MolotovRibbentrop Pact

The MolotovRibbentrop Pact, named after the Soviet

foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the German
foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, ocially the
Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,[lower-alpha 1] was a
non-aggression pact signed between Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union in Moscow on 23 August 1939. It is
also known as the RibbentropMolotov Pact or Nazi
Soviet Pact.

ries an approving foreword by Russian foreign Minister

Sergei Lavrov.[3] Vladimir Putin has defended the pact
as well.[4][5]

The pacts publicly stated intentions were a guarantee

of non-belligerence by each party towards the other and
a commitment that neither party would ally itself to or
aid an enemy of the other party. In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol that divided territories of Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland into German and Soviet
"spheres of inuence", anticipating potential territorial
and political rearrangements of these countries. Thereafter, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939.
After the SovietJapanese ceasere agreement took effect on 16 September, Stalin ordered his own invasion of
Poland on 17 September.[2] Part of southeastern (Karelia)
and Salla region in Finland were annexed by the Soviet
Union after the Winter War. This was followed by Soviet annexations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts
of Romania (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the
Hertza region). Concern about ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians had been proered as the reason for the Soviet
invasion of Poland.

The outcome of the First World War was disastrous for

both the German Reich and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. During the war, the Bolsheviks
struggled for survival, and Vladimir Lenin recognised the
independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Poland. Moreover, facing a German military advance,
Lenin and Trotsky were forced to enter into the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk,[6] which ceded massive western Russian
territories to the German Empire. After Germanys collapse, a multinational Allied-led army intervened in the
Russian Civil War (191722).[7]

Of the territories of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union

between 1939 and 1940, the region around Biaystok
and a minor part of Galicia east of the San river
around Przemyl were returned to the Polish state at
the end of World War II. Of all other territories annexed by the USSR in 193940, the ones detached from
Finland (Karelia, Petsamo), Estonia (Ingrian area and
Petseri County) and Latvia (Abrene) remained part of
the Russian Federation, the successor state of the Soviet Union, after 1991. Northern Bukovina, Southern
Bessarabia and Hertza remain part of Ukraine.

At the beginning of the 1930s, the Nazi Party's rise to

power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union along with other countries with ethnic Slavs,
who were considered "Untermenschen" (inferior) according to Nazi racial ideology.[11] Moreover, the anti-Semitic
Nazis associated ethnic Jews with both communism and
nancial capitalism, both of which they opposed.[12][13]
Consequently, Nazi theory held that Slavs in the Soviet Union were being ruled by "Jewish Bolshevik"
masters.[14] In 1934, Hitler himself had spoken of an
inescapable battle against both Pan-Slavism and NeoSlavism, the victory in which would lead to permanent
mastery of the world, though he stated that they would
walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will
help us.[15] The resulting manifestation of German antiBolshevism and an increase in Soviet foreign debts caused
GermanSoviet trade to dramatically decline.[lower-alpha 2]
Imports of Soviet goods to Germany fell to 223 million

1 Background

Main articles: SovietGerman relations before 1941 and

The pact remained in force until the German government MolotovRibbentrop Pact negotiations
broke it by invading the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.

On 16 April 1922, Germany and the Soviet Union entered

the Treaty of Rapallo, pursuant to which they renounced
territorial and nancial claims against each other.[8] The
parties further pledged neutrality in the event of an attack against one another with the 1926 Treaty of Berlin.[9]
While trade between the two countries fell sharply after
World War I, trade agreements signed in the mid-1920s
helped to increase trade to 433 million Reichsmarks per
year by 1927.[10]

The existence of the secret protocol was denied by Soviet leadership until 1989, when it was acknowledged
and denounced.[3] Some time afterwards the Russian historiography has been inclined to describe the pact as a
necessary measure. This includes books by Alexander
Dyukov, and one edited by N.A. Narochnitskaya that car-

2
Reichsmarks in 1934 as the more isolationist Stalinist
regime asserted power and the abandonment of post
World War I Treaty of Versailles military controls decreased Germanys reliance on Soviet imports.[10][17]

NEGOTIATIONS

tain Hitlers expansionism, the Soviet Union, Britain

and France traded a urry of suggestions and counterplans regarding a potential political and military
agreement.[38][39] Although informal consultations comin April, the main negotiations began only in
In 1936, Germany and Fascist Italy supported Spanish menced
[39]
May.
At the same time, throughout early 1939, GerNationalists in the Spanish Civil War, while the Somany
had
secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could
viets supported the partially socialist-led Second Spanoer
better
terms for a political agreement than Britain
ish Republic under the leadership of president Manuel
and France.[40][41][42]
[18]
Azaa.
Thus, in a sense, the Spanish Civil War became also the scene of a proxy war between Germany The Soviet Union feared Western powers and the possiand the USSR.[19] In 1936, Germany and Japan entered bility of capitalist encirclements, had little faith either
the Anti-Comintern Pact,[20] and were joined a year later that war could be avoided, or faith in the Polish army,
by Italy.[18][21]
and wanted nothing less than an ironclad military alliance
[43]
Hitlers erce anti-Soviet rhetoric was one of the rea- with France and Britain that would provide a guaran[44]
sons why the UK and France decided that Soviet par- teed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany;
to the collective security line was
ticipation in the 1938 Munich Conference regarding thus, Stalins adherence
[45]
purely
conditional.
Britain
and France believed that
[22]
Czechoslovakia would be both dangerous and useless.
war
could
still
be
avoided,
and
that the Soviet Union,
[23]
The Munich Agreement that followed
marked a par[46]
weakened
by
the
Great
Purge,
could not be a main
tial German annexation of Czechoslovakia in late 1938
[44]
military
participant,
a
point
that
many
military sources
[24]
followed by its complete dissolution in March 1939,
were
at
variance
with,
especially
after
the
sound thrashwhich as part of the appeasement of Germany conducted
ing
administered
to
the
Japanese
Kwantung
army on the
[25]
by Chamberlain's and Daladier's cabinets.
This pol[47]
Manchurian
frontier.
France
was
more
anxious
to nd
icy immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet
an
agreement
with
the
USSR
than
was
Britain;
as
a
conti[26]
Union could avoid being next on Hitlers list. The Sonental
power,
it
was
more
willing
to
make
concessions,
viet leadership believed that the West wanted to encourof an agreement between
age German aggression in the East[27] and that France more fearful of the dangers
[48]
the
USSR
and
Germany.
These
contrasting attitudes
and Britain might stay neutral in a war initiated by Gerpartly
explain
why
the
USSR
has
often
been charged with
many, hoping that the warring states would wear each
playing
a
double
game
in
1939:
carrying
on open negotiaother out and put an end to both the Soviet Union and
tions for an alliance with Britain and France while secretly
[28]
Nazi Germany.
considering propositions from Germany.[48]
For Germany, because an autarkic economic approach
[39]
or an alliance with Britain were impossible, closer re- By the end of May, drafts were formally presented.[49]
lations with the Soviet Union to obtain raw materi- In mid-June, the main Tripartite negotiations started.
als became necessary, if not just for economic reasons The discussion was focused on potential guarantees to
European countries should a German agalone.[29] Moreover, an expected British blockade in the central and east[50]
gression
arise.
The USSR proposed to consider that
event of war would create massive shortages for Gera
political
turn
towards
Germany by the Baltic states
[30]
many in a number of key raw materials. After the Muwould
constitute
an
indirect
aggression towards the
nich agreement, the resulting increase in German mili[51]
Soviet
Union.
Britain
opposed
such proposals, betary supply needs and Soviet demands for military macause
they
feared
the
Soviets
proposed
language could
chinery, talks between the two countries occurred from
justify
a
Soviet
intervention
in
Finland
and the Baltic
[31]
late 1938 to March 1939. The third Soviet Five Year
states,
or
push
those
countries
to
seek
closer
relations with
Plan required new infusions of technology and industrial
[52][53]
Germany.
The
discussion
about
a
denition
of in[29][32]
German war planners had estimated seequipment.
direct
aggression
became
one
of
the
sticking
points
berious shortfalls of raw materials if Germany entered a war
tween
the
parties,
and
by
mid-July,
the
tripartite
political
[33]
without Soviet supply.
negotiations eectively stalled, while the parties agreed
On 31 March 1939, in response to Nazi Germanys to start negotiations on a military agreement, which the
deance of the Munich Agreement and occupation of Soviets insisted must be entered into simultaneously with
Czechoslovakia,[34] the United Kingdom pledged the sup- any political agreement.[54]
port of itself and France to guarantee the independence
of Poland, Belgium, Romania, Greece, and Turkey.[35]
On 6 April Poland and the UK agreed to formalize the
guarantee as a military alliance, pending negotiations.[36]
On 28 April, Hitler denounced the 1934 GermanPolish 2 Negotiations
Non-Aggression Pact and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval
Agreement.[37]
Main article: MolotovRibbentrop Pact negotiations
Starting in mid-March 1939, in attempts to con-

