ANASTACIA QUIMEN VS. COURT OF APPEALS G .R. NO.

112331
Facts:
Private respondent Yolanda Oliveros bought the lot belonging to his uncle Antonio
Quimen, a land without access to the road public, with an inducement by her
petitioner Aunt Anastacia that she will give her a right of way on her adjoining
property for P200 per square meter. When Yolanda offered Anastacia the payment,
the latter refused to accept denying the promise of right of way to her once she
bought the property. Yolanda filed an action with a prayer of right of way through
Anastacias property. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the space
at the back of her fathers house which a store was situation was the better right of
way because it is shorter than that of Anastacias property. But the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision saying that respondent has the right of way through
petitioners property and as it was the one which will cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has a right of way through petitioners property.
Held:
The Court held that she has. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the right of
way must be the one which has the shortest route and which will cause the least
damage and detriment to the servient state. Though the easement to petitioners
property in the case at bar is longer than the one located at the back of respondents
house which has a store blocking it, the requirement that it can bring the least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortness of the route to the
public highway. The less damage will be incurred not as when the store made of
strong materials should be removed. More so, the conditions for a valid grant of
right of way through petitioners property, which are: 1. the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to public highway 2.
the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity 3. the isolation was not
due to the acts of the dominant estate 4. the right of way being claimed is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate are met by the circumstances at hand.

FRANCISCO VS. IAC

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from
a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate.
Isolation must not be due to his own acts.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by
several co-owners. On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and
Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was
donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion to the children
of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an undivided
third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila.
A partition was then executed.
The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision,
Epifania Dilas lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860
along Parada Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e.,
of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.
Despite that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to
Ramos.Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but negotiations
failed. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to
three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was
unacceptable to Ramos.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway
through Dilas lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete
wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through
Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not
bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what
he wanted.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire
fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco
filed a case against him asserting his right to a legal easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land
belonging to Francisco
HELD:
NO.
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of
way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant
of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been

met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and
thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of
the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being
to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and
also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an
existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative
location.
FLORO v. LLENADO
A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant estate. The
owner must prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the
servient estate.
FACTS:
Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own
access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado,
owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it
was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south
by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat
the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did
not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway.
However, a proposed access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been
specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision.
This plan was approved by the HLURB.
Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought,
and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park .
At this point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still
drafting a contract.
Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy
machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe
stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off property.
Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by
LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the
same against Mr. Floro.
HELD: NO.
As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of
way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established. These include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision
development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms.

