Fmea - Aiag Manual

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POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND
EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
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REFERENCE MANUAL
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The content of this document is the technical equivalent of SAE J-1739.

Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) should be used by
suppliers to companies subscribing to QS-9000 or equivalent document.
First Edition Issued February, 1993 Second Edition, February, 1995 Third Edition, July, 2001
Copyright 1993, 1995, 2001
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation
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FOREWORD
1st and 2nd Edition
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This reference Manual and Reporting Format was developed by the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) teams at Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, working under the auspices of the Automotive
Division of the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC) and the Automotive Industry Action Group
(AIAG).
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The ASQC/AIAG Task Force charter is to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats
and technical nomenclature used by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors in their respective supplier quality
systems. Accordingly, this manual and format, which is approved and endorsed by Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors, should be used by suppliers implementing FMEA techniques into their design/
manufacturing processes.
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In the past, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors each had their own guidelines and formats for insuring
supplier FMEA compliance. Differences between these guidelines and formats resulted in additional
demands on supplier resources. To improve upon this situation, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors agreed
to develop, and, through AIAG, distribute this Manual. The work group responsible for the Manual was led
be George Baumgartner of Ford Motor Company.
This Manual provides general guidelines for preparing an FMEA. It does not give specific instructions on
how to arrive at each FMEA entry, a task best left to each FMEA team. This Manual also is not intended to
be a comprehensive FMEA reference source or training document.
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While these guidelines are intended to cover all situation normally occurring either in the design phase or
process analysis, there will be questions that arise. These questions should be directed to your customer's
Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) activity. If you are uncertain as to how to contact the appropriate SQA
activity, the buyer in your customer's Purchasing office can help.
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The Task Force gratefully acknowledges: the leadership and commitment of Vice Presidents Thomas T.
Stallkamp at Chrysler, Norman F. Ehlers at Ford, and J. Ignasio Lopez de Arriortua of General Motors; the
assistance of the AIAG in the development, production, and distribution of the Procedure; the guidance of
Task Force principals Russ Jacobs (Chrysler), Steve Walsh (Ford), Dan Reid (General Motors), and Rad
Smith; and the assistance of the ASQC Automotive Division Reading Team. This team, led by Tripp Martin
(Peterson Spring), reviewed the Manual for technical content and accuracy and made valuable
contributions to form and content. Since the Manual was developed to meet specific needs of the
automotive industry, the ASQC voluntary standards process defined by ASQC policies and procedures was
not used in its development.
Additional copies can be ordered from AIAG and/or permission to copy portions of this Procedure for use
within supplier organizations should be obtained from AIAG at 248-358-3003.
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FOREWORD
3rd Edition
The FMEA 3rd Edition (QS-9000) is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to DaimlerChrysler, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both
Design and Process FMEAs. This reference manual is intended to clarify questions concerning the technical development of FMEAs.
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This reference manual is consistent with the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force charter to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats and technical nomenclature used by suppliers to
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Accordingly the FMEA, 3rd
Edition Manual is written to provide guidance for the supplier. The manual does not define requirements, it
does provide general guidelines intended to cover situations normally occurring when preparing FMEAs
during the design phase or process analysis phase.
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This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, for Design and Process FMEAs. However, it does
not include an application for Machinery FMEA. Interested parties in Machinery FMEA may refer to SAE
J1739 for a related example.
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The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals, and their
companies, who have contributed their time and efforts to the development of either this edition of the
FMEA manual or earlier editions.
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Mark T. Wrobbel - DaimlerChrysler
Rebecca French - General Motors
Mary Ann Raymond - Bosch
William Ireland - Kelsey-Hayes
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Earlier Editions
Howard Riley - DaimlerChrysler
George R. Baumgartner - Ford Motor Company
Lawrence R. McCullen - General Motors
Robert A. May - Goodyear
Tripp Martin - Peterson Spring
3rd Edition
Kevin A. Lange - DaimlerChrysler
Steven C. Leggett - General Motors Corporation
Beth Baker - AIAG
In addition, the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals from
the SAE J1739 work group who contributed significantly to the technical changes and improvements in this
edition.
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William D. Carlson - DaimlerChrysler

Glen R. Vallance - Ford Motor Company
Carl S. Carlson - General Motors Corporation
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This manual is a copyright of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, with
all rights reserved. Additional copies may be obtained from AIAG, Southfield, Michigan, by calling 248-3583003. Supply chain organizations of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company or General Motors Corporation
have permission to copy forms used in this manual.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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General Information ................................................................................................................................... 1

1
1
1
2
4
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Overview .........................................................................................................................................
What Is an FMEA ............................................................................................................................
Manual Format ................................................................................................................................
FMEA Implementation ....................................................................................................................
Follow Up .........................................................................................................................................
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Design FMEA .............................................................................................................................................. 7
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Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 9
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Customer Defined ........................................................................................................................... 9

Team Effort ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Development of a Design FMEA ............................................................................................................... 10
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13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
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18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
FMEA Number ........................................................................................................................

System, Subsystem, or Component Name and Number .......................................................
Design Responsibility .............................................................................................................
Prepared By ............................................................................................................................
Model Year(s)/Program(s) ......................................................................................................
Key Date .................................................................................................................................
FMEA Date .............................................................................................................................
Core Team ..............................................................................................................................
Item/Function ..........................................................................................................................
Potential Failure Mode ...........................................................................................................
Potential Effect(s) of Failure ...................................................................................................
Severity (S) .............................................................................................................................
Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria ....................................................................
Classification ..........................................................................................................................
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure ..........................................................................
Occurrence (O) .......................................................................................................................
Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria ..............................................................
Current Design Controls .........................................................................................................
Detection (D) ..........................................................................................................................
Suggested DFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria .................................................................
Risk Priority Number (RPN) ...................................................................................................
Recommended Action(s) ........................................................................................................
Responsibility for the Recommended Action(s) .....................................................................
Action(s) Taken ......................................................................................................................
Action Results .........................................................................................................................
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
15
15
15
17
17
19
19
19
21
23
23
25
27
27
29
29
31
31
Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 31

Process FMEA .......................................................................................................................................... 33
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 35
Customer Defined ......................................................................................................................... 35
Team Effort ................................................................................................................................... 35
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TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued
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18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
16)
17)
13)
14)
15)
FMEA Number .........................................................................................................................

Item .........................................................................................................................................
Process Responsibility ............................................................................................................
Prepared By ............................................................................................................................
Model Year(s)/Program(s) ......................................................................................................
Key Date ..................................................................................................................................
FMEA Date ..............................................................................................................................
Core Team ..............................................................................................................................
Process Function/Requirements .............................................................................................
Potential Failure Mode ............................................................................................................
Potential Effect(s) of Failure ....................................................................................................
Severity (S) ..............................................................................................................................
Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria .....................................................................
Classification ...........................................................................................................................
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure ...........................................................................
Occurrence (O) .......................................................................................................................
Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria ...............................................................
Current Process Controls ........................................................................................................
Detection (D) ...........................................................................................................................
Suggested PFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria ..................................................................
Risk Priority Number (RPN) ....................................................................................................
Recommended Action(s) .........................................................................................................
Responsibility for the Recommended Action(s) ......................................................................
Action(s) Taken .......................................................................................................................
Action Results ..........................................................................................................................
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
Development of a Process FMEA ............................................................................................................. 37

37
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
41
41
43
45
45
47
49
49
51
53
53
55
57
57
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Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 57
APPENDICES
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A Design FMEA Quality Objectives ............................................................................................

