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Shells
The affirmative must defend a topical plan.
centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a
centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This
means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal
forces: Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we
take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in
the on-going negotiation of truths between teachers and students. In the words of
Bakhtin: Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person,
it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic
interaction (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games
also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario
of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly
determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a
limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals,
roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually
endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and
evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a
game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal
forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students game activities. In this
way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different
pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning
resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the
election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between
educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a
balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or facts of a game
(centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent
possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal
orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often
manifests itself as a dynamic between monological and dialogical forms
of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the
Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new
from the students, despite Socrates ideological claims to the contrary
(Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when someone who
knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and
in error, where a thought is either affirmed or repudiated by the
authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy
fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students existing
knowledge and collaborative construction of truths (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I
should clarify that Bakhtins term dialogic is both a descriptive term (all
utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a
chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be
worked for against the forces of monologism (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this
project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the
same time, I agree with Wegerif that one of the goals of education, perhaps the
most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself (Wegerif, 2006:
61).
A stasis point is key to debate we offer the only one rooted in the
resolution.
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, Assistant
Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
182-3)
The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must
be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often
very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic"
need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful
if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn
is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox
should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance;
and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of
careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane.
Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all
further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged
ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some
agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the
door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this
initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real
business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. For and then proceed to debate without
attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is,
they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for
instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As
noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to
begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on
basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is
about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on.
They must also agreeand they do so simply by entering into debatethat they will not
use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to
be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of
argumentation.
http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-anddebate.pdf, p. 43-44]
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of
opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in
agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be
settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to
debate Resolved: That two plus two equals four, because there is simply no
controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of
debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed
positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce
effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to
be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of
illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the
impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on
our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers?
Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not
speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by
not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain
citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal
immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as
workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers,
law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their
status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its
borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national
identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite
immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be
addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in
this debate is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be
productive or useful without focus on a particular question and
identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed
and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding
results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and
emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States
Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer
of 2007.Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly
educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, Public schools are doing a
terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their
subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order
in their classrooms. That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues,
might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as We ought to do something about this or,
worse, Its too complicated a problem to deal with. Groups of concerned citizens
worried about the state of public education could join together to express
their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the
schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree
about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or
potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed
such as What can be done to improve public education?then a more profitable area of
discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution
step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions
for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements Resolved:
That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk
communities and Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher
program more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a
manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated
and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.
Definitions
Resolved
Resolved expresses intent to implement a plan
Colon
The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon the USFG is
the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand
by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on If the introductory
phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon
represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with
a capital letter.
USfg
Federal Government means the central government in Washington
D.C.
Encarta 2K
Should
Should requires we perform the actions of the following verb, its a
necessity
2NC Blocks
Critique Fails
Critiques get bogged down in theoretical jargon that distract
from efforts for true political change we must engage in the
rhetoric of policymaking.
McClean Rutgers Philosophy Professor 1
[David E., Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American
Philosophy, The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion
%20papers/david_mcclean.htm]
Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our
Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and
refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just
mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and
Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative
attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest
them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed,
national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for
American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually
want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease
regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program
of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies"
wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical
remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled
questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or
whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human
nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to
starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our
children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic
leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be
pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of
language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of
economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way
into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats
from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its
country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).
(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that
philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced
to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic
formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its
own implicit principle of successful action."
Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural
Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers
for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy
themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather
than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and
who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered
with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the
Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond
reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous
conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for
our social hopes, as I will explain.
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to
better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political
prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of
determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the
country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard
Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the
words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to
seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread
of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a
true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faithbased initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business
interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part
of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy
ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and
from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a
hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move
past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and
"interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis,
one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than
any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a
missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a
community of nations under a "law of peoples?"
The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade
theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international
markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics
of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our
arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social
institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe
to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take
difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples'
lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those
institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their
overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in
debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about
but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed,
and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from
philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called
"managerial class."
Simulation
Simulating government discourses allows students to synthesize
theory and fact creating useful real-world knowledge.
Esberg and Sagan, special assistant to the director at New York University's and
Professor at Stanford, Center 12
(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on.
International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott
Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for
International Security and Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION:
Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, The Nonproliferation Review,
19:1, 95-108 accessed 5-7-13, RRR
Dialogue
Their interpretation results in a monologic dialogue where debate
becomes a one-sided lecture only a dialogic exchange can accrue
educational benefits.
Decisionmaking
Critical frameworks destroy decision-making skills we become
intellectually invested in utopian alternatives that lack political
traction.
Strait, George Mason University, and Wallace, George Washington University
Communications Professors, 7
[L. Paul and Brett, The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making,
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/2007/The%20Scope%20of
%20Negative%20Fiat%20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Decision%20Making.pdf, p.
A-5)
Informed Citizenry
Critique disavows our responsibility to being an informed
citizenry their framework arguments are intrinsically
apolitical.
Lundberg University of North Carolina Communications Professor, 10
[Christian 0., January 2010, The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the
Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,
http://academia.edu/968401/LundbergOnDebate, p. 311, accessed 7/5/13,
ALT]
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in
articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary
pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic
capacities built by debate are not limited to speechas indicated earlier, debate
builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed
decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern
political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of
increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid
scientific and technological change, outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to
comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest and moneydriven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions
warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to
rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the
citizenrys capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of
democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on
deducation (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate provides an indispensable form of
education in the modern articulation of democracy because it builds
precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed
about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the
evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an
increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and
political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.
