E U R O P E A N

S O C I A L

A S S O C I A T I O N

O F

A N T H R O P O L O G I S T S

W H O DEFINES AND W H O
E N F O R C E S W H A T IS R I G H T A N D
WRONG?
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ETHICAL
BREACH?
The social construction o f moraliiy is a complex and challenging topic which is central to the anthropological discipline. Until recendy, however, it has received little direct
attention from anthropologists. W i t h the growing interest in
indigenous notions of seif and personhood, and related questions regarding human rights, issues pertaining to moral and
ethical groundings o f social iife have become increasingly relevant. So far, however, few anthropologists have concerned
themselves with disentangiing 'moralities' and how one might
set about studying them in empirical settings. The focas for
The Ethnography of Moralities-wzs chosen precisely i n order to
raise a debate aroimd the empirical study of different moral
discourses and how these are related to social institutions, to
indigenous concepts o f human nature (male and female), to
cosmology and to the nature o f good and evil.
These quesdons are addressed in their theoretical context and
discussed with reference to a wide array of ethnographic stdies from: Argentina, Mongolia, Melanesia, Yemen,
Zimbabwe, Mxico, England and the O d Testament. The
Ethnography of Moralities will be o f considerable interest to
students o f anthropology, sociology and cultural studies as
weli as, i n some aspects, to law students.
Signe Howell is Professor o f Social Anthropology at the
University o f Oslo.
Cover design: Andrew Corbett
Cover drawin^: from rock engravings in Val Camonica,
Northern Italy. ca 800-200 BC
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E U R O P E A N
S O C I A L

A S S O C I A T I O N

O F

A N T H R O P O L O G I S T S

The Ethnography
of Moralities

Edited by

Signe Howell

.4/
X

Preface

I wish t o take this o p p o r t u n i t y to t h a n k the Social Science

Faculty a n d the D e p a r t m e n t and M u s e u m o f A n t h r o p o l o g y at the
University o f Oslo for their generous financial and administrative
support. W i t h o u t this we w o u l d n o t have been able t o host the
conference. I further wish to t h a n k the N o r w e g i a n Science Research
C o u n c i l , as well as the a n t h r o p o l o g y departmcnts o f the tmiversities
o f Bergen, T r o n d h e i m and Troms0 for their financial support.

Introduction
Signe

Howell

Signe H o w e l l
D e p a r t m e n t and M u s e u m o f A n t h r o p o l o g y
University o f Oslo
A headline f r o m the science section o f the New York Times, dated 24
M a y 1944, reads ' O d accident points to brain's m o r a l center'.
Briefly, the article concerns a r a i l w a y m a n who, i n 1848, was struck
by a l o n g metal r o d w h i c h entered under his left cheek, went behind
his left eye and exited t h r o u g h the t o p o f his b r a i n . H e survived and
remained able t o take r a t i o n a l decisions, but he was 'a different
m a n ' i n the sense that he h a d become 'unable to make m o r a l
judgements'. A philosopher and a cognitive scientist had examined
the skuU w i t h the aid o f 'advanced computer brain-imaging
techniques' and stated that i t offers
compelling evidence that the h u m a n b r a i n has a specialized
r e g i n for m a k i n g personal and social decisions and that this
r e g i n , located i n the frontal lobes at the t o p o f the b r a i n , is
c o n n e c t e d t o deeper b r a i n regions t h a t store e m o t i o n a l
memories. W h e n this higher b r a i n r e g i n is damaged i n a certain
way . . . a person undergoes a personality change and can no
longer make m o r a l decisions.
They are further reported as saying that 'we w i l l need to re-examine
o u r notions about m o r a l character, empathy and the determinants
i n choosing right over w r o n g , foolish over sensible'.
This report reflects a long-standing t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n Western
academic discourse to make claims concerning h u m a n nature f r o m
w i t h i n some k i n d o f n a t u r a l science mode. I t is yet another example
o f a desire to anchor h u m a n capabilities firmly w i t h i n biology. The
I n f o r m a t i o n is indeed i n t r i g u i n g , b u t h o w can we as anthropologists
use it? Should we deconstruct the scientists' claims along familiar
d e f i n i t i o n a l and theoretical grounds, or should we gratefully
embrace their fndings as one further step i n the search for

Introduction

cognitive h a r d wiring? W h i l e few anthropologists w o u l d accept such

a positivistic approach to the sensitive and complex questions
concerning h u m a n c o g n i t i o n , reasoning, e m o t i o n a l i t y or morality,
the example does, nevertheless, raise issues concerning h u m a n
universals and p r i m o r d i a l characters. I t also raises issues concerning
to what extent one may d e l i n a t e something called ' m o r a l i t y ' from
w i t h i n the whole gamut o f h u m a n endeavour, thought and vales,
and whether there can be an anthropology o f morality.
A l t h o u g h this b o o k does not attempt to answer all these
questions, the authors address theoretical and methodological
problems involved i n the study o f indigenous moralities. They t r y
to d e l i n a t e arenas suitable for empirical investigations w h i c h can
yield pertinent material for the understanding o f m o r a l orders. They
debate various approaches towards interpretations o f their o w n
ethnographic m a t e r i a l . N o attempts at g r a n d t h e o r i z i n g are
provided i n this b o o k . However, i m p o r t a n t questions are posed
that go to the heart o f the anthropological a m b i t i o n o f eliciting not
only alternative reahties, but the i m p l i c i t and explicit premises that
make such realities meaningful and desirable for those w h o live
them. For these reasons alone, I m a i n t a i n that this volume
represents an i m p o r t a n t first step i n an empirical and comparative
study o f m o r a l discourses and discursive practices.

MORALITY: A N 'ODD-JOB' WORD?

The overall focus o f this b o o k is methodological. W h i l e no general
definition w i l l be p u t f o r w a r d , questions w i l l be posed as to what we
might mean by m o r a l i t y or m o r a l discourse; h o w we as anthropologists may set about studying such phenomena; and h o w our
studies may enhance o u r understanding o f some significant
indigenous concepts, pertaining, for example, to h u m a n nature
( b o t h male and female), to cosmology and to the nature o f r i g h t and
w r o n g (to say n o t h i n g o f good and bad). A n overriding concern is
h o w such knowledge m i g h t provide a potential for fresh approaches
i n the interpretation o f social institutions and practices more
generally.
F r o n i an anthropological p o i n t o f view, there are few useful
definitions o f m o r i s , m o r a l i t y or ethics. A pioneering w o r k entitled
Anthropology and Ethics appeared i n 1959. I t was w r i t t e n by M a y
a n d A b r a h a m E d e l , she the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , he the m o r a l
philosopher. I t h a d l i t t l e i m p a c t i n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l circles.