2.1

Beginning of SovietGerman secret and Bessarabia in the Soviets sphere of inuence.[74]

That night, Stalin replied that the Soviets were willing to
talks

sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on 23

[75]
From AprilJuly, Soviet and German ocials made August.
statements regarding the potential for the beginning of Main article: GermanSoviet Credit Agreement (1939)
political negotiations, while no actual negotiations took
place during that time period.[55] The ensuing discussion of a potential political deal between Germany and
the Soviet Union had to be channeled into the framework of economic negotiations between the two coun- 3 The secret protocol
tries, because close military and diplomatic connections,
'Following completion of the Soviet
as was the case before the mid-1930s, had afterward
[56]
German
trade and credit agreement, there has
been largely severed. In May, Stalin replaced his Forarisen
the
question of improving political links
eign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who was regarded as
between
Germany
and the USSR.
pro-western and who was also Jewish, with Vyacheslav
Molotov, allowing the Soviet Union more latitude in discussions with more parties, not only with Britain and
Excerpt from the article On SovietGerman Relations on
France.[57]
Soviet newspaper Izvestia, August 21, 1939.[76]
In late July and early August 1939, Soviet and German ocials agreed on most of the details for a planned
economic agreement,[58] and specically addressed a
potential political agreement,[59][60][61][lower-alpha 3] which
the Soviets stated could only come after an economic
agreement.[63]
Main article: NaziSoviet economic relations (193441)

2.2

August negotiations

In early August, Germany and the Soviet Union worked

out the last details of their economic deal,[64] and started
to discuss a political alliance. They explained to each
other the reasons for their foreign policy hostility in the
1930s, nding common ground in the anti-capitalism of
both countries.[65][66][67]
At the same time, British, French, and Soviet negotiators scheduled three-party talks on military matters to occur in Moscow in August 1939, aiming to dene what
the agreement would specify should be the reaction of
the three powers to a German attack.[52] The tripartite
military talks, started in mid-August, hit a sticking point
regarding the passage of Soviet troops through Poland
if Germans attacked, and the parties waited as British
and French ocials overseas pressured Polish ocials to
agree to such terms.[68][69] Polish ocials refused to allow
Soviet troops into Polish territory if Germany attacked;
as Polish foreign minister Jzef Beck pointed out, they
feared that once the Red Army entered their territories,
it might never leave.[70][71]

The Prussian Tribute in Moscow", satirical newspaper Mucha,

September 8, 1939, Warsaw

On 22 August, one day after the talks broke down with

France and Britain, Moscow revealed that Ribbentrop
would visit Stalin the next day. This happened while the
Soviets were still negotiating with the British and French
missions in Moscow. With the Western nations unwilling to accede to Soviet demands, Stalin instead entered a
secret NaziSoviet pact.[77] On 24 August a 10-year nonaggression pact was signed with provisions that included:
consultation, arbitration if either party disagreed, neutrality if either went to war against a third power, no membership of a group which is directly or indirectly aimed
at the other.

On August 19, the 1939 GermanSoviet Commercial

Agreement was nally signed.[72] On 21 August, the
Soviets suspended Tripartite military talks, citing other
reasons.[40][73] That same day, Stalin received assurance
that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would place half of Poland Most notably, there was also a secret protocol to the
(border along the Vistula river), Latvia, Estonia, Finland, pact, revealed only after Germanys defeat in 1945,[78]

3 THE SECRET PROTOCOL

of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact

Ribbentrop and Stalin at the signing of the Pact

ence".[78] In the north, Finland, Estonia and Latvia were

assigned to the Soviet sphere.[78] Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its political rearrangementthe
areas east of the Pisa, Narev, Vistula and San rivers going to the Soviet Union while Germany would occupy
the west.[78] Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, would
be in the German sphere of inuence, although a second
secret protocol agreed to in September 1939 reassigned
the majority of Lithuania to the USSR.[80] According to
the secret protocol, Lithuania would be granted the city
of Vilnius its historical capital, which was under Polish control during the inter-war period. Another clause
of the treaty was that Germany would not interfere with
the Soviet Unions actions towards Bessarabia, then part
of Romania; as the result, Bessarabia was joined to the
Moldovan ASSR, and become the Moldovan SSR under
control of Moscow.[78]

Last page of the Additional Secret Protocol

although hints about its provisions were leaked much earlier, e.g., to inuence Lithuania.[79] According to it Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland
were divided into German and Soviet "spheres of inu-

At the signing, Ribbentrop and Stalin enjoyed warm conversations, exchanged toasts and further addressed the
prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s.[81]
They characterized Britain as always attempting to disrupt SovietGerman relations, stated that the AntiComintern pact was not aimed at the Soviet Union, but
actually aimed at Western democracies and frightened
principally the City of London [i.e., the British nanciers]
and the English shopkeepers.[82]
On 24 August, Pravda and Izvestia carried news of the
non-secret portions of the Pact, complete with the now infamous front-page picture of Molotov signing the treaty,
with a smiling Stalin looking on.[40] The news was met