Critical Thinking
Debate is key to critical thinking skills - arguing opposing points
of view enables a self-reflexive thought process that checks
dogmatism and ideological rigidity.
Keller, University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration Professor, et.
al, 01 [Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas
E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of
Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, 2001
(Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge
through active learning, Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001,
EBSCOhost)
The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for
promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of
substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments
designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates
actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to
develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as
testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, debates may help to stimulate critical thinking by shaking
students free from established opinions and helping them to appreciate the
complexities involved in policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice
Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers'
"efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of
social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities,
such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing
policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive
activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating
issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to
Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when
pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing
the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and
evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for
interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in
a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective
strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a
particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking
(see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are
identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of
thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis,
and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making
process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating
multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing
policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for
critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers
acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to
seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical
thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of
which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John
Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in
the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding
fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by
exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40).
Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse
perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and
meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that
learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the
ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb,
1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs
risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences.
On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is
insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to
help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas
and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the
education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining
and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief
systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that
involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the
fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates
clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values
underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively
students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective.
The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to
yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining
to the issue
Empathy
Using a statis point to debate multiple sides of an issue
humanizes people with opposing views and creates empathy.
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 High
School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1034&context=theses)
Small 6 (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition,
very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive
society. With humankinds next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism
backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any
other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage
rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming
and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution
will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will
invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current
course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical
solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face
the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and
tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin
to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing,
and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and
more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism?
How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power?
These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our
conception of education. Well need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth
to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first
century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic
engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself
well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a
higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban
setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity
such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at
a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear
understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other
affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often
ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on
this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice
to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic
engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community
conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been
around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of
Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically
that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete
expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic
engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, lets not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic
engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate
around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some
will say that todays youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement.
Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement.
And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and todays youth. But
perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, There is a tragic flaw in our
precious Constitution, and I dont know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.
Maybe the youths rejection of American politics isnt a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response
to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster
fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twentyfirst century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our
challenge becomes
convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have
the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political
meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social
justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a
subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define
itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new
points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working
in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at
an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making
better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to
different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the
natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and
service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them.
However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart
our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.
Debate=Policy
The resolution was created for two distinct sides to determine
the desirability of policy action.
PARCHER 2001 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)
(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To
make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into
constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at
*Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution.
2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question.
American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion,
as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is
utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic
AT Exclusionary
C/A Limits their interpretation excludes the rest of the tournament.
Effective subversion occurs within the limits of the game, not from
the outside.
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, Assistant
Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
180)
Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about
anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be
steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say
"no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about
acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to
stretch the boundaries of behaviorif they want to be revolutionary and
disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasmthey need first to be firm believers in
something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what
they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G.
K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite
and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would
rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel
against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and
not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"because he
and/or she cannot bring him and/or herself to will something definite
and limited "he and/or she cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that
he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce
anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most
radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and
activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace
everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a
particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as
observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace selfcontradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's
purposesto tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness,
democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to
will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary
impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what
they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in
their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to
deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They
cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their
backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the
tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In
short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is
ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some
uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of
others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility
and democracy.
used to solve an equation, would reply, because some old, dead guy said so. Of course, no answer could be further from
the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean
theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student
understands the why. In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain
way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the
contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has
survived such questioning. Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not
necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy
is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can
give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and
all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of
the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. In short, authoritative words may or may
not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no
more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each
was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the
correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtins embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the
economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it
embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. It follows from Bakhtins argument
that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe
something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been
more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly we are often convinced with
qualifications, with a just in case, with loopholes. 320 However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on
generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief
is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. An authoritative word of this
nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must
be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by
believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot
bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action
would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do wrong. Much of the moral
complexity of this book lies in Hucks self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as
wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this
respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something
wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself:
we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed
beliefs. our own authoritative words The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that
everyone hears. Everyone
has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that the
environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their
lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we
are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for
inclusion and affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the
people in the world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices , and , too, we
may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because
we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and
have thought about, if not ultimately accepted, their answers. Again, educators know
the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the
temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking
Vulnerability accompanies too much power. But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual
development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic
community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and
rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a
court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily
rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps
we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our
teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a
great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our
own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. In much the same way, we react to the advice of our
parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may
greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue
goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it
so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom
in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents
when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful
ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. It is always a difficult moment when we
realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its 322 own
terms, not like our parents voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents
authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own.
They may have done the same thing we did question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version and that rigid voice of
authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they
do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities). Dialogue, Laughter, And
Surprise Bakhtin viewed the whole process of ideological (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic)
we
may think of ours as the rebels voice, because our rebelliousness against
society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture . We speak
the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we
are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all
the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as
fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be
felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same
reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we
disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image:
development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much
helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on
The
Theme of the Rebel and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great
rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a
famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation,
but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be
Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree.
Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more
intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really
think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isnt that itself often the root cause? We
know from Tsar Ivan
the Terribles letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that
Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured
himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed
whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against
authority that produces ever greater intolerance , unless one is very careful.
323 For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue.
In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitlers Mein Kampf and discovering that his selfconsciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing
appeal otherwise so inexplicable was to the German sense that they
one become what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. Laughter at oneself invites the
perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at ones opponents as the unconditionally
wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not
my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must
understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue
is a
process of real testing, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that
the result is not guaranteed. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be
right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own innerly persuasive voice. Once one has done this,
once one has allowed ones own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions
AT Creativity
Not at the expense of limits the result is a pedagogically bankrupt
discussion.
AT K of Fairness
Conflicts are inevitable our attempt to establish procedural fairness
is necessary to the decision-making process EVEN IF substantive
fairness cannot be achieved.
If recent world events have taught us anything, it is that conflict and conflicting
notions of the good are inevitable for human beings. So, while many of us seek
ways to establish more universal notions of the good toward which to direct our human
efforts, it has, sadly, become, in the early years of the twenty-first century, more common
for us to assume there will be basic value differences among us. We should, then,
spend our time thinking about how we can at least develop fair and
considerate processes for communicating enough with each other so that we
may act with the most benefit and the least harm. Some offer hopes that "the rule
of law" can be universalized as a principled way to resolve conflicts, domestically and
internationally. Others of us see law as often conflictual, indeterminate, and politically
contested or manipulable, or so focused on the need for regulation of the aggregate that
it cannot always do 'Justice" in particular cases. Legal justice is not always actual justice.
The social philosopher Stuart Hampshire has recently concluded, in his book Justice Is
Conflict, that while we may never agree about what the content of universal justice is
"because there never will be such a harmony, either in the soul or in the city," we might
instead come closer to recognizing that "fairness in procedures for resolving
conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and that it is acknowledged as a
value in most cultures, places, and times: fairness in procedure is an invariable value, a
constant in human nature."2 Hampshire goes on to say-in words eloquent enough to
make one feel proud of what has constituted at least half of a lifetime's work of theorizing
and practice 10 conflict resolution-that [b]ecause there will always be conflicts
between conceptions of the good, moral conflicts, both in the soul and in the city, there
is everywhere a well- recognized need for procedures of conflict resolution,
which can replace brute force and domination and tyranny.3 The existence of such an
institution [for conflict resolution], and the particular form of its rules and conventions
of procedure are matters of historical contingency. There is no rational necessity about
the more specific rules and conventions determining the criteria for success in argument
in any particular institution, except the overriding necessity that each side in the
conflict should be heard putting its case ("audi alteram par/em '].4 [T]he skillful
management of conflicts [is] among the highest of human skills. 5 Hampshire identifies
several principles which are crucial to understanding the importance of procedural
justice. 1. Conflict is human and ubiquitous. Conflict is actually necessary for
defining what is important about oneself and the polity to which individuals belong,
and for instigating important social change (e.g., the elimination of slavery, the
movements toward racial and gender equality, as well as increased democratic
participation in many nations). Agreement on all human values is unlikely given
human diversity, deep-seated cultural norms, and the variation of human needs and
desires. 2. Even if we cannot all agree on substantive norms and goals, we can
probably agree on some processes for making decisions that will enable us to
go forward and act. We might have some virtually universal ideas about procedural
fairness, like the ability to "make a case" and "be heard" and to have
impartiality and fairness govern any decision-making process. Some might go
further and suggest that some participation in the process by which decisions are made
is essential to the legitimacy of a process (with or without commitments to
democratic political regimes).
Early in her essay, and again at the end, Roberts-Miller shakes hands with her opponent and acknowledges that there is a
legitimate grievance against agonistic rhetoric. The basic problem with valuing agonistic rhetoric is that one seems at the
One
needs a way to distinguish between agonistic rhetoric that is merely succeedat-all-costs-and-never-give-in combat and agonistic rhetoric that uses competition and
struggle to accomplish something greater than simple conquest. She is not sure that she has a
same time to be promoting mere wrangling. The opponents ofagonistic rhetoric have opposed it on these grounds.
satisfying way of addressing this problem, but she cites a passage from John Locke in which the essence of wrangling is
that the wranglers are incapable of changing their minds, of being convinced by opposing arguments. Later in her essay, in
her gloss on a passage from Arendt, she develops this important feature of agonistic discourse: "It is not asymmetric
manipula- tion ofothers ... it must be a world into which one enters and by which one can be changed" (593). This is a
If the
interlocutors are not willing to change their minds, then they are not
engaged in argumentation. Near the end of her article, she regrets that Arendt did not do more to
familiar condition by which argumentation theorists attempt to delineate just what argumentation is.
distinguish polemical agonism from wrangling, and then she drops the discussion. It would of course be very interesting
to hear more about this. The agonistic/collaborative distinction is made in large part, according to Roberts-Miller herself,
because one cannot distinguish the valuable kind of rhetoric from the destructive kind. If neither Arendt nor RobertsMiller can address this, then something is seriously amiss. At this point, it is just impossible not to regret that the last halfcentury's resurgence of argu- mentation theory is not more broadly acknowledged by those who make a profession of
rhetoric, writing, and literacy. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca labor carefully in The New Rhetoric to
describe what makes possible the "contact of minds" that is a condition for the possibil- ity of genuine argumentation.
