CESAR

V.
ROCES,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE G. APORTADERA, respondent.

complainant,

This case arose from the purported sale of a parcel of land

located in Dingle, Iloilo by the late, Isabel Roces to a certain
Gregorio Licauan, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, dated
January 4, 1980. The document was notarized on even date
by respondent Atty. Jose C. Aportadera, and contained the
following subscription:
, J.:
This case arose from the purported sale of a parcel of land
located in Dingle, Iloilo by the late, Isabel Roces to a certain
Gregorio Licauan, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, dated
January 4, 1980. The document was notarized on even date
by respondent Atty. Jose C. Aportadera, and contained the
following subscription:
In the City of Iloilo, Philippines, this 4th day of January, 1980,
personally appeared before me, Isabel Roces with Residence
Certificate No. A-9-9079133 issued at Manila on February 1,
1980 known to me to be the same person who executed the
foregoing instrument known as Deed of Sale, consisting of
two (2) pages signed by her and (sic) her instrumental
witnesses, each and every page thereof and she
acknowledged to me that the same is her true, free and
voluntary act and deed.
On September 30 , 1986, a verified Complaint for Disbarment
was flied with this Court against respondent alleging, inter
alia, that he caused the execution of the Deed of Sale and
made it appear that Isabel had participated therein by

forging her signature thereon, and notarizing it through the

use of a fictitious Residence Certificate. Complainant's
averments were supported the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional
Office. As embodied in a report, dated April 1, 1986, the NBI
found that: (1) respondent admitted he notarized the deed
although it was not signed by Isabel Roces in his presence,
and although he knew she was hospitalized at that time; (2)
handwriting examinations showed that the signature of Isabel
Roces appearing in the deed is a forgery; (3) when the deed
was notarized in Iloilo on January 4, 1980, Isabel Roces was
confined at. the Hospital de San Juan de Dios in Pasay City,
and could not have personally appeared before respondent in
Iloilo City: and (4) Residence Certificate No. A-9079133, listed
in the subscription portion of the Deed of Sale as that
presented by Isabel Roces to respondent at that time of
notarization, was fictitious as it was issued on February 1,
1980, at which time Isabel Roces had already passed away.
In a Resolution, dated November 24, 1986, respondent was
required by this Court to comment on the charges levied
against him. He did not comply. On April 13, 1987, the case
was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSC) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The OSG set the case for hearing several times, from
September, 1987 through March, 1988, but these were
postponed at the instance of respondent. The case was
eventually transferred from the OSG to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) by virtue of this Court's Resolution,
dated April 12, 1988.
On August 23, 1988, respondent received notice from the IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline
(National
Grievance

Investigation Office) of a hearing set for the afternoon of

September 29, 1988. On the morning of the hearing, the IBP
received a telegram from respondent requesting resetting to
October 17, 1988, for the reason that he "is busy in election
case as party intervenor and has hearing in People vs.
Gamgam, RTC Iloilo." The hearing officer, IBP Commissioner
Ernesto L. Pineda allowed the rescheduling "with a warning
that no further postponement shall be entertained." Despite
the caveat, respondent was again granted a second resetting
from October 17, 1988 1 to November 25, 1988.
On November 25, 1988, respondent, again failed to appear
before the IBP Commission Bar Discipline. On even date;
Commissioner Pineda ordered the case submitted for
resolution, viz.:
When this case was called for hearing, only the complainant
appeared. The respondent, Atty. Jose Aportadera, did not
appear although it was he who chose the date November 5,
1988 as the date of the hearing. His telegram to this effect is
attached to the record of the case.
This case was filed on September 30, 1988 and despite
receipt by respondent of the copy of the complaint and the
annexes thereto, the said respondent to date has not filed his
answer. He is deemed therefore to have waived his right to
file his answer.
Considering that the complaint is supported by documentary
evidence submitted by the National Bureau of Investigation
consisting of 55 pages and acting upon the motion of the
complainant that the case be deemed submitted for
resolution, the instant case is now considered so submitted
on the basis of the documentary evidence forming part of the
record of the case.

SO ORDERED.
Two weeks later, or on December 9, 1988, respondent moved
for reconsideration of the Order by way of a telegram which
motion was opposed by complainant, through counsel.
Without acting on the telegraphic motion, Commissioner
Pineda, on September 4, 1989, forwarded to the IBP Board of
Governors his Report finding respondent guilty of malpractice
and gross negligence, and recommending his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. The Commissioner noted
in the Report, dated August 28, 1989, that:
After going minutely over the records particularly the findings
of the NBI, the following appears undisputed 1). The subject deed of sale . . . of sub-lot no. 12-C-2-B in
favor of Gregorio Licauan is a FORGERY. The supposed seller,
Isabelo Roces did not sign the Deed of Sale.
2). The deed of sale was notarized by the respondent on
January 4, 1980 at which date Isabel Roces was confined at.
the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
3). The number of the Residence Certificate (No. A-9079233
purportedly issued at Manila on February 1, 1980) used by
the supposed seller Isabel Roces is fictitious because the
date of issue is February 1, 1980 and Isabel Roces was
already dead at that time, she having died on January 1,
1980 at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. . . .
In his Sworn Statement before the NBI Regional Director in
Iloilo City, the respondent puts up the defense of lack of
knowledge of the foregory of the signature of the supposed
seller Isabel Roces. Thus:

26. Q: For your information, we have established in the

course of this investigation that the signature of ISABEL
ROCES appearing in the Deed of Sale dated January 4, 1980
in favor of GREGORIO LICAUAN covering Lot No. 12-C-2-B was
a complete forgery May I have your comment on this?
A: I knew of the alleged forgery when I came to the office of
the NBI that one (of the) heirs of ISABEL ROCES complained
that the signature of ISABEL ROCES was forged. Before that
time, I fully believed that the signature appearing on the
document is the signature of ISABEL ROCES that is why I
notarized the document. And believing that the consideration
of the sale was fully received by ISABEL ROCES or her
representative.
The respondents defense of good faith is untenable.
As a notary public, he should not have notarized the deed of
sale without seeing first seller the signatory parties particularly the seller - sign or affix their signatures on a
serious document of conveyance of a real property.
In the subscription part of the deed of sale, the respondent
represented that Isabel Roces, "personally appeared" before
him with Residence Certificate No. A-9079133. As stated
elsewhere, the residence certificate is fictitious.
At the time of the notarization of the deed of sale in Iloilo City
on January 4, 1980, Isabel Roces was confined at the San
Juan de Dios Hospital as per the Certification of the Medical
Records Clerk in said Hospital. . . . Isabel Roces died in said
Hospital on January 21, 1980 per the Certification of Dra.
Amalia M. Villanueva. . . .