5
Planned division of Central Europe
Actual territorial changes
with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and
according to MolotovRibbentrop Pact
19391940
media worldwide, most of whom were aware only of
the BritishFrenchSoviet negotiations that had taken
place for months.[40] The MolotovRibbentrop Pact was
received with shock by Nazi Germanys allies, notably
Finland
Finland
1939
Japan, by the Comintern and foreign communist parties,
Russian
Russian
SFSR
SFSR
and by Jewish communities all around the world.[83] So,
that day, German diplomat Hans von Herwarth, whose
Poland
grandmother was Jewish, informed Guido Relli, an Ital1940
Ukrainian
ian diplomat,[84] and American charg d'aaires Charles
SSR
gary
n
u
H
Bohlen on the secret protocol regarding vital interests in
Romania
Yug
Yug
Romania
osla
osla
via
via
the countries allotted spheres of inuence, without revealing the annexation rights for territorial and political
rearrangement.[85][86]
Planned and actual territorial changes in Central Europe 1939
Time Magazine repeatedly referred to the Pact as the 1940
Communazi Pact and its participants as communazis
until April 1941.[87][88][89][90][91][92][93]
4 Consequences
in
Finland,
Salla

ed
e

Sw

Sw

Other countries and territories

ish

ed
en

Germany

EP

n
Fin
lore SSR
Ka

Soviet Union

East Prussia

Karelia

Soviet sphere of inuence

Estonia
La

tvia

German sphere of inuence

Vilnius
Region

Lithuania

EP

Czecho

slovakia

Byelorussian
SSR

Free City
of Danzig

Ukrainian
SSR

ary

Planned Borders
Soviet republic
borders as of 1939

Annexed
by the Soviet Union

Annexed by Germany

Lithuanian
SSR

Suwalki
Triangle

General
Government
Protectorate
of Bohemia
and Moravia

EP

Byelorussian
SSR

Slovakia

Occupied by Germany

ng

Hu

National borders as of 1939

Estonian
SSR

Latvian
SSR

National borders as of 1940

National borders as of 1938

Bessarabia

Soviet propaganda and representatives went to great

lengths to minimize the importance of the fact that they
had opposed and fought against the Nazis in various ways
for a decade prior to signing the Pact. Upon signing the
pact, Molotov tried to reassure the Germans of his good
intentions by commenting to journalists that fascism is a
matter of taste.[94] For its part, Nazi Germany also did a
public volte-face regarding its virulent opposition to the
Soviet Union, though Hitler still viewed an attack on the
Soviet Union as inevitable.

Soviet republic borders as of 1940

Moldavian
SSR

Poland, the Baltic States and

Bessarabia
Poland never will rise again in the form of
the Versailles treaty. That is guaranteed not
only by Germany, but also ... Russia.
Adolf Hitler in a public speech in Danzig at the end of
September 1939[98]

Concerns over the possible existence of a secret protocol were rst expressed by the intelligence organizations
of the Baltic states scant days after the pact was signed.
Speculation grew stronger when Soviet negotiators referred to its content during negotiations for military bases
in those countries (see occupation of the Baltic States).
The day after the Pact was signed, the French and
British military negotiation delegation urgently requested
a meeting with Soviet military negotiator Kliment
Voroshilov.[95] On August 25, Voroshilov told them "[i]n
view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose
can be served in continuing the conversation.[95] That
day, Hitler told the British ambassador to Berlin that the
pact with the Soviets prevented Germany from facing a
two front war, changing the strategic situation from that in
World War I, and that Britain should accept his demands
Rendezvous. David Lows cartoon, published in the Evening
regarding Poland.[96]
Standard on 20 September 1939, shows Hitler greeting Stalin, fol-

On 25 August, surprising Hitler, Britain entered into a lowing their joint invasion of Poland, with the words, The scum
defense pact with Poland.[96] Consequently, Hitler post- of the earth, I believe?". To which Stalin replies, The bloody
poned his planned 26 August invasion of Poland to 1 assassin of the workers, I presume?"
September.[96][97] Britain and France responded by guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland, so they declared war
on Germany on 3 September.

4.1 Initial invasions

Main articles: Invasion of Poland (1939) and Soviet

invasion of Poland
See also: GermanSoviet military parade in BrestLitovsk

4 CONSEQUENCES IN FINLAND, POLAND, THE BALTIC STATES AND BESSARABIA

On 1 September, Germany invaded Poland from the

west.[99] Within the rst few days of the invasion, Germany began conducting massacres of Polish and Jewish
civilians and POWs.[100][101] These executions took place
in over 30 towns and villages in the rst month of German
occupation.[102][103][104] The Luftwae also took part by
strang eeing civilian refugees on roads and carrying out
a bombing campaign.[105][106][107][108] The Soviet Union
assisted German air forces by allowing them to use signals
broadcast by the Soviet radio station at Minsk allegedly
for urgent aeronautical experiments.[109]
Stalin did not instantly interpret the protocol as permitting the Soviet Union to grab territory. Stalin was waiting to see whether the Germans would halt within the
agreed area, and also the Soviet Union needed to secure
the frontier in the Far East.[110] On 17 September the
Red Army invaded Poland, violating the 1932 Soviet
Polish Non-Aggression Pact, and occupied the Polish territory assigned to it by the MolotovRibbentrop Pact.
This was followed by co-ordination with German forces
in Poland.[111]

and after a heavy but short struggle Polish forces withdrew to Lithuania where they were interned. Some of the
Polish forces which were ghting the Soviets in the far
South of the nation withdrew to Romania.
On 21 September, the Soviets and Germans signed a
formal agreement coordinating military movements in
Poland, including the purging of saboteurs.[113] A joint
GermanSoviet parade was held in Lvov and BrestLitovsk, while the countries commanders met in the latter location.[114] Stalin had decided in August that he
was going to liquidate the Polish state, and a German
Soviet meeting in September addressed the future structure of the Polish region.[114] Soviet authorities immediately started a campaign of Sovietization[115][116] of
the newly acquired areas. The Soviets organized staged
elections,[117] the result of which was to become a legitimization of Soviet annexation of eastern Poland.[118]
Soviet authorities attempted to erase Polish history and
culture,[119] withdrew the Polish currency without exchanging roubles,[120] collectivized agriculture,[121] and
nationalized and redistributed private and state-owned
Polish property.[122] Soviet authorities regarded service for the pre-war Polish state as a crime against
revolution[123] and counter-revolutionary activity,[124]
and subsequently arrested large numbers of Polish citizens.