Franz van Eemeren and the late Rob Grootendorst worked for years on their "pragma-dialectical" rules for argumentative
discourse. And more recently, in The New Dialectic, Douglas Walton has systematized his thinking on the rules for
argumen- tative dialogues and distinguished the rules for eristic dialogues from the rules for inquiry dialogues,
deliberative dialogues, and other kinds of argumentative discourse. It would be interesting to know whether Rob- ertsMiller would find in this work a way to elaborate the concept of polemical agonism and save it from its indistinguishability
from wran- gling. However the threat of agonism's logical indistinguishability from wrangling is only part of the problem.
There is also a psychological dimension to the objection to agonistic argumentation. Some people are just psychologically
defeated by it. Their experience-in childhood, in a bad marriage, in the course of life in general, or even in court and with
lawyers, and perhaps in education-is to have been outdone by argumentation. It
virtuous action. When Socrates breaks off the argument with young Theaetetus in Plato's dialogue of that name, it is
because he understands Theaetetus and his condition, the stage of his formation, and the threat of misology, and because
he has the virtue to act on the younger man's behalf, to keep a space open for his individual development. One of the less
noted objections to agonistic rhetoric is that it damages those who are defeated by it, that it creates an association between
reason and failure, reason and psychological pain. It would be interesting to hear Roberts-Miller address this objection.
What would it take not only to theorize a logical distinction between agonistic rhetoric and wrangling but also to make use
ofthe distinction in our practice and teaching? The central move in Roberts-Miller's deployment of Arendt's think- ing is
to accept the distinction between agonistic and collaborative rhetoric but to present arguments that reverse the value
hierarchy that the split sets up: to replace "much ofour dislike ofconflict with a dislike of consensus." Here she gives us
Arendt at her most Heideggerian. Human
social and
institutional identities pretty much determine how one should think and act
on almost all occasions. This conformist sociality is the absolutization of
bureaucracy and the apotheosis of collaborationism . In Arendt's and Roberts-Miller's
hands, the idea of the collaborative takes on all the resonance the word had when it was used of those who capitulated to
the Nazis. One can almost see and hear scenes from The Sorrow and the Pity as one ponders these Arendtian ideas. And,
of course, Arendt's prime exhibit of "collaborative man" is the desk- murderer Adolph Eichmann, the perfect
administrator who, even after recognizing his complicity in the murder of millions, could under- stand his guilt only as
the guilt ofobedience to his superiors, the guilt of doing his official duties. Eichmann is the thoroughly historicist, perfectly
formed social constructionist. To the challenge that he should have spoken out against what was going on, he replied:
"Under the circumstances then prevailing such an attitude was not possible. Nor did anyone behave in this fashion. From
my experience I know that the possibility, which was alleged only after the War, of opposing orders is a self-protective
fairy tale." Arendt's argument depends on Eichmann's words never losing their power to chill us. And so Roberts-Miller
looks to Arendt for help in "replacing
conflict, says Roberts- Miller, need not be forced. It is the form taken by open
acknowledgment of difference. We find identities in the course of these conflicts; we set out on paths
toward ourselves. And this can all take place only when there is some kind of social
space for it and when there are individuals capable of it. And so, says Roberts-Miller,
we should trust collaborationism less and look to the agonism that allows
for individuality and openness to difference.
participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table
a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness
requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in
fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of
each topic as its central point of departure.
Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts
approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative
crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments
that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits
at a relatively balanced argumentative table.
When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers.
However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue.
When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood
of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as
dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a
fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of
voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand
for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally
months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be
silenced.
Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude
particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the
argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They
are unable to understand what went on and are left to the whims of time and power
(Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:
Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in
doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound
decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We
assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who
subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that
we reach agreement which binds us to a common causeIf we are to be
equalrelationships among equals must find expression in many formal
and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).
Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework
that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither
state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the
topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is
oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically
suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the
interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the
affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing
them from offering effective counter-word and undermining the value of a
meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for
topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
AT Roleplaying
No link defending policy does not necessitate pretending to be the
USfg fiat is merely an intellectual heuristic for imagining the
enactment and consequences of a plan does not kill agency.
Michael Eber 5, former Director of Debate at Michigan State University, Everyone
Uses Fiat, April 8th,
http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/edebate@ndtceda.com/1077700.html
AT Agency
Policy debates are empowering.
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 High
School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1034&context=theses]
AT Privilege DA
Forcing confessions out of individuals fails to collectivize action that
can change broader structures of domination Instead it bestows
cultural capital to those least privileged creating a perverse game to
be the most oppressed.
Andrea Smith, Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC
Riverside Associate Professor, 2013, Geographies of Privilege, Unsettling the Privilege of
Self-Reflexivity, Kindle
In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself
participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc.
privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: I am so and so, and I have x privilege. It was
never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in
question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It
instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of
power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The
sayer of the
confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and
relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little
critique of the fact that in the end, it
the goal
became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible.
