Morgan C. Lloyd. The Realities of Experience, 1897

Hegeler Institute
THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE

Author(s): C. Lloyd Morgan
Source: The Monist, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October, 1897), pp. 1-18
Published by: Hegeler Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27897462
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VIII.
Vol.
October,
THE
I.
No.
1897.
MONIST.
OF EXPERIENCE.
THE REALITIES
IN MANY
REAT
an essayist.
To
for
essentials,
eye
?an
Huxley was perhaps greatest as

this end he applied three conspicuous gifts,
WAYS,
lucidity of thought, and style. Original

him with a solid basis of first-hand knowl
had provided
his
in
special branch of science. Wide
edge
reading and a ten
acious memory furnished him with abundant material for apt and
He knew the public whom he addressed and
forcible illustration.
research
felt its pulse with admirable skill. He had a mission and a mes
sage. He stood forth as the champion of science and of a negative
It is one aspect of that philosophy
philosophy founded thereon.
I propose to consider.
the close
Towards
Method
**
The
reconciliation
upon
nature
are
both
sides
of physics
by metaphysics
pr?table
only by the methods
servance
by both metaphysical
to no proposition
and metaphysics
; in the confession
in their ultimate
the admission
on Descartes's
on
Discourse
said i1
Huxley
faults
of the essay
the matter
analysis
known
lies in the acknowledgment

that all
by physics
the formulae of physics
and physical
of which
of
to us only as facts of consciousness
that the facts of consciousness

and
of
the phenomena
are, practically,
; and, finally,
thinkers of Descartes's
is not so clear
and distinct
; in
inter
in the ob
maxim?assent
that it cannot
be
doubted."
In two subsequent
essays, and elsewhere
interpreted and fully accepted the Berkeleyan
1Collected
Essays,
I. p.
incidentally, Huxley
analysis of sensation
194.
THE
MONIST.
and perception.
Starting with the prick of a pin, which subtly
transforms itself on the next page into a needle, and passing to the
of the orange, without which,
smell, taste, and visible appearance
as part of his stock in trade, no one who has a due respect for tra
attempt to deal with the problem,
Locke
thus summarised :l
which
position
''
Flame
white
and
is denominated
sweet,
the same
to be
thought
of
fect resemblance
be
the same
that
warmth,
pain,
ought
which
was
to bethink
whiteness
of its solid parts
can
and
pain
that will
yet, he
in us
to say that his
he has
of
the sensation
sensation
of
idea of warmth
in the fire ; and his idea of pain

in the fire.
is not
are
Why
the one
it produces
not, when
but by the bulk,
do neither
And
the per
by most men
it would
the far different
in the same way,
in him
in snow,
coldness
in us ; and
idea
other
produce
; and manna,
are commonly
in us ; the one
; and
produces
in us
cold
qualities
ideas are
say otherwise.
distance
reason
what
; which
in a mirror
in him by the fire, is actually
produced
and
those
should
approach
himself
the same fire produced
which
they are
if one
at a nearer
does
as
that
that at one
fire
in us
they produce
the other
and
light ; snow, white
in these bodies
very extravagant
judged
consider
and
hot
from the ideas
leads up to the
he
dition would
and
the
and motion
figure, number,
?"
thus, in company with Locke, disposed of any claim

Having
to external reality which these so-called "secondary
qualities" may
then proceeds to apply the Berke
be supposed to possess, Huxley
leyan logic to the "primary
''
The
therefore
but
particular
are
snow
really
bulk,
light, heat, whiteness
pain
is in manna.
colors,
nor
all colors,
cease,
Take
the ears hear

tastes, odors,
one's
any
away
sounds
motion
senses
because
real qualities
the sensation
of
sounds,
to their causes,
not
i. e., bulk,
in Collected
VI.
Essays,
Vol. VI.
pp.
in those bodies;
in them than sickness
taste nor
particular
the eyes see

the nose
or
light or
smell
ideas, vanish
; and
and
of parts."
goes on to show, a rig

of the secondary quali
ties, forces us to admit that the primary qualities

So that the final upshot is this :
demnation.
Vol.
of fire and
them or not, and
figure, and motion
as Huxley,
interpreting Berkeley,
orous extension of the logic which disposes
1
Quoted
2
Quoted
the parts
perceives
really
they are such
But
of
them ; let not
; let the palate

as
had said :2
they really exist
no more
are
or coldness
and
and are reduced
figure, and
number,
in them, whether
they may be called
Locke
qualities."
are in like con
253-254.
p. 255.
THE
''
are
and motion
conceived
and motion,
or known
Berkeley
to us only as
known
OF
replies
and all its phenomena

