Tanada v.

Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986
(146 SCRA 446)
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication
to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by
3
judges.
Petitioners
move
for
reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor
General avers that the motion is a request
for advisory opinion. February Revolution
took place, which subsequently required
the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder
on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of
the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required
in light of the clause unless otherwise
provided.
Held: The clause unless it is otherwise
provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any
other
date,
without
its
previous
publication. The legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or
extended.
Publication
requirements
applies to
(1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws;
(2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of

legislative powers whenever the same are

validly delegated by the legislature or
directly conferred by the Constitution;
(3) Administrative rules and regulations for
the purpose of enforcing or implementing
existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation;
(4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that
it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place;
(5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the
details of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the
laws.

money orders. The postal cancellation

mark on the envelope containing the
remittance bears the date August 31,
1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle
Office ruled that pursuant to Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment
for registration fees was payable on or
before the last working day of August. The
last working day of August 1957 was
Friday,
August
30,
1957.
And
consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga
which bears cancellation mark dated
August 31, 1957was made beyond time
fixed by law.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared

that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to
become effective only after 15 days from
their publication, or on another date
specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code.

RULING: The Motor Vehicle Office in

Cagayan had no office on Saturday,
August 31, 1957. However, it was
immaterial
the
last
working
day
contemplated in the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law should not necessarily mean the last
working day of Motor Vehicle Office. The
fact that August31, 1957 was declared a
special public holiday did not have the
effect of making the preceding day,
August 30, the last day for paying
registration
fees
without
penalty.
Moreover, under the said law, for payment
of registration fees by mail, the date of
cancellation of the postage stamps of the
envelope containing the remittance is
considered the date of application.

Gonzaga vs David
GR no. L-14858
December 29, 1960
FACTS: Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a
cargo truck and passenger bus, registers
the vehicles and pays the first installment
for registration fees due on 1957. To cover
the second installment for registration
fees, he remitted to the provincial
treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail,
the amount of P500.00, under postal

ISSUE: Whether or not the remittance for

second installment of registration fees was
made beyond the time fixed by law.

Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA

GR no. L-32116
April 21, 1981
FACTS: Maxima Castro, accompanied by
Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of

Caloocan to apply for industrial loan. The

loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage on Castors house, after that,
the bank approved the loan of P3000.
Valencia obtained from the bank an equal
amount of loan affixing Castros signature
as co-maker without its knowledge. The
sheriff then sent a notice announcing the
property would be sold at public auction to
satisfy the obligation. Upon request, the
auction sale which was scheduled for
March 10, 1961was postponed for April 10,
1961. But April 10 was subsequently
declared a special holiday so the sheriff
sold the property on public auction on
April 11, 1961 which was the next
succeeding business day following the
special holiday. Castro prayed for the
annulment of sale alleging that there was
fraud on the part of Valencias who induced
her to sign as co-maker of a promissory
note since she is a 70-year old widow who
cannot read and write and it was only
when she receive the notice of sheriff, she
learned that the encumbrance on her
property was P6000 and not for P3000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public auction
sale was null and void for transferring the
date already set by law.
RULING: The sale is null and void for not
having in accordance with Act 3135 which
states that a notice shall be given by
posting notices of sale for not less than 20
days in at least 3public places and if the
property is worth more than P400 such
notice shall also be published for in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city once a week for 3
consecutive weeks. The pretermission of a
holiday applies only where the day, or the
last day for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday or

when the last day of a given period for

doing an act falls on holiday. It does not
apply to a day fixed by an office or officer
of the government for an act to be done.
Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or
the last day set by law for the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a
given period but a date fixed by deputy
sheriff, the sale cannot be legally made on
the next succeeding business day without
the notice of the sale in accordance with
Act no. 3135.
PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791,
29 March 1954
FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of
First Instance of Manila for violating
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection
with Section 34 of Republic No. 265. The
appellant was in possession of foreign
exchange consisting of U.S dollars, checks
and money orders amounting to about $
7,000. He failed to sell the said currency to
the Central Bank through its agents one
day following the receipt of such currency
as required by Circular No.20. The
appellant was sentenced to six months
imprisonment and a fine of Php 1, 000.
The appellant based the appeal on the
claim that said circular was not published
on the Official Gazette prior to the act of
omission of the appellant, thus, said
circular has no force and effect.
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was
issued in the year 1949. It was not
published until November 1951, or after
three months after appelants conviction
of its violation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:
1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank,
not being a statute or a law should
be
subjected
to
publication
requirement stated in Article 2 of
the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said
Circular No. 20 when the latter was
only published after about three
months of his conviction.
HELD:
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a
law but it is being issued for the
implementation
of
the
law
authorizing its issuance, therefore
it has the force and effect of the
law. Circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation
should
be
published
before
becoming effective. It is based on
the general principle that before
the public is bound by penal
provisions, the people should be
officially informed of its contents
and penalties.
2. Appellant could not be held liable
for the violation of Circular No. 20
for it was not binding at the time
he was found to have failed to sell
the foreign exchange.
CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 137873,
20 April 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990,
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow,
Maria, filed a complaint for damages at