These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building .
best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together. Consequently,
And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed,
these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the
colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity. These rituals around self-reflexivity in the academy and in
activist circles are not without merit. They are informed by key insights into how the logics of domination that structure
the world also constitute who we are as subjects. Political projects of transformation necessarily involve a fundamental
reconstitution of ourselves as well. However, for this process to work, individual
transformation must
occur concurrently with social and political transformation. That is, the
undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or
trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective
structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist
genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a
problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural
forms of oppression. However, the response to structural racism became an individual one individual confession at the
expense of collective action. Thus the question becomes, how would one collectivize individual transformation? Many
organizing projects attempt and have attempted to do precisely this, such Sisters in Action for Power, Sista II Sista, Incite!
Women of Color Against Violence, and Communities Against Rape and Abuse, among many others. Rather than focus
simply on ones individual privilege, they address privilege on an organizational level. For instance, they might assess is
everyone who is invited to speak a college graduate? Are certain peoples always in the limelight? Based on this assessment,
they develop structures to address how privilege is exercised collectively. For instance, anytime a person with a college
degree is invited to speak, they bring with them a co-speaker who does not have that education level. They might develop
mentoring and skills-sharing programs within the group. To quote one of my activist mentors, Judy Vaughn, You dont
think your way into a different way of acting; you act your way into a different way of thinking. Essentially, the current
social structure conditions us to exercise what privileges we may have. If
AT Discourse/Reps
Placing representations and discourse first trades off with concrete
political change
Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of
critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines
Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all
social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens
speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion,
Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual
impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst
terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly
ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's
conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of
the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from
the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of
ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that
require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive
without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material
circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete
social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of
marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences
are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example,
argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p.
571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of
education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299).
West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about
"Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170).
Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy
about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from
marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete
circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for
postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new
recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not
address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism,
sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are
living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences.
Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a
cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and
attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful
of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and
the budgets that fuel them.
AT: Ontology/Epistemology
No prior questions
655-7
Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that [a] frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology often signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that
these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one
respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different
theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet,
such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this
philosophical
epistemology over explanatory
function
explanatory
philosophical turn. The first danger with the
prioritise
ontology and
power as if the latter were a
power
is not
dependent
issues of
and/or interpretive
and/or interpretive
two
of a theoretical account
merely
simple
and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly
on these
philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of
problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good
account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the
rational
may provide the best account available
ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is
not the
most important kind
ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from
philosophical principles it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problemdriven approach
there is always a plurality
of
descriptions
the challenge is to decide which
get a
grip on action
theorydriven work is part of a reductionist program
assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weaknessbut this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems,
choice
theory
. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of
first
to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that
possible true
terms of
ting
perspicuous
the
, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint,
in that it dictates always opting for the description that calls for the
explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are
required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since whether there are general
explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry.6 Moreover,
slips into
generality over
that of
combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IRwhat might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander viewnamely, an image of warring theoretical
approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and
prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and
epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.
State Good
While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmen- tality theory, for the
purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories.2 One body of scholar- ship uses governmentality as a heuristic
tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are
deployed; the other adopts this notion as a descriptive tool to theorize the globally oppressive features of international
building upon Pierre Bourdieu, has encouraged a research methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses
on practice;3 William Walters has advocated consider- ing governmentality as a research program rather than as a
depiction of discrete systems of power;4 and Michael Merlingen has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use
of governmentality as interchangeable with liberalism.5 Many other scholars have engaged in con- textualized analyses
of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has shown how responsibilization has become an instrument
for governing individual travelers through travel warnings as well as for developing states through performance
indicators;6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of
the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus on studying the discourses, processes and practices
through which globalization is made as a space and a political economy;7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have
looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and transform power relations;8 and in my own work, I have
studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations
and how these practices 9 were hijacked and resisted and by their targets. Scholars
who use
governmentality as a descriptive tool focus instead on one particular
trajectory of global liberalism, that is on the convergence of knowledge and scrutiny of life processes (or
bio- politics) and violence and theorize global liberalism as an extremely effective formation, a coherent and powerful
Leviathan, where biopolitical tools and violence come together to serve dominant classes or states political agendas. As I
will show, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Sergei Prozorov tend to embrace this position.10
such as for instance the international liberal order or the state. In this framework, political
McCoy 2 (Martha L. Executive director of the Study Circles Resource Center, the
primary project of The Paul J. Aicher Foundation, of which she is President and
Patrick L. Scully president of Clearview Consulting LLC, a firm that conducts public
policy research and analysis, designs and leads public participation and engagement
initiatives, develops and evaluates programs, and provides leadership and management
support; Before forming Clearview Consulting, Pat was Executive Vice President of The
Paul J. Aicher Foundation where he served as deputy director of its flagship program,
Everyday Democracy "Deliberative Dialogue to Expand Civic Engagement: What Kind
of Talk Does Democracy Need?," NATIONALCIVIC REVIEW, vol. 91, no. 2, Summer
2002, http://ncdd.org/rc/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/McCoy-DD_Expand_CE.pdf)
8. Provide a way for people to see themselves as actors and to be actors. Our
dialogue
processes address this in two ways. First, whole-community organizing creates opportunities for people from
various neighborhoods, institutions, and agencies to work through problems, consider solutions, and share a variety of
conversation, so that the conversation is about all of us making a difference in the community. This
different actors (such as individuals, small groups, nonprofits, businesses, schools, and government) can take, they are
more likely to see that solutions to public problems can come in many and varied ways. They are also more likely to
see themselves as actors. When a public conversation ends with analy- sis of the issue and does not
progress to an intentional conversation about action steps, it reinforces the idea that the possibilities for addressing the
issue are entirely outside the room. The final session of a study circle gives participants a chance to follow this natural
progression, consider a range of possible actions, and decide which action steps they see as most important. Then they
present those action prior- ities at a large-group meeting (often referred to as an action forum) that gives all the small
groups a chance to pool their ideas and move forward on a range of actions. It is also important to keep the results of the
deliberative dialogue process in the public eye. This helps people see the value of their participa- tion.33 Some
communities have developed benchmarks for change to help par- ticipants and the larger community measure the
progress they are making. This recognition of change encourages sustained efforts and also inspires broader
participation. We have found that the marriage of community organizing to deliberative dialogue is essential for bringing
this principle to life. While it is possible for people in small-scale engagement processes to consider possible action steps, a
diverse, large-scale process opens up many more avenues for action that can address institutional, community-wide, and
policy dimensions of issues.34 9. Connect to government, policymaking, and governance. A common prac- tice in public
talk processes is to ask participants to report the results of their deliberation to elected officials. Yet if the process does not
include a way to establish trust and mutuality between citizens and government, it will fall short of helping them work
together more effectively. Some engagement processes include ways to capture themes and convey them to public officials.
Identify- ing areas of common ground among members of the public can be especially
Deliberative Dialogue to Expand Civic Engagement 127 useful
to legislators who are looking for ways to reframe adversarial public pol- icy debates. But the more effective input
processes go one step further: they involve the policymakers as participants on an equal basis in the dialogue. Democratic
conversation between citizens and government has always been central to the ideal (if not
practice) of democracy. A current-day example is Benjamin Barbers call for horizontal conversations among
citizens rather than the more usual vertical conversation typical of communication between citizens and elites.35
This
type of process
Chandler 7
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of Westminster "The Attraction of Post-Territorial
Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere" Inaugural Lecture May
available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural20lecture.pdf)
The practice of doing politics as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the opium
of the people - this
political
activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti- globalisation protests, the huge
march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of AlQaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are
through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me
that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that
political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the
existence of guns and other weapons? It
debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, healing the scar of Africa, the war on terror and the war against
climate insecurity. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that foreign policy is no longer foreign policy (Timothy
Garten Ash, Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for, 26 April 2007), this is certainly
true. 4 Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making,
no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office
where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more
resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear
in the UKs attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s an approach which openly claimed to have rejected
strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britains caring and sharing identity. Clearly, the projection of foreign
policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of
people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the value-based
interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blairs recent Foreign Affairs article, A Battle for Global Values, 86:1 (2007),
pp.7990). Governments
is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policymaking increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, there are no
metrics to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the
altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather
than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics the ethics of conviction to
the ethics of responsibility in his lecture on Politics as a Vocation. The
are
more concerned with our reflectivity the awareness of our own ethics and values
- than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which
theoretical frameworks they agreed with most and they replied mostly Critical theory and Constructivism despite the fact
that they thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical
preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals than about how theory might be
used to understand and engage with the world.
AT: Exclusive
The state is not innately exclusionary invoking nationhood can
vitalize and sustain civic engagement as well as relativize
internal differences.
Brubaker 4
Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation:
Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2,
www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf
In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, nation
can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the
rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (la France oux Francais, Deutschland
den Deutshchen). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally
inclusive way.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of
the nation, inclusively defined to include all citizensand perhaps all long-term
residentsof the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to
transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an
attempt to get people to think of themselves to formulate their identities and
their interestsas members of that nation, rather than as members of some other
collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is
not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United
States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of
nationhood. They are often seen as depasse, parochial, naive, regressive, or even
dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, nation is a suspect
category.
Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And
often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance,
xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign
policy. Unspeakable horrorsand a wide range of lesser evilshave been perpetrated in
the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ethnic nations, but in the name of
putatively civic nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for
the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally
wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of
imagined communities as wellin the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith.
In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our timethe sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put
it, nationalism is the starkest political shame of the 20th-century there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the
widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category nation was to economic, political, and
cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category,
and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4
The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The
empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages,
images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to cage (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic,
cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning
problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted
an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous
move beyond the nation-state. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe workedand were intended
to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at
the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The short twentieth
century concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale
nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood.
Can one speak of an unprecedented porosity of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects
especially with regard to the movement of peoplesocial technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of
control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated
technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The worlds poor who seek
to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 301,
267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to
the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today on balance slightly less intensive than those of the
later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they
managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clearcontrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest
that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to
regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domainssuch as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behaviorthe regulatory grip of
the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 4912).
The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from methodological nationalism (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002;
Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)the tendency to take the nation-state as equivalent to society, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the
expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be
overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks.
But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so
much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled as it often iswith the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it
serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for
better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power.
The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state,
should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics
celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations.
One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the
nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since
membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the
cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree
with this point. No matter how open and joinable a nation isa point to which I will return belowit is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed,
as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond
the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic
resources.9
The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-statethe multiculturalist critiqueitself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a
homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact
nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11).
But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to
cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties.
In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary
American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who
has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not
only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good
reasonsat least in the American contextfor cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who
defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad
I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They
can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive
social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the
development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy.
First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It
is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens,
and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument
shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies
allegedly need; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with
largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in
functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that
does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It
can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the
boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is
conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. Identification with fellow members of this
imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my
problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12
Patriotic identification with ones countrythe feeling that this is my country, and
my governmentcan help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than
disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of
responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them;
it may even generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie
and motivate opposition to government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to
intensify rather than attenuate such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, you
can feel shame over your countrys behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your
country.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate
and sustain civic engagement
The state remains one of the central and most persistent problems of
radical politics. Revolutions in the past have attempted to seize state power
with the view to its eventual withering away; however, the result has often been a
strengthening and expansion of the state, and with it a repression of the
very revolutionary forces that sought to control it. This is the problem that I
have termed the place of powerthe structural imperative of the state to
perpetuate itself even in moments of revolutionary upheaval (see Newman
2001). Alain Badiou also sees this problem as being of fundamental importance: More
precisely, we must ask the question that, without a doubt, constitutes the great enigma
of the century: why does the subsumption of politics, either through the form of the
immediate bond (the masses), or the mediate bond (the party) ultimately give rise to
bureaucratic submission and the cult of the State? (2005: 70) In other words, perhaps
there is something in the political forms that revolutions have taken in the past that led
to the perpetuation of the state. We might recall that this was the same problem that
classical anarchists during the nineteenth century confronted in their debates with
Marx. Anarchists like Mikhail Bakunin warned of the dangers of a workers revolution
that sought not to dismantle the state, but to seize control of it and use it to complete the
revolution. He predicted that this would end up in the emergence of a new
bureaucratic class of technocrats who would exploit and oppress workers
and peasants, much in the same way as the old class system did (Bakunin
1973: 266). Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the political and
ideological conflict between liberal-democracy and totalitarianism, has allowed us to
confront, for the first time, the specific problem of state power. In other words, liberaldemocracy and Communism merely served as the ideological masks of the
state. These fictions have now fallen away and the true face of sovereignty
has been laid bare. This dull visage is merely one of naked power: a power that no
longer tries to justify itself legally or normatively; a power that now operates
more or less with total impunity in the name of guaranteeing our securityor,
to be more, precise, creating a permanent state of insecurity in order to legitimize its
existence. Indeed, we might say that the war on terrorismwith its permanent state of
emergency and warmerely operates as the states latest and flimsiest ideological
fiction, a desperate attempt by the state to disguise its absence of legitimate foundation.
In its new security mode, the liberal-democratic state is becoming increasingly
indistinguishable from the authoritarian police state. As Giorgio Agamben argues, the
modern state now has the provision of securityor some illusion of securityas its sole
purpose. The guarantee of security has become, in other words, the ultimate
standard of the states political legitimacy.
Topic Specific
Steel et al, 5 (Brent S. Steela, , Court Smithb, Laura Opsommerc, Sara Curiela, Ryan
Warner-Steeld a Department of Political Science, Oregon State University b Department
of Anthropology, Oregon State University, c Master of Public Policy Program, Oregon
State University, Corvallis d Department of Biology, University of Oregon, 3/3/5, Ocean
and Coastal Management, Public ocean literacy in the United States,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569105000190)
Steel et al, 5 (Brent S. Steela, , Court Smithb, Laura Opsommerc, Sara Curiela, Ryan
Warner-Steeld a Department of Political Science, Oregon State University b Department
of Anthropology, Oregon State University, c Master of Public Policy Program, Oregon
State University, Corvallis d Department of Biology, University of Oregon, 3/3/5, Ocean
and Coastal Management, Public ocean literacy in the United States,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569105000190)
Greely, 8 (Teresa, University of South Florida, 2008, Ocean literacy and reasoning
about ocean issues: The influence of content, experience and morality,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=etd)
Ocean issues with conceptual ties to science and a global society have captured the attention, imagination, and concern
of an international audience. Global climate change, natural disasters, over fishing, marine pollution, freshwater
shortages, groundwater contamination, economic trade and commerce, marine mammal stranding, and decreased
biodiversity are just a few of the ocean issues highlighted in our media and conversations. The ocean shapes our weather,
links us to other nations, and is crucial to our national security. From the life-giving rain that nourishes crops and our
bodies, to life-saving medicines; from the fish that come from the ocean, to the goods that are transported on the seas
surface--- the ocean plays a role in our lives in some way everyday (NOAA, 1998). The American public values the ocean
and considers protecting it to be a fundamental responsibility, but its understanding of why we need the ocean is
superficial (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 1999). However, a broad disconnect exists between what scientist know and
the public understands about the ocean. The ocean, more than any other single ecosystem, has social and personal
relevance to all persons. In the 21st century we will look increasingly to the ocean to meet our everyday needs and
future sustainability. Thus, there
2005). Results from a series of ocean and coastal literacy surveys 2 (AAAS, 2004; Belden, et al., 1999; Steel, Smith,
Opsommer, Curiel & Warner-Steel, 2005) of American adults reveal similar findings. Surveys demonstrated that in the
1990s the public valued the ocean and expressed emotional and recreational connections, however, awareness about
ocean health was low. A decade later Americans had an increased sense of urgency about ocean issues and were willing to
support actions to protect the oceans even when the tradeoffs of higher prices at the supermarket, fewer recreational
choices, and increased government spending were presented (AAAS, 2004). While most Americans surveyed agree that
humans are impacting the health of the ocean more than one-third felt that they cannot make a difference. In contrast, a
survey of youth reveals strong feelings about environmental issues and the confidence that they can make a difference
(AZA, 2003). Collectively, these studies
the Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). The need for ocean education and
literacy that goes beyond emotive factors is critical and relevant towards preparing our students, teachers, and citizens to
regularly contribute to ocean decisions and socioscientific issues that impact their health and well being on Earth. The
biggest barriers to increasing commitment to ocean protection are Americans lack of awareness of the condition of the
oceans and of their own role in damaging the oceans, (Belden, et al., 1999). The challenge for ocean educators is to
explicitly state the connections between the ocean and daily decisions and actions of people. People enjoy the beauty of
the ocean and the bounty of its waters, but may not understand that their everyday actions such as boating, construction,
improper waste disposal, or ignoring protected areas, can impact the ocean and its resources. More than one-half of the
US population lives within 200 miles of the ocean. Long-term planning for growth, development and use of coastal areas
is key to the continued productivity of the ocean (NOAA, 1998). Because
Of equal concern is the fact that with oceans covering 70% of our planet and play- ing such a critical role in sustaining life,
somehow we have allowed our oceans to degrade to the point where it has
become a crisis. One of the reasons may be that very few people are oceanliterate and thus have no concern for the state of our oceansnot because they dont care but
because they dont know. In a recent national survey of the American public, results indicated a super- ficial level of
knowledge about the impor- tance of our oceans to human life and to our planets future.1 So what is the solution? The
solution is to improve awareness of our ocean, coasts and Great Lakes by developing
an ocean-literate societyaccomplished by simply educating all Americans about our oceans, from
school-aged children to se- nior citizens. This way they will under- stand its importance to our
existence on this planet and the urgency for action and become advocates for change. With over 200
recommendations put forth in the Ocean Commission (OC) report to Con- gress, a key item states, strengthening the
nations awareness of the importance of the oceans requires a heightened focus on the marine environment through both
formal and informal education efforts. Curricula for kindergarten through 12th grade should expose students to ocean issues throughout their formal education with the next generation of ocean scien- tists, managers, educators and leaders being prepared through diverse higher edu- cation opportunities... The report went on to say, the
public should
be armed not only with the knowledge and skills needed to make informed
choices, but also with a sense of excitement about the marine en- vironment. Individuals should understand the
importance of the ocean to their lives and should realize how individual actions affect the marine environment. The
Consortium for Oceanographic Research and Education (CORE), represent- ing 81 of the nations leading ocean research
and education universities, aquaria, non- profit institutes, laboratories, and industry partners, fully supports the
recommenda- tions in the OC report. The goals we sup- port in contributing to an ocean-literate America include: (1) to
invest in higher education (both under- graduate and graduate) in science and technology fields relevant to the oceans,
(2) to develop an ocean workforce and train individuals for productive ocean-related careers, (3) to build a solid
framework for goals 1 and 2 by integrating ocean studies into elementary and secondary school education programs, (4)
to establish a nationwide public outreach program and innovative education programs at museums, aquaria, science
centers and other informal education sites. But obtaining the goal of lifelong ocean education is not an undertaking that
can be accomplished by a single federal agency. It will require a coordinated federal effort ad- vocating for increased
federal funding for both formal and informal ocean education. Programs will need to be creative and en- gaging to spark
the interest of young peopleand what better way to teach sci- ence, math, physics, biology, economics, then by using the
ocean as the medium. Keeping ocean science in front of our talented youth is a challenge. However, we know that formal
education is one way to keep talented individuals who are well versed in science, mathematics and technology moving into
the nations workforce. Pro- grams such as the Centers for Ocean Sci- ence Education Excellence (COSEE), the National
Ocean Sciences Bowl (NOSB) and the outreach and education programs supported by the National Sea Grant Col lege
Program are good investments in the educational continuum. Graduate education
in ocean-related
fields also needs to flourish in the United States if the nation is to have the
expert sci- entists, teachers, and policy makers, now and in the future. Closely
intertwined with this high quality graduate education is ocean re- searchalso essential if we are
to make the right decisions on how to preserve and man- age our oceans and coasts. But again, gradu- ate education in the
ocean sciences cannot be the concern of a single agency because all agencies with an ocean-related mission must have a
well-educated workforce. Informal education, defined by the National Science Foundation (NSF) as a life-long learning
process where people ac- quire knowledge and values from daily ex- periences (usually voluntarily and driven by personal
interest), is also necessary to educate our society. We must provide the opportunities that will draw interest from our
society to learn about the oceans, the prerequisite for an ocean literate society. The OC report states it clearly by explaining while most people do not recognize the number of benefits the ocean provides, or its potential for further discovery,
many do feel a positive connection with it, sens- ing perhaps that the vitality of the sea is directly related to human
survival. This connection can be a powerful tool for in- creasing awareness of, interest in, and re- sponsible action toward
the marine envi- ronment, and is critical to building an ocean stewardship ethic, strengthening the nations science
literacy and creating a new generation of ocean leaders. There
is a lot of work to do to get Americans up to speed on their oceans. Its a chal- lenge we must meet or face the
dangerous consequences of being too late to preserve this vital resource. This nation must pro-
mote the goal of lifelong ocean education, both formal and informal. The OC report is a wake-up call!! It is also our
handbook on how to protect and preserve our seas. It