Introduction

although, once i t was brought t o the attention o f the contributors t o

this volume, several o f them have i n fact made use o f i t . Edel and
Edel start b y stating, ' O f course i n one sense we all k n o w what we
are t a l k i n g about when we t a l k about m o r a l i t y ' , but, they c o n t i n u ,
'By what m a r k shall we k n o w "the m o r a l " ? ' (Edel and Edel 1959: 7).
W h i l e n o t m a k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r i s and ethics, their
suggestion is that we distinguish between 'ethics wide' and 'ethics
narrow'. Briefly, ethics wide assumes that moralities are p a r t and
parcel o f the whole field o f h u m a n endeavour and striving. I t
implies a widest possible empirical investigation and assumes that
accounts o f virtues, obligations, sanctions, feelings and so f o r t h w i l l
i n the l o n g r u n reveal h u m a n v a l e s a n d modes o f achieving them.
Ethics narrow, o n the other h a n d , limits the scope. Conceptually, i t
pushes t o the fore the idea o f obligaton or duty. Vales, they insist,
are 'far t o o broad, far t o o promiscuous'. A c c o r d i n g t o ethics
narrow, o n l y those notions that ought to be or ought to be realized
come w i t h i n the scope o f m o r a l i t y ( i b i d . : 8 - 1 1 , m y emphasis).
Perhaps today we w o u l d regard the former as too wide and the
latter as t o o narrow.
M o r e recently, there have been a few anthropological attempts at
tackling the issue o f definition a n d d e l i m i t a t i o n . I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n
to the edited volume The Anthropology of Evil, P a r k i n considers the
possibility for an anthropological study o f morality. W h i l e n o t
actually offering a definition o f m o r a l i t y , he debates possible
ramifications o f such a concept and asks whether the study o f evil
w o u l d n o t be better i f carried o u t as the study o f m o r a l i t y (Parkin
1985: 3). H e concludes, however, that u n t i l anthropologists can
reach some k i n d o f consensus as t o what w o u l d be involved i n such
studies, 'the approach t o the study o f evil is . . . signposted more
directly t h a n simply to m o r a l i t y ' ( i b i d . : 6).
Edel a n d Edel's definition o f ethics wide is similar t o the more
familiar anthropological concept o f culture. I t is also open t o
similar criticisms: namely those o f reification, o f discrete bounded
static universes o f shared customary practices and beliefs, o f
totalizing conformity, o f i m p l i c i t agency. ( c f Borofsky 1994).
Whether o r not we agree w i t h the anthropological hard-line a n t i culture lobby, is i t l e g i t m a t e to ask whether, by i n t r o d u c i n g
'moralities', we are d o i n g n o t h i n g more t h a n t a k i n g the pressure ofif
culture; a n d whether moralities m i g h t n o t equally be subjected t o
the same analytical and theoretical attacks t o w h i c h culture has
been subjected? Perhaps; but since I w o u l d a r g e that h u m a n beings

Introduction

are inherently c u l t u r a l (as well as social and m o r a l ) , and that the j o b

o f anthropologists is t o study the many different c u l t u r a l processes
and forms that exist, to d r o p culture from our vocabulary just
because some have used i t unwisely, w o u l d be to t h r o w the baby out
w i t h the bath-water. The same argument applies to morality. The
use o f the t e r m 'moralities' i n the unusual p l u r a l f o r m is a d e l i b r a t e
choice: first, because it opens for p l u r a l i t y - a prerequisite for
anthropological comparison; second, whether i n the singular or the
p l u r a l f o r m , i t is a m o r e inclusive t e r m than ' m o r i s ' . M o r a l i t i e s can
be made to c o n t a i n and express b o t h discourse and practice. Just as
emotions act o n the self and on the w o r l d ( c f A r c h e t t i this volume),
the argument is that m o r a l i t y constitutes the self and makes for
action i n the w o r l d .
The challenge for anthropologists lies precisely i n discerning the
l i n k between val es w h i c h are derived from a larger metaphysical
whole and actual behaviour and practices. The relationship between
m o r a l v a l e s and practice is a dynamic one. Vales are continuously
changing and adapting t h r o u g h actual cholees and practices, while,
at the same time, they c o n t i n u to i n f o r m and shape cholees and
practices.
T h e contributors were asked to anchor their discussion firmly
w i t h i n their o w n particular ethnographic r e a and consider the
dynamic interaction between abstract ideis and e m p i r i c a l realities.
They were further asked to consider problems i n connection w i t h
the doing o f fieldwork w h i c h seeks to elicit indigenous morality, and
about the subsequent writing o f anthropological texts i n w h i c h the
ethnographic m a t e r i a l is analysed. M y a i m t h r o u g h such an
approach has been t o raise some general points concerning
definitions and methodology. I n particular, I feel that we need to
d e l i b r a t e where and h o w to direct our ethnographic gaze when
seeking to discover and interpret the moralities, the m o r a l discourse
and practices, o f a particular social group. We need to consider what
m i g h t be used as data for eliciting underlying m o r a l assumptions
and premises as well as explicit m o r a l vales.
T h e methodological challenge may, i n part, be met by addressing
some b f the f o l l o w i n g questions: H o w is ethical knowledge
grounded? W h a t constitutes an ethical breach and w h a t can
breaches, o r active dissent, tell us about reigning orthodoxies?
W h a t is the forc o f 'the ought', and h o w are the various m o r a l l y
prescriptive discourses formulated and legitimated? W h o defines
and enforces what is r i g h t and wrong? W h i c h social domains most

Introduction

profoundly a r t i c l a t e m o r a l v a l e s a n d w h i c h are most (or least)

affected by such? These, a n d related questions, are variously
deliberated by the authors o f this volume. They seek meaningful
answers by isolating selected socio-cultural arenas which t h r o w
some i m p o r t a n t c o n s t l t u t i n g m o r a l v a l e s i n t o sharp rehef Each,
t h e n , has identifed arenas w h i c h they consider highlight local
m o r a l i t y These include the m o r a l significance of: the use o f
exemplars; o f sexuality; o f cross- and same-sex relations; o f gossip;
o f guilt, h o n o u r and shame; o f showing respect; and o f passages
f r o m scriptural texts.
H o w we deal w i t h the existence o f apparently different moralities
being operative according to context, or to the social personhood o f
the actors, w i t h i n any one indigenously defmed social group,
becomes an i m p o r t a n t issue. S h o u l d we treat such multiplicities o f
meaning as pieces i n a complex puzzle w h i c h may add up t o some
overall m o r a l order, or should we be satisfied t o explcate u p o n the
apparent paradoxes? There can be n o final answers, but I regard i t
as i m p o r t a n t t o identify as many arenas as possible which may serve
as 'pegs' for analysis for future a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l studies o f
moralities.
Some o f the complexity m a y best be expressed i n terms o f t w o
different levis. First, there is the challenge o f discerning conflicting
premises and v a l e s w i t h i n any one m o r a l community, such as those
pertaining to men and w o m e n , to nobles and commoners. Second,
conflicts o f premises and v a l e s may emerge at the meeting o f
different m o r a l orders, such as, for example, between a m o d e r n
Western one based o n principies o f democracy and h u m a n rights
and H i n d u i s m based o n a hierarchical caste system.
However one chooses to approach the empirical study o f
morahties, i t is a d o m a i n where extreme definitional c a u t i o n must
be exercised, and where i t is prudent to t h i n k polythetically
(Needham 1975). H a v i n g b r o u g h t a previously unexplored concept
i n t o anthropology, i t w o u l d be a great mistake i f we immediately
hypostesize i t .
I'he fact that few anthropologists have attempted the empirical
study o f different m o r a l discourses does n o t mean that such studies
should n o t , or c o u l d not, be undertaken. o r should the fact that i t
is difficult to p i n d o w n exactly what indigenous m o r a l i t y m i g h t
mean, prevent us f r o m t r y i n g to glean m o r a l principies and v a l e s i n
o u r fieldwork. Such arguments are n o t sufficient j u s t i f c a t i o n for
abandoning the theoretical and ethnographic quest to approach