4.2 Modifying the secret protocols

Common parade of Wehrmacht and Red Army in Brest at the end

of the Invasion of Poland. At the center Major General Heinz
Guderian and Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein

Polish troops already ghting much stronger German

forces on its western side desperately tried to delay the
capture of Warsaw. Consequently, Polish forces were
not able to mount signicant resistance against the Soviets. The Soviet Union marshaled 466,516 soldiers,
3,739 tanks, 380 armored cars, and approximately 1,200
ghters, 600 bombers, and 200 other aircraft against
Poland.[112] The Polish armed forces in the East consisted
mostly of lightly armed border guard units of the Border
Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP). In
the Northeast of Poland, only a few cities were defended

Soviet and German soldiers in Lublin

Eleven days after the Soviet invasion of the Polish Kresy,

the secret protocol of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact was
modied by the GermanSoviet Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Demarcation,[125] ) allotting Germany a
larger part of Poland and transferring Lithuania's territory
(with the exception of left bank of river Scheschupe, the
Lithuanian Strip) from the envisioned German sphere
to the Soviets.[126] On 28 September 1939, the Soviet
Union and German Reich issued a joint declaration in
which they declared:
After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR have, by

4.3

The Soviet war with Finland and Katyn Massacre

7
The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were
given no choice but to sign a so-called Pact of defence
and mutual assistance which permitted the Soviet Union
to station troops in them.[126]

4.3 The Soviet war with Finland and

Katyn Massacre
Main articles: Winter War and Katyn massacre
After the Baltic states were forced to accept treaties,[129]
Latvia
Teliai

Klaipda

Daugavpils

iauliai
Panevys

Lithuania

Utena

ilut

Raseiniai
Taurag

Ukmerg
Gainai

Kudirkos Naumiestis

Germany

Kaunas

Vilkavikis

Prienai
Marijampol
Alytus

Suwaki

Lazdijai

Sejny
Augustw
Sztabin

"Second RibbentropMolotov Pact" of 28 September 1939. Map

of Poland signed by Stalin and Ribbentrop adjusting the German
Soviet border in the aftermath of German and Soviet invasion of
Poland.

means of the treaty signed today, denitively settled the problems arising from the collapse of
the Polish state and have thereby created a sure
foundation for a lasting peace in the region, they
mutually express their conviction that it would
serve the true interest of all peoples to put an
end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England
and France on the other. Both Governments will
therefore direct their common eorts, jointly
with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.
Should, however, the eorts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are
responsible for the continuation of the war,
whereupon, in case of the continuation of the
war, the Governments of Germany and of the
USSR shall engage in mutual consultations with
regard to necessary measures.[127]

Vilnius
Naujoji Vilnia
Oszmiana
alininkai
Varna

Druskininkai

Lida
Grodno

venionliai

irvintos

Moodeczno

Poland
Nowogrdek

Lithuania between 1939 and 1941. Nazi Germany had requested the territory west of the eup River (area in pink) in
the GermanSoviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty but relinquished its claims for a compensation in the amount of $7.5 million

Stalin turned his sights on Finland, condent that Finnish

capitulation could be attained without great eort.[130]
The Soviets demanded territories on the Karelian Isthmus, the islands of the Gulf of Finland and a military base near the Finnish capital Helsinki,[131][132] which
Finland rejected.[133] The Soviets staged the shelling of
Mainila and used it as a pretext to withdraw from the nonaggression pact.[134] The Red Army attacked in November 1939.[135] Simultaneously, Stalin set up a puppet government in the Finnish Democratic Republic.[136] The
leader of the Leningrad Military District Andrei Zhdanov commissioned a celebratory piece from Dmitri
Shostakovich, entitled "Suite on Finnish Themes" to be
performed as the marching bands of the Red Army would
be parading through Helsinki.[137] After Finnish defenses
surprisingly held out for over three months while inicting sti losses on Soviet forces, the Soviets settled for
an interim peace. Finland ceded southeastern areas of
Karelia (10% of Finnish territory),[135] which resulted in
approximately 422,000 Karelians (12% of Finlands population) losing their homes.[138] Soviet ocial casualty
counts in the war exceeded 200,000,[139] although Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev later claimed the casualties
may have been one million.[140]

On 3 October, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, German ambassador in Moscow, informed Joachim
Ribbentrop that the Soviet government was willing to
cede the city of Vilnius and its environs. On 8 October
1939, a new NaziSoviet agreement was reached by an
exchange of letters between Vyacheslav Molotov and the At around this time, after several GestapoNKVD
German Ambassador.[128]
Conferences, Soviet NKVD ocers also conducted

4 CONSEQUENCES IN FINLAND, POLAND, THE BALTIC STATES AND BESSARABIA

lengthy interrogations of 300,000 Polish POWs in

camps[141][142][143][144] that were, in eect, a selection
process to determine who would be killed.[145] On March
5, 1940, in what would later be known as the Katyn massacre,[145][146][147] orders were signed to execute 25,700
Polish POWs, labeled nationalists and counterrevolutionaries, kept at camps and prisons in occupied western
Ukraine and Belarus.[148]

4.4

an ultimatum demanding Bessarabia and, unexpectedly,

Northern Bukovina from Romania.[151] Two days later,
the Romanians caved to the Soviet demands and the Soviets occupied the territory. The Hertza region was initially not requested by the USSR but was later occupied
by force after the Romanians agreed to the initial Soviet
demands.[151] The subsequent waves of deportations began in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

The Soviet Union occupies the Baltic 4.5 Holocaust beginnings, Operation TanRepublics and part of Romania
nenberg and other Nazi atrocities

Main articles: Soviet occupation of the Baltic states Main articles: Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland,
(1940) and Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and North- Operation Tannenberg and Nazi crimes against ethnic
ern Bukovina
Poles
In mid-June 1940, when international attention was foAt the end of October 1939, Germany enacted the death
penalty for disobedience to the German occupation.[152]
Germany began a campaign of "Germanization", which
meant to assimilate the occupied territories politically,
culturally, socially, and economically into the German
Reich.[153][154][155] 50,000200,000 Polish children were
kidnapped to be Germanized.[156][157]

Polish hostages being blindfolded during preparations for their

mass execution in Palmiry, 1940

Commemoration of NaziSoviet Pact, Alytus, 23 Aug 2013

cused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVD

troops raided border posts in Lithuania, Estonia and
Latvia.[126][149] State administrations were liquidated and
replaced by Soviet cadres,[126] in which 34,250 Latvians,
75,000 Lithuanians and almost 60,000 Estonians were
deported or killed.[150] Elections were held with single
pro-Soviet candidates listed for many positions, with resulting peoples assemblies immediately requesting admission into the USSR, which was granted by the Soviet
Union.[126] The USSR annexed the whole of Lithuania,
including the Scheschupe area, which was to be given to
Germany.