'
: True
; but what you
forms of consciousness
is a contradiction
in terms.'
(P. 279.)
thinking mind,
"
our pains, and the [relations
Our sensations, our pleasures,
the sum total of positive,
and
these sensations
thinking;
and
unquestionable
knowledge.
their relations matter

shows
experience
We
and motion;
that there
is a
tween some of the former and some of the latter."
call
(P.
is to be
from a
apart
of
a
them make
up
section
large
the rest we
constant
are resolv
call matter
; their being
of a state of consciousness,
the existence
; and
EXPERIENCE.
that the universe
affirms
If the materialist
into matter
able
REALITIES
of
term mind
and
order of succession
be
318.)
Now, when having closed the book and looking up, one sees a
bunch of purple violets, delicately formed, sweetly scented, in the
vase out there on the table, one is tempted to wonder whether, in
following the lead of Locke and Berkeley, the high priest, or if it
be preferred the proctor, of modern science, took the line most
That end was first the de
suitable for the end he had in view.
limitation of scientific knowledge, and secondly the disclosure of
the foundations on which that knowledge is securely based.
Both
the range and the basis may be summarised, on the principles he
adopts, in the single word Experience.
Beyond experience we are
not to stray; and the clear
with absolute confidence.
''
The memorable
said Huxley,
cal criticism
investigation
entertained,
ence
; and
"consisted
by his
rendered
into the nature
started by Descartes,
should
that is the momentary
(VI.
to the cause
of sound
thinking by Descartes,
in this : that he laid the foundation
inquiry
for he who
that is safe, even

inferences."
service
teachings of experience we are to trust
if all other
of certainty.
that there is one

pretend
to doubt
consciousness
kinds of certainty
of modern
It is a clear
thing of which
itwould
are merely
philosophi
result of the
no doubt
thereby prove
we call a present
more
'
can be
its exist
thought or feeling;
or
less probable
65, 6.)
For my own part I confess that when, having closed the book,
reverie it has suggested, I see
or awakened
from the metaphysical
before me the bunch of violets, nothing in the whole range of my
experience appears to be more certain and clear than the reality in
If I
all its details, of this present item of immediate perception.
am to accept the Cartesian maxim, here and now is my opportun
ity.
Suppose
that a physicist at my side undertakes
to show that
THE
4
what
MONIST.
I call the color of the violets
is explicable
; I listen with respectful attention.
and motion
in terms of matter
But, granting that

to
of
conforms
his
the
Cartesian canon,
every step
argument
strictly
it is none the less true that every step takes us farther from the
from which we started.
particular reality of immediate experience
No doubt, our path may lead us to new realities of physical thought
and inference. That I do not deny ; what I deny is that our jour
has altered one
neying from the Land's End to Berwick-on-Tweed
at the outset of our journey.
whit the reality of our experiences
then offers to be my guide through
And if the mental philosopher
I am delighted to be his companion right up
the country of Hume,
to John o' Groat's.
I rejoice to travel in such excellent company.
we
when
But
get there, when not only the Land's End violets but
the matter
and motion
of Berwick
have
faded in the indefinite dis
to me that
it appears
tance, and become but pleasant memories,
though we have taken many more steps and journeyed further from
our starting-point, and though what we see at John o' Groat's (with
a good
of metaphysical
pair
is our bunch
spectacles) may be quite clear and

of violets on the table. We
have
real, yet,?there
passed from the realities of immediate perception to the realities of
physics and thence to the realities of Berkeleyan
thought : but
don't try and persuade us that these realities of abstraction carry
with them more certitude than the immediate experience with which
we started.
I profess that, being but a plain man, the reality of
as I look at the bunch of violets, carries with it the
And it appears
to me that, on the
of conviction.
my experience,
very maximum
himself, we should substitute for his cele

principles of Descartes's
brated Cogito ergo sum, concerning which as it stands very pretty
est.
arguments have arisen, the indisputable axiom Experientia
There
are some, however, who would
foundations
of this belief.
the teaching of Naturalism

"Whereas
with a knowledge
science
common
sense
tells
us
of their nature which
informs us that each
long chain
Mr. Balfour,
as follows :
of causes
particular
and effects, whose
seek
for example,
that our experience

so far as
to undermine
it goes,
of objects
is immediate
the
interprets
us
provides
and
direct,
experience
is itself but
the final
link
in a
beginning
is lost amid
the complexities
of
THE
REALITIES
OF EXPERIENCE.
and whose ending is a change of some sort in the mind of the

us further, that among these innumerable
It
informs
the thing
causes,
percipient.
'
'
one
and
one
is
but
from
the
;
moreover,
is,
immediately experienced
separated
'
'
a
it
which
in
immediate
assists
very large
modestly
experience
producing
by
the material
number
world,
the most
of their veracity
sources
of the causal
tions of objects.
ual
But
; and all visual
eous.
tion produced
which
become
reflecting ethereal
perceived
color
solely
undulations.
are
thing is possible,
The
in the mind
feelings produced
possessing
rect but unmeaning
Tweed.
creed,
But we must
thus
to be
interpreted,
their power
of brightness
and
extension,
brightness
alone
to optics,
of the percipient
to attribute
he assumes
degrees
of
percep
of objects
are vis
and
no part of
by the complex
to which
but
1
or color."
: it is a sensa
of uncolored
of either
particles,
or
producing
the qualities
any visual
erron
to science,
of the thing seen
thing itself consists
according
mass
Mr. Balfour would

