PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

GREGORIO PERFECTO (43 Phil 887) Case

Digest
Facts: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La
Nacion regarding the disappearance of certain
documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero,
the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The article
of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in
finding the perpetrators was due to an official
concealment by the Senate since the missing
documents constituted the records of testimony
given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies. This resulted to a case being filed
against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of
the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the
Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case
on the ground that Article 256 was not in force
anymore.
Issue: Will a law be abrogated by the change of
Spanish to American Sovereignty over the
Philippines?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials
who were representative of the King. With the
change of sovereignty, a new government, and a
new theory of government, was set up in the
Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the
old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only in
bated breath.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the
Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under
the American flag.
Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and
appellant ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE
V.
( C A S E D I G E S T ) July 10, 2014
People v. Perfecto,
October 4, 1922

G.R.

Then, the day following the convening of Senate,

the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr.
Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish

Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the

Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted
to
protect
Spanish
officials
as
representatives of the King. However, the Court
explains that in the present case, we no longer
have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish
to American, it means that the invoked provision
of the SPC had been automatically abrogated.
The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be
political in nature for it is about the relation of
the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that it is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory, the
previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated.Hence, Article 256 of the
SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted.

PERFECTO

No.

L-18463,

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of

the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the
testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of
oil companies had disappeared from his office.

DIGEST: Macariola v.s. Asuncion, 114 SCRA

77 (1982)

DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: A.M. No. 133-J

DATE: May
31,
1982
COMPLAINANT: Bernardita
R..
Macariola
RESPONDENT: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte

which he previously decide in a Civil Case Nio.

3010 and his engage ment in business by joining
a private corporation during his incumbency as a
judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an act
unbecoming of a judge?

FACTS: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010

rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte
became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to
him which he later approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

HELD: No. The respondent Judge Asuncions

actuation does not constitute of an act
unbecoming of a judge. But he is reminded to be
more discreet in his private and business
activities.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of

partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the
decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was
adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares
subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot
1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria
Asuncion.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par 5

of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the
sale or assignment of the property during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to
par H sec 3 of RA 3019 because the business of
the corporation in which the respondent
participated had obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. SC stated that
respondent judge and his wife deserve to the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal
from the firm 22 days after its incorporation
realizing that their interest contravenes the
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses

Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein
Judge Asuncion was the president.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on

August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234
in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with
acts unbecoming a judge alleging that Judge
Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
1184-E violated Article 1491 pr. 5 of the New Civil
Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce Sec 3 par H of RA 3019 Sec 12 Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canons of
Judicial Ethics.

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate

implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought
to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries
from
implementing
the
said
constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was
initiated by the president. He argued that the
President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify
such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.

On November 2, 1970 Judge Jose Nepomuceno of

the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing
the complaints against Judge Asuncion,
After
the
investigation,
report
and
recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia
Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she
recommended on her decision dated March
29,1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.
ISSUE: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate
Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E

50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law

Political Question Validity of the1973
Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due

course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon
the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by
the ascertainment made by the president of the
Philippines, in the exercise of his political
prerogatives. Further, there being no competent
evidence to show such fraud and intimidation

during the election, it is to be assumed that the

people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973
Constitution. The question of the validity of
the 1973 Constitution is a political question which
was left to the people in their sovereign capacity
to answer. Their ratification of the same had
shown such acquiescence.

PERFECTO V MEER 85 PHIL 552

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R.
No.
L-2348.
February
27,
1950.]
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal
Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of this
Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this action in the
Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax
upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held: Yes. As in the United States during the
second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income"
taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to
wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income"
did not include salaries of judicial officers when
these are protected from diminution. That was
the prevailing official belief in the United States,
which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the
Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in
1935) the prohibition against diminution of the
judges' compensation, the Federal principle was
known that income tax on judicial salaries really
impairs
them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for
men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay
the corresponding duties. Owning real property,
they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other
than their judicial salary, assessments are levied.
It is only when the tax is charged directly on their
salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their
official stipend that the taxation must be
resisted as an infringement of the fundamental
charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the
Constitution if they did not perceive and block

encroachments upon their prerogatives in

whatever form. The undiminishable character of
judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges
personal and therefore waivable but a basic
limitation upon legislative or executive action
imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
Labels: Digest, Law School, Political Law by Jay
Gerochi

ENDENCIA V. DAVID
93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te
Legislature Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal
Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other
judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer
of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered
as
exempt
from
the income
tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case
of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from
taxation this is also in observance of the
doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports,
is separate from the judiciary; that under the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent and
the salaries of judges may not be diminished by
the other branches of government; that taxing
theirsalaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see
Section
9,
Art.
VIII,
Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR,
states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the
separation of powers. Only courts have the power
to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts
interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is
already encroaching upon the functions of the
courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of

which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a

diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing
taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their
salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the
legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term.
The interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it
be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.
NITAFAN V. DAVID
93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te
Legislature Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal
Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other
judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 which provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer

of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered
as
exempt
from
the income
tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case
of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from
taxation this is also in observance of the
doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports,
is separate from the judiciary; that under the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent and
the salaries of judges may not be diminished by
the other branches of government; that taxing
theirsalaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see
Section
9,
Art.
VIII,
Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR,
states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the
separation of powers. Only courts have the power
to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts
interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is
already encroaching upon the functions of the
courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of
which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing
taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their
salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the
legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature

would be usurping a judicial function in defining a

term.
The interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it
be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

24SEP
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Fact:
The Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In
a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September
1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check
to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS
refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince
Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Issue:
1. w/n the provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
2. w/n the 51% share is part of the national
patrimony.
Held:
A provision which is complete in itself and
becomes
operative
without
the
aid
of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution
are
self-executing.
If
the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation
instead
of
self-executing,
the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically
nullify
the
mandate
of
the
fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second
paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers
to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of

Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an

American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of
economic rights, privileges, and concessions,
especially
on
matters
involving
national
patrimony, when a choice has to be made
between a qualified foreigner and a qualified
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the
former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila

Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization
and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of
the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to
accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at
P44 per share and thereafter execute the
necessary agreements and document to effect
the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.