Elimination of Polish elites and intelligentia was part of

Generalplan Ost. The Intelligenzaktion, a plan to eliminate the Polish intelligentsia, Polands 'leadership class,
took place soon after the German invasion of Poland, lasting from fall of 1939 till spring of 1940. As the result of
this operation in 10 regional actions about 60,000 Polish
nobles, teachers, social workers, priests, judges and political activists were killed.[158][159] It was continued in May
1940 when Germany launched AB-Aktion,[156] More
than 16,000 members of the intelligentsia were murdered
in Operation Tannenberg alone.[160]

Germany also planned to incorporate all land into the

Third Reich.[154] This eort resulted in the forced resettlement of 2 million Poles. Families were forced to
travel in the severe winter of 193940, leaving behind
Finally, on 26 June, four days after France sued for an almost all of their possessions without recompense.[154]
armistice with the Third Reich, the Soviet Union issued As part of Operation Tannenberg alone, 750,000 Polish

4.7

Further secret protocol modications, settling borders and immigration issues

peasants were forced to leave and their property was given

to Germans.[161] A further 330,000 were murdered.[162]
Germany eventually planned to move ethnic Poles to
Siberia.[163][164]

ber, Romania ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria (Axissponsored Treaty of Craiova).[175] After various events in
Romania, over the next few months, it increasingly took
on the aspect of a German-occupied country.[175]

Although Germany used forced labourers in most occupied countries, Poles and other Slavs were viewed
as inferior by Nazi propaganda, thus, better suited
for such duties.[156] Between 1 and 2.5 million Polish citizens[156][165] were transported to the Reich for
forced labour, against their will.[166][167] All Polish males
were required to perform forced labour.[156] While ethnic Poles were subject to selective persecution, all ethnic Jews were targeted by the Reich.[165] In the winter
of 193940, about 100,000 Jews were thus deported to
Poland.[168] They were initially gathered into massive urban ghettos,[169] such as 380,000 held in the Warsaw
Ghetto, where large numbers died under the harsh conditions therein, including 43,000 in the Warsaw Ghetto
alone.[165][170][171] Poles and ethnic Jews were imprisoned
in nearly every camp of the extensive concentration camp
system in German-occupied Poland and the Reich. In
Auschwitz, which began operating on 14 June 1940, 1.1
million people died.[172][173]

The Soviet-occupied territories were converted into

republics of the Soviet Union. During the two years
following the annexation, the Soviets arrested approximately 100,000 Polish citizens[176] and deported between
350,000 and 1,500,000, of whom between 250,000 and
1,000,000 died, mostly civilians.[177][lower-alpha 4] Forced
re-settlements into Gulag labour camps and exile settlements in remote areas of the Soviet Union occurred.[116]
According to Norman Davies,[183] almost half of them
were dead by July 1940.[184]

4.6

4.7 Further secret protocol modications,

settling borders and immigration issues

Romania and Soviet republics

SLOVACIA
Hotin

U.R.S.S.

Cernui

UNGARIA
Suceava
Oradea

Iai

Cluj-Napoca

Chiinu
Tiraspol

Odesa

Bacu
Alba Iulia

Cetatea Alb

Sibiu
Timioara

ROMNIA
Belgrad

Chilia Nou

Braov
Brila

Trgovite
DrobetaTurnu Severin

IUGOSLAVIA

Craiova
Vidin

Marea Neagr
Bucureti
Giurgiu

Silistra

Constana

BULGARIA

Romanias territorial losses in the summer of 1940

Further information: Second Vienna Award, Population

transfer in the Soviet Union and Involuntary settlements
in the Soviet Union
In the summer of 1940, fear of the Soviet Union, in
conjunction with German support for the territorial demands of Romanias neighbors and the Romanian governments own miscalculations, resulted in more territorial losses for Romania. Between 28 June and 4 July, the
Soviet Union occupied and annexed Bessarabia, Northern
Bukovina and the Hertza region of Romania.[174]

German and Soviet soldiers meeting in Brest

Main article: GermanSoviet Border and Commercial

Agreement

On 10 January 1941, Germany and the Soviet Union

signed an agreement settling several ongoing issues.[185]
On 30 August, Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign Minister Secret protocols in the new agreement modied the SeGaleazzo Ciano issued the Second Vienna Award giv- cret Additional Protocols of the GermanSoviet Bounding Northern Transylvania to Hungary. On 7 Septem- ary and Friendship Treaty, ceding the Lithuanian Strip to

10

5 SOVIETGERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE PACTS OPERATION

the Soviet Union in exchange for 7.5 million dollars (31.5

million Reichsmark).[185] The agreement formally set the
border between Germany and the Soviet Union between
the Igorka river and the Baltic Sea.[186] It also extended
trade regulation of the 1940 GermanSoviet Commercial Agreement until August 1, 1942, increased deliveries
above the levels of year one of that agreement,[186] settled
trading rights in the Baltics and Bessarabia, calculated the
compensation for German property interests in the Baltic
States now occupied by the Soviets and other issues.[185]
It also covered the migration to Germany within two and
a half months of ethnic Germans and German citizens in
Soviet-held Baltic territories, and the migration to the Soviet Union of Baltic and White Russian nationals in
German-held territories.[186]

SovietGerman relations during

the Pacts operation

the army.
The Communist Party of Germany featured similar attitudes. In Die Welt, a communist newspaper published
in Stockholm[lower-alpha 5] the exiled communist leader
Walter Ulbricht opposed the allies (Britain representing
the most reactionary force in the world[192] ) and argued: The German government declared itself ready
for friendly relations with the Soviet Union, whereas the
EnglishFrench war bloc desires a war against the socialist Soviet Union. The Soviet people and the working people of Germany have an interest in preventing the English
war plan.[193]
Despite a warning by the Comintern, German tensions
were raised when the Soviets stated in September that
they must enter Poland to protect their ethnic Ukrainian
and Belorussian brethren therein from Germany; Molotov
later admitted to German ocials that this excuse was
necessary because the Kremlin could nd no other pretext for the Soviet invasion.[194]

While active collaboration between Nazi Germany and

Soviet Union caused great shock in western Europe and
amongst communists opposed to Germany, on 1 OctoBefore the pacts announcement, Communists in the West ber 1939, Winston Churchill declared that the Russian
denied that such a treaty would be signed. Future mem- armies acted for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
ber of the Hollywood Ten Herbert Biberman denounced menace.[195]
rumors as Fascist propaganda. Earl Browder, head of
When a joint GermanSoviet peace initiative was rethe Communist Party USA, stated that there is as much
jected by Britain and France on 28 September 1939,
chance of agreement as of Earl Browder being elected
Soviet foreign policy became critical of the Allies and
[187]
president of the Chamber of Commerce.
Beginmore pro-German in turn. During the fth session of
ning in September 1939, the Soviet Comintern suspended
the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939 Molotov analall anti-Nazi and anti-fascist propaganda, explaining that
ysed the international situation thus giving the direction
the war in Europe was a matter of capitalist states atfor Communist propaganda. According to Molotov Ger[188]
tacking each other for imperialist purposes.
Western
many had a legitimate interest in regaining its position as
Communists acted accordingly; while before they supa great power and the Allies had started an aggressive war
ported protecting collective security, now they denounced
in order to maintain the Versailles system.[196]
[187]
Britain and France going to war.
Molotov declared in his report entitled On the ForWhen anti-German demonstrations erupted in Prague,
eign Policy of the Soviet Union (31 October 1939) held
Czechoslovakia, the Comintern ordered the Czech Comon the fth (extraordinary) session of the Supreme Somunist Party to employ all of its strength to paraviet, that the Western ruling circles disguise their in[188]
lyze chauvinist elements.
Moscow soon forced the
tentions with the pretext of defending democracy against
Communist Parties of France and Great Britain to adopt
Hitlerism, declaring their aim in war with Germany is
an anti-war position. On 7 September, Stalin called
nothing more, nothing less than extermination of HitGeorgi Dimitrov, and the latter sketched a new Comlerism. [...] There is absolutely no justication for this
intern line on the war. The new linewhich stated that
kind of war. The ideology of Hitlerism, just like any other
the war was unjust and imperialistwas approved by the
ideological system, can be accepted or rejected, this is a
secretariat of the Communist International on 9 Septemmatter of political views. But everyone grasps, that an
ber. Thus, the various western Communist parties now
ideology can not be exterminated by force, must not be
[189]
had to oppose the war, and to vote against war credits.
nished o with a war.[197]
Although the French Communists had unanimously voted
in Parliament for war credits on 2 September and on 19
September declared their unshakeable will to defend
the country, on 27 September the Comintern formally in- 5.2 Expansion of raw materials and military trading
structed the party to condemn the war as imperialist. By
1 October the French Communists advocated listening to
German peace proposals, and Communist leader Maurice Main articles: GermanSoviet Commercial Agreement
Thorez deserted from the French Army on 4 October and (1939) and GermanSoviet Commercial Agreement
ed to Russia.[190] Other Communists also deserted from (1940)