what
The
immediate
are, according
exception,
as
to which
according
upon our
experiences
is not a property
in virtue of which
therefore
emerge
but habitually
inaccurate,
occasionally
immediate
in consequence
in the thing, and
terial molecules,
without
in us by that thing.
visible
fact
to see that, regarded
in order
is thrown wholly
of our
nine-tenths
knows,
. . .The
inherent guarantee
the difficulties which
recollect, with a theory of science
experiences,
As everybody
of
results,
they are not merely
stress of scientific proof
the ultimate
them no
from object to perception, with the cog

. . .For we need
only to consider carefully
to object.
are dealing,
We
at all.
experienced
carry with
movement
as psychological
regarded
of information,
mendacious.
experiences
never
by far the smallest
from perception
leap
our perceptions
are
which
immediate
is, however,
from a comparison
nitive
causes
intermediate
of
that even
of color
perception
of the
its reality, but

movements
it is not only
are
of ma
incor
seem to have written this near Berwick-on

remember
that he
is merely
the creed of science.

our
experiences
at
the
interpreting
to this
According
Land's
end
were
I refuse to admit the physical sce

naught but an illusory dream.
nery of this interpretation, real enough in its proper place, as a sub
stitute for the equally real scenery of direct perception. The Land's
from which Mr. Balfour starts is a
experience
tree
next
field.
in
the
And I claim that this green
green
standing
tree is not a whit less real than "the complex movements
of ma
"
mass
come
terial molecules,
and extension
which
into
possessing
end of immediate
view at Berwick.
are not dealing at present, remember, with

any of the inferences which may be drawn from the original expe
1
Foundations
We
of Belief*
pp.
108, in,
112.
THE
MONIST.
These may be true

rience,?with
any judgment about the object.
or false without affecting one jot the reality of the experience as
are
We
such.
be
true
'
that,
not
'Anything which
in the same
indistinguishable
Balfour
would
as
pattern
a like modification
of the cerebral
interpretation
The
same message
would
Be
it would
it
true
tissues, would
an
give
peculiarity
in the same
it [nay, Sir, not
of being wholly
It
it but
incorrect
terms and on the same
or
false,
as
however,
real. We
a message,?as
either have
an
it or do not.
author
experience
If we have
of this much
it, it is real in the only intelligible meaning
as
in the affairs of practical
life. We have
word
applied
real
lished our asylums for those whose
terribly
experiences
that is to say messages which
ually deliver false messages,
is of course
produce
in itself quite
be false."
it is unquestionably
you and me
the eyes
that would
experience
of the tree, although
the unfortunate
be delivered,
It may
rays on the retina of
green
by the tree, or anything
from the experience

of it] has
a message.
:
similar
distribute
as
experience
says
that produced
our
ity, but
the
regarding
as Mr.
and other normal

open
to some
people
one
unverifiable
to elaborate
the
abused
estab
habit
are for
and incorrect.
thesis
that we
are
all mad, and that this world inwhich we live is a glorified Bedlam.
If so all we can do is to clap him into an asylum for the sane, and
treat him kindly.
that
It is on the validity of normal experience
we
must
take
Perhaps
our
it may
stand.
seem
somewhat
arbitrary
to
select
certain
ex
perience, label it normal, and assert that it is on this selected real

ity that we must take our stand. The distinction, however, is be
All experience, normal and abnormal
tween reality and validity.
If a lad
not
it
all
of the same social validity.
real
but
is
is
;
alike,
come in on a dark night with blanched cheeks and trembling limbs
saying that he has seen a ghost in the lane, his experience was real
He stoutly con
it lacks social validity.
real?but
?appallingly
see
too
the
it
will
dare
face
tends that if you
you
spectre standing
Curiosity impels you to go ; and you find a sheet of
by the bank.
the Daily Telegraph blown by the wind against the hedge. The ex
perience was real, but itwas falsely interpreted. The dagger Mac
beth saw was
for him as real as
immediate
experience
could make
THE
REALITIES
OF EXPERIENCE.
it : but the phantom of his overwrought brain had no social validity,

since for others there was but vacant air. The value of experience
It generates anticipations ; and only in
is as the guide to action.
are verifiable
so far as these anticipations

real but valid.
by others
is it not only
leads us on to our next point. What

is true of an imme
true
is
of
Their
series.
any given
reality lies in
experience
This
diate
There is the tree in yonder green field.

their being experienced.
If I walk to it, touch it, inhale the fragrance of its blossoms, or,
later in the season, enjoy the flavor of its fruit ; if I run a splinter
from it into my finger, or foolishly knock my head against its
its height or calculate its value ; in all of this
boughs ; if I measure
there is a sequence of experiences, each of which is real forme just
in so far as it is an actual experience.
And we are able to guide
our actions
perience,
have been
but
and walk more or less sure-footedly in the paths of ex

as experience
itself shows, the realm we
just because,
exploring
for you.
For
whence
ence,
is an orderly realm,?orderly
you
emerges
I can
and
natural
notes
compare
not only forme

as
to our
experi
knowledge.
All of this seems, no doubt, to many very elementary and trite.

