Gabatan and Laureana Clarito.

While Petitioners denied that respondent's mother

administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the

Germogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laurena Clarito and that Hermogena

parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in

or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan

fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the

Gabatan died without any issue and was survived by one brother and two sisters, thereby

case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

inheriting the subject land to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents and the Court of Appeals

reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a

affirmed. The CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was

determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case

sufficiently established during trial.

filed by petitioners.

Aggrieved, petitioners contends that CA committed errors when it declared the

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by

respondent as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan and in failing to appreciate

the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical

preponderance of evidence in favor of petitioners claim that they are the sole and surviving

to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of

heirs of Juan Gabatan and therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof.

respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, especially in light of the fact that the parties
to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC

Issue:

assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
Whether or not determination of heirship can be had in an ordinary civil action?

Ruling:
As a general rule, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
However, there is an exception which is provided in the case Portugal v. PortugalBeltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for
annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate
estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an

G.R. No. 198680, July 08, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO
YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, Petitioners,
v.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. GAUDIOSO E. YPON, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining
such rights.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the Regional Trial Court had
consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted
but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
FACTS:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso, alleging that Magdaleno died intestate and childless on June 28,
1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J covered by (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading
to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the

prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate
of Live Birth; (b) (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the
case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause
of action against Gaudioso. That while the plaintiffs had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,
this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory
heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos
son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted
which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista;
(b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.
ISSUE:
WON not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action was proper in relation to Special Proceedings.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause
of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for.Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of
the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one

by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking
the
establishment
of
a
status
or
right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its
ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated
in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held
that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate
could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
recovery of property.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine
the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails
to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper.
In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship
which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.
UY VS LEE
JANUARY 15 2010

FACTS:

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a

holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his mother,

respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with

specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the

damages before the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that

rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the

probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.

Allegedly,

petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate
and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason.
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for
lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing
thereof.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in

the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of

Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will

enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.The writ is a

and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of

proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the

the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent

performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is

was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will the RTC of Valenzuela City.

mandated by the Constitution.As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the

Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest
efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. In its February 4, 2005
Order,however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents
motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied.
CA

initially

denied

the

appeal

for

lack

of

tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an

act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection

merit. Respondent

moved

for

reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued
the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees.

raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the writ of mandamus to compel petitioner

to produce the holographic will (alleged to be in her possession) left by respondents father.

unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which he is entitled.

RULING:

The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that

On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus

that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation,

be used to enforce contractual obligations.

board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act

Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights,

which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,

and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a

or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of

public or quasi-public duty is imposed.The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private

a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be

right against an individual.

The writ of mandamuslies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,
justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and
to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.To preserve its prerogative character,

SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A

mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public.

person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there

should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than

sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not

exceeding two thousand pesos.

the remedy of mandamus being invoked.In other words, mandamus can be issued only in

SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person

cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford

having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects

relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its

without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to

issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of

the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there

mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

kept until he delivers the will.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of
a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it
to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants
the demurrer.

Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1
relevantly provides:

Republic v. Marcos
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855

August 4, 2009

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any

executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether
the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of
the original holographic will. Thus

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has

custody

of a will shall,

within twenty

(20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will
to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A
person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he
knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he
knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after
the death of the testator, present such will to the court having
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner,
and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

Facts:
The probate court issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he
already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the RTC order and that he
took his oath as named executor of the will. The RTC issued Letters of Administration to
BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order, appointing
her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate. Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the
Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsiderationin so far
as the RTC Order granting letters testamentary to respondents. It opposed the grant of
letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of
integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that
respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and, hence, should be characterized
as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.
Petitioner contends (second contention) that respondents denied the existence of
the will, and are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof.
Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that respondents lack the
competence and integrity to serve as officers of the court.
In the meantime, the RTC appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic (the Undersecretary of the DOJ
whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez

Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally
appointed.
Issue:

Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of

Ferdinand Marcos.

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. No. 183053

October 10, 2012

DOCCTRINE: It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the

estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.