5.1

Early political issues

5.4

GermanSoviet Axis talks

11
again as the countries had redrawn the Hungarian and Romanian borders, settled some Bulgarian claims and Stalin
was again convinced that Germany would face a long war
in the west with Britains improvement in its air battle
with Germany and the execution of an agreement between the United States and Britain regarding destroyers and bases.[204] However, in late August, Germany
arranged its own occupation of Romania, targeting oil
elds.[205] The move raised tensions with the Soviets, who
responded that Germany was supposed to have consulted
with the Soviet Union under Article III of the Molotov
Ribbentrop Pact.[205]

Germany and the Soviet Union entered an intricate trade

pact on February 11, 1940, that was over four times
larger than the one the two countries had signed in August
1939.[198] The trade pact helped Germany to surmount a
British blockade of Germany.[198] In the rst year, Germany received one million tons of cereals, half a million
tons of wheat, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton,
500,000 tons of phosphates and considerable amounts of
other vital raw materials, along with the transit of one million tons of soybeans from Manchuria. These and other
supplies were being transported through Soviet and occupied Polish territories.[198] The Soviets were to receive a
naval cruiser, the plans to the battleship Bismarck, heavy 5.4
naval guns, other naval gear and thirty of Germanys latest warplanes, including the Me-109 and Me-110 ghters and Ju-88 bomber.[198] The Soviets would also receive
oil and electric equipment, locomotives, turbines, generators, diesel engines, ships, machine tools and samples
of German artillery, tanks, explosives, chemical-warfare
equipment and other items.[198]

GermanSoviet Axis talks

The Soviets also helped Germany to avoid British naval

blockades by providing a submarine base, Basis Nord,
in the northern Soviet Union near Murmansk.[188] This
also provided a refueling and maintenance location, and
a takeo point for raids and attacks on shipping.[188] In
addition, the Soviets provided Germany with access to
the Northern Sea Route for both cargo ships and raiders
(though only the commerce raider Komet used the route Ribbentrop taking leave of Molotov in Berlin, November 1940
before the German invasion), which forced Britain to protect sea lanes in both the Atlantic and the Pacic.[199]
Main article: GermanSoviet Axis talks

5.3

Summer deterioration of relations

After Germany entered a Tripartite Pact with Japan and

Italy, Ribbentrop wrote to Stalin, inviting Molotov to
Berlin for negotiations aimed to create a 'continental bloc'
of Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR that would oppose Britain and the USA.[206] Stalin sent Molotov to
Berlin to negotiate the terms for the Soviet Union to
join the Axis and potentially enjoy the spoils of the
pact.[207][208] After negotiations during November 1940
on where to extend the USSRs sphere of inuence, Hitler
broke o talks and continued planning for the eventual attempts to invade the Soviet Union.[206][209]

The Finnish and Baltic invasions began a deterioration of

relations between the Soviets and Germany.[200] Stalins
invasions were a severe irritant to Berlin, as the intent to
accomplish these was not communicated to the Germans
beforehand, and prompted concern that Stalin was seeking to form an anti-German bloc.[201] Molotovs reassurances to the Germans, and the Germans mistrust, intensied. On June 16, as the Soviets invaded Lithuania, but
before they had invaded Latvia and Estonia, Ribbentrop
instructed his sta to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek
5.5 Late relations
support from the Reich can be observed or whether an
attempt was made to form a bloc.[202]
In an eort to demonstrate peaceful intentions toward
In August 1940, the Soviet Union briey suspended its Germany, on 13 April 1941, the Soviets signed a neudeliveries under their commercial agreement after their trality pact with Axis power Japan.[210] While Stalin had
relations were strained following disagreement over pol- little faith in Japans commitment to neutrality, he felt
icy in Romania, the Soviet war with Finland, Germany that the pact was important for its political symbolism, to
falling behind in its deliveries of goods under the pact reinforce a public aection for Germany.[211] Stalin felt
and with Stalin worried that Hitlers war with the West that there was a growing split in German circles about
might end quickly after France signed an armistice.[203] whether Germany should initiate a war with the Soviet
The suspension created signicant resource problems for Union.[211] Stalin did not know that Hitler had been seGermany.[203] By the end of August, relations improved cretly discussing an invasion of the Soviet Union since

12

7 AFTERMATH

Situation in Europe by May/June 1941, immediately before Operation Barbarossa

summer 1940,[212] and that Hitler had ordered his military in late 1940 to prepare for war in the east regardless
of the parties talks of a potential Soviet entry as a fourth
Axis Power.[213]
Soviet expansion, change of Central European borders and creation of the Eastern bloc after World War II

7 Aftermath
6

Hitler breaks the Pact

Main article: Operation Barbarossa

Nazi Germany terminated the MolotovRibbentrop Pact
with its invasion of the Soviet Union at 03:15 on 22 June
1941.[99] Stalin had ignored several warnings that Germany was likely to attack,[214][215][216] and ordered no
full-scale mobilization of forces.[217] After the launch of
the invasion, the territories gained by the Soviet Union
due to the MolotovRibbentrop Pact were lost in a matter of weeks. Within six months, the Soviet military
had suered 4.3 million casualties[218] and Germany had
captured three million Soviet prisoners.[219] The imports
of Soviet raw materials into Germany over the duration
of the countries economic relationship proved vital to
Operation Barbarossa. Without Soviet imports, German
stocks would have run out in several key products by October 1941, and Germany would have already run through
its stocks of rubber and grain before the rst day of the
invasion.[220]

