Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a
firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT
OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1,
it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor
and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to
govern its citizens." 8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is
not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is

"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
10
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For
all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the

expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is
not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot,
however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to
justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the
Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their
part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it
is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question

its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the
Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically
given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at
bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length
shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the
Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality,
the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment
ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban
on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed
with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
and protection of Filipino workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban,
say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would
obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case
of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would
be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state,
an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions

that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups,
the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women,
and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an
element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law
ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If
such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal
protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain
women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has
hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and
workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and
Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior
government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly
accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have
[sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR
SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be
allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are
returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served
employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new
employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these
guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the

welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right.
The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"
"as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the
Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
27
The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right
to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature,
but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not welltaken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns
the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just,
and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have
adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case,
the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the
lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an
indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to

the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise,
like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where
laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business
of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain
profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a
result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to
its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent.
We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to
warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.: **separate opinion by Fernando, J.

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect
known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop
provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the
following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with
a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that

unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee
to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In
its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections
24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial
conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present
employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action.3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law,
assigning the following errors:
I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff
the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union
contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a
labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting
affiliation with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious
sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form
or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its
collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the
Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are
relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those
religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article
Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain

religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8

Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision
that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the
laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law
has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely,
if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in
a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would
violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of
laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for
while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles
them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments
that the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for
the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic Act No.
3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do
away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not
violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the
right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow
his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the
compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the
obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms
of the closed shop agreement; 15that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion
clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members
from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the
constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over
union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate
the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the
Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to
the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act,
finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was
enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the

diversities of their religious beliefs." 18

I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to

premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in
all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved.
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis
may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must
negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19

1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the
members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions
from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350;
neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising,
therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending
that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association.
Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV
of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875
provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize
and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different
theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and
contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or
refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for
himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with
said organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes
the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and
the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right"
to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in

the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin
an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ
only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the
employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed
shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless
of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee
not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act
No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to
join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the
obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in

the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees
workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350
was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been
incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as
others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should
cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue
employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore,
introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause; the Company was
partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of
employing only Union members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore,
that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the
contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its
enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation
or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either
party is absolved by law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on
laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad
outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 25 For not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter
that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in
reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose
of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must,
therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate
instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It
follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are
obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract
rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating
relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor
contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27

In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the
obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus,
this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation
of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the
law having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power.29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations,
no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which
the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every
case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the
general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within
the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional
limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose
was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by
preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and
constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby
they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that
said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against
two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The
individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates
of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force
and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their
frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third
aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection the
collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory
Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of
his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor
organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is
tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right
under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish
to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor

organization. Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their
right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any manner
violating their religious faith and/or belief. 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that
purpose exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union
security agreements is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to
the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion,
enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not
unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in
the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It
is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional,
appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious
sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now
Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been
said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
37
But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result

would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order
to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a
living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the
state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the
relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution
where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members
of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is
the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining
agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by
eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of
closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion)
does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
44

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the
spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away
the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the
laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes.45 In
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain

religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor
organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor
unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and
the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and
protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is
determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and
remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples,
would hurt, rather than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious
objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a
fortiori to a labor union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through
coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political
right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its
members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from
a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic
Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a
positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted
ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector
need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union
he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may
have entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a
right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No.
3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never
an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it.49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory
legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue
advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935
Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the

application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54 This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The
Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop
security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions
cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit
membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings
and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and
different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations
and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied
forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad
spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which
beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the
country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist,
and these differences are important and should not be ignored.

Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and
important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in
the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes
a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its
distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness.
Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain
persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion,
or their not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments,
a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks
the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries.
Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable
and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of
differences in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution,
hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were
intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No.
3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of
the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor
unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their
work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions
existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for
a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions
to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between
an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their
religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said
agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from
its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects
cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only
restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken
away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by
their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees,
because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render
the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature
involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply
because in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that

whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the
public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the
law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond
those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the
welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it
looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor
unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In
determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary
that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a
religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for
it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union
having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper
economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join
labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor
unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is
concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose
religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply social equality,
because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal
or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal
equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on
personal or natural conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and
this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act
No. 3350 is not called for in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable.
Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that
reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the
courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation
in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being
chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of
the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant
that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and
thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on
the number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the
demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and

anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the
validity of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis
for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the
criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued
that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees
directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves
an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the
exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining
contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil
Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant
Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there
was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its
membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to
protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under
Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by
appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a
labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on
behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is
a party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a
contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the
trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of some
other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought
the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2
(j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the
term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It
being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to
dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The
mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in
furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its
favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair
labor practice case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the
lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield.