Introduction

m o r a l i t y as a field o f c u l t u r a l predispositions i n f o r m i n g and

creating, rather t h a n s u p p o r t i n g social relations between groups
and persons ( c f P a r k i n 1985: 4). Indeed, it is the underlying premise
o f this volume that n o t only are such studies possible, they are
potentially very f r u i t f u l , opening new paths for interpretation.
Rather t h a n leaving i n d i g e n o u s m o r a l precepts a n d v a l e s
unexplored, i t is suggested that a head-on c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e m
might reveal previously unperceived depths about why people act
! the way they do. A t the very least, i n this b o o k , we have begun to
/ identify some methods to approach the empirical study o f morality,
I and t o discuss the ramifications o f various possible approaches.

INDIGENOUS MORALITIES AND SOCIAL

ANTHROPOLOGY
I t m i g h t be argued that anthropologists have, ultimately, always
been studying the variety o f social constructions o f m o r a l i t y w i t h a
more or less explicit a i m o f eliciting premises for comparative ethics.
Yet the topic o f m o r a l i t y as such has hardly ever been directly
addressed. M a n y earlier studies o f indigenous rehgious concepts
might also be characterized as studies o f indigenous moralities. F o r
example, Evans-Pritchard's and Lienhardt's studies of, respectively,
N u e r (1956) a n d D i n k a (1961) rehgious concepts and practices,
Leenhardt's study Do Kamo (1979) about personhood a m o n g the
K a n a q o f N e w Caledonia, and the w o r k by Griaule (e.g. 1965) and
Dieterlin (e.g. 1973) o n the D o g o n cosmology w o u l d qualify.
However, these authors never presented their w o r k i n terms o f the
e x p l o r a t i o n o f indigenous moralities. Similarly, the extensive
debates about the interpretation o f Mediterranean concepts o f
h o n o u r and shame (starting w i t h the classical studies i n Peristiany
1966) were carried o u t w i t h o u t any attempt t o l c a t e these concepts
w i t h i n a wider m o r a l schema. A s Melhuus, G i n g r i c h and JacobsonW i d d i n g show (this volume), h o n o u r and shame can fruitfully be
examined as expressions o f p r o f o u n d m o r a l vales.
W i t h i n the a n t h r o p o l o g y o f law i t is possible t o discern i m p l i c i t
references to m o r a l codes, or m o r a l orders, but, again, the issues are
not framed i n sucK terms. I n Crime and Custom in Savage Society
(1926), M a l i n o w s k i posed questions about why people behave as
they should. H e asks whether they are constrained by fear o f
punishment, or whether the answer lies elsewhere, i n 'the nature o f
bonding forces' ( i b i d . : 15). G l u c k m a n and the Manchester School,

Introduction

i n their w o r k o n j u d i c i a l systems, focused o n principies o f social

c o n t r o l , less o n u n d e r l y i n g m o r a l vales. M o r a l codes were treated
as expressing sanction and as m a i n t a i n i n g a n d reinforcing the status t
quo, n o t as shaping e p i s t e m o l g i c a ! a n d j u d i c i a l concerns, o r as ^
constltuting a universe o f meaning.
One major exception to the above approaches is Read's ' M o r a l i t y
and the concept o f the person a m o n g the G a h u k u - G a m a ' , first
published i n 1955. Read begins by stating that it is p r i m a r i l y an
essay i n comparative ethics; i n this case a comparison between
ethical categories o f Western European philosophical traditions and
those o f the G a h u k u - G a m a o f the N e w Guinea Highlands. W h i l e
his argument i n this respect may be faulted today, p r i m a r i l y because
he is n o t c o m p a r i n g like w i t h hke, his general plea for focusing u p o n
indigenous notions o f personhood as a way t o learn about n o n literate people's moralities is t o the p o i n t - as is his exposition o f
Gahuku-Gama's conceptions o f body, ' s o u l ' and other qualities o f
personhood w h i c h leads h i m t o suggest that therein lies the
springboard for their ethical understandings. Today, most w o u l d
agree that a scholarly pursuit o f the m o r a l system o f any one social
group must i n some way take account o f indigenous perceptions
about the h u m a n being; about personhood, agency and sociality.
A project that occupied D u r k h e i m d u r i n g his last years was to
develop a sociology o f ethics. A l t h o u g h he never published a major
w o r k o n the topic, he d i d w r i t e several articles, some o f w h i c h were
recently reissued ( D u r k h e i m 1992). I n many ways unsatisfactory,
not least because o f their sometimes m o r a l i z i n g stance, the essays,
nevertheless, show us D u r k h e i m b o t h as the analytical and
methodological sociologist, and D u r k h e i m as the socially engaged
Citizen seeking solutions t o w h a t he regarded as the rising
utilitarianism o f m o d e r n society ( c f Turner 1992). (See also the
discussion below o n embodied concepts.) Certainly, the essays o n
'Civic m o r i s ' and 'Professional ethics' (ibid.) can still be read w i t h
profit by anthropologists. H i s discussion about the delineation o f a
m o r a l d o m a i n , about the relationship between i n d i v i d u a l and
coUective responsibility and justice, and about contextualized
morahty, succinctly debates the implications o f various possible
theoretical positions. P a r k i n expresses a c o m m o n , but perhaps
unfair, reaction t o D u r k h e i m w h e n he states that ' D u r k h e i m so
conflated the m o r a l w i t h the social that ethnographers c o u l d n o t
isolate f o r analysis those c o n t e m p l a t i v e m o m e n t s o f m o r a l
reflexivity that, rather t h a n strict and unambiguous rules, so typify