B Process FMEA Quality Objectives ...........................................................................................
C Design FMEA Block Diagram Example ...................................................................................
D Standard Forms for Design FMEA (1 and 2 column for controls) ...........................................
E Design FMEA Example ............................................................................................................
F System FMEA ..........................................................................................................................
G Standard Forms for Process FMEA (1 and 2 column for controls) ..........................................
H Process FMEA Example ..........................................................................................................
I Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria With Ppk Values ....................................
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................
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68
70
71
72
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GENERAL INFORMATION
This manual introduces the topic of Potential Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and gives general guidance in the
application of the technique.
What Is an FMEA
An FMEA can be described as a systematic group of activities

intended to: (a) recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a
product/process and the effects of that failure, (b) identify
actions that could eliminate or reduce the chance of the
potential failure occurring, and (c) document the entire process.
It is complementary to the process of defining what a design or
process must do to satisfy the customer.
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Overview
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All FMEAs focus on the design, whether it be of the product, or

process.
Manual Format
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This reference document presents two types of FMEA: Design

FMEA, and Process FMEA.
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This manual should be used by suppliers that subscribe to QS9000 or its equivalent. FMEA teams are allowed to use the
guidelines listed herein in the manner that will be most effective
for a given situation.
FMEA Implementation
Because of the general industry trend to continually improve

products and processes whenever possible, using the FMEA as
a disciplined technique to identify and help minimize potential
concern is as important as ever. Studies of vehicle campaigns
have shown that fully implemented FMEA programs could have
prevented many of the campaigns.
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One of the most important factors for the successful

implementation of an FMEA program is timeliness. It is meant to
be a before-the-event action, not an after-the-fact exercise.
To achieve the greatest value, the FMEA must be done before a
product or process failure mode has been incorporated into a
product or process. Up-front time spent properly completing an
FMEA, when product/process changes can be most easily and
inexpensively implemented, will minimize late change crises. An
FMEA can reduce or eliminate the chance of implementing a
preventive/corrective change that would create an even larger
concern. Communication and coordination should occur
among all FMEA teams.
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Figure 1 depicts the sequence in which an FMEA should be

performed. It is not simply a case of filling out the form but
rather of understanding the FMEA process in order to eliminate
risk and plan the appropriate controls to ensure customer
satisfaction.
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Case 1:
There are three basic cases for which FMEA's are generated,
each with a different scope or focus:
Modifications to existing design or process (assumes

there is an FMEA for the existing design or process).
The scope of the FMEA should focus on the
modification to design or process, possible
interactions due to the modification, and field history.
Case 3:
Use of an existing design or process in a new

environment, location, or application (assumes there
is an FMEA for the existing design or process). The
scope of the FMEA is the impact of the new
environment or location on the existing design or
process.
Case 2:
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New designs, new technology, or new process. The

scope of the FMEA is the complete design,
technology, or process.
Although responsibility for the preparation of the FMEA is

usually assigned to an individual, FMEA input should be a team
effort. A team of knowledgeable individuals should be
assembled (e.g., engineers with expertise in design, analysis/
testing, manufacturing, assembly, service, recycling, quality,
and reliability). The FMEA is initiated by the engineer from the
responsible activity, which can be the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (i.e., produces the final product), a supplier, or a
subcontractor.
Potential
Failure
Mode
- Unintended
Function
- Intermittent
Function
- Partial/Over/
Degraded
Function
- No Function
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
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What
are the
Effect(s)?
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What can go wrong?
What are the

Functions, Features or
Requirements?
Function
Reqt's
Subsystem
What
are the
Cause(s)?
How bad
is it?
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Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
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- Changes to
Standards,
Procedures,
or Guides
- Special
Controls
- Process
Changes
- Design
Changes
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
What can be done?
Recommended
Action(s)
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How good is this

method at
detecting it?
Detection
How can this be

prevented and
detected?
How often
does it
happen?
Prevention
Current
Controls
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SEQUENCE
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Actions
Taken
S O D
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Action Results
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N.
Figure 1. FMEA Process Sequence
It is not appropriate to compare the ratings of one teams FMEA

with the ratings of another teams FMEA, even if the product/
process appears to be identical, since each team's environment
is unique and thus the respective individual ratings will be
unique (i.e., the ratings are subjective).
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A review of the FMEA document against FMEA quality

objectives (see Appendix A and Appendix B) is recommended,
including a management review.
Follow-Up
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The need for taking effective preventive/corrective actions, with

appropriate follow-up on those actions, cannot be
overemphasized. Actions should be communicated to all
affected activities. A thoroughly thought-out and well-developed
FMEA will be of limited value without positive and effective
preventive/corrective actions.
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The responsible engineer is in charge of ensuring that all

recommended actions have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest level, as well as the latest relevant actions,
including those occurring after the start of production.
The responsible engineer has several means of assuring that

recommended actions are implemented. They include, but are
not limited to the following:
a. Reviewing designs, processes, and, drawings, to ensure that

recommended actions have been implemented,
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b. Confirming the incorporation of changes to design/assembly/

manufacturing documentation, and,
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c. Reviewing Design/Process FMEAs,

applications, and Control Plans.
special
FMEA
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DESIGN FMEA
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POTENTIAL
In
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN
DESIGN
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(DESIGN FMEA)
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DESIGN FMEA
INTRODUCTION
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A Design Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used

primarily by a Design-Responsible Engineer/Team as a means
to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure modes
and their associated causes/mechanisms have been considered
and addressed. End items, along with every related system,
subsystem, and component, should be evaluated. In its most
rigorous form, an FMEA is a summary of the teams thoughts
(including an analysis of items that could go wrong based on
experience) as a component, subsystem, or system is designed.
This systematic approach parallels, formalizes, and documents
the mental disciplines that an engineer normally goes through in
any design process.
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The Design Potential FMEA supports the design process in

reducing the risk of failures (including unintended outcomes) by:
Aiding in the objective evaluation of the design,
including functional requirements and design
alternatives,
Evaluating the initial design for manufacturing,
assembly, service, and recycling requirements,
Increasing the probability that potential failure modes
and their effects on system and vehicle operation have
been considered in the design/development process,
Providing additional information to aid in the planning of
thorough and efficient design, development, and
validation programs,
Developing a ranked list of potential failure modes
according to their effect on the customer, thus
establishing a priority system for design improvements,
development, and validation testing/analysis,
Providing an open issue format for recommending and
tracking risk-reducing actions, and,
Providing future reference, (e.g. lessons learned), to aid
in analyzing field concerns, evaluating design changes,
and developing advanced designs.
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Customer Defined
Team Effort
The definition of Customer for a Design FMEA is not only the

End User but also the design-responsible engineers/teams of
the vehicle or higher-level assemblies, and/or the
manufacturing/process-responsible engineers in activities such
as manufacturing, assembly, and service.
During the initial Design FMEA process, the responsible
engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas of expertise
and responsibility should include but are not limited to
assembly, manufacturing, design, analysis/test, reliability,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the design
area responsible for the next higher or lower assembly or
system, subsystem, or component. The FMEA should be a
catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
functions affected and thus promote a team approach.
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DESIGN FMEA
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.
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The Design FMEA is a living document and should:

Be initiated before or at design concept finalization,
Be continually updated as changes occur or additional
information is obtained throughout the phases of
product development, and
Be fundamentally completed before the production
drawings are released for tooling.
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Considering that manufacturing/assembly needs have been

incorporated, the Design FMEA addresses the design intent and
assumes the design will be manufactured/assembled to this
intent. Potential failure modes and/or causes/mechanisms that
can occur during the manufacturing or assembly process need
not but may be included in a Design FMEA. When not included,
their identification, effect, and control are covered by the
Process FMEA.
Necessary mold drafts

Limited surface finish
Assembling space/access for tooling
Limited hardenability of steels
Tolerances/process capability/performance
The Design FMEA can also take into consideration the

technical/physical limits of product maintenance (service) and
recycling, for example:
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The Design FMEA does not rely on process controls to

overcome potential design weaknesses, but it does take the
technical/physical limits of a manufacturing/assembly process
into consideration, for example:
Tool access
Diagnostic capability
Material classification symbols (for recycling)
DEVELOPMENT OF A DESIGN FMEA