7.1 Discovery of the Secret Protocol

The German original of the secret protocols was presumably destroyed in the bombing of Germany,[221] but
in late 1943, Ribbentrop had ordered that the most secret records of the German Foreign Oce from 1933 on,
amounting to some 9,800 pages, be microlmed. When
the various departments of the Foreign Oce in Berlin
were evacuated to Thuringia at the end of the war, Karl
von Loesch, a civil servant who had worked for the chief
interpreter Paul Otto Schmidt, was entrusted with these
microlm copies. He eventually received orders to destroy the secret documents but decided to bury the metal
container with the microlms as a personal insurance for
his future well-being. In May 1945, von Loesch approached the British Lt. Col. Robert C. Thomson with
the request to transmit a personal letter to Duncan Sandys,
Churchills son-in-law. In the letter, von Loesch revealed
that he had knowledge of the documents whereabouts but
expected preferential treatment in return. Colonel Thomson and his American counterpart Ralph Collins agreed
to transfer von Loesch to Marburg in the American zone
if he would produce the microlms. The microlms con-

13
tained a copy of the Non-Aggression Treaty as well as the a highly important phase in their policy aimed at goading
Secret Protocol.[222] Both documents were discovered as the Hitlerite aggressors against the Soviet Union.[229][230]
part of the microlmed records in August 1945 by the
State Department employee Wendell B. Blancke, head
of a special unit called Exploitation German Archives 8 Denial of the pact
(EGA).[223]
The treaty was published in the United States for the rst
time by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on May 22, 1946,
in Britain by the Manchester Guardian. It was also part
of an ocial State Department publication, NaziSoviet
Relations 19391941, edited by Raymond J. Sontag and
James S. Beddie in January 1948. The decision to publish the key documents on GermanSoviet relations, including the treaty and protocol, had been taken already
in spring 1947. Sontag and Beddie prepared the collection throughout the summer of 1947. In November
1947, President Truman personally approved the publication but it was held back in view of the Foreign Ministers
Conference in London scheduled for December. Since
negotiations at that conference did not prove constructive
from an American point of view, the document edition
was sent to press. The documents made headlines worldwide. State Department ocials counted it as a success:
The Soviet Government was caught at-footed in what
was the rst eective blow from our side in a clear-cut
propaganda war.[224]
Despite publication of the recovered copy in western media, for decades, it was the ocial policy of the Soviet
Union to deny the existence of the secret protocol.[225]
The secret protocols existence was ocially denied until
1989. Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the signatories, went
to his grave categorically rejecting its existence.[226] The
French Communist Party did not acknowledge the existence of the secret protocol until 1968, as the party deStalinized.[190]

For decades, it was the ocial policy of the Soviet Union

to deny the existence of the secret protocol to the Soviet
German Pact. At the behest of Mikhail Gorbachev,
Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev headed a commission
investigating the existence of such a protocol. In December 1989, the commission concluded that the protocol had existed and revealed its ndings to the Congress
of Peoples Deputies of the Soviet Union.[221] As a result, the Congress passed the declaration conrming the
existence of the secret protocols, condemning and denouncing them.[231][232] Both successor-states of the pact
parties have declared the secret protocols to be invalid
from the moment they were signed. The Federal Republic of Germany declared this on September 1, 1989 and
the Soviet Union on December 24, 1989,[233] following
an examination of the microlmed copy of the German
originals.[234]
The Soviet copy of the original document was declassied in 1992 and published in a scientic journal in early
1993.[234]
In August 2009, in an article written for the Polish
newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin condemned the MolotovRibbentrop
Pact as immoral.[235] In 2014 however, he defended the
whole non-aggression treaty and raised doubts about the
secret protocols, saying that people still argue about the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.[236]

In spite of such statements the present Russian government and media have to some extent moved back to the
Soviet position, again using the term falsiers of history. They assert that the invasions of Poland were unconnected to the pact, that the NaziSoviet pact was concluded only after fruitless negotiations with Britain and
France, and that, by the Munich agreement, Britain and
France were at least as culpable for the outbreak of war
Stalins Falsiers of History and Axis as the USSR.[237][238]

On 23 August 1986, tens of thousands of demonstrators in 21 western cities including New York, London,
Stockholm, Toronto, Seattle, and Perth participated in
Black Ribbon Day Rallies to draw attention to the secret
protocols.[227]

7.2

negotiations
In response to the publication of the secret protocols and
other secret GermanSoviet relations documents in the
State Department edition NaziSoviet Relations (1948),
Stalin published Falsiers of History, which included the
claim that, during the Pacts operation, Stalin rejected
Hitlers claim to share in a division of the world,[228] without mentioning the Soviet oer to join the Axis. That
version persisted, without exception, in historical studies,
ocial accounts, memoirs and textbooks published in the
Soviet Union until the Soviet Unions dissolution.[228]

8.1 Post-war commentary regarding the

motives of Stalin and Hitler
Some scholars believe that, from the very beginning of
the Tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and France, it was clear that the Soviet position required the other parties to agree to a Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,[42] as
well as for Finland be included in the Soviet sphere of
inuence.[239]

The book also claimed that the Munich agreement was a Regarding the timing of German rapprochement, many
secret agreement between Germany and the west and historians agree that the dismissal of Maxim Litvi-

14
nov, whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed unfavorably
by Nazi Germany, removed an obstacle to negotiations
with Germany.[57][240][241][242][243][244][245][246] Stalin immediately directed Molotov to purge the ministry of
Jews.[247][243][248] Given Litvinovs prior attempts to create an anti-fascist coalition, association with the doctrine
of collective security with France and Britain, and proWestern orientation[249] by the standards of the Kremlin,
his dismissal indicated the existence of a Soviet option of
rapprochement with Germany.[250][lower-alpha 6] Likewise,
Molotovs appointment served as a signal to Germany that
the USSR was open to oers.[250] The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential
negotiation option with Germany.[39][252] One British ofcial wrote that Litvinovs disappearance also meant the
loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber, while
Molotovs modus operandi was more truly Bolshevik
than diplomatic or cosmopolitan.[253] Carr argued that
the Soviet Unions replacement of Foreign Minister Litvinov with Molotov on May 3, 1939 indicated not an irrevocable shift towards alignment with Germany, but rather
was Stalins way of engaging in hard bargaining with the
British and the French by appointing a proverbial hard
man, namely Molotov, to the Foreign Commissariat.[254]
Historian Albert Resis stated that the Litvinov dismissal
gave the Soviets freedom to pursue faster-paced German negotiations, but that they did not abandon British
French talks.[252] Derek Watson argued that Molotov
could get the best deal with Britain and France because
he was not encumbered with the baggage of collective
security and could negotiate with Germany.[255] Georey
Roberts argued that Litvinovs dismissal helped the Soviets with BritishFrench talks, because Litvinov doubted
or maybe even opposed such discussions.[256]

11 NOTES
calculation that such a pact could result in a conict between the capitalist countries of Western Europe. This
idea is supported by Albert L. Weeks.[263] Claims by Suvorov that Stalin planned to invade Germany in 1941 are
debated by historians with, for example, David Glantz opposing such claims, while Mikhail Meltyukhov supports
them. The authors of The Black Book of Communism
consider the pact a crime against peace and a conspiracy
to conduct war of aggression.[264]
Soviet sources have claimed that soon after the pact was
signed, both the UK and US showed understanding that
the buer zone was necessary to keep Hitler from advancing for some time, accepting the ostensible strategic
reasoning;[265] however, soon after World War II ended,
those countries changed their view. Many Polish newspapers published numerous articles claiming that Russia
must apologize to Poland for the MolotovRibbentrop
Pact.[266]
Two weeks after Soviet armies had entered the Baltic
states, Berlin requested Finland to permit the transit
of German troops, followed ve weeks thereafter by
Hitlers issuance of a secret directive to take up the Russian problem, to think about war preparations, a war
whose objective would include establishment of a Baltic
confederation.[267]