We know perfectly well, itmay be said, that out there in the field
is a tree ; that if one is near enough one can see it, and if one goes
still nearer one can handle it and taste its fruits. There is no need
to tell us that the orderly sequence
two
quite
That
common
independent
is mere
sense
common
is a subtle
of experience
things,?our
consciousness
sense.
it must
But
compound
of
be
practical
is the result of
and
the
remembered
experience
tree.
that
and
The assumption
crude metaphysics.
that the unity of experience
is the product of two independent
factors, the tree and con
is a metaphysical
sciousness,
assumption, and one which leads to
all sorts of difficulties.
It forces you to divide
the experience be
You will perhaps begin, with Locke, by
admitting that the color, and the sweetness, and the pain are in
while matter and extension are in the tree.
your consciousness,
tween the two existences.
Then
you may be perplexed, like readers of Huxley, with horrid

doubts about the matter and extension as they exist independently
THE
MONIST.
of the percipient mind. And you may end with the conviction that
"what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to
its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by
objective agencies which are unknown
be enfolded at last with the lambs
and unknowable
and may
that Mr. Herbert

Spencer
of
Realism.
Which
grass
transfigured
is innutritious provender.
forbid ! for the unknowable
feeds with
Heaven
the metaphysical
surely, the tree as object and

clearness.
tinguishable with Cartesian
But
the mind
as subject are dis
Distinguishable,
yes?like
But it does not follow that they
the scent and color of my violets.
are separable.
In experience they are inseparable ; and ifwe pos
Let us
tulate independence, we do so on metaphysical
grounds.
go back to the immediate experience which I describe as a green
tree in the field. This is our starting point.
Now what we do is
And as the result of
to analyse this bit of practical experience.
our analysis we distinguish
in thought what philosophers
have
agreed to call an objective aspect, the green tree, and a subjective
In experience
the two are inseparable.
aspect, our perception.
a system of science which is founded on experience
should
leave
to
and
limitations
its
outstanding problems
frankly accept
Ifwe do this ; ifwe hold firmly, as students of science,
metaphysics.
And
to the teachings of experience and refuse, within the sphere of sci

ence, to go beyond them ; ifwe be careful to avoid the pernicious
in analysis is necessarily separ
fallacy, that what is distinguishable
able in existence ; then our way is comparatively clear and simple.
at our experience in its objective bearings, we elaborate
Looking
a system of natural and physical science ; looking at it in its sub
system of mental sci
jective bearings, we elaborate a co-ordinate
ence.
the color is in the tree or in our
The question whether
admits of no answer
just because it is wrongly

stated. It is formulated in terms of the crude dualistic metaphysics
Asked in an intelligible form for science, it ad
of common sense.
mind,
from science,
The color is certainly part

mits of a perfectly intelligible answer.
of the objective aspect of vision and has to be investigated by nat
ural
has a bearing on
; it, as unquestionably,
interpretation of experience, and from this point of
and physical
the subjective
science
THE
REALITIES
OF EXPERIENCE.
view falls within
the province of the psychologist.

The distance
of the tree, its size, its value, fall, in like manner, within the
scheme of objective
interpretation, from one point of view, and
within the scheme of subjective interpretation from the other ; and
that because as items of experience
they are susceptible of this
mode
of analysis.
science both aspects, objective and subjective, are abso
It is just
lutely co-equal and co-ordinate in the matter of reality.
as absurd to deny objective reality as to deny the reality of experi
ence ; the one implies the other.
Science, I repeat, takes its stand
For
on this reality of experience ; polarises it under the magnetic influ

ence of thought ; terms all that falls within the objective purview
the natural and physical universe, and all that falls under the sub
jective analysis
; regarding both as co-ordinate

aspects of the basal reality of experi
the world of mind
realities, or, rather, coequal

ence.
But itmay be said that the immediate experience of the bunch

of violets, or the green tree in the field, carries with it the ineradic
able conviction that the object is independent of the subject.
In
what
Ifwe cross-question practical experience,

independent?
from the metaphysics of common sense, does it assert with
sense
apart
conviction
anything
tion or of verifiable
beyond
the
range
or possible
of actual
inference founded thereon?
that it does.
observa
I cannot discover
and
the reiterated
begets expectations,
Experience
verification of such expectations does carry with it a sort of convic
I am convinced that if I reach forthmy hand to the violets
tion.
and carry them to my nose, I shall experience
their fragrance.
I
do not wish in any degree to minimise the force and value of such
They are our guides in the practical conduct of life.
them we could make no advances in science. At the same
convictions.
Without
time these expectations may be misleading.

