elderly. Finally, on October, the
Foreign Ofce ofcially informed Cambon that there was no objection to
releasing any of the men in the refugee camp to form the Lgion on Cyprus.
Egypt, however, was not informed about the ofcial decision. McMahon asked
the Foreign Ofce for answers after two French ofcers visited him about
transporting the Armenians to Cyprus. Although the Foreign Ofce had
consented to the French government, it had not been informed of French
procedures to transport and train the Armenians on Cyprus. As late as
October, Defrance had informed the Foreign Ministry that he had word that
Murray opposed Cyprus as the training base. On that day, however, Romieu
met Murray and they agreed for the Lgion to be trained on Cyprus, but Murray
would await approval from the War Ofce and Clauson. On October,
Cambon informed the Foreign Ministry that London had informed its
authorities in Egypt to facilitate departure of Armenians to Cyprus. Indeed,
Grey informed Egypt that the French had appointed Romieu to arrange with
the Egyptian authorities for the transportation of the militarily t Armenian
refugees to Cyprus for training. The British military in Egypt, however, would
only comply if the War Ofce, which Grey had kept in the dark, approved.
Eventually, the Foreign Ofce informed the War Ofce of its decision.
Meanwhile, arrangements were also made for the British to transport the
Armenian prisoners of war in India to Cyprus, earning the ire of one
Colonial Ofce minion: I am not impressed with this method of raising
troops. The French government was so pleased with the British government
that Cambon asked the British also to send to Cyprus the Armenian
prisoners of war near Bombay. The Foreign Ofce agreed, informing the
authorities in Egypt that the Armenian patriarch was travelling to India to
persuade them to enrol themselves under French ag. For the British, the
WO to FO, Oct. , TNA, FO//// (M. I..); commander-in-chief Egypt to chief of the General Staff, Oct. , TNA, FO//.
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
French Armenian Lgion was a joint Allied project, as was inadvertently stated
by the Foreign Ofce to the India Ofce.
The nal arrangements were left to Clauson and Romieu in Cyprus, again
reecting the important role of local agents and men on the ground. Defrance
informed the Foreign Ministry that the British Foreign Ofce had nally
telegraphed Clauson that Armenians would go to Cyprus. Indeed, a letter
dated October reveals that the Cyprus government informed Romieu
that a site had been found at Monarga, a Muslim Cypriot hamlet (despite earlier
concerns about interaction with Cypriot Muslims) sixteen miles north of
Famagusta, and near Boghaz, an Orthodox Christian hamlet, at the base of the
Karpass Peninsula. Three weeks passed, before Clauson telegraphed Bonar
Law with this fact, where he also revealed that the rst Armenians would arrive
by the end of November. Romieu informed his superiors of his meeting with
Clauson on October, with the only outstanding question remaining that of
transporting and settling the non-combatants on Cyprus. The nal question
for the British was secrecy. The Colonial Ofce ordered Clauson to keep a strict
watch on the correspondence from Cyprus with a view to suppressing
reference to the Armenian Corps at Monarga. Accordingly, John Fenn, the
acting chief secretary, ordered the military authorities on the island to suppress
references to the Armenian corps.
The Colonial Ofce was concerned at the establishment of the French
Armenian camp in Cyprus. W. D. Ellis, a secretary in the Colonial Ofce who
had rst dealt with Cyprus in , claimed that you cannot bring some
thousands of Armenians to Cyprus without the Government being injured in
the matter, especially because the Armenians were unpopular with both
Greeks and Turks again projecting an observation of Anatolian politics onto
Cyprus, where Armenians were a small minority. He hoped that Clauson
would prevent any difculties arising.
Lastly, there remained convincing Boghos Nubar Pasha, who had been left
out of the decision-making process until October. In Paris, on October ,
Nubar was informed about the establishment of the Lgion dOrient and
Letter, Oct. , Nicosia, Cypriot State Archives (CSA), Secretariat Archive (SA),
SA//.
Ahmet An, The Cypriot Armenian minority and their cultural relationship with the
Turkish Cypriots, in Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, and Marina Elia, eds., The minorities
of Cyprus: development patterns and the identity of the internal-exclusion (Newcastle upon Tyne,
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
Boghos Nubar meeting with Gout, Paris, Oct. , Boghos Nubar papers, doc. ,
FA.