9 Remembrance

The European Parliament has proclaimed 23 August

2009, the anniversary of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact,
as a European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, to be commemorated with dignity and
Edward Hallett Carr, a frequent defender of Soviet impartiality.[268]
policy,[257] stated: In return for 'non-intervention' Stalin
In connection with the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, an
secured a breathing space of immunity from German
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
attack.[258] According to Carr, the bastion created by
parliamentary resolution condemned both communism
means of the Pact, was and could only be, a line of deand fascism for starting World War II and called for a
fense against potential German attack.[258] According to
day of remembrance for victims of both Stalinism and
Carr, an important advantage was that if Soviet Russia
Nazism on 23 August.[269] In response to the resolution,
had eventually to ght Hitler, the Western Powers would
the Russian lawmakers threatened the OSCE with harsh
already be involved.[258][259] However, during the last
consequences.[269][270]
decades, this view has been disputed. Historian Werner
Maser stated that the claim that the Soviet Union was During the re-ignition of Cold War tensions in 1982, the
at the time threatened by Hitler, as Stalin supposed ... is U.S. Congress during the Reagan Administration estaba legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged.[260] lished the Baltic Freedom Day to be remembered every
In Masers view, neither Germany nor Japan were in a June 14 in the United States.[271]
situation [of] invading the USSR even with the least perspective [sic] of success, and this could not have been
unknown to Stalin.[261] Carr further stated that, for a long 10 See also
time, the primary motive of Stalins sudden change of
course was assumed to be the fear of German aggressive
intentions.[262]
11 Notes
Some critics of Stalins policy, such as the popular writer
Viktor Suvorov, claim that Stalins primary motive for
signing the SovietGerman non-aggression treaty was his

[1] Russian:
; German: Nichtangrisvertrag
zwischen Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen

15
Sowjetrepubliken.[1]
[2] To 53 million RM in German imports (0.9% of Germanys
total imports and 6.3% of Russias total exports) and 34
million RM in German exports (0.6% of Germanys total
exports and 4.6% of Russias total imports) in 1938.[16]
[3] On 28 July, Molotov sent a political instruction to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin that marked a start of secret
SovietGerman political negotiations.[62]
[4] The actual number of deported in the period of 1939
1941 remains unknown and various estimates vary from
350,000[178] to over 2 million (mostly World War II estimates by the underground. The earlier number is based
on records made by the NKVD and does not include
roughly 180,000 prisoners of war, also in Soviet captivity. Most modern historians estimate the number of all
people deported from areas taken by Soviet Union during this period at between 800,000 and 1,500,000;[179][180]
for example RJ Rummel gives the number of 1,200,000
million;[181] Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox give
1,500,000.[182]
[5] Having been banned in Stockholm, it continued to be published in Zurich.[191]
[6] According to Paul Flewers, Stalins address to the eighteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union on March 10, 1939 discounted any idea of German
designs on the Soviet Union. Stalin had intended: To be
cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others
pull the chestnuts out of the re for them. This was intended to warn the Western powers that they could not
necessarily rely upon the support of the Soviet Union.[251]

12

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[11] Bendersky 2000, p. 177.

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15

EXTERNAL LINKS

Watson, Derek (2000). Molotovs Apprenticeship

in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations
in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (4): 695722.
doi:10.1080/713663077. JSTOR 153322.
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14 Further reading
Carr, Edward Hallett (1949). From Munich
to MoscowII.
Soviet Studies 1 (2): 93
105. doi:10.1080/09668134908409737. JSTOR
148585.
Fisher, David; Read, Anthony (1999). The Deadly
Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the NaziSoviet Pact
19391941. W. W. Norton & Co.
Roberts, Georey (1992). Infamous Encounter?
The MerekalovWeizsacker Meeting of 17 April
1939. The Historical Journal 35 (4): 921
6. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00026224. JSTOR
2639445.
Roberts, Georey (1995). Soviet Policy and
the Baltic States, 19391940: A Reappraisal.
Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (3):
695722.
doi:10.1080/09592299508405982.
JSTOR
153322.
Vizulis, Izidors (1990). The MolotovRibbentrop
Pact of 1939: The Baltic Case. Praeger. ISBN 0275-93456-X.
Watt, Richard M. (1979). Bitter Glory: Poland &
Its Fate 19181939. NY: Simon & Schuster. ISBN
0-7818-0673-9.

15 External links
Text of the pact
NaziSoviet Relations 19391941
Leonas Cerskus. The Story of Lithuanian soldier
Modern History Sourcebook, a collection of public
domain and copy-permitted texts in modern European and World history has scanned photocopies of
original documents
The Meaning of the SovietGerman Non-Aggression
Pact Molotov speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 31, 1939
Italy and the NaziSoviet Pact of August 23, 1939
International Conference and booklet on the
MolotovRibbentrop Pact

23

16

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16.2

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File:Armia_Czerwona,Wehrmacht_23.09.1939_wsplna_parada.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/

a5/Armia_Czerwona%2CWehrmacht_23.09.1939_wsp%C3%B3lna_parada.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors:
This le has an extracted image: File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-121-0011A-22, Polen, Siegesparade, Guderian, Kriwoschein.jpg.
Original artist: Gutjahr
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-013-0068-18A,_Polen,_Treffen_deutscher_und_sowjetischer_Soldaten.jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-013-0068-18A%2C_Polen%2C_Treffen_deutscher_
und_sowjetischer_Soldaten.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the

24

16

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic
representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-121-0011-20,_Polen,_deutsch-sowjetische_Siegesparade.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/9/9b/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-121-0011-20%2C_Polen%2C_deutsch-sowjetische_Siegesparade.jpg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative
and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-1984-1206-523,_Berlin,_Verabschiedung_Molotows.jpg Source:
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wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-1984-1206-523%2C_Berlin%2C_Verabschiedung_Molotows.jpg License:
CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative
and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H27337,_Moskau,_Stalin_und_Ribbentrop_im_Kreml.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/3/38/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H27337%2C_Moskau%2C_Stalin_und_Ribbentrop_im_Kreml.jpg License: CC BYSA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as
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16.3

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File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?

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PrdidasTerritorialesRumanas1940.svg:

*Romania_1940_1941_es.svg:

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domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
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Contributors: Own work Original artist: User:Bastique, User:Ramac et al.
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Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
Simon.
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Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Wikisource-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: Rei-artur Original artist: Nicholas Moreau
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domain Contributors: Vector version of Image:Wiktionary-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Fvasconcellos (talk contribs),
based on original logo tossed together by Brion Vibber

16.3

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