Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
because Manaban was already pointing hisfirearm at Bautista when the latter turned
his back. The defense failedto establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause
that allegedlyproduced obfuscation.
couplewhich usually resulted in the cruel treatment of Marivic by Ben. Thiswent on for
about 10 or 11 years, occurring around thrice a weekwhen everytime the latter got
drunk. On the evening of November 15,1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas, his co-worker,
after having collectedtheir salary, went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO where they
stayedfor 3 hours and drank 2 bottles of beer, each. They then went to theGenosa
residence but Marivic was not there because, as sheexplained, she was out with her
cousin looking for Ben, knowing that itwas a payday and that he was probably out to
gamble again. Uponarriving later at the Genosa residence and finding Ben
drunkbecause of his staggering walking Marivic asked Ecel to sleep in the house
because she was scared that Ben might again beat her, butEcel declined for fear of a
repetition of an incident a year ago. Benwas in his usual unruly behavior, nagging and
yelling at Marivic, evencutting the antenna wire with a bolo to keep her from watching
TV. There were basically 2 incidents of attack made by Ben: 1) he
whirled Marivic, causing her to fall on the bedside, and two hours laterwhen 2) he
dragged her out of the room towards the drawer, holdingher neck. He tried opening
the drawer, failed, so reached for a bladeinstead in his wallet. At this point, she was
aware that he was going tokill her so she smashed his arm, causing the wallet and
blade to fall.She also subsequently smashed him with a metal pipe before running to
the childrens room, where she felt overwhelming selfpity and feltnauseous. Marivic
admitted killing her husband, however, by shooting him later on. She had distorted
the drawer where the gun was and shot him. The RTC charged Genosa with
parricide, giving her thedeath penalty.
ISSUES:
1) WON Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus(invoking BWS)
2)WON there was treachery in the killing of Ben Genosa1)No, but with 2 mitigating
circumstances2)None
HELD:RATIO: 1) Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of thebattered
woman at the time of the offense- she must have actuallyfeared imminent harm from
her batterer and honestly believed thatkilling him would save her life. Here, there was
a sufficient timeinterval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attackupon him. The reality or even imminent danger he posed endedaltogether the
moment he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed, notwithstanding the Courts
recognition of this special case that requiring the battered person to await an obvious,
deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to
murder byinstallment and that threatening behavior or communication can satisfy
the required imminence of danger. Aggression, if notcontinuous, does not warrant
self-defense. In the absence of suchaggression, there can be no self-defensecomplete or incomplete- thepart of the victim.Mitigating circumstance 1: Par. 9 and 10
of Art. 13 of the RPCThe cyclical nature of the BWS and repeated beatings over
a period oftime resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous toan
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without deprivingher of
consciousness of her acts.Mitigating circumstance 2: passion and obfuscation.This
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result ofan uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust acts or alegit stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason, with 1) there is anunlawful and sufficient act to produce such
condition and 2) noconsiderable length of time when the accused might recover
hernormal equanimity, as requisites. 2) There is no showing of the victims position
relative to appellant at the time of the shooting, nor that Marivic chose a specific
means of attacking her husband whichdoes not pose as a risk to her. Besides,
Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the crime of
murder for which Nicolas wasacquitted while Avelina was found guilty of homicide.
She appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon onJune 10, 1944 to
completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility for having acted in defense of her
honor, to find inher favour additional mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating
circumstance.
At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim, went
to the chapel of Seventh DayAdventists to attend religious services and sat at the
front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapelshortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last
one nearest the door.Upon seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelinas right
side from his seat on the other side of the chapel, and without saying a word, placed
his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had
in a pocket of her dress with theintention of punishing Amados offending hand.
Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on herleft hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 inchesdeep, which is mortal.
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing
his daughter approached her andasked her the reason for her action to which Avelina
replied, Father, I could not endure anymore.
Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada was
there and Avelina surrenderedherself. Lozada advised the Jaurigues to go home
immediately for fear of retaliation of Capinas relatives.
EVENTS PRIOR:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelinas handkerchief
bearing her nickname while it was washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and
professed his love for her which wasrefused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him, gave himfist blows and
kicked him. She informed her matter about it and since then, she armed herself with a
long fan knife whenever she went out.
2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina and
entered the room where she wassleeping. She felt her forehead and she immediately
screamed for help which awakened her parents and brought themto her side. Amado
came out from where he had hidden and kissed the hand of Avelinas father, Nicolas.
Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the day of the
incident (September 20, 1942) thatAmado had been falsely boasting in the
neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person. In the evening,Amado had
been courting the latter in vain.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility because she is justified inhaving acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor.
Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, presence ofprovocation and absence of intent in her favour
Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating
circumstance in this case
HELD:
Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely exempt
from criminal liability. To be entitled toa complete self-defense of chastity, there must
be an attempt to rape. To provide for a justifying circumstance of self-defense, there
must be a.) unlawful aggression, b) reasonable necessity of the mean employed to
prevent or repel it c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Attempt to rape is an unlawful aggression. However, under the circumstances
of the offense, there was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they were
inside the chapel lighted with electric lights and contained several people. Thrusting
at the bsae of capinos neck as her means to repel aggression is not reasonable but
instead, excessive.
Excessive fines
Facts:
The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted."
In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La
Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of
"Carnation" milk for thirty centavos.
As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good
terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in
this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of
Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of
commodity.
Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by
the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months
and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all
other respects.
Ratio:
However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies
as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so
severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding,
that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings
up again two opposing theories
we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the
courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur.,
"Criminal Law" sec. 526).
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price,
Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to
imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He
was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.
Issue/s:
1.
WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate
to the offence
2.
WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it
prescribed excessive penalties.
1.
Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too
excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in
the Executive Order?
2.
Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a
violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
[in this particular case there are a number of issues, but the most compelling
is the 2nd and 4th issues]
DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE
WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS
REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
OR SELF-DEFENSE
- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to
the accused to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of
the evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful
aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being
hit in the forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense
makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that
was alleged to have constituted the unlawful aggression
NO.
In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not
measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one
violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial
system of price controls.
be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is,
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen
years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months
Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not
be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after
actual liberation of the area from enemy control. The court held that any
reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were
indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating
in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no.8, granting amnesty to
all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of
resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. All the accused ( except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by
the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission,
which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by
purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On
July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as
conspirator and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or nor accused appellants are guilty of murder; and
relieve him from criminal liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience
must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a compliance with "a
lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule,
an inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has
said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving
just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what that
superior commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th
edition, p. 528.)
We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant
committed the acts charged in the information in obedience to the
instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of argument, that
such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and
therefore does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil.,
433.)
The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full
knowledge of their falsity; but he alleges that he did so from data furnished
by his immediate chief, the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and only in
obedience to instructions from him.
As regards the data, we find it to be sufficiently proven that they were not
supplied by the aforementioned Baldomero Fernandez, but by the head of
the pressmen, Hermenegildo de la Cruz, and the defendant later collated
them with the books of the daily pressings.