Introduction

h u m a n activity and predicaments' ( P a r k i n 1985: 4 - 5 ) . Lukes

suggests that towards the end o f his Ufe, D u r k h e i m began t o shift
his investigations f r o m 'the obligatory to the " d e s i r a b i l i t y " aspect o f
morahty, a n d f r o m the rules people follow to the m o r a l behefs
expressed by the rules' (Lukes 1975: 419; This reading o f D u r k h e i m
(see also A r c h e t t i this volume) opens b r firuitful e o n t e m p o r a r y
anthropological investigations.
W h i l e anthropologists have, by and large, ignored the theoretical
challenges o f the empirical study o f moralities, m o r a l philosophy
has a l o n g intellectual t r a d i t i o n . Philosophers, however, do n o t
concern themselves w i t h locating the m o r a l subject w i t h i n social
and c u l t u r a l worlds. A s a result, anthropologists tend n o t t o draw
u p o n philosophical writings. Three levis o f m o r a l philosophy are
c o m m o n l y identifed: first, that o f meta-ethics, whereby general
questions are asked about what m i g h t be m o r a l principies or m o r a l
beliefs, what k i n d o f sense is a m o r a l sense, etc.; second, that o f
m o r a l theory, w h i c h is concerned w i t h h o w to explain principies
used to solve concrete problems o f applied ethics. T h e t h i r d level
concerns issues o f apphed ethics whereby arguments about concrete
m o r a l dilemmas, such as euthanasia or capital punishment, are
tested w i t h a view to reach defensible positions ( T h o m p s o n and
H a r m a n 1996). A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s c o u l d have something to contribute
t o debates o n a l l these three levis. They can w i d e n the scope o f
enquiry f r o m one searching for a single t r u t h , to one questioning
the basis o f the very propositions i n each instance by demonstrating
alternative, but viable, rationahties, approaches and solutions.
D a v i d Pocock, paying tribute t o the b o o k by Edel and Edel, cites
their explanation for the anthropological lack o f interest i n m o r a l
issues, namely their overarching preoccupation w i t h 'describing
empirical facts and [with] causal investigation to the neglect o f the
analysis o f concepts' (Pocock 1986: 3). However, as m y comments
above suggest, a n interest i n indigenous concepts does n o t
necessarily lead to an interest i n m o r a l issues. Interestingly, as the
w o r k o f D u m o n t demonstrates (e.g. 1986), a theoretical concern
w i t h v a l u i n anthropology doe n o t lead t o a concern w i t h m o r a l
issues either. D u m o n t appears t o l i n k m o r a l i t y as a n intellectual
reaUty only t o the Western philosophical t r a d i t i o n i n w h i c h the
bounded i n d i v i d u a l is the focal analytic entity. I n this t r a d i t i o n , he
a r g e s , a n inevitable separation between fact and v a l u , between is
and ought stands central. However, I w o u l d a r g e that outside the
logic o f academic philosophy, such separations are n o t made, and

introduction

that facts and v a l e s are inevitably entangled. M o r a l principies, I

suggest, express simultaneously an inherent dynamic relationship
between the 'ought' and the 'is.' I f this is so, then they are w o r t h y o f
special attention i n the study o f social and c u l t u r a l life.
THE HIDDEN TRAPS OF EMBODIED CONCEPTS AND
VALUES
The trouble w i t h y o u people [he meant the West] is that y o u see
everything t h r o u g h sex and politics. These are your imperatives.
A n d , incidentally, this makes it almost impossible for y o u to
understand the past when people had quite different priorities.
(Lessing 1995: 188)
A n A f r i c a n historian once said the above to D o r i s Lessing. The
criticism may equally be directed t o o u r (i.e. Western intellectuals')
failure to understand the priorities o f o u r contemporaries w h o live
in different social w o r l d s f r o m ours and w h o orient themselves
according to different m o r a l priorities. I t is an anthropological
t r u i s m to say that we study social and c u l t u r a l life i n terms o f
indigenous ideas and practices. The continuous reflexive p r o b i n g o f
o u r o w n ideas, v a l e s and practices is heralded as an integral part o f
the process o f interpreting alien forms o f h u m a n life. Despite this,
certain domains have gained an unquestioned centrality i n the
analysis o f social life. T h e A f r i c a n historian was probably right i n
identifying sex and pohtics to be a m o n g them. (See also p. 18
below.) A s a result, i t is n o t o r i o u s l y difficult to shed o u r Western a
p r i o r i assumptions where these matters are concerned; they
represent perhaps a p r i m e example o f entangled fact and v a l u
w i t h i n the ' m o d e r n ' w o r l d .
A l t h o u g h o f a somewhat different order, I w o u l d like to add
m o r a l i t y t o the list o f relatively unexamined Western social
domains. We appear unable to stand completely outside o u r core >
m o r a l vales, v a l e s so naturalized, so intellectually and e m o t i o n ally embodied that they are integral parts o f our sense o f self O u r {
sense o f m o r a l i t y is, after all, what constitutes o u r sociality, the very
basis for relating. H u m a n s are, I suggested at the outset, inherently
m o r a l . B u t unless we exercise rigorous checks o n our o w n m o r a l
imaginations (Johnson 1993), we easily fall v i c t i m t o socio-centric
evaluations o f situations i n v o l v i n g people whose m o r a l worlds and
m o r a l imaginations draw o n different sources (see also H o w e l l

10

Introduction

1995). Anthropologists are well aware that the Declaration

of
Human Rights is o f Uttle relevance to the m a j o r i t y o f the world's
p o p u l a t i o n , a n d that it represents a clear expression o f socio-centric
assumptions ( c f A m e r i c a n A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l Association 1947).
Nevertheless, that humans everywhere are cognitively a n d e m o t i o n ally predisposed t o w a r d s m o r a l sensibility is the u n d e r l y i n g
argument o f this b o o k . This, o f course, is j u s t a starting p o i n t ; it
can tell us n o t h i n g about the content o f any m o r a l sensibility
I do n o t wish to revive the od debate about m o r a l relativism. I
only wish to a r g e that the long-standing deep concern about the
possibility
o f m o r a l relativism is a peculiarly Western ( m o r a l )
dilemma. I suggest that debates i n European m o r a l philosophy since
the eighteenth century, whether about m o r a l principies or about
applied ethics, have predisposed anthropologists and others to
worry about the basis for t a k i n g m o r a l stands ( c f T h o m p s o n and
H a r m a n 1996, Taylor 1992). I n our fieldwork i t is at times difficult
t o avoid t a k i n g a m o r a l stand. O u r deeply felt sense o f right and
w r o n g is p u t severely to the test when we observe socially sanctioned
physical violence, o r manifestations o f exploitative relationships
between unequal social persons, such as between parents and
children, husbands and wives, rich and poor, masters and servants,
nobles a n d commoners, etc. A n t h r o p o l o g i s t s can easily find
themselves i n situations where their disinterested role is severely
challenged. This, i n t u r n , may result i n a reluctance towards
conducting a disinterested analysis o f the m o r a l system i n question
o n a par w i t h an analysis o f the kinship system, exchange relations
or any o f the more t r a d i t i o n a l anthropological themes. However, i n
my view, this ought to act as a spur to investigation, reflexivity and
interpretation, not as a damper.