On the basis of Commissioner Pineda's report and

recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors, on March 26,
1994:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above entitled case (referring to the case at bench),
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A";
however, after a consideration of the findings of facts, the
evidence on record and the applicable law and rules, the
respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, instead of indefinite suspension as
recommended in the Report.
A copy of the IBP Order/Decision and Commissioner Pineda's
Report were received by this Court on June 29, 1994.
Dissatisfied with the IBP ruling, respondent, on July 15, 1994,
filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Allow the
Respondent to Present His Evidence." He alleged that he was
not given a fair hearing or accorded due process by the IBP
when the case was deemed submitted for resolution without
letting him adduce his evidence. Furthermore, he averred
that suspension is too harsh a penalty for his one-time
infraction of the notarial law. He claims that he deserves no
more than a reprimand for his actions.
After a review of the case at bench, we affirm of respondent's
two-year suspension.
Commissioner Pineda did not deprive respondent of his right
to procedural due process in ordering the case at bench
submitted for decision on November 25, 1988. His actions
were in accord with the provisions of Sec. 8, Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:

Sec. 8. Investigation. - Upon joinder of issues or upon failure

of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case.
He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer
oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to
defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be
heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable
notice, the respondent fails to appear the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within
three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon
prior application.
Willful failure refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful
order issued by the Investigator which shall be dealt with as
for indirect contempt of Court. The correspondent charge
shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of
Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of
Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for
hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall
within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court final action
and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

to do so. 3 In the case at bench, respondent first failed to file

his Comment to the Complaint with this Court; and then,
when the case was referred to the OSG and IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation, he moved to
postpone and reset the hearing on the case several times
over a span of more than a year. Respondent as lawyer is
presumed to understand the gravity of the disbarment
proceedings filed against him. His failure to ventilate his side
of the controversy, inspite of all opportunities for him to do
so, constitutes a waiver by him to exercise such right.
Respondent's contention that he should have been, if at all,
only reprimanded for his actions in respect of the Deed of
Sale over Isabel's property deserves scant consideration. His
dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of
the falsified sale of his client's property merits the penalty of
suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors.
On its face, the subscription part of the questioned deed
bears eloquent testimony to respondents knowing
falsification thereof for it stated that Isabel appeared before
him on January 4, 1980, while it listed her Resident
Certificate as having been issued on February 1, 1980.
Respondent's misconduct is also shown by his statement to
NBI Regional Director Federico H. Opinion, Jr. on September 6,
1985, to wit:
15. Q: Were you the one who prepared the Deeds of Sale
executed
in favor of the four buyers you mentioned?

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard. 2 There is no violation of due process even if no
hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance
to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right

A: Yes, your honor. After I was advised by the Hontiveros

Realty that full payments of the lots sold were received by

JOHN HONTIVEROS.

ELIZA DAYOT covering Sub-Lot No. 12-C-2-E with an

16. Q: I am showing to you xerox copies of the following

Deeds of

area of 342 square meters more or less for a consideration

of P5,472.00 dated November 4, 1976, all notarized before

Sale: 1) Deed of Sale dated January 4, 1980 executed by

JOSE G. APORTADERA, Notary Public. Will you please
ISABEL ROCES in favor of GREGORIO LICAUAN
examine these and tell me what relation do these documents
married to FELIZA DALDE as Vendee covering Lot No. 12have to Deeds of Sale you claimed to have been prepared?
C-2-B with an area of 835 square meters more or less for a
A: This first sale refers to the sale in favor of GREGORIO
consideration of P6,930.00; 2) Deed of Sale executed by
LICAUAN and estates that the consideration is P6,930.00,
ISABEL ROCES in favor of RAYMUNDO SEROPIA
but the amount actually received by ISABEL ROCES or her
married to MYRNA MUYCO covering Lot. No. 12-C-2-C
representative is only P4,620.00 minus deduction of one per
with an area of 299 square meters more or less for a
cent notarial fee and expenses in securing the Manager's
consideration of P5,400.00 dated January 5, 1979; 3) Deed
Check or Telegraphic Transfer to Manila. Because
of Sale executed by ISABEL ROCES in favor of
according to the Authority to Sell this Lot No. 12-C-2-B
FLORENTINA MUYCO married to MANUEL ORTIZO
should be sold for P12.00 per square meter. So the
and LOURDES VDA. DE CAMANAY for Sub-lot No. 12Hontiveros Realty has an overprice of 6% and 10% from
C-2-D with an area of 300 square meters more or less for
P4,620.00 as agreed in the Authority to Sell. After the
a consideration of P5,100.00 dated November 3, 1976; 4)
Hontiveros Realty received the full amount of P6,930.00 and
Deed of Sale executed by ISABEL ROCES in favor of
the remaining amount after deducting the commission (10%)

and overprice and other expenses which amount is due to

after I was advised by Hontiveros Realty. And from those

ISABEL ROCES, JOHN HONTIVEROS advised me to

amounts appearing are deductible 10% commission and

prepare the documents to be signed by ISABEL ROCES. So

overprice of 6% because the authorized sale as stated in the

I prepared this document and considering that ISABEL

Authority to Sell is 12% your honor.

ROCES was an old woman, rich and aristocratic, she

17. Q: Were you the one the one who personally delivered
these

seldom went to my office, but somebody instructed me

Deeds of Sale to the house of ISABEL ROCES for the
instead to bring the document to her house in front of the
purpose of letting her affix her signatures on these
Colegio del Sagrado Corazon Jesus, Iloilo City. I used to do
documents?
that because ISABEL ROCES had been my old client before
and during this transaction. So, several days after I received
this document and believing in all honesty and good faith
that
it is the signature of ISABEL ROCES and furthermore
believing that the consideration of this sale which were
received by me were turned over to Hontiveros Realty and
upon advise of Hontiveros Realty, I notarized this document.
With respect to the three other Deeds of Sale, believing to
be the true signatures of ISABEL ROCES, I notarized them

A: Several days after I was called by somebody to go the

house of ISABEL ROCES and believing that it is the true
signature of ISABEL ROCES and that the consideration of the
sale was duly received by Hontiveros Realty, I notarized said
documents, your honor. As for the other three Deeds of Sale,
when I got those copies it was already signed by ISABEL
ROCES. 18. Q: In other words, do I understand correctly that
the purported signatures of ISABEL ROCES appearing in these
four Deeds of Sale were affixed therein not in your presence,
and that you subscribed or notarized these documents
without the presence of ISABEL ROCES? A: In the case of the
first three documents not including the sale of LICAUAN
because that was the last document I notarized. Several days
after I received those three documents, I went to the house
of ISABEL ROCES and asked her to confirm whether those
three documents were signed by her and whether the money
representing the proceeds of the sale were received by her.
She answered yes. That was before she died and when she

was in Iloilo City. With regard to the last document, I was not
able to meet her anymore to ask for confirmation because
when I went to her house, I was informed that she was in
Manila and she died there later. 19. Q: Who gave you this
Deed of Sale in favor of Gregorio Licauan with the signature
of ISABEL ROCES already affixed therein? A: I do not
remember the name the person who gave that document to
me, . . . may be a member of the household of ISABEL
ROCES. 20. Q: Did you get this Deed of Sale in favor of
LICAUAN from the house of ISABEL ROCES or was it delivered
to you? A: The document of LICAUAN, first I received a
telephone call to get the document so I went there first to
ask ISABEL ROCES whether she received the amount, and
also to renew the Authority to Sell. But when I arrived there,
somebody gave me this document and I was informed that
ISABEL ROCES was in Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
26. Q: For your information, we have established in the
course of this investigation that the signature of ISABEL
ROCES appearing in the Deed of Sale dated January 4, 1980
in favor of GREGORIO LICAUAN covering Lot No. 12-C-2- B
was a complete forgery. May I have your comment on this? A:
I knew of the alleged forgery when I came to the office of the
NBI that one (of the) heirs ISABEL ROCES complained that
the signature of ISABEL ROCES was forged. Before that time I
fully believed that the signature appearing on the documents
is the signature of ISABEL ROCES that is why I notarized the
document. And believing that the consideration of the sale
was fully by ISABEL ROCES or her representative.
Furthermore the NBI investigation reveals that: (1)
respondent misrepresented to Gregorio Licauan as being
duly-authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it

was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over

Isabel's subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already confined at a
hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deed's date
of Execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was
hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed;
(5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her
confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the
questioned deed of sale. In the face of all the evidence, this
Court cannot accept respondent's claim that he notarized the
questioned Deed of Sale in good faith, without knowledge of
any defect therein. He undoubtedly knew that Isabel Roces
could not have executed the deed in Iloilo City on January 4,
1980 because she was hospitalized in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, he notarized the same, expressly subscribing
that Isabel had appeared before him in Iloilo City on January
4, 1980 exhibiting a Residence Certificate issued on February
1, 1980 (at which time Isabel was already dead) and
acknowledging to him that it was her free and voluntary act.
Clearly, respondent's conduct is not an accord with the
Canons of Professional Ethics. PREMISES CONSIDERED,
respondent ATTY. JOSE G. APORTADERA is found GUILTY of
malpractice and gross misconduct, and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. SO
ORDERED.