The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect
his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it
cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused
Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according
to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965,
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.
Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

X--------------------------------------------------------x

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No. 3350 is free
from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner wellnigh
conclusive in the learned, scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts
of the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering
moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and every objection raised as to its validity
and the clarity and persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in
authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last word has been written on this
particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to submit this brief expression of my
views on the transcendent character of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against
the claims of protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual possesses to worship
or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any sect, to act in accordance with its creed.
Thus is constitutionally safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The choice of what a
man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a domain left untouched, where
intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which the law is denied entry, whatever be his
thoughts or hopes. In that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he
pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of rational foundation. No

matter. There is no requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance. It

suffices that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's
freedom. That for him is one of the ways of self- realization. It would be to disregard the
dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive him of such an attribute. The "fixed
star on our constitutional constellation," to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice
Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in his power to prescribe what
shall be orthodox in matters of conscience or to mundane affairs, for that matter.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the language of its ponente,
Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only
by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in
the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5 There was this qualification though:
"But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch
of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the
one exercising it." 6 It was on that basis that the daily compulsory flag ceremony in
accordance with a statute 7 was found free from the constitutional objection on the part of
a religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members alleged that their participation
would be offensive to their religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 the American Supreme Court reached a contrary
conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent opinion is, for this writer, highly persuasive. Thus:
"The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but
because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the
Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even
contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to
exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.
When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is
not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order." 9
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of the primacy of
religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as against the command of the State
itself: "Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it
is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty
to the state exists within the domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to
laws regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power of the state, the
latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the
forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been
maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would

unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The

essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in dissent, it is true, but
with him in agreement were three of the foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal,
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as set forth earlier, is
wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a
message that cannot be misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase
Cardozo, a fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to
cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question is far from persuasive. It
is attended by futility. It is not for this Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to
restrict the scope of a preferred freedom.
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication
that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted,
constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility,
but upon closer analysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom
of association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe a
constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of
the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy
accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right implies at the very least that one can
determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor
organization, an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A
closed shop, on the other hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably
reflected in our decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations,
12
it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory provision then to further curtail
its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is in the mainstream
of constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the channel to follow.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),
DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN
ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN,
VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR
C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can
enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not
employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a

complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00,
and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the
meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94],
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated
October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred
case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In
the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R.
No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the
Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of
strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and
to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply
filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the
National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees
of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor
Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed
by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are
government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the
Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from
continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the strike are as
follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS
and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to
work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that
the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees,
including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly
confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it
provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall

not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically,
the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding
the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we
proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they
also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about
organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will
remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form
associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done because
the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act
875, workers, including those from the government-owned and controlled, are
allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we
approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee
on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the
government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces
will go on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that
is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the
right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of
the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the
Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:

.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to
be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment.
Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose
the obligation to strike or to join in strike:Provided, however, That this section
shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions and not those
employed in proprietary functions of the Government including but not limited
to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the
right of employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code to
organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for
purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980],
in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now
Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government
employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil
Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government
employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for
the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is
provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes
in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior
to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service."
The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating
the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the

SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes
the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government
employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace
Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442,
as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are
fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot
be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and
their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads
of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position
paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the
Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that
the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all
people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as
are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January 17,1985,134 SCRA
172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the

rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not
among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof,
except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between
duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement
of labor disputes in the public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and
cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved
after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures,
the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector LaborManagement] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided
under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being
prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The
Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276].
More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council
with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec.
16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the
SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law
authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since
it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute,
resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the
strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it
had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated
in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld
bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a
writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its
agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their
supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated
May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively
suspended and who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative
cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits
and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that
petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the
execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court
dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners'
"Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December
13,1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25003 October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with the NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO
DISTOR, BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO,
ERNESTO ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO, defendants-appellants.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case and condemning the
defendants (herein appellants) to pay plaintiff (herein appellee), the amount of

P10,152.42 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the commencement of this action
until fully paid, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFIManila against Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when its employees were prevented
from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon
Roces, a first lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the plaintiff is
separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete and
barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. This
entrance is separate and distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. 1
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which
it uses for its printing and publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to
feed its printing plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who are
representatives and members of the defendant union declared a strike against their
company.
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal justification, Permanent
Concrete Workers Union and its members picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's
truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The union members
intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who were in the truck.
On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited the general manager,
personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting
newsprint in their bodega. 2
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten its
employees with bodily harm and not to blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from
getting newsprint in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give in
to the demands of the plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the
defendant union prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega
rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega.
On December 14, 1964, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the defendants from:

(a) threatening and intimidating plaintiff's executive officers and their representatives,
who are going to its bodega as well as its employees who are getting newsprint from it;
(b) ordering the defendants and their representatives not to blockade and/or picket the
compound and the gate of the plaintiff;
(c) ordering the defendants not to stop, prohibit, molest and interfere with the free
passage of the plaintiff in going in and out of the bodega.
Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor practices and,
therefore, the Court of First Instance where this action was brought has no jurisdiction to
issue an injunction since this case fans within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations;
2. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name the present action may be
prosecuted in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On the first ground, defendants argued that the Court of Industrial Relations is vested
with the exclusive power to issue injunctions in labor disputes involving unfair labor
practices and that in the long line of decisions, the Supreme Court hat, repeatedly held
that ordinary do not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction in any labor dispute
particularly when the Court of Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over
it.
As to the second ground, defendants argue that the real party in interest in this case is the
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. against whom the defendants' strike and picket
activities were directed and confined, and they point to cases between the real parties in
interest, namely: Permanent Concrete products, Inc. on one hand and the Permanent
Concrete Workers Union on the other, pending before the Court of Industrial Relations
docketed therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge No. 1414-M.C.
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging that:
1. There is no employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant;
2. There is no labor dispute between them;
3. Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the compound of the company where
the defendant's are employed.
Defendants by way of reply to the abovementioned opposition argued that even if there
was no employer-employee relationship, still the Court of First Instance would have no
jurisdiction to issue an injunction, citing several cases holding that there could be a labor
dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in proximate relation of

employer and employee and that peaceful picketing is an extension of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, 3 a fundamental right granted to labor which
cannot be enjoined.
Since plaintiff averred in its complaint that "it is a second sublessee of a part of the
premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila from Don Ramon Roces, first lessee from the aforementioned company,
defendants contend that plaintiff has no cause of action against them but against Don
Ramon Roces under the provisions of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code which obliges
the lessor to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract.
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and
motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no
labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial
Relations may take cognizance.
On November 16, 1964, the court, on motion of the plaintiff, declared defendants in
default. Defendants prayed for the lifting of the order of default, which plaintiff opposed.
In the order of December 16, 1964, the court denied the motion to lift the order of default,
and subsequently defendants' motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the court rendered
its decision dated February 16, 1965 which declared permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount
of ?10,152.42 with interest thereon at legal rate from the commencement of the action
until fully paid, Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. Copy of this decision was
received by defendants on July 20, 1965 and forthwith, defendants filed the notice of
appeal on July 26, 1965.
On October 12,1965, Liwayway Publications, Inc. filed with the Supreme Court a
petition praying that a writ of attachment be issued on any sum of money which is owing
from the company to the union and to other defendants to be used to satisfy the judgment
in its favor should the same be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Defendants filed an opposition to the petition for attachment alleging that even assuming
that there is an amount owing to the union from the company, such would be in the
concept of uncollected wages due the strikers and, therefore, cannot be subject of
attachment as provided by Art. 1708 of the New Civil Code that the laborer's wages shall
not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter,
clothing and for medical attendance.
The Supreme Court denied the above petition for attachment but without prejudice to the
movant seeking remedy in the Court of First Instance.
The sole issue raised in the instant appeal is whether or not the lower court has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction considering that there was a labor
dispute between Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and appellants for alleged unfair

labor practices committed by the former.

The first question that strikes Us to be of determinative significance is whether or not this
case involves or has arisen out of a labor dispute. If it does, then with certainty, section 9
of Republic Act 875, the "Industrial Peace Act", would apply. If it does not, then the
Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because it
will not partake the nature of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction
to issue.
The record before Us reveals that appellant union and its members picketed the gate
leading to appellee's bodega. This gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the
premises of the employer of the appellants. Appellee is not in any way related to the
striking union except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a bodega in the company's
compound. The picketers belonging to the appellant union had stopped and prohibited the
truck of the appellee from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the
union members intimidating and threatening with bodily harm the employees of the
appellee who were in the truck. The union members also stopped and prohibited the
general manager, personnel manager including the man in-charge of the bodega and other
employees of the Liwayway Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The
business of the appellee is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag
Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or
connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company,
much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. In such a factual
situation, the query to be resolved is whether the appellee is a third party or an "innocent
bystander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the
regular courts.
At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on
the right to picket. Thus, in the case of Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU)
vs. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel et al., L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472, the
Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a
phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully
carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without
power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration
to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to
insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent. bystanders" if it appears
that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor
dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and