The design-responsible engineer has at his or her disposal a
number of documents that will be useful in preparing the Design
FMEA. The process begins by developing a listing of what the
design is expected to do and what it is expected not to do, i.e.,
the design intent. Customer wants and needs as may be
determined from sources such as Quality Function Deployment
(QFD), Vehicle Requirements Documents, known product
requirements, and/or manufacturing/assembly/service/recycling
requirements should be incorporated. The better the
definition of the desired characteristics, the easier it is to identify
potential failure modes for preventive/corrective action.
A Design FMEA should begin with a block diagram for the
system, subsystem, and/or component being analyzed.
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DESIGN FMEA
An example block diagram is shown in Appendix C. The block
diagram can also indicate the flow of information, energy, force,
fluid, etc. The object is to understand the deliverables (input) to
the block, the process (function) performed in the block, and the
deliverables (output) from the block.
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The diagram illustrates the primary relationship among the items

covered in the analysis and establishes a logical order to the
analysis. Copies of the diagrams used in FMEA preparation
should accompany the FMEA.
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In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential

failures and their consequences, a blank Design FMEA form is
available in Appendix D.
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Component 01.03/Body Closures
Subsystem
P
Design Responsibility Body Engineering
Function
12
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
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s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
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Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
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A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax
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Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification
None
21
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Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
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28
28
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P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30
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Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28
Design aid investigation

with non-functioning
spray head
7 196
Entrapped air prevents 5

wax from entering
corner/edge access
Vehicle general durability

testing- as above
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P.
N.
7 294
D
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Physical and Chem Lab

test- Report No.1265
17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
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Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
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Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops
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MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA
DESIGN FMEA
1)
FMEA Number
Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for

tracking.
Note:
System,
Subsystem, or
Component Name
and Number
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Indicate the appropriate level of analysis and enter the name

and number of the system, subsystem, or component being
analyzed. The FMEA team members must decide on what
constitutes a system, subsystem, or component for their
specific activities. The actual boundaries that divide a system,
subsystem, and component are arbitrary and must be set by the
FMEA team. Some descriptions are provided below and some
examples are provided in Appendix F.
rn
2)
For an example of items 1-22 see Table 1.
In
te
System FMEA Scope

A system can be considered to be made up of various
subsystems. These subsystems often have been designed by
different teams. Some typical System FMEAs might cover the
following systems: Chassis System, or Powertrain System, or
Interior System, etc. Thus, the focus of the System FMEA is to
ensure that all interfaces and interactions are covered among
the various subsystems that make up the system as well as
interfaces to other vehicle systems and the customer.
Component FMEA Scope

A Component FMEA is a generally an FMEA focused on the
sub-set of a subsystem. For example, a strut is a component of
the front suspension (which is a subsystem of the chassis
system.)
Design Responsibility
Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the

supplier name, if applicable.
Prepared By
Enter the name, telephone number, and company of the

engineer responsible for preparing the FMEA.
5)
Model Year(s)/Program(s)
Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or

be affected by the design being analyzed (if known).
6)
Key Date
Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled production design release date.
7)
FMEA Date
Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
4)
ro
3)
rt
y
rd
to
Subsystem FMEA Scope

A Subsystem FMEA is generally a sub-set of a larger system.
For example, the front suspension subsystem is a sub-set of the
chassis system. Thus, the focus of the Subsystem FMEA is to
ensure that all interfaces and interactions are covered among
the various components that make up the subsystem.
13
Subsystem
P
Function
14
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
Core Team
List the names of the responsible individuals and departments

that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, address, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)
9)
Item/Function
Enter the name and other pertinent information (e.g., the

number, the part class, etc.) of the item being analyzed. Use the
nomenclature and show the design level as indicated on the
engineering drawing. Prior to initial release (e.g., in the
conceptual phases), experimental numbers should be used.
U
s
e
ly
8)
In
te
rn
Enter, as concisely as possible, the function of the item being

analyzed to meet the design intent. Include information (metrics/
measurables) regarding the environment in which this system
operates (e.g., define temperature, pressure, humidity ranges,
design life). If the item has more than one function with different
potential modes of failure, list all the functions separately.
10) Potential Failure Mode
Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which a

component, subsystem, or system could potentially fail to meet
or deliver the intended function described in the item/function
column (i.e., intended function fails). The potential failure mode
may also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higherlevel subsystem or system, or be the effect of one in a lowerlevel component.
Potential failure modes that could occur only under certain

operating conditions (i.e., hot, cold, dry, dusty, etc.) and under
certain usage conditions (i.e., above-average mileage, rough
terrain, city driving only, etc.) should be considered.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
List each potential failure mode associated with the particular

item and item function. The assumption is made that the failure
could occur but may not necessarily occur. A recommended
starting point is a review of past things-gone-wrong, concerns,
reports, and group brainstorming.
Typical failure modes could be but are not limited to:

Cracked
Loosened
Sticking
Fractured
Slips (does not hold full torque)
Inadequate support (structural)
Disengages too fast
Intermittent signal
EMC/RFI
NOTE:
Deformed
Leaking
Oxidized
Does not transmit torque
No support (structural)
Harsh engagement
Inadequate signal
No signal
Drift
Potential failure modes should be described in

physical or technical terms, not as a symptom
necessarily noticeable by the customer.
15
Subsystem
P
Function
16
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
11) Potential Effect(s) of Failure Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer.
In
te
rn
U
s
e
ly
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer

might notice or experience, remembering that the customer may
be an internal customer as well as the ultimate end user. State
clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or noncompliance to regulations. The effects should always be stated
in terms of the specific system, subsystem, or component being
analyzed. Remember that a hierarchical relationship exists
between the component, subsystem, and system levels. For
example, a part could fracture, which may cause the assembly
to vibrate, resulting in an intermittent system operation. The
intermittent system operation could cause performance to
degrade and ultimately lead to customer dissatisfaction. The
intent is to forecast the failure effects, to the teams level of
knowledge.
Typical failure effects could be but are not limited to:
Noise
Erratic Operation
Poor Appearance
Unstable
Intermittent Operation
Leaks
Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
scope of the individual FMEA.
A reduction in the severity
ranking index can be effected only through a design change.
Severity should be estimated using Table 2 as a guideline:
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis. (See Table 2.)
NOTE:
It is not recommended to modify criteria ranking

values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of
severity 1 should not be analyzed further.
NOTE:
High severity rankings can sometimes be reduced by

making design revisions that compensate or mitigate
the resultant severity of failure. For example, run
flat tires can mitigate the severity of a sudden tire
blowout and seat belts can mitigate the severity of
a vehicle crash.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
12) Severity (S)
Rough
Inoperative
Unpleasant Odor
Operation Impaired
Thermal Event
Regulatory Non-Compliance
17
Subsystem
P
Function
18
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
Table 1. DESIGN FMEA
DESIGN FMEA
12) Severity (S) (continued)
Table 2. Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria

Criteria: Severity of Effect
ly
10
U
s
e
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning.
Hazardous
without
warning
Ranking
Effect
Very High
Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function).
High
Vehicle/item operable but at reduced level of performance. Customer very

dissatisfied.
Moderate
Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer

dissatisfied.
Low
Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced

level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Very Low
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater than 75%).
Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
customers.
Very Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%).
None
No discernible effect.
to
o
F
f
o
rt
y
e
p
ro
P
14) Potential Cause(s)/

Mechanism(s) of Failure
4
3
2
1
o
M
Classification
rd
13)
In
te
rn
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
with warning operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.
This column may be used to classify any special product

characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional design or process controls.
This column may also be used to highlight high-priority failure
modes for engineering assessment if the team finds this helpful
or if local management requires it.
Special product or process characteristic symbols and their
usage is directed by specific company policy and is not
standardized in this document.
Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of a design
weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mode.
List, to the extent possible, every potential cause and/or failure
mechanism for each failure mode. The cause/mechanism
should be listed as concisely and completely as possible so that
remedial efforts can be aimed at pertinent causes.
19
Subsystem
P
Function
20
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
n
O
rn
U
s
e
Incorrect Material Specified

Inadequate Design Life Assumption
Over-stressing
Insufficient Lubrication Capability
Inadequate Maintenance Instructions
Incorrect Algorithm
Improper Maintenance Instructions
Improper Software Specification
Improper Surface Finish Specification
Inadequate Travel Specification
Improper Friction Material Specified
Excessive Heat
Improper Tolerance Specified
ly
Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:

(continued)
In
te
Typical failure mechanisms may include but are not limited to:
Yield
Chemical Oxidation
Fatigue
Electromigration
Material Instability
Creep
Wear
Corrosion
Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism
will occur during the design life. The likelihood of occurrence
ranking number has a relative meaning rather than an absolute
value. Preventing or controlling the causes/mechanisms of the
failure mode through a design change or design process
change (e.g., design checklist, design review, design guide) is
the only way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be
effected. (See Table 3.)
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/
mechanism on a 1 to 10 scale. In determining this estimate,
questions such as the following should be considered:
ro
rt
y
rd
to
15) Occurrence (O)
What is the service history/field experience with similar

components, subsystems, or systems?
Is the component a carryover or similar to a previous
level component, subsystem or system?
How significant are changes from a previous level
component, subsystem, or system?
Is the component radically different from a previous
level component?
Is the component completely new?
Has the component application changed?
What are the environmental changes?
Has an engineering analysis (e.g., reliability) been used
to estimate the expected comparable occurrence rate
for the application?
Have preventive controls been put in place?
21
Subsystem
P
Function
22
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
15) Occurrence (O)
(continued)
A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to

ensure continuity. The occurrence ranking number is a relative
rating within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the
actual likelihood of occurrence.
U
s
e
ly

system, that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis. (See Table 3.) Occurrence should be estimated using
Table 3 as a guideline:
The ranking value of 1 is reserved for Remote: Failure
Is unlikely.
NOTE:
te
rn
TABLE 3. Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

Possible Failure Rates
In
Probability of Failure
> 100 per thousand vehicles/items
Very High: Persistent failures
50 per thousand vehicles/items

High: Frequent failures
r
M
to
F
ro
rt
y
16) Current Design Controls
9
8
7
6
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items
< 0.010 per thousand vehicles/items
Remote: Failure is unlikely
rd
Low: Relatively few failures
10
Moderate: Occasional failures
Ranking
List the prevention, design validation/verification (DV), or other

activities that have been completed or committed to and that
will assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or
cause/mechanism under consideration. Current controls (e.g.,
design reviews, fail/safe designs such as a pressure relief valve,
mathematical studies, rig/lab testing, feasibility review,
prototype tests, road testing, fleet testing) are those that have
been or are being used with the same or similar designs. The
team should always be focused on improving design controls;
for example, creating new system tests in the lab, or creating
new system modeling algorithms, etc.
There are two types of design controls to consider:
Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode from occurring, or reduce their
rate of occurrence,
Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode, either by analytical or physical
methods, before the item is released to
production.
23
Subsystem
P
Function
24
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
Current Design Controls
(continued)
The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if

possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
design intent. The initial rankings for detection will be based on
design controls that either detect the cause/mechanism of
failure, or detect the failure mode.
ly
16)
rn
U
s
e
The Design FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
design controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of design controls. This
allows for a quick visual determination that both types of design
controls have been considered. Use of this two-column form is
the preferred approach.
In the example included here, it is clear that the team
has not identified any prevention controls. This could
be due to prevention controls not having been used
on the same or similar designs.
In
te
Note:
If a one-column (for design controls) form is used, then the

following prefixes should be used. For prevention controls,
place a 'P' before each prevention control listed. For detection
controls, place a 'D' before each detection control listed.
to
Once the design controls have been identified, review all

prevention controls to determine if any occurrence rankings
need to be revised.
Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control
listed in the design control. Detection is a relative ranking,
within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to achieve a
lower ranking, generally the planned design control (e.g.,
validation, and/or verification activities) has to be improved.
ro
rt
y
rd
17) Detection (D)
25
Subsystem
P
Function
26
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis.
ly
It is best to have detection controls in place as early as possible

in the design development process.
After making the detection ranking, the team should
review the occurrence ranking and ensure that the
occurrence ranking is still appropriate.
U
s
e
NOTE:
Detection should be estimated using Table 4 as a guideline.

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for almost
certain.
rn
NOTE:
In
te
TABLE 4. Suggested DFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria

Detection
Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control
Absolute
Uncertainty
Design Control will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
10
9
Remote
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Very Low
Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Low
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism

and subsequent failure mode.
Moderate
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Moderately
High
Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
High
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and

ro
Almost
Certain
rt
y
Very High
rd
to
Very Remote Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
Ranking
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the design.
27
Subsystem
P
Function
28
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)
Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should

be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity,
occurrence, and detection.
rn
U
s
e
ly
In general practice when the severity is a 9 or 10, special

attention must be given to ensure that the risk is addressed
through existing design controls or preventive/corrective
action(s), regardless of the RPN. In all cases where the effect of
an identified potential failure mode could be a hazard to the end
user, preventive/corrective actions should be considered to
avoid the failure mode by eliminating, mitigating, or controlling
the cause(s).
In
te
After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9

or 10, the team then addresses other failure modes, with the
intent of reducing severity, then occurrence, and then detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:
Revised Design Geometry and/or Tolerances,
Revised Material Specification,
Design of Experiments (particularly when multiple or
interactive causes are present) or other problem-solving
techniques, and,
Revised Test Plan.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
20) Responsibility for the

Recommended Action(s)
The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce

risks and increase customer satisfaction by improving the
design.
Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the
severity ranking. A reduction in the occurrence ranking can be
effected only by removing or controlling one or more of the
causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design
revision. An increase in design validation/verification actions will
result in a reduction in the detection ranking only. Increasing
the design validation/verification actions is a less desirable
engineering action since it does not address the severity or
occurrence of the failure mode.
If engineering assessment leads to no recommended actions for
a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this
by entering None in this column.
Enter the name of the organization and individual responsible for
each recommended action and the target completion date.
29
Subsystem
P
Function
30
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
DESIGN FMEA
After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description
of the actual action and effective date.
22) Action Results
After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,

estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
ly
21) Action(s) Taken
U
s
e
All revised ratings should be reviewed. If further action is

considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should
always be on continuous improvement.
Follow-Up Actions
In
te
rn
The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that

all actions recommended have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest design level as well as the latest relevant
actions, including those occurring after start of production.
Ensuring design requirements are achieved,

Reviewing engineering drawings and specifications,
Confirming incorporation in assembly/manufacturing
documentation, and,
Reviewing Process FMEAs and Control Plans.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
The design-responsible engineer has several means of ensuring

that concerns are identified and that recommended actions are
implemented. They include, but are not limited to the following:
31
32
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
U
s
e
ly
PROCESS FMEA
rn
POTENTIAL
In
te
IN
MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY PROCESSES
ro
rt
y
rd
to
(PROCESS FMEA)
33
34
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION
U
s
e
ly
A Process Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used by a

Manufacturing/Assembly-Responsible Engineer/Team as a
means to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure
modes and their associated causes/mechanisms have been
considered and addressed. In its most rigorous form, an FMEA
is a summary of the teams thoughts (including an analysis of
items that could go wrong based on experience) as a process is
developed. This systematic approach parallels and formalizes
the mental discipline that an engineer normally goes through in
any manufacturing planning process.
rn
The Process Potential FMEA:
Identifies the process functions and requirements,

Identifies potential product and process-related failure
modes,
Assesses the effects of the potential failures on the
customer,
Identifies the potential manufacturing or assembly
process causes and identifies process variables on
which to focus controls for occurrence reduction or
detection of the failure conditions,
Identifies process variables on which to focus process
controls,
Develops a ranked list of potential failure modes, thus
establishing a priority system for preventive/corrective
action considerations, and,
Documents the results of the manufacturing or
assembly process.
te
In
to
rd
Customer Defined
rt
y
The definition of Customer for a Process FMEA should

normally be the End User. However, the customer can also be
a subsequent or downstream manufacturing or assembly
operation, a service operation, or government regulations.
ro
Team Effort
During the initial development of the Process FMEA, the

responsible engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas should
include but are not limited to design, assembly, manufacturing,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the area
responsible for the next assembly. The Process FMEA should
be a catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
areas affected and thus promote a team approach.
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.
35
Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
36
8
SAMPLE
Operator instructions and

lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c
Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to
5 Test spray pattern at

start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Process Responsibility Body Engrg.
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance
ro
Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon
Item
P
7
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
ly
The Process FMEA is a living document and should be initiated:

Before or at the feasibility stage,
Prior to tooling for production, and
Take into account all manufacturing operations, from
individual components to assemblies.
U
s
e
Early review and analysis of new or revised processes is

promoted to anticipate, resolve, or monitor potential process
concerns during the manufacturing planning stages of a new
model or component program.
In
te
rn
The Process FMEA assumes the product as designed will meet

the design intent. Potential failure modes that can occur
because of a design weakness may be included in a Process
FMEA. Their effect and avoidance is covered by the Design
FMEA.
The Process FMEA does not rely on product design changes to

overcome weaknesses in the process. However, it does take
into consideration a products design characteristics relative to
the planned manufacturing or assembly process to assure that,
to the extent possible, the resultant product meets customer
needs and expectations.
The process-responsible engineer has at his or her disposal a

number of documents that will be useful in preparing the
Process FMEA. The FMEA begins by developing a list of what
the process is expected to do and what it is expected not to do,
i.e., the process intent.
ro
rt
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rd
to
DEVELOPMENT OF A PROCESS FMEA
1)
FMEA Number
The Process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of the general
process. This flow chart should identify the product/process
characteristics associated with each operation. Identification of
some product effects from the corresponding Design FMEA,
should be included, if available. Copies of the flow chart used in
FMEA preparation should accompany the FMEA.
In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential
failures and their consequences, a Process FMEA form has
been developed and is in Appendix G.
Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for
tracking.
Note:
For an example of items 1-22 see Table 5.
37
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
38
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
Item
Enter the name and number of the system, subsystem, or

component for which the process is being analyzed.
3)
Process Responsibility
Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the

supplier name if known.
4)
Prepared By
Enter the name, telephone number, and company of the

engineer responsible for preparing the FMEA.
5)
Model Year(s)/Program(s)
Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or

be affected by the design/process being analyzed (if known).
6)
Key Date
Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled start of production date.
rn
U
s
e
ly
2)
In the case of a supplier, the initial FMEA due date

should not exceed the customer required Production
Part Approval Process (PPAP) submission date.
In
te
Note:
FMEA Date
Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
8)
Core Team
List the names of the responsible individuals and departments

that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, address, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)
9)
Process Function/
Requirements
Enter a simple description of the process or operation being

analyzed (e.g., turning, drilling, tapping, welding, assembling).
In addition, it is recommended to record the associated
process/operation number for the step being analyzed. The
team should review applicable performance, material, process,
environmental, and safety standards. Indicate as concisely as
possible the purpose of the process or operation being
analyzed, including information about the design (metrics/
measurables) of the system, subsystem, or component. Where
the process involves numerous operations (e.g., assembling)
with different potential modes of failure, it may be desirable to
list the operations as separate elements.
rt
y
rd
to
7)
ro
Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the

process could potentially fail to meet the process requirements
and/or design intent as described in the process function/
requirements column. It is a description of the nonconformance
at that specific operation. It can be a cause associated with a
potential failure mode in a subsequent (downstream) operation
or an effect associated with a potential failure in a previous
(upstream) operation. However, in preparing the FMEA, assume
that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct. Exceptions can
be made by the FMEA team where historical data indicate
deficiencies in incoming part quality.
List each potential failure mode for the particular operation in
terms of a component, subsystem, system, or process
characteristic. Assume that the failure could occur but may not
necessarily occur. The process engineer/team should be able to
39
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
40
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
pose and answer the following questions:

(continued)
How can the process/part fail to meet requirements?

Regardless of engineering specifications, what would a
customer (end user, subsequent operations, or service)
consider objectionable?
Start by comparing similar processes and reviewing customer
(end user and subsequent operation) claims relating to similar
components. In addition, a knowledge of the design intent is
necessary. Typical failure modes could be but are not limited to:
Bent
Burred
Hole off-location
Cracked
Hole too shallow Hole missing
Handling damage
Dirty
Hole too deep
Surface too rough
Deformed
Surface too smooth
Open circuited
Short circuited
Mis-labeled
rn
U
s
e
ly
Potential failure modes should be described in

"physical" or technical terms, not as a symptom
noticeable by the customer.
In
te
NOTE:
11) Potential Effect(s) of

Failure
Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure

mode on the customer(s).
ro
rt
y
rd
to
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer

might notice or experience, remembering that the customer may
be an internal customer as well as the ultimate end user. State
clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or cause
noncompliance to regulations. The customer(s) in this context
could be the next operation, subsequent operations or
locations, the dealer, and/or the vehicle owner. Each must be
considered when assessing the potential effect of a failure.
For the end user, the effects should always be stated in terms of
product or system performance, such as:
Noise
Erratic operation
Effort
Unpleasant odor
Operation impaired
Intermittent operation
Leaks
Rework/Repairs
Scrap
If the customer is the next operation or subsequent operation(s)/

location(s), the effects should be stated in terms of process/
operation performance, such as:
Cannot fasten
Cannot bore/tap
Cannot mount
Cannot face
Damages equipment
12) Severity (S)
Rough
Excessive
Inoperative
Unstable
Draft
Poor appearance
Vehicle control impaired
Customer dissatisfaction
Does not fit

Does not connect
Does not match
Causes excessive tool wear
Endangers operator
Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
41
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
42
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
Table 6. Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria
This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a
final
customer
and/or
a
manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two
severities.
(Manufacturing/ Assembly Effect) Ranking
Very high severity ranking when a

potential failure mode affects safe
vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation without warning.
Or may endanger operator (machine

or assembly) without warning.
Very high severity ranking when a

Hazardous
with warning potential failure mode affects safe
vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation with warning.
Or may endanger operator (machine

or assembly) with warning.
Very High
Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of

primary function).
High
Vehicle/Item operable but at a

reduced level of performance.
Customer very dissatisfied.
Moderate
Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/

Convenience item(s) inoperable.
Customer dissatisfied.
Low
U
s
e
In
te
rn
10
Hazardous
without
warning
Effect
ly

This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a
final
customer
and/or
a
manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two
severities.
(Customer Effect)
Or product may have to be sorted

and a portion (less than 100%)
scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
between a half-hour and an hour.
Or a portion (less than 100%) of the

product may have to scrapped with
no sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in
less than a half-hour.
Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/

Convenience item(s) operable at a
reduced level of performance.
Or 100% of product may have to be

reworked, or vehicle/item repaired offline but does not go to repair
department.
Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item

does not conform. Defect noticed by
most customers (greater than 75%).
Or the product may have to be

sorted, with no scrap, and a portion
(less than 100%) reworked.
Minor

50% of customers.

product may have to be reworked,
with no scrap, on-line but out-of-station.
Very Minor

discriminating customers (less than
25%).
No discernible effect.

product may have to be reworked,
with no scrap, on-line but in-station.
rt
y
rd
to
Or 100% of product may have to be

scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
greater than one hour.
ro
Very Low
None
43
Or slight inconvenience to operation

or operator, or no effect.
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
44
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
12) Severity (S) (continued)
scope of the individual FMEA. A reduction in severity ranking

index can be effected through a design change to system,
subsystem or component, or a redesign of the process.
ly
If the customer affected by a failure mode is the manufacturing

or assembly plant or the product user, assessing the severity
may lie outside the immediate process engineers/teams field of
experience or knowledge. In these cases, the Design FMEA,
design engineer, and/or subsequent manufacturing or assembly
plant process engineer, should be consulted.
U
s
e

system, that is consistent, even if modified for individual
process analysis. (See Table 6)
Severity should be estimated using Table 6 as a guideline:

It is not recommended to modify criteria for ranking
values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of
severity 1 should not be analyzed further.
In
te
rn
NOTE:
13) Classification
This column may be used to classify any special product or

process characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional process controls.
This column may also be used to highlight high priority failure

modes for engineering assessment.
rd
to
If a classification is identified in the Process FMEA, notify the

design responsible engineer since this may affect the
engineering documents concerning control item identification.
ro
rt
y