IN
INTO

THE
THE

MATTER
1989

OF

THE
INQUIRY
ELECTIONS
OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.chanrobles

virtual law library
A. M. No. 491
October 6, 1989
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines [hereafter "IBP"] held on June 3, 1989 at the
Philippine International Convention Center [or "PICC"], the
following were elected by the House of Delegates [composed
of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates] and proclaimed
as officers:
NAME
POSITION
Atty.
Violeta
Drilon
President
Atty.
Bella
Tiro
Executive
VicePresident
Atty. Salvador Lao
Chairman, House of
Delegates
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo
House of
Delegates
Secretary
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy
Treasurer, House of
Delegates
Atty. Oscar Badelles
Sergeant-at-Arms
House of Delegates
Atty. Justiniano Cortes
Governor & Vice-President for
Northern
Luzon
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza
Governor & Vice-President for
Central
Luzon
Atty. Mario Jalandoni
Governor & Vice-President for
Metro
Manila
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon
Governor & Vice-President
for
Southern
Luzon
Atty. Teodoro Almine
Governor & Vice-President for
Bicolandia
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco
Governor & Vice-President for
Eastern
Visayas
Atty. Ricardo Teruel
Governor & Vice-President for
Western
Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for
Eastern
Mindanao
Atty. Simeon Datumanong
Governor & Vice-President
for Western Mindanao
The newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of
office on July 4,1989 before the Supreme Court en banc.
However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by
some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed
or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates,
led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the
IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the
reports.cralaw
It should be stated at the outset that the election process
itself [i.e., the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3,
1989] which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by
Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was
unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to
device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking
of, the ballots.cralaw
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the
reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized
the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.cralaw
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon
Election" [Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989]; Luis
Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar"
[Malaya, June 10, 1989] and "The Disintegrating Bar"
[Malaya, June 20, 1989]; and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article
entitled "Pam-Pam" [The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989],

and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe

[June 8, 1989], were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying
and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by
the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo
Paculdo and Ramon Nisce, who reportedly "poured heart,
soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals
who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly
used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the
pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the
added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment [who
had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the
Labor Secretary] campaigning for her. Jurado's informants
alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some
members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity [Secretary Drilon's
fraternity] as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA [Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Offices] where Mrs.
Drilon is employed, and that government positions were
promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.cralaw
Mr. Mauricio, in his column wrote about the same matters
and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the
Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers,
notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her [Atty.
Drilon's] candidacy"; the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling
over the price of their votes." which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some
twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top
official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP
politics on election day by closeting himself with
campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room
of the PICC [the Philippine International Convention Center
where the convention/election were held] during a recess"
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed
Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.cralaw

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc
Resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and
incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the
principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates, to
appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the
aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the
consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the
problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.cralaw
In that Resolution, the Court "called to mind that a basic
postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines [IBP],
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and
commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be nonpolitical in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor
campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental
assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness
and ability to serve."
The Resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply
disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth,
that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by
candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including votebuying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP
President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue,
upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The
meeting between the Court en banc, on the one hand, and
the outgoing and incoming IBP officers, on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a
formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and
activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed

before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national

officers.cralaw
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated
Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and
Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as
members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty.
Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording
Secretary.cralaw
A total of forty-nine [49] witnesses appeared and testified in
response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on
the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star
hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn
where the three protagonists [Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo]
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where
they billeted their supporters, were summoned. The officer of
the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were
called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate used
PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign
to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials
were called to testify on the charge that some candidates
gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of
the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly
campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.cralaw
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus
Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the
nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP
elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters,
phone calls and personal interviews with persons who
claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they,
invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.cralaw
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving
and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons
as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of
the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon,
has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.cralaw
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the

"strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:
"Sec. 4. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly nonpolitical, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be
eligible for election or appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A delegate, governor,
officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or
employee of any chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his
certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited
acts relative to IBP elections:
Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections.
- The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any
elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
[a] Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
materials;
[b] Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
materials other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done
by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;
[c] Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;

[d] Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of

candidates as well as the advertisement thereof;
[e] For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate: [1]
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;
[2] giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
[3] making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules:
[d] Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and Practices Relative
to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws
of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the
investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
[1] Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the
candidates for president, executive vice-president, the
officers or candidates for the House of Delegates and Board
of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President, Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo, began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April, 1989. Upon the invitation
of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. [t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4],
they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 [t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123], in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City, during the conference of
chapter presidents of Northern Luzon [t.s.n., July 3,1989, p.
113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47] where they
announced their candidacies and met the chapter
presidents.cralaw
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking
the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and

securing their written endorsements. He personally handcarried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the
nomination forms in March, 1989, after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates
composed of the 120 chapter presidents [t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86]. He obtained forty [40] commitments. He
submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I
Join
in
Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE
as
National
President
Integrated
Bar
of

of
the

the
Philippines

______________
_______________
Chapter
Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre
P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico
L. Quirico, Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B.
Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M.
Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J.
Arbolado, Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B.
Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano, Dionisio
E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C.
Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella,
Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo,
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S.
Parson.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt

Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained [t.s.n.,
June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85]. Unfortunately, despite those
formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the
election [t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86]. The reason, he said, is
that. some of those who had committed their votes to him
were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated"
[t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July
4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04].cralaw
[2] Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank [Exhibit C-1Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo] show that Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources [DENR] borrowed a plane from the Philippine
National Bank for his Bicol CORD [Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development] Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio
Tria. The plane manifest [Exh. C-2-Crudo] listed Atty. Violeta
Drilon, Arturo Tusi [Tiu], Assistant Secretary for Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco,
and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.cralaw
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB
plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the
availability of a PNB plane [t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118].
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP Executive VicePresident in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May
1989, he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines
for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the
DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While
at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was
going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As
Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if
he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the
plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in
going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP
elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP Chapter
Presidents in Daet, Naga and Legaspi, and asked for their
support [t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549].cralaw

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a

PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on
May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go
to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects
there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the
region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a
fraternity brother [meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma
Rho fraternity] went to the DENR office and requested the
Secretary [Factoran] if he [Tiu] could be allowed to hitch a
ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the
Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy
Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic
Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi, the
Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP
Chapter President [t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69].cralaw
[3] Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted
having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national
officers on June 3, 1989.cralaw
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella
D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors:
Justiniano P. Cortez [Northern Luzon], Oscar C. Fernandez
[Central Luzon], Mario C.V. Jalandoni [Greater Manila],
Petronilo A. de la Cruz [Southern Luzon], Teodorico C. Almine,
Jr. [Bicolandia], Ricardo B. Teruel [Western Visayas], Porfirio P.
Siyangco [Eastern Visayas], Jesus S. Anonat [Western
Mindanao], and Gregorio A. Adaza, Jr. [Eastern Mindanao].
(Exhibit M-Nisce).cralaw
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President,
Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for
Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors:
Basil Rupisan [Northern 'Luzon], Acong Atienza [Central
Luzon], Amy Wong [Metro Manila], Jose Grapilon [Southern
Tagalog], Teodoro Almine [Bicolandia], Baldomero Estenzo
[Eastern Visayas], Joselito Barrera [Western Visayas], Gladys
Tiongco [Eastern Mindanao], and Simeon Datumanong
[Eastern Mindanao]. (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).cralaw
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B.
Sansano, Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo, Renato
F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P.

Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C.

Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite, and Oscar V. Badelles.cralaw
[4] Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some
delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to
whom he gave four round-trip tickets [worth about P10,000]
from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting
delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from
him
because
Atty.
Medialdea
assured
him
[Nisce] "sigurado
na
'yan,
h'wag
mo
nang
papirmahin." Badelles won as Sergeant-at-Arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.cralaw
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets,
but he [Badelles] said that he did not use them, because if he
did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he [Badelles] did
not want to be committed [t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 9596].cralaw
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his
candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that
Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. [Exh.
D-1-Calica], Romeo Fortes [Exh. D-1-Calica], Cesar Batica
[Exh. D-2-Calica], Jose Buban of Leyte [Exh. D-2-Calica],
Delsanto Resuello [Exh. D-3- Calica], and Ceferino Cabanas
[Exh. D-3-Calica].cralaw
In spite of his efforts and expenses, only one of Nisce's
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of
the House of Delegates [t.s.n. July 3, p. 161].cralaw
[5] Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, and
entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and
three suites at the Holiday Inn which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff
[mostly ladies] and the IBP delegates. The three suites were
to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for

the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a

room cost P990 per day with breakfast.cralaw
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn
were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan, Judge Alfonso
Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto
Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe,
Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roel
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco,
Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy, Manito Lucero, Fred
Cledera, Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio, Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri,
Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr.,
Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge
Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo, Bella Tiro,
Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano, James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge
Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma,
Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.cralaw
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's Credit Manager, testified that
Atty. Paculdo booked 52 [not 24] rooms, including the
presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The
group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife
of Nereo Paculdo [t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68]. The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the
rooms.cralaw
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at
the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty.
Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza Banquet and
Conventions Manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP
c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a Sales Manager of the Philippine Plaza,
recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to
book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he
obtain a group [or discounted] rate. He gave her the name of
Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her.

Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the

Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE].cralaw
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for
the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon
group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney
Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.cralaw
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40
rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of
P123,000. His working sheet showed that the following
persons contributed for that downpayment:
[a] Nilo Pena [Quasha Law Office] - P 25,000
[b]
Antonio
Carpio
20,000
[c]
Toto
Ferrer
[Carpio
Law
Office]
10,000
[d]
Jay
Castro
10,000
[e]
Danny
Deen
20,000
[f] Angangco Tan [Angara Law Office] - 10,000
[g]
Alfonso
Reyno
20,000
[h] Cosme Rossel - 15,300 [t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4].
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have
been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a
project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or
associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention, too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta
had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She
allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she
occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where
she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta,
through Atty. Loanzon [t.s.n. July 3,1989].cralaw
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms
reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A.
Consulto, Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Amy Wong, Callanta, Pena,
Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson,
Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar

Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor

Atienza, Gil Batula, Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot, Romeo
Fortes, Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica,
Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano,
Araneta, Renato Callanta.cralaw
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which
he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at
the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm
could campaign for the Drilon group [t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp.
7678] during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon [meaning, members of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity]. He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy
of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom
Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong, are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "Sigma Rho sister," her
husband being a Sigma Rhoan.cralaw
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for
the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid
seminar and the convention. He made the reservation
through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 [t.s.n. July
6,1989, pp. 30-34]. Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her
campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite, his former teacher [but
the latter was already committed to Nisce] and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law [t.s.n. July
6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39].cralaw
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered
into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms
plus one [1] seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 [t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58] on April 20, 1989, and
P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45. Ms. Cecile
Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the
Sales Department Manager, Credit Manager, and Reservation
Manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's
bill amounted to P216,127.74 [t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 5758; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo].cralaw

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved

rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos, Dennis
Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes,
Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio
Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot,
Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin
Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin R. Ronquillo,
Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop
Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icaonapo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit,
Augurio
Pamintuan,
Daniel
Macaraeg,
and
Onofre
Tejada.cralaw
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or
against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c],
Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the
IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the
Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to
Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of
Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there
is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs. Drilon when her spirits were low. He
talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony
Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin
and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign,
and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of
May. Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant
Secretary Benedicto, toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls
[amounting to Pl,356] were recorded as emanating from his
room.cralaw
Opposite Room 114 was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the
names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco [candidate for
Governor, Eastern Mindanao] and Amy Wong [candidate for

Governor, Metro Manila]. These two rooms served as the

"action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies
were discussed before and during the convention. It was in
these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like
Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.cralaw
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any member
(Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has
heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who
promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of
ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the
delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued
in the name of the member for whom payment is made
[t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28].cralaw
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of
payments in March, April, and May during any election year.
This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of
last year [a non-election year] from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875.
[t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25].cralaw
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more
than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP
By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty.
Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a
leaflet entitled "My Quest" as well as the lists of his slate.
Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and
bio-data.cralaw
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to
P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop.cralaw
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding
at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his
campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials distributed
at the convention site this year than in previous years. The
election was more heated and expensive [t.s.n. July 6,1989,
p. 39]. Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President
of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the

House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign

materials were distributed during the convention by girls and
by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon [t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142145].cralaw
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote,
or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BYLaws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman
of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in
Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined [t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp.
137, 149].cralaw
Atty. Gloria Agunos, Personnel Director of the Hyatt Terraces
Hotel in Baguio and President of the Baguio-Benguet IBP
Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after
the tripartite meeting of the Department of Labor and
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City,
she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of
Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala. Atty.
Drilon solicited her [Atty. Agunos'] vote and invited her to
stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available
for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during
the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for
Governor for the Northern Luzon Region [t.s.n. July 13,1989,
pp. 43-54].cralaw
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial
Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce
changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship [This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay]. When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio
G. Nalapo, an IBP candidate, who also withdrew.cralaw
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race
and refused to be nominated [t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104].
Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor,
became Paculdo's candidate instead [t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p.
104].cralaw
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in
Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying,

"I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce

said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him
that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon [t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 109-110]. He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna,
who allegedly campaigned in La Union [t.s.n. June
29,1989,p.111].cralaw
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for
governor
of
the
Western
Visayas,
expressed
his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport, he was
met by an Assistant Regional Director of the DOLE who
offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined
the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited
him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had
been reserved for him. He declined the invitation [t.s.n. July
4,1989, pp. 102-106].cralaw
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he
already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn;
Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He
knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to
campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA
Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve, the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete
City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza [t.s.n. July
4,1989, pp. 101-104]. But he declined the offer because he
was already committed to Atty. Nisce.cralaw
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May
31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to
convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that
he was already committed to Nisce.cralaw
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because
he and his two companions [Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto]
had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila [t.s.n. July 4,
1989,
p.
101].