the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided
by this Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from
blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill
with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no
connection was found other than their being situated in the same premises. It is
to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally
banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a labor
union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor
dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main
entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by
third persons were located.
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for the court's regulation of
the right to picket in the following wise and manner:
Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent bystanders'. They are entitled to seek
protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally
extend the same. Moreover, PAFLU's right to peacefully picket METBANK is
not curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent judge. The picket is merely
regulated to protect the rights of third parties. And the reason for this is not farfetched. If the law fails to afford said protection, men will endeavor to safeguard
their rights by their own might, take the law in their own hands, and commit acts
which lead to breaches of the law. 'This should not be allowed to happen.
It may be conceded that the appellant Union has a labor dispute with the Permanent
Concrete Products company and that the dispute is pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations docket therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge No.
1414-M.C. Nonetheless, the rule laid down in the case of National Garment and Textile
Workers' Union (PAFLU) vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al. G.R. No. L-9104,
September 10, 1956, cited by the appellants as authority holding that "where the Court of
Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over two unfair labor practices cases
and much later on as a consequence thereof, the Court of First Instance cannot legally
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the picketers. Besides, the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations is exclusive. (Sec. 5-a, Republic Act 875)" is not
controlling, much less applicable to the instant case where the facts are essentially and
materially different.
Neither is the case of SMB Box factory Workers' Union vs. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, et
al. G.R. No. L-12820, Dec. 29, 1957, where We held that "the Court of First Instance
cannot take cognizance of an action for injunction where the issue involved is interwoven
with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of Industrial Relations," nor the rule
laid down in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees AssociationNATU, G.R. No. L-11907, June 24, 1958,104 Phil. 17, holding that "even if no unfair
labor practice suit has been filed at all by any of the parties in the Court of Industrial
Relations at the time the present petition for injunction was filed in the court below, still
the latter court would have no jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order prayed

for if it is shown to its satisfaction that the labor dispute arose out of unfair labor practices
committed by any of the parties. The parties would still have to institute the proper action
in the Court of Industrial Relations, and there ask for a temporary restraining order under
sec. 9 (d) of the Industrial peace Act. "
We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are controlling in the instant
case for as We said inPhil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et at. vs. Tan, 99
Phil. 854, that "with regard to activities that may be enjoined, in order to ascertain what
court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
controversy, " (emphasis supplied) We find and hold that there is no connection between
the appellee Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking Union, nor with the company
against whom the strikers staged the strike, and neither are the acts of the driver of the
appellee, its general manager, personnel manager, the man in-charge of the bodega and
other employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain newsprint therefrom to
feed and supply its publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between the
striking Union and the Permanent Concrete Products company. If there is a connection
between appellee publishing company and the Permanent Concrete Products company; it
is that both are situated in the same premises, which can hardly be considered as
interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations between
the strikers and their employer.
The contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action, is likewise without merit.
Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in support of their motion to
dismiss, which obliges the lessor, among others, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract, and therefore, the
appellee publishing company should have brought its complaint against the first sublessee, Don Ramon Roces, and not against the appellant Union is not in point. The acts
complained of against the striking union members are properly called mere acts of
trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that following the doctrine laid down in
Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562, the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere
fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the
estate leased but the lessee shag have a direct action against the trespasser. The instant
case fags squarely under the provisions of Article 1664 of the New Civil Code which
provides as follows:
Art. 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a
third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a
direct action against the intruder.
There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no right whatever.
The Goldstein doctrine had been reiterated in Reyes vs. Caltex (Phil). Inc., 84 Phil. 654;
Lo Ching, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 81 Phil. 601; Afesa vs. Ayala y Cia 89 Phil.
292; Vda. de Villaruel et al. vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., et al. 104 Phil. 926; Heirs of B.A.

Crumb, et al. vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 391.

The obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654, New Civil Code, to maintain the lessee in
the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract
arises only when acts, termed as legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho), disturb, dispute,
object to, or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's peaceful enjoyment of the
premises that in some manner or other cast doubt upon the right of the lessor by virtue of
which the lessor himself executed the lease, in which case the lessor is obliged to answer
for said act of trespass.
The difference between simple trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho and legal trespass
(perturbacion de derecho) is simply but - clearly stated in Goldstein vs. Roces case, supra,
thus:
Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything which
reveals a really juridic intention on the part of the trespasser, in such wise that
the lessee can only distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal form or
reasons, we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero hecho). (pp. 566567)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Annex A, Exhibit H-4.
2 Annex C, D, E, F, G and H.
3 Art. 3, Sec. 1, Paragraph 8 of the 1935 Constitution provides: "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people
to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."