S O M E E M E R G E N T GENERAL ISSUES
The anthropologists i n this volume represent a wide geographical
spectrum, having done fieldwork i n M o n g o l i a , East A f r i c a ,
Argentina, M x i c o , England, Papua N e w Guinea and the M i d d l e
East. I n contrast t o these t r a d i t i o n a l ethnographic studies is the
chapter b y the last c o n t r i b u t o r who bases his discussion n o t o n
fieldwork, but on the O d Testament.
There clearly are difficulties i n deciding what constitutes 'data' i n
the quest to b r i n g t o light the principies o f a particular m o r a l order.
Where t o l o o k for relevant material? W h a t may count as relevant

Introduction

11

material? W h a t sorts o f questions to ask? W h o t o ask? W h a t k i n d o f

legitimacy t o place o n different people's answers? These are j u s t
some o f the questions t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y arise. I asked the
anthropologists w r i t i n g here t o pay particular attention t o these
a n d t o other questions o f methodology. N o n e o f them had explicitly
taken m o r a h t y as a t o p i c for investigation d u r i n g their fieldwork,
a l t h o u g h a l l t h e m have been concemed w i t h the study o f indigenous
concepts a n d vales.
One insight derived f r o m this collection o f papers is that i t is
possible for t w o o r m o r e m o r a l discourses to exist w i t h i n any one
society, each predicated u p o n a specifc k i n d o f sociality. I n
Chapters 4, 5, 6 a n d 7 this is explicit, i n others more i m p l i c i t . By
contrast, Jacobson-Widding (Chapter 2) f o u n d that, despite i n i t i a l
impressions t o the contrary, the same m o r a l code can be f o u n d to
u n d e r p i n social relations o f different orders. W h a t is clear, however,
is that w i t h i n any one society t w o or more m o r a l discursive practices
may coexist a n d be made operational according to context. O f
course, this does n o t mean that people themselves perceive the
situation i n terms o f contested meanings.
I t u r n n o w t o a consideration o f the eight chapters and start by
seeking t o isolate each i n d i v i d u a l anthropologist's approach and
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the e m p i r i c a l study o f moralities. The eight authors
vary widely i n h o w they choose to interpret ' m o r a h t y ' , where they
focus their interpretative gaze, a n d h o w they set about b u i l d i n g up
an argument about the m o r a l i t y (the m o r a l order, val es and
practices) i n their p a r t i c u l a r given socio-cultural setting. I w i l l give a
b r i e f s u m m a r y o f each, before proceeding to a discussion o f some
themes that may be identifed across the chapters. I t is i m p o r t a n t to
bear i n m i n d that, n o t o n l y are we presented w i t h material from
eight different societies, we are also invited t o interact w i t h eight
(nine i f I include myself) different anthropologists, each o f w h o m is
a product o f his o r her relationship to one or more 'interpretative
communities' ( H o w e l l 1994), a n d has a particular visin o f the
discipline and the kinds o f question that are i m p o r t a n t . This fact is,
I suggest, p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant i n the present case because, as
discussed above, m o r a l issues and m o r a l v a l e s are embodied
knowledge w h i c h make us act i n the w o r l d i n ways that render the
separation o f fact and v a l u - subject and object - especially
difTicult. F o r these reasons also, I asked the contributors t o selfconsciously debate questions o f d e f i n i t i o n s a n d what m i g h t
constitute suitable e m p i r i c a l material.

12

Introduction

Defning and locating moralities

A l l the authors seek to d e l i n a t e the field for investigation; to
identify some manageable domain(s) o f socio-cultural life that can
give some clues to m o r a l imperatives.
F r o m his study o f a r u r a l c o m m u n i t y i n the n o r t h o f England,
N i g e l R a p p o r t suggests that m o r a l i t y here is manifested ' i n terms o f
a sense o f righteous i n d i g n a t i o n ' . H e is interested i n the discourses
employed by the locis i n m o r a l i z i n g about outsiders to the village.
His chosen entre is gossip - speech acls u l e r e d i n a self-righteous
f o r m by local inhabitants.
Eduardo A r c h e t t i maintains that since the field o f m o r a l i t y
covers such a vast arena o f actions and evaluations, i t is impossible
to deal w i t h all o f these. Rather, we need to direct o u r concern to
particular concrete activities. I n his paper, therefore, he focuses o n
male A r g e n t i n i a n altitudes t o the national sport o f football w h i c h ,
he arges, may be considered as a k i n d o f microcosm for m o r a l
vales. His 'pegs' for analysis are male virtues, the importance o f
local t r a d i o n s for understanding the present, the significance o f
different styles o f playing football and ideas o f happiness. H i s data
are a m i x t u r e o f historical material f r o m newspapers and studies
about the h i s t o r y o f f o o t b a l l , j u x t a p o s e d w i t h i n f o r m a n t s '
comments and reactions to events.
Caroline H u m p h r e y points out that there is no single t e r m i n the
M o n g o l i a n language that corresponds, however loosely, t o the
European concept o f morahty. Choosing t o interpret the meaning
o f m o r a h t y as 'the evaluadon o f conduct i n relation to esteemed or
despised h u m a n qualities', she finds that the most appropriate way
to elicit these i n the M o n g o l i a n context is to examine the range o f
exemplars to good behaviour that i n d i v i d u i s choose for themselves.
The most c o m m o n type o f exemplars are sayings o f famous
personages - either historical, legendary or contemporary. She thus
distinguishes between c o m m o n l y accepted 'rules o f order, reason
and custom' (jos) and the m u c h more personal 'things that are
taught' (surtakhuun) which she treats as exemplars.
I n her w o r k w i t h the Shona o f Zimbabwe, A n i t a JacobsonW i d d i n g also fails to find local words that she can satisfactorily
t r a n s a t e i n t o ' m o r a l ' or ' m o r a h t y ' . The w o r d tsika that her
informants gave when asked, means ' t o show respect'. A t first she
refused to equate this w i t h morality, but later she came to accept a
semantic equivalence. She employs a m e t h o d o f using ' c u l t u r a l