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE

CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during
his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol
Bar Association [of which he was the chapter president]
contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a
voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips
to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain
Province and Bulacan). [t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14].cralaw
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to
P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd
election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.cralaw
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of
Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over
P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for
the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's
supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's
end.
FINDINGS
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which
the principal candidates for the national positions in the
Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP ByLaws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the ByLaws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates [Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo] in five-star
hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt,
the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates
billeted therein; the island-hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of
Delegates that elects the national officers and regional
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of
candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or

supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement

of written commitments and the distribution of nomination
forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of
rooms for delegates in three big hotels at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol
provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which, in the case of Paculdo,
admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the
employment of uniformed girls [by Paculdo] and lawyers [by
Drilon] to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and
her group; the use of Labor Arbiters to meet delegates at the
airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the
giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to
delegates [and some families who accompanied them] in
exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates
by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to
another for some rumored consideration; all these practices
made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the
whole election process.cralaw
The candidates and many of the participants in that election
not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of
the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
Constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for
law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." [Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside
the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance.cralaw
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the
presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of
the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or
being bribed to vote one way or another certainly did not

uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the

public's esteem.cralaw
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the
evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including some of the
candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before
its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that
those parties had been less than candid with the Court and
seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or,
at least, withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing
for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven [7]
members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated
Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the
reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so
much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office
might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the
seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the
stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to
restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if
not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded
elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which
seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association
of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the
Court hereby orders:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they
are hereby annulled.cralaw
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election
by the House of Delegates [approved by this Court in its
Resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287] of the
following
national
officers:

[a] the officers of the House of Delegates;

[b]
the
IBP
president;

and

[c] the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify
or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of
said By-Laws.cralaw
3. The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
[composed of the governors of the nine (9) IBP regions] from
among themselves [as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original
IBP By-Laws] should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency
upon the expiration of their two-year term [which was
abolished by this Court's Resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287] should be as it is hereby restored.cralaw
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of
President. The incoming Board of Governors shall then elect
an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The
position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine [9] IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine [9] regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.cralaw
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive VicePresident to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine [9] regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board.cralaw
6. Section 33[b], Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as
follows:

[b] The President and Executive Vice-President of the IBP

shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33[g] of Article V providing for the positions of
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Sergeantat-Arms of the House of Delegates, is hereby repealed.cralaw
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine [9] Governors from the nine [9] regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one [1] Governor for each region to
be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from
that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.cralaw
9. Section 39, Article V, is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at
least one [1] month before the national convention. - The
delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.cralaw
10. Section33 [a], Article V, is hereby amended by adding the
following provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year.cralaw
11. Section 39 [a], [b], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] of
Article VI should be, as they are hereby, deleted.cralaw
All other provisions of the By-Laws, including its amendment
by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 [Bar
Matter No. 287] that are inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified.cralaw
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held
in the nine [9] IBP regions within three [3] months, after the
promulgation of the Court's Resolution in this case. Within
thirty [30] days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at
the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves, the IBP

National President and Executive Vice-President. In these special elections,

the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989,
particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation
of Tickets and Single Slates", as well as those identified in this Resolution
as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidates for any
position.cralaw
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker Board shall be appointed by
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that
the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the
premises.cralaw
SO ORDERED.crala

In

re

Atty.

ROQUE

SANTIAGO, Respondent.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.

The

respondent

in

his

own

behalf.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; MALPRACTICE; DISBARMENT. There
is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and
between the spouses E. B. and S. C. upon the advice of the
respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and
acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law,
morals and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the
family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation
and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute
malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of
law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon
the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the
privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and
safe person to society. When it appears that he, by
recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe
to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a
lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this
professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the
present case, respondent was either ignorant of the
applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in
giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should
lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some
members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined

to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the

Honorable S. R., in view of the circumstances stated in the
report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after
discovering his mistake, respondent endeavored to correct it
by making the parties sign another document cancelling the
previous one. The respondent R. S. is found guilty of
malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the
Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque Santiago,
charging the latter with malpractice and praying that
disciplinary
action
be
taken
against
him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then
separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second
marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who
was at the time a practicing attorney and notary public in the
Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing
Baniquits side of the case, assured the latter that he could
secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked
him to bring his wife on the afternoon of that same day, May
29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and
there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was
stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties,
who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry
again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever
right of action one might have against the party so marrying.
After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the
parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands
and assured them that they were again single and as such
could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit

then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it

the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging
on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns
out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A,
Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second
marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show
that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of
P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and the
same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we
do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to
whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or,
as contended by the respondent, the services were rendered
free
of
charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, but
put up the defense that he had the idea that seven years
separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them
to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared
Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said
document he realized that he had made a mistake and for
that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who,
on June 30,1939, came to his office and signed the deed of
cancellation
Exhibit
C.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and
between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares
upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter
as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, morals and tends to subvert the vital
foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent,
the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract
constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the
practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of
law is upon the implied condition that his continued
enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his
remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears
that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is
unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment
of this professional privilege should be declared terminated.

In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the

applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in
giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should
lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some
members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined
to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the
Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated
in the report of said investigator and the fact that
immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent
endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another
document
cancelling
the
previous
one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice
and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year. So ordered.

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v.

FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO
ABUYEN, Respondents-Appellees.
Benedicto

G.

Arcinas

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Villavieja & Zapanta for Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS
1.
LABOR
AND
SOCIAL
LEGISLATION;
WORKMENS
COMPENSATION ACT; JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL OFFICE OF
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; HEARING OFFICER; REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR MAY DESIGNATE PERSON TO ACT AS

HEARING OFFICER; INSTANT CASE. This Court has held, as

early as August 21, 1961 (Caltex v. Villanueva, L-15658)." . .
that a regional office of the Department of Labor has original
jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation
under the Workmens Compensation Act. If a claim is
controverted, it shall be heard and decided only by a
regularly appointed hearing officer or any other employee
duly designated by the Regional Administrator to act as
hearing officer. In the case at bar, Regional Administrator
Arnado had by virtue of an office order marked as Exhibit
1, designated respondent Tan, a duly qualified Member of the
Philippine Bar "as Hearing Officer in the case of Rufino
Abuyen v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI217)." Exhibit I confirmed the allegation in respondents
answer that respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney
but as Hearing Officer designated to try and hear the merits
of the aforecited compensation case." Petitioner, in the very
cases which it cited, is deemed to have impliedly admitted
the truth of respondents allegation when it submitted the
case
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings.
2.
ID.;
ID.;
UNCONTROVERTED
CLAIMS;
REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR TO ENTER AWARD THEREON. When the
claim is uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring
the claimant to present further evidence, the Regional
Administrator may enter an award or deny the claim.
3. ID.; ID.: CONTROVERTED CLAIMS; PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
TO CONTROVERT CLAIMS; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
CONTROVERT
WITHIN
PRESCRIBED
PERIOD.