Special product or process characteristic symbols and their

usage is directed by specific company policy and is not
standardized in this document.
Potential cause of failure is defined as how the failure could
occur, described in terms of something that can be corrected or
can be controlled.
List, to the extent possible, every failure cause assignable to
each potential failure mode. If a cause is exclusive to the failure
mode, i.e., if correcting the cause has a direct impact on the
failure mode, then this portion of the FMEA thought process is
completed. Many causes, however, are not mutually exclusive,
and to correct or control the cause, a design of experiments, for
example, may be considered to determine which root causes
are the major contributors and which can be most easily
controlled. The causes should be described so that remedial
efforts can be aimed at those causes which are pertinent.
Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:
Improper torque - over, under
Improper weld - current, time, pressure
Inaccurate gauging
Improper heat treat - time, temperature
45
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
46
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
(continued)
ly
Inadequate gating/venting
Inadequate or no lubrication
Part missing or mislocated
Worn locator
Worn tool
Chip on locator
Broken tool
Improper machine setup
Improper programming
U
s
e
Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., operator fails to install

seal) should be listed; ambiguous phrases (e.g., operator error,
machine malfunction) should not be used.
15) Occurrence (O)
In
te
rn
Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism of

failure will occur. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number
has a relative meaning rather than an absolute value. Preventing
or controlling the causes/mechanisms of failure through a
design or process change is the only way a reduction in the
occurrence ranking can be effected.
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/

mechanism on a 1 to 10 scale.
The Possible Failure Rates are based on the number of

failures that are anticipated during the process execution. If
statistical data are available from a similar process, the data
should be used to determine the occurrence ranking. In all other
cases, a subjective assessment can be made by using the word
descriptions in the left column of the table, along with any
historical data available for similar processes.
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual process
analysis. (See Table 7)
Occurrence should be estimated using Table 7 as a guideline:
ro
rt
y
rd
to
A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to

ensure continuity. The occurrence ranking number is a relative
rating within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the
actual likelihood of occurrence.
NOTE:
The ranking value of 1 is reserved for

failure is Unlikely.
47
Remote:
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
48
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
Table 7. Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
Ranking
> 100 per thousand pieces
10
50 per thousand pieces
n
O
Very High: Persistent Failures
ly
Likely Failure Rates*
Probability
U
s
e
High: Frequent Failures
rn
Moderate: Occasional Failures
7
6
5
4
0.5 per thousand pieces
< 0.01 per thousand pieces
te
In
Low: Relatively Few Failures
Remote: Failure is Unlikely
*For associated Ppk calculations and values, see Appendix I.

Current Process Controls are descriptions of the controls that
either prevent to the extent possible the failure mode or cause/
mechanism of failure from occurring, or detect the failure mode
or cause/mechanism of failure should it occur. These controls
can be process controls such as error/mistake proofing,
statistical process control (SPC), or can be post-process
evaluation. The evaluation may occur at the subject operation
or at subsequent operations.
There are two types of Process Controls to consider:
Prevention:
Detection:
ro
rt
y
rd
to
16) Current Process

Controls
Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or

the failure mode from occurring, or reduce
their rate of occurrence,
Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode, and lead to corrective
action(s).
The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if

possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
process intent. The initial rankings for detection will be based
on process controls that either detect the cause/mechanism of
failure, or detect the failure mode.
The Process FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
process controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of process controls.
This allows for a quick visual determination that both types of
process controls have been considered. Use of this twocolumn form is the preferred approach.
49
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
50
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
16) Current Process
Controls (continued)
If a one-column (for process controls) form is used, then the

following prefixes should be used. For prevention controls,
place a 'P' before each prevention control listed. For detection
controls, place a 'D' before each detection control listed.
ly
Once the process controls have been identified, review all

prevention controls to determine if any occurrence rankings
need to be revised.
17) Detection (D)
rn
U
s
e
Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control

listed in the process control column. Detection is a relative
ranking, within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to
achieve a lower ranking, generally the planned process control
has to be improved.
In
te
Assume the failure has occurred and then assess the

capabilities of all "Current Process Controls" to prevent
shipment of the part having this failure mode or defect. Do not
automatically presume that the detection ranking is low because
the occurrence is low (e.g., when control charts are used), but
do assess the ability of the process controls to detect low
frequency failure modes or prevent them from going further in
the process.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
Random quality checks are unlikely to detect the existence of an

isolated defect and should not influence the detection ranking.
Sampling done on a statistical basis is a valid detection control.
51
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
52
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
17) Detection (D) (continued)

system that is consistent, even if modified for individual
product analysis. (See Table 8.)
ly
Detection should be estimated using Table 8 as a guideline.

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for Certain to
Detect.
NOTE:
Moderate
Controls may detect.
Cannot detect or is not checked.
Control is achieved with indirect or random

checks only.
Control is achieved with visual inspection only.
10
9
8
Control is achieved with double visual inspection

only.
Control is achieved with charting methods, such
as SPC {Statistical Process Control}.
Control is based on variable gauging after parts
have left the station, or Go/No Go gauging
performed on 100% of the parts after parts have
left the station.
Error detection in subsequent operations, OR
gauging performed on setup and first-piece
check (for set-up causes only).
Error detection in-station, or error detection in
subsequent operations by multiple layers of
acceptance: supply, select, install, verify. Cannot
accept discrepant part.
Error detection in-station (automatic gauging with
automatic stop feature). Cannot pass discrepant
part.
Discrepant parts cannot be made because item
has been error-proofed by process/product
design.
7
6
5
to
Controls have a good

chance to detect.
Very High
Controls almost certain to

detect.
Very High
Controls certain to detect.
rt
y
rd
High
Moderately Controls have a good

High
chance to detect.
Ranking
Low
Absolute certainty of nondetection.

Controls will probably not
detect.
Controls have poor chance
of detection.
Controls have poor chance
of detection.
Controls may detect.
Suggested Range of Detection Methods
rn
Almost
Impossible
Very
Remote
Remote
Very Low
Inspection
Types
A B C
te
Criteria
In
Detection
U
s
e
TABLE 8. Suggested PFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria
ro
Inspection Types:
A. Error-proofed
B. Gauging
C. Manual Inspection
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the process.
53
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
54
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)
Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should

be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity, occurrence, and detection.
rn
U
s
e
ly
In general practice, when the severity is 9 or 10, special attention must be given to ensure that the risk is addressed through
existing design actions/controls or process preventive/corrective action(s), regardless of the RPN. In all cases where the
effect of an identified potential failure mode could be a hazard
to manufacturing/assembly personnel, preventive/corrective actions should be taken to avoid the failure mode by eliminating or
controlling the cause(s), or appropriate operator protection
should be specified.
In
te
After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9

or 10, the team then addresses other failure modes, with the
intent of reducing severity, then occurrence, and then detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:
To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or
design revisions are required. An action-oriented study
of the process using statistical methods could be implemented with an ongoing feedback of information to the
appropriate operations for continuous improvement and
defect prevention.
Only a design and/or process revision can bring about a

reduction in the severity ranking.
The preferred method to accomplish a reduction in the

detection ranking is the use of error/mistake proofing
methods. Generally, improving detection controls is
costly and ineffective for quality improvements. Increasing the frequency of quality controls inspection is not an
effective preventive/corrective action and should only
be used as a temporary measure since permanent preventive/corrective action is required. In some cases, a
design change to a specific part may be required to
assist in the detection. Changes to the current control
system may be implemented to increase this probability. Emphasis must, however, be placed on preventing
defects (i.e., reducing the occurrence) rather than detecting them. An example would be the use of statistical
process control and process improvement rather than
random quality checks or associated inspection.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
If engineering assessment leads to no recommended actions for

a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this
by entering None in this column.
55
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
56
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
PROCESS FMEA
Enter the individual responsible for the recommended action,
and the target completion date.
21) Action(s) Taken
After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description

of the actual action and effective date.
22) Action Results
After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,

estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
U
s
e
ly
20) Responsibility for the

Recommended Action(s)
te
In
Follow-Up Actions
rn
All revised ratings should be reviewed and if further action is

considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should
always be on continuous improvement.
The process-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring

that all actions recommended have been implemented or
adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and
should always reflect the latest design level as well as the latest
relevant actions, including those occurring after the start of
production.
Ensuring that process/product requirements are achieved,