the RTC of Pasig against the deceaseds

employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widows prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the widow Maria Juego.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
1. The petitioner can be held liable
under the grounds of negligence.
2. The injured employee or his heirs
have the right to choose between
availing themselves of the workers
right
under
the
Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code
for higher damages in cases of
employers negligence.
HELD:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the thing
or transaction speaks for itself recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof. It has the
following requisites: (1) the accident was
of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person
injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur
are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of
appellants negligence arises.
Claims for damages sustained by workers
in the course of their employment could
be filed only under the Workmens

Compensation
Law.
In
availing
its
remedies, claimants are deemed to have
waived their right of the remedies
provided by other laws. However, this is
an exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioners negligence
when she filed her claim for death
benefits, otherwise, she would have opted
to avail of a better remedy than that of
which she already had.
EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO
UNIVERSITY CONCEPCION, J.:
G.R. No. L-15127
May 30, 1961
Facts: Emeterio Cui enrolled in the
defendant
university
where
plaintiff
finished his law studies in the up to and
including the first semester of the fourth
year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant
Law College, he was awarded scholarship
grants and his semestral tuition fees were
returned to him after ends of the
semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's law
college and enrolled for the last semester
of his fourth year law in the college of law
of the Abad Santos University graduating
from the college of law of the latter
university. He applied to take the bar
examination in which he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant
Arellano University. The defendant refused
until after he had paid back the P1,033 87,
noting the contract that he signed which
stated that in consideration of the
scholarship granted to him by the
University, he waives his right to transfer
to another school without having refunded
to the defendant the equivalent of the
scholarship
cash
and
followed
by
Memorandum No. 38 that the Director of

Private

Schools

issued.

Issue: Whether or not the contract

between
Cui
and
the
respondent
university, whereby the former waives his
right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or
not.
Held: The contract of waiver between the
plaintiff and respondent on September 10,
1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum
No. 38 and hence null and void. The
contract was contrary to sound policy and
civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. When students are given full or
partial scholarships, it is understood that
such scholarships are merited and earned.
The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
PERFECTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX
G.R. No. L-30642
April 30, 1985
136 SCRA 141
FACTS:
On June 28, 1967, some employees of
Philex
Mining
Corporation
died
as
a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the copper mine (Tuba,
Benguet) during underground operations.
Allegedly, Philex was in violation of
government rules and regulations for
negligently and deliberately failing to take

the required precautions for the protection

of
the
lives
of
its
men
working underground.
The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the
heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation. Petitioners moved to
claim
their benefits pursuant
to
the
Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission.
They also petitioned before the regular
courts and sued Philex for additional
damages.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al
can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
HELD:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do
either one. If they filed for benefits under
the WCA then they will be prohibited from
proceeding with a civil case before the
regular courts. On the contrary, if they
sued before the civil courts then they
would
also
be
prohibited
from
claiming benefits under the WCA.
The SC however ruled that Floresca et al
are excused from this deficiency due
to ignorance of the fact. Had they been
aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. The SC ruled
that the dismissal of the case in the lower
court be reversed and case is remanded
for further proceedings.
However, if in case the petitioners win in
the lower court, whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under

the WCA should be deducted. The SC

emphasized that if they would go strictly
by the book in this case then the purpose
of the law may be defeated. (Refer to
excerpt below)
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER
OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED
TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SHOULD
A
GREATER
AMOUNT
OF
DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS
ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO
THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT
SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting
No civil suit should prosper after
claiming benefits under
the
WCA.
If employers are
already
liable
to
pay benefits under the WCA they should
not be compelled to bear the cost of
damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose. The exclusion provided by the
WCA can only be properly removed by the
legislature NOT the SC.
Miciano vs Brimo
50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the
estate in question, filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed
Micianos participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine
law will be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph
Brimos
estates.

HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause
of the will expressly said that it be made
and disposed of in accordance with the
laws
in
force
in
the
Philippine
Island, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir
or
legatee
in
any
manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those
contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in
his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to
include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
YAO KEE VS. GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988
167 SCRA 736
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on
January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and
personal properties here in the Philippines
worth more or less Php 300,000.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition alleging that they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego.
However, Yao Kee testified that she was
married to Sy Kiat on Jan. 19, 1981
through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their
children. Petitioners provided that fact of
marriage through evidences like Yao Kees
and Gan Chings testimony, Sy Kiats
Master Card of Registration stating his

marriage with Yao Kee, and the certificate

by the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of
China affirming the fact of the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat
and Yao Kee was valid.
RULING:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to
establish the validity of foreign marriages
the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact must be proven and the
alleged foreign marriage must be proven
by convincing evidence. The petitioners
have provided the fact of marriage
however the same do not suffice to
establish the validity of said marriage with
Chinese Law or custom. In such absence
of foreign law, the doctrine of processual
presumption must be applied. The
Supreme Court then held that in the
absence of a foreign law it must be
presumed as the same as ours. In the
Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be
valid
without
the
presence
of
a
solemnizing officer; therefore the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.
National marketing
Tecson
GR no. L-20131
27 August 1969

corporation

Facts:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing
Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as
civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as
successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation, against the same defendant
from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel
Tecson moved to dismiss the said
complaint upon the ground lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter of that

and prescription of action. The court, then,
issued an order of dismissal with regards
the article 13 of the civil code. However,
National Marketing Corporation appealed
to the court of appeals from such order.
Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is
a leap year, they insisted that a 3year4
means a 3calendar year4 and a leap year
would still be counted as 1 year even if it
consists of 366 days. The case reached its
conclusion with the appellant5s theory
with regards to the article 13 of the civil
code.
Issues:
Whether or not the term 3year4 as used in
the article 13 of the civil code is limited to
365 days.
Ruling:
The term 3year4 as used in the article 13
of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if
public interest demands a reversion to the
policy
embodied
in
the
revised
administrative code, this may be done
through legislative process and not by
judicial decree.
Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United
States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen,
whom he divorced, he had 5
legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-

deceased him in infancy), Henry A.

Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna
Bellis Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had 3
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and
finally,
he
had
three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines
dividing his estate as follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis
3.
remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second
wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of Texas, U.S.A
September 15, 1958: his will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company
as executor of the will did as the
will directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that
they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16
of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which
in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of

Amos should govern the intrinsic validity
of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is
hereby affirmed
Doctrine
of
Processual
Presumption:
o The foreign law, whenever
applicable,
should
be
proved by the proponent
thereof, otherwise, such law
shall be presumed to be
exactly the same as the law
of the forum.
o In the absence of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be
presumed different from
ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of
the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in
intestate
or
testamentary
successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of

the country wherein said property may be

found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
The
parties
admit
that
the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos
G. Bellis.

Philippines, and the deceased appears to

have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he
executed his will he declared that he was
a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another.
But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

The law that governs the validity of his

testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate.

The estate was distributed by Executioner
Aznar according to the will, which provides
that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN
Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of
his estate
to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project
of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward in an
earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento from 1904
to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the

ISSUE: what law on succession should

apply the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
the
decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal

property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of
the country where said property may be
found.
The application of this article in the case
at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term national law is used
therein.

The next question is: What is the law in

California governing the disposition of
personal
property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires.
But HELEN invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the
place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
It is argued on executors behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the
Kaufman
case,
should
govern
the
determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensens
will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the
decedents
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California
Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its
internal law. If the law on succesion and
the conflict of laws rules of California are
to be enforced jointly, each in its own

intended and appropriate sphere, the

principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person
of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the
laws of California have prescribed two sets
of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and
LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is
the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention cannot be
sustained.
As explained in the various authorities
cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the
law of the testators domicile. The conflict
of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when

a decedent is not domiciled in California,

to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile cannot and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of
the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine
law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of
the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of
the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant
HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law
governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state
of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The national law
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.