In
controverted cases, the employer is duty bound to controvert
the claim within 14 days from the date of the accident or
illness of the laborer or within 10 days after he or his
representative first acquired knowledge of said accident or
sickness. Failure to do so within the period provided will
result in the renunciation of his right to controvert the claim.
But an employer may reinstate his right to controvert the
claim by filing a petition under oath specifying the reasons
for
his
failure
to
do
so.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; POWER OF COURTS TO REOPEN

A CASE; REASON THEREFOR; INSTANT CASE. Trial courts
have discretionary power to reopen a case either before or
after rendition of judgment, for the introduction of additional
evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such
power is controlled by no other rule than that of the
paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will not be
reviewed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse thereof.
No such abuse has been committed in the case at bar. On the
contrary, the exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial
Judge, served to promote the interest of justice, by clarifying
the question whether or not respondent Tan had been given
the
aforementioned
designation.
5. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; COUNSELS CONDUCT
IN INSTANT CASE INCOMPATIBLE WITH DUTY TO ASSIST
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Through the present case,
and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation,
for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years.
What is more, petitioners contention was based on the
theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as
August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of Abuyens
disability had never been questioned by petitioner herein.
Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the
previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "often
resorted to" in the language of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes "as
a means of draining the resources of the poorer party" in
this case a tuberculosis patient "and of compelling it to
submit out of sheer exhaustion." Thus, the conduct of
petitioners counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the
Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct
or defeat the same.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,

dismissing this case, with costs against the petitioner, and
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428,
filed by Rufino Abuyen, on June 18, 1956, for a disease
allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as
foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. hereinafter referred
to as the petitioner and docketed as WCC Case No. R-VI217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958, by
Pompeyo V. Tan an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the
Department
of
Labor

sentencing
petitioner
herein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To
provide
continued
medical
treatment
and
hospitalization to the claimant in accordance with Section 13
of the Act until his tuberculosis is cured or arrested;
"2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS and a
weekly compensation of P17.40 from date hereof until he is
cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as certified by
a competent physician but the total compensation should not
exceed P4,000.00; Payment to be made, thru the Regional
Office
No.
VI
of
the
Department
of
Labor;
"3. To pay to the workmen compensation fund the amount of
P26.00 as administrative costs pursuant to Section 55 of Act
3428,
as
amended."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on
March 24, 1960, petitioner commenced Civil Case No. 42836
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for a writ
of certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
against Francisco P. Arnado, as Regional Administrator of said
office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said decision, and
claimant Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted
without jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering
decision thereon, and that Arnado had committed a grave
abuse of discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of

Tan. Sustaining respondents objection, upon the ground of

wrong venue, the case was, however, dismissed by said
court, the decision of which was, on June 30, 1961, affirmed
by
Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same
respondents in said Case No. 42836, the present action,
for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the
case, said court issued a restraining order, which was, later,
followed by a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the filing
and approval of the requisite bond. After appropriate
proceedings, said court subsequently rendered the decision
mentioned in the opening paragraph hereof, dismissing the
petition, upon the ground that respondent Tan had authority
to hear and pass upon the aforementioned claim of Abuyen,
and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued
meanwhile. Hence, this appeal by petitioner herein, who
insists: 1) that, being merely a labor attorney, respondent Tan
had no authority to make the award complained of; 2) that as
Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could not
delegate said authority to respondent Tan; and 3) that no
such delegation of authority to him has been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney,
assigned to Regional Office No. VI of the Department of
Labor, and that, as such, he has no authority to hear claims
for compensation under Act No. 3428 and to render decisions
thereon. Based, however, upon Plan No. 20-A, submitted to
the President of the Philippines by the Government Survey
and Reorganization Commission, and Executive Order No.
218, dated December 10, 1956, particularly section 32
thereof, 1 as well as on Rule 21, section 1, of the Rules of
Procedure promulgated by the Workmens Compensation
Commission 2 pursuant to section 12, of Article III of said
Plan No. 20-A, and section 45 of Act No. 3428, as amended
by Republic Act No. 772, 3 we have held, as early as August
21,
1961

". . . that a regional office of the Department of Labor has

original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for

compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. If a
claim is controverted, it shall be heard and decided only by a
regularly appointed hearing officer or any other employee
duly designated by the Regional Administrator to act as
hearing officer. But when the claim is uncontroverted and
there is no necessity of requiring the claimant to present
further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an
award or deny the claim. Furthermore, an employer is duty
bound to controvert a claim within 14 days from the date of
the accident or illness of the laborer or within 10 days after
he or his representative first acquired knowledge of the said
accident or sickness. Failure to do so within the period
provided will result in the renunciation of his right to
controvert the claim. But an employer may reinstate his right
to controvert the claim by filing a petition under oath
specifying the reasons for his failure to do so." 4
We have repeatedly reiterated this view, 5 which is now well
settled. In the case at bar, respondents-appellees contend
and have introduced evidence to the effect that Regional
Administrator Arnado had by virtue of an office order,
dated November 29, 1957, and marked as Exhibit 1
designated respondent Tan who is a duly qualified Member
of the Philippine Bar "as Hearing Officer in the case of
Rufino Abuyen v. Samar Mining Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (RVI- 217)." As a consequence, the only issue for determination
is whether or not there has been such designation in his
favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory: 1)
that the lower court erred in reopening the case, after its
submission for decision, for the reception of said evidence;
and 2) that the same is insufficient to establish the
designation
aforementioned.
As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioners
had asked the lower court to render judgment on the
pleadings; that, thereafter, both parties submitted their
respective memoranda; that, in order to bolster up their

contention, respondents attached to their Memorandum, as

Annex I, the alleged designation of respondent Tan by
Regional Administrator Arnado; that petitioner, however,
objected to the consideration of said Annex I; that,
accordingly, the lower court deemed it best to reopen the
case for the introduction of additional evidence and the
determination of the admissibility in evidence of said Annex I;
and that the same was identified, marked and admitted as
Exhibit
I
at
the
rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have
discretionary power to reopen a case either before or after
rendition of judgment, for the introduction of additional
evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such
power is controlled by no other rule than that of the
paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will not be
reviewed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse thereof. 6
No such abuse has been committed in the case at bar. On the
contrary, the exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial
Judge, served to promote the interest of justice, by clarifying
the question whether or not respondent Tan had been given
the
aforementioned
designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the
allegation in respondents answer to the effect that
respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney but as
Hearing Officer designate pursuant to the authority granted
him by the previous Regional Labor Administrator to try and
hear the merits of the compensation case . . . WCC Case No.
R-VI-217, Rufino Abuyen v. Samar Mining Co., Inc." Moreover,
pursuant to the very cases cited by petitioner, 7 the truth of
this allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted by the
petitioner, when it submitted the case for judgment on the
pleadings.
8
Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is
obviously devoid of merit, the signature of Regional
Administrator Arnado on said Exhibit 1 having been identified
by one of his subordinates, who, as such, was familiar
therewith.

One other point must be stressed. The illness on which

Abuyens claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, through
the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila petitioner has succeeded in
prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved
therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioners
contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected
by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the
compensability of Abuyens disability had never been
questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the
purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely
to delay, a policy "often resorted to" in the language of Mr.
Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as a means of draining the resources
of the poorer party" in this case a tuberculosis patient
"and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion." 9
Thus, the conduct of petitioners counsel is hardly compatible
with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of
Justice,
not
to
obstruct
or
defeat
the
same.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with trebel costs, jointly and severally, against the petitioner
and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas, and let
certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal
record of the latter, as a Member of the Bar. It is so ordered.