The violets may be
artificial and have been placed on my table as a practical joke. Or
The order of certainty?if the expression
they may be dog-violets.
be allowed?of
the immediate experience, as such, is different from
that of any expectation,
no matter how well
founded.
Experientia
IO
THE
erit cannot
perientia
Now,
MONIST.
the same
be asserted with
absolute
confidence as Ex
est.
so far as I can ascertain, practical

never
metaphysics,
goes
the
beyond
knowledge,
assertion
that
apart from
experience,
ac
tual or possible,
It
is, was, or will be, of such and such a kind.
asserts on the evidence of Geology
that Ichthyosauri lived in the
seas of Liassic
men been living then, there
had
and
times,
that,
It asserts that in the
would have been such and such experiences.
experience of the future, as in that of to-day, sunrise and sunset
will continue so long as the solar system shall endure.
All past
all
the
for
the
it
form of
in
future,
presents
history,
anticipations
actual or possible experience.
not admit of answers couched
ifwe ask questions which do

in terms of experience, inquiring,
for example, what will be the state of matters if experience, actual
or possible,
is from the nature of the case excluded, then common
But
sense either refuses to give any reply, or has resort to metaphysical

It
assumptions.
is
apt
to
assume,
for
instance,
that
because
my
experience, say of the bunch of violets, is independent of you, and

third person, the
yours of me, and ours of some actual or possible
as
is
of
That there may
any experience.
such,
object,
independent
be something independent of any experience, I am not concerned
here either to assert or to deny.
Such assertion or denial must be
based on metaphysical
grounds altogether beyond the domain of
actual observation.
For the practical affairs of life the word "ob
"
indicates that which is given in sensory experience.
Begot
ject
ten thus of experience, the object should resent any doubts which
I cannot believe that
may be thrown on its legitimate parentage.
common sense ever seriously means to cast this slur on the objects
It asserts that under given conditions of experience
of perception.
as
you or I, or any one else, may see and handle the violets?that
objects they are independent of any of us severally, not surely that
they exist, as such, independently of all experience.
this complete independence
implied in our words
and forms of speech?
Not necessarily.
The function of language
But
is not
is to enable
to each other, or to record, the re

and of thought. Their implications are either
us to communicate
sults of experience
REALITIES
THE
II
EXPERIENCE.
OF
Absolute
independence is a metaphys
practical or metaphysical.
that
differs
from
and
ical implication,
practical independence which
is a matter
of common
one
If some
experience.
on the Dover
are mile-stones
tells me
that
there
that if I care
to journey
first a fact of experience, and
road, and
thither I shall see them, he expresses

secondly an anticipation based thereon.
It is true that I or any

one else can verify my informant's anticipation.
This shows that
individual
of
the object is independent
merely
experience, but it
not show, nor does our language necessarily imply, that, as
And if
objects, the mile-stones are independent of all experience.
it be said that some thing, at any rate, does exist independently
does
of
which generates or is the occasion of the several experiences
those who journey along the Dover
road, I am certainly not pre
pared to deny the statement ; but it belongs to the domain of met
To the question,
aphysics, not to that of practical knowledge.
cause
is the
What
of the experience in which you trust? practical
is outside my
from
replies : That
metaphysics,
knowledge, apart
information I have is entirely based on observa
province. What
I can offer no opinion on matters which lie behind and be
yond it.
I conceive that science, in so far as it is founded on practical
tion.
should
experience,
ence has
carried
make
the
precisely
same
its inferences much
answer.
No
further afield.
sci
doubt
in
It deals
and employs more largely the

greater degree with generalisations
It soars on the wings of thought to more
symbolism of abstraction.
For it must not be forgotten that the
lofty and difficult heights.
realm of experience includes not only the domain of the senses, but
all that can logically, with the Cartesian canon in view, be founded
thereon.
"
Indeed
in comparison
From
the domain
with
few observations
cope, an astronomer
and
in like manner,
we make
of the senses,"
the vast
ourselves
of a comet when
can calculate
by means
at home
asTyndall
its path
of data
said,
"is
it comes within
in regions which
furnished
in other and wider
infinitely small
almost
to thought which
region accessible
lies beyond
no telescope
in the narrow world

worlds,
which
them.
the range of his teles
can
be
can reach
of the senses,
traversed
the intellect alone."
by
12
THE
MONIST.
Just as the trigonometrical

a
from
constructed
construct
the vast
rately measured
single
survey of a whole
world
extra-sensible
base-line
measured
accurately
of
continent may be
so may
base-line,
science
from
of sensible
the
we
accu
does but
experience.
the process of inference which
in dealing with daily affairs. And
Science
indefinitely prolong and extend