Ruling:

When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
No. Petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation. Petitioner conveniently omits to

state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed by
this Court. Hence, the so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot
serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four
charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC). It is a matter of record, that the CA acquitted respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his
conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress,
that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income
tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still pending appeal.
Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to
four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify
him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even
assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to
disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral
turpitude.
As to the second contention
Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming
the existence of the will, but because of certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not
have the requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached to
the petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate.
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents
cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in
issue legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said
grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that
respondents were fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition

statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is
entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the
issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the
decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.
Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren:
3 legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation
of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
The marriage of Isabels parent was declared as ul and void and no effect . On 27
September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before RTC Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate. Federico, opposed the
petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be
appointed administrator of the decedents estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more
than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did
not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of
his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to
protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in
the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabels allegation that some of the properties
are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the

ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an

will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a

illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared

person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel
and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,

based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who

in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or

can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

Federico nominated Emilio III to administer Christinas estate on hs bahelf. On 13

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the

November 2000, Federico died.

person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or

widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to

On 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as

apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some

administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate:

other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if

competent and willing to serve;

CA reversed RTCs decision. It revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate. In this motion, Isabel pleads

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted

for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship

to such other person as the court may select.

based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to
administer.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration
of a decedents estate presupposes the surviving spouses interest in the conjugal

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on

partnership or community property forming part of the decedents estate. Likewise, a

the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and

surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent which evinces as much, if not more,

that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had

interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the

demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to

conjugal partnership or absolute community property.

become a co-administrator thereof.

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not

administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been

an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the

allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court

decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof;

which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving

(3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9

spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of

November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference

the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or

in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration

is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."

as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
ISSUE: Who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of

issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the

the decedents estate.

next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously

HELD: Isabel, being the legitimate grandchild of the deceased Christina.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.
It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the
law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to

share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA

whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent,
the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals, we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the
estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that
where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the
appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
SC zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in
Cristinas estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances,
directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing
survey of cases.

FACTS:

Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Susan Go 13checks but when presented to the

drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason
"account closed." Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP
22, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City, convicted the accused in the
13 cases.
The RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. No further appeal to the CA, the
RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.
The MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence
as a result of his conviction.
Dimagiba filed a MR of the MTCC Order. The MTCC denied the MR and directed the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba, he was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does
not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of
the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in

He filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
The RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement
and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.

said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.

ISSUE
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-

WON the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted.

administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond .

HELD
No. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus

Ocampo

deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.

Boston

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by
virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when,
as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is

OTHER SPECPRO

attendant:

Rule 102
(1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
G.R. No. 151876

June 21, 2005

person;

(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or

(3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling
in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of
those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being
excessive.
The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which
he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively
misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court.

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the RTC br 17 for Libel, filed
against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence. He began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February
20, 2007.5
A 2ND libel case, Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette
L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Br 14.6
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order for the Discharge on
Parole of 7 inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis.
On Jan 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the subject of which is
the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel
Cases."

His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had
already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum
shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of
instituting a different action in another forum.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty
imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained
by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTCBranch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of
granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. And the case be REMANDED to MTCC of
Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.

G.R. No. 182855

June 5, 2013

In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a Motion
to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from detention and
for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said Circular.
On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved
for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted in open court and he was
allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed
a cash bond and an undertaking, 10 the trial court issued an Order "to release the accused Alexis
Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or offenses." 11 On the same date, the said
order was served to the respondent,12 but the release of Adonis was not effected.
Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his
liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.13
The Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the Court that Adonis had been
released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth in his
parole and with the advise to report to the City Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17

ADONIS VS TESORO
The Courts Ruling
RESOLUTION
The petition is without merit.
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 under Rule 102, ROC by
petitioner Alexander Adonis, praying that the Court directs respondent Superintendent Venancio
Tesoro (respondent), Director of the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to have the body of the
former brought before this Court.
Antecedent Facts

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and
as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining
relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued
when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. 18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC. Since his detention was by
virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving
his sentence when the BPP granted him parole. While it is true that a convict may be
released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the
pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict
from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second
libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. 21 In fact, even when the instant petition was
filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his
immediate release at that time.

Reyes
De Lima vs. Gatdula
Facts:

The respondent Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in

the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima"to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the
fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner
[Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012
to determine whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for
Amparo cases.
In an Order dated 2 March 2012, Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of
Court applysuppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary

Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-200.
Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the
"guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel
cases."

Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.

The RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also
granted the interim reliefs prayed for. In an Order, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by De Lima, et al.

A clear reading of the AO and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the benefits
of the administrative circular cannot be given retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 486792001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument considering that Criminal Case
has already become final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his
sentence.

Issue:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

1.

Whether or not a petition is the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order

2.

denominated as Decision.
Whether or not the filing of an answer instead of a return in the issuance of Writs

3.

of Amparo is proper.
Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of

4.

the writ and filing of a return is proper.

Whether or not a memorandum is required in lieu of a responsive pleading

5.

(Answer) of De Lima is proper.

Whether or not "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 which grants "the privilege of the
writ" and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitionercan be executed.

Ampatuan
Bagtas

Held:
1.

No.
As enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

WRIT OF AMPARO
Tapuz

SEC. 19.Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a

Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x xx

hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the

(Emphasis supplied).

other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since

It is the Courts view that the "Decision" granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or

these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may
not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.

the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
2.

No.

5.

No.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and
concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as
"granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called

an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those

the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in

whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its

disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons

attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the

and requiring an Answer.

judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not

As basis, he cited Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure which provides
that:
SECTION 1.Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction xxx
This type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is not applicable to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It

totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING, v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf
and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO
Facts:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore (Lolita). When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards. One of them
asked Lolita where they could find her son Enrique Lapore (Bong). The guard saw Bong and told him
that he and BenhurPardico (Ben)should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a
complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.Shortly
thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land. The
supervisor of the security guards, Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.

is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not
a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary

Version of the Petitioners

Procedure is seriously misplaced.

3.

No.

Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
4.

No.

Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a
report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post. Ruben
Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards were able to confirm who
the suspects were. They invited the suspects, who voluntarily went with them.During the interview
the suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post
nearer to the house of Lolita.Navia informed them that there is no complainantas she was not
participating in the investigation. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released
him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an
entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Lolita and Bong left

the security office. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be
involved. Thereafter,Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook. Upon
Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as
witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Subsequently, petitioners received an
invitation from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear to the complaint of Virginia
Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben.
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested. Navia
upon seeing Ben,the former slapped him while he was still seated. Navia then took hold of his gun,
looked at Bong, and said, Walakangnakita at walakangnarinig, papatayinkonasi Ben. Bong admitted
that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp because the area where their house is very dark. But
since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the
subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the
guards logbook twice, 1stwhere she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore and 2nd
because they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed. Ben grabbed Bong and
pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security
office at once leaving Ben behind.The following morning, when Virginia cannot find her husband, she
then reported the matter to the police. Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparocourt issued an Order
to produce the body of Ben against petitioners.

acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c)

that it be followed by the State or
political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparopetition; and, (d)
that the intention for such refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
It is now clear that for the protective writ of amparoto issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparocase has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation. The Petition for Writ of Amparofiled by Virginia Pardico is hereby
DISMISSED.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Gamboa
Rule 103

Issue: whether or not the writ of amparo is the proper remedy?

Ruling: Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparois fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not
for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides: The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however,
define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary
disappearances as follows:(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the
arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,
with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed
to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No.
9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it: (a)
that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;(b)
that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or

REPUBLIC V. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

DOCTRINE:
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
under Rule 108.

FACTS
Julian Edward Emerson CosetengMagpayo (Julian) filed a petition to the RTC of
QC to change his nameto Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Costengalleging that his
parents were not legally married which contrary to what is reflected in his certificate of live
birth.
In support of his petition, Julian submitted a certification from the NSO stating
that his mother does not appear in its National Indices of Marriage. Julian also submitted

his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname
Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his surname.
In addition, when Julian was elected as Councilor of QC he is using the name JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG.
Julian amended his petition upon the order of the RTC of QC by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement underSection 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
The trial court granted the petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City
to:

1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 forDATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in Julians Certificate of Live Birth];
2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the LastName of Julian to
COSETENG;
3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for MiddleName of Julian; and
4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. inthe space for FATHER of
Julian.

Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones
civil status should be filed in the civil registry in whichthe entry is sought to be cancelled or
corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have orclaim any
interest which would be affected thereby shouldbe made parties to the proceeding.As
earlier stated, however, the petition of Julian wasfiled not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registeredbut in Quezon City. And as the title of thepetition filed by Julian
before the RTC shows, neitherthe civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother
weremade parties thereto.
Moreover, there is a mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead
the civilregistrar and the parties who would naturally and legally beaffected by the grant of
a petition for correction orcancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as partyrespondentof one who is inadvertently left out or is notestablished to be known by the
petitioner to be affected bythe grant of thepetition or actually participates in the proceeding
is notified through publication.
In conclusion, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

The Republic filed a MR but it was denied by the trial court.

register
ISSUES: WON the petition for change of name of Julian involves the change of his civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate and thus, must be made through the appropriate
adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 and not under Rule 103. (YES)

HELD

involves

In the case of Labayo-Rowe v. Republic the Court held that changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate toillegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterationswhich can only be allowed after appropriate adversaryproceedings. . .

andcontroversial

alterations

including

with the requirements of Rule108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

Rule 108

The change being sought in Julians petition goes sofar as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. Itseeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule103 then
would not suffice to grant respondentssupplication.

substantial

those

on

citizenship,legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy ofmarriage, a strict compliance

Republic vs Uy
Republic vs Olaybar
Silverio vs Republic
Siverio vs CA