Reviewing engineering drawings, process/product
specifications, and process flow,
Confirming the incorporation of changes in assembly/
manufacturing documentation and,
Reviewing Control Plans and operation instructions.
ro
rt
y
rd
to
The process-responsible engineer has several means of

ensuring that concerns are identified and that recommended
actions are implemented. They include, but are not limited to
the following:
57
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
PROCESS FMEA
58
APPENDIX A
DESIGN FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence
1. DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS
ly
The FMEA drives Design Improvements as the primary

objective.
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
U
s
e
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
The Analysis/Development/Validation (A/D/V), and/or Design
Verification Plan and Report (DVP&R) considers the failure
modes from the FMEA.
4. INTERFACES
The FMEA scope includes integration and interface failure

modes in both block diagram and analysis.
5. LESSONS LEARNED
The FMEA considers all major lessons learned (such as high

warranty, campaigns, etc.) as input to failure mode
identification.
6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS
The FMEA identifies appropriate Key Characteristics candidates

as input to the Key Characteristics selection process, if
applicable due to company policy.
7. TIMING
The FMEA is completed during the Window of Opportunity

where it could most efficiently impact the product design.
to
In
te
rn
3. A/D/V OR DVP & R PLANS
The right people participate as part of the FMEA team throughout the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA methods.
As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.
The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",
including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.
9. DOCUMENTATION
rd
8. TEAM
Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result. This
assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required and
the actions are implemented.
ro
rt
y
10. TIME USAGE
59
APPENDIX B
PROCESS FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence.
1. PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS The FMEA drives Process Improvements as the primary
ly
objective, with an emphasis on Error/Mistake Proofing solutions.
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
U
s
e
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
The Pre-launch and Production Control Plans consider the
failure modes from the Process FMEA.
4. INTEGRATION
The FMEA is integrated and consistent with the Process Flow

Diagram and the Process Control Plan. The Process FMEA
considers the Design FMEA, if available as part of its analysis.
5. LESSONS LEARNED
The FMEA considers all major lessons learned (such as high

warranty, campaigns, non-conforming product, customer
complaints, etc.) as input to failure mode identification.
6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS
The FMEA identifies appropriate Key Characteristics candidates

as input to the Key Characteristics selection process, if
applicable due to company policy.
7. TIMING
The FMEA is completed during the Window of Opportunity

where it could most efficiently impact the design of product or
process.
to
In
te
rn
3. CONTROL PLANS
The right people participate as part of the FMEA team

throughout the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA
methods. As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.
The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",
including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.
Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an
effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result.
This assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required
and the actions are implemented.
ro
rt
y
10. TIME USAGE
9. DOCUMENTATION
rd
8. TEAM
60
APPENDIX C
DESIGN FMEA BLOCK DIAGRAM EXAMPLE
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

BLOCK DIAGRAM/ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES
ly
FLASHLIGHT
1994 NEW PRODUCT
XXXI10D001
SYSTEM NAME:
YEAR VEHICLE PLATFORM:
FMEA I.D. NUMBER
U
s
e
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES
a
rn
------- = INTERFACING, NOT JOINED
= NOT INCLUDED IN
THIS FMEA
te
= ATTACHED/JOINED
In
LETTERS = COMPONENTS
NUMBERS = ATTACHING METHODS
VIBRATION: NOT APPLICABLE

HUMIDITY: 0 - 100 % RH
TEMPERATURE: -20 TO 160 F

CORROSIVE: TEST SCHEDULE B
SHOCK: 6 FOOT DROP
FOREIGN MATERIAL: DUST
FLAMMABILITY: (WHAT COMPONENT(S) ARE NEAR HEAT SOURCE(S)?
OTHER:
The example below is a relational block diagram. Other types of block diagrams may be used by the FMEA
Team to clarify the item(s) being considered in their analysis
HOUSING
A
4
1
ro
rt
y
BULB
ASSEMBLY
D
rd
to
SWITCH
ON/OFF
C
PLATE
E
+
BATTERIES
B
COMPONENTS
A. HOUSING
B. BATTERIES (2 D CELL)
C. ON/OFF SWITCH
D. BULB ASSEMBLY
E. PLATE
F. SPRING
SPRING
F
-
ATTACHING METHOD
1. SLIP FIT
2. RIVETS
3. THREAD
4. SNAP FIT
5. COMPRESSIVE FIT
61
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
Key Date _________
Design Responsibility _________
Item
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
O
c
c
u
r
to
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
rd
C
S l
e a
v s
s
o
D
e
t
e
c
Current
Design
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
Core Team ___________________________________________________________________________________________
Model Year(S)/Vehicle(s) _____________________
____ Component ___
____ Subsystem
____ System
rn
Recommended
Action(s)
te
In
R.
P.
N.
of
U
s
e
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
ly
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
Actions
Taken
FMEA Date (Orig.) _________
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX D
STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA
62
Item
Function
Core Team
Potential
Failure
Mode
MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s)
Component
Subsystem
System
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
Key Date
rd
O
c
c
u
r
to
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
D
e
t
e
c
R.
P.
N.
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
Design Responsibility
rt
y
C
S l
e a
v s
s
ro
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
P
of
U
s
e
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
rn
te
In
Recommended
Action(s)
FMEA Date (Orig.)
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
ly
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX D
STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA
63
Subsystem
P
Function
64
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
to
SAMPLE
4 112
19
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
U
s
e
Body Engrg &

Assy Ops
8X 09 15
a
Add team
evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head
te
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Add team
Body Engrg &
equipment and
specified wax
rn
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
Add laboratory
Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
None
21
ly
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
Recommended
Action(s)
18
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
Add laboratory
A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
In
Drawing evaluation
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
8 280
28

spray head
7 196

wax from entering
corner/edge access

testing- as above
R.
P.
N.
7 294
D
e
t
e
c

17

test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
2
Inappropriate wax
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
15
rd
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
too low
14
O
c
c
u
r
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Front Door L.H.

H8HX-0000-A
Item
e5
rt
y
ro
POTENTIAL
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
APPENDIX E
DESIGN FMEA EXAMPLE
Appendix F System FMEA

To help illustrate the meaning of System, Subsystem, and Component FMEAs, two
examples have been constructed below in Figure F1 (for Interfaces and Interactions)
and in Figure F2 (for Item, Function, and Failure Modes).
U
s
e
ly
EXAMPLE 1: Interfaces and Interactions
Subsystem B
Subsystem A
Subsystem C
te
Subsystem D
rn
System
In
Environment
Figure F1. Interfaces and Interactions
SUBSYSTEMS ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED VIA INTERFACES.
INTERFACES:
to
The FMEA team is responsible for specifying the scope of its respective FMEAs. The example in Figure
F1 shows that the team has specified Subsystems A, B, C, and D along with the surrounding environment
as comprising the System that must be considered while completing the System FMEA.
rd
In Figure F1, interfaces between subsystems are shown where Subsystem A touches
(connects with) Subsystem B, B touches C, C touches D, A touches D, and B touches
D. The Environment also touches each of the subsystems listed in Figure F1, which
requires that the Environmental Interfaces be considered when completing the
FMEA.
rt
y
NOTE: Each Subsystem FMEA should have its Interfaces included in its respective
Subsystem FMEA.
ro
INTERACTIONS:
A CHANGE IN ONE SUBSYSTEM MIGHT CAUSE A CHANGE IN ANOTHER

SUBSYSTEM.
In Figure F1, interactions between subsystems can occur among any of the interfacing
systems (e.g., Subsystem A heats up, resulting in Subsystem D and Subsystem B also
gaining heat through the respective interfaces, as well as Subsystem A giving off heat
to the environment). Interactions might also occur among non-contacting systems via
transfer through the environment (e.g., if the environment is composed of high
humidity and Subsystems A and C are dissimilar metals separated by a non-metal
composing Subsystem B, Subsystems A and C can still have an electrolytic reaction
due to the moisture from the environment). Thus, interactions among non-contacting
subsystems can be relatively difficult to predict but are important and should be
considered.
65
EXAMPLE 2: Items, Functions, and Failure Modes