Introduction

13

scripts'. T h i s involves identifying simple sentences that b o t h capture

indigenous norms and universal concerns, and which lay bare the
clear d o m i n a n t social v a l e s o f a group. She further seeks o u t
' m u t e d structures' o f v a l e s that ' l u r k behind the fagade o f
" d o m i n a n t structure" o f social personhood and m o r a l i t y ' . She
suggests that i n her o w n ethnographic case, relevant c u l t u r a l scripts
w o u l d need to focus u p o n guilt, shame and dignity. She finds, to her
surprise, that there is a correspondence between the two analytical
levis o f m u t e d and d o m i n a n t structures. I n other words, we do n o t
find parallel m o r a l discourses operating dependent u p o n context or
category o f actors. Rather, the Shona c u l t u r a l script o f hierarchical
relationships between different social personages is m i r r o r e d
t h r o u g h o u t society.
M a r i l y n Strathern takes her cue from the feminist critic C a r o l
Smart w h o a r g e s that the iaw's claims ( i n E u r o - A m e r i c a n legal
traditions) to o p r a t e according t o objective and neutral criteria do
n o t reflect reality, since men's and women's interests are differentially protected i n i t . D r a w i n g o n her material from the Hagen
people o f N e w Guinea, Strathern examines m o r a l reasoning f r o m a
gender perspective and asks whether double standards may be
discerned here also. She uses several case studies w h i c h concern the
k i l l i n g o f cise k i n to elicit what m o r a l considerations may be
discerned from people's m a n i p u l a t i o n of, and reactions to, such
events.
M a r i t M e l h u u s also examines the operation o f relative gender
v a l e s as the m a i n means to understand the m o r a l universe o f
meaning among Catholic r u r a l M e x i c a n mestizos. She suggests that
one may n o t s e p r a t e m o r a l i t y f r o m gender. She draws o n some case
studies f r o m her o w n field material as well as on story lines o f
M e x i c a n films i n order to b r i n g out some d o m i n a n t m o r a l themes
and evaluations, a n d focuses u p o n local notions o f h o n o u r and
shame as these are expressed i n relation to sexual behaviour.
Terry Evens seeks to connect our contemporary Western m o r a l
t h i n k i n g firmly t o its roots, namely the Bible and, more precisely,
the chapters that deal w i t h the Fall i n the B o o k o f Gnesis. H i s
interpretation also draws heavily o n various exegetical texts. H e
makes clear that he approaches biblical criticism as a social
anthropologist, n o t as a biblical scholar. H e is concerned w i t h
eliciting explicit a n d i m p l i c i t meanings. H e treats the analysis o f
G n e s i s o n a par w i t h any other anthropological analysis o f m y t h ,
projecting the 'logic' o f a particular socio-cultural t r a d i t i o n .

14

Introduction

A n d r e G i n g r i c h , w h o worked w i t h an A r a b M u s h m c o m m u n i t y
i n the Yemen, draws o n scriptural texts, as well as o n local notions
oharam.
H e states that coUective moralities w h i c h are the forms b y
w h i c h communities 'establish normative ordering for i n d i v i d u a l
behaviour . . . cannot be studied independently o f legal orders and
social practice'. I n a d d i t i o n , he a r g e s that the religious m o r a l
tenets must be incorporated i n any empirical study o f morality. H i s
overall theoretical frame is that o f an 'exhausted c o m m u n i t y ' .
T h r o u g h this interpretative category, he seeks to explain what can
only be described as a m o r a l collapse w i t h i n Islamic communities,
when haram i d e i s o f respecting w o m e n are breaking d o w n i n the
attack o n w o m e n a n d children o f other Islamic communities.

Moral reasoning
One question that arises i n the study o f moralities is whether m o r a l
codes a n d v a l e s m u s t necessarily involve i n d i v i d u a l self-awareness
i n some f o r m or another, and whether m o r a l reasoning is performed
by every i n d i v i d u a l regardless o f socio-cultural conditions a n d
( i d e o l o g i c a l constructs. Ultimately, we are dealing w i t h m o r a l
( reasoning, judgements and m o r a l dilemmas. The m o r a l philosopher
M a r y M i d g l e y makes a helpful suggestion, namely that we shift
away f r o m 'the content and object o f m o r a l i t y to the way o f
* reasoning'. T o ask what k i n d o f reasoning a person (or a group o f
people) conducts i n order to justify a particular d e c i s i n i n a
situation o f a m o r a l d i l e m m a can be, she says, a useful way to elicit
m o r a l v a l e s (Pocock 1986: 9-12). I t is h a r d to believe that
something recognizably Uke m o r a l dilemmas are n o t f o i m d everywhere. Some m i g h t m a i n t a i n that m o r a l dilemmas experienced i n
m o r e holistic societies m i g h t be more predictable t h a n those o f the
i n d u s t r i a l m o d e r n West ( c f i b i d . : 11). I t w o u l d , however, be w r o n g
to conclude that they are any less difficult to handle. T h i s is where
Midgley's proposed focus o n the processes o f reasoning m i g h t come
i n useful. A c c o r d i n g t o Pocock, by shifting the focus f r o m m o r a l
content t o m o r a l t h i n k i n g , or reasoning, M i d g l e y opens the p a t h for
anthropological, i.e. comparative, studies o f m o r a l systems. The
argument is that i t is n o t a question o f whether the H o m e r i c Greeks
(or the Nuer, the H a g e n or whoever) had m o r a l standards o r not;
loosely speaking they clearly had. Whether they h a d 'alternatives t o
their o w n evaluations, rather t h a n the quality o f their evaluations'
has led commentators t o hesitate t o cali t h e m m o r a l ( i b i d . : 12,

Introduction

15

o r i g i n a l emphasis). I suggest that insisting o n this criterion may

help US t o identify the nub o f 'Western' dilemmas i n studying other
moralities. We d o o p r a t e w i t h some prerequisites for what may be
accepted as a m o r a l system, a n d central to these are demands for
alternatives, for m o r a l reasoning and for choice. M u c h o f the
diTerence between Western intellectuals and the highlanders o f N e w
Guinea may, I suggest, be f o u n d precisely i n posited alternatives
and, henee, the degree o f reflexivity involved i n the reasoning.
I f self-conscious reasoning is ubiquitous, then how d o people
regard responsibility for i m m o r a l acts? Several o f the contributors
address this question. Strathern, t a k i n g her material f r o m the
Hagen r e a o f Papua N e w G u i n e a , makes explicit her o w n E u r o A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n that takes i t for granted that the m o r a l person
acts knowingly, and that this necessitates a conscious positing vis-vis possible different courses for action. However, she maintains
that the ethnography f r o m the Highlands demonstrates that there
also 'people sift t h r o u g h different types o f Information i n a k n o w i n g
way'. She suggests that some m o r a l l y deviant behaviour, such as
k i l l i n g k i n , is explained locally by the actor having been rendered
' u n k n o w i n g ' and henee ' a m o r a l ' t h r o u g h the application o f poison.
This results i n a special k i n d o f madness w h i c h accounts for the
deviant m o r a l behaviour. There is linguistic support for such an
interpretation. T h i s madness is called wulya, and the sorcery
substance applied is wulya wulya. A m a d person does n o t reason
according t o the same m o r a l norms as does a n o r m a l person w h i c h w o u l d also be a Western argument. Thus, t h r o u g h focusing
o n H a g e n perceptions about the person, Strathern addresses
questions about m o r a l reasoning and responsibility, and highlights
contextual differences i n these w i t h regard to same-sex and cross-sex
relations (see also below).
E m o t i o n a h t y may play a p a r t i n m o r a l reasoning. A r c h e t t i shows
h o w A r g e n t i n i a n male football players and fans are t o r n between
the desire t o w i n and the desire to c r a t e beautiful football.
A c c o r d i n g t o local aesthetic vales, the players have t o play
brutishly i n order t o w i n against foreign teams. B u t i t is only elegant
playing that produces a feeling o f happiness. A r c h e t t i makes an
interesting d i s t i n c t i o n between 'feeling happy' and 'being happy'.
The former is transient, b u t strong, and is provoked by good
football. C o n c o m i t a n t l y , t o lose t o a foreign team produces a feeling
o f despair. A r c h e t t i shows h o w football is intrinsically part o f male
A r g e n t i n i a n s ' sense o f personal a n d n a t i o n a l identity, and h o w

16

Introduction

football also orchestrates feelings o f h o n o u r and shame. T h e failure

o f the n a t i o n a l team to w i n i n the 1958 W o r l d C u p after many years'
refusal to p a r t i c p a t e , produced a m o r a l crisis a m o n g football
players and fans. I n f o r m a n t s t o l d h i m that Tor many years
[afterwards] we c o u l d n o t distinguish right f r o m w r o n g ' . B r u t i s h
football gets the goals, b u t does not p i w h i c e happiness. T h e choice
involved i n choosing the style o f playing takes o n m o r a l dimensions
for fans a n d players alike. To play i n order to w i n w o u l d , according
t o A r g e n t i n i a n supporters o f the od vales, mean a betrayal o f
deeply felt v a l e s about themselves, each other, and the social and
m o r a l w o r l d i n w h i c h they live.