common sense habitually employs
only by oft-repeated reference to the touchstone
of experience is
the gold of valid inference distinguishable
from the false coinage
and spurious notes of fallacy.
There
is, however, another feature of scientific knowledge
It is founded on se
which is perhaps more frequently overlooked.
lected experience.
Although from the subjective aspect abnormal
experience forms an important field for investigation, yet, in its ob
And not
jective aspect, science is forced to exclude it altogether.
only is abnormal experience necessarily
cial validity), but all observations which
of accuracy
and
son excluded.
exactness
which
science
ignored (for it has no so

fail to reach the standard
are
imposes,
for
rea
that
is also a tendency, wise in the main but apt

to be arbitrary, to deny the validity of all such experience as fails
to conform to the existing conclusions of science?to
ignore what
soever seems
There
to be discordant
with
our scheme
of scientific
inter
may perhaps be regarded as the besetting intel

pretation.
It is a defect
lectual sin of the narrow-minded devotee of science.
This
time and increased wisdom will remedy. The ideal towards

which we work should be that all sane and accurate experience
which
shall find its appropriate
place
in the system of scientific knowl
edge.
The
then, of the analysis of this extended

system
is to polarise
it into objective
founded and built on experience,
and subjective, one in essence but diverse in aspect, of neither of
result,
which do we know anything apart from the other, both of strictly

co-ordinate reality within the system. Under the objective aspect
we classify all that we learn from astronomy, geology, biology,
physics,
planets
delicate
the material
universe.
The
chemistry, concerning
of the solar system, the rocks of the carboniferous age, the
and
pencillings
on
the guinea-fowl's
plumage,
the chasing
on
THE
the minutest
diatom,
REALITIES
are
in no
OF EXPERIENCE.
sense
less
real,
13
for experience,
than
the orderly molecular or atomic evolutions of which the physicist

or the chemist has to tell us. Men of science who are concerned
with the objective take for granted the subjective aspect which all
experience, as such, must present. That they leave to those whose
from this point of view?
business it is to deal with our knowledge
to the psychologists, who regard the whole realm of experience as
of the orderly se
that which affords data for the understanding
states
of
of
take cognisance
consciousnesss.
quence
Psychologists
of the objective, not for its own sake, but as inevitably throwing
light on those conscious processes which they have to explain in
terms of their special science.
Thus by an organised division of
extend the systematic survey,
and psychologists
from his selected point of view ; and thus by analysis are dis
the strands which constitute the intricately-woven tap
entangled
human
of
estry
experience ; thus, too, in synthetic interpretation,
labor naturalists
each
the student of history, whether of our own times or of a more

distant past, utilise all that is rendered visible from each stand
does
point, and combine
actions
and motives
in one dramatic
represen
tation.
Let us, however, in surveying the edifice of human knowledge,

be careful not to lose sight of the foundations. These are the com
mon experiences
of daily life?the data afforded by observation.
so far as these are real and valid, will the superstructure
Just in
have reality and validity.
Any system of thought which conveys
the notion that they are tainted with unreality is false to the prin
ciples of experience and of science. The corner-stone of the whole
building has inscribed upon it the axiom Experientia est. If my ex
perience of the bunch of violets be not real and trustworthy down
and apparently most trivial detail, then there is
nothing in the vast system of scientific knowledge which can resist
the solvent acid of philosophical
scepticism, leaving but the phan
to its minutest
tom dregs of the Unknowable.

line of argument founded
And so we come back to Huxley's
on the Berkeleyan
shall we say of it? Is it true
analysis. What
or false ? Shall we evade the question and answer indirectly that
THE
14
MONIST.
Or may we not take refuge in an oxymoron?

one was more desirous than Huxley of doing honor to science.
it is ill-chosen?
in these Berkeleyan
But
essays
''
His
honor
And
If he wished
No
rooted
in dishonor
faith unfaithful
stood
kept him falsely
a desert of the Unknowable
to make
true."
so that the divine
of philosophic
peace should commence her blessed reign,
he adopted a strangely ill-advised method of realising his desires.
:
Hear again the words in which he summarises his conclusions
Astrsea
''
Our
total of positive,
these sensations
and
of the former and
our pains,
unquestionable
their relations
; and experience
thinking
some
our pleasures,
sensations,
the sum
shows
and
the relations
knowledge.
matter
and motion
that there is a constant
We
of these make
call a large
; the rest we
term mind
order of succession
up
section
of
and
between
some of the latter."
I venture
to deny the validity of this division into two separate