A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA
VI
This article has tapped into various historiographies in order to answer the
complex question of why and how the Lgion dOrient was formed in October
. These historiographies included: French and British imperialism in the
eastern Mediterranean; the French and British war effort and war spoils at
the expense of the Ottoman Empire; French and British interventions in the
Ottoman Empire and responses to the Armenian Genocide; and Armenian
efforts to avenge the Genocide and forge a safe homeland. Overall, the French,
British, and Armenians had different agendas, yet exhibited a similar cautious
attitude to bringing to fruition these different aims, as shown by the various
rejections of the formation of an Armenian Lgion, until, for the French and
British, they had determined on the war spoils in the SykesPicot Agreement of
May .
The eventual formation of an Armenian Lgion under French auspices in
October reected in every way the differing agendas of the three parties
involved, as well as French and British determination to form it after the Sykes
Picot Agreement. For the French, the Lgion allowed them to contribute
manpower to a military theatre of imperial importance where otherwise they
could not, because troops were preoccupied ghting elsewhere, especially the
western front. This theatre was of growing importance because both the French
and the British had imperial designs on the Ottoman Empire once defeated,
and in the French case they planned to use the Armenians not only as proxies
to liberate their homeland but as part of the army of occupation after. The
formation of the Lgion also beneted the British. They were relieved of
Armenians in their care in Egypt and India, which was becoming a nuisance
for local ofcials. Secondly, it allowed them to accept the French as partners in
the campaign in the Middle East by adding it was hoped once trained French
troops, without the British expending any resources, with the exception of space
for training them in Cyprus. For Armenian political elites, it was initially a
defence against what they believed would be Ottoman massacres in revenge for
Armenians joining the Russian army in the Caucasus, and what they hoped
would lead to Armenian autonomy, and certainly at the time of accepting it, the
lure of a safe homeland under French protection was too great.
It is important to understand that in order to achieve the formation of the
Lgion dOrient, a signicant hurdle was overcome, namely the traditional
F O R M I N G T H E L G I O N DO R I E N T
British and French imperial rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean. This was
reinvented to bring about a greater French military contribution to the Middle
East theatre (via the Armenian volunteers), and as evidenced by the SykesPicot
Agreement, the British were willing to accept a formal French empire in
portions of three (Sivas, Harput, and Diyarbakir) of the so-called six Armenian
vilayets, parts of Adana vilayet, and the Syrian coast, not because they were not
interested in these areas themselves, because they were certainly interested in
Alexandretta, but because this territory was of less interest to them than
Mesopotamia and Palestine. If this territory had been of prime imperial interest
to the British they would have accepted to undertake the Armenian Lgion
scheme when rst proposed in late or during . Moreover, by
providing the French with the use of Cyprus, which had been under British
occupation and administration since and annexed in , as well as
facilitating the recruitment of Armenian men for the Lgion from Egypt and
India, the British were aiding the French in achieving their imperial ambitions
in the eastern Mediterranean, which, although tied to the war effort, could
threaten existing British imperial interests in Cyprus and Egypt, and new ones
in Mesopotamia and Palestine.
It is also important to understand the complex power balances at play.
Although the Armenian political elites were able to once reject the formation of
the Lgion early in , they had done so by drawing upon the exact reason
the British and French had given to reject it in the likely Ottoman
massacres against Armenians and thus on humanitarian grounds that could not
be questioned. The Armenians were clearly in the weaker position, having failed
to convince the British and French to form the Lgion in , while not being
able to resist its formation once the great powers had become determined to
form it late in , especially since there were by now few Armenians left in the
Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Armenian desire to forge a safe and secure
homeland was reliant on French imperialism, which was dependent, as
discussed above, largely on British military prowess in the Middle East. What
kind of Armenian autonomy would the French grant the Armenians who are
being asked to ght for it when according to the SykesPicot Agreement
Cilicia and its surrounding areas were to come under formal French imperial
control? The French (and British) were using the Armenians for their own postwar imperial agenda(s), reecting the obvious power imbalance, and
humanitarianism, in response to the Genocide, was merely an afterthought, if
that, since the Lgion remained a public secret. In this way, this episode of
humanitarianism clashing with imperialism resembles some of the examples
discussed in Rodognos book. The fact that the French pulled out of their deal
with the Armenians in (a subject deserving revisiting elsewhere) indicates
the weakness of their humanitarian impulse as much as their weak imperial
impulse and imperial capabilities at the end of the long nineteenth century.