AMPARO ROXAS, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

and MANOTOK REALTY, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44650. The CA
had affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court 2 of Marikina,
Branch 273, in SCA No. 97-198-MK, which earlier overturned
the order3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Branch
76, in Civil Case No. 96-6235, for unlawful detainer.
The factual antecedents as found by the Court of Appeals are
as follows:

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by herein private

respondent Manotok Realty, Inc. against herein petitioner
Amparo Roxas before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina,
Branch 76. Manotok Realty, Inc. alleged in its complaint that:
it is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
Manotok-Ramos Subdivision IX, City of Marikina, Metro
Manila, known as Lot 14, Block 9 duly covered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 100498; that sometime on September
18, 1961, plaintiff and defendant entered into a Contract to
Sell covering the subject property, however, on September
14, 1973, plaintiff notarially rescinded and cancelled the
contract as of June 25, 1966 for defendant's failure to comply
with the terms thereof, specifically for her failure to pay the
stipulated monthly payments; that despite receipt of said
notice of cancellation however, defendant continued in her
possession and occupation of subject parcel of land without
any legal basis except by mere tolerance of plaintiff; that
defendant since and from that time of the service of the
notice of rescission and the demand to vacate on September
14, 1973, defendant has possessed and occupied said
property without making any payment to plaintiff of such
reasonable compensation for her use and occupancy thereof;
that on August 3, 1995, plaintiff needing said property for its
own use, made a final demand to defendant, through
counsel, to vacate subject property within three (3) months
from receipt thereof; that notwithstanding however her
receipt of said final demand and the lapse of the three (3)
months period within which to vacate, defendant unlawfully
failed and refused to vacate the same without legal basis.
In her answer, Amparo Roxas denied the material allegations
of the complaint, and by way of special and affirmative
defenses, alleged that the notice of cancellation has not been
received by defendant hence, a condition precedent has not
been complied with, thus subject to dismissal; that she has

complied with all the terms and conditions of the Contract to

Sell, but Manotok Realty, Inc. has not been recording
defendant's compliance, amounting to plaintiff's dealing in
bad faith and with malice afterthought; and by way of special
and affirmative defense alleged that there is no cause of
action and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed; and
by way of counterclaim seeks moral and exemplary damages
in the total amount of P200,000.00 and an award of
attorney's fee in the amount of P50,000.00.
After the requisite preliminary conference and the submission
of affidavits and position papers by both parties, Hon. Judge
Jerry B. Gonzales of MeTC, Marikina City, Branch 76,
dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In an order dated November 20, 1996, Judge Gonzales
ratiocinated:
This is a clear case of ejectment through accion publiciana,
jurisdiction of which belongs to the Regional Trial Court
because the cause of action is tolerance.
The Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Magin vs.
Avelino,4 127 SCRA 602, said:
"Where the possession of the land by another is due to
tolerance of owner the action for ejectment is accion
publiciana, not unlawful detainer or forcible entry."

jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as "the complaint is

one for unlawful detainer" as clearly alleged in the complaint,
"and not for accion publiciana as incorrectly ruled by the
lower court."6
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the judgement
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff-appellant and against
defendant-appellee Amparo Roxas, ordering the latter and all
persons claiming rights under her:
1) to immediately vacate and surrender the possession of the
premises in question described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint;
2) to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of P2,000.00 per
month as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject premises from November 4, 1995
up to the time the premises in question is fully vacated, and
possession thereof is surrendered to plaintiff-appellant;
3) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS as reasonable attorney's fees, and the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.7

Under the above doctrine, the demand being that of

terminating possession allowed by tolerance of the alleged
owner, this Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. 5
Aggrieved, Manotok Realty, Inc. appealed the matter before
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 273. The RTC
ruled for Manotok Realty, Inc. holding that the MeTC had

The reversal of the MeTC order prompted Amparo Roxas to

elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals for review under
Rule 42. However, the appellate court affirmed the
aforequoted RTC decision opining that Amparo's reliance on
Velez vs. Avelino8 is misplaced for the latter partakes of a

different factual setting. The RTC of Marikina had found, inter

alia:
In this particular case, the private respondents from the very
beginning occupied the subject premises without any
contract and constructed thereon houses sans any building
permits. The Court described them as squatters and
characterized their possession as one of tolerance.in the case
at bench, the petitioner was not a squatter but a lawful
possessor of the property by virtue of a contract to sell duly
entered into by the petitioner and private respondent. Her
occupation became illegal only upon her refusal to vacate
despite the cancellation of the contract to sell and a demand
letter dated August 3, 1995 for her to vacate.
While in the Velez case, supra, there was no contract,
express or implied, at the start, in the case at bench, there
was such an express contract to sell that governed the
relationship between the petitioner and private respondent.
Accordingly, it is imperative in a case of unlawful detainer
that the incipient occupancy is founded on some legal
authority such as an express or implied contract, which
however, has expired. In the Velez case supra, there was no
expiration or termination to speak of because there was
really no contract in the first place, whereas, in the instant
case there was.9
The aforesaid finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the lone
issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGULAR COURT HAS JURISDICTION
TO TRY AND HEAR THE INSTANT CASE.10

While this petition for review does not assign any specific
error committed by the court a quo in affirming the decision
of the RTC, what petitioner raises is the question of
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice over the subject
matter of this case. According to her petition, 11 the matter
involved in the present petition falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of an administrative agency, namely the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 12She explains that
"this is for the simple reason that the issue between the
parties is the determination of whether or not the terms and
conditions of their contract to sell are violated." She adds
that she is one of the buyers on installment of a subdivision
lot in private respondent's subdivision. For Manotok Realty
Inc. is the subdivision owner and/or developer. Consequently,
according to petitioner, any question that may arise
regarding their contract, be it for non-payment of
amortization, specific performance, or in general, violation of
any term or condition thereof, including a special instance of
ejectment13 if proper, should be resolved before the HLURB
by a proper initiatory pleading filed thereat. 14
Moreover, petitioner Amparo Roxas reiterated in her
memorandum15 that although the complaint has been framed
to be one for unlawful detainer, the truth is that the matter
involves a dispute between a subdivision owner/developer
and a subdivision lot buyer. She further asserts that she
could not be estopped from raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction of the courts to try and hear the case because, in
her position paper filed with the MeTC, she has already raised
the argument that the matter was cognizable by the HLURB.
Respondent Manotok Realty, Inc., maintains the contrary, to
wit, that the settled rule is that the question of jurisdiction
must be raised before the inferior court. Otherwise, petitioner
is barred by estoppel or even laches. Respondent contends

that in the determination of whether or not an inferior court

has jurisdiction over ejectment suits, what determines the
nature of the action as well as the court that has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the complaint. Citing
Sumulong vs. CA,16 private respondent avers that the cause
of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the
complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the
complaint define or prescribe. Private respondent claims that
the CA correctly pointed out that the complaint expressly
provides that the case is one for unlawful detainer and not an
accion publiciana.
In our view, the following issues now appear for the Court's
resolution: (1) whether petitioner could still raise the issue of
jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings; and (2) whether
the instant case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.
Considering the circumstances of the cases, including the
averments of the parties, we find the present petition without
merit.
On the first issue, we hold that petitioner is already estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction. What she raised in her
position paper as a special and affirmative defense was the
purported failure of the complaint to state a cause of action,
arising from an alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before the HLURB as a condition precedent to filing
a case in court. This is not an explicit attack on the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, but
merely a claim for the need to go through an alleged
jurisdictional
requirement,
namely
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies.