The body of experience is one and
sections, material and mental.
and
homogeneous,
let that
pass.
every
The
item presents
passage
is open
to
to a more
analysis
serious
two
aspects.
criticism.
But
Bear
ing inmind the way in which Huxley hunts down the objectivities,
hounding first the secondary qualities, and then those once termed
primary, until they take refuge in the safe haven of the subjective,
as follows? Only the
to paraphrase
his conclusions
subjective aspect of experience can make good at the bar of reason
its title to reality : the objective universe is at best but an orderly
is it unjust
mental
phantasmagoria.
Now
professed mental
sided conclusion.
exercised
came naturally enough from the lips of a

like Berkeley.
It was indeed a one
philosopher
this conclusion
It was
in its own proper
elaborated
sphere
in the subjective field ; but it

no little influence on the devel
It established triumph
opment
thought.
philosophic
as
in
the
all
aspect
present
subjective
experience throughout
antly
itswhole range. And if in its vivid realisation of this aspect it
of modern
to minimise
the value of the correlative objective aspect,
the
With Huxley
the fault may well be condoned?in
Berkeley.
case is different. What was seemly, nay admissible,
in the Bishop
seemed
THE
REALITIES
OF
EXPERIENCE.
IS
I have
of Cloyne may scarcely befit the proctor of modern science.
But when,
a sincere admiration of Huxley's work and genius.
on
the
enviable
with
discoursed
lucidity
physical basis of
having
life and mind, he finally merges the object in the subject, he is no

longer true to the flag of experience under which he professed to
serve. The following words are the utterance of a deserter : "If
I say that thought is a property of matter, all that I can mean is
of extension and that of
that actually or possibly the consciousness
resistance
accompany
all
other
sorts
of consciousness."
The
ideal
it professes
ism of the explanation is as absurd as the materialism
to explain.
Does any true soldier of science believe that his cap
tain here spoke wisely and well ? I for one must protest, even if I
be drummed out of the service for sowing the seeds of disaffection
to a superior officer whose memory is justly revered.
But before I
am
ignominiously stripped of my uniform I must repeat that the

objective and the subjective are the co-ordinate products of the
analysis of experience, and that the one is as real (and real in pre
If we polarise the experience
cisely the same sense) as the other.
of a bunch of flowers into objective violets and subjective states of
consciousness, we cannot doubt the reality of either without deny
the reality of the experience thus polarised.
And what good purpose, it may be asked, can be served by
this discussion ? The question at issue is of very little if any prac
tical moment.
all that the Bishop of Cloyne and

Notwithstanding
the philosopher of Ninewells have written, in spite of the arguments
of their spiritual progenitor Locke and their nineteenth-century in
terpreter Huxley, men of science have quietly and steadily pursued

their researches, and the general public have accepted and profited
But ifwe found our knowl
by their labors without misgivings.
edge on experience, we must be prepared either to hold Huxley's

it and occupy more advantageous
position or to abandon
ground.
No doubt in times of peace we may be content to retain the posi
tion in a merely formal manner, without considering its strength or

It will then afford no little gratification to onlookers
its weakness.
when
in times of attack
walls
and
force us
the enemy's
to beat a retreat.
shot destroy our crumbling

If one may judge from the
i6
THE
MONIST.
of the press, this was the attitude of many, when Mr.

fire on what seemed
opened a vigorous and well-directed
comments
Balfour
to the field-glasses
of the attacking party the chief positions
of nat
uralism.
his ground with all the skill of a trained dialectician,

for his most concentrated fire a position
in itself in
Choosing
and selecting
herently weak, Mr. Balfour
affords to onlookers
very pretty artillery practice
"
Naturalism
tension,
(as commonly
the primary
tion between
so forth) being
and
solidity,
the latter (such as sound

the sentient
upon
dent being."
he says,
held),
the secondary
and
organism,
(Foundations
; the former
to exist as they are perceived,
supposed
and apart
to the distinc
committed
of matter
qualities
are due
and color)
is deeply
a view of some
to the action
of
the primary
from the sentient organism
(ex
while
qualities
no indepen
have
%p. 42.)
of Belief
Then, in the passage

already quoted, he argues that, on this
view, our perceptions regarded as sources of information, are not
inaccurate but habitually mendacious.
And a
merely occasionally
little further on he asks :
''
By what
and
to be wrong
ated and
title can we
possible
(P.
immediate
reality of something
it testifies to the independent
when
colored."
the same
proclaim
it testifies to the independent
right when
to be
experience
and
solid
extended,
reality of something
illumin
113.)
on one more
this position and advanced
captured
closely resembling that strengthened and fortified by Huxley, he
places a telling shot when he says that?
Having
'1
It involves
a complete
It is all very well,"

in general,
iology
what
with
its own
about material
is ultimately
...
things.
be
singular
spectacle
though
in theory
beneficent
accurate,
accident,
in its gradual
inferential.
since
premises,
perience
in particular,
the proposition
So
the system
it can
only be
turns out
development
a conclusion
is quite
on which,
as a matter
that, if this particular