T h e moral person
W i t h a recent shift i n interest towards indigenous notions o f self and
personhood, questions pertaining to the m o r a l g r o u n d i n g o f ideas
a n d v a l e s concerning w h a t i t means to be a h u m a n being are highly
pertinent (Heelas and L o c k 1981, Carrithers et al. 1985). Several o f
the authors address such questions i n seeking a 'peg' o n w h i c h to
hang their analysis. Some coUectively held views o n h u m a n nature
are present i n every k n o w n s o c i o - c u l t u r a l g r o u p . A useful
d i s t i n c t i o n may be made between qualities perceived as inherently
p a r t o f different categories o f social persons - such as men, women,
chiefs, Brahmins, slaves - and those that are perceived as attainable
( i n b o t h positive and negative directions) and, as such, potentially
subject to t r a i n i n g a n d socialization. F r o m such a starting p o i n t one
may explore questions concerning. Inter alia: responsibility and
rights; laws, rules, and sanctions; crime and punishment; right and
w r o n g ; g o o d and evil; sin and forgiveness or redemption; notions o f
causality; i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ; possibility for choice; notions o f conscience.
Evens interprets G n e s i s as an endeavour o f 'self-construction'.
The u l t m a t e existential question o f ' w h o a m I ' is, he suggests, a
practical question, the answer to which Jewish and Christian
i n d i v i d u i s can find i n this text. G n e s i s informs its readers that
they, as humans, are 'those creatures w h o are especially given to
g i v i n g themselves their o w n identity'. I f this interpretation is
correct, i t certainly helps to explain the o d and persistent v a l u
placed o n i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n these religions, c u l m i n a t i n g i n the
democratic ideal a n d the n o t i o n o f universal h u m a n rights.
Jacobson-Widding centres her essay a r o u n d a p r o p o s i t i o n that

Introduction

17

the concept o f m o r a l i t y is a Western one and depends u p o n an

individualistic, egahtarian conception o f personhood. She questions
whether obeying norms for g o o d behaviour ' i n so far as this
behaviour affects the well-being o f any other person t h a n the actor
h i m - or herself' must necessarily i m p l y notions o f bounded and
equal i n d i v i d u i s . I f so, h o w then can one approach the study o f
moralities i n those places, as i n m u c h o f A f r i c a , where hierarchical
categories o f social persons are the n o r m , where ideas about unique
and bounded i n d i v i d u i s are n o t meaningful? The Shona social
person, like the Hagen one, is a function o f the relative position that
he or she occupies i n any one social context. However, having
elaborated Shona notions o f social, not personal, personhood and
associated vales, she fnally accepts that showing respect i n the way
that Shona themselves understand this behaviour, may indeed
coincide w i t h the way that people orient themselves m o r a l l y i n the
w o r l d . Failure t o behave accordingly provokes feelings o f shame
rather than guilt.
The M o n g o l i a n s , like the peoples o f Zimbabwe, also o p r a t e w i t h
different, and hierarchically placed, categories o f social persons
each associated w i t h different behavioural ( m o r a l ) expectations, but
to different effect. H u m p h r e y makes an interesting distinction
between M o n g o l i a n basic premises and Western ones. She suggests
that i n Western philosophy a basic premise has been that 'at the very
least a sympathy for others has been considered . . . as a sine qua
non for entering i n the w o r l d o f m o r a h t y ' . This contrasts sharply
w i t h M o n g o l i a n precepts where 'the core o f m o r a l i t y is essentially
referred to the self, adjudicating one's o w n actions as good and bad
for oneself
( o r i g i n a l emphasis). T h u s , the very q u a l i t y o f
personhood and responsibihty differs radically between the t w o
cultural traditions. A l t r u i s m (so heralded i n the West) is, she
suggests, 'weakly internalized' among the M o n g o l s .
Rapport's analysis o f h o w i n d i v i d u a l discourses f o r m different
subject positions highlights some c o m m o n features about constructing and expressing identities. H e is p r i m a r i l y interested i n the
construction o f the 'outsider' i n different contexts. H e points out,
however, that each such construction simultaneously constructs the
self i n its role as 'insider'. Identities, he says, 'are intrinsically
comparative . . . i m p l i c i t l y a d m i t t i n g their o w n negativity'. E m p l o y i n g Boon's ideal types o f t r i b a l and scribal 'nay-saying', R a p p o r t
discerns a t e n s i n i n the E n g l i s h village that he studied, between
what, he suggests, may be a changeover f r o m a 'scribal' tendency o f

18

Introduction

m u t u a l exclusions to a ' t r i b a l ' one o f complementary opposites;

f r o m clear-cut notions o f g o o d and bad, right and w r o n g , to
demands o f relativism w h i c h is following i n the wake o f regional,
national a n d International intrusions i n t o the local.
S e x and morality
Debates about r i g h t o r w r o n g behaviour inevitably involve morality.
C e r t a i n k i n d s o f behaviour are, i n the West, singled o u t for m o r a l
debates m o r e often t h a n others. These include sexual behaviour.
Foucault makes this p o i n t when he asks i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n to
Volume T w o o f The History of Sexuality,
why is sexual conduct, why are the activities and pleasures that
attach t o i t , an object o f m o r a l solicitude? W h y this ethical
concern - w h i c h , at certain times, i n certain societies and groups,
appears m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the m o r a l attention that is focused
o n other, likewise essential, r e a s o f i n d i v i d u a l or coUective life,
such as a l i m e n t a r y behaviour or the fulfilment o f civic duties?
(Foucauh 1986: 10)
Foucault rightly, i n m y view, seeks the answer i n the history o f
t h o u g h t , n o t i n circular arguments about rules and regulations. The
m e t h o d he pursues is to pose the question 'how, why, and i n what
forms was sexuaHty constituted as a m o r a l domain?' (ibid.).
SexuaUty then becomes part o f a wider field o f gender, one that
focuses directly u p o n sexual behaviour and its constltuting vales.
However, as every anthropologist knows, n o t a l l moralities are
particularly concerned w i t h sexual conduct. The papers i n this
collection that explicitly take up sexuality as one entre i n t o the
study o f indigenous m o r a l i t y are based o n societies anchored w i t h i n
C h r i s t i a n o r Islamic traditions. Melhuus, i n her study o f a Catholic
mestizo peasant c o m m u n i t y i n M x i c o , shows h o w women as sexual
beings can, t h r o u g h t h e i r behaviour, shame or h o n o u r the
significant m e n i n their lives: husbands, fathers and brothers.
T h r o u g h a n ideology o f machismo, men's o w n h o n o u r as men is
vulnerable t o the conduct o f their w o m e n . M a l e i d e n t i t y is
constructed a l o n g a scale o f more or less male, the criteria for
w h i c h are dependent u p o n a paradox. By seducing other men's
women they enhance their masculinity, while they lose their h o n o u r
when other m e n seduce their o w n w o m e n . W i t h i n this harsh v a l u
system, w o m e n represent a m o r a l barometer for men while, at the