Figure F2 (see next page) describes a method of showing the Items, Functions, and Failure Modes in a
tree arrangement that can assist the team in visualizing the System, Subsystems, and Components.
At the System Level, the descriptions will tend to be much more general than for the Subsystems and
Components (Components will usually have the most specific descriptions).
ly
The tree arrangement is arranged as follows for the System, Subsystem, and Components:
ITEM
U
s
e
Design Objectives (a statement of design objectives is often helpful)
In
te
rn
- FUNCTION 1
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- FUNCTION 2
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
ro
rt
y
rd
to
- etc.....
66
67
p
rt
y
Potential Failure Mode(s):

seating position is not
comfortable
Function:
provide comfortable
transportation

chain breaks frequently
Tires require frequent
maintenance
Function:
provide reliable transportation

difficult to steer
difficult to pedal
Function:
ease of use
Design Objectives:
1) minimum 3000 hours of riding
without need for maintenance
and 10,000 hours of riding for
design life.
2) accommodates male adults
comfortably to the 99.5th
percentile
3) ... etc. ...
Bicycle
ro
SystemPLevel
rd
to
Chain Assembly
Seat Assembly
Sprocket Assembly
Rear Wheel Assembly
Front Wheel Assembly
Handle Bar Assembly

finish (shine) deteriorates
paint chips
rn
te
In
Function:
provides pleasing appearance

structural failure of seat support
excessive deflection of seat
support
Figure F2. Items, Functions, and Failures
Function:
provides stable attachment for
seat support
Frame
Subsystem Level
ULower Rear Tube

s
e
O Tube
Sprocket
n
ly
Lower Front Tube
Function:
support frame assembly
production methods (welding)

length of frame mounting points
too long
length of frame mounting points
too short
Function:
provides dimensional control
for correct finished frame
geometry

structural failure
excessive deflection
Function:
provides structural support
Upper Frame
Component Level
ro
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
Process Responsibility __________
of
FMEA Date (Orig.) _________
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
(Rev.)
Requirements
Process
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
o
rd
O
c
c
u
r
to
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
U
s
e
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
rn
te
Recommended
Action(s)
In
R.
P.
N.
D
e
t
e
c
Current
Process
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection
ly
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
R.
P.
N.
Core Team _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Key Date _________
rt
y
Model Year(S)/Vehicle(s) ____________________________
Item
APPENDIX G
STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA
68
Requirements
Process
Function
Core Team
Potential
Failure
Mode
Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s)
Item
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
Key Date
rd
O
c
c
u
r
to
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
rn
te
of
U
s
e
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
FMEA Date (Orig.)
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
In
R.
P.
N.
D
e
t
e
c
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
Process Responsibility
rt
y
C
S l
e a
v s
s
ro
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
ly
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX G
STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA
69
e5
rt
y
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Insufficient
Manual
application of
surface
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
14
15
70
8
SAMPLE

shift) to check for
R.
P.
N.
18
19
rn
te
In
70 None
7 392 Install spray

timer
U
s
e
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
21
Actions
Taken
ly
Automatic spray
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Temp and press

limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
5 175 Use Design of

Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Page 1
FMEA Number
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e
t
e
c

(depth meter) and
coverage

(depth meter) and
coverage
17

(depth meter) and
coverage
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
to

clean heads
rd16
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
o
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
POTENTIAL
(PROCESS FMEA)
ro
Item
P
7
APPENDIX H
PROCESS FMEA EXAMPLE
APPENDIX I
SUGGESTED PFMEA OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
CRITERIA WITH Ppk VALUES
Ppk
Ranking
> 100 per thousand pieces
< 0.55
10
0.55
0.78
0.86
0.94
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
< 0.01 per thousand pieces
1.67
In
Low: Relatively Few Failures
n
8
Remote: Failure is Unlikely
U
s
e
te
Moderate: Occasional Failures
High: Frequent Failures
rn
Very High: Persistent Failures
ly
Likely Failure Rates*
Probability
Sample Calculation
r
o
= 0.0025 divided by 2 for out-of-specifications high or low.
0.05
2
0.005
to
5
=
1000
Defect rate =
Sample Calculation to determine Ppk value from a likely failure rate of 5 per thousand pieces.
min (SL upper - x, x - SL lower)

3 s
2. Ppk =
rt
y
where:
x = Average
SL = Specifications
SL - x
s
1. Z =
rd
Using a "Z" table the associated "Z" value is 2.81 for a tail value of 0.0025.
ro
3. Replace using Z
4. Ppk =
Note:
Z
2.81
~ 0.94
=
= 0.9367 =
3
3
The above Ppk values are to be used by the FMEA team as guidance to assist in determining an
occurrence ranking when valid statistical data is available. No other use of the above Ppk values
is intended.
71
Glossary
The control plan provides the process monitoring and control
methods that will be used to control characteristics.
Design Intent
List of what a given component/subsystem/system is expected

to do or not do.
Design Life
The time period (e.g., cycles, time, mileage) for which the design
is intended to perform its requirements.
Design Validation/Verification (DV)
A program intended to ensure that the design meets its

requirements.
Design of Experiments (DOE)
Methods that identify factors that affect the mean and variation
with minimum testing/experimentation.
Error/Mistake Proofing
Each OEM may have its own unique definition for Error/Mistake
Proofing. Confer with the OEM for the appropriate definition.
Feature
A measurable product characteristic (e.g., radius, hardness) or a

measurable process characteristic (e.g., insertion force,
temperature).
Pareto
A simple tool that can assist problem solving that involves

ranking all potential problem areas.
Process
The combination of people, machines and equipment, raw

materials, methods, and environment that produces a given
product or service.
Process Change
A change in processing concept that could alter the capability of

the process to meet the design requirements or the durability of
the product.
to
In
te
rn
U
s
e
ly
Control Plans
rd
Quality Function Deployment (QFD)
rt
y
Root Cause
ro
Special Process Characteristic
A structured method in which customer requirements are

translated into appropriate technical requirements for each
stage of product development and production.
The root cause is the reason for the primary non-conformance
and is the item that requires change to achieve permanent
preventive/corrective action.
A special process characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,
significant) is a process characteristic for which variation must
be controlled to some target value to ensure that variation in a
process or a special product characteristic is maintained to its
target value during manufacturing and assembly.
Special Product Characteristic
A special product characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,

significant) is a product characteristic for which reasonably
anticipated variation could significantly affect a products safety
or compliance with governmental standards or regulations, or is
likely to significantly affect customer satisfaction with a product.
Vehicle Campaign
Recall of vehicles for rework or safety inspection.
72
73
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
74
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
75
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
76
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
77
P
p
ro
rt
y
e
f
o
rd
to
rn
te
In
U
s
e
ly
78
P
p
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The content of this document is the technical equivalent of SAE J-1739.

William D. Carlson - DaimlerChrysler

General Information ................................................................................................................................... 1

Design FMEA .............................................................................................................................................. 7

Customer Defined ........................................................................................................................... 9

Development of a Design FMEA ............................................................................................................... 10

FMEA Number ........................................................................................................................

Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 31

TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued

FMEA Number .........................................................................................................................

Development of a Process FMEA ............................................................................................................. 37

Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 57

A Design FMEA Quality Objectives ............................................................................................

An FMEA can be described as a systematic group of activities

All FMEAs focus on the design, whether it be of the product, or

This reference document presents two types of FMEA: Design

Because of the general industry trend to continually improve

One of the most important factors for the successful

Figure 1 depicts the sequence in which an FMEA should be

Modifications to existing design or process (assumes

Use of an existing design or process in a new

New designs, new technology, or new process. The

Although responsibility for the preparation of the FMEA is

What can go wrong?

What are the

What can be done?

How good is this

How can this be

Figure 1. FMEA Process Sequence

It is not appropriate to compare the ratings of one teams FMEA

A review of the FMEA document against FMEA quality

The need for taking effective preventive/corrective actions, with

The responsible engineer is in charge of ensuring that all

The responsible engineer has several means of assuring that

a. Reviewing designs, processes, and, drawings, to ensure that

b. Confirming the incorporation of changes to design/assembly/

c. Reviewing Design/Process FMEAs,

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

A Design Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used

The Design Potential FMEA supports the design process in

The definition of Customer for a Design FMEA is not only the

The Design FMEA is a living document and should:

Considering that manufacturing/assembly needs have been

Necessary mold drafts

The Design FMEA can also take into consideration the

The Design FMEA does not rely on process controls to

DEVELOPMENT OF A DESIGN FMEA

The diagram illustrates the primary relationship among the items

In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Body Engrg &

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Design aid investigation

Entrapped air prevents 5

Vehicle general durability

Physical and Chem Lab

Vehicle general durability

Front Door L.H.

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA