Running head: DEREGULATING THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM

Deregulating the Air Traffic Control System

A Classical Argument Position Paper
Nicole Watts
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Worldwide

Author Note
This paper was prepared for ENGL 123, English Composition, taught by Dr. Toni M. Holland

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With the application of excise taxes, and the expectation of

congressional increases, the air traffic control (ATC) network is certain to
always have a steady foundation of funding. However, if private corporations
are responsible for the high-costs related to the maintenance of a global
navigational network responsible for the safety of 670 million people (Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, 2015) during an unexpected economic decline,
putting the ATC in debt and causing parts of or the whole system to become
collateral, who will bail-out these corporations?
Before the implementation of the air traffic control radar beacon
system (ATCRBS), surveillance equipment was supported by long-range radar
as well as hand mapping with the use of aviation calculations to determine
the location of an aircraft. (Skolnik). ATCRBS allowed air traffic controllers the
ability to electronically identify any radar tracked aircraft (Adams, 2005).
Researchers report that "legacy" ATC systems will not be able to keep up
with the increase in air traffic in the next 20 years (Poole, 2006). Efficient
management for the continued safe and organized flow of air traffic is
transitioning to NextGen, a satellite based system that is reported to cost
$40 billion to implement (DeGood, May 2015). In 2005, the Government
Accountability Office, or GAO, reported this Performance Based Navigation
system, or PBN, as high risk because of its vulnerabilities to fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement (GAO, 2005 January). Since 2013, NextGen is
in its midterm stage until 2018, during this time operational sites are
pursuing improvements in guiding air traffic control routes, yet there are no

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determined benefits expected during this 5-year period. (GAO, 2013 April).
Up until the year 2030 an economic analysis reports a $37 billion receipt for
the FAA while generating $106 billion in benefit, both during the
implementation process (DeGood). With a project that is noted for high-risk
mismanagement vulnerability, who is supposed to support its
implementation if things go awry missed deadlines, overspending, etc.?
The federal government came to be involved with the air traffic control
system in 1937 because airlines did not have jurisdiction over non-airline
traffic, such as cargo and general aviation or private aircraft. The
Department of Commerce acquired the air traffic control units (ACTU)
created by a group of airlines in 1934, changing their titles to Air Traffic
Control Station (ACTS). This allowed for the government oversight of air
traffic on the ground and in the air (Adams, 2005). The 1957 Airways
Modernization Act allowed for the development of a modernized, national
ATC, system. The responsibility to regulate navigable airspace for civil and
military operations was delegated by the Department of Transportation, or
DOT, to the Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA, in 1967.
Talks of privatizing ATC has been a constant for several decades within
the walls of the government. As of now, the air traffic control system in the
United States is funded by annual appropriations and the Airport and Airway
Trust Fund, or AATF. The AATF receives excise taxes from shares of airline
tickets, international arrivals and departures, air cargo, and commercial and
general aviation fuel (DeGood). Robert W. Poole, Jr. of Reason Foundation

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writes in Business Jets and ATC User Fees: Taking a Closer Look removing
ATC from the federal budget process and creating a user-oriented
governance mechanismknown globally as ATC commercializationcan
address all three impediments, referring to lack of capital funding, FAAs
high implementation risk, and political opposition to facility opposition
(2006).
Instead of having private corporations own pieces of an intricately
connected global system, the current stakeholders need reorganize and plan
for these future implementations, with an increase in taxes. They are an
expected expense, easily calculated, collected, and reasonable and can be
raised equally through a structured process. There will always be airborne
customers and shippers who are willing to pay these fees. A satellite network
is high-risk because aircraft manufacturers have to update their onboard
avionics systems, and ATC systems will have to effectively communicate
wherever aircraft fly, all over the globe - if one system fails, accidents may
happen.
Another option is to reassess essential personnel on a regular basis. An
outcome of a 1981 the United States strike was that the ATC system
maintained efficient levels of operations using 20 percent less workforce
than before the strike. If the DoT and FAA were to take an assessment of
essential personnel, overstaffing and overspending could be avoided. And
what about protecting the public interest? The primary goal of any for-profit
corporation is generate a profit, consistently. If they recess into the red,

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unregulated increases in user fees would be inconsistent - even in the spirit

of maintaining competitive, affordable charges.
Everyone turns their nose up to tax increases, however, the informed
understand it is necessary to maintain a growing economy. The funding
structure of a new ATC does not require a change of hands, it simply needs to
be adjusted to accommodate an industry which will always evolve and
provide a boundless global socio-economic impact. A government that was
created to protect public interest should continue to administer the aviation
sector, a public segment that increases the mobility of an all-inclusive
economic society.

References
Adams, A. W. (2005). The effects of air traffic control privatization on
operating cost and flight

safety. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace

Education & Research, 14(3) Retrieved from

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/168941177
9?accou

ntid=27203

DeGood, K. (2013). 4 essential questions about air traffic control

privatization. Retrieved from
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2015/05/05/11240
6/4-

essential-questions-about-air-traffic-control-privatization/

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Department of Transportation. (2015) Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

Retrieved from

http://www.transtats.bts.gov/

Poole, R. W. (2006). Business jets and ATC user fees: Taking a closer look. Los
Angeles, CA:

Reason Foundation.

Skolnik, M. (n.d.) Encyclopedia Britannica. Electronic countermeasures.

Retrieved from

http://www.britannica.com/technology/radar/Electronic-

countermeasures-electronic- warfare#ref398732
United States Government and Accountability Office. (2005, January). High
risk series: An

update GAO-05-207. Retrieved from

http://gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207
United States Government and Accountability Office. (2013, April). NextGen
air transportation

system: FAA has made some progress in midterm

implementation, but ongoing challenges limit expected benefits. Retrieved

from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 13-264