introduction

19

same time, their o w n femaleness becomes classified as either good

or bad. T h u s g o o d w o m e n are b o t h asexual and mothers. Bad
w o m e n are characterized by d i n t o f sexual activities. M e l h u u s shows
h o w these conflicting i d e i s are reflected t h r o u g h different levis o f
M e x i c a n society, f r o m the pious p i l g r i m at the site o f the V i r g i n o f
Guadelupe, t o the m a n w h o violently confronts another w h o has
made his sister i n t o a b a d w o m a n . These images are reiterated i n
p o p u l a r films a n d serious literature. H o n o u r a n d shame, g o o d and
bad, m a r r i e d and u n m a r r i e d , sexual and asexual, male and female,
virginity and promiscuity, C h u r c h and home are a l l lived concepts
that c r a t e the overall m o r a l discourse for r u r a l Mexicans. This
discourse is articulated t h r o u g h images derived f r o m v a l e s about
sexual conduct.
Evens relies o n w r i t t e n texts alone t o debate similar issues. H i s
purpose is t o elicit the foundations for Christian m o r a l v a l e s about
sexuality, and he r e t u m s for this to Eve's part i n the Fall. Eve, as the
representative o f biblical female principies, may, he a r g e s , be
regarded as the u l t m a t e temptress; but as part o f A d a m , she is ' n o
more t h a n A d a m ' s t e m p t a t i o n o f himself, the seduction o f his
spiritual by his c a m a l nature'. Echoes o f this interpretation can be
found i n the M e x i c a n situation described by Melhuus. T h i s becomes
striking when we consider that Evens suggests that, despite a l l
appearances t o the contrary, a p r i m a c y o f the female principie may
be discerned i n G n e s i s . A g a i n , we are faced w i t h a paradox:
spirituality versus m a t e r i a l i t y i n w h i c h the explicit m o r a l storyline
emphasizes the former at the expense o f the latter. However, while
the conjugal relationship opposes A d a m to ' G o d , his maker, the
fundamental association o f marriage and creativity makes i t "next
t o g o d l i n e s s " ' . G n e s i s m a y thus serve as an exemplar ( c f
H u m p h r e y this volume) for the Catholic Church's teaching about
sexuality and marriage.
B y contrast, such m o r a l central concern w i t h sexuality is n o t part
o f the Hagen situation. Strathern, however, stresses that gender
v a l e s and d i e r e n c e s still may be regarded as constltuting a
significant m o r a l forc. She suggests that i n the N e w Guinea
Highlands, people e v a l a t e possible courses o f action open t o them,
but that their r o o m for m a n o e u v r i n g and for acting is 'crucially
affected whether they find themselves acting w i t h others of their sex
or with those of opposite sex\my
emphasis). She further makes a
d i s t i n c t i o n between mediated a n d unmediated relations a n d ,
although Strathern is concemed to analyse the Hagen situation.

20

Introduction

Introduction

the following p o i n t is, I suggest, pertinent more widely: ' W o m e n d i d

not have the same access to such objects o f m e d i a t i o n [as men], as
they also lack oratorical skills or unambiguous claims to support.
But they had relationships at their disposal.'
I f we n o w l o o k at the example from n o r t h e r n Yemen as discussed
by G i n g r i c h , we fnd that he provides a n interesting complement t o
Evens' and Melhuus's papers. G i n g r i c h also draws on authoritative
rehgious texts, i n this case Islamic ones, but he supplements these
w i t h observations f r o m fieldwork i n a M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the
Yemen. Indeed, he a r g e s forcibly that to analyse local concepts o f
m o r a l concepts, such as haram ('forbidden', 'sacrosanct' - a t e r m
applied most frequently to the segregation and seclusion o f w o m e n
and children from p u b l i c hfe) i n isolation from their scriptural
traditions is 'to cut one segment o f a m o r a l , legal, and p o l i t i c a l
system from its other elements'. G i n g r i c h shows h o w the d o m i n a n t
Islamic ideology o f male h o n o u r is intimately linked to the way that
their significant w o m e n behave. This is not unlike m u c h o f what
Melhuus describes for r u r a l M x i c o . A c c o r d i n g to G i n g r i c h , 'The
m o r a l location o f w o m e n and children as a protected appendage t o
men's h o n o u r certainly represents one powerful and effective local
concept.' However, he is not satisfied just to explore the semantics
o f this social fact, but wishes to take i t one step further and
elucdate h o w w o m e n themselves, i n their segregated interactions,
refer to the concept o f haram. He a r g e s that the female-centred
idea o f 'modesty' may be interpreted as serving as a second, parallel
concept for women's behaviour. O n the other hand, he reports that
in some t r i b a l periphery o f the Arab-speaking M u s l i m w o r l d
'women often have the r i g h t to, and the burden of, an h o n o u r o f
their o w n ' . I n sharp contrast to other M u s l i m r e a s , here w o m e n
who defend themselves are 'good and honourable'.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
I n this text I have been pursuing paths that have led i n many
different directions. The a i m , however, has been to start t o clear the
ground for some novel approaches t o o d problems experienced a n d
debated i n social anthropology. The a i m has n o t been to provide
clear answers as t o h o w that ground be defined or operationalized,
o r to define an anthropology o f moralities . A t the outset, I made a
long hst o f possible questions that c o u l d be posed i n the pursuit o f
eliciting indigenous m o r a l discourses and discursive practices. Some

21

o f these have been addressed i n this b o o k . M a n y remain for future

studies to engage w i t h . F r o m their very varied positions, the authors
o f these papers have raised a range o f theoretical and methodological problems and issues. C o m m o n to t h e m all, however, is a
wilhngness t o grapple w i t h the same central topic and to present
t h e i r ethnographic m a t e r i a l f r o m a n angle t h a t they w o u l d
otherwise not have chosen. For this reason alone, I feel that the
exercise has been worthwhile. The range and q u a l i t y o f the papers i n
this volume do, I beheve, bear witness to the rich potentiahty
inherent i n a focus o n morality.
A n t h r o p o l o g y can indeed contribute to the understanding o f
indigenous m o r a l discourses and discursive practices and, o n the
bases o f such understandings, t o comparative ethics.
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22

'<

^i-

.sr

Part I

Introduction

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Discourses on morality
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