Ipapo to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed
to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such
road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the Floro property.
The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of
convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road
development and pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards
in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance
his behavior.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No.
71393 June 28, 1989
FACTS:Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a parcel of land with an area of 5,216.60 square meters,
situated in Cainta, Rizal at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and the road leading to the town center of Cainta, covered by
O.C.T. 4416, issued in 1931. Upon the death of both, the property passed on to their daughter Bibiana Crisostomo
Vda. de Eladio Leyva, whose title was evidenced by TCT 8144. Ultimately, the property was inherited by the LEYVAs
who were the children of Bibiana.
Prior to the issuance of OCT 4416, in the name of Nazario Crisostomo between 1929 and 1930, MERALCO erected
thereon two transmission steel towers numbered 86 and 87, later renumbered 76 (situated in Lot 1-K which is owned
in common by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No. 297168) and 77 (situated in Lot 2-V-6, which is also owned incommon by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No. 338524), (par. 3, Partial Stipulation of Facts, quoted in CA
Decision, p. 39, Rollo). In 1931, when O.C.T. 4416 was issued, no encumbrance was annotated thereon.
On August 4, 1973, the LEYVAs sued MERALCO for damages and sum of money with prayer for attorney's fees and
exemplary damages for its continued use of the LEYVAs' property, claiming that the property became off limits
because of the high voltage of electric current running in the cable lines.
In its answer, MERALCO claimed that it had acquired a grant from the original owner of the land, Nazario Crisostomo,
for a perpetual easement of right of way for the erection and operation of the transmission steel towers for which it
had paid Crisostomo the total sum of $12.40. Moreover, even without the grant of perpetual easement, the LEYVAs'
complaint is deemed barred by prescription and laches, because of MERALCO's open, continuous and uninterrupted
enjoyment of the easement for a period of 43 years.
MERALCO did not present any proof regarding the alleged contract/grant with Nazario Crisostomo. Instead, it
presented a deposition of a certain Leland Gardner, a retired MERALCO field auditor, who testified on the alleged
payment by MERALCO of the sum of $12.40 for the grant of right of way, claiming thus, that in the absence of the
original document, Lelands deposition must be admitted as secondary evidence of an original document, pursuant to
Sec. 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MERALCO acquired a perpetual easement of right of way, over subject property.
HELD:
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim
of title (en concepto de dueo) or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de
dueo and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that MERALCO never acquired any easement over the LEYVAs' property to
construct and operate the steel towers. Consequently, the LEYVAs must be compensated and awarded temperate
damages, attorney's fees and annual compensation for the loss of use and deprivation of opportunity to profit and
benefit from their lands. As respondent court pointed out (pp. 44-45, Rollo):
In this case, there is no doubt that plaintiffs' property has been practically off-limits to its entirety because of the
danger posed by the high voltage electric current being conducted through cable lines hanging through the steel
transmission towers, thereby prejudicing plaintiffs from reaping profits and benefits from their lands. Aggravating the
situation, plaintiffs remain as owners only to be liable to payment of real estate taxes and other related dues and
levies. Meanwhile, the MERALCO does nothing except to reap benefits and profits in its business concern to the
prejudice of plaintiffs; or as Manresa has pined 'to the annulment of right' of ownership of plaintiffs. For this
plaintiffs should not be without redress.

AMOR v. FLORENTINO

FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she
transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria
Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old
warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will
shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent
house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a
negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any
height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no
easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code
took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said
construction.

RULING:
Yes.

Easement is established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art.

624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is
subsequently owned by two different persons and the service (it cannot be
an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an
easement is established.

VALISNO VS ADRIANO, 161 SCRA 398

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the
land from the respondents sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts,
corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both
parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to
Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the Respondent's land.
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal,
the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A
reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water to irrigate his
watermelon fields was urgent.
Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered damages when he failed to plant his
fields that year for lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed the canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which had been
granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the

water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the water
rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondents land.

RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondents land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may
continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be
provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of
the deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements"
appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary consideration for his
purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity
does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive
him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

RONQUILLO ET AL VS. ROCO, 103 PHIL 84

FACTS:

FACTS:
Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way
through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however,
respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after,
by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated,
planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad
St. and Naga public market.
(The plaintiffs alleged that they have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which
traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market
place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants
have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of the former. On May 12, 1953,
the defendants and their men constructed a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which, accordingly has
impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way. On July
10, 1954 defendants planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way
and their right of way against the plaintiffs protests and opposition. This prevented them from going to or coming from
their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The
easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the
acts of man.
An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is,nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore,
cannot beacquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under the NewCivil Code, easements may be
continuous discontinuous (intermittent),apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or lesslong
intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615). Continuousand apparent easements are acquired either,
by title or prescription,continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whetherapparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 620 and622)

TANEDO VS BERNAD, 165 SCRA 86

An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates
to different persons is not a ground for extinguishment of easements absent
a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A
and 7501-B). He constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he
constructed an apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for common use
of the occupants of the two lots.
Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Taedo (pet). He also
agreed that should be decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Taedo.
However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also
asked Tanedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot B.

Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps.
Cardenas admitted that he had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by
way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he had
executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed the
complaint and the cross claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the
subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners.

RULING: NO.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is
not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the
contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as provided in
Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed
of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic
tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot impair, in
any manner, the use of the servitude.

COSTABELLA CORP. VS. CA, 193 SCRA 333