Granted that she placed MeTC's jurisdiction at issue, on the

supposition that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over
Manotok's complaint below, she abandoned her theory after
she obtained a favorable judgment at the MeTC. She chose
not to appeal the MeTC's decision and instead consistently
adopted in her pleadings before the RTC and CA, the MeTC's
ruling that the action is one for accion publiciana. Nowhere in
her pleadings before the RTC and CA did she raise the
argument that jurisdiction properly lies with the HLURB. As
earlier mentioned, it was only in her present petition with this
Court that she squarely asserted for the first time that the
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.
Indeed, the general rule is that a question of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time, even on appeal, provided that doing so
does not result in a mockery of the tenets of fair
play.17 When, however, a party adopts a particular theory,
and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal.18 Where the case was tried by the lower court and
the parties on a certain theory, it will be reviewed and
decided on that theory, insofar as the pleadings, liberally
construed, permit, and not be approached from a different
point of view.19
Petitioner is bound by the theory behind her arguments
before the RTC and CA that the case is properly an accion
publiciana as the cause of action arises from the termination
of possession by mere tolerance. Her assertion now that the
issue involves the determination of whether or not the terms
and conditions of the contract to sell have been violated by
private respondent, which must be decided by the HLURB,
constitutes a change of theory that could require
presentation of further evidence. Given this premise, the
Court cannot countenance petitioner's act of adopting

inconsistent postures by attacking the jurisdiction of the

regular courts to which she has submitted, voluntarily.
Estoppel bars her from doing so.
Nevertheless, to avoid further delay in this case, let us
resolve the second issue of whether the HLURB has the
exclusive primary jurisdiction to try and hear the instant
case.20
In support of her position, petitioner cites Sec. 1 of P.D.
1344,21 to wit:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide the cases of the following nature:
a. Unsound real estate business practices;
b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyeragainst the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
In our view, the mere relationship between the
parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and
subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction
in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature
of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344. On this

matter, we have consistently held that the concerned

administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints
aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Thus, in Arranza vs. B.F. Homes, Inc.,22 we sustained the
HLURB's jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint for specific
performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of
subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces,
road and perimeter wall repairs, and security. Also, in Que vs.
CA,23 we noted that:
. the complaint against Que is distinct from the complaint
against GDREC and its officers before the HLURB. The first
basically pertains to non-performance by the buyer of her
obligations to Klaver, whereas the second deals with nonperformance by the seller of its own obligations to the buyer,
such that Klaver properly sued them before different fora.
Accordingly, the second complaint by Klaver against GDREC
and its officers for unsound real estate practices consisting in
their unwarranted delay in the delivery of Unit No. 1902-A to
him was properly lodged with the HLURB. Moreover,
in Siasoco vs. Narvaja,24 we ruled that it is the HLURB, not the
trial court that has jurisdiction over complaints for specific
performance filed against subdivision developers to compel
the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale and to deliver the
certificates of titles to buyers.
But the antecedent circumstances to the present petition are
in stark contrast to those in the cited cases
of Arranzaand Que. Perusal of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of
Sec. 1, P.D. 1344 abovecited, vis--vis the allegations of the
complaint25 for ejectment filed by Manotok Realty, Inc. with

the MeTC, shows clearly that the HLURB has no jurisdiction

over the complaint. Note particularly pars. (b) and (c) as
worded, where the HLURB's jurisdiction concerns cases
commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers.
As to par. (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," it
would appear that the logical complainant would be the
buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners
and developers or condominium builders and realtors), and
not vice versa.
Petitioner's reliance on Francel Realty Corporation vs. CA, is
misplaced. In that case, the complaint for unlawful detainer
was premised on the "failure of the buyer on installment
basis of real property to pay based on the right to stop
paying monthly amortizations under P.D. 957." 26 That
involves, "a determinative question.exclusively cognizable by
the HLURB," i.e., a determination of the rights and obligations
of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957, not P.D.
1344. Private respondent therein, Francisco Sycip, in fact,
filed earlier a complaint against Francel Realty Corp. for
"unsound real estate business practices" with the HLURB.
Thus, per Mendoza, J., "Petitioner's cause of action against
private respondent [Sycip] should instead be filed as a
counterclaim in HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80 in
accordance with Rule 6, S.6 of the Rules of Court." 27 That
situation does not obtain in the present case.
Petitioner Amparo Roxas' attempt to bring the case within
HLURB's jurisdiction, by belatedly asserting that the matter
involved is the determination of whether or not the terms
and conditions of the contract to sell between the parties
have been violated, would contravene settled jural principles.
First, the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot

be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer

or pleadings filed by the defendant.28 Since there is no
dispute that the allegations of the complaint filed below by
Manotok Realty, Inc., sufficiently describe unlawful detainer,
the MeTC of Marikina properly acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
Second, the cause of action for unlawful detainer between
the present parties springs from the failure of petitioner to
vacate the premises upon lawful demand of the owner, the
private respondent. For petitioner's possession of the land in
question is allegedly by mere tolerance or permission. Our
ruling in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court
of Appeals29 is demonstrably applicable:
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44650 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D.

MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976
asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang
(admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of
marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth
on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino
Maniwang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in
October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while
Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena
refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January,
1971,
Segundino
stopped
visiting
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in
the following month. They renewed their relationship. After
they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding
themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house
since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had
sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she
had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse
with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another
man and that she had a child with still another man.
Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not
mind
because
he
loved
her
very

much.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
library

virtual

law

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation.

Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena
were
secretly
married.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada,
Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City.
.Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and
telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to
Z).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was
pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan,
Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married
although they were not really so. Segundino convinced
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until
after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his
birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage
license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual
law
library
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein
he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he
would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He
was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on
September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went
to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were

released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oathtaking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped
corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to
contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get
married for lack of money. She went back to
Ivisan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual
law
library
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed
to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She
followed him there only to be told that their marriage could
not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on
November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she
returned
to
Davao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries
upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of
the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a
hospital (Exh. I and J).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were
lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also
admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and
that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady
past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral
defamation and had already an illegitimate child before
Michael
was
born.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case.

In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do
not
warrant
his
disbarment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral
character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed
or
are
pending
in
any
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral character
is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude".
A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible

standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants
disbarment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members
of
the
community"
(7
C.J.S.
959).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of
a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct
was
justified
(In
re Hicks
20
Pac.
2nd
896).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be
inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or
deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises.
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on
the
surrounding
circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned

morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well
knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man,
whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well
cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the
fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion
is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty
makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint"
has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533,
535).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is
illustrated in the following cases:chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage,
which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a
marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another
woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to
take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried
to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not
agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100
Phil. 1102).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera
believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in
the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they
cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs.
Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife

and cohabited with another women who had borne him a
child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for
contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta,
101 Phil. 313).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of
Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities,
while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping
his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money
from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and
persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the
latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character
not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123
Phil. 450).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was
engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by
him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling
her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because,
anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give
Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant
and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her.
(Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February
28,
1967,
19
SCRA
439).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man,
misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with.
Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina

and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are
alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will
bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony."
"Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in
death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and
the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil.
586).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having
adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her
eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a
child.
(Royong
vs.
Oblena,
117
Phil.
865).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the
foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano
vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V.
Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano
before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in
frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in
hotels.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual
law
library

with impudicity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law library
According to the complainant, two children were born as a
consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In
1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Villanueva.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the
complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative
Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs.
Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63
SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz,
Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA
91).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited
precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the
respondent
is
hereby
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly

sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of
the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him