of
of a creed which
thought
is believed
justified
to be
are
account
by another
of
of historical
the nature
for one
of error and
and
but
of ex
the
presents
set of reasons,
; and which,
its origin
that
of phys
out of harmony
by science
in practice
phys
to hold
states of mind,
about
represented
true, though
the product
us
requires
are not propositions
founded
its theory.
of mental
that our knowledge
facts, and
Such
and
of science
say that the scientific account
are mental
experienced
and
the practice
between
"to
of sense-perception
is but mediate
verity, science
stage
and
is immediately
ical facts
divorce
he continues,
through
each
some
subsequent
illusion."
THE
Finally
surveying
to speak
my whole
progeny?a
yet been
mind?is
most
to agree,
able
more
is more
both
degree
resembling
than
absurd
distinguished
fort,Mr. Balfour
in which
in spite of all
is essentially
can be rationally
the existing
astonishing,
the way
race?have,
that experience
that from such an experience
remotest
17
the ruins of the captured
in the history of speculation
"Nothing
and
OF EXPERIENCE.
exclaims
sophic
REALITIES
system
of
extracted
Hume's
philo
their differences,
as Hume
anything
the natural
I am
nothing?if
described
even
sciences."
it,
in the
(Pp.
96, 97.)
I have recalled to the reader's memory these strategic advances

a
as a philosophy,
of
powerful and avowed enemy to Naturalism
partly with the object of showing that the position inwhich Huxley
regarded by one who had no narrow and
petty cause to fight for, as a position of importance and worth cap
turing, and partly with a view to indicating that Mr. Balfour's
logi
cal projectiles have not pierced or weakened
the central citadel of
entrenched
himself was
For if there be any truth in the conclusions set forth

experience.
in the preceding pages, Mr. Balfour has only succeeded
in taking
outposts which the captains of experience should never have occu
pied.
more
If he have
to fall back upon

them to defend the co-ordin
forced the soldiers of science
tenable ground, and compelled

ate reality of the objective and subjective
in all their details, he
a
The po
will, in my judgment, have done them
signal service.
sition of naturalism will be the stronger for his spirited attack.
By naturalism I here mean a system of knowledge founded on
in its widest and most comprehensive sense. Within
experience
that system experience may be trusted implicitely as far as it goes

no farther. Although
?and
it may occasionally
lead to false in
ferences, it is not habitually inaccurate, still less mendacious.
Only
when dealing with problems outside its proper sphere does it talk
nonsense.
It is by no means a complete system of knowledge, but
It does not afford an
is full of gaps, and ends off in ragged edges.
explanation of the universe. Nay, I am prepared to go further and
assert that experience does not and cannot furnish a philosophical
of anything, its r?le being to describe the past and
explanation
anticipate
the future.
It deals with
sequences
which,
under
the
i8
the
monist.
And
conditions, it finds to be practically invariable.
appropriate
if it commonly speaks of the causes of events, when it should be
content with describing their antecedents, it is but borrowing, con
the language of metaphysics.
sciously or unconsciously,
Experi
ence of past sequences enables us to predict the future in similar
terms. There its guidance ceases.
In presence of the problem of
causation
it is smitten with the dumbness
of agnosticism.
And beyond the babble of experience all is silence!
men of thought in all ages have regarded as the deepest
of existence
no
answers!
we
are
I,
to ask
for one,
I do indeed contend
no
am
questions,
unable
or
at any
to assent
to
rate
these
are
On what
problems
to expect
propositions.
edifice of scientific knowledge

is securely founded on the realities of experience.
If, however, I
be asked whether I am content to accept the universe as inexplic
that the whole
I have no hesitation
the
in replying that I am not. Behind
a
which
realities
of
causal
I
believe
in
sequential
reality
experience
makes
that experience possible and explicable.
But, as Mr. Rud
able,
yard Kipling
would
say, that is another story.

C.
Bristol,
Lloyd
Morgan.
England.

Morgan C. Lloyd. The Realities of Experience, 1897

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Hegeler Institute

THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE

Huxley was perhaps greatest as

lucidity of thought, and style. Original

only by the methods

lies in the acknowledgment

the formulae of physics

to us only as facts of consciousness

that the facts of consciousness

of its solid parts

to say that his

in the fire ; and his idea of pain

but by the bulk,

the far different

in the same way,

in him by the fire, is actually

the same fire produced

light ; snow, white

from the ideas

thus, in company with Locke, disposed of any claim

light, heat, whiteness

the ears hear

in them than sickness

the eyes see

goes on to show, a rig

ties, forces us to admit that the primary qualities

them or not, and

figure, and motion

they are such

them ; let not

; let the palate

they really exist

and are reduced

they may be called

are in like con

and all its phenomena

their relations matter

tween some of the former and some of the latter."

that the universe

into the nature

that is the momentary

in this : that he laid the foundation

that is safe, even

teachings of experience we are to trust

that there is one

that a physicist at my side undertakes

I call the color of the violets

But, granting that

faded in the indefinite dis

spectacles) may be quite clear and

himself, we should substitute for his cele

are some, however, who would

the teaching of Naturalism

of their nature which

informs us that each

and effects, whose

that our experience

and whose ending is a change of some sort in the mind of the

; and all visual

rect but unmeaning

of the thing seen

thing itself consists

Mr. Balfour would