[G.R. No. 122770.

January 16, 1998]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

vs. EDUARDO

AGBAYANI

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:

Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent person who recognize that a
womans cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that will
descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage is
perpetrated on ones own flesh and blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The latter
yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but
the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores of his
society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting coercion of
incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not least of all by the
fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless lechery.[1]
At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who charged her own father with rape
committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19 July 1994, this Court finds itself repeating this declaration.
[2]

Before this Court on automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in view
of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
[3]

[4]

On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National Capital Region Command,
Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of Eden
Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y. Mendoza.
[5]

After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint for rape signed by EDEN, assisted by her sister Fedelina
Agbayani, and subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was filed against appellant with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 27 October, 1994. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149,
then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22 December 1994.
[6]

[7]

At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel Baldado and Edwin dela Cruz as
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits immediately followed,
with the prosecution presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, who cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. On the succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution presented
EDEN and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. During these hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo
Temanil of the Public Attorneys Office.
[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

On this part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina Agbayani, as well as EN who identified
her and Fedelinas affidavit of desistance, which was subscribed and sworn to before notary public Eranio Cedillo on 6
February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:
[14]

We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old, sister of Eden
Agbayani, and presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta, Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and states [sic]:
That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before this Honorable Court
docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I formally realize that the
incident between us and my father is purely family problem that arise from the disciplinarian attitude of our
father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this case and withdraw
the same;

That I am executing this affidavit for purposes of finally withdrawing the instant case and therefrom
requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
This affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court what she said in her previous testimony and sworn statement were not true, the trial
court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning that her intentional falsehood was offensive to its dignity and a blatant
disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading [to] the administration of justice. Accordingly, the trial court ordered her
committed to incarceration and imprisonment within the period provided by law, which penalty however was modified to
a fine of P200.00 upon EDENs motion for reconsideration.
[15]

[16]

On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her affidavit of desistance and
claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother and elder sister.
The trial courts summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to the pages of the stenographic
notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:

The evidence adduced on the record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the
accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape
which case was raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo Manalastas fo Branch 7, Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted
from pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on July
13, 1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden,
Diana, and Edina, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant Eden Agbayani,
Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows that the above mentioned
address, the complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the
room with her father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her
breast and vagina. She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting her. Frightened, she
asked, Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito, gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan? and threatened to kill
her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in

having carnal knowledge with the complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt
blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been
done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the incident to
Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and
Dodima. Several attempts were made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was
only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the
complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previous provisionally dismissed case and issued
a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the accused was arrested
on the same day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City and was later brought
to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently detained. After the accuseds arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned
to Station 10 where they made individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events
leading to and occurring after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Dr.
Florante Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report.[17]
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped his daughter EDEN,
because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter. He declared
that EDEN charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt after he caught her lying about her whereabouts on
night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented apartment and did not return anymore.
[18]

[19]

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellants alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994, appellant requested her to take care
of his children because he was going to Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July 1994.
[20]

The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who appeared, during her entire testimonies on January
20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive; futher, it commended her for her courage and her unwavering
strength in the midst of the emotional and psychological strain and humiliation, not to mention the pressure and lack of
moral support of her family, brought on by the filing of this case. It also ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily execute the

affidavit of desistance, as it was procured at the behest of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and
the familys good name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever injury the complainant might have
suffered in the hands of the accused. Besides, even assuming arguendo that no such pressure was exerted by her
mother and sister, the trial court declared that it understood EDENs moral predicament, viz for a child like EDEN, it was
difficult to charge her own father with rape; insist on his punishment; and hereby inflict emotional stress and financial
strain upon the members of her family, particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit E) of Fedelina Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving, and characterized the testimony
of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellants claim that EDEN filed the complaint because of a grudge against
him, the trial court found this incredible,if not totally absurd, for:

The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is likely to possess such vindictiveness and death of
conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging story. The complainant appeared, during her
entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on
March 16 was sufficiently explained to this Court the seriousness of the injury upon he person and dignity
inflicted upon by the accused. Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would indeed lodge a
complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation with him, it is highly unlikely that the
complainant would concoct a charge which would damage her and wreck havoc on her familys reputation,
destroy the household peace and subject her father, the accused, to a grave punishment which by dent of
express of law, can obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the defenses proposition
would be stretching the imagination too far, if not to the extreme.
The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation by virtue of his moral ascendancy
over her and his threat that he would kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the penalty of death when the victim
is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or common law spouse of the parent of the victim, rendered judgement against
appellant, to wit:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, EDUARDO
AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against complainant, Eden
Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court as a consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme
penalty law R.A. 7659. Further, Accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the
sum of P75,000.00 as damages, with all the necessary penalties provided for by law without subsidiary
imprisonment, however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and Domingo Floresta, filed
a Motion for New Trial on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed during
the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a) present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero, Quezon
City, who would have testified, on basis of his certification attached to the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30,
Makabayan St., in his barangay, but that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was the
address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruzs testimony; (c) present private complainants mother
and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the circumstances which brought about the execution of the affidavit of
desistance; and (d) cross examine complainant and the police investigator exhaustively. He further alleged that his
counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings, worse, even waived the presence of appellant
after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of
contempt to intimidate private complainant.
[21]

In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Trial, the public and private prosecutors alleged that there were
no such irregularities; neither was there new and material evidence to be presented that appellant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted at trial would
probably change the judgment of the court.
[22]

In its Order of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial being devoid of merit and for not being
within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.
[23]

In his Appellants Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: (a) denying his motion for
new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.

In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new trial, and adds two others
namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower court did
not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDENs testimony is not sufficient to convict, since its is unclear
and not free from serious contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her sisters or any one
of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet
and allowed him to abuse her; neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened her
sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room even after the
alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDENs testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of desistance must have
necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her subsequent turn-around that she was pressured and influenced to execute
and sign the affidavit of desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and, in effect, demolished whatsoever faith left
on her charge against the accused.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of merit. When appellant
appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for him if
he so desired, to which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of Rule 116
is merely directory and does not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial after arraignment, especially if the defense,
as here, consented thereto. It would have been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court
would have no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellants other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant never questioned the
way his defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latters request for a continuance because he had not yet
conferred with appellant was not evidence of counsels lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsels awareness of
his duty to confer with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for the
prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of appellants presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him,
because on that date, the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina to corroborate
the statements of EDEN which testimonies were in appellants favor. As to the manner appellants counsel de oficio crossexamined the prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record shows that said counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as barren of merit. EDENs positive identification of appellant
as the author of the crime rendered appellants defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly

what transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in view of EDENs candid and categorical manner of testifying
the OSG concluded that she was a credible witness.
[24]

As to the commission of rape in a small room and in presence of other persons, the OSG maintains that such was not
at all improbable. There was, as well, nothing unusual in EDENs silence; as she could only attempt to shout because
appellant had succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over
EDEN, his daughter. Hence the OSG invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.
[25]

[26]

[27]

As regards EDENs affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that court look with disfavor on retraction of testimonies
previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for monetary
consideration, as well as the probability that it may later be repudiated.
[28]

In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio his arraignment did not
relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel and that
it would be grievous error to deny an accused such right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:

This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People vs. Domenden, 73
Phil. 349, cited in RJ Franciscos Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p. 323 it was held, that:
The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to proceed by sentencing the
accused without due process of law and this is not complete, when the accused is denied the right
recognized by said rule. The records must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced his
right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice and remove all doubt that if the
accused had waived said right, he was fully informed before giving his plea of its consequences. Omission
by courts whether voluntary should not truly be censured but also condemned.
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends that said right:

[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is reversible error and a ground for new trial. (R.J.
Franciscos Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing people vs. Mijares,et al., 47 OG 4606;
Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 259). This must be so xxx to prevent that any accused be caught unaware
and deprived of the means of properly facing the charges presented against him.

The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only
state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose
that the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court
failed to inform appellant of such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficio were appointed is not disclosed in the
record either. At the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994, the two
formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT: Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and direct supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your
Honor, we are ready to present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio.[29]

This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial courts order of 22 December 1994
states that said de oficio counsel were duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused. Since appellant has
miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed
and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have
complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused
that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused
whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him
reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.
[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to
counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that
the accused was informed by the court of such right.
[34]

In U.S. v. Labial, this Court held:

[35]

Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in this case is whether
the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have
counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new
trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did
in fact fail to advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of Section 17 of General Orders No. 58,
as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought here upon appeal of an
entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed in matters of this
kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had
before him.
While in People v. Miranda this Court explicitly stated:
[36]

However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the time
appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section
3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States v. Labial (27 Phil., 87,88), in the sense that unless the
contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his right
to counsel. *** If we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an
offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must
be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them

correctly. (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil.
722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one
of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this
appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he
previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio,
coupled with said counsels extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to
question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform of his right to counsel.
[37]

[38]

The cases of People v. Domenden and People v. Cachero cited by appellant are inapplicable. In both casis the trial
courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during the
arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with their prearraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him
that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel will be
appointed for him, must appear on record.
[39]

[40]

Turning to the alleged violation of appellants right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial. -- After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare
for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof
constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the
instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
[41]

[42]

[43]

During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorneys Office in Quezon
City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty. Temanils
services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), formerly the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO). There is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and skill to defend
appellant. The latters contention that his counsel was not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he
asked for a continuation as he has not yet interviewed [his] client, is misleading. Atty. Temanil made that statement after
[44]

[45]

he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it was almost 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and both of them
were already hungry, thus:

ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of the trial the witness appears to be
fluent and suffers no difficulty in answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the
Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and we are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet interviewed my client, Your
Honor.[46]
Neither is there merit in appellants claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility of
the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense, and
EDENs mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellants alibi that he was in the province and not in their rented room
from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that rape was
committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did not
occupy a house numbered 30-A nor denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and his
children were not renting the entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered 30-A referred to
by EDEN.

As to the presentation of EDENs mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN
that they coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they
were in fact willing to refute EDENs claim.
Finally, contrary to appellants allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the stenographic notes
convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his crossexamination, it could have been due to the futility of any further cross-examination which might only prove favorable to the
prosecution, as it might have opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of
the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of
the trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the records some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is
founded on practical and empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. He had
before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk
boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds eye of the judge who tried the case. To
him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the
heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien. On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does not reveal the
thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or guilt.
[47]

[48]

[49]

At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death imposed, this Court took
painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father, herein appellant, on 19 July
1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity and
candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral shock
and anguish.She must have been torn between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might
mean the imposition of capital punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful and humiliating
secret, which others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She thereby jeopardized her chances
of marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant to marry her because her traumatic experience may be
psychological and emotional impediment to a blissful union. Moreover, such a revelation divided her family and brought it
shame and humiliation.

If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her private parts, she did
so inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the painful
experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged
her own father with a heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real. The presence of
her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no
conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere even in places
where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside within school premises, and inside a house where there
are other occupants. In People v. Opena, rape was committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant
case, EDENs other companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep.
[50]

[51]

That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant threatened to kill
her. Whether he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such
moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the victims
and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of
the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim
was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of
unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile
because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victims
submission to the sexual act voluntary.
[52]

In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the formers moral ascendancy
or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her tender
age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act
like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and
intelligence to disregard the threat. Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and
unpredictable reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may
openly welcome the intrusion.
[53]

[54]

[55]

Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the same rented room disprove the rape. While
she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have been irresistible and compelling that
her assailant was her own father, who was both a father and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who

provided her with the daily wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are
not few when daughters raped by their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the
evil deed even if the memory thereof haunted them forever.
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDENs affidavit of desistance must have necessarily contradicted her
previous testimony. We have earlier quoted if full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her
previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and
solemnly declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte,
are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; and affidavits or recantation have been invariably
regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings
at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
[56]

[57]

This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death under the first circumstance
mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as follows:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a sin or crime is Gods exclusive
prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital punishment
in cases of heinous crimes, hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta
est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
[58]

To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby
forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the
full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede to him is a
modification of the award of P75,000.00 as damages, which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current
case law.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and penalized under under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above
modification as to the amount of indemnity.
Two justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forwarded
without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.